JOANIE SURPOSA UY, petitioner, 

vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, respondent. Judgments; A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.—A judgment void for
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
Pleadings and Practice; A party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence,
or resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law.—A party may directly appeal to this Court from a it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless
decision or final order or resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of head. In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res
fact exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent’s Compromise Agreement, which was
or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts. contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Judgments; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well-regulated Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without
system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
law.—The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence Pleadings and Practice; RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioner’s admission may
and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.—The Court must
policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent is void for being
litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against
vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. For res judicata, to serve as an her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioner’s
absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.809
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of Demurrer to Evidence; Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if
Compromise Agreements; Contracts; A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.—Demurrer to evidence authorizes a
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.—A compromise is a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought.
already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic (537 SCRA 513 [2007]), the Court Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a
pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny. The Court has recently established
agreement is a judgment on the merits. It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus: A demurrer to evidence may be
compromise agreement must comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s
consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not
of the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging
Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out
and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all. one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation
Civil Law; Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a person’s civil necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for
status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.—Advincula v. Advincula (10 SCRA 189 [1964]) has a a recovery.
factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Procedural Rules and Technicalities; When there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of
Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same
again instituted, before the same court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against in the interest of substantial justice.—It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When
Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of
No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a person’s civil status, which cannot be the Court were conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind
subject of compromise. and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical
Same; Filiation; It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been,
cannot be compromised.—It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities
child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and take backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.
filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or  CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:
agreement of the parties. This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated 25
Courts; No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the demurrer to
Article 2035 of the Civil Code.—Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition 1 for the issuance of
said contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. The Complaint was docketed as Special Proceeding
legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and submitted Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship
for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother,
the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959, and
circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled out with the following names: “ALFREDO F.
SURPOSA” as father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of
Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. Respondent financially supported “This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the Evidence submitted to this Court; the
petitioner and Allan. Respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got Opposition thereto; the Comment on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
married. He also provided her with employment. When petitioner was still in high school, respondent x x x x
required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later on able to The instant case is barred by the principle of 1. res judicata because there was a
work at the Gaisano-Borromeo Branch through respondent’s efforts. Petitioner and Allan were introduced judgment entered based on the Compromise Agreement approved by this multiple-
to each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children. During sala Court, branch 09, on the same issues and between the same parties.
petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond review, reversal or
was the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of alteration by another Regional Trial Court and not even the Supreme Court, no matter
petitioner’s daughter.2 how erroneous. 2.
In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an illicit 3.   Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioner’s pleadings to the effect that there is no
relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter. 4 Hearings then ensued during which blood relationship between petitioner and respondent, which is a declaration against
petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until interest, are conclusive on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.
she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on special family occasions. She also 4.   That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioner’s father is Alfredo Surposa is
presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation. Subsequently, on 27 March a public document which is the evidence of the facts therein stated, unless corrected
2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence 5 on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 by judicial order.
of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res judicata in Special 5.  After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their compromise agreement,
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24. she is estopped from refuting on the effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, respondent].
petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against        The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner 1.  That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the open, and
and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision6 dated 21 February 2000. The full contents of said The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a Motion to
Decision reads: Dismiss. 2.
“Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18, 2000, praying The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be subject to
that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which follows: compromise. 3.
Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no 4.    The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for the
blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and [herein same relief against the same defendant.”9
respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or acknowledgement
is concurred with petitioner’s brother Allan, who although not a party to the case, hereby affixes Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:
his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration herein. “1. “Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court believes that its hands are tied.
As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brother’s (Allan) civil, Unless the Court of Appeals strikes down the Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of the
monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not attempt to vacate, much more annul, that Judgment
CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS issued by a co-equal court, which had long become final and executory, and in fact executed.
(P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise would result in patent abuse
SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have received in full the said of judicial discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction cannot be
compromise amount. 2. waived. At any rate, such is brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.
Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more claims, This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing herein case involving same parties
causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and to re-litigate on the same issues already closed.”10
assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors and assigns and/or
against all corporations, companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty Lumber and In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence is hereby given due course,
or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or participation. 3. as the herein case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.” 11
[Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand with
respect to the subject matter of the present petition. 4. RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration 12 in a Resolution13 dated 29 July
Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent 2008.
dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following issues for resolution of this Court:
permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim.” 5. I
   Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the same. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a compromise
Judgment is rendered in accordance with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The parties are agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings embodied in the agreement.”7 II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein before the Regional
With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City effectively bars the filing of the present case.14
Special Proceeding 8830-CEB was declared final and executory.
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition 8 to respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence in Special At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondent’s Demurrer to
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed Resolution dated 25 June Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is
2008 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting respondent’s Demurrer. raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.
RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer and Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
Opposition, respectively, as follows:
  1. “SECTIONFiling of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal also waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent.
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.819
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be Advincula v. Advincula21 has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Manuela
distinctly set forth.” Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for
acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said case
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or resolution of the was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same court, Civil Case No. 5659
trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil Case No. 3553
arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the other hand, when the ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a
the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed person’s civil status, which cannot be the subject of compromise.
facts.15 It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between petitioner compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special child.22 Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established,
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the
before RTC-Branch 24. parties.23
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of jurisprudence and Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000
is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation,  interest produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties’
reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for the alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. 24
same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.16 Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its Decision
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and legal.
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-
the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that was contrary to
between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.17 law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and submitted for approval by both parties.
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9, and RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the said
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the issuance Compromise Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit
of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta25 is
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases. However, the question arises as to relevant herein:
whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case. “It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a
The court rules in the negative. matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a competent
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether the court itself is competent under
or put an end to one already commenced.18 In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,19 the Court any circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where there is want of jurisdiction of
pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can never impart to it the
agreement is a judgment on the merits. vitality which a valid judgment derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply provision of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people.” (7 R. C. L.,
with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) 1039.)
object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is established.
And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or
law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said
produces no legal effect at all.20 to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which it exhibits its head.26
states: In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata,
No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: 2035. “ART. since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
(1) The civil status of persons; Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondent’s Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to
The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (2) law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No.
Any ground for legal separation; (3) 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not
(4) Future support; have attained finality or been considered a judgment on the merits.
The jurisdiction of courts; (5) Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between petitioner
(6) Future legitime.” (Emphases ours.) and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein
may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and reminded that while petitioner’s admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, establish the lack of filiation.27
obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTC-Branch 24 for
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for respondent’s
are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. presentation of evidence.
Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner
 Although respondent’s pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more appropriately a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced
in full below:
 1. “SECTIONDemurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence.”
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to
submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not
entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of
an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.28
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be
granted, thus:
“A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may
reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence
should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact
favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable
therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when
there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the
plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.”29

The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has been able to
show that she is entitled to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make such a
determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter. It did not take into consideration
any of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-Branch 24 dismissed Special Proceedings No. 12562-
CEB on the sole basis of res judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
respondent. Hence, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having
dismissed Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res judicata rather than an adjudication on
the merits of respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent should still be allowed to present evidence before
RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong showing that
grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not
hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court were conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that
dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to
be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around.30
WhereforE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is REVERSED and set aside. This case is
ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the ruling of the
Court herein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Same; Same; Same; Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
respondents. filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.—Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
Family Code; Marriages;  Filiation; The status and filiation of the child cannot be compromised. child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his defenselessness. The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
parents is legitimate.—The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that
Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.
a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides: Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared Same; Same; Same; Proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is
Same;  Same; Same;  The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of sought to be established.—The law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.
legitimacy.—The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,
explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals: The presumption as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the
of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent termination of marriage is sought to be established.
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Same; Same; Same; A record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
Same;  Same; Same;  The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more
particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements
(1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could made therein by the interested parties.—A record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts
have enable the husband to father the child.—The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual contained therein. As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more
union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements
basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was made therein by the interested parties. Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of
no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond
where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also
more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
Same;  Same; Same;  The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence
of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days Same; Same; Same; A person’s surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs
which immediately preceded the birth of the child.—The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be and is passed on from parent to child.—As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the
refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child. To rebut the presumption, the on surnames. A person’s surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed
separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. This may take place, on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of
for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the the law, not related to him in any way.
period of conception. Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that
sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations. Same; Same; Same; In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article
49 of the Family Code grants visi-tation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. —In
Same;  Same; Same;  Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary.—Sexual union between spouses is Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each other’s
contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally
the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.

