G.R. No.

151908            August 12, 2003

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 152063 August 12, 2003

GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (ISLACOM), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (The Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-
2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Among its pertinent provisions are the following:

(1) The billing statements shall be received by the subscriber of the telephone service not later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. In case the statement
is received beyond this period, the subscriber shall have a specified grace period within which to pay the bill and the public telecommunications entity (PTEs) shall not
be allowed to disconnect the service within the grace period.

(2) There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message or similar facility excluding the customer's own equipment.

(3) PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the
date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the date the prepaid SIM card is fully consumed but not beyond 2 years and 45 days from
date of first use to replenish the SIM card, otherwise the SIM card shall be rendered invalid. The validity of an invalid SIM card, however, shall be installed upon
request of the customer at no additional charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.

(4) Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of every call using the cards.

(5) The unit of billing for the cellular mobile telephone service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per pulse. The
authorized rates per minute shall thus be divided by 10.1

The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof
furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000.2 Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular
pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the
Memorandum Circular.

On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally
eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. The Memorandum directed CMTS operators to:

a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000 requiring the presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid SIM card customers;

b. require all your respective prepaid SIM cards dealers to comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000;

c. deny acceptance to your respective networks prepaid and/or postpaid customers using stolen cellphone units or cellphone units registered to somebody other than
the applicant when properly informed of all information relative to the stolen cellphone units;

d. share all necessary information of stolen cellphone units to all other CMTS operators in order to prevent the use of stolen cellphone units; and

e. require all your existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present valid identification cards.3

This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities, which reads:

This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use pursuant
to MC 13-6-2000.

In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least
two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October 2000.

For strict compliance.4

On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications Commission,
Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.5

Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such
jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of
the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid
card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-
Intervention.6 This was granted by the trial court.

On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.7

In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Subsequently, after hearing petitioners' application for preliminary injunction as well as respondent's motion to dismiss, the trial court issued on November 20, 2000
an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit. The plaintiffs' application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby granted. Accordingly, the defendants are hereby enjoined from implementing NTC Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000 and the NTC
Memorandum, dated October 6, 2000, pending the issuance and finality of the decision in this case. The plaintiffs and intervenors are, however, required to file a
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), Philippine currency.

SO ORDERED.8

Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 2001.9

Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 64274. On October 9,
2001, a decision was rendered, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED, in that, the order of the court a quo denying the petitioner's motion
to dismiss as well as the order of the court a quo granting the private respondents' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued thereby, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint and complaint-in-intervention below are hereby DISMISSED, without
prejudice to the referral of the private respondents' grievances and disputes on the assailed issuances of the NTC with the said agency.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration were denied in a Resolution dated January 10, 2002 for lack of merit.11

Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Smart and Piltel, which was docketed as G.R. No. 151908, anchored on the following grounds:

A.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) AND NOT THE REGULAR
COURTS HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

B.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO EXHAUST AN AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDY.

C.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE BILLING CIRCULAR ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NTC IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
CONTRARY TO LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY.

D.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO SHOW THEIR CLEAR POSITIVE RIGHT TO WARRANT THE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.12

Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 152063, assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
DO NOT APPLY SINCE THE INSTANT CASE IS FOR LEGAL NULLIFICATION (BECAUSE OF LEGAL INFIRMITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF LAW) OF A PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATION PROMULGATED BY AN AGENCY IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS RULE MAKING POWERS AND INVOLVES ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE
QUESTIONS RAISED ARE PURELY LEGAL QUESTIONS.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IS COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE, WHEN THERE IS NO OTHER REMEDY, AND THE PETITIONER STANDS TO SUFFER GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE
INJURY.

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE PETITIONERS IN FACT EXHAUSTED ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM.

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING ITS QUESTIONED RULINGS IN THIS CASE BECAUSE GLOBE AND ISLA HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT TO
AN INJUNCTION.13

The two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.14

On March 24, 2003, the petitions were given due course and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.15
We find merit in the petitions.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers.16

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that
the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.17 They
must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by
it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must
prevail.18

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially
of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.19

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when
the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority,20 it was held:

The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of
respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only
judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with
this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register
their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for
the billing circular.21 After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 200022 and July 5, 2000,23 asking for the suspension and
reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000, when respondent NTC issued the second assailed
Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters,
thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.

