Media Discourse On Islam in The Western Balkans

The aim of this work is to provide an insight into the major drivers
Harun Karčić and Ivan Ejub Kostić
H. Karčić I I. E. Kostić
and platforms of such rhetoric in two Western Balkan countries – Bo-
snia and Herzegovina and Serbia. This work employs the critical dis-
course analysis method to study the pervasive representation of
Islam and Muslims in a number of leading Bosnian Serb and Croat
owned newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in a num-
ber of high-circulation newspapers and tabloids in Serbia published
over the course of one year (August 2018-August 2019). MEDIA DISCOURSE
Following the collocation and concordance of the most frequent ON ISLAM IN THE
MEDIA DISCOURSE ON ISLAM IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

terms and words that revolve around the representation of Islam and
Muslims, the findings indicated that in an overwhelming number of WESTERN BALKANS
cases, Islam and Muslims are associated with violence, religious radi-
calism, ethnic nationalisms and political obstructionism.
Harun Karčić is a PhD degree holder from the Faculty

of Law, University of Sarajevo and a journalist and po-
litical analyst based in Sarajevo. He is a news producer
at Al Jazeera Balkans. He specializes in post-commu-
nist Islam in the Balkans and has published extensive-
ly on Islam and foreign influences in the Balkans with particular focus
on Arab, Turkish and Iranian activities.
Ivan Ejub Kostić is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of

Political Sciences, University of Belgrade. He is one
of the founders of the Balkan Centre for the Midd-
le East and its Executive Director. He is the author
of numerous scientific papers in the field of Islamic
studies and a frequent commentator for the leading media in the
country and region on the topic of the Islam in the Balkans, religion
and nationalism, Islamophobia and Middle East.
ISBN 978-9926-471-37-8
Media Discourse on Islam
in the Western Balkans
Media Discourse on Islam in the Western Balkans
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Media discourse on islam in the Western Balkans / Harun Karčić and Ivan Ejub Kostić. - Sarajevo : Centar
za napredne studije, CNS, 2020. - 96 str. ; 21 cm
Bibliografija: str. 95-96 ; bibliografske i druge bilješke uz tekst.
ISBN 978-9926-471-37-8
1. Kostić, Ivan Ejub
COBISS.BH-ID 41588742
Media Discourse on Islam

in the Western Balkans
Sarajevo, 2020
Content
Foreword.................................................................................................................. 7
Constructing the Internal Enemy:

A Discourse Analysis of the Representation of
Islam and Muslims in Bosnian Media........................................................... 9
Introduction......................................................................................................9
A note on the perception of Balkan Muslims................................... 12
Design and method..................................................................................... 15
Analysis and discussion............................................................................ 19
The notion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as
a hotbed of Muslim extremism.............................................................. 31
Muslim migrants as a threat to Christian Europe.......................... 38
Conclusion....................................................................................................... 55
Attitudes toward Bosniak Muslims and Kosovar

Albanians and historical revisionism in the Serbian media:
Reaffirming the Greater Serbia project.....................................................57
Introduction .................................................................................................. 57
I. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the (Re)Affirmation of the
Expansionist Politics of Serbian Nationalism.................................. 58
II. “Kosovo is the Heart of Serbia” ........................................................ 75
III. Memory Politics and Crimes Committed in the 1990s in
B&H and Kosovo........................................................................................... 87
Conclusion....................................................................................................... 93
References..............................................................................................................95
Foreword
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, there has been a spike in
both the scholarly study of Islam as well as in the study of Mu-
slims around the globe, with perhaps an over-emphasis on Arab
Muslims living in the Middle East. At the same time, considera-
ble scholarly attention has been paid to the negative media por-
trayals of Muslim populations living as minorities in Europe and
the United States – where researchers have concluded that re-
presentations of Muslims in Western media are often associated
with violence and conflict. Such Western representations of
Islam and Muslims centered on notions of conflict and violence
have established Islam as a perceived material threat to establi-
shed ‘Western values’ and what is commonly referred to as the
‘Judeo-Christian heritage’.
However, though due attention has been paid to the repre-
sentation of and discourse revolving around Muslims living in
the West, there has been a lacuna in the study of Muslims living
in the Balkans and how they are represented in media. This is a
major gap in the study of Muslims living in a region where Islam-
ophobic rhetoric peaked in the 1990s and played an instrumen-
tal role in justifying large-scale massacres of thousands of Bos-
niak Muslims and Kosovar Albanians that in the end resulted in
7
H. Karčić and I. E. Kostić / Media Discourse on Islam in the Western Balkans
the first genocide committed on the European soil after World

War II. Such dangerous rhetoric is, however, once again being
utilized by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalist journal-
ists and politicians, as well as by the same circles in neighboring
Serbia and Croatia, to justify political instability and secession-
ist motives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The aim of this work is to provide an insight into the major
drivers and platforms of such rhetoric in two Western Balkan
countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. This work em-
ploys the critical discourse analysis method to study the perva-
sive representation of Islam and Muslims in a number of leading
Bosnian Serb and Croat owned newspapers in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina as well as in a number of high-circulation newspapers
and tabloids in Serbia published over the course of one year
(August 2018-August 2019). Following the collocation and con-
cordance of the most frequent terms and words that revolve
around the representation of Islam and Muslims, the findings
indicated that in an overwhelming number of cases, Islam and
Muslims are associated with violence, religious radicalism, eth-
nic nationalisms and political obstructionism.
We would like to thank the International Institute of Islamic
Thought and the Center for Advanced Studies for supporting
this project.

Authors
8
Constructing the Internal Enemy:
A Discourse Analysis of the Representation
of Islam and Muslims in Bosnian Media
Harun Karčić
Introduction
The media is a major source of information for the average per-

son. It has undeniable power to shape not only the public’s opi-
nion but its system of values, beliefs, identities and social relati-
ons. Moreover, the media has strong influence on viewers due to
its ability to organize and present information through framing:
the organization of information into stories specifically tailored
for the audience to comprehend. The discourse that it creates is
one of the main sources of people’s knowledge. According to the
renowned French philosopher Michel Foucault, those who pro-
duce a discourse have the power to produce a “regime of truth”
and to enforce its validity and factual status.1
1 Eva Połońska-Kimunguyi and Marie Gillespie, “Terrorism Discourse on French

International Broadcasting: France 24 and the Case of Charlie Hebdo Attacks in
Paris”, European Journal of Communication 31, no. 5, October 2016, pp. 568–83.
9
Muslims and Islam have been a major point of interest for the
media in recent decades. Several empirical studies strongly sup-
port the notion that Muslims are a highly stigmatized and nega-
tively associated category in Western media.2 The association of
Muslims with terrorism, violence and cultural otherness gained
prominence and intensity in the years following the September
11 attacks and shows little sign of abating. According to a recent
Pew Research Center study, between 8% and 26% of respondents
polled in 15 West European countries felt that Islamic teachings
promoted violence and between 23% and 41% agreed with the
statement that “Muslims want to impose their religious law on
everyone else.”3 Given the role played by media in shaping public
opinion, the negative representation of Islam and Muslims fur-
ther entrenches already existing stereotypes and plays a decisive
role in how Muslims and Islam are perceived.
Despite Muslim voices becoming increasingly vocal in the
W est and awareness of Islamophobia growing, the climate of
fear over Muslims and Islam as a religion has persisted and ex-
panded, alongside the rise of right-wing populist leaders in ma-
jor democracies such as the United States and European Union.
While some media are blatantly Islamophobic, others are more
subtle and their framing of Islam and Muslims implicit and am-
bivalent. Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representa-
tion of Islam in the British Press offers a meticulous study of one
example of the discourse on Islam and Muslims in Europe.4
There have also been numerous reports and studies on other
2 “UK media’s portrayal of Muslims ‘misleading and negative’: study“, Al Jazeera En-
glish, July 9, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/uk-media-por-
trayal-muslims-misleading-negative-study-19070810455053 9.html, (accessed
14 September 2019).
3 E. Bleich, J. Souffrant, E. Stabler, and A. M. Van der Veen, “Media Coverage of Mu-
slim Devotion: A Four-Country Analysis of Newspaper Articles, 1996–2016“,
Religions, 2018, 9, 247.
4 P. Baker, C. Gabrielatos, and T. McEnery, Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes:
The Representation of Islam in the British Press (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2013).
10
Constructing the Internal Enemy
major European countries with sizeable Muslim populations,

such as Germany, France and Austria.5
Even as Muslims in Western Europe have received signifi-
cant academic and media attention, the Balkan Muslims remain
understudied. Home to Muslims since the late 14th century, the
region was more recently an arena in which Serb and Croat na-
tionalists applied genocidal and irredentist policies to their
Muslim neighbours and their territory. The 1992-1995 and
1998-1999 wars against the Bosniak Muslims and Kosovar Al-
banians led to Western media giving these persecuted popula-
tions unprecedented attention. Once the wars had ended, a lull
ensued in journalistic interest in the region that lasted until the
beginning of the Syrian war, when a disproportionate amount of
media attention was again devoted to the relatively small num-
ber of Balkan Muslim volunteers fighting alongside different
armed factions in Syria and Iraq.
So, how are Muslims depicted by their compatriots today
and to what extent are ongoing political antagonisms reflected
in the media? How are the images of Muslims and Islam con-
structed in the discourse of Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat
newspapers? This remains a deeply understudied field.
This lacuna will be addressed in the following work. It will
be done by scrutinizing the representation of and dominant dis-
course patterns regarding Islam and Muslims in Bosnian Croat
and Bosnian Serb newspapers in order to find out how these
and other ethno-nationalist references to Muslims are con-
structed vis-à-vis the context in which they are used. An analysis
of major discursive patterns regarding Islam and Muslims in
Bosniak Muslim-owned newspapers will also be provided, for a
more holistic picture.
5 “The One Percent Problem: Muslims in the West and the Rise of the New Populi-
sts,” Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/product/muslims-in-the-west/ (ac-
cessed 14 September 2019).
11
A note on the perception

of Balkan Muslims
In contrast to Muslim migrant communities in Western Europe

established in the mid-20th century, Balkan Muslims have been
living with Catholic and Orthodox Christians for centuries. The
Balkans are, therefore, currently experiencing a peculiar brand
of Islamophobia deeply rooted in anti-Ottoman animosity, whe-
reby Muslims are perceived as an alien element that has taken
root in the region.
Analysing public discourse on Islam and Muslims requires a
slightly different approach in the Balkans than in the West. This is
because of the region’s indigenous Muslim populations (Bosniaks,
Albanians and Pomaks), which began to convert to Islam with the
gradual Ottoman conquest of the peninsula, from the late 14th cen-
tury onwards. They played an important and integral part in the Ot-
toman Empire, contributing to the running of its complex adminis-
tration and military machinery. Insofar as these conversions to Is-
lam began with the Ottoman conquest, however, the local popula-
tions that became Muslim came to be associated with the religion of
the occupying Ottoman forces - the “Turks” as they were more com-
monly known.6 Being labelled a “Turk” has a derogatory connota-
tion in Slavic languages, even compared to the use of the same word
in English. A sinister prevalent association (in the popular imagina-
tion of the Balkan Christians) is of Slavic-Muslims not just as “Turks”
but as “race traitors” who converted to Islam and abandoned Christ
for personal gain and elevated social status.7 These perceptions of
6 Slobodan Drakulic, “Anti-Turkish obsession and the exodus of Balkan Mus-

lims“, Patterns of Prejudice, 43:3-4, pp. 233-249.
7 David Bruce MacDonald, Balkan Holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian Victim Cen-
tred Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia (Manchester and New York: Man-
chester University Press, 2002), p. 232.
12
Slavic Muslims as “traitors” were a central theme in the creation of

nation states and the development of nationalism.8
A particularly striking example for the development of Bal-
kan nationalism was the 1389 Battle of Kosovo as presented in
Serbian historiography, as the ultimate sacrifice by Serb warriors
defending their nation and faith against the “Turkish oppressor.”
Over the centuries, the battle’s significance far outgrew its origi-
nal dimensions and was supplemented by mythology and legend.
The myth of Serbia as the bulwark of Christianity (antemurale
Christianitas) was constructed about this famous battle.9
As the Ottoman state weakened and the formation of Balkan
nation states began in the 19th and early 20th century, numerous
wars of independence were fought to establish those independ-
ent states and expel the Ottomans. These wars were described
and presented to those involved and to sympathizers as struggles
against the Turkish occupiers – a legitimate endeavour in the eyes
of many. These “wars of liberation” as they were locally known
were followed by brutal reductions in the Muslim populations,
through killings and forced deportations. The boundaries be-
tween Ottoman combatants and Slavic Muslim non-combatants
became so blurred that the categories were often equated.
For the Balkan Christian nationalist mind-set, liberation was
to be followed by the physical destruction of Ottoman Islamic her-
itage. Within decades, Balkan Muslims went from being the dom-
inant educated elite to an undesired and marginalized religious
minority living in Christian majority states. In other words, after
8 Alexander Lopasic, “Islamization of the Balkans with special reference to Bos-

nia“, Journal of Islamic Studies, (5) No. 2 (1994), pp. 163-86. http://www.jstor.
org/stable/26195614.
9 Jason A. Edwards, “Bringing in Earthly Redemption: Slobodan Milosevic and the
National Myth of Kosovo.” Advances in the History of Rhetoric, 18, sup 1, pp. 187-
204, 2015. See also Zdenko Zlatar, “From Medieval to Modern: The Myth of Ko-
sovo, “The Turks,” and Montenegro (A Lacanian Interpretation)” In: J. C. Frakes
(ed.), Contextualizing the Muslim Other in Medieval Christian Discourse. The New
Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
13
the retreat of the Ottoman Empire, the remaining Balkan Muslims

bore the brunt of anti-Ottoman hatred and centuries of perceived
Ottoman injustice and oppression.
The myth of the Battle of Kosovo today serves as the basis of
Serb anti-Muslim nationalism and is often translated into an-
ti-Bosniak and anti-Albanian sentiment that views these two
groups as physical remnants of the Ottoman Empire. While the
Albanian Muslims are a separate ethnic group with their own cul-
ture and language, the Bosniak Muslims are considered by Serb
nationalists to be “traitors” who accepted the religion of the occu-
pying Ottoman empire. They are thus guilty of race betrayal and
so detested even more. So strong is this sentiment regarding the
Ottoman/Turkish occupation that, when Serb General Ratko
Mladić and his forces overran Srebrenica in July 1995, he publicly
declared “Here we are in Srebrenica on July 11, 1995. On the eve
of yet another great Serb holiday. We present this city to the Ser-
bian people as a gift. Finally, the time has come to take revenge on
the Turks.” The ensuing industrial-scale killings of Bosniak Mus-
lims have been characterized as genocide by the UN-established
court in The Hague.
The genocide against the Bosniak Muslims offers a textbook
example of how hatred towards the Ottoman Empire and the un-
derstanding of Slavic Muslims as race traitors translated into the
slaughter and annihilation of the Empire’s perceived remnants
in the Balkans – its Muslim populations. In other words, in Ser-
bian public discourse, being Muslim is more or less synonymous
with being a Turk. The extermination of Bosniak Muslims and
Kosovar Albanians accordingly becomes a morality tale, aveng-
ing centuries of perceived Ottoman oppression and injustice.
14
Design and method
Mass media has the exclusive power to present information in a

way that shapes people’s perceptions of reality and their inter-
pretation of events. It can influence their beliefs, social relations
and personal identities. It does so by presenting information
through framing, understood as the organization of information
through a particular lens or frame so that the audience is better
able to comprehend events taking place.10 Media outlets and
their journalists select what information is to be included and to
what degree and what is to be omitted in the coverage of a parti-
cular story. Once this frame becomes established, it represents,
in the words of Stephen D. Reese, the “organizing principles that
are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symboli-
cally to meaningfully structure the social world”.11
Media outlets and journalists are the primary definers of
what is important and what is correct in the coverage of news.12
Hence, media outlets establish the initial interpretation and
frame for viewing a given topic or event. As Kimberly A. Powell
notes, certain aspects of the reporter-perceived reality may be-
come more salient than others and when these more salient ele-
ments become dominant, a frame is then created which impacts
other journalists, who frame the same story identically, making
it the dominant lens through which to view a given story.13 The
audience and wider public adopt the hegemonic frame and
identify and render moral judgement on repeated or similar
10 K. A. Powell, “Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage

of Terrorism from 2011–2016”, Religions, 2018, 9, p. 257.
11 Stephen D. Reese, “Framing public life: A bridging model for media research”
in Framing Public Life. Edited by Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy Jr. and Au-
gust E. Grand (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2001), pp. 7-31.
12 Amir Saeed, “Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam
and Muslims in the Media”, Sociology Compass ½, 2007, p. 449.
13 Powell, K. A. Powell, “Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media
Coverage of Terrorism from 2011–2016”, p. 3.
15
future events through this established frame. When the audienc-

es applying the framework have little or no real social contact
with the target group, in this case Muslims, then the role of the
media as sole provider of information and interpreter of events
becomes crucial. Pervasive exposure to the same words, phrases
and terms causes viewers unwittingly to adopt the opinions
they in the media.
In post-communist and post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bosniak Muslims, Croats and Serbs all live largely in ethnically
homogenous regions and enclaves, reading newspapers and
watching TV channels owned by members of their respective
ethnic groups. This exacerbates the cleavage. The only excep-
tions are such larger towns as Sarajevo, Brčko and Tuzla where
some semblance of the much talked-about Yugoslav-era mul-
ti-ethnic coexistence still exists.
The media’s substantively linguistic and discursive nature
means careful analysis of its deployment of linguistic tools is re-
quired in examining the representation of events. The present
chapter applies Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to the rep-
resentation of Islam and Muslims in Bosnian media. Norman
Fairclough discusses the term CDA in his book Language and
Power.14 He introduces concepts central to CDA, including “dis-
course, power, ideology, social practice and common sense”. Dis-
course analysis plays a key role in showing how social phenom-
ena are discursively constituted by demonstrating how things
come to be as they are. According to Fairclough, discourse anal-
ysis follows a three-dimensional model: (i) textual; (ii) inter-tex-
tual; and (iii) contextual. The first focuses on the linguistic fea-
tures and aspects of the text and examines the elements that are
being placed in the discourse and how subjects are distinguished
from each other, mostly in the form of binary opposition. The
second analyses how authors of texts relate to already existing
14 Norman Fairclough, Language and power (London: Longman, 1989).
16
discourses to create their texts, while the third puts text into
context and examines links between language and social prac-
tice.15 While the CDA approach can deploy a range of different
techniques, the focus generally lies on the analysis of words and
their textual context, including some not explicitly related to
Muslims but often raised and discussed alongside any reference
to Islam and Muslims. The analysis begins by presenting contin-
uous topic categories that are then further exemplified using
short quotes or headlines from articles within each category.
Newspapers are some of the oldest forms of political commu-
nication in the world and still retain significant influence, even
with the emergence of the internet and social media as fora for
mass communication. Research has shown that “even short expo-
sure to a daily newspaper appears to influence voting behaviour
and may affect turnout.”16 In other words, newspapers are still
vital in shaping mass political orientation. Teon A. van Dijk argues
in “Opinions and Ideologies in the Press” that the ideologies and
opinions presented in newspapers are not personal and, even
when they represent the author’s opinions and beliefs, they are in
fact representing the views of the media outlet and are framed by
their social, political and institutional context.17
Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided into two highly autono-
mous political, security and administrative units – the predomi-
nantly Serb-populated Republika Srpska and the overwhelming-
ly Bosniak-Croat Federation of BiH – so we have selected high-cir-
culation newspapers from both entities. The selection from the
Republika Srpska is Glas Srpske, a major newspaper with a high
15 Połońska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie, “Terrorism Discourse on French Interna-

tional Broadcasting: France 24 and the Case of Charlie Hebdo Attacks in Paris”.
16 Alan S. Gerber, Dean Karlan, and Daniel Bergan, ”Does the Media Matter? A
Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and
Political Opinions.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1 (2),
2009, 35-52:47.
17 T. A. Dijk, ”Opinions and ideologies in the press”, in A. Bell & P. Garrett (eds.), Ap-
proaches to media discourse (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 21–63.
17
circulation.18 It is owned and read by Bosnian Serbs in the Re-

publika Srpska, but also by Serb minorities living in the Federa-
tion and in Brčko District. The other major newspaper in the
Republika Srpska is Nezavisne novine, which is, moreover, owned
by the same company as Glas Srpske, so that its editorial policy
hardly differs. As a result, only Glas Srpske was used in this study.
The Bosnian Croat-owned Dnevni list and the Bosnian edition of
Večernji list, a paper from neighbouring Croatia, are among the
highest circulation dailies owned and read by Bosnian Croats
living in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.19 Finally, two
newspapers owned and read predominantly by Bosniak Mus-
lims living in the Federation, Dnevni Avaz and the somewhat
more liberal and civic-oriented Oslobođenje, were also selected.
In analysing political culture, we study newspaper articles
and the discourse they create to understand how the arguments
they contain legitimize or delegitimize a particular political be-
haviour. The newspapers selected here are among the most in-
fluential newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rationale
behind choosing mainstream newspapers instead of yellow
press is that the former are expected to be generally more nu-
anced and balanced in their reporting on Islam and Muslims
than the latter. This research aims to find out whether more sub-
tle patterns of reporting do actually exist in Bosnia’s mainstream
newspapers.
The study focuses on the period spanning August 1, 2018,
to August 31, 2019. During the period, a total of 1,975 issues
were produced by the above-mentioned five newspapers. As
this represented an overwhelming amount of information, three
filters were applied. First, we selected all newspaper articles
18 B. Vukojevic, and B. Vukojevic. Dnevne novine u Republici Srpskoj. [online] Evrops-

ka opservatorija za novinarstvo - EJO. Available at: https://rs.ejo-online.eu/novi-
narstvo/dnevne-novine-u-republici-srpskoj (accessed 16 September 2019).
19 “Dnevne Novine u BiH 2019”, Vzs.Ba. https://www.vzs.ba/index.php/vije-
ce-za-stampu/printani-mediji-u-bih/200-dnevne-novine-u-bih.
18
featuring the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian words for “Islam,”