Same;  Same; Same;  An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect Same; Same; Same; The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.—The import of Ma. Theresa’s exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to
statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. those of tender years.—The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
This declaration—an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate—is the very declaration that is exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by those of tender years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents,
the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
within a valid marriage. impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case,
the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
Same;  Same; Same;  For reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say
that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The proscription is in CORONA, J.:
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to
lean toward the legitimacy of the children.—For reasons of public decency and morality, a married
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. The
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. 1 In case of assault on his rights by those who take
proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the
advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded
intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.
purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved
child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. 2 After their the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of
marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresa’s parents in Fairview, Quezon City. 3 Almost a year later, on Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.4 “It is, therefore, undeniable—established by the evidence in this case—that the appellant [Ma. Theresa]
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee
1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. 5 He [Gerardo] since the so-called “marriage” with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who
alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when
Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. 6 Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo—under the law
residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.7 —is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent ‘marriage’ between [Ma.
the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all. 8 Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly
Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further,
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was [Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the
granted visitation rights.9 child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between the
responsible for the ‘bastardization’ of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship.”16
“INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the . . . decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called ‘visitation
rights’. . . between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday.” 10 She argued that there The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo
was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate showing that he was born a little less
child.”11 She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname should be changed from Concepcion to than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mother’s surname. “We are not unaware of the movant’s argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the appellant
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of ‘Concepcion’ as have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook
Jose Gerardo’s surname. the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
Applying the “best interest of the child” principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresa’s motion and “The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
made the following observations: may have been sentenced as an adulteress.” (italics ours)
“It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something they
should never do if they want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy. Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In
he is a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize—something that the mother alone cannot give. fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for one’s
Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would be better legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can
served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father. change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.17 (Emphasis supplied)
invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, to wit: Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied.18 Hence, this appeal.
“In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. 19 Article 164 of the Family Code is clear.
paramount consideration.” A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.20
As a guaranty in favor of the child21 and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
WHEREFORE, the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED.” 12 Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardo’s surname
(Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate and should The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. 22 We explained the
therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals:23
decision of the trial court.13 “The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to
visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the “best interest of the child” protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.”
policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that “[a]t bottom, it (was) the child’s welfare and not the
convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few hours Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) 24 of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute
once a week.”14 the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband Mario or, in a proper case, 25 his heirs, who can
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mother’s surname  motu contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. 26 Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a
proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of name strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. 27 Since the marriage of Gerardo
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.15 and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate court. She The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period
also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues involved of conception.28 To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it
in the controversy. must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to
father the child.29 Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth. 43 Although a
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.30 record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child, 44 as the status
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the
impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of
immediately preceded the birth of the child.31 marriage is sought to be established.45
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested
intimacy impossible.32 This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the
provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. 33 Or, the husband was in prison presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.
during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 46 As prima
prison regulations.34 facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a parties.47 Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardo’s illegitimacy and
scant four kilometers apart. the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardo’s
impossible for them to engage in the marital act. illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the child’s interests at heart. The law, reason and common
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. mother, full support and full inheritance.48 On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa’s statement in her answer 35 to the petition for annulment of surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more
marriage36 that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart. 49 Moreover (without
sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her. unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a ‘bastard’ is usually
Gerardo’s argument is without merit. regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested
First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.
but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration—an avowal by the mother that her child is It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very persons
illegitimate—is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage. This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost
where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write
between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
happened between them. Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
Gerardo’s conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. 50 A person’s
each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to
established beyond reasonable doubt. child.51 Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right related to him in any way.
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. 37 A mother has no right to disavow a The matter of changing Jose Gerardo’s name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil
child because maternity is never uncertain.38 Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
Gerardo’s legitimacy. In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow
intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. 39 The proscription is in consonance from the natural right of both parent and child to each other’s company. There being no such parent-child
with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
the legitimacy of children.40 Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Gerardo’s insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed Article 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount.—In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the
mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the signatory is similarly emphatic:
child. Article 3
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. 41 Otherwise, 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness. institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo’s birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in shall be a primary consideration.
this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not
consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.42 The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years.52 Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the end
that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue
concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
     Panganiban (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez and Gar-cia, JJ., concur.
     Carpio-Morales, J.,No Part.

Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.

Note.—Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be judicially established.
(Arbolario vs. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 360 [2003])
MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEÑAS, "Children born after the one hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or
plaintiffs vs. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant. within the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
"This presumption may be rebutted only by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to
1.PARENT AND CHILD; LEGITIMATE CHILDREN; PRESUMPTION.—Husband died on
have had access to his wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next
January 1, 1943. The boy whose legitimacy is in question was born on June 17, 1943. Held: That
preceding the birth of the child."
boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of said husband and his wife, he having been born within
three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage. That presumption can only be
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife
presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred
during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. The fact that the wife has
(300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that
committed adultery cannot overcome this presumption.
it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the
300 next preceding the birth of the child. Is there any evidence to prove that it was physically impossible
2.ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY UPHELD; TUBERCULOSIS DOES NOT for Emiliano to have such access? Is the fact that Emiliano was sick of tuberculosis and was so weak that
PREVENT CARNAL INTERCOURSE.—Although the husband was already suffering from he could hardly move and get up from his bed sufficient to overcome this presumption?
tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from his Manresa on this point says:
bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse, yet that is no evidence of impotency, nor does it "Impossibility of access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial period of
prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can
carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse. As be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations." Manresa, 492-500,
an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculous towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code,
probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease." (An Vol. 1, p. 90)."
Integrated Practice to Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p. 2202.)
There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception,
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is
included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary,
there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between
of land situated in the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. Emiliano and his wife. We admit that Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition
The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas; then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were swollen and his voice
that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There are cases where persons
in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more
nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the inclined to sexual intercourse. As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculous towards eroticism
land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the
prevailing, entered the land in question. disease." (An Integrated Practice of Medicine, by Hyman, Vol. 3, p. 2202). There is neither evidence to
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (a) declaring Mariano Andal the show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there
legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and as such entitled to inherit the land in question; (b) declaring Mariano evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child
Andal owner of said land; and (c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. Defendant took the case has not, therefore, been overcome.
to this Court upon the plea that only questions of law are involved. We can obtain the same result viewing this case under section 68, par. (c) of Rule 123, of the Rules
It appears undisputed that the land in question was given by Eduvigis Macaraig to her son Emiliano of Court, which is practically based upon the same rai'son d'etre underlying the Civil Code. Said section
Andal by virtue of a donation propter nuptias she has executed in his favor on the occasion of his provides:
marriage to Maria Dueñas. If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit "The issue of a wife cohabiting with the husband who is not impotent, is indisputably presumed to be
the land in question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin legitimate, if not born within one hundred eighty days immediately succeeding the marriage, or after the
entitled to succeed him under the law. The main issue, therefore, to be determined hinges on the expiration of three hundred days following its dissolution."
legitimacy of Mariano Andal in so far as his relation to Emiliano Andal is concerned. The determination
of this issue much depends upon the relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife We have already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living together, or at least had access one to the
during the period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in connection with the death of the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within three hundred (300) days following
alleged father Emiliano Andal. the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than that the issue is
The following facts appear to have been proven: Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis in legitimate. We have also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was
January 1941. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his farm. physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such
His sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak that he could hardly proof. The fact that Maria Dueñas has committed adultery can not also overcome this presumption
move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria Dueñas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and (Tolentino's Commentaries on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 92).
both went to live in the house of Maria's father, until the middle of 1943. Since May, 1942, Felix and In view of all the foregoing, we are constrained to hold that the lower court did not err in declaring
Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943, Emiliano Mariano Andal as the legitimate son of the spouses Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas.
died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. Under these facts, can the child Parás, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason,  Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
be considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano?
Article 108 of the Civil Code provides:
Judgment affirmed.
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has
TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents. arisen thereon.

Filiation; Parent and Child; Presumptions;  There is no presumption of the law more firmly Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Declarations About Pedigree; Where the party claiming seeks
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant—not from the declarant himself or the
children born in wedlock are legitimate.—It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate declarant’s estate—the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no declaration itself, but this requirement does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the
presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that other member of the family.—The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery
the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the
declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
Same;  Same; Same;  Actions;  Actions for Reconveyance; The issue of legitimacy cannot be declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement
properly controverted in an action for reconveyance.—The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where
the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his
reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to
operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted. Same; Same; Same; Same; Where a party claims a right to a part of the estate of the declarant,
the declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of
Same;  Same; Same;  Burden of Proof; The burden of proof rests on the party who disputes the such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the
legitimacy of a particular party.—Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such
burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but evidence to avoid a failure of justice.—We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is
on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming
trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora
have delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby. Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of
Same;  Same; Same;  Evidence; In order to destroy the presumption of legitimacy, the party such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason
against whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. —Ordinarily, being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to
when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to avoid a failure of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and
introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. The presumption of legitimacy is Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the subject of the declaration is the declarant’s own
so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the
And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce substantial and declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish.—From the foregoing
credible evidence to the contrary. disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent’s declaration and without
need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless held in one case, where the subject of the declaration is the declarant’s own relationship to another person,
the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact
proved.—Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, and unless or until it is which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence
rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or unnecessary.
decision. Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that
a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; It is elementary that an objection shall be made at
facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived.—Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Pleadings and Practice; When a party opts not to present result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on
countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, he their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of
or she in effect impliedly admits the truth of such fact.—Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to private respondent’s failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in
present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to
evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved. Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if certain documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Hearsay Rule; Declarations About Pedigree;  Conditions for the account of a party’s failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to
admission of declarations about pedigree.—The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the prove the facts therein asserted.—The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private
relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that respondent unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is that were offered. At no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis
Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondent’s counsel elicited answers from the witness
exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following on the circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said documents: The observations later made by
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person private respondent in her comment to petitioners’ offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were
whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the already apparent at the time these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the Corazon Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to
rectify the legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that
these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent’s failure (3)whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation of
to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
which was duly annotated on the title of the defendant;
Succession; Where a decedent is survived by the spouse and nephews and nieces, the former shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the nephews and nieces to the other half.—Upon the death of (4)whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney’s fees
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving for the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the
spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who nephew of said deceased; and
are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his
total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly,
petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by Transfer Certificate (5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal property of
of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.3
thereof, respectively.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the
Actions; Pleadings and Practice;  Demurrer to Evidence;  If a demurrer to evidence is granted but following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit:
on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed
present evidence.—All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs’ records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller
evidence should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene
allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of
Court which provides that “if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.” the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of
Martin and Teodora Guerrero.4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of
REGALADO, J.: these exhibits to which a Comment5 was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with
Appeals on June 30, 19951 which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller
Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private respondent’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and
filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein. incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against to establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records referred to
aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece presented for cross-examination.6
and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioners’ On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and
father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or dismissing the complaint for reconveyance.7
descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners’ In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence
father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are
by right of representation. The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial We find for petitioners.
Settlement2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by The bone of contention in private respondent’s demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish
358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner’s
herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
issued in the latter’s name. I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is
reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically premised on the
question by right of representation. erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution: action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove
their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts. It seems that both the court a
quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption
(1)whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder
Dezoller; morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.8 And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
(2)whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the estate of the The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
late Teodora Dezoller; “The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned
only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
 The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving
of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
contest made in any other way is void.’ This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is
171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles. the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the
can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily “One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the declarant
be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available. and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant’s pedigree, he may not do so by
xxx declarant’s own statements as to declarant’s relationship to the particular family. The reason is that
declarant’s declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant’s relationship to the common
conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none—even claim directly from the declarant or the declarant’s estate, the situation and the policy of the law
his heirs—can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.9 applicable are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy,
that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground for its
be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that consideration, although it is a
consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we
The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted. have noted is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the other  they are
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on competent from reasons of necessity.”17 (Italics ours.)
herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to
disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship of
appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby. independent proof of this fact.18 As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of
does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some
issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption other member of the family.19
of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general
claiming illegitimacy.11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of
adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary.12 the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless or until it is rebutted, Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding
it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is
decision.14 Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of
that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima justice.20 More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that
facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved.15 declaration made by the decedent.
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent’s
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of
such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case,21 where the subject of the declaration is the declarant’s
and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are own relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the
thereby considered as duly proved. declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner’s relationship with Teodora would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while
extensive examination. the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their
Petitioners’ evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of
Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a private respondent’s failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in
family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and evidence.22 It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
explained in the course and as part of her testimony. document is offered in evidence,23 otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,24 since the right to
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.25
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al.,26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece. 16 Such a statement is that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time,
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to
Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is
the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4)
evidence is, or may be inferred. share therein, respectively.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of SO ORDERED.
the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the      Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after      Torres, Jr., J., On leave.
the testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on
the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto.28 Judgment reversed and set aside.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross- Notes.—Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an injunction suit but, when
examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. deserves. (Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. vs. ECED, S.A., 138 SCRA 118 [1985])
Instead, private respondent’s counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and Photographs of a person at baptism and in the house do not prove that he is the father. (Fernandez vs.
regularity of her obtention of said documents: The observations later made by private respondent in her Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 130 [1994])
comment to petitioners’ offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already apparent at the time
these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but
which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal consequences
which resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent’s failure to object thereto, the
same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of
Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of
Teodora Dezoller30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their
parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries
wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint
Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are the
children of Hermogenes Dezoller—these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship
between the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a  prima
facie showing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not be
amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the
claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller.32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent
shall be divided in this case, to wit:
“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from
the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall
inherit in equal portions.”
“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article
1001.”
“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.”

