I. SHORT TITLE: Ching v. Secretary of Justice Ii. Full Title: Alfredo Ching, Petitioner, vs. The Secretary of Justice

I. SHORT TITLE: Ching v.
Secretary of Justice
II. FULL TITLE: ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR CECILYN BURGOS-VILLAVERT, JUDGE EDGARDO
SUDIAM of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 52; RIZAL COMMERCIAL
BANKING CORP. and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
III. TOPIC:
IV. Statement of the Facts:
Petitioner was the Senior Vice-President of Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (PBMI).
PBMI, through petitioner, applied with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(respondent bank) for the issuance of commercial letters of credit to finance its
importation of assorted goods. Respondent bank approved the application, and
irrevocable letters of credit were issued in favor of petitioner. The goods were
purchased and delivered in trust to PBMI. Petitioner signed 13 trust receipts as surety,
acknowledging delivery of several goods. When the trust receipts matured, petitioner
failed to return the goods to respondent bank, or to return their value amounting to
P6,940,280.66 despite demands. Thus, the bank filed a criminal complaint for estafa
against petitioner in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
V. Statement of the Case:
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor found probable cause
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 115, otherwise known as the Trust Receipts Law.
Thirteen (13) Informations were filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila. Petitioner appealed the Resolution to the Sec. of Justice, which
initially dismissed the appeal but later on granted the appeal, by way of reconsideration,
and ordered the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations. Respondent bank filed a
motion for reconsideration, which, however, was denied. The RTC, for its part, granted
the Motion to Quash the Informations filed by petitioner on the ground that the material
allegations therein did not amount to estafa. Respondent bank re-filed the criminal
complaint for estafa against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila,
in light of a newly promulgated jurisprudence on Trust Receipts. The City Prosecutor
ruled that there was no probable cause to charge petitioner with violating P.D. No. 115,
as petitioner's liability was only civil, not criminal, having signed the trust receipts as
surety. Respondent bank appealed the resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
via petition for review and the SOJ granted the petition and ordered the filing of
informations against petitioner. The Justice Secretary further stated that the respondent
bound himself under the terms of the trust receipts not only as a corporate official of
PBMI but also as its surety; hence, he could be proceeded against in two (2) ways: first,
as surety as determined by the Supreme Court in its decision in Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals; and second, as the corporate official
responsible for the offense under P.D. No. 115, via criminal prosecution. Petitioner
appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for lack of merit.
VI. Issue/s:
Whether or not the SOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the filing of
informations against petitioner
VII. Ruling:
No. The Court rules that although petitioner signed the trust receipts merely as Senior
Vice-President of PBMI and had no physical possession of the goods, he cannot avoid
prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 115. Though the entrustee is a corporation,
nevertheless, the law specifically makes the officers, employees or other officers or
persons responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities of such
corporation and/or board of directors, officers, or other officials or employees
responsible for the offense. The rationale is that such officers or employees are vested
with the authority and responsibility to devise means necessary to ensure compliance
with the law and, if they fail to do so, are held criminally accountable; thus, they have a
responsible share in the violations of the law.
A crime is the doing of that which the penal code forbids to be done, or omitting to do
what it commands. A necessary part of the definition of every crime is the designation of
the author of the crime upon whom the penalty is to be inflicted. When a criminal statute
designates an act of a corporation or a crime and prescribes punishment therefor, it
creates a criminal offense which, otherwise, would not exist and such can be committed
only by the corporation. But when a penal statute does not expressly apply to
corporations, it does not create an offense for which a corporation may be punished. On
the other hand, if the State, by statute, defines a crime that may be committed by a
corporation but prescribes the penalty therefor to be suffered by the officers, directors,
or employees of such corporation or other persons responsible for the offense, only
such individuals will suffer such penalty. Corporate officers or employees, through
whose act, default or omission the corporation commits a crime, are themselves
individually guilty of the crime.
The principle applies whether or not the crime requires the consciousness of
wrongdoing. It applies to those corporate agents who themselves commit the crime and
to those, who, by virtue of their managerial positions or other similar relation to the
corporation, could be deemed responsible for its commission, if by virtue of their
relationship to the corporation, they had the power to prevent the act. Moreover, all
parties active in promoting a crime, whether agents or not, are principals. Whether such
officers or employees are benefited by their delictual acts is not a touchstone of their
criminal liability. Benefit is not an operative fact.

In this case, petitioner signed the trust receipts in question. He cannot, thus, hide
behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of PBMI. In the words of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, a corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation
where he is the actual, present and efficient actor.
VIII. Dispositive Portion
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
IX. PREPARED BY: Niles Adam C. Revilla

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