Heirs of Sandejas Vs Alex Lina
Heirs of Sandejas Vs Alex Lina
Heirs of Sandejas Vs Alex Lina
Facts:
The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition, in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor
for the settlement of the estate of his wife, Remedios Sandejas, who died on April 17, 1955.
On July 1, 1981, Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro Sandejas,
Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas. Likewise on the same date, Eliodoro
Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as administrator.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were
the records of Branch XI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. As a result, he filed a Motion for
Reconstitution of the records of the case on February 9, 1983. On February 16, 1983, the lower court in
its Order granted the said motion.
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by
Movant Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and administrator Eliodoro P.
Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to
sell forever and absolutely and in their entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the
estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas.
It showed that there was receipt of money with promise to sell and to buy with the sum of P100,000.00
Issues:
a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey title to the property referred to in
the subject document which was found to be in the nature of a contract to sell where court approval was
not complied with?
b) Whether or not he was guilty of bad faith despite the conclusion of the CA that he [bore] the burden of
proving that a motion for authority to sell had been filed in court?
c) Whether or not undivided shares of Eliodoro in the subject property is (3/5) and the administrator of
the latter should execute deeds of conveyance within thirty days from receipt of the balance of the
purchase price from the respondent?
d)Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-intervention was converted to a money claim and whether
the [trial court] acting as a probate court could approve the sale and compel the petitioners to execute [a]
deed of conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr.?
Held:
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land,
despite the nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition -- court approval of the sale -- as contained in the
"Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy" (also referred to as the "Receipt"). Instead,
they assert that because this condition had not been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed
parcels of land was converted into a money claim.
The agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a suspensive condition -- the
procurement of a court approval, not full payment. There was no reservation of ownership in the
agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed
lots over to respondent. This they could do upon the court's approval, even before full payment. Hence,
their contract was a conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and
when the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, the intestate court's grant of the Motion for Approval of
the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners' obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed
lots in his favor. The condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties
were bound to fulfill what they had expressly agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose
of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other words, they can sell their
rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court
approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely
implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the court's permission. It would
seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over ordinary civil action
seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not
upon an intestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no one
else, to file an application for approval of a sale of the property under administration.
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to respondent;
hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to
file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the
disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased
spouses.
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for
the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in
entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval.
Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a) he informed respondent of the need to
secure court approval prior to the sale of the lots, and (2) he did not promise that he could obtain the
approval. However, Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent these lots to respondent as his own properties to
which he alone had a title in fee simple. The fact that he failed to obtain the approval of the conditional
sale did not automatically imply bad faith on his part. The CA held him in bad faith only for the purpose
of binding him to the conditional sale. This was unnecessary because his being bound to it is, as already
shown, beyond cavil.
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale should cover the one half (1/2)
pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal
heirs of the decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.
Petitioners' correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire
disputed property. It should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.
Ruling
The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires further explanation. Succession laws and
jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
decedent's entire estate - under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally,
with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.25 After the
settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal
heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that this preliminary determination of the decedent's
estate has already been taken into account by the parties, since the only issue raised in this case is whether
Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
WHEREFORE, The Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision and Resolution
are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to only a pro-indiviso share
equivalent to 11/20 of the disputed lots. SO ORDERED.