In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases
involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of
the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising
its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It
applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view.24

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional
trial courts.25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments.26 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.27

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative
or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances. In Drilon v. Lim,28 it was held:

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of
the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, B.P. 129 vests in the
regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action
has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders
of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.29
In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the Circular contravened Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional
prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law. These are within the competence of the trial judge. Contrary to the finding of the Court of
Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity
with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good
percentage of our population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court
and in dismissing the case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64274 dated October 9, 2001
and its Resolution dated January 10, 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated November 20, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in
Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 is REINSTATED. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for continuation of the proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 164171 : February 20, 2006]

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT
ZONE, Petitioners, v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., represented by its President JOSE T. DIZON, UNITED AUCTIONEERS, INC., represented by its President
DOMINIC SYTIN, and MICROVAN, INC., represented by its President MARIANO C. SONON, Respondents.

[G.R. NO. 164172 : February 20, 2006]

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION (DOTC), COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT
ZONE, Petitioners, v. SUBIC INTEGRATED MACRO VENTURES CORP., represented by its President YOLANDA AMBAR, Respondent.

[G.R. NO. 168741 : February 20, 2006]

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE CHIEF OF THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE, Petitioners, v. MOTOR VEHICLE IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION OF SUBIC BAY FREEPORT, INC., represented
by its President ALFREDO S. GALANG, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, in Civil Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil
Case No. 22-0-04, both dated May 24, 2004; and the February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284, which declared Article 2, Section
3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional. Said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and
Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.

The undisputed facts show that on December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156, entitled
"Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines." The challenged
provision states:

3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types of used motor vehicles is prohibited, except for the following:

3.1.1 A vehicle that is owned and for the personal use of a returning resident or immigrant and covered by an authority to import issued under the No-dollar
Importation Program. Such vehicles cannot be resold for at least three (3) years;

3.1.2 A vehicle for the use of an official of the Diplomatic Corps and authorized to be imported by the Department of Foreign Affairs;

3.1.3 Trucks excluding pickup trucks;

1. with GVW of 2.5-6.0 tons covered by an authority to import issued by the DTI.

2. With GVW above 6.0 tons.

3.1.4 Buses:

1. with GVW of 6-12 tons covered by an authority to import issued by DTI;

2. with GVW above 12 tons.

3.1.5 Special purpose vehicles:

1. fire trucks

2. ambulances

3. funeral hearse/coaches

4. crane lorries

5. tractor heads and truck tractors

6. boom trucks

7. tanker trucks

8. tank lorries with high pressure spray gun

9. reefers or refrigerated trucks

10. mobile drilling derricks

11. transit/concrete mixers

12. mobile radiological units

13. wreckers or tow trucks

14. concrete pump trucks

15. aerial/bucket flat-form trucks

16. street sweepers

17. vacuum trucks

18. garbage compactors

19. self loader trucks

20. man lift trucks

21. lighting trucks

22. trucks mounted with special purpose equipment

23. all other types of vehicle designed for a specific use.

The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief before Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration
of the unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order. The cases were filed by herein respondent entities, who or whose members, are classified as
Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the business of, among others, importing and/or trading used motor vehicles.

[G.R. NO. 164171]

On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., (Southwing) United Auctioneers, Inc. (United Auctioneers), and Microvan, Inc. (Microvan),
instituted a declaratory relief case docketed as Civil Case No. 20-0-04,1 against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation and Communication,
Commissioner of Customs, Assistant Secretary and Head of the Land Transportation Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), Collector of Customs for the
Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone, and the Chief of the Land Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport Zone.

Southwing, United Auctioneers and Microvan prayed that judgment be rendered (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal; (2) directing
the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow the importation of used motor vehicles; (2)
ordering the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic Zone to process the registration of the imported used motor vehicles;
and (3) in general, to allow the unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.

Upon filing of petitioners' answer/comment, respondents Southwing and Microvan filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. On
May 24, 2004, a summary judgment was rendered declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the
Constitution with Congress. The trial court further held that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and illegal; directing
respondents Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow the importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227; directing
respondent Chief of the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used
motor vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of the required
customs duties.

SO ORDERED.2

From the foregoing decision, petitioners sought relief before this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 164171.