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved
to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and
herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private
respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-
fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs’ evidence should have
been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed to present
evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides
that “if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.”33 WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and Same; Same; Same; “Impotence,” Meaning of; Distinguished from “sterility.”—Impotence refers
ELIZABETH MEJIAS, respondents. to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary
514). As defined in the celebrated case of Menciano vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is the physical
Appeals; When conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals are not binding.—The findings of facts inability to have sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the inability to
of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion procreate, whereas impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual intercourse. In
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference made is respect of the impotency of the husband of the mother of a child, to overcome the presumption of
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension legitimacy based on conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it has been held or recognized
of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the that the evidence or proof must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and convincing, irresistible or
admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to positive.
those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on Same; Same; Same; Rational behind presumption of legitimacy.—It must be stressed that Article
which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress has been adopted for two solid
premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the husband, the wife may have made this
Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Parent and Child;  Necessity of adducing evidence of physical declaration (Powell vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is established as a guaranty in favor of the
impossibility of access of husband to the wife during first 120 days of the 300 days prior to the child’s children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the passions of their parents. The husband
birth in a suit for recognition of illegitimate child.—Whether or not respondent and her husband were whose honor if offended, that is, being aware of his wife’s adultery, may obtain from the guilty spouse by
separated would be immaterial to the resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What should really means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the child which may really be only a confession
matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the of her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite, may declare the child as not her husband’s although
birth of the aforenamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish physical the statement be false. But there is another reason which is more powerful, demanding the exclusion of
impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From her very revealing testimony, proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment of conception, if cannot be determined when
respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her four a woman cohabits during the same period with two men, by whom the child was begotten, it being
children by her husband lived in her mother’s house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband possible that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503-504).
also lived in her mother’s place (p. 73, rec.; pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). It should also be Same; Same; Same; Only the husband can contest legitimacy of a child born to his wife.—At this
noted that even during her affair with petitioner and right after her delivery, respondent went to her juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
mother’s house in Samal for treatment. wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
Same;  Same; Same;  Legitimate filiation, when conclusively presumed.—The baby boy subject of produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or
this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after March, 1967 when the economic interest involved. (Tolentino, citing Bevilaque, Familia, p. 314).
“incident” or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would
from their separation (if there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of March, 1967, respondent indulge in illicit affairs with married men.—This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who
and Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date (t.s.n., would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral
pp. 21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty [180] days following relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the vilest form of
the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
aforenamed spouses. Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband. MAKASIAR, J.:
Same;  Baptismal and marriage certificates prove only the administration of the sacraments to the This petition for review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 54618-
subjects thereof, not the veracity of the statements made therein with respect to relationship.—In Our R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX dismissing the action for
jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal recognition and support filed by respondent Elizabeth Mejias against petitioner Antonio Macadangdang,
certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public and which found minor Rolando to be the illegitimate son of petitioner who was ordered to give a monthly
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein support of P350.00 until his alleged son reaches the age of majority (p. 47, rec.; p. 10, ROA).
specified—but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin
and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L- Anahaw (pp. 61-62, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972; pp. 10-11, Brief for Respondent [p. 198, rec.]). She allegedly
22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]). This Court held that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967 (p. 38, t.s.n., June 7,
baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the 1972 in CC No. 109). She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967 (p. 63,
child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). On October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days following the illicit encounter), she
concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24,
may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. 1967 (Annex “A”, List of Exhibits).
Same;  Same; Same;  Quantum of proof required to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.—The The records also disclose that on April 25, 1972, respondent (then plaintiff) filed a complaint for
modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be shown beyond recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant) with the Court of First Instance of Davao,
reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Branch IX. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 263 (p. 1, ROA).
Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is Defendant (now petitioner) Macadangdang filed his answer on June 30, 1972, opposing plaintiff’s
rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved, the husband must be claim and praying for its dismissal (p. 3, ROA).
taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, pp. 340- On August 9, 1972, the lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing
341). certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed (pp. 4, 5, and 6, ROA).
Same;  Same; Same;  Same.—To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff on October
physical impossibility of access by the husband to the wife during the period of conception. The law 17, 1972 (pp. 7, 8 and 9, ROA).
expressly refers to physical impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which makes sexual relations In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the complaint. The decision
improbable, cannot defeat the presumption of legitimacy; but it may be proved as a circumstance to invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities (pp. 10-18, ROA).
corroborate proof of physical impossibility of access.
 On April 18, 1973, plaintiff appealed the CFI decision to the Court of Appeals (p. 59, rec.). In her Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the aforestated doctrine adding four more
appeal, appellant assigned these errors: exceptions to the general rule. This case invoked the same ruling in the previous case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Company, etc., supra.
In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-46430-31, July 30,
1. 1.“The Honorable Trial Court erred in applying in the instant case the provisions of Arts. 255
1979), which petitioner aptly invokes, this Court thus emphasized:
and 256 of the Civil Code and Secs. 4[a], 4[b] and 4[c], Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of
“x x x But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle that the
Court” (p. 18, rec.);
‘findings of fact’ described as ‘final’ or ‘conclusive’ are those borne out by the record or those which are
2. 2.“The Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that plaintiff-appellant cannot validly question
based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare the
the legitimacy of her son, Rolando Macadangdang, by a collateral attack without joining her
absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. There are exceptions to the
legal husband as a party in the instant case” (p. 18, rec.).
general rule, where we have reviewed the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals x x” (italics supplied).