“Muslim,” “Bosniak,” “Bosnian Muslims” or “migrant” and “refu-
gee,” terms used by journalists to refer to Muslim refugees arriv-
ing in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to avoid direct use of the
religious label. All the articles containing these keywords were
then reviewed again and those relating to Bosnia and Herzego-
vina were singled out. This was done to exclude the many arti-
cles covering news from the Middle East, United States, Europe,
Africa and Asia. In the third phase of the study, 30 articles were
selected randomly from each newspaper for the one-year time
span and their content was analysed. This selection represented
an average of 2.5 articles per month for the period. Cumulative-
ly, 150 articles from the newspapers, including editorials, inter-
views, features, and news reports, were analysed.
Analysis and discussion
Articles published in the newspapers chosen ranged from

harsh political rhetoric exchanged between Bosniak, Serb
and Croat media to the distastefully discriminatory, including
both more subtle and overtly anti-Muslim invective. Careful
analysis of the articles selected from the five newspapers re-
vealed three major themes regarding Islam and Muslims: Bo-
sniak Muslims as political troublemakers; Bosnian Muslims as
religious extremists; and Europe as a Christian continent and
Muslim migrants as a problem. Within each of these major the-
mes, there were further salient features, common trends and
patterns which are analysed below.
19
I. The narrative of Bosniak Muslims as political trouble-

makers and Bosnia as an unstable country
Selected headlines from Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb newspapers
Večernji list Dnevni list Glas Srpske
“Croatian People’s
“Vital national interest – Assembly: Bosnia entering “Bosniaks aim for Serb
Bosniaks play card 13 new turmoil as key posts in Council of
times, Croats only twice.”20 political posts all held by Ministers.”22
Bosniaks.”21
“Bosniaks want to take

everything away from “Karamatić: Bosnia’s end “Scandalous: Bosniaks
Croats: their church, their is nearing; Bosniaks will want Harvard University
history and their right to be begging for a statelet.”24 to fire Professor Israel.”25
life in Bosnia.”23
20 “Nacionalni interes - Bošnjaci ‘povlačili’ 13, a Hrvati samo dva puta“, Večernji list,
July 14, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/nacionalni-interes-bosnjaci- pov-
la-cili-13-a-hrvati-samo-dva-puta-1325932 (accessed 14 September 2019).
21 “HNS: BiH Ulazi U Novu Krizi Jer Sve Ključne Pozicije Drže Bošnjaci”, Dnevni
list, August 1, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/hns-bih-ulazi-u-novu-kri-
zi-jer-sve-kljucne-pozicije-drze-bosnjaci (accessed 14 September 2019).
22 Ž� .D. “Bošnjaci naciljali srpska mjesta u Savjetu ministara“, Glas Srpske, March 20,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Bosnjaci-nacilja-
li-srpska-mjesta-u-Savjetu-ministara/280887 (accessed 14 September 2019).
23 Ivo Š� imunović, “Bošnjaci žele uzeti sve od Hrvata: crkvu, povijest i pravo na
život u Bosni” Večernji list, June 12, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/
bosnjaci-zele-uzeti-sve-od-hrvata-crkvu-povijest-i-pravo-na-zivot-u-bos-
ni-1325641 (accessed 14 September 2019).
24 “KARAMATIĆ� : Bošnjaci Pričom o NATO-U Sprječavaju Dogovor U BiH”, Dnevni
list, August 27, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/karamatic-bosnjaci- pri-
com-o-nato-u-sprjecavaju-dogovor-u-bih (accessed 14 September 2019).
25 Darko Momić, “Skandalozan zahtjev: Bošnjaci traže da se Harvard odrekne Iz-
raela“, Glas Srpske, April 16, 2019. http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/
vijesti_dana/SKANDALOZAN-ZAHTJEV-Bosnjaci-traze-da-se-Harvard-odre-
kne-Izraela/282508.
20
“The political will is there, “Croatian People’s

“NATO understands what
but Bosniaks are blocking Assembly: Political
military neutrality means,
the formation of a Sarajevo is nervous and
but Bosniaks do not.”27
government.”26 hysterical.”
“Croats put talk of their
“Bosniaks once again
own entity on ice, “Coalition partners at
celebrate Turkish
Bosniaks should stop ‘war’.”29
occupation.”30
trying to dominate.”28
“The West has the most
“He returned from Austria “Orić’s friend calls for
influence in Bosnia and
to sow chaos among Bosniaks to take up
Herzegovina but doesn’t
Croats and Bosniaks.”32 arms.”33
know what to do with it.” 31
26 “Postoji spremnost za formiranje vlasti, ali Bošnjaci opstruiraju”, Vecernji list, May
11, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/nepostivanje-izvorne-volje-naroda-
govori-da-netko-zeli-majorizaciju-u-bih-1318647
27 V.K., “NATO razumije politiku neutralnosti, ali Bošnjaci ne”, Glas Srpske, June
11, 2019. http://www.glassrpske.com/cir/novosti/vijesti_dana/NATO-razu-
mije-politiku-neutralnosti-ali-Bosnjaci-ne/286085 (accessed 14 September
2019).
28 Zoran Krešić, “Hrvati ‘zamrznuli’ entitet, Bošnjaci bi se trebali odreći domi-
nacije“, Večernji list, April 13, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/hrva-
ti-zamrznuli-entitet-bosnjaci-bi-se-trebali-odreci-dominacije-1312948 (ac-
29 “‘Zaratili’ koalicioni partneri”, Dnevni list, July 29, 2019. https://www.dnevni-
list.ba/zaratili-koalicioni-partneri/.
30 Darko Momić, “Bošnjaci ponovo slavili tursku okupaciju“, Glas Srpske, March 20,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Bosnjaci-po-no-
vo-slavili-tursku-okupaciju/280852 (accessed 14 September 2019).
31 Maja Ereš, “Zapad, koji je najutjecajniji u BiH, ne zna što bi s njom“, Večernji list,
March 11, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/zapad-koji-je-najutjecajniji-
u-bih-ne-zna-sto-bi-s-njom-1305870 (accessed 14 September 2019).
32 “Vratio se iz Austrije da izazove mržnju među Hrvatima i Bošnjacima“, Dnevni
list, August 9, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/vratio-se-iz-austrije-da-iza-
zove-mrznju-medu-hrvatima-i-bosnjacima/.
33 “Orićev prijatelj poziva Bošnjake da se naoružaju“, Glas Srpske, April 21, 2019.
http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Oricev-prijatelj-pozi-
va-Bosnjake-da-se-naoruzaju/282887 (accessed 14 September 2019).
21
“Cvijanović: Political
“Bosniaks want to elect
Sarajevo is blocking
Serb representatives in the “Krajišnik: Muslims
everything in Bosnia and
Herzegovina-Neretva committed atrocities
Herzegovina, but the Serb
canton.”34 against themselves.”35
Republic is functional.”36
“Why it is dangerous and “Dramatic warnings from
“Banning the Pride parade
harmful for Bosniaks to the few remaining Serbs:
would be shameful and
elect the Croat member of The Federation will soon be
proof that Sarajevo does not
the Presidency for the third home only to Bosniaks and
want European values.”38
time.”37 Croats.”39
“Display of pathological
“Karamatić: Bosniaks are
hatred; Sarajevo is trying
using all the NATO talk to “Bosniaks are celebrating
to silence Zagreb in
prevent the formation of a non-existent holiday.”42
advocating for Croat
government.”41
equality in Bosnia.”40
34 Marko Karačić, “Bošnjaci žele izabrati predstavnike Srba u HNŽ� -u”, Večernji
list, February 15, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/bosnjaci-zele-izabra-
ti-predstavnike-srba-u-hnz-u-1301001 (accessed 14 September 2019).
35 “Krajišnik: Muslimani činili zločine protiv svog naroda”, Dnevni list, April 26, 2018.
https://www.dnevni-list.ba/krajisnik-muslimani-cinili-zlocine-protiv-svog -nar-
oda/ (accessed 18 December 2019).
36 “Cvijanović: Političko Sarajevo sve blokira u BIH, ali Srpska funkcioniše”, Glas
Srpske, July 30, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/
cvijanovic-politicko-sarajevo-sve-blokira-u-bih-ali-srpska-funkcion-
ise/289552 (accessed 14 September 2019).
37 “Zašto je opasno i štetno da Bošnjaci u BiH i treći put biraju hrvatskog pred-
stavnika“, Večernji list, September 17, 2018. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/
zasto-je-opasno-i-stetno-da-bosnjaci-u-bih-i-treci-put-biraju-hrvatskog-
predstavnika-1270271 (accessed 14 September 2019).
38 “Zabrana parade ponosa bi bila neviđena sramota i dokaz da Sarajevo ne želi
europske vrijednosti!”, Dnevni list, August 26, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.
ba/zabrana-parade-ponosa-bi-bila-nevidena-sramota-i-dokaz-da-saraje-
vo-ne-zeli-europske-vrijednosti/.
39 Ž� eljka Domazet, “Dramatično upozorenje malobrojnih Srba: U FBiH će ostati
samo Bošnjaci i Hrvati“, Glas Srpske, May 15, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.
com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Dramaticno-upozorenje-malobrojnih-Sr-
ba-U-FBiH-ce-ostati-samo-Bosnjaci-i-Hrvati/284240.
40 Zoran Krešić, “Pokazala se patološka mržnja, Sarajevo pokušava ušutkati Zagreb u
lobiranju za jednakopravnost Hrvata“, Večernji list, July 31, 2019. https://www.
vecernji.ba/vijesti/pokazala-se-patoloska-mrznja-sarajevo-pokusava-usutka-
ti-zagreb-u-lobiranju-za-jednakopravnost-hrvata-1335729 (accessed 14 Septem-
ber 2019).
41 “KARAMATIĆ� : Bošnjaci Pričom O NATO-U Sprječavaju Dogovor U BiH”, Dnevni list,
August 27, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/karamatic-bosnjaci-pricom-o-na-
to-u-sprjecavaju-dogovor-u-bih (accessed 14 September 2019).
42 D. Momić, Ž� . Domazet, “Bošnjaci slave nepostojeći praznik“, Glas Srpske, Novem-
ber 26, 2018. https://www.glassrpske.com/cir/novosti/vijesti_dana/bosnja-
ci-slave-nepostojeci-praznik/274007 (accessed 14 September 2019).
22
“Dodik: Bosniaks have a

“Dodik: Bosniaks are “Why are all armaments
long-term plan to destroy
risking the very existence factories in the hands of
the Serb Republic, step-by-
of the country.”44 Bosniaks?”45
step.”43
“Croatian Democratic
“Bosniaks will not give in
Party and Croatian
on a third entity, and “Dodik: Bosniaks are
National Assembly: Party
Croats will never accept a seriously usurping Croat
of Democratic Action
unitary Bosnia and and Serbs rights.”48
refuses to respect the
Herzegovina.”46
choice of Bosnian voters.”47
By far, the most dominant theme regarding Muslims and Islam in

the newspapers analysed was the notion of Bosniak Muslims as
political troublemakers and uncompromising political obstru-
ctionists, while the country is depicted as politically unstable.
Such depictions accord with the dominant narratives of Bosnian
Croat and Bosnian Serb nationalist politicians and their respe-
ctive political parties. Similarly, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb
journalists seem to be attempting to divert all blame towards
the Bosniak Muslims, as, if not the sole, then the major politi-
cal problem and obstacle to the functioning of the state. This is
43 “Dodik: Bošnjaci imaju dugoročan plan korak po korak devastirati RS“, Večernji list,
January 29, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/dodik-bosnjaci-imaju-dugoro-
can-plan-korak-po-korak-devastirati-rs-1297525 (accessed 14 September 2019).
44 “Dodik: Bošnjaci riskiraju da BiH ne postoji!”, Dnevni list, June 25, 2019.
https://www.dnevni-list.ba/dodik-bosnjaci-riskiraju-da-bih-ne-postoji (ac-
45 “Zašto su fabrike oružja u BiH u rukama Bošnjaka”, Glas Srpske, February 11, 2019.
http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Zasto-su-fabrike-oruz-
ja-u-BiH-u-rukama-Bosnjaka/278634 (accessed 14 September 2019).
46 “Kao što Bošnjaci odbijaju treći entitet, Hrvati nikad neće prihvatiti unitarnu
BiH“, Večernji List, August 4, 2018. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/kao-sto-bos-
njaci-odbijaju-treci-entitet-hrvati-nikad-nece-prihvatiti-unitarnu-bih-1262140
(accessed 14 September 2019).
47 “HDZ I HNS: SDA Izbjegava Poštivanje Izborne Volje Naroda U BiH”, Dnevni list,
July 21, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/hdz-i-hns-sda-izbjegava-postiva-
nje-izborne-volje-naroda-u-bih (accessed 14 September 2019).
48 “Dodik: Bošnjaci teško uzurpiraju prava Srba i Hrvata”, Glas Srpske, August 27,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/dodik-bosnjaci-te-
sko-uzurpiraju-prava-srba-i-hrvata/291411 (accessed 14 September 2019).
23
manifested most saliently through the self-versus-other schema

or the combination of positive self-representation and negative
other-representation. The rhetorical strategy of discursive exc-
lusion is articulated primarily by delineating Bosniak Muslims
as the out-group.
A dominant narrative in articles such as “The political will is
there, but the Bosniaks are blocking the formation of a govern-
ment,”49 “Karamatić: Bosniaks are using all the NATO talk to pre-
vent formation of a government,”50 “Croatian Democratic Party
and Croatian National Assembly: Party of Democratic Action re-
fuses to respect the choice of Bosnian voters,”51 “Croatian Na-
tional Assembly: Bosnia and Herzegovina is entering a new po-
litical crisis as all key political posts held by Bosniaks”52 and
“Dodik: Bosniaks are seriously usurping the rights of Croats and
Serbs”53 is that of Bosniak Muslims obstructing the proper func-
tioning of the state. There is widespread use of the noun “Bos-
niaks” (Bošnjaci) as though Bosniak Muslims were a homogene-
ous group (despite being extremely fragmented politically and
socially) with a common agenda to dominate Bosnian Croats
and Serbs in the country’s decision-making bodies. Such pigeon-
holing of Bosniak Muslims as a single entity establishes the
sense of intergroup differentiation required by Bosnian Croats
49 “Postoji spremnost za formiranje vlasti, ali Bošnjaci opstruiraju”, Vecernji list,

May 11, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/nepostivanje-izvorne-volje-na-
roda- govori-da-netko-zeli-majorizaciju-u-bih-1318647
50 “KARAMATIĆ� : Bošnjaci Pričom o NATO-U Sprječavaju Dogovor U BiH”, Dnevni list,
August 27, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/karamatic-bosnjaci-pricom-o-na-
to-u-sprjecavaju-dogovor-u-bih (accessed 14 September 2019).
51 “HDZ I HNS: SDA Izbjegava Poštivanje Izborne Volje Naroda U BiH”, Dnevni list,
July 21, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/hdz-i-hns-sda-izbjegava-postiva-
nje-izborne-volje-naroda-u-bih (accessed 14 September 2019).
52 “HNS: BiH Ulazi U Novu Krizi Jer Sve Ključne Pozicije Drže Bošnjaci”, Dnevni
list, August 1, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/hns-bih-ulazi-u-novu-kri-
zi-jer-sve-kljucne-pozicije-drze-bosnjaci (accessed 14 September 2019).
53 “Dodik: Bošnjaci teško uzurpiraju prava Srba i Hrvata”, Glas Srpske, August 27,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/dodik-bosnjaci-te-
sko-uzurpiraju-prava-srba-i-hrvata/291411 (accessed 14 September 2019).
24
and Bosnian Serb nationalists to establish the distinctiveness

principle and their own sense of identity. Bosniak Muslim politi-
cians are depicted as bearing the brunt of responsibility for the
country’s political crisis. Radical moves and harsh rhetoric com-
ing from Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb politicians are shown
as provoked by and in response to moves emanating from the
Bosniak Muslim side. They hardly acknowledge, let alone high-
light, mistakes made by politicians from their own ethno-nation-
al groups. Moreover, any attempt by Bosniak Muslim politicians
to act jointly, despite often being politically on opposing ends, is
interpreted by Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb media as politi-
cally threatening and ultimately leading the country into further
political crisis.
The second rhetorical strategy employed by Bosnian Croat
and Bosnian Serb newspapers is negativization, whereby Bosniak
Muslims are discussed in terms of negative social representations
and presented as being in direct opposition to the in-group (here
the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs). The negativization of Bos-
niak Muslims is made manifest through the contrast of the alleged
“normality” of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs and the abnor-
mality of Bosniak Muslims. Examples may be seen in articles like
“The display of pathological hatred: Sarajevo is trying to silence
Zagreb in advocating for Croat equality in Bosnia,”54 “NATO under-
stands what military neutrality means, but Bosniaks do not,”55
“Bosniaks are celebrating a non-existent holiday,”56 “Banning the
54 Zoran Krešić, “Pokazala se patološka mržnja, Sarajevo pokušava ušutkati Zagreb

u lobiranju za jednakopravnost Hrvata“, Večernji list, July 31, 2019. https://www.
vecernji.ba/vijesti/pokazala-se-patoloska-mrznja-sarajevo-pokusava-usutka-
ti-zagreb-u-lobiranju-za-jednakopravnost-hrvata-1335729 (accessed 14 Sep-
tember 2019).
55 V.K., “NATO razumije politiku neutralnosti, ali Bošnjaci ne”, Glas Srpske, June 11,
2019. http://www.glassrpske.com/cir/novosti/vijesti_dana/NATO-razumije-poli-
tiku-neutralnosti-ali-Bosnjaci-ne/286085 (accessed 14 September 2019).
56 D. Momić, Ž� . Domazet, “Bošnjaci slave nepostojeći praznik“, Glas Srpske, Novem-
ber 26, 2018. https://www.glassrpske.com/cir/novosti/vijesti_dana/bosnja-
ci-slave-nepostojeci-praznik/274007 (accessed 14 September 2019).
25
Pride parade would be shameful and proof that Sarajevo does not
want European values”57 and “Bosniaks once again celebrate Turk-
ish occupation”58 (which accuses Bosniak Muslim of celebrating the
Ottoman conquest of their native country). Their behaviour is pre-
sented as irrational and deviating from existing values, norms and
principles. All political actions taken by Bosniak Muslim politicians
and Bosniaks generally are considered from the Bosnian Croat and
Bosnian Serb point of view. Those two groups are depicted as nor-
mal and Eurocentric and are positively socially represented, while
the third group is the outlier. There is over-emphasis on the Bos-
niak Muslims’ ethnicity and their cultural (i.e. Islamic) difference is
depicted as being more complex than any of the other problems
facing the country, such as high-unemployment, low-wages and
rampant corruption. The Bosnian Croats in particular are depicted
as the nation carrying and epitomizing European values, the same
values Bosniak Muslims are depicted as lacking.
Then there is repeated use of the term political Sarajevo,
which might at first sound benign to the average non-Bosnian
reader. This is seen in such articles as “Cvijanović: political Sara-
jevo is blocking everything in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the
Serb Republic is functioning”59 and “Croatian People’s Assem-
bly: political Sarajevo is nervous and hysterical.”60 It is worth
noting that Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb media often use
57 “Zabrana parade ponosa bi bila neviđena sramota i dokaz da Sarajevo ne želi

europske vrijednosti!” Dnevni list, August 26, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.
ba/zabrana-parade-ponosa-bi-bila-nevidena-sramota-i-dokaz-da-saraje-
vo-ne-zeli-europske-vrijednosti/
58 Darko Momić, “Bošnjaci ponovo slavili tursku okupaciju“, Glas Srpske, March 20,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Bosnjaci-ponovo-
slavili-tursku-okupaciju/280852 (accessed 14 September 2019).
59 “Cvijanović: Političko Sarajevo sve blokira u BIH, ali Srpska funkcioniše.” Glas
Srpske, July 30, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/
cvijanovic-politicko-sarajevo-sve-blokira-u-bih-ali-srpska-funkcionise/289552
60 “HNS: Političko Sarajevo u nervozi i histeriji.” Dnevni list, July 31, 2019. https://
www.dnevni-list.ba/hns-politicko-sarajevo-u-nervozi-i-histeriji (accessed 14
September 2019).
26
“political Sarajevo” as a euphemism for Bosniak Muslim politi-

cians due to the capital city’s predominantly Muslim character
and the significant concentration of Bosniak Muslim ethno-na-
tional political parties and organizations there. The con-
flict-based understanding of Bosniak Muslims presented in
these articles is reinforced by continuous reference to their al-
leged unwillingness to cooperate. Another reason Bosnian Croat
and Bosnian Serb journalists use the term political Sarajevo in-
stead of ethno-religious markers is perhaps political correct-
ness and to avoid being labelled racist or Islamophobic.
Bosniak Muslims are also depicted as being immoral in the
sense of not law-abiding and not respectful of the rights of other
citizens. They are portrayed as cunning and shrewd political op-
portunists who will stop at nothing to achieve their political goals.
The tone of these articles creates a sense of distrust towards Bos-
niak Muslims, a feeling that they do not and will not respect the
rights of other ethnic groups in the country. Example of such de-
piction are “Bosniaks want to take away everything from Croats:
their church, their history and their right to life in Bosnia,”61 “Vital
national interest – Bosniaks played the card 13 times, Croats only
twice,”62 “Croats put talk of their own entity on ice, Bosniaks
should stop trying to dominate,”63 “Bosniaks want to elect Serb
61 Ivo Š� imunović, “Bošnjaci žele uzeti sve od Hrvata: crkvu, povijest i pravo na
život u Bosni.” Večernji list, June 12, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/
bosnjaci-zele-uzeti-sve-od-hrvata-crkvu-povijest-i-pravo-na-zivot-u-bos-
ni-1325641 (accessed 14 September 2019).
62 “Nacionalni interes - Bošnjaci ‘povlačili’ 13, a Hrvati samo dva puta“, Večernji
list, July 14, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/nacionalni-interes-bosnja-
ci-povlacili-13-a-hrvati-samo-dva-puta-1325932 (accessed 14 September
2019). *The ‘vital national interest’ is a political veto enshrined in the Consti-
tution of BIH which technically allows any given ethno-national political party
to torpedo another ethno-national party’s parliamentary act/move if deemed
dangerous to their national interests.
63 Zoran Krešić, “Hrvati ‘zamrznuli’ entitet, Bošnjaci bi se trebali odreći domi-
nacije“, Večernji list, April 13, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/hrva-
ti-zamrznuli-entitet-bosnjaci-bi-se-trebali-odreci-dominacije-1312948 (ac-
27
representatives in Herzegovina-Neretva canton”64 and “Dodik:

Bosniaks have a long term plan to destroy the Serb Republic, step-
by-step.”65 In the same articles, Bosniak Muslims are also depicted
as wanting to dominate Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs polit-
ically and marginalize or exclude them from decision-making in-
stitutions. In a number of interviews, journalists accentuated this
point and quoted statements referring to the alleged desire of
Bosniak Muslims to dominate others. Thus, Davor Marijan, a his-
torian at the Croatian Institute for History, told Večernji list in an
interview “What the Bosniaks envisioned was nominally a liberal
[citizenship-based] state, but one that would allow them to dom-
inate the entire country.”66 He added “...Bosniaks have in mind an
essentially centralized unitary state, which is to say a nation state
of their own that would be presented ostensibly as ‘civic’ but in
which they would be the dominant group.”67 Along the same lines,
the subheading of an interview given by Bosnian Serb member of
the tripartite Presidency Milorad Dodik to the Croatian daily
Večernji list read “Bosniaks have a long-lasting desire to dominate
first Croats, and then Serbs and the Serb Republic.”68 It is note-
worthy here that Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb newspapers
openly oppose any restructuring of the country on liberal lines
based on citizenship and one-person-one-vote, preferring the
64 Marko Karačić, “Bošnjaci žele izabrati predstavnike Srba u HNŽ� -u.” Večernji
list, February 15, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/bosnjaci-zele-izabra-
ti-predstavnike-srba-u-hnz-u-1301001 (accessed 14 September 2019).
65 “Dodik: Bošnjaci imaju dugoročan plan korak po korak devastirati RS“, Večern-
ji list, January 29, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/dodik-bosnjaci-ima-
ju-dugorocan-plan-korak-po-korak-devastirati-rs-1297525 (accessed 14 Sep-
tember 2019).
66 Ž� arko Ivković, “Davor Marijan: Za rat Hrvata i Muslimana kriv je Alija Izetbegović”,
Večernji list, December 8, 2018. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/davor-mari-
jan-za-rat-hrvata-i-muslimana-kriv-je-alija-izetbegovic-1287712 (accessed 14
September 2019).
67 Ž� arko Ivković, “Davor Marijan: Za rat Hrvata i Muslimana kriv je Alija Izetbegović”.
68 Zoran Krešić, “Da je BiH normalna, u Predsjedništvu Hrvat ne bi bio protiv
Pelješkog mosta.” Večernji list, July 21, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/
da-je-bih-normalna-u-predsjednistvu-hrvat-ne-bi-bio-protiv-peljeskog-mos-
ta-1333553 (accessed 14 September 2019).
28
current system that gives Croats a disproportionately high voice

in decision- and law-making government bodies. A major reason
they are against a fully democratic majoritarian system is their
alleged fear of Muslim domination.
In other words, one can see a clear narrative of an alleged
Bosniak Muslim will to dominate the two Christian ethno-reli-
gious groups being constructed in these interviews. Similarly,
Fra Luka Marković, a Franciscan theologian, has said in an inter-
view with Večernji list that “Everyone is playing games. Serbs are
playing their game, Bosniaks talk about a liberal state, but what
they have in mind in the long run is a Bosniak state.”69 He added
“... Serbs have their own entity, while Bosniaks are using all the
means available to turn the Federation into theirs.”70
Apart from these interviews, we also find the Bosniak Mus-
lims’ alleged desire to lord it over their Catholic and Orthodox
compatriots emphasised in a number of articles, e.g. “Dramatic
warnings from the few remaining Serbs: the Federation will soon
be home only to Bosniaks and Croats,”71 “Bosniaks after Serb
posts in Council of Ministers,”72 “Why it is dangerous and harmful
for Bosniaks to elect the Croat member of the Presidency for the
third time”73 and “Bosniaks will not give in on a third entity, just as
69 Ana Popović, “Građanski model dugoročno znači državu većinskoga bošn-

jačkog naroda“, Večernji list, December 3, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vi-
jesti/gra-anski-model-dugorocno-znaci-drzavu-vecinskoga-bosnjackog-naro-
da-1286489 (accessed 14 September 2019).
70 Ana Popović, “Građanski model dugoročno znači državu većinskoga bošnjačkog
naroda“.
71 Ž� eljka Domazet, “Dramatično upozorenje malobrojnih Srba: U FBiH će ostati
samo Bošnjaci i Hrvati“, Glas Srpske, May 15, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.
com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Dramaticno-upozorenje-malobrojnih-Sr-
ba-U-FBiH-ce-ostati-samo-Bosnjaci-i-Hrvati/284240.
72 Ž� .D. “Bošnjaci naciljali srpska mjesta u Savjetu ministara“, Glas Srpske, March 20,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Bosnjaci-nacilja-
li-srpska-mjesta-u-Savjetu-ministara/280887 (accessed 14 September 2019).
73 “Zašto je opasno i štetno da Bošnjaci u BiH i treći put biraju hrvatskog pred-
stavnika“, Večernji list, September 17, 2018. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/
zasto-je-opasno-i-stetno-da-bosnjaci-u-bih-i-treci-put-biraju-hrvatskog-
predstavnika-1270271 (accessed 14 September 2019).
29
roats will never accept a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina.”74 The

type of domination discussed here is both real, in terms of num-
bers, and symbolic. It is interesting that both Bosnian Serb and
Bosnian Croat newspapers accuse Bosniak Muslims of the same
supposed intention and that the categorization of “us” and “them”
as “in-group” and “out-group” respectively was very evident in
both the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb media. Bosniak Croat
and Bosnian Serb politicians are constantly represented as seek-
ing compromise and making political concessions for the sake of
the country’s higher objectives, but the same does not hold for
Bosniak Muslims. Journalists from the ethnic media regularly
highlight the positive aspects of “their” Bosnian Croat and Bos-
nian Serb politicians, while playing down any positive aspects of
Bosniak Muslim politicians and stressing their negative aspects.
Finally, Bosniak Muslims are represented as responsible for
their own victimhood and the current state of affairs in the country,
losing the support even of their Western backers. This may be seen
in “Karamatić: The end of Bosnia and Herzegovina is nearing, Bos-
niaks will be begging for a statelet,”75 “Dodik: Bosniaks are putting
at stake the very existence of the country,”76 “The West has the most
influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina but doesn’t know what to do
with it”77 and “Krajišnik: Muslims committed atrocities against
themselves.” Bosnia and Herzegovina is depicted as a country dom-
inated by Bosniak Muslims, ill-functioning, on the verge of political
collapse, and increasingly abandoned by its former allies.
74 “Kao Š� to Bošnjaci Odbijaju Treći Entitet, Hrvati Nikad Neće Prihvatiti Unitarnu
BiH“, Večernji List, August 4, 2018. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/kao-sto-bos-
njaci-odbijaju-treci-entitet-hrvati-nikad-nece-prihvatiti-unitarnu-bih-1262140
75 “KARAMATIĆ� : Bliži se kraj BiH, Bošnjaci će moliti za “bašča državicu”,’ Dnevni
list, July 16, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/karamatic-blizi-se-kraj-bih-bos-
njaci-ce-moliti-za-basca-drzavicu (accessed 14 September 2019).
76 “Dodik: Bošnjaci riskiraju da BiH ne postoji!” Dnevni list, June 25, 2019.
https://www.dnevni-list.ba/dodik-bosnjaci-riskiraju-da-bih-ne-postoji (ac-
77 Maja Ereš, “Zapad, koji je najutjecajniji u BiH, ne zna što bi s njom“, Večernji list,
March 11, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/zapad-koji-je-najutjecajniji-
u-bih-ne-zna-sto-bi-s-njom-1305870 (accessed 14 September 2019).
30
II. The notion of Bosnia and Herzegovi-

na as a hotbed of Muslim extremism
The second major discourse revolving around the terms “Mu-

slim” and “Islam” in Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb media is that
of Muslim extremism, or more specifically the notion of Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a hotbed of Muslim extremism. The central
pattern here is the association of Bosniak Muslims with radicali-
sm and global terrorist organizations. Crucially, these extremists
are depicted as problematic for and contesting the country’s fra-
gile peace, security and post-war inter-ethnic relations.
“These are the individuals

“Bosniak officials praise
who have surrendered in “16.9% of Mostar citizens
terrorism.”80
Syria; they will be deported say they support ISIL.”79
to Bosnia and Herzegovina.”78
“They came to Bosnia after

“Bosnian woman from ISIL “The ever-growing list of
fighting in Afghanistan.
sentenced to 6.5 years in terrorists from Bosnia and
They waged jihad around
US jail.”82 Herzegovina.”83
the world.”81
78 “Ovo su osobe koje su se predale u Siriji, oni će biti vraćeni u BiH”, Večernji list,
March 13, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/ovo-su-osobe-koje-su-se-pre-
dale-u-siriji-oni-ce-biti-vraceni-u-bih-1306429 (accessed 14 September 2019).
79 “Č� ak 16,9% Mostaraca navelo da podržava ISIL“, Dnevni list, May 4, 2019.
https://www.dnevni-list.ba/cak-169-mostaraca-navelo-da-podrzava-isil (ac-
80 Darko Momić, “Bošnjački zvaničnici veličaju terorizam”, Glas Srpske, August 27,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/bosnjacki-zvanic-
nici-velicaju-terorizam/291373 (accessed 14 September 2019).
81 Hassan Haidar Diab, “U BiH su došli nakon ratovanja u Afganistanu. Išli su u džihad
po cijelom svijetu“, Večernji list, February 17, 2019. https://www.vecernji.hr/vi-
jesti/u-bih-su-dosli-nakon-ratovanja-u-afganistanu-isli-su-u-dzihad-po-cije-
lom-svijetu-1301385 (accessed 14 September 2019).
82 “Bosanka iz ISIL-a osuđena na 6,5 godina zatvora u SAD-u”, Dnevni list, https://
www.dnevni-list.ba/bosanka-iz-isil-a-osudena-na-65-godina-zatvora-u-sad-u/
83 Darko Momić, “Spisak terorista iz BiH sve veći“, Glas Srpske, June 29, 2019.
https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Spisak-terorista-iz-
BiH-sve-veci/287340 (accessed 14 September 2019).
31
“Croatia faces a huge

“Bosnia once again at the
security challenge: Who
“Ibro Ć� ufurović indicted centre of world attention
are the jihadis that are
for joining ISIL.”85 because of terrorism.”86
returning to Bosnia and
Herzegovina?”84
“A poke in the eye of the
West: Bosniak religious
“These are the leaders of “A high-risk country.”89
and political elite pays
Balkan jihadis.”87
tribute to the leader of
Muslim brotherhood.”88
“Hundreds of ISIL fighters
are returning to Bosnia “Republika Srpska warns
“War-time mujahedeen
and Herzegovina. Croatia’s of terrorism threat and
fighters spread fear
Security and Intelligence migrant crisis in Bosnia
throughout Bosnia.”91
Agency is stepping up and Herzegovina.”92
security checks.”90
84 Hassan Haidar Diab, “Hrvatska pred velikim sigurnosnim izazovom: Tko su dži-
hadisti koji se vraćaju u BiH?” Večernji list, February 24, 2019. https://www.
vecernji.ba/svijet/hrvatska-pred-velikim-sigurnosnim-izazovom-tko-su-dziha-
disti-koji-se-vracaju-u-bih-1302901 (accessed 14 September 2019).
85 “Zbog pridruživanja ISIL-u podignuta optužnica protiv Ibre Ć� ufurovića“, Dnevni
list, July 15, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/zbog-pridruzivanja-isil-u-podig-
nuta-optuznica-protiv-ibre-cufurovica (accessed 14 September 2019).
86 Darko Momić, “BiH ponovo u centru svjetske pažnje zbog terorizma”, Glas Srpske,
June 28, 2019. http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/BiH-pono-
vo-u-centru-svjetske-paznje-zbog-terorizma/287269 (accessed 14 September
2019).
87 “Ovo su vođe balkanskih džihadista“, Večernji list, January 27, 2019. https://www.
vecernji.ba/vijesti/ovo-su-vo-e-balkanskih-dzihadista-1297130 (accessed 14
September 2019).
88 “PRST U OKO ZAPADU: Bošnjačka vjerska i politička elita odala počast lideru
Muslimanskog bratstva”, Dnevni list, June 24, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.
ba/prst-u-oko-zapadu-bosnjacka-vjerska-i-politicka-elita-odala-pocast-lide-
ru-muslimanskog-bratstva (accessed 14 September 2019).
89 Dragana Orlović, “Zemlja rizika“, Glas Srpske, July 24, 2019. https://www.
glassrpske.com/cir/komentar/komentar_dana/zemlja-rizika/3608 (accessed
14 September 2019).
90 Davor Ivanković, “U BiH se vraća stotinu boraca ISIL-a, SOA pojačava provjere”,
Večernji list, March 20, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/svijet /u-bih-se-vraca-sto-
tinu-boraca-isil-a-soa-pojacava-provjere-1307924 (accessed 14 September 2019).
91 Zoran Krešić, Goran Sudar. “Mudžahedini iz rata siju smrt po BiH u miru“,
Večernji list, February 13, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/mudzahed-
ini-iz-rata-siju-smrt-po-bih-u-miru-1300549 (accessed 14 September 2019).
92 “Srpska upozorava na rizik od terorizma i migrantske krize u BiH“, Glas Srpske,
May 6, 2019. http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Srpska-upo-
zorava-na-rizik-od-terorizma-i-migrantske-krize-u-BiH/283759.
32
“Without additional
“ISIL terrorist: Edvin
security measures, Bosnia
Babić, known as Osman “Terrorism a constant
at higher risk of facing
from Sarajevo, threat.”95
terrorism from returning
surrenders.”94
ISIL fighters.”93
“Former ISIL fighters soon “ISIL member from Bosnia

“Bosnian terrorist flees
returning to Bosnia and and Herzegovina
Syria to Libya?”98
Herzegovina.”96 sentenced in Berlin.”97
“Intelligence agencies
“Deported from Slovenia
preparing new operation: “Jihadi Delić under special
because of radicalism.
Women and children of surveillance.”101
They returned to Bosnia
Bosnian ISIL fighters to be
and Herzegovina.”99
deported to Bosnia?”100
93 Zoran Krešić, “Bez mjera veći rizik od terorizma u BiH i na Balkanu povratkom
ratnika iz ISIL-a”, Večernji list, May 20, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/
bez-mjera-veci-rizik-od-terorizma-u-bih-i-na-balkanu-povratkom-ratnika-iz-
isil-a-1320360 (accessed 14 September 2019).
94 “TERORIST ISIL-a: Predao se Edvin Babić zvani Osman iz Sarajeva”, Dnevni list,
March 5, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/terorist-isil-a-predao-se-edvin-babic-
zvani-osman-iz-sarajeva (accessed 14 September 2019).
95 “Terorizam stalna prijetnja“, Glas Srpska, January 21, 2019. https://www.
glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/terorizam-stalna-prijetnja/277284.
96 Zoran Krešić, “Bivši pripadnici ISIL-a uskoro stižu u BiH.” Večernji list, May 15,
2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/bivsi-pripadnici-isil-a-uskoro-stizu-u-
bih-1319294 (accessed 14 September 2019).
97 “Pristaša ISIL-a iz BiH osuđen u Berlinu“, Dnevni list, February 27, 2019. https://
www.dnevni-list.ba/pristasa-isil-a-iz-bih-osuden-u-berlinu (accessed 27 Feb-
ruary 2019).
98 “Terorista iz BiH iz Sirije pobjegao u Libiju?” Glas Srpske, March 3, 2019. http://
www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Terorista-iz-BiH-iz-Sirije-pobje-
gao-u-Libiju/279916 (accessed 14 September 2019).
99 “Protjerani iz Slovenije zbog radikalizma. Vratili se u BiH“, Večernji list, March 24,
2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/protjerani-iz-slovenije-zbog-radikalizma-
vratili-se-u-bih-1308744 (accessed 14 September 2019).
100 “OBAVJEŠ� TAJNE SLUŽ� BE PRIPREMAJU AKCIJU: Organizira se povratak žena i
djece bosanskih ISIL-ovaca?” Dnevni list, February 19, 2019. https://www.dnevni-
list.ba/obavjestajne-sluzbe-pripremaju-akciju-organizira-se-povratak-ze-
na-i-djece-bosanskih-isil-ovaca (accessed 14 September 2019).
101 V.Z., “Džihadlija Delić pod posebnom prismotrom“, Glas Srpske, January 17,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Dzihadlija-Del-
ic-pod-posebnom-prismotrom/277062 (accessed 14 September 2019).
33
“It is a fact: Islamists in “Children of dead Bosnian “10,000 Bosnian

Bosnia and Herzegovina terrorist resettled in mujahedeen ready for
are a threat.”102 Australia.”103 jihad.”104
Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb media display a pervasive ten-

dency to focus on the allegedly threatening nature of Bosniak
Muslims, depicting them as prone to religious radicalism. This
connection is established through chains of association with in-
ternational terrorist groups (mostly ISIL) and a range of narra-
tive elements (e.g. Bosniak Muslim mujahedeen fighters). Such
threats are depicted as both realistic, in the sense that they may
cause physical harm to other ethno-national groups (Bosnian
Croats and Bosnian Serbs), and symbolic, in the sense that they
may pose a challenge or threat to the established cultural and
religious values of those groups.
First, the most common association made between Bosniak
Muslims and terrorism in these media is of them being an exten-
sion of existing global terrorist networks, specifically ISIL and,
to a lesser extent, Al Qaida. Many articles from the period in
question focus on Bosnian ISIL fighters from Syria and Iraq and
the threat they do or may pose to the country and region. In ar-
ticles such as “These are the individuals who have surrendered
in Syria, who will be deported to Bosnia and Herzegovina,”105
“Croatia faces a huge security challenge: Who are the jihadis
102 Davor Ivanković, “Ne treba izmišljati, islamisti iz BiH jesu prijetnja.” Večernji list,
March 15, 2019. https://www.vecernji.hr/premium/ne-treba-izmisljati-islami-
sti-iz-bih-jesu-prijetnja-1306848 (accessed 14 September 2019).
103 “Australija preuzima djecu poginulog bosanskog teroriste“, Dnevni list, June 26,
2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/australija-preuzima-djecu-poginulog-bosan-
skog-teroriste (accessed 14 September 2019).
104 Veljko Zeljković, “Za džihad u BIH spremno 10.000 mudžahidina” Glas Srpske, Janu-
ary 16, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Za-dzihad-u-
BiH-spremno-10000-mudzahedina/277007 (accessed 14 September 2019).
105 “Ovo su osobe koje su se predale u Siriji, oni će biti vraćeni u BiH” Večernji list,
March 13, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/ovo-su-osobe-koje-su-se-pre-
dale-u-siriji-oni-ce-biti-vraceni-u-bih-1306429 (accessed 14 September 2019).
34
returning to Bosnia and Herzegovina,”106 “Intelligence agencies

preparing new operation: Women and children of Bosnian ISIL
fighters to be deported to Bosnia”107 and “They came to Bosnia
after fighting in Afghanistan, then waged jihad around the
world”108 a direct link is posited between the Bosniak Muslims
and global radical Muslim groups. These newspapers systemat-
ically chose international events that fit their negative interpre-
tations of Islam and stereotypes of Muslims, while the structures
of their articles attempt to show a spill-over effect of Middle
Eastern conflicts onto the Balkans. In “Croatia faces a huge secu-
rity challenge: Who are the jihadis returning to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina?”, the journalist also claims that “Unlike member states
of the European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina has agreed to
take back any citizens who fought on the side of the terrorist Is-
lamic state group...”109 Speaking of returning Bosnian ISIL fight-
ers, the author adds “They are returning with a bloodthirsty ide-
ology, ready to die in the name of Allah, for the very same rea-
sons they went to fight in Syria and Iraq. Security agencies must
pay close attention to the many sympathizers that ISIL has in
Bosnia, who finance the organization and share its ideology.
They are far more dangerous, as they are in hiding and waiting.”110
hadisti koji se vraćaju u BiH?” Večernji list, February 24, 2019. https://www.ve-
cernji.ba/svijet/hrvatska-pred-velikim-sigurnosnim-izazovom-tko-su-dziha-
107 “OBAVJEŠ� TAJNE SLUŽ� BE PRIPREMAJU AKCIJU: Organizira se povratak žena i
djece bosanskih ISIL-ovaca?” Dnevni list, February 19, 2019. https://www.dnevni-
list.ba/obavjestajne-sluzbe-pripremaju-akciju-organizira-se-povratak-ze-
na-i-djece-bosanskih-isil-ovaca (accessed 14 September 2019).
108 Hassan Haidar Diab, “U BiH su došli nakon ratovanja u Afganistanu. Išli su u džihad
po cijelom svijetu“, Večernji list, February 17, 2019. https://www.vecernji.hr/vi-
jesti/u-bih-su-dosli-nakon-ratovanja-u-afganistanu-isli-su-u-dzihad-po-cije-
lom-svijetu-1301385 (accessed 14 September 2019).
hadisti koji se vraćaju u BiH?” Večernji list, February 24, 2019. https://www.ve-
cernji.ba/svijet/hrvatska-pred-velikim-sigurnosnim-izazovom-tko-su-dziha-
110 Hassan Haidar Diab, “Hrvatska pred velikim sigurnosnim izazovom: Tko su
džihadisti koji se vraćaju u BiH?”.
35
In other words, Bosniak Muslims are depicted as the medium

through which radicalism is transmitted from the Middle East to
Europe. One sees the same in an article entitled “A poke in the eye
of the West: Bosniak religious and political elite pays tribute to
the leader of Muslim brotherhood”,111 which accused the entire
Bosniak Muslim political elite of being sympathetic to the Muslim
Brotherhood Islamist movement. The authors of these texts de-
ploy radicalism as a frame for understanding Middle Eastern con-
flicts, while subtly utilising Islam, the religion of Bosniak Muslims,
as a threat-marker posed to the rest of the country and region. As
a means of emphasizing their alleged connections to Middle East-
ern terrorist groups, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb newspapers
often juxtapose photographs of masked non-Bosnian fighters
from the Syrian and Iraqi warzones with articles on the increased
risk of terrorist activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
There is also the management of vagueness and clarity in the
discourse on radicalism. Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat media
remain rather vague about Croat and Serb fighters who have trav-
elled to fight in the Ukraine with pro-Russian separatists or the
role played by Orthodox Christianity. On the other hand, their
clarity in reporting on the relatively small number of Bosniak
Muslim volunteers to have travelled to join extremist groups in
Middle Eastern countries has acted as a catalyst in constructing
Bosniak Muslims as an alleged security threat. In articles such as
“These are the leaders of Balkan jihadis,”112 “Children of dead Bos-
nian terrorist resettled in Australia,”113 “ISIL terrorist: Edvin
111 “PRST U OKO ZAPADU: Bošnjačka vjerska i politička elita odala počast lideru
Muslimanskog bratstva”, Dnevni list, June 24, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.
ba/prst-u-oko-zapadu-bosnjacka-vjerska-i-politicka-elita-odala-pocast-lide-
ru-muslimanskog-bratstva (accessed 14 September 2019).
112 “Ovo su vođe balkanskih džihadista“, Večernji list, January 27, 2019. https://
www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/ovo-su-vo-e-balkanskih-dzihadista-1297130 (acces-
sed 14 September 2019).
113 “Australija preuzima djecu poginulog bosanskog teroriste“, Dnevni list, June 26, 2019.
https://www.dnevni-list.ba/australija-preuzima-djecu-poginulog-bosanskog-tero-
riste (accessed 14 September 2019).
36
Babić, known as Osman from Sarajevo, surrenders”114 and “Ibro

Ć� ufurović indicted for joining ISIL”115 the accent is on the eth-
no-national affiliation of the ISIL fighters, whether explicitly or
implicitly. Such identity markers point to a link between Bosniaks,
Islam and terrorism and only act to strengthen the ideological di-
mension of the intended discourse. The war in Syria and Iraq and
the atrocities committed by ISIL serve to amplify Bosnian Croat
and Bosnian Serb media’s culturally framed discourses and inte-
grate them with the framing of national security debates. The jux-
taposition of Bosniak Muslim radicals domestically and Muslim
extremist groups internationally only serves to strengthen the
construction of an overreaching “Islamic threat” linked to Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Such association of Bosniak Muslims with vio-
lent extremists around the world creates a sense of insecurity and
distrust among the other two ethno-national groups, with poten-
tial repercussions for the general social representation of Bosniak
Muslims in the country and region.
Finally, the alleged arming of Bosniak Muslims is used to de-
note possible transitions from rhetoric towards violent conflict in
the country and consequently as posing a threat to the region.
This was the theme in articles like “Orić’s friend calls for Bosniaks
to arm themselves”116 and “Why are all armaments factories in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the hands of Bosniaks?”117 The notion
being put forward is that not only are Bosniak Muslims ready to
114 “TERORIST ISIL-a: Predao se Edvin Babić zvani Osman iz Sarajeva”, Dnevni list,
March 5, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/terorist-isil-a-predao-se-edvin-babic-
zvani-osman-iz-sarajeva (accessed 14 September 2019).
115 “Zbog pridruživanja ISIL-u podignuta optužnica protiv Ibre Ć� ufurovića“, Dnevni
list, July 15, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/zbog-pridruzivanja-isil-u-podignu-
ta-optuznica-protiv-ibre-cufurovica (accessed 14 September 2019).
116 “Orićev prijatelj poziva Bošnjake da se naoružaju“, Glas Srpske, April 21, 2019.
http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Oricev-prijatelj-pozi-
va-Bosnjake-da-se-naoruzaju/282887 (accessed 14 September 2019).
117 “Zašto su fabrike oružja u BiH u rukama Bošnjaka”, Glas Srpske, February 11, 2019.
http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Zasto-su-fabrike-oruz-
ja-u-BiH-u-rukama-Bosnjaka/278634 (accessed 14 September 2019).
37
arm themselves but, in case of another war, they will have plenty
of weapons at their disposal. Similarly, in articles such as “10,000
Bosnian mujahedeen ready for jihad,” “A high-risk country,”
“These are the leaders of Balkan jihadis,” “Bosnia once again at the
centre of world attention because of terrorism,” and “16.9% of
Mostar citizens say they support ISIL,” Bosnian Croat and Bosnian
Serb media deploy the number game as an ideological tool to
strengthen their argument that Bosniak Muslims pose a security
threat, without however backing up their figures with reliable
sources. The reference to “mujahedeen” fighters, a now non-exist-
ent war-time military unit, is a clear attempt to link alleged Bos-
niak Muslim extremists today to the 1992-1995 war for inde-
pendence and, however retroactively, present the Bosnian Croat
and Bosnian Serb war against Bosniak Muslims as a “war on ter-
ror.” Moreover, all this talk of radical Bosniak Muslim fighters be-
ing ready and waiting to wage war frames them in a sleeper cell
narrative and casts suspicion on them (and on anyone displaying
similar physical features) as a potential security threat. Such a
suspicious tone towards Bosniak Muslims intertwines with the
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat public’s opinion of the recent
war and heightens fears of Bosniaks as the dominant ethno-na-
tional population. It also casts doubt on them as a “suspect com-
munity” and a symbolic threat to the two other ethnonational
groups - Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.
III. Muslim migrants as a threat to