[G.R. NO. 164172]

On January 20, 2004, respondent Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corporation (Macro Ventures) filed with the same trial court, a similar action for declaratory relief
docketed as Civil Case No. 22-0-04,3 with the same prayer and against the same parties4 as those in Civil Case No. 20-0-04.

In this case, the trial court likewise rendered a summary judgment on May 24, 2004, holding that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is repugnant to the
constitution.5 Elevated to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, Civil Case No. 22-0-04 was docketed as G.R. No. 164172.

[G.R. NO. 168741]

On January 22, 2003, respondent Motor Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport, Inc. (Association), filed another action for declaratory relief with
essentially the same prayer as those in Civil Case No. 22-0-04 and Civil Case No. 20-0-04, against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Chief of the Land
Transportation Office, Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs at SBMA and the Chairman of SBMA. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,6 before
the same trial court.

In a decision dated March 10, 2004, the court a quo granted the Association's prayer and declared the assailed proviso as contrary to the Constitution, to wit:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and illegal; directing
respondents Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow the importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227; directing
respondent Chief of the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used
motor vehicles; directing the respondent Chairman of the SBMA to allow the entry into the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA imported used motor vehicle; and
in general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of the required customs duties.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, filed a petition for certiorari 8 with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284) which denied the petition on
February 14, 2005 and sustained the finding of the trial court that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is void for being repugnant to the constitution. The dispositive
portion thereof, reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 72, Olongapo City, in
Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, accordingly, STANDS.

SO ORDERED.9

The aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 168741. In a Resolution dated October 4, 2005,10 said case was
consolidated with G.R. No. 164171 and G.R. No. 164172.

Petitioners are now before this Court contending that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country, including the Freeeport. In support
of their arguments, they raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of the assailed proviso. The procedural issues are: the lack of
respondents' locus standi to question the validity of EO 156, the propriety of challenging EO 156 in a declaratory relief proceeding and the applicability of a judgment
on the pleadings in this case.

Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the importation ban considering that their certificate of registration and tax exemption do not authorize
them to engage in the importation and/or trading of used cars. They also aver that the actions filed by respondents do not qualify as declaratory relief cases. Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be filed before there is a breach or violation of rights. Petitioners claim that there
was already a breach of respondents' supposed right because the cases were filed more than a year after the issuance of EO 156. In fact, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,
numerous warrants of seizure and detention were issued against imported used motor vehicles belonging to respondent Association's members.

Petitioners' arguments lack merit.

The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement11 has been satisfied in the instant case. The broad subject of the prohibited importation is "all types of used motor vehicles." Respondents would
definitely suffer a direct injury from the implementation of EO 156 because their certificate of registration and tax exemption authorize them to trade and/or import
new and used motor vehicles and spare parts, except "used cars."12 Other types of motor vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents and not falling within the
category of used cars would thus be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of their business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing to assail the validity of
EO 156.

As to the propriety of declaratory relief as a vehicle for assailing the executive issuance, suffice it to state that any breach of the rights of respondents will not affect
the case. In Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu,13 the Court entertained a suit for declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the
proper interpretation of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the right of the party affected. We find no reason to deviate from said ruling
mindful of the significance of the present case to the national economy.

So also, summary judgments were properly rendered by the trial court because the issues involved in the instant case were pure questions of law. A motion for
summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is
no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action in which the pleadings raise only a
legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.14

At any rate, even assuming the procedural flaws raised by petitioners truly exist, the Court is not precluded from brushing aside these technicalities and taking
cognizance of the action filed by respondents considering its importance to the public and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.15

We now come to the substantive issues, which are: (1) whether there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; and (2) if the answer is in the affirmative, whether
the application of Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, reasonable and within the scope provided by law.

The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its
application should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs
duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.

In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It
held that the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise
thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is void.

Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is
lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well
as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay.16 Such delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined
as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and
implement legislative policy.17 To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following requisites:

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;

(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; andcralawlibrary
(4) It must be reasonable.18

Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, EO 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. It has both constitutional and statutory
bases.

Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. It provides:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.19 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:

1) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the President, in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, to, inter alia, prohibit
the importation of any commodity. Section 401 thereof, reads:

Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. -

A. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: x x x (2) to establish import
quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; x x x Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of
the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently
granted pursuant to this section. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise
of legislative power under the Provisional Freedom Constitution,20 empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any equipment
or raw materials or finished products. Pertinent provisions thereof, read:

ART. 4. Composition of the board. The Board of Investments shall be composed of seven (7) governors: The Secretary of Trade and Industry, three (3)
Undersecretaries of Trade and Industry to be chosen by the President; and three (3) representatives from the government agencies and the private sector x x x.