In its decision handed down on June 2, 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision (p. The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in mind:
47, rec.) and thus declared minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang (p. 52, “Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
rec.). before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to
On November 6, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied appellant’s motions for reconsideration for lack be legitimate.
of merit. (p. 56, rec.). “Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility
Hence, petitioner filed this petition on January 12, 1979. of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
The issues boil down to: hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
“This physical impossibility may be caused:
1. 1.Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the
spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and 1. “(1)By the impotence of the husband;
2. 2.Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without 2. “(2)By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was
giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. not possible;
3. “(3)By the serious illness of the husband.
The crucial point that should be emphasized and should be straightened out from the very beginning is the
fact that respondent’s initial illicit affair with petitioner occurred sometime in March, 1967 and that by “Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its
reason thereof, she and her husband separated. This fact surfaced from the testimony of respondent herself legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
in the hearing of September 21, 1972 when this case was still in the lower court. The pertinent portions of “Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but
her testimony are thus quoted: there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the
From the foregoing line of questions and answers, it can be gleaned that respondent’s answers were given child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the
with spontaneity and with a clear understanding of the questions posed. There cannot be any other child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife’s adultery need not be proved in a
meaning or interpretation of the word “incident” other than that of the initial contact between petitioner criminal case.
and respondent. Even a layman would understand the clear sense of the question posed before respondent xxxxxx
and her categorical and spontaneous answer which does not leave any room for interpretation. It must be “Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy—
noted that the very question of her counsel conveys the assumption of an existing marriage between
respondent and her husband. “(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were separated in 1965 cannot three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed legitimate.
therefore be considered conclusive and binding on this Court. It is based solely on the testimony of
respondent which is self-serving. Nothing in the records shows that her statement was confirmed or “Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility
corroborated by another witness and the same cannot be treated as borne out by the record or that which is of the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
based on substantial evidence. Respondent’s testimony, by itself, is insufficient without further evidence. hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
It is not even confirmed by her own husband, who was not impleaded. “This physical impossibility may be caused:
In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this Court restated that the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the 1. “[1]By the impotence of the husband;
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on 2. “[2]By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such a way that access
misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are was not possible;
contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals 3. “[3]By the serious illness of the husband;
are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the 1. “(b)The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of facts of legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on 2. “(c)Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but
record [Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974; Roque vs. there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth above,
Buan, L-22459, 21 SCRA 642 (1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, L- the child is presumed legitimate, unless it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that
22533, 19 SCRA 289 (1967); italics supplied]. the child is that of the husband. For the purpose of the rule, the wife’s adultery need not be
proved in a criminal case.
 xx x” (Rule 131, Rules of Court). presumption is actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence—the
physical impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which
Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to the resolution of the preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:
status of the child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the aforenamed child, no concrete or even 1. 1.Impotence of the husband;
substantial proof was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her 2. 2.Living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and
spouse. From her very revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to 3. 3.Serious illness of the husband.
Samal for her children; that her four children by her husband lived in her mother’s house in the said town;
that her alleged estranged husband also lived in her mother’s place (p. 73, rec.: pp. 21 & 22, 64 & 65,
t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). It should also be noted that even during her affair with petitioner and right after her This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage,
delivery, respondent went to her mother’s house in Samal for treatment. Thus, in the direct examination of particularly during the period of conception. Hence, proof of the physical impossibility of such sexual
Patrocinia Avila (the boy’s yaya), the following came out: union prevents the application of the presumption (Tolentino, Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil
From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, the fact Code, Vol. I, p. 513 citing Bevilaqua, Familia p. 311).
remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other. As has already been pointed out, The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy, it must be
respondent’s self-serving statements were never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence, more shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the
particularly that of her husband. father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary; where sexual intercourse is presumed or proved,
March, 1967 when the “incident” or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place, the husband must be taken to be the father of the child (Tolentino, citing Madden, Persons and Domestic
and also, seven months from their separation (if there really was a separation). It must be noted that as of Relations, pp. 340-341).
March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married To defeat the presumption of legitimacy, therefore, there must be physical impossibility of access by
years before such date (t.s.n., pp. 21-22, Sept. 21, 1972). The birth of Rolando came more than one the husband to the wife during the period of conception. The law expressly refers to physical
hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the impossibility. Hence, a circumstance which makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the
alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. presumption of legitimacy; but it may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical
Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to impossibility of access (Tolentino, citing Bonet 352; 4 Valverde 408).
be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband. Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function
The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact between (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 514). As defined in the celebrated case of Menciano vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63),
petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from all impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility
indications, he came out as a normal, full-term baby. refers to the inability to procreate, whereas, impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of
It must be stressed that the child under question has no birth certificate nor any other official record of sexual intercourse. In respect of the impotency of the husband of the mother of a child, to overcome the
birth. His birth is attested to merely by oral declarations of witnesses and by a Certificate of Baptism presumption of legitimacy based on conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it has been
(attached in the List of Exhibits) which was prepared in the absence of the alleged father [petitioner]. Note held or recognized that the evidence or proof must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and
again that he was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time convincing, irresistible or positive (S.C.—Tarleton vs. Thompson, 118 S.E. 421, 125 SC 182, cited in 10
difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the C.J.S. 50).
case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. Respondent herself and the yaya, Patrocinia The separation between the spouses must be such as to make sexual access impossible. This may take
Avila, declared that the baby was born in the rented house at Carpenter Street, which birth was obviously place when they reside in different countries or provinces, and they have never been together during the
normal; that he was such a healthy baby that barely 5 days after his birth, he was already cared for by period of conception (Estate of Benito Marcelo, 60 Phil. 442). Or, the husband may be in prison during the
said yaya when respondent became sick (pp. 28, 29 & 43, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972); and that when he was period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through corrupt violation of or allowed
between 15 days and 2 months of age, respondent left him to the care of the yaya when the former left for by prison regulations (1 Manresa 492-500).
Samal for treatment and returned only in February, 1968 (pp. 30-32, t.s.n., Sept. 21, 1972). From the The illness of the husband must be of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of his having sexual
aforestated facts, it can be indubitably said that the child was a full-term baby at birth, normally delivered, intercourse with his wife; such as, when because of a sacroiliac injury, he was placed in a plaster cast, and
and raised normally by the yaya. If it were otherwise or if he were born prematurely, he would have it was inconceivable to have sexual intercourse without the most severe pain (Tolentino,
needed special care like being placed in an incubator in a clinic or hospital and attended to by a physician, citing Commissioner vs. Kotel, 256 App. Div. 352, 9 N.Y. Supp. p. 515); or the illness produced
not just a mere yaya. These all point to the fact that the baby who was born on October 30, 1967 or 7 temporary or permanent impotence, making copulation impossible (Tolentino, citing Q. Bonet 352).
months from the first sexual encounter between petitioner and respondent was conceived as early as Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this Court ruled that just because tuberculosis is
January, 1967. How then could he be the child of petitioner? advanced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of sexual intercourse. There are cases
In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage of health
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered because then they seemed to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. The fact that the wife had illicit
public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period, does not preclude cohabitation
therein specified—but not the veracity of the states or declarations made therein with respect to his between said husband and wife.
kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Significantly, American courts have made definite pronouncements or rulings on the issues under
Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal administered, in conformity consideration.
with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the The policy of the law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the husband at the time of conception was not impossible (N.Y. Milone vs. Milone, 290 N.Y. S. 863, 160
person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must Misc. 830) and there is the presumption that a child so born is the child of the husband and is legitimate
indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period of conception (N.Y. Dieterich vs.
The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This Dieterich, 278 N.Y. S. 645, Misc. 714; both cited in 10 C.J.S., pp. 18, 19 & 20).
presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access
between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This
 So firm was this presumption originally that it cannot be rebutted unless the husband was incapable really separated, there was all the possibility of physical access to each other considering their proximity
of procreation or was absent beyond the four seas, that is, absent from the realm, during the whole period to each other and considering further that respondent still visited and recuperated in her mother’s house in
of the wife’s pregnancy (10 C.J.S. p. 20). Samal where her spouse resided with her children. Moreover, Crispin Anahaw did not have any serious
The presumption of legitimacy of children born during wedlock obtains, notwithstanding the husband illness or any illness whatsoever which would have rendered him incapable of having sexual act with his
and wife voluntarily separate and live apart, unless the contrary is shown (Ala. Franks vs. State, 161 So. wife. No substantial evidence whatsoever was brought out to negate the aforestated facts.
549, 26 Ala. App. 430) and this includes children born after the separation [10 C.J.S. pp. 23 & 24; italics Crispin Anahaw served as a refuge after respondent’s reckless and immoral pursuits or a “buffer”
supplied]. after her flings. And she deliberately did not include nor present her husband in this case because she
It must be stressed that Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed could not risk her scheme. She had to be certain that such scheme to bastardize her own son for her selfish
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an motives would not be thwarted.
adulteress has been adopted for two solid reasons. First, in a fit of anger, or to arouse jealousy in the This Court finds no other recourse except to deny respondent’s claim to declare her son Rolando the
husband, the wife may have made this declaration (Powell vs. State, 95 N.E., 660). Second, the article is illegitimate child of petitioner. From all indications, respondent has paraded herself as a woman of highly
established as a guaranty in favor of the children whose condition should not be under the mercy of the questionable character. A married woman who, on first meeting, rides with a total stranger who is married
passions of their parents. The husband whose honor if offended, that is, being aware of his wife’s adultery, towards nightfall, sleeps in his house in the presence of his children, then lives with him after their initial
may obtain from the guilty spouse by means of coercion, a confession against the legitimacy of the child sexual contact—the atmosphere for which she herself provided—is patently immoral and hedonistic.
which may really be only a confession of her guilt. Or the wife, out of vengeance and spite, may declare Although her husband was a very potent man, she readily indulged in an instant illicit relationship with a
the child as not her husband’s although the statement be false. But there is another reason which is more married man she had never known before.
powerful, demanding the exclusion of proof of confession or adultery, and it is, that at the moment of Respondent had shown total lack of or genuine concern for her child (Rolando) for, even after his
conception, it cannot be determined when a woman cohabits during the same period with two men, by birth, she left him in the care of a yaya for several months. This is not the normal instinct and behavior of
whom the child was begotten, it being possible that it be the husband himself (Manresa, Vol. I, pp. 503- a mother who has the safety and welfare of her child foremost in her mind. The filing of this case itself
504). shows how she is capable of sacrificing the psycho-social future (reputation) of the child in exchange for
Hence, in general, good morals and public policy require that a mother should not be permitted to some monetary consideration. This is blatant shamelessness.
assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain some benefit for herself (N.Y.—Flint It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguiseed attempt to evade the responsibility and
vs. Pierce, 136 N.Y. S. 1056, cited in 10 C.J.S. 77). The law is not willing that the child be declared consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all—her
illegitimate own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent’s son would give
to suit the whims and purposes of either parent, nor merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married
intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or about the time the wife became pregnant. Thus, women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during
where the husband denies having any intercourse with his wife, the child was still presumed legitimate such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the vilest
(Lynn vs. State, 47 Ohio App. 158, 191 N.E. 100). form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
With respect to Article 257 aforequoted, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part of the wife, And as between the paternity by the husband and the paternity by the paramour, all the circumstances
in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child being equal, the law is inclined to follow the former; hence, the child is thus given the benefit of
is that of the husband (Tolentino, citing 1 Vera 170; 4 Borja 23-24). legitimacy.
It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife’s testimony on the point would be unseemly Finally, Article 220 of the Civil Code reinforces the aforesaid principle when it provides thus:
and scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it “Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
may have on the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby (7 Am. law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the  legitimacy
Jur. Sec. 21, pp. 641-642). of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and
In the case of a child born or conceived in wedlock, evidence of the infidelity or adultery of the wife and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.”
mother is not admissible to show illegitimacy, if there is no proof of the husband’s impotency or non-
access to his wife (Iowa—Craven vs. Selway, 246 N.W. 821, cited in 10 C.J.S. 36). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 2, 1978, AND ITS
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1978 ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. COSTS
born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or SO ORDERED.
economic interest involved (Tolentino, citing Bevilaqua, Familia, p. 314).
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only to the alleged
father, who is the husband of the mother and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed
time, and in certain cases, and only in a direct suit brought for the purpose (La—Ducasse vs. Ducasse, 45
So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy’s Succ. 10 So. 872, 44 La. Ann., cited in 10 C.J.S. 77; italics supplied).
Thus the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain; she can only
contest the identity of the child (La—Eloi vs. Mader, 1 Rob. 581, 38 Am. D. 192).
Formerly, declarations of a wife that her husband was not the father of a child in wedlock were held
to be admissible in evidence; but the general rule now is that they are inadmissible to bastardize the child,
regardless of statutory provisions obviating incompetency on the ground of interest, or the fact that the
conception was antenuptial. The rule is said to be founded in decency, morality and public policy
(Wallace vs. Wallace, 137 Iowa 37, 114 N.W. 527, 14 L.R.A. [N.S] 544, 126 Am. St. Rep. 253, 15 Ann.
Cas. 761, Am. Jur. 26).
From the foregoing, particularly the testimony of respondent and her witnesses, this Court has every
reason to believe that Crispin Anahaw was not actually separated from Elizabeth Mejias; that he was a
very potent man, having had four children with his wife; that even if he and respondent were even living
separately (which the latter failed to prove anyway) and assuming, for argument’s sake, that they were
CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING abovediscussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances of this case, Teopista Toring Tuñacao
TUÑACAO, respondents. has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as
such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the
Civil Law; Paternity and Filiation; Rules on compulsory recognition applicable not only to rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the
natural children but also to spurious children.—The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable
Article 283 of the Civil Code, which has been held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to through the facilities of modern medicine and technology.
spurious children.
Same;  Same; Same;  Compliance with certain jurisprudential requirements necessary to establish CRUZ, J.:
“the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.—To establish “the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,” it is necessary to comply with certain
The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter
jurisprudential requirements. “Continuous” does not mean that the concession of status shall continue
denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint
forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues, The possession of such
for compulsory recognition. The appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below.
status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously
Now the issue is before us on certiorari.
and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a
The complaint was filed on August 21,1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista
showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous
Toring Tuñacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida
and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Court agrees with the trial court that Teopista has not been in
Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza.—With these
according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiff’s allegations and set up
status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, Under both Article 283 of the Civil Code
a counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.
and Article 172 of the Family Code.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Fact that Teopista failed to show that she was in open and
Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, she has nevertheless established
used to visit him at his house. When she married Valentin Tuñacao, Casimiro bought a passenger track
that status by another method.—But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and
and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless
proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tuñacao, to build a
establish that status by another method.
house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Same; An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue
filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws according to the Civil Code
City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate,
or by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father according to the Family Code.—What
Casimiro’s adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after
both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
admonishing Margarita.1
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
Lolito Tuñacao corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his grandfather because
laws,” according to the Civil Code, or “by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,”
Teopista said so. He would kiss his hand whenever they saw each other and Casimiro would give him
according to the Family Code, Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
money. Casimiro used to invite him to his house and give him jackfruits. When his grandfather learned
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
that he was living on a rented lot, the old man allowed him to build a house on the former’s land.2
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, both
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she
Same;  Same; Acts or declarations about pedigree may be received in evidence as an exception to
used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later,
the hearsay rule.—Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming
rule because “it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from
pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at
the rejection of such proof than from its admission.
Teopista’s baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.3
Same;  Same; Same;  Requisites to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito,
pedigree may be admitted in evidence.—Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the
Casimiro’s brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro’s
following requisites that Have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding regarding
boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to
pedigree may be admitted in evidence: 1. The declarant is; dead or unable to testify. 2. The pedigree must
P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to
be in issue. 3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue. 4. The declaration
Teopista.4
must be made before the controversy arose. 5. The relationship between the declarant and the person
Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente Toring took the stand to
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
resist Teopista’s claim. Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro’s only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring,
Same:  Same: Same:  Same; All the above requisite are present in the case at bar.—All the above
declared that Teopista’s father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later abandoned her,
requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of
Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half-sister.
Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro. Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at
It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiro’s lot. This witness stressed that when
the time of Isaac’s testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of
Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father.5
Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The
The last statement was shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro’s niece, who
declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose
also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in Casimiro’s boat. She flatly declared she had
between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been
never met Teopista but she knew her husband, who was a mechanic.6
established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code, which has been
Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to spurious children.7 The said article provides:
Same;  Same; Court gives effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:
the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children.—We hold that by virtue of the
 1. (1)In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or The decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on August 11,1988. A motion for
less with that of the conception; reconsideration was filed, and it was only from the opposition thereto of the private respondent that
2. (2)When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the Casimiro’s counsel learned that his client had died on May 31, 1986. He immediately informed the
direct acts of the latter or of his family; respondent court but the motion for reconsideration was denied without any substitution of parties having
3. (3)When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the been effected. The said counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring, then asked this Court to substitute the
supposed father. latter for the deceased Casimiro Mendoza in the present petition.
4. (4)When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. The applicable provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3, reading as follows:
Sec. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party.—Whenever a party to a
pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the
This article has been substantially reproduced in the Family Code as follows:
court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
executor, guardian or other legal representative.
Sec. 17. Death of party.—After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
1. (1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
2. (2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. representative fails to appear within said time the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
1. (1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
2. (2)Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. heirs.