Christian Europe
The third major theme associated with the terms “Muslim” and
“Islam” is the issue of migrants and the notion of a Christian
Europe. Even though the term “Christianity” was initially not
38
envisioned as part of this research, in the ensuing analyses it

became evident how many depictions of refugees and migrants
deployed the backdrop of a purportedly “Christian” Europe. In
most discussion centring on the foundations of Europe as a con-
tinent and how Europeans perceive themselves and their values,
it has been a commonplace to refer to Europe’s “Christian” cha-
racter and its Christian roots, subtly or overtly. In this category,
the following articles were analysed:

“The Hagia Sofia of Jajce:
“The number of Catholics
Islamic Community claims
in Bosnia and Herzegovina “Styrian guard defending
that the church is their
is decreasing; they do not country’s borders against
mosque, but Franciscans
enjoy the same rights as Muslims.”120
call for a joint cultural
other citizens”118
centre”119
“They gave refuge to
“A new migrant route
migrants in Ljubuški, but “The Battle of Kosovo is a
across Bosnia and
migrants destroyed their battle for a Christian
Herzegovina in the
homes and threw out Europe.”122
making.”
crucifixes.”121
118 “Katolika u BiH sve manje, ne uživaju ista prava kao i drugi građani“, Večernji
list, August 3, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/katolika-u-bih-sve-man-
je-ne-uzivaju-ista-prava-kao-i-drugi-gra-ani-1262051 (accessed 14 Septem-
ber 2019).
119 “JAJAČ� KA AJA SOFIJA’ Medžlis tvrdi da je crkva njihova džamija, a franjevci žele
zajednički spomenik kulture“, Dnevni list, July 30, 2019. https://www.dnevni-
list.ba/jajacka-aja-sofija-medzlis-tvrdi-da-je-crkva-njihova-dzamija-a-franje-
vci-zele-zajednicki-spomenik-kulture (accessed 14 September 2019).
120 “Š� tajerska garda’ brani granice od muslimana”, Glas Srpske, September 5,
2018. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/region/Stajerska-garda-bra-
ni-granice-od-muslimana/269026
121 “Dovodili migrante u kuće kod Ljubuškog, a oni uništili sve što se uništiti mo-
glo i pobacali križeve“, Večernji list, August 20, 2019. https://www.vecernji.
ba/vijesti/dovodili-migrante-u-kuce-kod-ljubuskog-a-oni-unistili-sve-sto-se-
unistiti-moglo-i-pobacali-krizeve-1339731 (accessed 14 September 2019).
122 “Fotije: Kosovska bitka je borba za čitavu hrišćansku Evropu”, Glas Srpske,
June 27, 2019. http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/drustvo/vijesti/Fotije-Kosov-
ska-bitka-je-borba-za-citavu-hriscansku-Evropu/287251
39
“Which countries are

“Dodik: The solution is:
migrants in Bosnia and “Statue to John Hunyadi
division of Bosnia and
Herzegovina coming unveiled.”125
Herzegovina.”124
from?”123
“Migrants may cause
“The Balkans are
collapse of Europe’s “Notre Dame Cathedral
becoming a buffer zone for
economy; in Bosnia and bells rang in honour of
migrants.”127
Herzegovina they may Serbian army in 1389.”128
even create conflict.”126
“Does Europe have a “Will migrants stay “Migrants becoming a

Christian identity or is it permanently in Bosnia and serious problem in Banja
just a myth?”129 Herzegovina?”130 Luka.”131
123 “Iz kojih i kakvih zemalja dolazi najviše migranata u BiH”, Večernji list, August
12, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/iz-kojih-i-kakvih-zemalja-dolazi-
najvise-migranata-u-bih-1337793 (accessed 14 September 2019).
124 “Dodik: Rješenje da se BIH podijeli”, Dnevni list, August 6, 2019. https://www.
dnevni-list.ba/dodik-rjesenje-da-se-bih-podijeli/.
125 “Otkriven spomenik Janku Sibinjaninu”, Glas Srpske, July 22, 2019. https://
www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/srbija/otkriven-spomenik-janku-sibin-
janinu/288979.
126 Ž� eljko Andrijanić, “Migranti mogu urušiti gospodarstvo Europe, a u BiH može
doći do sukoba“, Večernji list, July 4, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/
migranti-mogu-urusiti-gospodarstvo-europe-a-u-bih-moze-doci-do-suko-
ba-1329981 (accessed 14 September 2019).
127 “Balkan postaje tampon zona za migrante“, Dnevni list, July 15, 2019. https://
www.dnevni-list.ba/balkan-postaje-tampon-zona-za-migrante (accessed 14
September 2019).
128 “Notr Dam zvonio u čast srpske vojske“, Glas Srpske, April 15, 2019. http://
www.glassrpske.com/lat/plus/istorija/Notr-Dam-zvonio-u-cast-srpske-vo-
jske-1389/282493.
129 Ivan Markešić, “Postoji li kršćanski identitet zapadne Europe ili je on mit?”,
Večernji list, april 23, 2019. https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/postoji-li-krscan-
ski-identitet-zapadne-europe-ili-je-on-mit-1314819.
130 “HOĆ� E LI MIGRANTI TRAJNO OSTATI U BiH?”, Dnevni list, August 27, 2019.
https://www.dnevni-list.ba/hoce-li-migranti-trajno-ostati-u-bih (accessed
14 September 2019).
131 Veljko Zeljković, “Migranti u Banjaluci postali ozbiljan problem“, Glas Srpske,
February 6, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Mi-
granti-u-Banjaluci-postali-ozbiljan-problem/278295.
40
Worst yet to come:

migrant route expanding
Lukač: Migrants will not
“Migrants creating chaos along Herzegovina Neretva
be allowed to stay in the
in Bihać”132 Canton, West Herzegovina
Serb Republic.134
Canton and Herzeg-Bosnia
Canton.133
“The crisis is escalating, “We have become only
Violent migrants creating
but the state has no remaining bulwark against
fear in Hercegovina.”135
solution to it.”136 migrants entering the EU.”137
“Serbs against migrant “The number of migrants “They lie to migrants in

centre in Medeno Polje.”138 in West Hercegovina Sarajevo about receiving a
Canton increasing, security warm welcome in
stepped up.”139 Banjaluka.”140
The discourse on migrants and refugee flows in Bosnia and Her-

zegovina often depicts them in the context of security threat,
as coming from unsafe Muslim majority countries with major
132 “Migranti prave kaos u Bihaću: Jednog napali sjekirom, drugi teško ozlijeđen“,
Večernji list, August 11, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/crna-kronika/mi-
granti-prave-kaos-u-bihacu-jednog-napali-sjekirom-drugi-tesko-ozli-
je-en-1337828 (accessed 14 September 2019).
133 “Najteže tek dolazi, migrantska trasa širi se na HNŽ� , Ž� ZH i HBŽ� ”, Dnevni list,
August 10, 2019. https://www.dnevni-list.ba/najteze-tek-dolazi-migrantska-
trasa-siri-se-na-hnz-zzh-i-hbz (accessed 14 September 2019).
134 Darko Mamić, “Lukač: Migranti neće ostati u Srpskoj“, Glas Srpske, July 17, 2019.
https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/lukac-migran-
ti-nece-ostati-u-srpskoj/288594 (accessed 18 December 2019).
135 Braco Selimović, “Nasilni migranti siju strah po Hercegovini”, Večernji list, April
26, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/nasilni-migranti-siju-strah-po-her-
cegovini-1315490
136 “Kriza eskalira, država bez odgovora”, Dnevni list, June 6, 2019. https://www.
dnevni-list.ba/kriza-eskalira-drzava-bez-odgovora/.
137 “Karan: Postali smo posljednja brana migrantima za ulazak u EU“, Glas Srpske,
June 18, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Karan- Po-
stali-smo-posljednja-brana-migrantima-za-ulazak-u-EU/286617.
138 “Srbi protiv migrantskog centra u Medenom Polju”, Večernji list, August 26,
2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/srbi-protiv-migrantskog-centra-u-me-
denom-polju-1340857.
139 “Povećan broj migranata u ZHŽ� -u, pojačana kontrola”, Dnevni list, August 5, 2019.
https://www.dnevni-list.ba/povecan-broj-migranata-u-zhz-u-pojacana-kontrola/.
140 Darko Momić, “Migrantima u Sarajevu svjesno lažu o dočeku u Banjaluci”, Glas Srp-
ske, February 7, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/
Migrantima-u-Sarajevu-svjesno-lazu-o-doceku-u-Banjaluci/279509 (accessed 14
September 2019).
41
security concerns and so as having the potential to escalate the

country’s existing economic woes. In an article published in Ve-
černji list, “Which countries are migrants in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina coming from,”141 the emphasis is on their ethnicity and that
they come from Muslim-majority countries. The article also lists
recent suicide- and terrorist-attacks in those countries (Afghani-
stan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), clearly framing them as unstable
and Muslim and so prone to terrorism, and implying that their ci-
tizens (migrants passing through Bosnia) are potential carriers of
such instability and insecurity. Significantly, the culturalist appro-
ach adopted sometimes, if not always, by these newspapers tends
to focus on the migrants’ culture and religion of origin rather than
the broader political, economic and social contexts that have led
them to flee their countries in the first place. In other articles,
such as “Migrants creating chaos in Bihać”142 and “Migrants may
produce collapse of Europe’s economy, in Bosnia and Herzegovina
they may even create conflict,”143 the accent is on migrants as an
economic and security threat to Bosnia’s native population. Their
allegedly violent nature is accentuated and there is an interesting
attempt to show them as having anti-Christian sentiments. A
case in point is an article entitle “They gave refuge to migrants in
Ljubuški, but the migrants destroyed their homes and threw out
the crucifixes,”144 where migrants are depicted as ungrateful and
141 “Iz kojih i kakvih zemalja dolazi najviše migranata u BiH”, Večernji list, August
12, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/iz-kojih-i-kakvih-zemalja-dolazi-
najvise-migranata-u-bih-1337793 (accessed 14 September 2019).
142 “Migranti prave kaos u Bihaću: Jednog napali sjekirom, drugi teško ozlijeđen“,
Večernji list, August 11, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/crna-kronika/migran-
ti-prave-kaos-u-bihacu-jednog-napali-sjekirom-drugi-tesko-ozlije-
en-1337828 (accessed 14 September 2019).
143 Ž� eljko Andrijanić, “Migranti mogu urušiti gospodarstvo Europe, a u BiH može
doći do sukoba“, Večernji list, July 4, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/
migranti-mogu-urusiti-gospodarstvo-europe-a-u-bih-moze-doci-do-suko-
ba-1329981 (accessed 14 September 2019).
glo i pobacali križeve“, Večernji list, August 20, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/
vijesti/dovodili-migrante-u-kuce-kod-ljubuskog-a-oni-unistili-sve-sto-se-un-
istiti-moglo-i-pobacali-krizeve-1339731 (accessed 14 September 2019).
42
violent – going so far as to throw out the crucifixes from the hou-
ses of Croat-Catholics who were kind enough to host them.
Then there is the narrative of migrants and refugees as pre-
senting an active cultural threat. The threat is conceptualised on
perceived cultural differences between native Bosnians as the
in-group and Muslim migrants as the out-group. Bosniak Mus-
lims are often portrayed as being the most welcoming towards
migrants and refugees. Without stating it directly, the articles
allude to their shared religious affiliation with Middle Eastern
and Asian migrants. On the opposite end, Bosnian Serbs and
Bosnian Croats are depicted as vigilant and wary of the presence
of Muslim migrants in the country. This is evident in articles like
“The number of migrants in the West Hercegovina Canton is in-
creasing, security stepped up,”145 “Serbs against a migrant cen-
tre in Medeno Polje”146 and in the afore-mentioned article “They
gave refuge to migrants in Ljubuški, but migrants destroyed
their homes and threw out the crucifixes.”147 It was also appar-
ent in “Violent migrants sowing fear in Hercegovina,”148 which
painted migrants from Algeria, Syria and Libya as causing trou-
ble, robbing businesses and terrifying the local population in
the town of Č� apljina, which is inhabited predominantly by Bos-
nian Croats. The references in these articles to Herzegovina,
West Herzegovina Canton, and the towns of Č� apljina and Ljubuški
are no accident. Anyone acquainted with Bosnian ethnic demo-
145 “Povećan broj migranata u ZHŽ� -u, pojačana kontrola”, Dnevni list, August 5, 2019.
https://www.dnevni-list.ba/povecan-broj-migranata-u-zhz-u-pojacana-kontrola/.
146 “Srbi protiv migrantskog centra u Medenom Polju”, Večernji list, August 26, 2019.
https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/srbi-protiv-migrantskog-centra-u-meden-
om-polju-1340857.
glo i pobacali križeve“, Večernji list, August 20, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/
vijesti/dovodili-migrante-u-kuce-kod-ljubuskog-a-oni-unistili-sve-sto-se-uni-
stiti-moglo-i-pobacali-krizeve-1339731.
148 Braco Selimović, “Nasilni migranti siju strah po Hercegovini”, Večernji list, April
26, 2019. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/nasilni-migranti-siju-strah-po-her-
cegovini-1315490.
43
graphics knows that West Herzegovina Canton is nearly 98% in-

habited by Bosnian Croats/Catholics and that Ljubuški is that
Canton’s biggest town. Likewise, in the article “Migrants will not
be allowed to stay in the Serb Republic”149 and “Migrants becom-
ing a serious problem in Banja Luka,”150 there is a stress on Middle
Eastern and Asian migrants not being welcome in the Republika
Srpska, the almost homogenously Orthodox-Christian and
semi-autonomous half of the country. Observing this from within
a broader perspective, the influx of refugees is inextricably linked
not only to crossing state and cantonal borders, but to crossing
cultural and religious borders. A confined territory in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, whether the Bosnian Croat towns of Ljubuški and
Č� apljina or the Republika Srpska, becomes a cultural-spatial con-
tainer marked by a precise distinction between a Christian cul-
ture and intruding Muslim migrants. All three articles subtly put
forward the notion that Orthodox Christian Serbs and Catholic
Croats are very much opposed to the influx of (Muslim) migrants.
Non-state borders, such as those of the Croat majority canton or
the Serb majority entity, gain a cultural and religious connotation.
This use of political and geographical allegory may not at first be
so clear to the outside observer as to the local audience, but refer-
ences to West Herzegovina Canton are at the same time clearly
references to a Catholic majority territory that has for years been
ruled by the right-wing Croat Democratic Party (HDZ).
The underlying narrative of Europe as having Christian foun-
dations is an integral part of depicting Europe as a Christian conti-
nent and Bosnian Serbs and Croats as Christian insiders and Mus-
lim as outsiders. In some articles, this narrative is unconcealed and
149 Darko Momić, “Darko Ć� ulum za Glas Srpske: Migranti neće ostati u Srpskoj“, Glas
Srpske, August 4, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/
Darko-Culum-za-Glas-Srpske-Migranti-nece-ostati-u-Srpskoj/266937.
150 Veljko Zeljković, “Migranti u Banjaluci postali ozbiljan problem“, Glas Srpske, Fe-
bruary 6, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Migran-
ti-u-Banjaluci-postali-ozbiljan-problem/278295.
44
obvious. For example, the article “Statue to John Hunyadi unveiled”151

presents the Hungarian military and political figure as a hero who
defended Serbia and Christian Europe from the marauding Otto-
man Turks. It is worth noting that John Hunyadi is considered a
hero not only by Hungarians and Romanians, but also by Serbs. In
an article titled “Styrian guard defend country’s borders against
Muslims,”152 the accent is on a self-organized paramilitary unit de-
fending Europe’s borders against allegedly intruding Muslim mi-
grants. An interesting article trying to establish a link between
Serbs and European Christianity was published on the day Notre
Dame Cathedral was in flames. The article entitled “Notre Dame
Cathedral bells rang in honour of Serbian army in 1389”153 was
published in Glas Srpske and related a somewhat tenuous story of
how the bells of the famed Parisian cathedral rang in 1389 during
the Battle of Kosovo, which Serbian mythology celebrates as epito-
mising the struggle against the Ottoman Turks. In fact, the article
defines the Battle of Kosovo as a “major Serbian-led Christian victo-
ry” over invading Muslim forces.
A similar narrative is also clearly being painted in an inter-
view published by Večernji list with Vinko Puljić, Bosnian Cardi-
nal of the Roman Catholic Church and current Archbishop of
Vrhbosna, who stated, “Europe must once again rediscover its
roots, its Christian identity, only that way will it not fear Islamic
radicalism.”154 Speaking of his native Bosnia and Herzegovina,
151 “Otkriven spomenik Janku Sibinjaninu”, Glas Srpske, July 22, 2019. https://
www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/srbija/otkriven-spomenik-janku-sibin-
janinu/288979 (accessed 18 December 2019).
152 “’Š� tajerska garda’ brani granice od muslimana”, Glas Srpske, September 5,
2018. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/region/Stajerska-garda-bra-
ni-granice-od-muslimana/269026.
153 “Notr Dam zvonio u čast srpske vojske 1389“, Glas Srpske, April 15, 2019.
http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/plus/istorija/Notr-Dam-zvonio-u-cast-srp-
ske-vojske-1389/282493.
154 “Katolika u BiH sve manje, ne uživaju ista prava kao i drugi građani“, Večernji
list, August 3, 2018. https://www.vecernji.ba/vijesti/katolika-u-bih-sve-ma-
nje-ne-uzivaju-ista-prava-kao-i-drugi-gra-ani-1262051.
45
he added, “Large investments from the Arab world are prepar-

ing the way for the construction of mosques” and that “unfortu-
nately, Europe does not know what it means to live side by side
with Islamic radicalism.”155
The only Muslims living side by side with Bosnian Croats
are Bosniak Muslims; hence, the Cardinal was clearly trying to
associate Bosniak Muslims with Islamic radicalism.
Something like this is also present in an interview by Kon-
stanin Dobrilović of Austria’s Christian-Freedom Platform. Of
Serb origin, in an interview with Glas Srpske, he stated that “A
strong European far right is important for the Republika Srp-
ska”156 and that “The basis of our program is for Europe to re-
main firmly founded on Christian tradition and culture, espe-
cially in times when we are witnessing an ever more aggressive
Islamic intrusion into Europe.”157 An article published in Glas
Srpske and entitled “The Battle of Kosovo is a battle for a Chris-
tian Europe”158 subtly presented Bosnian Serbs along similar
lines, in light of the Kosovo political issue, as defending Christian
Europe against Muslim Albanians. In other words, Serbs were
presented, or rather they tried to present themselves, as being
the bulwark of Christianity in a wider battle against Muslims
(here personified in the form of Albanian Muslims).
The Glas Srpske newspaper, citing the General Secretary of
the Republika Srpska, Siniša Karan, similarly presents the Serb
Republic as the only remaining bulwark against migrants com-
155 “Katolika u BiH sve manje, ne uživaju ista prava kao i drugi građani“, Večernji list.
156 Darko Momić, “Konstanin Dobrilović, lider austrijske Hrišćanske-slobodarske
platforme: Snažna evropska desnica važna i za Srpsku“, Glas Srpske, May 16,
2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/konstanin-do-
brilovic-lider-austrijske-hriscanske-slobodarske-platforme-snazna-evrop-
ska-desnica-vazna-i-za-srpsku/284313
157 Darko Momić, “Konstanin Dobrilović, lider austrijske Hrišćanske-slobodarske
platforme: Snažna evropska desnica važna i za Srpsku“.
158 “Fotije: Kosovska bitka je borba za čitavu hrišćansku Evropu”, Glas Srpske, June
27, 2019. http://www.glassrpske.com/lat/drustvo/vijesti/Fotije-Kosovska-bit-
ka-je-borba-za-citavu-hriscansku-Evropu/287251.
46
ing from Pakistan, Syria, Iran and Iraq.159 It is worth noting that
the term “Christianity” in the articles cited above seems to be
used more often to refer to a vague set of values and cultural
concepts than in any religious sense. The anti-migrant and an-
ti-Muslim narratives that now dominate Bosnian Croat and Bos-
nian Serb newspapers seem to have been imported from West-
ern European far-right discourses, in which Islam is framed in
the context of a cultural war between the Christian West and the
Muslim world. Despite both being highly fragmented in reality,
Muslim and Christian Europeans are both thus depicted as mon-
olithic communities united in possession of their respective uni-
tary cultures, ideologies and values.
A counter narrative? The discourse of Islam and Muslims

in Bosniak-owned newspapers
Oslobođenje Dnevni Avaz
“Croatian intelligence agency: We deny

“Wives of former ISIL fighters are not allegations of arming Salafis, we demand
shooting targets.”160 explanations from Bosnia’s
intelligence.”161
“Why Bosniaks do not want to look like
“Are Muslims in Bosnia a problem?”162
Bakir Izetbegović.”163
159 “Karan: Postali smo posljednja brana migrantima za ulazak u EU“, Glas Srpske, June
18, 2019. https://www.glassrpske.com/lat/novosti/vijesti_dana/Karan-Posta-
li-smo-posljednja-brana-migrantima-za-ulazak-u-EU/286617.
160 Adem Džaferović, “Ž� ene bivših boraca ISIL-a nisu mete za odstrel“, Oslobođen-
je, March 13, 2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/zene-bivsih-bo-
raca-isil-a-nisu-mete-za-odstrel-440507.
161 “SOA: Odbacujemo sve navode o naoružavanju selefija, tražili mo od OSA-e da se
očituje“, Dnevni avaz, March 13, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/466297/soa-od-
bacujemo-sve-navode-o-naoruzavanju-selefija-trazili-smo-od-osa-e-da-se-ocituje.
162 Ibrahim Prohić, “Jesu li muslimani u BiH problem?”, Oslobođenje, August 1,
2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/jesu-li-muslimani-u-bih-pro-
blem-478467.
163 “Zašto Bošnjaci neće da liče na Bakira Izetbegovića“, Dnevni avaz, august 12, 2018.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/404994/zasto-bosnjaci-nece-da-lice-na-baki-
ra-izetbegovica.
47
“Islamophobia: lessons from the “Are we ready for the return of jihadis
Srebrenica genocide.”164 and the remnants of ISIL?”165
“Fra Ivo Marković: Christians did not

understand what Islam and Muslims are. “Who is trying to create a green left and
Shocked, they answered with attacks why?”167
and war.” 166
“SBB: Dodik intentionally insulting the

“Migrants fearing upcoming winter.
victims of genocide and Bosniaks as a
Volunteers exhausted.”168
nation.”169
“Muslims are the major victims of

“What Kolinda denied saying.”170
terrorism.”171
164 Dunja Mijatović, “Islamofobija: pouke iz srebreničkog genocida”, Oslobođenje,