ART. 7. Powers and duties of the Board.

xxx

(12) Formulate and implement rationalization programs for certain industries whose operation may result in dislocation, overcrowding or inefficient use of resources,
thus impeding economic growth. For this purpose, the Board may formulate guidelines for progressive manufacturing programs, local content programs, mandatory
sourcing requirements and dispersal of industries. In appropriate cases and upon approval of the President, the Board may restrict, either totally or partially, the
importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished products involved in the rationalization program; (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the "Safeguard Measures Act" (SMA), and entitled "An Act Protecting Local Industries By Providing Safeguard Measures
To Be Undertaken In Response To Increased Imports And Providing Penalties For Violation Thereof,"21 designated the Secretaries22 of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture, in their capacity as alter egos of the President, as the implementing authorities of the safeguard measures, which
include, inter alia, modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction on the importation of a product into the Philippines. The purpose of the SMA is stated in
the declaration of policy, thus:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote competitiveness of domestic industries and producers based on sound industrial and agricultural development
policies, and efficient use of human, natural and technical resources. In pursuit of this goal and in the public interest, the State shall provide safeguard measures to
protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which cause or threaten to cause serious injury to those domestic industries and producers.

There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing the President to ban or regulate importation of articles and commodities into the country.

Anent the second requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary that the nature of the
administrative issuance is properly determined. As in the enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous
notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at
an appropriate investigation.23 This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as distinguished from interpretative rules which give no real consequence
more than what the law itself has already prescribed;24 and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing.25 A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,26 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc.,27 the Court enunciated the
doctrine that when an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law
and substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard and, thereafter, to
be duly informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law.

In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the domestic industry
by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not previously subject to such prohibition. The due process requirements in the issuance thereof are
embodied in Section 40128 of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 5 and 9 of the SMA29 which essentially mandate the conduct of investigation and public
hearings before the regulatory measure or importation ban may be issued.

In the present case, respondents neither questioned before this Court nor with the courts below the procedure that paved the way for the issuance of EO 156. What
they challenged in their petitions before the trial court was the absence of "substantive due process" in the issuance of the EO.30 Their main contention before the
court a quo is that the importation ban is illogical and unfair because it unreasonably drives them out of business to the prejudice of the national economy.
Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are presumed to be valid,31 and
there being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of EO 156, the presumption is that said executive issuance duly complied with
the procedures and limitations imposed by law.

To determine whether EO 156 has complied with the third and fourth requisites of a valid administrative issuance, to wit, that it was issued within the scope of
authority given by the legislature and that it is reasonable, an examination of the nature of a Freeport under RA 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation
ban under the questioned EO is necessary.

RA 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions into
alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and social development
of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.

The Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 specifically defines the territory comprising the Subic Bay Freeport, referred to as the Special Economic and
Freeport Zone in Section 12 of RA 7227 as "a separate customs territory consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the
lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Philippine-U.S. Military Base Agreement as
amended and within the territorial jurisdiction of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, the metes and bounds of which shall be delineated by the President of
the Philippines; provided further that pending establishment of secure perimeters around the entire SBF, the SBF shall refer to the area demarcated by the SBMA
pursuant to Section 1332 hereof."

Among the salient provisions of RA 7227 are as follows:

SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. -

xxx

The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:

xxx

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and
around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;

(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into
and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.
However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to
customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;

The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest
their capital in a business climate with the least governmental intervention. The concept of this zone was explained by Senator Guingona in this wise:

Senator Guingona. Mr. President, the special economic zone is successful in many places, particularly Hong Kong, which is a free port. The difference between a
special economic zone and an industrial estate is simply expansive in the sense that the commercial activities, including the establishment of banks, services, financial
institutions, agro-industrial activities, maybe agriculture to a certain extent.

This delineates the activities that would have the least of government intervention, and the running of the affairs of the special economic zone would be run
principally by the investors themselves, similar to a housing subdivision, where the subdivision owners elect their representatives to run the affairs of the
subdivision, to set the policies, to set the guidelines.