In the early case of Masecampo vs. Masecampo,9 it was settled that:

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
The subsequent death of the father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one who
same evidence as legitimate children,
pretended to be his natural son. It may survive against the executor, administrator, or any other legal
representative of the testate or intestate succession.
In his remarkably well-written decision, Judge Leoncio P. Abarquez rejected the plaintiffs claim that she
was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or
Pursuant to the above rules and jurisprudence, we hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza
of his family. His Honor declared:
pro haec vice and nune pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former’s illegitimate son. This
In this particular case the established evidence is that plaintiff continuously lived with her mother,
disposes of the private respondent’s contention that the lawyer-client relationship terminated with
together with her sister Paulina. Neither the plaintiff nor her husband had come to live with the defendant.
Casimiro’s death and that Vicente has no personality now to substitute him.
At most, only their son, Lolito Tuñacao was allowed to construct a small house in the land of the
Now to the merits.
defendant, either by the defendant himself, as claimed by the plaintiff, or by Vicente Toring, as claimed by
We note that both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their respective conclusions,
the witnesses of the defendant. The defendant never spent for the support and education of the plaintiff.
focused on the question of whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of
He did not allow the plaintiff to carry his surname. The instances when the defendant gave money to the
an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was understandable because Teopista herself had
plaintiff were, more or less, off-and-on or rather isolatedly periodic. They were made at considerable
apparently based her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of the
intervals and were not given directly to the plaintiff but through a third person. Thus, while it may be
Civil Code.
conceded that: a) the defendant’s parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and
To establish “the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,” it is
Isaac Mendoza that Teopista is the daughter of the defendant; b) that Teopista calls the defendant as “Papa
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. “Continuous” does not mean that the
Miroy”; c) that Teopista would kiss defendant’s hand when she met him; d) that the defendant gave to her
concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
and her husband the income of the passenger truck as well as the proceeds of the sale thereof, all these
continues.10 The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly
acts, taken altogether, are not sufficient to show that the plaintiff had possessed continuously the status of
and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the
a recognized illegitimate child.
relation is illegitimate).11 There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.12
On appeal, however, the respondent court8 disagreed and arrived at its own conclusion as follows: With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous
Contrary to the conclusion of the court a quo, We find that appellant has sufficiently proven her possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of
continuous possession of such status. Although the court a quo did not pass on the credibility of the the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.
various witnesses presented, We consider the witnesses for the plaintiff as credible and unbiased. No proof The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of
was shown to render them otherwise. There is no showing that Isaac and Gaudencio testified falsely. They Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed, that this could have been because
were disinterested parties with no axe to grind against the appellee or the people actively acting in his defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into
behalf. In fact even the court a quo conceded to the truthfulness of some of their testimonies. his house to live with him and his legitimate wife. especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In
fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his
By contrast, it continued, Vicente Toring was an interested party who was claiming to be the sole wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of
recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to lose much inheritance if Teopista’s claim were Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one’s status. No less significantly, the regularity of
recognized. He had earlier filed theft charges against his own sister and libel charges against her husband. defendant’s act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not
As for Julieta Ouano, the respondent court found it difficult to believe that she had never met Teopista been sufficiently established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were “off-and-on,”
although both of them have been living in the same barangay since birth. not continuous and intermittent. Indeed, the plaintiffs testimony on this point is tenuous as in one breath
she said that her mother solely spent for her education and in another that Casimiro helped in supporting Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of
her.13 Casimiro Mendoza.
But although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances of
of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another this case, Teopista Toring Tuñacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza
method. and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children, without
child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including
special laws,” according to the Civil Code, or “by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology
father,” according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under to such status. Costs against the petitioner.
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.14 SO ORDERED
The trial court conceded that “the defendant’s parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio      
Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant.” It should have probed this
matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39.—Act or declaration about pedigree.—The act or declara tion of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word “pedigree” includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista’s parentage is not entirely accurate. To set the record
straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he
did not cite Casimiro’s father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was
Casimiro’s brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro’s own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro’s
illegitimate daughter.15
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because “it
is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of
such proof than from its admission. 16" Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay evidence,
there are certain safeguards against its abuse. Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the
following requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be
admitted in evidence:

1. 1.The declarant is dead or unable to testify,

2. 2.The pedigree must be in issue.
3. 3.The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. 4.The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. 5.The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such declaration.17