July 10, 2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/dosjei/kolumne/islamofobija-po-
uke-iz-srebrenickog-genocida-472013.
165 Amina Nuhanović, “Jesmo li spremni za povratak džihadista i zaostavštinu Islam-
ske države!”, Dnevni avaz, Aroil 14, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/475535/
jesmo-li-spremni-za-povratak-dzihadista-i-zaostavstinu-islamske-drzave.
166 Alena Beširević, “Fra Ivo Marković: Kršćani nisu pogledali šta je islam i ko su
muslimani, te šokirani širenjem odgovarali su samo napadima i ratovima“,
Oslobođenje, March 24, 2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/fra-
ivo-markovic-krscani-nisu-pogledali-sta-je-islam-i-ko-su-muslimani-te-soki-
rani-sirenjem-odgovarali-su-samo-napadima-i-ratovima-443818.
167 E. Maslo, “Ko i zbog čega pravi ‘zelenu ljevicu’?“, Dnevni avaz, August 28, 2018.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/512355/tragom-izjave-nermina-niksi-
ca-ko-i-zbog-cega-pravi-zelenu-ljevicu (accessed 18 December 2019).
168 “Migranti u strahu od jeseni, volonteri na izmaku snaga”, Oslobođenje, Septem-
ber 7, 2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/migranti-u-strahu-od-je-
seni-volonteri-na-izmaku-snaga-488118.
169 “SBB: Dodik planirano nastavlja da vrijeđa žrtve genocida i Bošnjake”, Dnevni avaz,
August 20, 2018. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/406979/sbb-dodik-planirano-nas-
tavlja-da-vrijeda-zrtve-genocida-i-bosnjake (accessed 18 December 2019).
170 Hajrudin Somun, “Š� ta je Kolinda porekla da je rekla”, Oslobođenje, August 9,
2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/dosjei/kolumne/sta-je-kolinda-porekla-
da-je-rekla-480338.
171 S. Numanović, “Muslimani i dalje najbrojnije žrtve terorističkih napada“, Dnev-
ni avaz, August 16, 2018. https://avaz.ba/globus/svijet/406131/muslima-
ni-i-dalje-najbrojnije-zrtve-teroristickih-napada.
48
“Close to one hundred Bosnian citizens

“Salafis from Dubnice disenchanted:
waiting to be returned to Bosnia from
they are painting targets on our backs.”173
Syrian camps. A chance for a new life?”172
“Nermin Ogrešević: Bosniaks are

“A new wave of migrants is coming to
currently the most oppressed nation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”175
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”174
“Migrants have brought certain benefits

“The Dutch sent people to their deaths,
to Krajina: people see them coming, but
now they are poking fun at them.”177
not leaving.”176
“Tuđman: There will not be any Muslim

“25,000 new migrants coming to Bosnia
areas, except as a small part of the
and Herzegovina.”179
Croatian state.”178
172 Aldijana Zorlak, “Blizu stotinu bh. državljana čeka na povratak u BiH iz sirij-
skih kampova: Š� ansa za drugi život?” Oslobođenje, June 27, 2019. https://
www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/blizu-stotinu-bh-drzavljana-ceka-na-po-
vratak-u-bih-iz-sirijskih-kampova-sansa-za-drugi-zivot-468504.
173 E. Trako, “Selefije iz Dubice ogorčene: Prave od nas mete“, Dnevni Avaz, Mar-
ch 17, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/467123/selefije-iz-dubnice-ogor-
cene-prave-od-nas-mete.
174 Fahrudin Bender, “Nermin Ogrešević: Bošnjaci su narod koji je trenutno naju-
groženiji u BiH“, Oslobođenje, February 14, 2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.
ba/dosjei/intervjui/nermin-ogresevic-bosnjaci-su-narod-koji-je-trenut-
no-najugrozeniji-u-bih-433251.
175 E. Halimić, “Novi migrantski val dolazi u BiH”, Dnevni avaz, October 13, 2019.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/422298/novi-migrantski-val-dolazi-u-bih.
176 Edina Kamenica, “ Migranti su Krajini donijeli i benefite: Ljudi vide nove migran-
te kada dolaze, ali ih ne vide i kada odlaze”, Oslobođenje, October 23, 2019.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/migranti-su-krajini-donijeli-i-benefi-
te-ljudi-vide-nove-migrante-kada-dolaze-ali-ih-ne-vide-i-kada-odlaze-403055.
177 S. Degirmendžić, “Duraković: Holanđani su poslali ljude u smrt, a presudom se
izruguju i vrijeđaju nas“, Dnevni avaz, July 19, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/
bih/503478/durakovic-holandani-su-poslali-ljude-u-smrt-a-presudom-se-iz-
ruguju-i-vrijedaju-nas (accessed December 18, 2019).
178 “Tuđman: Neće biti muslimanskih područja, osim kao mali dio hrvatske drža-
ve“, Oslobođenje, March 31, 2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/regi-
on/tudman-nece-biti-muslimanskih-podrucja-osim-kao-mali-dio-hrvat-
ske-drzave-445715.
179 K. Kešmer, “U BiH stiže novih 25.000 migranata!”, Dnevni avaz. February 16, 2019.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/458760/u-bih-stize-novih-25-000-migranata.
49
In the final section of this work, we shall be analysing the dis-

course on Islam and Muslims in Bosniak-owned media. Dnevni
Avaz is a newspaper owned by Fahrudin Radončić, leader of the
Union for a Better Future of BIH (SBB) political party, while Oslo-
bođenje is owned by Mujo Selimović, an influential businessman.
In the two newspapers being analysed, the dominant topics
were mostly inter-Bosniak political debates, the war-related
past, and the socio-political position of Bosniak Muslims in the
country. Compared to the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb news-
papers analysed previous, which tended to present Muslims and
Islam as monolithic and homogeneous, the Bosniak-owned
newspapers were rather more nuanced and objective in their
coveraged of Islam and Muslims in Bosnia. In articles such as
“On the Muslim question in Europe,”180 “Fra Ivo Marković: Chris-
tians did not understand what Islam was and who Muslims
were. Shocked, they answered with attacks and war,”181 “Are
Muslims in Bosnia a problem”182 published in Oslobođenje and “A
battle for the national identity and recognition of Bosniaks and
their rights”183 published in Dnevni Avaz, the authors tried to do
the exact opposite of what Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb me-
dia were doing– namely, to present Bosniak Muslims and gener-
ally Muslims in Europe not as a threat but as the victims of in-
180 Fikret Karčić, “O muslimanskom pitanju u Evropi“, Oslobođenje, August 22, 2019.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/dosjei/kolum-ne/o-muslimanskom-pit a-
nju-u-evropi-483670.
181 Alena Beširević, “Fra Ivo Marković: Kršćani nisu pogledali šta je islam i ko su
muslimani, te šokirani širenjem odgovarali su samo napadima i ratovima“, Oslo-
bođenje, March 24, 2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/fra-ivo-mar-
kovic-krscani-nisu-pogledali-sta-je-islam-i-ko-su-muslimani-te-sokirani-sire-
njem-odgovarali-su-samo-napadima-i-ratovima-443818.
182 Ibrahim Prohić, “Jesu li muslimani u BiH problem?”, Oslobođenje, August 1, 2019.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/jesu-li-muslimani-u-bih-prob-
lem-478467.
183 Muhamed Filipović, “Borba Bošnjaka za nacionalni identitet i priznavanje njihovih
državnih i građanskih prava“, Dnevni avaz, June 9, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/
kolumne/492473/borba-bosnjaka-za-nacionalni-identitet-i-priznavanje-njiho-
vih-drzavnih-i-gradanskih-prava.
50
creased anti-Muslim sentiment and rising right-wing populism.

They also tried to portray Islam and Bosniak Muslims as having
been an integral part of the European continent for centuries.
Internal political differences among Bosniak Muslims have
been elaborated on numerous occasions in Dnevni Avaz, not least
because of its owner’s political affiliation meaning he is often at
odds with the other major Bosniak Muslim political party, the Party
of Democratic Action. The extent of their mutual disagreement may
be seen in articles like “Why Bosniaks do not want to look like Bakir
Izetbegović” and “Who is trying to create a green [Islamic] left and
why?” both of which showed how fragmented the Bosniak Muslims
are along ideological, religious and political fault lines. This is in
stark contrast to Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb media, which
tend to frame all Bosniak Muslims as a homogeneous body and use
the all-encompassing noun Bosniaks (“Bošnjaci”) to refer to any
and all Bosniak Muslim politicians and ordinary citizens.
It is noteworthy that in both these newspapers, in spite of
the political bickering between Bosniak Muslim politicians and
their relations with other political parties being a dominant
theme, quite a number of articles do seem to have been written
to defend against accusations emanating from Bosnian Croat
and Bosnian Serb politicians and media outlets. For example, in
the articles “What Kolinda denied saying”184, “Salafis from Dub-
nice disenchanted: they are painting targets on our backs”185 and
“Croatian intelligence agency: We deny allegations of arming
Salafis, we demand explanations from Bosnia’s intelligence,”186
184 Hajrudin Somun, “Š� ta je Kolinda porekla da je rekla”, Oslobođenje, August 9, 2019.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/dosjei/kolumne/sta-je-kolinda-porekla-da-je-rek-
la-480338.
185 E. Trako, “Selefije iz Dubice ogorčene: Prave od nas mete“, Dnevni Avaz, March
17, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/467123/selefije-iz-dubnice-ogorce-
ne-prave-od-nas-mete.
186 “SOA: Odbacujemo sve navode o naoružavanju selefija, tražili mo od OSA-e da se
očituje“, Dnevni avaz, March 13, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/466297/soa-od-
bacujemo-sve-navode-o-naoruzavanju-selefija-trazili-smo-od-osa-e-da-se-ocituje.
51
there is a clear response to accusations from the Bosnian Croat

media (and media from neighbouring Croatia) over the alleged
presence of a radical Muslim threat in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Bosniak-owned newspapers seem, in fact, to have stood in
defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country against un-
founded allegations from Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb news-
papers. Bosnian Muslims and Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina
are presented as moderate and pro-European, while Muslim
radicals are depicted as isolated cases and unrepresentative of
the Bosniak Muslim population. Dnevni avaz’s line was variable,
at times accusing Bakir Izetbegović and the Party of Democratic
Action of being sympathetic to radical interpretations of Islam,
while at others clearly defending the country against the self-
same accusations from other ethno-national circles. The reason
for this was the owner of Dnevni avaz’s political orientation and
his political party’s being at loggerheads with Bakir Izetbegović
and the Party of Democratic Action.
There was also significant coverage of issues related to re-
turning ISIL fighters. Articles in Oslobođenje such as “Wives of for-
mer ISIL fighters are not shooting targets”187 accented the need to
re-socialize the wives and children of former ISIL fighters. The
need for a fair and transparent trial for Bosnian ISIL fighters was
also stressed. This was in stark contrast with Bosnian Croat and
Bosnian Serb media, which presented entire families as security
threats. This was not, however, the case with Dnevni Avaz, which
showed clear political tendencies in its reporting on terrorism
and foreign fighters. This is because that newspaper’s owner,
Fahrudin Radončić, was a former state-level Minister of Security
and had introduced a bill to punish Bosnian citizens fighting with
armed foreign paramilitary groups. This move is often lauded by
187 Adem Džaferović, “Ž� ene bivših boraca ISIL-a nisu mete za odstrel“, Oslobođen-
je, March 13, 2019. https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/zene-bivsih-bo-
raca-isil-a-nisu-mete-za-odstrel-440507.
52
the journalists of Dnevni Avaz, while at the same time harshly crit-
icising many of the later political moves and measures by their
archenemy, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA).
There was a significant number of texts about the 1992-1995
genocide of Bosniak Muslims and its repercussions today, either
in the form of discrimination against Bosniak Muslims in the Re-
publika Srpska or Islamophobic statements coming from Bosnian
Serb and Bosnian Croat politicians. For example, “Dodik inten-
tionally insulting the victims of genocide and Bosniaks as a na-
tion” and “The Dutch sent people to their deaths, now they are
poking fun at them” touch on the plight of Bosniak Muslims living
in a post-genocidal society – particularly Srebrenica – and the
everyday challenges they face. Unlike Bosnian Croat and Bosnian
Serb newspapers, which frame Bosniak Muslims as responsible
for the war, the Bosniak-owned newspapers depict them as the
actual victims and the Bosnian Croats and Serbs as perpetrators.188
When it comes to migrants and refugees in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Dnevni Avaz has been significantly more sensationalist
and negative in its reporting, with such headlines as “25,000 new
migrants coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina,”189 “Apocalyptic
scenes from Velečeva near Ključ: this is where the women and
children are living.”190 and “A new wave of migrants coming to
Bosnia and Herzegovina.”191 It often used references to natural
188 “SBB: Dodik planirano nastavlja da vrijeđa žrtve genocida i Bošnjake”, Dnevni
avaz, August 20, 2018. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/406979/sbb-dodik-plan-
irano-nastavlja-da-vrijeda-zrtve-genocida-i-bosnjake; S. Degirmendžić, “Du-
raković: Holanđani su poslali ljude u smrt, a presudom se izruguju i vrijeđaju
nas“, Dnevni avaz, July 19, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/503478/durak-
ovic-holandani-su-poslali-ljude-u-smrt-a-presudom-se-izruguju-i-vrijedaju-
nas (accessed 18 December 2019).
189 K. Kešmer, “U BiH stiže novih 25.000 migranata!”, Dnevni avaz. February 16, 2019.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/458760/u-bih-stize-novih-25-000-migranata.
190 “Apokaliptične slike iz Velečeva kod Ključa: Ovdje borave djeca, žene, trud-
nice...”, Dnevni avaz, July 29, 2019. https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/505756/apo-
kalipticne-slike-iz-veleceva-kod-kljuca-ovdje-borave-djeca-zene-trudnice.
191 E. Halimić, “Novi migrantski val dolazi u BiH”, Dnevni avaz, October 13, 2019.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/422298/novi-migrantski-val-dolazi-u-bih.
53
disasters and terms such as “flood” and “wave” in speaking of mi-

grants and refugees, depicting them as uncontrollable forces that
pose a potential threat to the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina. On the other hand, Oslobođenje had sympathetic articles
about migrants and refugees that did not present them as a secu-
rity threat to the country. This is clearly seen in the articles cited
above, namely “Migrants fearing upcoming winter. Volunteers ex-
hausted” and “Migrants have brought benefits to Krajina: people
see them coming, but not leaving.” In the first of these articles, the
inhumane living conditions of migrants, the cold weather, and the
lack of food and medicine are described. As are the extraordinary
efforts of Bosnian volunteers to help migrants without much state
support. In the second article, the stress is on the economic bene-
fits and mini economic boom the town of Bihać experienced due
to the migrants – in the form of renting rooms to the better-off
among them, who can afford to pay rent, and small businesses
making a good profit selling foodstuffs to migrants, volunteers,
and workers in international non-governmental organizations.
Overall, both Oslobođenje and Dnevni Avaz were much more
nuanced in their reporting on Muslims and Islam. Unlike Bos-
nian Croat and Bosnian Serb newspapers, which sometimes had
palpably Islamophobic articles, the two Bosniak-owned news-
papers more often than not presented Bosniaks as the real vic-
tims of the recent war and ongoing political commotions. On
international issues, they mostly presented Muslims as victims
of discrimination, wars, and poverty. Rarely did they engage in
negative depictions of and fearmongering regarding Muslims
and when they did – mostly Dnevni Avaz in their reporting on
political Islamism, ISIL fighters and migrants – it was motivated
by Bosniak political infighting between the owner of Dnevi Avaz
Fahrudin Radončić and his nemesis Bakir Izetbegović, president
of the Party of Democratic Action, and the latter’s contacts with
the Muslim world.
54
Conclusion
These topics from the five daily newspapers analysed capture

the discursive landscape of Muslims and Islam in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This landscape is highly polarized in line with the
existing ethno-national, political and administrative divisions
in the country. Broadly focused on a range of issues, the three
major discourses on Muslims are those of Bosniak Muslims as
politically aggressive and uncompromising, and of Bosniak Mu-
slims as prone to religious extremism and linked to international
terror groups, and finally of migrants as presenting a threat to
Christian Europe. The Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb media’s
focus on these three major themes has contributed to the social
representation of Muslims and Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina
as a multifaceted threat to the two other ethno-religious groups,
viz. the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs.
This suggests that the discourse on Muslims in the Balkans
is more or less in line with that described in existing research on
Muslims in Western media, albeit with a somewhat milder tone
than in certain conservative European newspapers. The con-
struction of Bosniak Muslims and Islam as being directly op-
posed to the self-understanding of the other two ethno-national
groups represents an amalgamation of hybridized threat – as it
is both realistic and symbolic. The depiction of Bosniak Muslims
as unwilling to cooperate politically helps create a sense of their
responsibility for the country’s current political tensions and
worsening of inter-ethnic relations. The Bosnian Croat and Bos-
nian Serb media’s construction of Islam and Muslims as such
seems to be contributing to and perhaps encouraging the social
representation of Bosniak Muslims and their religion as a multi-
faceted threat to the country. The boundaries between Bosniak
Muslims and Islam as symbolic/realistic threat is blurred in the
media’s representation of them. There seems to be a spill-over
55
of populist readings of Islam and Bosniak Muslims as a marker

of cultural and societal difference from the European populist
right to the Bosnian mainstream.
This is in line with what Van Dijks earlier identified as the
four basic strategies used to legitimize the self and delegitimize
the other: (i) emphasizing positive things about “us”; (ii) em-
phasizing negative things about “them”; (iii) deemphasizing
negative things about us; (iv) de-emphasizing positive things
about “them.”192 Aside from these continuous narratives, there
are a number of episodically salient topic categories that are re-
lated to Islam and Muslims – such as articles related to Islamic
dress and religious practices, the reconstruction of mosques
and Islamic monuments destroyed during the war, and war
crimes committed during the war against Bosniak Muslims.
Perhaps more worrying is the fact that such negative rep-
resentation of Islam and Muslims is present in the mainstream
Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb media and not just in right-
wing tabloids. Such media representation, if uncritically accept-
ed and reproduced, may in theory lead to a hegemonic social
representation among the non-Muslim masses.
192 M. H. Khan, H. M. Adnan, S. Kaur, R. A. Khuhro, R. Asghar, and S. Jabeen, “Muslims’

Representation in Donald Trump’s Anti-Muslim-Islam Statement: A Critical Dis-
course Analysis”, Religions, 2019, 10, 115.
56
Attitudes toward Bosniak Muslims
and Kosovar Albanians and historical
revisionism in the Serbian media:
Reaffirming the Greater Serbia project
Ivan Ejub Kostić
Introduction
In this part, we monitored three daily newspapers in Serbia, Po-
litika, Novosti and Informer, from August 1, 2018, to August 31,
2019. Over the period, the three papers printed a total of 1,020
daily issues. Given the significant amount of data involved, we se-
lected only newspaper articles that featured the Serbian words for
“Islam,” “Muslim/s”, “Bosnia”, “Bosniak”, “Bosnian Muslims”, “Ko-
sovo”, “Kosovar Albanians” and “Albanians”. All articles containing
these keywords were then further filtered for ones on Bosnia and
Herzegovina (B&H), Kosovo, or Serbia. For this chapter, we rando-
mly selected 38 articles from each newspaper for critical discourse
analysis, hoping to disclose the ideological assumptions implicit in
written text or oral speech.1 It aims to explore systematically the
1 S.L.T. McGregor, Critical Discourse Analysis: A Primer (Halifax: Mount Saint Vin-
cent University, 2010).
57
often opaque relationships between discursive practices, texts, and

events and wider social and cultural structures, (power) relations,
and processes. The number 38 yields an average of approximately
three articles per month. Cumulatively, we have analyzed 115 artic-
les, including opinion pieces, editorials, interviews, feature articles,
and news reports. Our research has disclosed three dominant to-
pics in the Serbian media: 1. Undermining the statehood of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and (re)affirming the expansionist politics of Ser-
bian nationalism; 2. “Kosovo is the heart of Serbia” and (Kosovar)
Albanians are consequently an existential threat; and 3. The politics
of remembrance and crimes committed by Serb forces during the
1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The first two topics
are reminiscent of narratives and the aspirations of Serbian natio-
nalist politics from the early 1990s, which led to genocide and et-
hnic cleansing of the Bosniak population in B&H and the Albanian
population in Kosovo. The third clearly indicates that a process of
(self-reflexive) confrontation with crimes from the past has yet to
begin in Serbia, where historical facts remain distorted by a con-
tinuing historical revisionism that avoids responsibility for crimes
and cherishes the idea of Greater Serbia as a legitimate aim and the
aspirations of Serbian nationalist politics as something to be ac-
complished in either the near or distant future. In such a socio-po-
litical atmosphere, created and fostered in the media, Bosniak Mu-
slims, Albanians, and other Muslim members of ethnic minorities
in Serbia feel extremely unsafe, more or less second-class citizens.
I. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the

(Re)Affirmation of the Expansionist
Politics of Serbian Nationalism
Attempts to undermine B&H and see part of its territory secede
and ultimately be annexed by Serbia have historically had serious
58
repercussions for the Muslim population of B&H and the Sandžak

region. Since the mid-19th century, the Serbian national idea of a
Greater Serbia, which seeks to integrate all territories inhabited
by Serbs (part of Croatia, B&H and Kosovo) within a single state,
has led to mass casualties and the expulsion of Muslim populati-
ons. When the Serbian national identity was being formed, Ser-
bian national ideology was not yet fully focused on expelling and
physically eliminating all Muslims, seeking rather to assimilate
them in line with Herder’s principle of “culture and language”. In
the years that followed, however, and in particular during the Bal-
kan Wars and World War II, the idea of assimilation was largely
replaced by brutal killing campaigns carried out by Orthodox Ser-
bs against Muslim population in eastern B&H, the Sandžak and
Kosovo. This was when the first tracts and books were written
openly advocating the physical elimination of Muslims from terri-
tories that the Serbian national ideology held belonged to Serbia.
Striking examples of the promotion of such ideas include The
Expulsion of the Arnauts by Vaso Č� ubrilović,2 which exhibited a
pathological intolerance of Albanians, and Homogeneous Serbia
by Stevan Moljević, ideologist of the Chetnik movement, a tract
admired by Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, leader of the Yugoslav
Army in the Homeland during World War II.3
The Greater Serbia idea was only partially realized during
the Balkan Wars and World War II, but it reappeared with the
disintegration of Yugoslavia under the populist and nationalist
regime of Slobodan Milošević, which came to power in Serbia in
2 Vaso Č� ubrilović, Isterivanje Arnauta (1937). Č� ubrilović wrote this pamphlet as

a memorandum in the form of a proposal for a solution of the Albanian ques-
tion in southern Serbia and Kosovo for the Government of Milan Stojadinović.
3 For a detailed account of crimes against Muslims by the Chetnik movement led
by Draža Mihailović during World War II in eastern B&H and the Sandžak, see V.
Dedijer and A. Miletić, (1990), Genocid nad muslimanima, 1941–1945, zbornik
dokumenata i svjedočenja, Sarajevo, Svjetlost, and M. Radanović, (2015), Kazna i
zločin: snage kolaboracije u Srbiji: odgovornost za ratne zločine (1941–1944) i
vojni gubici (1944–1945), Belgrade, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Regional Office for
Southeast Europe.
59
1989. Under Milošević’s regime, Serbia decided to launch mili-

tary strikes and attack the internationally recognized states of
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In B&H, the Bos-
nian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadžić, since convicted for war
crimes, and with the assistance of the Serbian regime in Bel-
grade, decided to employ the same methods of ethnic cleansing
and genocide against the Muslim population as had been used
during the Balkan Wars and World War II.
It is this context of the 1990s that must be borne in mind as
we seek to understand and interpret the present-day post-con-
flict condition in Serbia now, as (ultra)nationalist ideology, once
again the dominant political force, reaffirms itself in full vigour,
especially since 2012, when power was taken by many of the
same political players as had held it during the 1990s. Serbian
political elites today hope to achieve the decades-old goal of se-
curing a part of B&H and annexing it to Serbia “peacefully”. To
put it in other words, their idea has been to “consolidate” the
reality achieved on the ground by ethnic cleansing and genocid-
al politics during the wars of the 1990s and to finalize matters in
a “peaceful manner”. Needless to say, such political aspirations
inevitably affect the lives of ghettoized Muslims in Serbia and
across the wider region, who live with a constant feeling of phys-
ical endangerment. A major role in pursuing these nationalist
pretentions is played by the media, which dispute the very exist-
ence of B&H in many ways, while presenting Bosniak Muslims as
essentially opposed to the identity and interests of Orthodox
Serbs, as the texts selected for our qualitative discourse analysis
clearly show (Table 1).
60
Selected Articles from the daily newspapers, Politika, Novosti and Informer
Politika Novosti Informer

Weekly Interview: Milorad Heavy Blow For Serbia –
Chair Of B&H Presidency
Dodik, Chair And Serb Naser Orić Released In
Projects His Idea On The
Member Of B&H Sarajevo In Spite Of
Map– Dodik ‘Unites’
Presidency – Serbs Have Evidence He Personally
Territories Of Serbia And
Never Got Anything From Slaughtered Serbs And
Srpska
Bosnia Gouged Out Their Eyes
Weekly Interview: Mladen
National Holiday Of
Ivanić, Member Of B&H Steven Meyer, Former
Republika Srpska
Presidency From RS – Head Of CIA, Supports
Threatened – Bosniaks
Bosniaks Need A Leader Serbs – RS Has Right To
And Croats Strike At
To Take Historical Step Unite With Serbia
Republika Srpska
Forward
SDA Demand Ordered By
Last Night In Belgrade:
The West – Undermining Russian Beasts Coming To
Festival Of The Republika
Srpska To Cut Off Russian Bijeljina
Srpska
Influence
Sabre-Rattling In Sarajevo:
SDA Initiative – Bosniaks
Serb People Disappearing Naser Orić’s Follower Calls
Want To Undo Republika
From B&H Federation For A New War Against
Srpska
Serbs
Novosti Exclusive – Bakir Threatens Dodik:

Izetbegović: B&H Must
Sarajevo Makes Blacklist B&H Will Join Nato Or US
Arm Itself
Of Serbs Will Destroy You
Dodik: Izetbegović Must Serbs In Srpska United

Three Serbs Tortured –
Come To His Senses Thanks To NATO: Bosniaks
Brutally Beaten By
Quickly Or Regret It For Risking Biggest Crisis In
Sarajevo Police
Long Time B&H With No Way Out!
Dodik Tells Novosti –

Bosnian Serb Leader At
Kitarović: B&H Unstable, Džaferović Watched
Gunpoint: Plan To
Controlled By Militant Isla Executions Of Dozens Of
Assassinate Dodik
Serbs
RS Police File On Former
Bosniaks Erect Monument
Official Of So-Called
To Honour Turkish
Person Suspected Of Republic Of B&H Sent To
Conquest Of Bosnia!
Assault On US Mission In B&H War Crimes
Descendants Of Turkish
Sarajevo Arrested Prosecutor’s Office – Haris
Slaves Celebrate Invaders
Silajdžić Suspected Of Link
Of Their Land
To Concentration Camps
61
Dodik Comments On Galijašević: Bin Laden And

Bosniaks Celebrate
Presidency Session: Rights Gang Granted Citizenship
Turkish Victory At
Of Serbs Being Usurped By By Advocates Of Unitary
Gallipoli
Bosniaks Bosnia
SDA President’s Diabolical

19% Of Young People In Exclusive – B&H Chief Plan: Bakir Sends Afghanis
B&H Have Never Read A Intelligence Officer To Settle In Serbian
Single Book Murdered Serbs For Fun Municipalities And Chase
Serbs Out Of B&H
Jihadi Families Waiting For Dževad Galijašević – New

Rajko Petrov Nogo–
Housing Solution In York Attackers Were
Darkness Over Sarajevo
Mostar Citizens Of B&H
23 Years After War Still Our Neighbours Are Bosnia On Alert! Two
Segregation Among Getting Us Involved In The Hard-Boiled ISIS Terrorists
Schoolchildren New Zealand Massacre Coming Back From Syria!
Bosniaks In Mostar Smells Like The 1990s! U.S.