We would like to see Subic area converted into a little Hong Kong, Mr. President, where there is a hub of free port and free entry, free duties and activities to a
maximum spur generation of investment and jobs.

While the investor is reluctant to come in the Philippines, as a rule, because of red tape and perceived delays, we envision this special economic zone to be an area
where there will be minimum government interference.

The initial outlay may not only come from the Government or the Authority as envisioned here, but from them themselves, because they would be encouraged to
invest not only for the land but also for the buildings and factories. As long as they are convinced that in such an area they can do business and reap reasonable
profits, then many from other parts, both local and foreign, would invest, Mr. President.33 (Emphasis, added)

With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in general, engage in any kind of business as well as import and export any article into and out of
the Freeport. These are among the rights accorded to Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises under Section 39 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227, thus'

SEC. 39. Rights and Obligations. - SBF Enterprises shall have the following rights and obligations:

A. To freely engage in any business, trade, manufacturing, financial or service activity, and to import and export freely all types of goods into and out of the SBF,
subject to the provisions of the Act, these Rules and other regulations that may be promulgated by the SBMA;

Citing, inter alia, the interpellations of Senator Enrile, petitioners claim that the "free flow or movement of goods and capital" only means that goods and material
brought within the Freeport shall not be subject to customs duties and other taxes and should not be construed as an open floodgate for entry of all kinds of goods.
They thus surmise that the importation ban on motor vehicles is applicable within the Freeport. Pertinent interpellations of Senator Enrile on the concept of Freeport
is as follows:
Senator Enrile: Mr. President, I think we are talking here of sovereign concepts, not territorial concepts. The concept that we are supposed to craft here is to carve
out a portion of our terrestrial domain as well as our adjacent waters and say to the world: "Well, you can set up your factories in this area that we are circumscribing,
and bringing your equipment and bringing your goods, you are not subject to any taxes and duties because you are not within the customs jurisdiction of the Republic
of the Philippines, whether you store the goods or only for purposes of transshipment or whether you make them into finished products again to be reexported to
other lands."

xxxx

My understanding of a "free port" is, we are in effect carving out a part of our territory and make it as if it were foreign territory for purposes of our customs laws,
and that people can come, bring their goods, store them there and bring them out again, as long as they do not come into the domestic commerce of the
Republic.

We do not really care whether these goods are stored here. The only thing that we care is for our people to have an employment because of the entry of these goods
that are being discharged, warehoused and reloaded into the ships so that they can be exported. That will generate employment for us. For as long as that is done,
we are saying, in effect, that we have the least contact with our tariff and customs laws and our tax laws. Therefore, we consider these goods as outside of the
customs jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines as yet, until we draw them from this territory and bring them inside our domestic commerce. In which case,
they have to pass through our customs gate. I thought we are carving out this entire area and convert it into this kind of concept.34

However, contrary to the claim of petitioners, there is nothing in the foregoing excerpts which absolutely limits the incentive to Freeport investors only to exemption
from customs duties and taxes. Mindful of the legislative intent to attract investors, enhance investment and boost the economy, the legislature could not have
limited the enticement only to exemption from taxes. The minimum interference policy of the government on the Freeport extends to the kind of business that
investors may embark on and the articles which they may import or export into and out of the zone. A contrary interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the
Freeport and drive away investors.

It does not mean, however, that the right of Freeport enterprises to import all types of goods and article is absolute. Such right is of course subject to the limitation
that articles absolutely prohibited by law cannot be imported into the Freeport.35 Nevertheless, in determining whether the prohibition would apply to the Freeport,
resort to the purpose of the prohibition is necessary.

In issuing EO 156, particularly the prohibition on importation under Article 2, Section 3.1, the President envisioned to rationalize the importation of used motor
vehicles and to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine motor manufacturing firms to be globally competitive producers of completely build-up units and their parts
and components for the local and export markets.36 In justifying the issuance of EO 156, petitioners alleged that there has been a decline in the sales of new vehicles
and a remarkable growth of the sales of imported used motor vehicles. To address the same, the President issued the questioned EO to prevent further erosion of the
already depressed market base of the local motor vehicle industry and to curtail the harmful effects of the increase in the importation of used motor vehicles.37

Taking our bearings from the foregoing discussions, we hold that the importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative order. To be valid, an
administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute
and other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot usurp. As held in United BF Homeowner's
Association v. BF Homes, Inc.:38

The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or
the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated
by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions
of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.