All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the
pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were
both dead at the time of Isaac’s testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the
paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition.
The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose
between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been
established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of
Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.18
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by deposition if he was
too old and weak to testify at the trial of the case.
If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her
witnesses, such as the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista’s
husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the
sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission he gave Lolito Tuñacao to build a house on his land after
he found that the latter was living on a rented lot , and, no less remarkably, the joint savings account
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner and appellant, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO He also made the following devises: "A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y Ernesto M. Guevara y a mis
BUISON, respondents and appellees. hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia, Cándida y Pío, apellidados Guevara," a residential lot with its
improvements situate in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan, having an area of 960 square meters and
  assessed at P540; to his wife Angustia Posadas he confirmed the donation propter nuptias theretofore
1.WILLS; PRESENTATION OF WILL FOR PROBATE IS MANDATORY; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE ON BASIS OF made by him to her of a portion of 25 hectares of the large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in
INTESTACY WHEN DECEDENT LEFT A WILL, AGAINST THE LAW.—We hold that under section 1 of plan Psu-66618. He also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same parcel of land by way of
Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees complete settlement of her usufructuary right.
desire" to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed bf either by him during his
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his pending debts and to defray
the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation his expenses and those of his family up to the time of his death.
of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public The remander of said parcel of land he disposed of in the following manner:
policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is  
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property "(d).—Toda la porción restante de mi terreno arriba descrito, de la extensión superficial aproximada
by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and de ciento veintinueve (129) hectáreas setenta (70) áreas, y veinticinco (25) centíareas, con todas sus
devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance mejoras existentes en la misma, dejo y distribuyo, proindiviso, a mis siguientes herederos como sigue:
thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among "A mi hijo legítimo Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108) hectáreas, ocho (8) áreas y cincuenta y
themselves to the exclusion of others. cuatro (54) centíareas, hacia la parte que colinda al Oeste de las cien482
2.ID.; ID.; ID.—Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and
due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with (100) hectareas referidas en el inciso (a) de este párrafo del testamento, como su propiedad absoluta y
that will without first securing its allowance or probate of the court: first, because the law expressly exclusiva, en la cual extensión superficial están incluídas cuarenta y tres (43) hectáreas, veintitrés (23)
provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the áreas y cuarenta y dos (42) centíareas que le doy en concepto de mejora.
proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem,  cannot be "A mi hija natural reconocida, Hosario Guevara, veintiun (21) hectáreas, sesenta y un (61) áreas y
dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending setenta y un (71) centíareas, que es la parte restante.
against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in "Duodecimo.—Nombro por la presente como Albacea Tes-tamentario a mi hi jo Ernesto M. Guevara,
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means con relevación de fianza. Y una yez legalizado este testamento, y en cuanto sea posible, es mi deseo, que
provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said los herederos y legatarios aquí nombrados se repartan extrajudicialmente mis bienes de conformidad con
heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an an mis disposiciones arriba consignadas."
action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under
the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reivindieacion  or partition.480 Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara executed a deed of sale (exhibit 2) in favor
of Ernesto M. Guevara whereby he conveyed to him the southern half of the large parcel of land of which
3.TORRENS REGISTRATION; REGISTRATION DOES NOT AFFECT RIGHTS OF PARTITION BETWEEN he had theretofore disposed by the will above mentioned, in consideration of the sum of P1 and other
LEGATEES. It results that the interested parties consented to the registration of the land in question in valuable considerations, among which were the payment of all his debts and obligations amounting to not
the name of E. M. G. alone subject to the implied trust on account of which he is under obligation to less than P16,500, his maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral
deliver and convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of the original owner of said expenses. As to the northern half of the same parcel of land, he de clared : "Hago constar también que
land had been paid. Such finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision and decree of reconozco a mi referido hi jo Ernesto M. Guevara como dueño de la mitad norte de la totalidad y con junto
registration, which merely confirmed the petitioner's title; and in the absence of any intervening de los referidos terrenos por haberlos comprado de su propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien había
innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled to fulfil the promise by virtue of which he vendido con anterioridad."
acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land Registration Act, cited by the Court of On September 27, 1933, final decree of registration was issued in land registration case No. 15174 of
Appeals, and by the decision of this Court in Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and pursuant thereto original certificate of title No. 51691 of the
therein cited. same province was issued on October 12 of the same year in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole
parcel of land described in the deed of sale above referred to. The registration proceeding had been
OZAETA, J.: commenced on November 1, 1932, by Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with
Ernesto M. Guevara and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter, respectively, of the Ros-483
deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter. The action was ario, among others, as oppositor; but before the trial of the case Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as
commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she applicant and Ros-ario Guevara and her co-oppositors also withdrew their opposition, .thereby facilitating
claims to be her strict ligitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased—to wit, a portion of the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone.
423,492 square meters of a large parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 51691 of the On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara died. His last will and testament, however, was never
province of Pangasinan, issued in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara— and to order the latter to pay her presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the
P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as damages for withholding such legitime from her. The defendant answered settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective
the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the plaintiff might have had, had been barred by the legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein
operation of law. made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of
It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit A), apparently with Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land
all the formalities of the law, wherein he made the following bequests: To his stepdaughter Candida adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the
Guevara, a pair of earrings worth P150 and a gold chain worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
ring worth P180 and all the furniture, pictures, statues, and other religious objects found in the residence In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in her
of the testator in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan; "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a pair of earrings custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby
worth P120; to his stepson Pio Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second marriage, Angustia the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests,
Posadas, various pieces of jewelry worth P1,020. devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little
over four years after the testator's demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present action "The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed ordering the filing of testate
against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the parties, and that
of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status which they themselves have chosen, and to
prove that the deceased Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that decide their controversy once and for all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same
proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or criterion (Leaño vs.  Leaño, supra), which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the
the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or
disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals sustained that theory. mode of procedure may be adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence,
Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the procedure adopted by we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law."
the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2) the efficacy of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the
effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant (petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara. Let us look into the validity of these considerations. Section 1 of Rule 74 provides as follows:
I "Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.—If the decedent left no debts and
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Gueyara, it being in our the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties
opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force up to the time this case was means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinent provisions: may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to
"Sec. 625. Allotvance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution.—No will shall pass either the real himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be
or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within
Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as two years after the death of the decedent."
to its due execution.
"Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver.—The person who has the custody of a will shall, within That is a modification of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, "Sec. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings.—Whenever all the heirs of a
or to the executor named in the will. person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate,
"Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust.—A person named as executor in a or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and
will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testa tor, or within thirty days after he not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings
knows that he is named executor, if he obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death of the testator, in court."
present such will to the court which has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise returned to said
court, and shall, within such period, signify to the court his acceptance of the trust, or make known in The implication is that by the omission of the word "intestate" and the use of the word "legatees" in
writing his refusal to accept it. section 1 of Rule 74, a summary extrajudicial settlement of a deceased person's estate, whether he died
testate or intestate, may be made under the conditions specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to
"Sec. 628. Penalty.—A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two preceding sections, section 1 of Rule 74 and apply it here, as the Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it sanctions the
unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court) shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand nonpresentation of a will for probate and much less the nullification of such will thru the failure of its cus -
dollars. todian to present it to the court for probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously provides
against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a
"Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed.—If a person having custody of a will after the decedent "without securing letters of administration." It does not say that in case the decedent left a will
death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without the necessity of presenting the will
after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued to the court for probate.The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are
by the court, and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will." two different things, altho both may be made in the same case. The allowance of a will precedes the issu -
ance of letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated
The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which took effect without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of administration. We hold that under section 1 of
on July 1, 1940. Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts arid the heirs and legatees desire to
The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and
and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator (section 630, C. divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless
C. P., and sections 3 and 4, Rule 77). Altho not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the those provisions are contrary to law.   Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the
will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law
acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice
and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
by the judge and attested by the seal, of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as
thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the
which the land lies. (Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C. P.) heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others.
It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had
for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the
assure and compel the probate of a will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of
the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.
committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the will.486 Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due
The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and held that a will, unless execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will
probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure adopted by the respondent for the without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that
following reasons : "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and,
second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and injustice in requiring the plaintiff not to violate but to comply with the law. On the contrary, an injustice
substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy might be committed against the other heirs and legatees mentioned in the will if the attempt of the plaintiff
designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to to nullify said will by not presenting it to the court for probate should be sanctioned. As to the
protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which inconvenience, delay, and expense, the plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the custodian of the
are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court will and she violated the duty imposed upon her by sections 2, 4, and 5 of Rule 76, which command her to
approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in deliver said will to the court on pain of a fine not exceeding P2,000 and of imprisonment for contempt of
personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in court. As for the defendant, he is not complaining of inconvenience, delay, and expense, but on the
an ordinary action for reivindicacion or partition. contrary he is insisting that the procedure prescribed by law be followed by the plaintiff.
We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted by the plaintiff to
not sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent. be in accordance with law. It also erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of
The case of Leaño vs. Leaño (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of Appeals, like section 1 of Rule 74, intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven existence of a will left by him and solely because
sanctions the extrajudicial partition by the heirs of the properties left by a decedent, but not the said will has not been probated due to the failure of the plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the
nonpresentation of a will for probate. In that case one Paulina Ver executed a will on October 11, 1902, duty imposed upon her by the law.
and died on November 1, 1902. Her will was presented for probate on November 10, 1902, and was It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named executor in said will, did not
approved and allowed by the Court on August 16, 1904. In the meantime, and on November 10, 1902, the take any step to have it presented to the court for probate and did not signify his acceptance of the trust or
heir 3 went ahead and divided the properties among themselves and some of them subsequently sold and refusal to accept it as required by section 3 of Rule 76 (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil
disposed of their shares to third persons. It does not affirmatively appear in the decision in that case that Procedure), because his contention is that said will, insofar as the large parcel of land in litigation is
the partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the will or that they in any way disregarded the concerned, has been superseded by the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by the subsequent issuance of the
will. In closing the case by its order dated September 1, 1911, the trial court validated the partition, and Torrens certificate of title in his favor.
one of the heirs, Cunegunda Leaño, appealed. In deciding the appeal this Court said: II
"The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed an error in deciding that the This brings us to the consideration of the second question, referring to the efficacy of the deed of sale
heirs and legatees of the estate of Dña. Paulina Ver had voluntarily divided the estate among themselves." exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant Ernes to M. Guevara. So that the
In resolving that question this Court said: parties may not have litigated here in vain insofar as that question is concerned, we deem it proper to
"In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that there had been a voluntary decide it now and obviate the necessity of a new action.
partition of the estate among the heirs and legatees, and in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara
we must conclude that the lower court had some evidence to support its conclusion." before a notary public on July 12, 1933, may be divided into two parts: (a) insofar as it disposes of and
conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the sourthern half of Victorino L. Guevara's hacienda of 259-odd hectares
Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was raised and decided in that case. in consideration of P1 and other valuable considerations therein mentioned; and (b) insofar as it declares
That decision cannot be relied upon as an authority for the unprecedented and unheard of procedure that Ernesto M. Guevara became the owner of the northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it
adopted by the respondent whereby she seeks to prove her status as an acknowledged natural child of the with his own money from Rafael T. Puzon.
decedent by his will and attempts to nullify and circumvent the testamentary dispositions made by him by A. As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara in
not presenting the will to the court for probate and by claiming her legitime as an acknowledged natural consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, the Court of
child on the basis of intestacy; and that in the face of express mandatory provisions of the law requiring Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious because: " (a) it has not been proven that the charges imposed
her to present the will to the court for probate. as a condition is [are] less than the value of the property; and (b) neither has it been proven that the de-
In the subsequent case of Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this Court departed from the fendant did not comply with the conditions imposed upon him in the deed of transfer." As a matter of fact
procedure sanctioned by the trial court and impliedly approved by this Court in the Leano case, by holding the Court of Appeals found: "It appears that the defendant has been paying the debts left by his father. To
that an extrajudicial partition is not proper in testate succession. In the Riosa case the Court, speaking thru accomplish this, he had to alienate considerable portions of the abovementioned land. And we cannot
Chief Justice Avancena, held: brand such alienation as anomalous unless it is proven that they have exceeded the value of what he has
"1. Extrajudicial Partition; Not Proper in Testate Succession.—Section 596 of the Code of Civil acquired by virtue of the deed of July 12, 1933, and that of his corresponding share in the inheritance."
Procedure, authorizing the heirs of a person who died intestate to make extrajudicial partition of the The finding of the Court of Appeals on this aspect of the case is final and conclusive upon the respondent,
property of the deceased, without going into any court of justice, makes express reference to intestate who did not appeal therefrom.
succession, and therefore excludes testate succession. B. With regard to the northern half of the hacienda, the findings of fact and of law made by the
"2. Id.; Effects of; Testate Succession.—In the instant case, which is a testate succession, the heirs Court of Appeals are as follows:
made an extrajudicial partition of the estate and at the same time instituted proceeding for the probate of "The defendant has tried to prove that with his own money, he bought from Rafael Puzon one-half of
the will and the administration of the estate. When the time came for making the partition, they submitted the land in  question, but the Court a quo,  after considering the evidence, found it not proven; we hold that
to the court the extrajudicial partition previously made by them, which the court approved. Held: That for such conclusion is well founded. The acknowledgment by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara, of the said
the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations created thereby, in connection with the transactions, which was inserted incidentally in the document of July 12, 1933, is clearly be lied by the fact
relatives benefited, the property must not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the that the money paid to Rafael Puzon came from Silvestre P. Coquia, to whom Victorino L. Guevara had
extrajudicial partition was made, but from the time said partition was approved by the court." (Syllabus.) sold a parcel of land with the right of repurchase. The defendant, acting for his father, received the money
and delivered it to Rafael Puzon to redeem the land in question, and instead of executing a deed of
The Court of Appeals also cites section 6 of Rule 124, which provides that if the procedure which the redemption in favor of Victorino L. Guevara, the latter executed a deed of sale in favor of the defendant.
court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of "The plaintiff avers that she withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the
Court, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the defendant, because of the latter's promise that after paying all the debts of their father, he would deliver to
spirit of the said Rules. That provision is not applicable here for the simple reason that the procedure her and to the widow their corresponding shares. As their father then was still alive, there was no reason to
which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is specifically pointed out and prescribed require the delivery of her share and that was why she did not insist on her opposition, trusting on the
in detail by Rules 74, 76, and 77 of the Rules of Court. reliability and sincerity of her brother's promise. The evidence shows that such promise was really made.    
The Court of Appeals also said "that if this case is dismissed, ordering the filing of testate The registration of land under the Torrens system does not have the effect of altering the laws of
proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the parties." We see no succession, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants, and other cotenants nor does it
change or affect in any other way any other rights and liabilities created by law and applicable to
unregistered land (sec. 70, Land Registration Law). The plaintiff is not, then, in estoppel, nor can the
doctrine of res judicata  be invoked against her claim. Under these circumstances, she has the right to
compel the defendant to deliver her corresponding share in the estate left by the deceased, Victorino L.
Guevara."