Infuriated By Prosvjeta B&H Held Hostage By Infiltrating Jihadists Into
“Stepa Stepanović” Book Bosniaks! B&H And Preparing Alija
Award Izetbegović’s Scenario
Table 1
Undermining the Statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina

As already mentioned, the dominant narrative on B&H in the Ser-
bian media monitored for this study consists largely of undermi-
ning the country’s statehood and insisting on the goal of unifying
the Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbia at some point in
the near future. In an interview for Politika on Sunday, June 30,
2019, Milorad Dodik, Chair and Serb member of the B&H Presi-
dency, stated unequivocally that “Serbs have never got anything
from Bosnia” which was established on “idealistic and ideological
grounds” and so “can never succeed”. In other words, “B&H has in
fact already collapsed due to the fact that it is unfeasible as a sta-
te”. Dodik also stressed that the overriding task of politicians from
the Republika Srpska was to “strengthen [the entity’s] sovereignty”
and that “it would have been best for B&H to have split up in 1995”
62
after the end of the war. In the same interview, Dodik referred to
crimes committed in the 1990s as “myths and lies”. Of the crimes
that have been turned into myth, Dodik singled out the genocide in
Srebrenica, which he stated was never proved at the Hague Tribu-
nal. According to Dodik, the Srebrenica myth was created with the
political purpose of “tarnishing the Serbian people” and using it as
needed to provide a rationale and legitimacy for attacking Serbia, as
with the NATO bombing campaign in 1999.4 In an interview a year
earlier, Mladen Ivanić, the then Serb member of the B&H Presiden-
cy, said Serbs had to follow the example of the Kosovar Albanians
“who enjoyed the status of an autonomous province for decades,
while the Republika Srpska has existed for barely two decades”. Ac-
cording to him, that is precisely where potential solutions for the
future are to be found, because “what is currently unrealistic will
not necessarily remain so for ever”. Ivanić was of course alluding
unequivocally to the secession of Kosovo from the Republic of Ser-
bia as an example for the Serbs in the Republika Srpska to imitate
patiently.5 An article entitled “Chair Of B&H Presidency Projects His
Idea On Map – Dodik ‘Unites’ Territories of Serbia and Srpska”6 in
Novosti provides probably the most glaring example of attempts to
achieve the unification of the Republika Srpska with the Republic
of Serbia. It referred to a recent interview given by Milorad Dodik
4 Opinion pieces featured in Politika reflect their authors’ views. Regular con-
tributors include Prof. Nenad Kecmanović, PhD, formerly of the Faculty of Po-
litical Sciences in Belgrade and now Political Advisor to Milorad Dodik. In his
opinion pieces, like Dodik, Professor Kecmanović insists on the impossibility
of Serbs surviving within Bosnia and Herzegovina due to its “centralization,
unitarization, i.e. Bosniak hegemony” (Politika, 4 December 2018). According
to him, B&H is in a “terminal phase” just like the SFRY before its breakup (Poli-
tika, 2nd November 2018). Also like Dodik, he denies the Srebrenica genocide,
which he says “places the Republika Srpska under international anathema,
ignoring the context of local Serb casualties and the political causes of the out-
break of civil war (in B&H)”. In the same article, Kecmanović accuses the Bos-
niak leadership of falsifying the recent census to make B&H a “Bosniak/Mus-
lim” majority state. He holds that in this process of “demographic engineering”
Bosniak political elites rely on “mujahideen and Salafis” and in future will also
count on “migrants from Muslim countries” (Politika, 9 September 2019).
5 Politika, 26 August 2018.
6 Novosti, 9 April 2019.
63
to the Serbian newspaper Espreso in which he not only explicitly

talked about his idea of unification but provided concrete maps de-
picting the future state. Interestingly the maps presented by Dodik
also include parts of Montenegro. Like Ivanić, Dodik emphasized
that it was unrealistic to expect the unification of Serbia and the Re-
publika Srpska to happen immediately but that the goal would be
achieved at some point in the 21st century, as something of the sort
is only natural, since “Serbs in B&H have always looked to Belgrade
not Sarajevo”. To support these efforts, Informer, a daily pro-regime
tabloid, published a statement by Steven Meyer, former CIA deputy
chief for the Balkans, who, it claims, said in a lecture at the Faculty
of Security Sciences in Belgrade that “The Republika Srpska has the
right to a referendum on self-determination and to unite with Ser-
bia if that is what it wants”.7
Messages asserting the unity of the Republika Srpska and
the Republic of Serbia in a similar vein were also to be heard at
the “Festival of the Republika Srpska” held in Belgrade. Report-
ing on it, Politika quoted Milorad Dodik as saying:
There are those who are trying to show us we are small, not worthy
of making decisions about our own lives. That is why it is important
we are here now in Belgrade to show you that the Republika Srpska
belongs to you and to tell you that Serbia belongs to us... [and that]
The Serb people today need to gather around their state and na-
tional ideas and finish what was left unfinished in the past.
Milorad Dodik finished his speech with the exclamation: “Long

live Serbia, long live the Republika Srpska, long live the Serb
people and long live our Orthodox Church”.8 In addition to
directly undermining the statehood and even the existence of
B&H, such irredentist statements unequivocally affirm the notion
that Serb national identity is synonymous with and tantamount
7 https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/former-cia-director-for-balkans-steven-
meyer-america-accepts-border-change-in-balkans/ (accessed 1 October 2019).
8 Politika, 4 September 2018.
64
to adherence to the Serbian Orthodox Church. It was precisely

in this context that a PEW Research Center survey conducted in
2018 showed that Serbs ranked third among European nations in
believing denominational adherence to be a necessary prerequi-
site to membership in a national-ethnic group.9
Threats to the survival of the Republika Srpska and the

systematic political and biological cleansing of Serbs
from Bosnia
In addition to this constant undermining of B&H’s statehood and
promotion of the expansionist ideology of a Greater Serbia that re-
sulted in anti-Muslim genocide in B&H and Kosovo in the 1990s, a
second topic regularly brought up in the Serbian media is the alle-
ged threat to the survival of the Republika Srpska and the physical
threat posed by Bosniaks to Serbs in B&H. Articles from the above
table that fall into this group include: “SDA Demand Ordered By
West – Undermine Srpska To Cut Off Russian Influence”,10 “SDA
Initiative – Bosniaks Want To Undo Republika Srpska”,11 “Natio-
nal Holiday Of Republika Srpska Threatened – Bosniaks And Cro-
ats Strike At Republika Srpska”,12 “Bakir Threatens Dodik: B&H
Will Join NATO Or US Will Destroy You”,13 “Serbs In Srpska United
Thanks To NATO: Bosniaks Risking Biggest Crisis In B&H With No
Way Out!”,14 “Bosnian Serb Leader At Gunpoint: Plan To Assassina-
te Dodik”,15 “Izetbegović: B&H Must Arm Itself”,16 “Dodik: Izetbego-
vić Must Come To Senses Quickly Or Regret It For Long Time”,17 “
9 https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/05/how-do-europe-
an-countries-differ-in-religious-commitment/ (accessed 1 October 2019).
10 Novosti, 25 January 2019.
12 Novosti, 30 March 2019.
13 Informer, 16 August 2019.
14 Informer, 14 February 2019.
15 Informer, 30 November 2018.
16 Politika, 19 November 2019.
17 Politika, 31 July 2019.
65
Heavy Blow For Serbia – Naser Orić Released In Sarajevo In Spite

Of Evidence He Personally Slaughtered Serbs And Gouged Out The-
ir Eyes”,18 “Novosti Exclusive – Sarajevo Makes Blacklist Of Serbs”,19
“Serbian People Disappearing From B&H Federation”,20 “Three Ser-
bs Tortured – Brutally Beaten By Sarajevo Police”.21
The essential purpose of these texts is clearly to question the
integrity of B&H, but in this case through the claim to victimhood
and by affirming a narrative of an existential threat facing Serbs in
B&H which renders survival of the Republika Srpska impossible.
These texts strongly emphasize geopolitical and geo-strategic is-
sues, insistently underlining the Republika Srpska’s special ties
with the Russian Federation and its opposition to B&H’s member-
ship in NATO, a goal advocated by Bosniak representatives. It is in
this context that Novosti insists particularly on the Republika Srps-
ka as a bastion of Russian geo-strategic interests in the region. The
article “SDA Demand Ordered By West – Undermine Srpska To Cut
off Russian Influence” presents a case taken by Bakir Izetbegović
and the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) before the Constitutional
Court to change the name of the Republika Srpska as an “indirect
message sent by Western centres of power to the Srpska leadership
to ‘loosen’ ties with Serbia and Russia, accept B&H’s accession to
NATO, and recognize Kosovo”. The same text in Novosti includes an
infographic presenting in chronological order all the attempts by
Bosniak representatives to change the name of the Republika Srps-
ka since 2004, interpreted as “much more than just renaming one
of the two constituent entities”, as it would actually have a “domino
effect... resulting in changes to the B&H Constitution and essentially
destroying the Dayton Agreement and so nullifying everything the
Serbs had accomplished through it. In other words, changing the
name would mean the end of the Republika Srpska”.22 The texts,
18 Informer, 1 December 2018.

19 Novosti, 9 November 2018.
20 Politika, 25 October 2018.
66
“SDA Initiative - Bosniaks Want To Undo Srpska”23 and “National

Holiday Of Republika Srpska Threatened – Bosniaks And Croats
Strike At Republika Srpska”,24 also published in Novosti, follow on
with the same narrative. These articles similarly insist that the Re-
publika Srpska is under direct threat of elimination by Bosniak and
Croat (political) forces, which is why the Republika Srpska’s repre-
sentatives must “present flagrant breaches of the Dayton Accords
to the RS National Assembly” so as to “reach a decision on the fu-
ture of the Republika Srpska” and “launch an initiative for seces-
sion”. With regard to these developments, Milorad Dodik was once
again quite explicit in his irredentist endeavours, saying “there is no
point in saying Srpska cannot secede, as Valentin Incko does. The
Republika Srpska has no intention of suffering in silence, as it
awaits the outcome of court proceedings. It is evident that the Bos-
niaks do not want anyone else in B&H and that there is no place for
Serbs in it.” Informer has carried similar stories about threats to the
existence of the Republika Srpska in feature articles, “Bakir Warns
Dodik: B&H Will Join NATO Or US Will Destroy You”25 and “Serbs In
Srpska United Thanks To NATO: Bosniaks Risking Biggest Crisis In
B&H With No Way Out!”, the only difference being a focus on the
anti-NATO narrative rather than the Russian Federation.
It is, however, texts that highlight the physical threat to Serb
survival in B&H, such as “Bosnian Serb Leader At Gunpoint: Plan To
Assassinate Dodik”,26 “Serbian People Disappearing From B&H
Federation”,27 and “Three Serbs Tortured – Brutally Beaten By
Sarajevo Police”,28 which produce the most disturbing effects. In the
last of these articles, the Novosti journalist, by name Matavulj, re-
ports on three Serbs questioned by police at a Sarajevo police sta-
tion as part of an investigation into the murder of two Sarajevo
23 Novosti, 24 January 2019

67
police officers. The author places the entire case in a context of Bos-
niak ethnic and religious intolerance for Serbs, stating that the po-
lice tortured the three detainees using “electrocution” and “testicle
crushing”, shouting at them “you’ll end up childless... you mother-
fucking Chetniks”, and that the three Serbs being interrogated were
“violated with umbrellas and forced to listen to Adhan and to pray
Salat al-Janazah (the Islamic funerary prayer)”. This narrative is a
vulgar manifestation and continuation of such texts as “Serbian
People Disappearing From B&H Federation” from Politika, which
accuses Bosniaks from the B&H Federation of “not want[ing] to see
Croats let alone Serbs in it”, while implying that they are carrying
out national-ethnic engineering with the aim of “cleansing the Fed-
eration of Serbs systematically” in both a “political and a biological”
sense.29 The existential threat at the political level is presented in an
article entitled “Bosnian Serb Leader At Gunpoint: Plan To Assassi-
nate Dodik”, published in Informer. In this text, the claim is made
that the Director of Coordination of B&H Police Units has issued
orders forbidding the Republika Srpska Police entry to Sarajevo,
which apparently suggests a covert operation aimed at paving the
way for the assassination of Milorad Dodik, just as, Informer claims,
happened at Potočari, in an incident that nearly “nearly ended in
the assassination of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić”. The same
article also features an official statement from the Republika Srps-
ka cabinet, stating that Milorad Dodik and his associates had re-
ceived death threats that they would be “burned alive”.
Bosniaks as descendants of the Turks

The third group of texts listed in the above table includes those
that present Bosniaks as “descendants of Turkish slaves” who, by
adopting Islam, had embraced the Ottoman Empire and so “the in-
vaders”, which is why they still celebrate the victory of the Turkish
68
army at Gallipoli, as Politika and Informer both reported under the

headlines, “Bosniaks Celebrate Turkish Victory At Gallipoli”30 and
“Bosniaks Erect Monument In Honour Of Turkish Conquest Of Bo-
snia! Descendants Of Turkish Slaves Celebrate Invaders Of Their
Own Land!”31 This narrative of the Bosnian Muslims as ultimate
Other was used by Serbian nationalist circles during the 1980s and
1990s to frame them as bearing a threat of Islamic fundamentali-
sm endangering Christian Europe and, so, Serbia as an Orthodox
country and last defence against “Islamic invasion”. As mentioned
in the introduction, it was precisely this way of presenting Bo-
snian Muslims as infidels and collaborators with the Ottoman oc-
cupation that led to ethnic cleansing and genocide in B&H during
the Serbian attack on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995. Per-
fect examples that show how present such thoughts and politics
are in Serbian society and the mainstream media there, even two
and a half decades after the conflict ended, are to be found in the
following texts: “Smells Like The 1990s! U.S. Infiltrating Jihadists
Into B&H And Preparing Alija Izetbegović’s Scenario”,32 “SDA Pre-
sident’s Diabolical Plan: Bakir Sends Afghanis To Settle In Serbian
Municipalities And Chase Serbs Out Of B&H”,33 “Dževad Galija-
šević – New York Attackers Were Citizens Of B&H”,34 “Bosnia On
Alert! Two Hard-Boiled ISIS Terrorists Coming Back From Syria-
!”,35 “Galijašević: Bin Laden And His Gang Granted Citizenship By
Advocates Of Unified Bosnia”,36 “Kitarović: B&H Unstable, Contro-
lled By Militant Islam”,37 “Suspect For Assault On US Mission In
Sarajevo Arrested”,38 and “Jihadi Families Waiting For Housing In
30 Politika, 22 March 2019.

31 Informer, 10 March 2019.
32 Informer, 14 October 2019.
34 Informer, 27 April 2019.
36 Informer, 18 September 2019.
69
Mostar”.39 All these texts aim to link B&H and Bosniak Muslims to
violent paramilitary takfir-jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda and
the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant, while at the same time
“rationalizing” attempts by Bosnian Serbs to break away from a
state union that is “dysfunctional” and of “questionable value”. In
the text entitled “Smells Like The 1990s!...”, Dževad Galijašević, a
vocal proponent of conspiracy theories and Islamophobic ideas in
Serbian society, comments:
Just recall the 1990s and how wars in the Middle East were
transplanted to the Balkans by the political agency of Western
countries. All of this is reminiscent of that period. The United
States is withdrawing its military from Syria, reducing its pres-
ence in the Middle East, while concentrating its troops and forc-
es towards Iran and the Balkans. American forerunners have al-
ready arrived in the Balkans. …[evident in the] soldiers of the
defeated so-called Islamic State, [and B&H has] is prepared to
receive them... and they will not come there unorganized.
The other texts serve basically the same purpose, using a range of
topics to achieve their aim, applying various perspectives to affirm
the idea that Bosnia is fertile ground for the extremist ideology of
radical Islamic groups that threaten the stability of the country and
the region and the safety of the Serb people. To name a few, there
are allegations of links between Bosnian Muslim political parties
and al-Qaeda and the individuals who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks
on New York, claims of plans by the Bosniak political ruling party to
cleanse the country of Serbs and replace them with Afghan settlers,
assertions about returnees from Syrian battlefields to be given a
warm welcome by the Bosniak Muslims, etc. In addition to the texts
listed in the table, the idea of “Islamic threat” was prominently fe-
atured as topic of the week in Politika on 14 July 2019, in an article
entitled “The Green Transversal: The Balkan Corridor Of Instabili-
ty”, which we will now analyse in more detail.
70
Reaffirmation of Old Anti-Muslim Tropes – “The Green

Transversal: the Balkan Corridor of Instability”
“The Green Transversal” was a common term in Serbian nati-
onalist circles in the late 1980s and early 1990s, employed to
pave the way for expansionist incursions by Serb forces and fo-
rays into B&H and Kosovo. In U.S. Policy and the Geopolitics of
Jihad: The Green Transversal in the Balkans, Srdja Trifković, a ra-
dical proponent of the theory of Islamic threat, says that “Green
Transversal” can have two meanings. The first implies that the
“long-term goal of Islamist ideologues, both in the Balkans and
throughout the Muslim world, is to create a unified territory to
include predominantly Muslim cities located along the route
from Turkey in the southeast to Bosnia in the northwest”. The
second, according to Trifković, relates to the threat of “increased
ethno-religious self-identification in traditional Muslim commu-
nities in the Balkans”. According to Trifković, these two different
concepts and aspirations are not at all mutually exclusive. They
reinforce each another and pose a threat to the Serb national
idea of a “Greater Serbia”. To support his thesis, Trifković cites
the words of Sir Alfred Sherman, former adviser to Margaret
Thatcher and founder of the Lord Byron Foundation, who clai-
med, during the Serbian attack on B&H, that the Muslim goal was
to create a “Green Transversal” stretching from Bosnia through
the Sandžak to Kosovo, to allow the Muslims to separate Serbia
territorially from Montenegro and so establish a compact pre-
dominantly Muslim territorial entity. Sherman also accused the
Western powers of “supporting the creation of this Islamistan”,
primarily through their “close cooperation with Iran, whose aim
was to establish a base on European soil for further political
activities”, but also because they had enabled Turkey to engage
in military actions through NATO, even though the country had
abandoned Ataturk’s secular ideology for neo-Ottomanism and
71
pan-Islamist aspirations.40 In the wake of democratic change in