In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO
156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some
extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7227, as follows:

"the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs laws are
in force and effect."39

The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the
prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as
in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable.

This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of
rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation
to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.40

There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. The deterioration of the local motor
manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor vehicles is an urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the
exercise of delegated police power, the executive can therefore validly proscribe the importation of these vehicles. Thus, in Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v.
Board of Transportation,41 the Court held that a regulation phasing out taxi cabs more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power. The regulation was
sustained as reasonable holding that the purpose thereof was to promote the convenience and comfort and protect the safety of the passengers.

The problem, however, lies with respect to the application of the importation ban to the Freeport. The Court finds no logic in the all encompassing application of the
assailed provision to the Freeport which is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm
sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. The application of the law should be consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et
cessat lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases. It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life.42 To apply the proscription to the
Freeport would not serve the purpose of the EO. Instead of improving the general economy of the country, the application of the importation ban in the Freeport
would subvert the avowed purpose of RA 7227 which is to create a market that would draw investors and ultimately boost the national economy.

In similar cases, we also declared void the administrative issuance or ordinances concerned for being unreasonable. To illustrate, in De la Cruz v. Paras,43 the Court
held as unreasonable and unconstitutional an ordinance characterized by overbreadth. In that case, the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, prohibited the operation of
all night clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its jurisdiction for the protection of public morals. As explained by the Court:

x x x It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in
Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation." It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the
case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein
employed.

Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,44 is a case involving a resolution issued by the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited examinees from attending review
classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure
examinations in accountancy. Besides being unreasonable on its face and violative of academic freedom, the measure was found to be more sweeping than what was
necessary, viz:

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least
minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days - when they should be
refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself -
would be like uprooting the tree to get rid of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right
there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by
examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. x x x

In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,45 the Court likewise struck down as unreasonable and overbreadth a city ordinance granting an exclusive
franchise for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena
City. While professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the
city, the ordinance was held to be beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city.

By parity of reasoning, the importation ban in this case should also be declared void for its too sweeping and unnecessary application to the Freeport which has no
bearing on the objective of the prohibition. If the aim of the EO is to prevent the entry of used motor vehicles from the Freeport to the customs territory, the solution
is not to forbid entry of these vehicles into the Freeport, but to intensify governmental campaign and measures to thwart illegal ingress of used motor vehicles into
the customs territory.

At this juncture, it must be mentioned that on June 19, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97-A, "Further Clarifying The Tax And Duty-Free
Privilege Within The Subic Special Economic And Free Port Zone," Section 1 of which provides:

SECTION 1. The following guidelines shall govern the tax and duty-free privilege within the Secured Area of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone:

1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the SSEFPZ. Business
enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and consumer items
tax and dutry-free. Consumption items, however, must be consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of raw materials, capital goods, equipment and consumer
items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided herein.

In Tiu v. Court of Appeals46 as reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,47 this provision limiting the special privileges on tax and duty-free
importation in the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base has been declared valid and constitutional and in accordance with RA 7227. Consistent with these
rulings and for easier management and monitoring of activities and to prevent fraudulent importation of merchandise and smuggling, the free flow and importation
of used motor vehicles shall be operative only within the "secured area."

In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made applicable to the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as
stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Pursuant to the separability clause48 of EO 156, Section 3.1 is declared valid insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the
Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come
into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory,
but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED and the May 24, 2004 Decisions of Branch 72, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 20-0-04 and
Civil Case No. 22-0-04; and the February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63284, are MODIFIED insofar as they declared Article 2, Section
3.1 of Executive Order No. 156, void in its entirety.

Said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to
its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205357               September 2, 2014

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

SENATOR ALAN PETER "COMPAÑERO" S. CAYETANO,Petitioner-Intervenor.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 205374

ABC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 205592

MANILA BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. and NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 205852

KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS (KBP) and ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 206360

RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

"The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests approach which is a 'fundamental postulate of constitutional law.'"1

Once again the Court is asked to draw a carefully drawn balance in the incessant conflicts between rights and regulations, liberties and limitations, and competing
demands of the different segments of society. Here, we are confronted with the need to strike a workable and viable equilibrium between a constitutional mandate
to maintain free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, together with the aim of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates,2 on one hand, and the imperatives of a republican and
democratic state,3 together with its guaranteed rights of suffrage,4 freedom of speech and of the press,5 and the people's right to information,6 on the other.