In his tenth to fourteenth assignments of error the petitioner assails the foregoing findings of the
Court of Appeals. But the findings of fact made by said court are final and not reviewable by us on
certiorari.   The Court of Appeals found that the money with which the petitioner repurchased the northern
half of the land in question from Rafael Puzon was not his own but his father's, it being the proceeds of the
sale of a parcel of land made by the latter to Silvestre P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent
withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the petitioner upon the latter's
promise that after paying all the debts of their father he would deliver to her and to the widow their
corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the interested parties consented to the registration of
the land in question in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone subject to the implied trust on account of
which he is under obligation to deliver and convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of
the original owner of said land had been paid. Such finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision
and decree of registration, which merely confirmed the petitioner's title; and in the absence of any
intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled to fulfil the promise by virtue of which
he acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land Registration Act, cited by the Court of
Appeals, and by the decision of this Court in Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases therein
cited.
Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the northern half
of the land described in the will exhibit A and in original certificate of title No. 51691 still belongs to the
estate of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. In the event the petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated
any portion thereof, he is under obligation to compensate the estate with an equivalent portion from the
southern half of said land that has not yet been sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara
still belongs one half of the total area of the land described in said original certificate of title, to be taken
from such portions as have not yet been sold by the petitioner, the other half having been lawfully
acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased.
Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in effect that
notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of original certificate of title No. 51691 in the name of Ernesto
M. Guevara, one half of the land described in said certificate of title belongs to the estate of Victorino L.
Guevara and the other half to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter's assumption of the
obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, is hereby affirmed; but the judgment of said court insofar
as it awards any relief to the respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby reversed and set aside,
and the parties herein are hereby ordered to present the document exhibit A to the proper court for probate
in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take
against the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document is approved
and allowed by the court as the last will .and testament of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs
and legatees therein named may take such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition
the estate of the testator, taking into consideration the pronouncements made in part II of this opinion. No
finding as to costs in any of the three instances.
Yulo, C. J., and Hontiveros,1 J., concur.
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ “AQUINO,” represented by AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL
Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, respondent. IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES.  AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S
The Family Law; Paternity and Filiation; Use of Surname; An illegitimate child is permitted to ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
handwritten instrument.—Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for registration of the child’s name in this wise:
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his 7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255 [“An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to
public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the ‘Family Code of the Philippines’ ”]) provides
approval is necessary. that:
Same; Same; Same; Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state  7. RuleRequirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the  For Births Not Yet Registered 7.1
putative father.—Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the 7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of
private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father.    the father if a public document is executed by
This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which    the father, either at the back of the Certificate of
require that recognition by the father must bear his signature.     Live Birth or in a separate document.
Same; Same; Same; A father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument 7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a
must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code.—That a father who    private handwritten instrument, the child shall
acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly    use the surname of the father, provided the
implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely    registration is supported by the following
articulated such requirement; it did not “unduly expand” the import of Article 176 as claimed by    documents:
petitioners. a. AUSF8
Same; Same; Same; The welfare of the child shall be the paramount consideration in resolving b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the
questions affecting him.—Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount document.
consideration” in resolving questions affecting him. x x x It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between
to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate the father and the child:
children x x x.” Too, “(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, 1. Employment records
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.” 2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
 CARPIO-MORALES,J.: 4. Certification of membership in any organization
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19- 5. Statement of Assets and Liability
year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife 6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. Aquino In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the
and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal. father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.1 After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102—Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Paternity—or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).” (Underscoring supplied)
Christian Dela Cruz “Aquino” at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of name against respondent
of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to
Birth,2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child’s name is a
and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino.4 Both violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as
affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides:
his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
document entitled “AUTOBIOGRAPHY” which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, 176. “Article  illegitimate
handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read: children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T. father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
AUTOBIOGRAPHY document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.5 I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.” (Emphasis and
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE underscoring supplied)
BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of
x x x. paternity in a “private handwritten instrument” within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of
xxxx law.
 For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not “unduly expand” the import of Article
declared in default. 176 as claimed by petitioners.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her common-law In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography,
relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
acknowledged his yet unborn child.11 She offered Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit “A”) First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
as her documentary evidence-in-chief.12 Dominique’s lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testified, corroborating Jenie’s declarations.13 testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint “for lack of cause of action” Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch
as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
R.A. 9255) which defines “private handwritten document” through which a father may acknowledge an Autobiography that “JENIE DELA CRUZ” is “MY WIFE” as “WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH
illegitimate child as follows: OTHER” and “NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.”
Private handwritten instrument—an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing
and “2.2 duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child.” (Underscoring filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
supplied) Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
same does not contain any express recognition of paternity. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal evidence as legitimate children. 175. ART.
issue of: xxxx
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 172. ART.
FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (1)
PATERNITY IN A “PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT” WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE instrument and signed by the parent concerned. (2)
SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER’S SURNAME.15 (Underscoring supplied) In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that The open and continuous possession of the statu (1)s of a legitimate child; or
the private handwritten instrument containing the putative father’s admission of paternity must be signed Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (2)
by him. They add that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the  39. SEC.Act or declaration about pedigree.—The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
admission/recognition must be “duly signed” by the father is void as it “unduly expanded” the earlier- unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16 received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominique’s handwritten persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word “pedigree” includes
Autobiography contains a “clear and unmistakable” recognition of the child’s paternity. 17 relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondent’s position, as occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It pedigree.
further submits that Dominique’s Autobiography “merely acknowledged Jenie’s pregnancy but not [his]  40. SEC.Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.—The reputation or tradition existing
paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb.”18 in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of This Court’s rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. 19 filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be
provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To
that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus: be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the 175. “Art. same way and on the be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted
same evidence as legitimate children. by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good
xxxx father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with
The filiation of 172. Art legitimate children is established by any of the following: the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (1) father’s operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a (2) private handwritten instrument authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
and signed by the parent concerned. establish filiation.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
x x x x” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his herein—that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. several months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the
child—they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and 1)
Where the private handwritten instrument is 2) accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the “paramount consideration” in resolving
questions affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which
the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
“Article 3
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, t 1.he best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration.”23 (Underscoring supplied)