Serbia in 2000 and the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević and his
nationalist regime, intellectuals who espoused such narratives
found themselves side-lined. When the first democratic prime
minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjić, was assassinated in 2003 by
members of the “Hague Lobby”, however, things started gradu-
ally to revert towards a reaffirmation of nationalist aspirations
and tendencies. The right-wing Democratic Party of Serbia, whi-
ch won power in 2004 in the first parliamentary elections after
the assassination, bears a special responsibility for this turn. As
a result of such developments, the intellectuals who had sown
hatred of Balkan Muslims during the 1990s regained, over the
following 15 years, considerable space in public discourse and
the mainstream media in Serbia. This is especially true of the
period since 2012, when power was seized by the right-wing
populist Serbian Progressive Party, founded by former top-ran-
king officials of the far-right Serbian Radical Party, whose leader
Vojislav Š� ešelj was sentenced by the Hague Tribunal to ten years
in prison for crimes including incitement to persecution and the
deportation and forcible displacement and resettlement of Cro-
ats from the village of Hrtkovci, in Vojvodina, in 1992.
On 14 July, 2019, the oldest and most important Serbian daily,
Politika, published a feuilleton, “The Green Transversal: The Balkan
Corridor Of Instability”, that offers an excellent example of this reaf-
firmation of the Serbian nationalist narrative of “Islamic threat”
and insistence on the image of Bosniak and Albanian Muslims as
part of a pan-Islamic conspiracy network aimed at conquering Eu-
rope. It is important to note that the feuilleton was published as the
five-page Topic of the Week section during the anniversary week of
the genocide of Bosniak Muslims in Srebrenica on 11 July 1995.
The editorial board did not consider it appropriate to mark 11 July
40 http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/2009/05/green-corridor-in-balkans.
html (accessed 1 October 2019).
72
as the Day of Remembrance of the Srebrenica Genocide in any way,

even though it is commemorated in countries around the world
and in the institutions of the European Union and the Council of
Europe. Instead it opted to feature a small piece of news on 12 July,
about the commemorative rally held annually at the Potočari Me-
morial Centre on 11 July.41 In this context, given the socio-political
atmosphere prevailing in Serbian society, it is difficult to believe
that choosing to address the issue of the “Green Transversal” dur-
ing the same calendar week was pure coincidence.
The feature on “The Green Transversal: The Balkan Corridor
Of Instability” included texts on “Myth or Reality”, “The Balkan
Corridor of Instability”, “Cutting Serbia and Russia off from the
Mediterranean” and an opinion piece on “The Geopolitical Phe-
nomenon” written by the aforementioned Srdja Trifković, with
contents basically identical to those of his U.S. Policy and the Geo-
politics of Jihad: The Green Transversal in the Balkans, analysed
above. In addition to Trifković, the feuilleton also featured the Is-
lamophobe Dževad Galijašević prominently, as interlocutor of the
author of the text on “Myth or Reality”, in which he set out the
goals of the Green Transversal as follows:
This idea implies that Turkey will reach out across Albania and
Kosovo and Metohija, along the route that extends from Ulcinj to
the Preševo Valley, thus separating Serbia and Montenegro, pene-
trating through the Sandžak and across Užice, to reach Sarajevo. It
41 In July 2019, nine non-governmental organizations issued a public statement

commenting that it was “shameful and disgusting” that not one Serbian state offi-
cial had characterized Srebrenica as genocide since 1995, confirming the continu-
ity of genocide denialism by the state and the society alike. The statement read,
“The official politics of genocide denial is particularly reinforced by the continuous
refusal of incumbent Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister Ana
Brnabić to call the Srebrenica crime a genocide, in which they are followed not
only by politicians from the ruling coalition but a large portion of the opposition”,
adding that Srebrenica genocide is a forbidden phrase for Serbian state institu-
tions, while genocide deniers are given ample space and freedom in pro-govern-
ment media. For more on the statement, see https://www.autonomija.info/nvo-
iz-srbije-shame-and-defeat-the- fact-the- official-serbia- neglect- genocide-in-sre-
brenica.html (accessed 1 Osctober 2019).
73
involves a route from Sarajevo to Istanbul, a swathe of land that

will eventually encompass isolated areas that stretch from Mace-
donia towards the Bulgarian border and are populated by Turco-
phone populations. It is supposed to be a broad project of Tur-
key’s return to the Balkans.
Galijašević claims that this route, with B&H as its stronghold,

includes “Saudi Arabian outposts and radical bases that would
prove useful in causing destabilization and chaos and serve to
redefine borders if necessary”. In addition to Trifković’s article
and Galijašević’s expertise, the feature also included short “hu-
morous puns” by satirist Dragutin Minić Karlo, such as “With the
Serbs down there stopping Europe turning green, Europe is far
from turning red in shame” and “In addition to the green tran-
sversal, there’s a white line, and it’s powdery”, along with a map
entitled “The Green Transversal Route” (figure 1).
The “Green Transversal Route” map, Politika, 14/07/2019

(figure 1)
74
It was, however, the text on “The Balkan Corridor Of Instability”

by Prof Milan Mijalkovski, PhD, of the Faculty of Security Studies
at Belgrade University that included the most disturbing claims,
framing Balkan Muslims as a security risk in the most direct and
dangerous way. In the spirit of Serbian nationalist intellectuals at
the turn of the century, he repeated the “mantra” that an entire
project to Islamise the Balkans had begun back in the mid-1980s.
He went on to recall the presence of mujahideen in the wars of the
1990s, fighting against the Serbs in B&H and Kosovo, which he then
(in)directly related to Bosnian and Kosovo Muslims going to Syria
today to fight for Islamic State, whose goal is “in its first phase, to
reclaim everything that was once Islamic, that is, all the territory of
the Ottoman Empire, including present-day B&H”. He also points
unambiguously to the threat posed by Islamic terrorists in the re-
gion, especially in B&H, the Sandžak, and Kosovo, where they are
free to organize and carry out serious terrorist attacks at any time.
II. “Kosovo is the Heart of Serbia”

In the introductory part of this chapter, we emphasized the signi-
ficance of the battle of Kosovo for the creation of Serbian national
identity, which is essentially opposed to the “Turk”. The Battle of
Kosovo took place on 28 June 1389 on “Kosovo Field, near where
the Lab flows into the Sitnica”, not far from Prishtina, the current
capital of Kosovo. During the battle, Serbian troops led by Prince
Lazar Hrebeljanović, his son-in-law Vuk Branković, and Bosnian
Duke Vlatko Vuković clashed with an Ottoman army led by Sultan
Murad I and his sons Bajezid and Yakub Çelebi.42 Reliable historical
sources for the battle are scarce, which has over time left ample
room for the construction and affirmation of legends and myths
42 Olga Zirojević, Iz osmanske baštine (Belgrade: Balkanski centar za Bliski Istok),

p. 127.
75
that stress the values of the Serb people’s “martyrdom, sacrifice
and fearlessness”, while at the same time promoting a very specific
religious and national symbolism. This is all expressed primarily
in a very rich cycle of epic poetry on various aspects of the Battle
of Kosovo, which dates largely from the period when the Serbian
national identity was being formed in the 19th century and was
therefore used as the cornerstone for building the national ide-
ology, by combining two very powerful narratives permeated by
distinct anti-Islamic sentiment, name a clerical-ecclesiastical and
a national-romantic narrative. American scholar of Islam Michael
Sells has defined the nationalist ideology created by amalgama-
tion of these two narratives through his coinage Christoslavism.
This ideology’s main characteristic is the emphasis it puts on the
Kosovo Battle as a “cosmic conflict between good and evil”, that
is, a conflict between Serb Christian knights led by Prince Lazar,
represented in epic poetry as embodiment of the entire Serb nati-
on, on one side, and Muslims or Turks, characterized as “heathen”
and “detractors of the Cross”, on the other side.43 Identifying Prince
Lazar with the entire Serb nation means his death at the Battle of
Kosovo also meant the “death of the Serbian nation”, for which the
Turks/Muslims were responsible. It is precisely on this basis that
the role of archetypal enemy, the ultimate Other, in Serb national
consciousness was transferred to those Southern Slavs who adop-
ted Islam as their religion later on in history. Seen as having sided
with the invaders, they were perceived as “race traitors” who had
betrayed the “faith of their ancestors”. This is why Muslim South
Slavs and Kosovar Albanians have been systematically racialized
in Serb tradition and depicted as “genetically faulty” “moral fre-
aks”. Over the centuries, such ideas have begotten a deeply ingra-
ined urge for and obsession with revenge that Serb nationalists
nurtured and directed against South Slav Muslims and Kosovar
43 Michael Sells, “Islam in Serbian Religious Mythology”, in Maya Shaztmiller, Is-

lam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), p. 63.
76
Albanians.44 The first opportunity for revenge came after Serbia gai-
ned independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. From then on,
the nationalist Serbian political elite systematically strove to enlar-
ge Serbia’s territory to encompass everywhere Serbs lived and any
regions they believed Serbia had an “historical” right to. The first
opportunity to pursue these goals arose with the outbreak of the
Balkan Wars (1912-1914) and then during and after the First Wor-
ld War (1914-1918). During that period, numerous atrocities and
crimes were committed against the Muslim populations of central
and southern Serbia, Kosovo, and the Sandžak. To this day, these
pogroms remain unfortunately under-researched, especially with
regard to ethnic cleansing of the Turkish population of the Balkans
as the Slavic, non-Muslim nation-states of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece,
and Montenegro were being created. American historian Justin Mc-
Carthy, a leading authority on this issue in his very valuable book
Death and Exile: Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821-1922,
has tried to shed light on the atrocities committed against Muslims
in the Western Balkans during the 19th and first half of the 20th
century. Other important sources also outline unambiguously the
fate of Balkan Muslims in the early 20th century, including the Car-
negie Foundation’s Report on the Balkan Wars, published in 1914,
and the very valuable first-hand reports of Russian Marxist Leon
Trotsky, who was sent in 1912 by the Kievskaya Myslin newspaper
as its correspondent to cover the events of the Balkan Wars. The
statistics provided by McCarthy tell us that the Muslim population
on the territories that would later be incorporated into Yugosla-
via dropped from 1,241,076 to 566,478, or by as much as 64 per-
cent, between 1911 and 1923.45 The Carnegie Foundation’s Report
states that 80% of Muslim villages were demolished and burned
44 Ivan Ejub Kostić, Religija, verovanje i građanski identitet (Belgrade: Balkanski

Centar za Bliski istok, 2019).
45 Justin McCarthy, Stanovništvo osmanlijske Evrope prije i posle pada carstva (Sa-
rajevo, Belgrade: Center for Advanced Studies & Balkan Centre for Middle East,
2017), pp. 48-52.
77
in areas where the newly established and predominantly Christian

nation-states waged military operations in their effort to create
“pure monoethnic states”. In the case of Serbia, the pogroms occu-
rred primarily in the south and on the territory of Kosovo and were
against the Muslim Albanian population.46 In retrospect it is clear
that the ethnic cleansing of the first half of the 20th century was
very similar to how Serb military, police and paramilitary forma-
tions operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo during the
wars of the 1990s, with the unambiguous aim of ethnically clean-
sing those territories of Bosniak Muslims and Kosovar Albanians.
In the Kosovan context, President Slobodan Milošević delivered a
famous speech in Gazimestan in June 1989, on the 600th anniver-
sary of the Battle of Kosovo, to a crowd of approximately 300,000
people. Many believe this speech heralded the bloody dissolution
of the former Yugoslavia.47 Following a series of socio-political
developments in the 1990s, open conflict broke out in Kosovo in
1998, between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which sought
independence from Serbia, and special forces of the Serbian Mini-
stry of Internal Affairs (MUP) and the Yugoslav Army. The conflict
soon escalated into the Kosovo War, which ended with NATO inter-
vention in 1999 against the Serbian forces.
According to a ruling of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War, the Yugoslav
Army and the Serbian MUP used “excessive and indiscriminate
force”, resulting in the destruction of villages, massacres of Alba-
nian civilians, and their mass displacement.48 The conflict’s final
epilogue came on February 17, 2008, when the Kosovo
Assembly unilaterally declared independence from the Republic
46 Dubravka Stojanović, Ulje na vodi (Belgrade: Peščanik, 2010), pp. 263-266.

47 During his speech, among other things, Milošević famously said “We are again
becoming engaged in battles and facing battles. They are not armed battles,
but such things cannot be excluded yet.”
48 D. Pavlica, Savremena istorija Kosova, available on: https://pescanik.net/
savremena-istorija-kosova/ (2011).
78
of Serbia.49 The Kosovo Parliament’s decision for independence

and the ongoing battle over the status of Kosovo remain highly
controversial issues and burning questions in political and so-
cial life in Serbia, which is why the role of archetypal enemy, im-
posed on the Turks from the 13th to the 19th century, has now
been transferred in public discourse to the Kosovar Albanians.
In other words, Kosovar Albanians have been given the role of
being out to steal Kosovo – the “heart of the Serbian” nation.
After this brief contextual introduction required to allow us
a deeper understanding of the motives for the strong animosity
expressed towards Kosovar Albanians within the Serbian na-
tional ideology, we may now turn to our discursive analysis of
the texts selected from the daily newspapers (Table 2).
Articles selected from Politika, Novosti and Informer
Politika Novosti Informer
Emergency! Shqiptars
Kosovo – Fake State KFOR Also Backs Thaçi’s Preparing Criminal Plan:
Founded On Terrorism Assault Greater Albania To Be
Realized By New Year
On-The-Scene With
Great Menace Lurking!
Representatives Of Our
Shqiptars Plotting
Independent Kosovo A People In Gjakova:
Diabolical Plan Against
Risk To World Peace Albanians Aim To
Serbia: Revolt Underway
Eradicate All Serbian
In Preševo
Traces
Emergency! Shqiptars On
West Threatens Serbia: Set Rampage Over Kosovo And
Greater Albania By Back
Foot In Kosovo And You Metohija: Shqiptars Attack
Door
Will Be At War With NATO Serbs Using Teargas And
Bats
49 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-serbia/kosovo-declares-inde-
pendence-from-serbia-idUSHAM53437920080217 (accessed 1 October 2019).
79
Extreme Danger! West

Rama: Strategy For Openly Supports Albanian
Albanian Unification By CIA Arming Albanians Extremists: Ustashe Train
2025 Shqiptars For Assault On
Serbian Border
Vučić Comments On
Alarming! Shqiptars Set
Kosovar Albanian Platform
Vučić Receives Lynch Date For Attack On Serbs:
– Get That Paper Out Of
Threats Just Like Djurić War In Kosovo To Begin
My Sight, You Prishtina
On 15 December
Thugs
EULEX And KFOR Tolerate

Vučić: Kosovar Army Could Northern Macedonia
KLA War Veteran Shoot-
End In Tragedy Overrun By Shqiptars
Outs
Debate Of The Week:

Prishtina Assembly
Marko Djurić, Head Of
Pacoli’s Government Led Working Against Peaceful
Office For Kosovo And
By Kiddie-Killer Solution With Belgrade:
Metohija: KFOR Must
Shqiptars Declare War On
Disarm Kosovar
Serbia!
Paramilitaries
Vulin: Paramilitary
Ramush Defends ‘Borders’ Vučić Not Bluffing: Will
Formations Formed In
And Calls For War Send Army To Kosovo
Kosovo
Kosovo Paramilitary Serbs Shot At, Old People Serbs In Kosovo Still Being
Pushes Region Over Edge Beaten Up Tortured By Shqiptars!
Western Balkans Vučić Comments On Moves

Danger! Madmen From
Operation Flash By Prishtina: They Want
Prishtina Getting Crazier:
Preparation For Northern To Cleanse Kosovo Of All
Shqiptars Want War
Kosovo Serbs
They Really Want To Start

West Gives Green Light For A War! Haradinaj And
Albanians And KFOR Train
New Attack On Northern Thaçi Threaten New
To Attack Serbian Tanks
Kosovo And Metohija Round Of Arrests In
Northern Kosovo
Prishtina Special Forces Minister Vulin In Beijing

Terrorize Northern Kosovo Warns About Threats To Shqiptars Have Diabolical
And Metohija: Brutal And Peace And Stability In This Plan: Assault On Northern
Indiscriminate Attack On Part Of Europe: Greater Kosovo Planned For June
Serbs, Dozens Beaten Up, Albania Will Set The 5?!
Four Injured Balkans On Fire
80
Combat Readiness Of Horror! Terrorists’ Wicked

Ana Brnabić: Prishtina
Armed Forces Raised To Plans In Kosovo: Shqiptars
Discriminates Against
Highest Level: Serbian Planned To Slaughter
Anything Serbian
Army Ready To Fight! Serbs
Realization Of Criminal
Stefanović: Prishtina Aim ROSU Assault: They Project, Serious
Is To Expel Serbs From Threatened To Open Fire Provocation From Peć:
Kosovo And Metohija On Us Shqiptars Create Greater
Albania
Prishtina Has Started To New Weapon Of The Great Two Devils Join Forces:
Carry Out Economic Ethnic Powers: Creating A Milo Andthaçi Usurp
Cleansing Kosovar Orthodox Church Serbian Churches
Perfidious Action By
Serbia Considers Using
Government In Prishtina: Serbian Church Under
Military In Kosovo And
Serbian Churches Turned NATO Attack
Metohija
Into Catholic Temples
Shqiptars Want To Occupy

Northern Kosovo Before
KLA Was Terrorist
Hillary Clinton’s Visit On
International: Jihadists
Next Year In Prizren June 12, While Putin’s
From Košare On Killing
Intelligence Officers Claim
Spree In London
Shqiptars From ISIS
Engaged For Action
Table 2
Kosovo as a Fake State

Unlike the texts dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are
primarily aimed at undermining its statehood, the language em-
ployed in the media in the case of Kosovo and the Kosovar Alba-
nians is openly warlike and as such constantly fosters a sense of
instability and a pre-war atmosphere in both Serbia and Kosovo.
Such writings may naturally have unpredictable consequences
for the region and for the integration of Kosovar Albanians living
in Serbia proper. It is of particular importance to note the openly
belligerent statements coming from top-ranking officials of the
Republic of Serbia, including the President Aleksandar Vučić,
81
Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, Defence Minister Aleksandar Vulin,

and Interior Minister Nebojša Stefanović. Before turning to their
statements, however, one should note how the Serbian media
present the idea of an independent state of Kosovo. In texts such
as “Kosovo – A Fake State Founded On Terrorism”,50 “Indepen-
dent Kosovo Risk To World Peace”,51 “Greater Albania By Back
Door”,52 “Rama: Strategy For Albanian Unification By 2025”,53
and “Realization Of Criminal Project, Serious Provocation From
Peć: Shqiptars Creating Greater Albania”54, the state of Kosovo is
pictured as a “fake” and “criminogenic entity” thanks to the acti-
vities of the separatist and terrorist organization that is the Ko-
sovo Liberation Army (KLA), which “financed itself from human
trafficking, narcotics, weapons and organ trafficking” during the
war. There is also a constant insistence that Kosovo’s indepen-
dence is actually only a first step towards achieving the ultimate
goal, the establishment of a “Greater Albania” by unification of
the territories of Kosovo and Metohija and Albania. The argu-
ments published in Politika on 27 November 2018 to support
such claims include the words of Albanian Prime Minister Edi
Rama, who presented the concept of a “national project for the
unification of Albania and Kosovo, and called on Ramush Hara-
dinaj, at the time Kosovar Prime Minister, to start developing a
common strategy for the unification of Albanians by 2025” at a
joint meeting of Albanians from Kosovo and Albania. Such ar-
ticles on the potential creation of a “Greater Albania” provide
strong support for the thesis put forward for decades by natio-
nalist Serbian circles insisting that the goal of Kosovar Albanian
separatism is to unification with Albania in a single state. In this
way, the narrative of the Serbian nationalist intellectuals is given
extra weight, while presenting itself as a kind of “prophecy”.

52 Politika, 8 August 2019.
82
Kosovo Albanians as Existential Threat
As well as being presented in the media as a “criminogenic crea-

tion”, Kosovo is also regularly written about as a territory where
Serbian heritage, medieval Orthodox monasteries, and the Ser-
bian population generally are threatened by the Prishtina autho-
rities and Kosovar security intelligence services, which, with the
tacit support of Western countries, are carrying out systematic
aggression against Serbs in Kosovo with the aim of ethnically
cleansing them. The number of texts conveying such messages is
extremely high and they serve to create an atmosphere of profo-
und indignation among Serbs living in Serbia, as well as national
homogenization that could potentially be used to mobilize the
Serb population should military force be employed and armed
conflict with Kosovar Albanians break out again.55
As already noted, these accounts acquire additional weight
in the light of statements made by top government officials of
the Republic of Serbia, who directly threaten war or the use of
force against Kosovo. Such statements were especially frequent
in November and December 2018, after information emerged
that the Kosovan Security Forces were being transformed into a
Kosovan Army. President Vučić commented that, if this were to
happen, “Serbia will find itself in a hopeless situation”, implicitly
55 Texts from Table 2 foreground the vulnerability of Serbs in Kosovo and the risk of
ethnic cleansing and so help create a febrile atmosphere in Serbia. The following
texts spread this kind of victimhood propaganda: “Vučić Comments On Moves By
Pristina: They Want To Cleanse Kosovo Of All Serbs” (Novosti, 22 November 2018),
“On-The-Scene With Representatives Of Our People In Gjakova: Albanians Aim To
Eradicate All Serbian Traces” (Novosti, 2 September 2018), “Horror! Wicked Plans Of
Terrorists In Kosovo: Shqiptars Planned To Slaughter Serbs” (Informer, 26 July
2019), “Serbs On Kosovo Still Tortured By Shqiptars!” (Informer, 15 Jun 2019),
“Emergency! Shqiptars On Rampage On Kosovo And Metohija: Shqiptars Attack
Serbs Using Teargas And Bats” (Informer, 4 May 2019), “Ana Brnabić: Prishtina Dis-
criminates Against Anything Serbian” (Politika, 20 November 2018), “‘Stefanović:
Prishtina Aims To Expel Serbs From Kosovo And Metohija” (Politika, 11 December
2018), “Prishtina Has Started To Carry Out Economic Ethnic Cleansing” (Politika, 22
November 2018), “Serbs Shot At, Old People Beaten Up” (Novosti, 29 May 2019).
83
telling the public what Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić had
already stated openly on November 6, 2018, viz. that if a Kosovan
Army were formed Serbia would “consider using military force
to prevent any new ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Serbs”. The Prime
Minister’s statement was followed by statements by other sen-
ior Serbian officials, such as Defence Minister Aleksandar Vulin,
who said “it is clear to everyone that the Kosovan Army is not an
army but a terrorist organization” with only one goal, “to clash
with Serbia and Serbs”, adding “that it may have grave conse-
quences and jeopardise the security of the entire region”. These
statements by Brnabić and Vulin were followed by basically
identical messages from Marko Djurić, the Head of the Office for
Kosovo and Metohija, and Interior Minister Nebojša Stefanović,
who both accused the Kosovo authorities of systematically striv-
ing to expel Serbs and labelled the Kosovo Army “paramilitary”,
just as their fellow government officials had done. Another thing
to provoke uproar among Serbian officials was the decision by
Kosovo officials in November 2018 to impose a 100% tariff on
Serbian exports to Kosovo. Following this decision by the Koso-
vo authorities, negotiations on normalizing relations between
Serbia and Kosovo, mediated by EU officials, were suspended.56
56 Texts from Table 2 that (in)directly contribute to the warmongering atmosphere,

whether by reference to potential threats of attack by Kosovar Albanians against
Serbs living in northern Kosovo and Serbia or threats that Serbia may use its mili-
tary might against Kosovo, include: “Serbia Considers Using Military On Kosovo
And Metohija” (Politika, 6 September 2018), “Vučić Not Bluffing: Will Send Army
To Kosovo” (Informer, 30 May 2019), “Combat Readiness Of Armed Forces Raised
To Highest Level: Serbian Army Ready To Fight!” (Novosti, 30 September 2018),
“Vučić: Kosovar Army Could End In Tragedy” (Politika, 20 October 2018), “Debate
Of The Week: Marko Djurić, Head Of Office For Kosovo And Metohija: KFOR Must
Disarm Kosovar Paramilitaries” (Politika, 9 December 2018), “Vulin: Paramilitary
Formations Forming In Kosovo” (Politika, 13 November 2018), “Kosovo Paramili-
taries Push Region Over Edge” (Politika, 5 December 2018), “Danger! Madmen
From Prishtina Getting Crazier: Shqiptars Want War” (Informer, 19 May 2019),
“Prishtina Assembly Working Against Peaceful Solution With Belgrade: Shqiptars
Declare War On Serbia!” (Informer, 8 March 2019), “Great Menace Lurking!
Shqiptars Plotting Diabolical Plan Against Serbia: Revolt In Preševo Under Way”
(Informer, 1 July 2019), “Extreme Danger! West Openly Supports Albanian
84
Indeed, the European Union, as mediator in the dialogue, and

the United States are framed as pursuing “anti-Serb ideas” and
supporting the “war” against the Serbs by arming the Kosovar Al-
banian security forces and providing logistical and military assis-
tance for their operations in the north of the country. Units of the
Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
(EULEX) are presented as destabilizing agents whose aim is to
help the Kosovo authorities in Prishtina meet their goals to the
detriment of Serbs and their rights.57
Media coverage also plays on the religious feelings of readers.
In the texts, “Serbian Church Under NATO Attack”,58 “New Weapons
Of The Great Powers: Creating A Kosovar Orthodox Church”,59 “Per-
fidious Action By Government in Prishtina: Serbian Churches
Turned Into Catholic Temples”,60 and “Two Devils Join Forces: Milo
And Thaçi Usurp Serbian Churches”,61 the claim is made that the
Kosovo authorities, helped by NATO and Western countries, have
plans to “steal” Serbian monasteries and churches, including some
of the oldest and most significant temples of the Serbian Orthodox
Church, like the monasteries of Gračanica (erected in 1321) and
Visoki Dečani (1335) and most important of all, the monastery of
the Patriarchate of Peć, which served as seat of the Serbian Ortho-
dox Church from 1346-1463 and 1557-1776 (under Ottoman rule).
These monasteries have great emotional value for Orthodox Serbs,
Extremists: Ustashe Train Shqiptars To Assault Serbian Border” (Informer, 4 Jun

2019), “Alarming! Shqiptars Set Date For Attack On Serbs: War In Kosovo Will Be-
gin On 15 December” (Informer, 4 December 2018).
57 The following texts from the table affirm this narrative: “EULEX And KFOR
Tolerate KLA War Veterans Shoot-Outs” (Novosti, 11 September 2018), “West
Threatens Serbia: Set Foot In Kosovo And You’ll Be At War With NATO” (Nov-
osti, 4 October 2018), “CIA Arms Albanians” (Novosti, 5 December 2018),
“Western Balkans Operation Flash Preparation For Northern Kosovo” (Politi-
ka, 2 April 2019), “West Gives Green Light For New Attack On Northern Kosovo
And Metohija” (Politika, 12 Jun 2019).
58 Informer, 22 July 2019.
59 Novosti, 7 September 2018.
60 Novosti, 7 June 2019.
61 Informer, 15 June 2019.
85
who regard them as a pillar of their religious and national identity,

which is why such media accounts can incite popular indignation
and anger against Kosovar Albanians and especially Islam. In this
context of fake media coverage of the potential “theft” of churches
or attacks on them, it is appropriate to recall how the Belgrade Bay-
rakli Mosque was set on fire in retaliation for a number of Serbian
monasteries in Kosovo attacked in 2004.
Kosovo Liberation Army: radical paramilitary jihadists

Texts linking the KLA to radical paramilitary takfir-jihadist or-
ganizations and Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) aim
to place Islam in a confrontation with Orthodox Christianity and
Serbia, which in turn are framed as forces standing in defence of
a Christian Europe unaware of the lurking danger from Muslims.
An article in Novosti entitled “KLA Was Terrorist International: Ji-
hadists From Košare On Killing Spree In London”62 includes the
claim that “Mujahideen led by al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s right-hand
man” responsible for “massacres in Britain, Belgium, Israel, Fran-
ce and Syria” fought against Serbia in the 1990s. The same text
includes the claim that the KLA was trained by the CIA, Green Be-
rets, and the SAS Regiment of the British Special Forces during the
1990s. The text ends with the conclusion that Western countries’
cooperation with “Islamic terrorists” in Kosovo “backfired on
them” on September 11, 2001, and again in 2005 with the bomb
attack on the London underground. Another article, “Assault On
Northern Kosovo Planned For June 5?!”,63 in Informer, has the cla-
im that “Shqiptars” from ISIL “joined Kosovo ROSU special forces,
which have the consent of the US Administration and backup tra-
ining of official Albanian troops to invade the north of Kosovo”,
where the Serbian population is in the majority.

86
III. Memory Politics and Crimes Commi-

tted in the 1990s in B&H and Kosovo
The politics of remembrance is strongly emphasised in the moni-
tored media. In particular, it plays on readers’ feelings by insisting
on the (nationalist) politics of remembering Serb victims, taken
to include not only those of the 1990s but also of the distant past,
especially from World Wars I and II. It is worth noting the key role
that the politics of remembrance play in creating both the present
and the future. Nenad Dimitrijević offers three possibilities for
how a collective or group can relate to its past: a) to promote offi-
cial memory, based on officially established truth; b) to affirm the
politics of oblivion and espouse the ideology of a new beginning;
or c) to adjust the past to particular political, social and cultural
goals.64 The last of these three possibilities has been the domi-
nant pattern in Serbia ever since Slobodan Milošević came to po-
wer in 1989. That is when the politics of remembrance and of the
past itself came increasingly to be deployed in very brutal ways
for the fulfilment of the goals of the Serbian expansionist national
ideology and the “rationalization of intolerance”. Using the politi-
cs of remembrance in this way in the 1990s led to genocide and
the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the B&H and Kosovo.
Attitudes towards the Serbian nationalist ideology and its
(ab)use of the politics of remembrance did not change substan-
tially even after the democratic changes of 2000, when Slobodan
Milošević was ousted from power, even if the criminal politics of
the 1990s were subjected by the new authorities to “various
forms of interpretative negation”. Things nonetheless got much
worse in 2012, when the Serbian Progressive Party, led by Alek-
sandar Vučić, former vice-president of the neo-fascist Serbian
64 Nenad Dimitrijević, „Sjećanje na zločine u naše ime“ in Hikmet Karčić (ed.),

Sjećanje na bosanski genocid: pravda, pamćenje i poricanje (Sarajevo, Institute
for the Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks, 2017), p. 97.
87
Radical Party, and the Socialist Party of Serbia, which had ruled
the country during the criminal 1990s, took power. From that
point on, there has been a rise in most direct forms of:

refusal to accept responsibility for crimes committed in Bosnia,
Croatia and Kosovo; vindication of the destructive essence of na-
tionalism; promotion of war criminals and setting them on a ped-
estal as national heroes, and refusal to recognize the legitimacy of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Public discourse has been colonized by an authoritarian friend-en-
emy dichotomy, where the enemies are non-Serbs, the interna-
tional community, and any individual or organization in Serbia
trying to examine the past with open eyes and insist the country’s
path to democracy requires prior condemnation of crime and a
straightforward rejection of the nationalist heritage.65
Reaffirming a radical nationalist politics of remembrance meant

undertaking a far-reaching historical revisionism to ensure a po-
sitive image of the “national past” and erase any atrocities that
had been committed. That is why the media keeps emphasizing
the heroism of the Serbian people and their sufferings, for whi-
ch the world has shown so little understanding or respect. This
goes hand-in-hand with the systematic construction of Others,
who are thereby turned into enemies of the Serbian people. In
general, the main figures of the enemy are Croats, Bosniaks, (Ko-
sovar) Albanians, and Western countries. Hence, the monitored
media places a strong emphasis on the torments suffered by Ser-
bs under the Ustashe regime in the Independent State of Croatia
(NDH) and the Jasenovac concentration camp during World War
II, for which the Croats have never been punished.66 As well as to
65 Dimitrijević, „Sjećanje na zločine u naše ime“, p. 100.

66 “Letter From Former Jasenovac Prisoners To The United Nations: A Warning To
The World That The Ustashe Are Back” (Politika, 4 April 2019); “Croatia In Shock
Bleiburg Commemoration Prohibited” (Politika, 10 March 2019); “Ivo Goldstein
Given Bad Press Over Jasenovac And Bleiburg” (Politika, 10 March 2019); “Š� ibe-
nik: Nazi Graffiti Sprayed On Monument To Anti-Fascist Victims” (10 March
2018); “Wikipedia Describes Jasenovac As Labour Camp” (Novosti, 1 September
2018); “Stepinac Killed Serbs With Blessing Of Holy See” (Novosti, 9 September
2018); “Ustashe Salutation In Parliament” (16 November 2018).
88
Serbian casualties during World War II, special attention is paid

to Operation Storm from 1995, when 250,000 Serbs fled Croatia
as a result of Croatian military operations, and the 1999 NATO
bombing of Serbia, which was, as already mentioned, the interna-
tional community’s response to the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar
Albanians by Serbian special police forces and the Yugoslav Army.
In the cases of Operation Storm67 and the NATO bombing campa-
ign68, just as with the NDH and World War II, Serbs are presented
as ultimate victims, absolutely guiltless and denied justice be-
cause the perpetrators of those crimes have not been adequately
convicted of their crimes. In the same way, it is insistently claimed
that no one has been found guilty at international tribunals for
the suffering of Serbian victims of the wars of the 1990s in B&H69
andKosovo.70
67 “Commemoration Of Operation Storm At Krušedol Monastery: Pogrom Must

Never Be Forgotten” (Politika, 5 August 2019); “Croatia Celebrates While Can-
dles Lit In Serbia” (Politika, 5 August 2019); “Requiems To Victims Of Opera-
tion Storm Served In Belgrade And Banja Luka” (Politika, 6 August 2019);
“Croats Keep Silent: Where Have 500,000 Serbs Gone?” (Novosti, 4 August
2019); “Twenty-Four Years From Criminal Croatian Operation, Largest Ethnic
Cleansing In Europe Since World War II: Screams Were Louder Than Words,
Death Easier Than Life” (Novosti, 4 August 2019); “Celebrating Pogroms In
Croatia: Threats Of New Storm Coming From Knin” (6 August 2019).
68 “Amfilohije: NATO Aggression Like Nazis” (Politika, 26 March 2019); “Topic Of
The Week: Twenty Years Since NATO Aggression – Heroic Defense Of Serbia,
Speeches By Obrad Stevanović, Božidar Delić And Spasoje Smiljanić” (Politika,
25 March 2019); “Commemorating Day Of Remembrance For Those Killed In
NATO Bombings: We Will Not Remember The Words Of Our Enemies But The
Silence Of Our Friends” (Politika, 25 March 2019).
69 “Day Of Remembrance For Children From Serb Sarajevo Killed” (Politika, 12
March 2019); “Investigation Opened Into Killings Of Serbs In Sarajevo” (Politi-
ka, 26 March 2019); “No Justice For Tuzla Column Incident” (Politika, 16 May
2019); “Naser Orić Found Not Guilty Of Crimes Against Serbs” (Politika, 1 De-
cember 2018); “European Hypocrisy: We Are Labelled Genocidal, While
Butcher Orić Is Acquitted” (Novosti, 1 December 2018); “How The West Con-
cealed Detailed List Of Podrinje Victims In 1993: Novosti Reveals Hidden Re-
port On Massacre Of 1,000 Serbs”; “Seven Islamic Terrorists Who Sowed Death
In Tuzla” (Novosti, 4 March 2019).
70 “Twenty Years Since Massacre Of 14 Serbian Harvesters: Old Gacko, Life And
Sacrifice” (Politika, 24 July 2019); “Srna: Body Organs Of Kidnapped Serbs
Went All The Way To Damascus” (Politika, 31 July 2018); “Tribunal Concealed
89
The most important aspect for this chapter, however, is the

attitude taken by the media we monitored to crimes committed
against the Muslim population in B&H and Kosovo, which they
constantly relativize, minimize or completely negate. The most
blatant example is the reporting in Informer, Politika and Novosti
on the final verdict of the Appeals Chamber of the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals in the case of Rado-
van Karadžić, who was found responsible for genocide in Sre-
brenica, crimes against humanity, and violation of the laws and
customs of war in B&H. All three newspapers either (in)directly
questioned or directly challenged the verdict against Karadžić
and unequivocally defined the Hague Tribunal as a “political
court” that had failed to deliver justice and showed bias, because
it was “founded with the aim of pronouncing only Serbs and their
leaders guilty for the civil war in B&H”. Informer published a piece
on the Karadžić verdict entitled “Hague Crime; Radovan Karadžić
Sentenced To Life”,71 decrying the verdict as “shameful and dis-
graceful” and “the terrible violation of Serbs continuing in the
court in Scheveningen”. The text quoted the words of Karadžić
himself, claiming the verdict had “nothing to do with justice”, and
of his brother Luka, who maintained that Serbs “should feel pride
for [Radovan Karadžić’s] establishment of the first Serbian state
across the Drina, regardless of who admits it”.72 The next day the
same paper featured an article with a message from Radovan
Karadžić from The Hague proclaiming “Brother Serbs, we have
won! The Republika Srpska is our victory”. Novosti also featured
Evidence Of Yellow House” (Politika, 7 December 2018); “Announcement Of

Captain Leshi Day In Bujanovac: Why Is Prosecutor Silent?” (Politika, 23 May
2019). As well as on these cases, particular emphasis tends to be placed on
three events: the Tuzla Column Incident, the crime at the Markale Market in
Sarajevo, and the fate of the “Sarajevo Serbs” reportedly expelled from the city.
All three cases are subjected to ideological interpretation in line with the dom-
inant Serbian nationalist version of the wars of the 1990s.
72 Novosti, 22 March 2019. A similar statement by Luka Karadžić was also pub-
lished in Politika.
90
an article dedicated to the defence of the Republika Srpska, stat-

ing that in light of the “(court) ruling that there was no genocide
in seven B&H municipalities... Srpska is not in danger”, as it had
deprived “Sarajevo [of] its trump cards for dismantling the Re-
publika Srpska”. On the day the sentence was handed down, Nov-
osti’s correspondents were in Pale, in the Republika Srpska, where
they spent time with local citizens watching the verdict live on
television. Novosti cited the words of locals: “We would still follow
Karadžić all over again. We will not run away and we will not for-
sake our Radovan. A man like this is born only once. We Serbs are
proud of our first president. We are thankful for our Republika
Srpska, which he created along with his people. The verdict is
shameful.”73 As well as glorifying Radovan Karadžić, Novosti re-
ported that the public were angry with The Hague Tribunal: “Our
Radovan remains a legendary figure for the Serbian people. As for
the international gangsters who handed down that sentence,
shame on them, not on Serbia.”74
Another very illustrative example of attitudes towards crimes
against Muslims in B&H is the media silence on 11 July, when the
Srebrenica genocide is commemorated. Informer and Novosti didn’t
carry a word on the genocide or any report on the commemorative
rallies at the Potočari Memorial Centre, held every year on July 11.
On the other hand, as discussed above, Politika did something even
more shameful and perfidious by publishing its series of articles on
July 14 in its “Theme of the Week” section on the “Green Transver-
sal”. On July 12, unlike Novosti or Informer, Politika did feature a
piece on the commemorative rally at the Potočari Memorial Centre,
but failed to mention that the crime was committed by Serb forces,
instead presenting the perpetrators of genocide in completely
“depersonalized” terms. Needless to say, the three media moni-
tored for this chapter kept their silence not only for Srebrenica but

91
also for many other cases of war crimes or ethnic cleansing com-
mitted in B&H and Kosovo, which they have never covered. We
mention only a few: Prijedor, Foča, Banja Luka, Višegrad, the siege
of Sarajevo, the massacre in Tuzla, Račak, Suva Reka, Vučitrn, Ora-
hovac, Pusto Selo, Izbica, Š� trpce, and many others.
Such media coverage has, of course, significant implications
for how the public perceives the wars of the 1990s, best evidenced
by a survey on “The Public’s Knowledge of the 1990s, War Crimes,
and War Crimes Trials” conducted by Demostat.75 When asked
what had happened in Srebrenica in 1995, only 12% of the sam-
ple said it was genocide, with as many as 40% saying they did not
know. Even more disturbing is that, when asked “which city was
under siege for four years during the wars of the 1990s”, 78% of
the population claimed not to know. Particularly important in the
context of an uninformed citizenry is that the youngest respond-
ents were least well-informed about the events of the 1990s (only
6% were well-informed while 84% wereuninformed).
To conclude this section of our analysis on the politics of
remembrance, it is worth noting a thirty-part feuilleton pub-
lished in Politika that presented a completely distorted and revi-
sionist picture of the role of Patriarch Pavle and the Serbian Or-
thodox Church during the wars of the 1990s. The feuilleton fea-
tured excerpts of a book by Deacon Aleksandar Praščević, Patri-
arch Pavle on Islam and Muslims (1990-1997). The parts pub-
lished in Politika abounded in inconsistencies and deliberate
disregard for the ample historical sources on Patriarch Pavle
and the Serbian Orthodox Church’s attitude during the wars of
the 1990s and their shameful (in)direct support to the genocid-
al politics of Serb forces in B&H.76
75 http://www.hlc-rdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Istrazivanje_javnog_
mnjenja_Sudjenja_za_ratne_zlocine_Demostat.pdf (accessed 1 October 2019).
76 For more details on Aleksandar Praščević’s feuilleton, see Ivan Ejub Kostić,
“Prećutkivanje istine” in Preporod, no. 22/1128, 2018, pp. 16-17.
92
Conclusion
The dissemination of the nationalist politics of remembrance and
revisionist narratives about crimes committed in the 1990s is
highly effectively carried out through the mass media, whose lan-
guage and style help them reach “ordinary” people and the mas-
ses. It results in war criminals being perceived as national heroes
and the crimes themselves “rationalized”, as explained in the abo-
ve quote from Nenad Dimitrijević. In our conclusion, it is worth
looking at The Ten Stages of Genocide written by Gregory Stanton,
professor at George Mason University.77 Professor Stanton defines
denial as the last, tenth, stage of genocide. During this post-geno-
cidal stage, mass graves are excavated, and attempts are made to
conceal the evidence of crimes committed and the perpetrators
themselves. There is a denial that the crimes were even committed,
while the victims are blamed for what happened to them. Serbia
has already passed through most of this stage and is now in an ele-
venth phase of “triumphalism”, added to the aforementioned ten
stages by Professor Hariz Halilovich, in his paper on “Globalization
and Genocide”. According to Halilovich, the stage of “triumphalism”
is characterized by the fact “that the perpetrators, their sponsors,
and the politics and ideologies behind them no longer seek to deny
the atrocities, but rather to glorify them, celebrating and humilia-
ting the survivors by erecting monuments to the perpetrators of
crimes in the places of massacres”.78 This creates a “culture of tri-
umphalism” in which the media play a key role. We have already
cited a survey on how unaware the Serbian public is of the crimes
committed in the 1990s, but another important aspect of the sur-
vey should be pointed out, namely the ethnic distance revealed
77 Gregory Stanton, “The ten stages of genocide”, in Genocide Watch, 2017. Avail-
able via http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html
(accessed 1 October 2019).
78 Hariz Halilovich, “Globalization and Genocide”, in Ali Farazmand (ed.), Global
Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance (Springer
International Publishing AG, 2017).
93
regarding Muslim ethnic groups, such as Bosniaks and Albanians,

with only 8% of the public responding that they feel any kinship
with Bosniaks and only 2% doing so for Albanians. This highly
disturbing and alarming piece of information should not surprise,
given the constant demonisation of these two ethnic groups in the
media which has turned them into archetypal enemies based on
their religious and ethnic affiliations. For several decades, efforts
have been steadily made to prevent Serbia from being constituted
as a civil and inclusive state of all its citizens, insisting on its sta-
tus as a monoethnic state and cradle of Orthodoxy. An illustrative
example is a text entitled “France Is Not A Civil State Either”, pu-
blished in Politika and written by Miroljub Jevtić, a highly vocal
Islamophobe who sowed hatred against Muslims during the 1980s
and 1990s, paving the way for their physical extermination. In his
text, Jevtić openly claims that, historically speaking, “Serbia is the
patrimony of the Serbian Orthodox Church”, so that all its tenants,
no matter whether they are Orthodox or of another faith, are under
an obligation to “kiss the hand of the patriarch”. He also says it must
be made clear to everyone that “Prince Lazar did not fight for the
Serbs but for Christianity and that his enemies were not Turks but
Muslims who aimed to destroy Christianity”.79
In light of the terrorist massacres committed by Andreas Brei-
vik and Brenton Tarrant, Jevtić’s words resonate even more strong-
ly, not least because his words express the guiding thoughts of the
idols who inspired both Breivik and Tarrant, i.e. Radovan Karadžić
and Ratko Mladić, in their acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing
against Muslims in B&H in the 1990s.80 Once this is taken into ac-
count, it becomes clear that the reaffirmed Serbian nationalist ide-
ology reaches far beyond the borders of Serbia and the Balkan re-
gion and reverberates strongly with ultra-right racist and fascist
movements around the world that harbour a deep hatred and intol-
erance of Muslims and Islam.
79 Politika, 28 May 2019.

80 Both have cited Karadžić and Mladić as their idols.
94
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The aim of this work is to provide an insight into the major drivers
H. Karčić I I. E. Kostić
and platforms of such rhetoric in two Western Balkan countries – Bo-
snia and Herzegovina and Serbia. This work employs the critical dis-
course analysis method to study the pervasive representation of
Islam and Muslims in a number of leading Bosnian Serb and Croat
owned newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in a num-
ber of high-circulation newspapers and tabloids in Serbia published
over the course of one year (August 2018-August 2019). MEDIA DISCOURSE
Following the collocation and concordance of the most frequent ON ISLAM IN THE
MEDIA DISCOURSE ON ISLAM IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

terms and words that revolve around the representation of Islam and
Muslims, the findings indicated that in an overwhelming number of WESTERN BALKANS
cases, Islam and Muslims are associated with violence, religious radi-
calism, ethnic nationalisms and political obstructionism.
Harun Karčić is a PhD degree holder from the Faculty

of Law, University of Sarajevo and a journalist and po-
litical analyst based in Sarajevo. He is a news producer
at Al Jazeera Balkans. He specializes in post-commu-
nist Islam in the Balkans and has published extensive-
ly on Islam and foreign influences in the Balkans with particular focus
on Arab, Turkish and Iranian activities.
Ivan Ejub Kostić is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of

Political Sciences, University of Belgrade. He is one
of the founders of the Balkan Centre for the Midd-
le East and its Executive Director. He is the author
of numerous scientific papers in the field of Islamic
studies and a frequent commentator for the leading media in the
country and region on the topic of the Islam in the Balkans, religion
and nationalism, Islamophobia and Middle East.
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The aim of this work is to provide an insight into the major drivers

Harun Karčić and Ivan Ejub Kostić

Harun Karčić is a PhD degree holder from the Faculty

Ivan Ejub Kostić is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of

Copyright © 2020 Center for Advanced Studies, First Edition

ISBN: 978-9926-471-37-8 Paperback

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CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji

KARČ� IĆ� , Harun

Bibliografija: str. 95-96 ; bibliografske i druge bilješke uz tekst.

Media Discourse on Islam

Constructing the Internal Enemy:

Attitudes toward Bosniak Muslims and Kosovar

the first genocide committed on the European soil after World

The media is a major source of information for the average per-

1 Eva Połońska-Kimunguyi and Marie Gillespie, “Terrorism Discourse on French

major European countries with sizeable Muslim populations,

A note on the perception

In contrast to Muslim migrant communities in Western Europe

6 Slobodan Drakulic, “Anti-Turkish obsession and the exodus of Balkan Mus-

Slavic Muslims as “traitors” were a central theme in the creation of

8 Alexander Lopasic, “Islamization of the Balkans with special reference to Bos-

the retreat of the Ottoman Empire, the remaining Balkan Muslims

Design and method

Mass media has the exclusive power to present information in a

10 K. A. Powell, “Framing Islam/Creating Fear: An Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage

future events through this established frame. When the audienc-

14 Norman Fairclough, Language and power (London: Longman, 1989).

15 Połońska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie, “Terrorism Discourse on French Interna-

circulation.18 It is owned and read by Bosnian Serbs in the Re-

18 B. Vukojevic, and B. Vukojevic. Dnevne novine u Republici Srpskoj. [online] Evrops-

featuring the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian words for “Islam,”

Analysis and discussion

Articles published in the newspapers chosen ranged from

I. The narrative of Bosniak Muslims as political trouble-

Večernji list Dnevni list Glas Srpske

“Bosniaks want to take

“The political will is there, “Croatian People’s

“Dodik: Bosniaks have a

By far, the most dominant theme regarding Muslims and Islam in

manifested most saliently through the self-versus-other schema

49 “Postoji spremnost za formiranje vlasti, ali Bošnjaci opstruiraju”, Vecernji list,

and Bosnian Serb nationalists to establish the distinctiveness

54 Zoran Krešić, “Pokazala se patološka mržnja, Sarajevo pokušava ušutkati Zagreb

57 “Zabrana parade ponosa bi bila neviđena sramota i dokaz da Sarajevo ne želi

“political Sarajevo” as a euphemism for Bosniak Muslim politi-

representatives in Herzegovina-Neretva canton”64 and “Dodik:

current system that gives Croats a disproportionately high voice

69 Ana Popović, “Građanski model dugoročno znači državu većinskoga bošn-

roats will never accept a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina.”74 The

II. The notion of Bosnia and Herzegovi-

The second major discourse revolving around the terms “Mu-

Večernji list Dnevni list Glas Srpske

“These are the individuals

“They came to Bosnia after

“Croatia faces a huge

“Former ISIL fighters soon “ISIL member from Bosnia

“It is a fact: Islamists in “Children of dead Bosnian “10,000 Bosnian