It is thus “(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x.”24 Too, “(t)he State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.”25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner
minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it
in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED
to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of
petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register
of Births.
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON, petitioners, vs. RONNIE S. Same; Same; Legal Support; There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the
VASQUEZ, respondent. resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.—Under Article 195 (4) of the Family
Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is no final
Jurisdiction; Summons; To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of
summons must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the
—To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if this necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. Support comprises
is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that overseas everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts expire, and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Under the premises, the award of
wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if they wish. P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant. 
It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the urban
areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home  QUISUMBING,J.:
address in the province where he originates. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur  
but he has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has This petition for review assails the September 29, 2003 Decision 1 and the July 19, 2004
established a residence in either place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71944, which had reversed the May 28, 2001
living at the time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Naga City in Civil Case No. RTC ’99-4460.
overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of The facts culled from the records are as follows.
summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 16. Residents In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint 4 for acknowledgment and support
temporarily out of the Philippines.—When any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the
resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner
be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied.) Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father. 5 According to petitioners,
Summons; We held in said case that the normal method of service of summons on one temporarily Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993. Vasquez
absent is by substituted service of summons because personal service abroad and service by publication allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores
are not ordinary means of summoning defendants.—Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070 (1968)  offers added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family.
a rational and logical solution of the issue. We held in said case that the normal method of service of A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted service because personal service abroad and service Vasquez’s grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez’s mother returned the
by publication are not ordinary means of summoning defendants. Summons in a suit in personam against documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non-service of summons.6
a temporarily absent resident may be by substituted service as domiciliaries of a State are always Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for lack of proper
amenable to suits in personam therein. service of summons.7
In 2000, the court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at “10 Int. President Garcia St., Zone 6,
Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence is the place where the person named in the summons is Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila” upon petitioners’ motion. Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff served it
living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the by substituted service on Vasquez’s caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff’s return incorrectly stated
time.—“Residence” is the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the “Lazaro” as Vasquez’s surname.8
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. A plaintiff is merely Another alias summons9 was issued, also received by Bejer. The second sheriff’s return states:
required to know the defendant’s residence, office or regular business place. He need not know where a “THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on the 19th day of July 2000 the undersigned sheriff caused the
resident defendant actually is at the very moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to ensure that service of summons issued by the court in the above-entitled case together with the copy of the complaint
the person upon whom service was actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or informs him and annexes attached thereon upon defendant RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, by substituted service, thru his
about it. The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive actual notice. caretaker, RAQUEL BEJER, a person of sufficient discretion, who acknowledged the receipt thereof at
Summons; Service of Summons; The absence in the final sheriff’s return of a statement about the No. 10 Int. President Garcia St. Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, as evidenced by her
impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid.—The letter of the signature appearing at the lower portion of the original copy of summons.
law must yield to its spirit. The absence in the final sheriff’s return of a statement about the impossibility WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to the court of origin DULY SERVED for its
of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. Such failure should not unduly records and information.
prejudice petitioners if what was undisclosed was in fact done. Proof of prior attempts at personal service Taguig for Naga City, July 19, 2000
may have been submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the                                                                    (SGD.)
substituted service had Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It                                                         ERNESTO G. RAYMUNDO, JR.,
was only when a judgment against him was rendered by the trial court that he questioned the validity of                                                              Deputy Sheriff
service of summons before the appellate court. Such failure to appear, and then later to question the                                                              MTC BR 74
court’s jurisdiction over his person, should not be taken against herein petitioners.                                                              Taguig, Metro Manila10
Family Law; Children; Filiation; Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that
illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.  
—Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be established On petitioners’ motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer despite
in the same way and on the substituted service of summons. Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of the
proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned as he had allegedly moved to another place
515 and left no new address.11
the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is In 2001, the court granted petitioners’ prayers, explaining that they had no ill-motive and that
established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final Dolores gave a truthful testimony. The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the allegations by
order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed his silence. It further explained that Laurence’s certificate of live birth, being a public document, is
by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate filiation. The trial court decreed:
legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 “WHEREFORE, by preponderant evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs expire, and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if
Dolores Montefalcon and her minor child Laurence Montefalcon and against defendant Ronnie S. they wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often has a temporary residence in the
Vasquez who is hereby ordered to: urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold offices, aside from his home
Acknowledge plaintiff Laurence Montefalcon as his illegitimate child with Dolores Montefalcon; 1. address in the province where he originates. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur
Give support to the said minor in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS monthly but he has lived in Taguig City when the complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has
commencing on June 1, 1993, the past support for eight (8) years in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED established a residence in either place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is
EIGHTY THOUSAND (P480,000.00) PESOS less the amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND (P19,000.00) living at the time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an
PESOS previously given, shall be paid promptly and the monthly support of FIVE THOUSAND overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of
(P5,000.00) PESOS shall be paid not later than the end of each month beginning on July 31, 2001 and summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
every end of the month thereafter as prayed for in the complaint; and 2.  16. “SEC.Residents temporarily out of the Philippines.—When any action is commenced against a
Pay the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by
PESOS as attorney’s and appearance fees, respectively, and litigation expenses of ONE THOUSAND leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.” (Emphasis
(P1,000.00) PESOS. 3. supplied.)
SO ORDERED.”12
 
  The preceding section referred to states:
In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed. Appeal  15. “SEC.Extraterritorial service.—When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
was granted by the court.13 Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in trying and Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which
deciding the case as it “never” acquired jurisdiction over his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per- is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
month support, which was allegedly “excessive and exorbitant.” The appellate court noted that the service contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from
of summons on Vasquez was “defective” as there was no explanation of impossibility of personal service any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may,
and an attempt to effect personal service, and decreed as follows: by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by
“WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The appealed publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order,
May 28, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City in Civil Case No. RTC ‘99-4460 is in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting
further proceedings. such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within
SO ORDERED.”14 which the defendant must answer.”

   
Petitioners argued in their motion for reconsideration 15 that any attempt at personal service of Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and “also,” it is not mandatory. Other methods
summons was needless as Vasquez already left for abroad. The appellate court, however, denied the of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a
motion. Hence, this petition. defendant-seaman.
Petitioners assign two appellate court errors: Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons. But was personal service of summons
  practicable? Conversely, was substituted service of summons justified?
I. Obviously, personal service of summons was not practicable since the defendant was temporarily out
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IN THIS CASE WAS of the country. To proceed with personal service of summons on a defendant-seaman who went on
NOT VALIDLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. RTC overseas contract work—would not only be impractical and futile—it would also be absurd.
’99-4460; AND THAT The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact that the Naga City-based sheriff
II. purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to serve the summons personally on Vasquez. When service
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ANNUL[L]ING AND SETTING ASIDE THE TRIAL of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained the whereabouts of Vasquez. Upon being informed that
COURT’S DECISION (ANNEX “B”) FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.16 Vasquez was in Manila, the Naga court commissioned a Taguig City-based sheriff to serve the summons.
Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs inquired about Vasquez’s whereabouts, signifying that they did not
  immediately resort to substituted service. There was no undue haste in effecting substituted service. The
Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as Vasquez had left as overseas seafarer when the fact that the Naga court allowed a reasonable time to locate Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows that there
sheriff served the summons on July 19, 2000 in Taguig. Noting that Vasquez’s seaman’s book indicated was indeed no precipitate haste in serving the summons.
that he left the country on January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000, they criticize the In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified because previous
appellate court for anchoring its rulings on mere technicality. attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent efforts were evidently
Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of summons should have been personal or by exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official duty. Also, the person
publication as substituted service is proper only if a defendant is in the country. Vasquez also added that who received the alias summons was of suitable age and discretion, then residing at Vasquez’s dwelling.
the sheriff’s return did not state that he exerted efforts to personally serve the summons. 17 There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez’s residence, as evidenced by his employment contract,
In their reply, petitioners insist that a substituted service is the normal method if one is temporarily executed under the supervision and authority of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
away from the country as personal service abroad or by publication are not ordinary means of service. 18 (POEA). Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of employment and seafarer’s information sheet, both
Simply put, the issues now for resolution are: (1) whether there is a valid substituted service of bearing POEA’s letterhead, his address in Metro Manila was what was correctly mentioned in the alias
summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court with jurisdiction over his person; and (2) whether he is summons that Bejer received. She must have informed Vasquez one way or another of the suit upon his
obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence. return in October 2000 after finishing his nine-month contract with Fathom Ship Management.
To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, 19 or if Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time to have the default order set aside. The
this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. 20 It is of judicial notice that default judgment was rendered on May 28, 2001. He also had enough time to file a motion for
overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts reconsideration. But he did nothing. The interregnum between the first but failed attempt at personal
service by the RTC of Naga City in Vasquez’s place in Camarines Sur to the final substituted service in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Metro Manila by a Taguig RTC sheriff was almost eight months, a reasonable time long enough to Court and special laws.
conclude that personal service had failed and was futile. Laurence’s record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove
Montalban v. Maximo21 offers a rational and logical solution of the issue. We held in said case that paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as father
the normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted service because in Laurence’s certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a
personal service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary means of summoning defendants. competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized
Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent resident may be by substituted service as by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for
domiciliaries of a State are always amenable to suits in personam therein.22 acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated act.28
“Residence” is the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to prove
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. A plaintiff is merely that Laurence needs Vasquez’s support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support. Dolores
required to know the defendant’s residence, office or regular business place. He need not know where a testified that she spent around P200,000 for Laurence; she spends P8,000 a month for his schooling and
resident defendant actually is at the very moment of filing suit. He is not even duty-bound to ensure that their subsistence. She told the lower court Vasquez was earning US$535 monthly based on his January 10,
the person upon whom service was actually made delivers the summons to the defendant or informs him 2000 contract of employment29 with Fathom Ship Management and his seafarer information sheet. 30 That
about it. The law presumes that for him. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive actual notice. income, if converted at the prevailing rate, would be more than sufficient to cover the monthly support for
As well said in Montalban: Laurence.
“. . . A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling Under Article 195 (4)31 of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. The
where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the resources or means
bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. 32 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according
be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business obliged to support.33 Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up. If he does not do what is family.34 Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not
expected of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot in justice raise his voice and say that excessive nor exorbitant.
he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the substituted service of summons
claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of and remanding the case. As there was valid substituted service of summons under the circumstances of
business. this case, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over his person and correctly ordered him to pay past and
present monthly support to his illegitimate child as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against him. petitioners.
There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams make WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 29, 2003 and Resolution
it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.”23 dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71944 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga City in Civil Case No.
  RTC ’99-4460 is hereby REINSTATED.
Aside from, at present, various forms of texting and short message services by the ubiquitous cellular Costs against respondent.
phones. SO ORDERED.
More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its spirit. The absence in the final sheriff’s return Tinga, Reyes,** Leonardo-De Castro*** and Brion, JJ., concur.
of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that the service is
invalid. Such failure should not unduly prejudice petitioners if what was undisclosed was in fact done. Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of
any incident assailing the validity of the substituted service 24 had Vasquez surfaced when the case was Notes.—While substituted service of summons is permitted since it is extraordinary in character and
heard. In fact, he was declared in default. It was only when a judgment against him was rendered by the in derogation of the usual method of service, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed
trial court that he questioned the validity of service of summons before the appellate court. Such failure to requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. (Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21
appear, and then later to question the court’s jurisdiction over his person, should not be taken against [2006])
herein petitioners. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
Between Vasquez’s self-serving assertion that he only came to know of the case when his mother told him generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
about the trial court’s decision and the sheriff’s return on the substituted service which carries a needs of the recipient. (Lacson vs. Lacson, 499 SCRA 677 [2006])
presumption of regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving of more faith and credit. The sheriff’s
certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts set out in it. Only clear and
convincing evidence may overcome its presumption of regularity. Given the circumstances in the present
case, we agree that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty on the part of the sheriff
stands.25
On the second issue, the trial court’s order must also be sustained. Co-petitioner Laurence is legally
entitled to support from the respondent, and the amount of P5,000 monthly set by the trial court is neither
excessive nor unreasonable.
Article 17526 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, 27 the
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and