In a nutshell, the present petitions may be seen as in search of the answer to the question - how does the Charter of a republican and democratic State achieve a
viable and acceptable balance between liberty, without which, government becomes an unbearable tyrant, and authority, without which, society becomes an
intolerable and dangerous arrangement?

Assailed in these petitions are certain regulations promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and local
elections dealing with political advertisements. Specifically, the petitions question the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to
candidates and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto, such as the need to report the same, and the sanctions imposed for violations.

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast
and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the
people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.

The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes that candidates may use for television and radio
advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006), otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. Pertinent portions of said provision state,
thus:

Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. - All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space. The following
guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC:

xxxx

6.2 (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of
television advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
b. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty ( 60) minutes of television advertisement
and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.

For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for
the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political party.

During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC issued Resolutions implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006, regarding
airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the aforestated number of minutes "per station."7 For the May 2013 elections, however, respondent
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 dated January 15, 2013, changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for
political campaigns or advertisements from a "per station" basis, to a "total aggregate" basis.

Petitioners ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN), ABC Development Corporation (ABC), GMA Network, Incorporated ( GMA), Manila Broadcasting Company, Inc. (MBC),
Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (NBN), and Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN) are owners/operators of radio and television networks in the Philippines,
while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the national organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators of
radio and television stations and said stations themselves. They sent their respective letters to the COMELEC questioning the provisions of the aforementioned
Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held public hearings. Thereafter, on February 1, 2013, respondent issued Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of Resolution No.
9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and oppressive, hence, the present petitions.

All of the petitioners assail the following provisions of the Resolution:

a) Section 7 (d),8 which provides for a penalty of suspension or revocation of an offender's franchise or permit, imposes criminal liability against broadcasting entities
and their officers in the event they sell airtime in excess of the size, duration, or frequency authorized in the new rules;

b) Section 9 (a),9 which provides for an "aggregate total" airtime instead of the previous "per station" airtime for political campaigns or dvertisements, and also
required prior COMELEC approval for candidates' television and radio guestings and appearances; and

c) Section 14,10 which provides for a candidate's "right to reply."

In addition, petitioner ABC also questions Section 1 (4) 11 thereof, which defines the term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda," while petitioner GMA
further assails Section 35, 12 which states that any violation of said Rules shall constitute an election offense.

On March 15, 2013, Senator Alan Peter S. Cayetano (Petitioner-Intervenor) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and Admit the Petition-in-Intervention,
which was granted by the Court per its Resolution dated March 19, 2013. Petitioner-Intervenor also assails Section 9 (a) of the Resolution changing the interpretation
of candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a "per station" basis, to a "total aggregate" basis. Petitioners
allege that Resolutions No. 9615 and 9631, amending the earlier Resolution, are unconstitutional and issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, for the reasons set forth hereunder.

Petitioners posit that Section 9 (a) of the assailed Resolution provides for a very restrictive aggregate airtime limit and a vague meaning for a proper computation of
"aggregate total" airtime, and violates the equal protection guarantee, thereby defeating the intent and purpose of R.A. No. 9006.

Petitioners contend that Section 9 (a), which imposes a notice requirement, is vague and infringes on the constitutionally protected freedom of speech, of the press
and of expression, and on the right of people to be informed on matters of public concern

Also, Section 9 (a) is a cruel and oppressive regulation as it imposes an unreasonable and almost impossible burden on broadcast mass media of monitoring a
candidate's or political party's aggregate airtime, otherwise, it may incur administrative and criminal liability.

Further, petitioners claim that Section 7 (d) is null and void for unlawfully criminalizing acts not prohibited and penalized as criminal offenses by R.A. No. 9006.

Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, providing for a candidate's or political party's "right to reply," is likewise assailed to be unconstitutional for being an improper
exercise of the COMELEC's regulatory powers; for constituting prior restraint and infringing petitioners' freedom of expression, speech and the press; and for being
violative of the equal protection guarantee. In addition to the foregoing, petitioner GMA further argues that the Resolution was promulgated without public
consultations, in violation of petitioners' right to due process. Petitioner ABC also avers that the Resolution's definition of the terms "political advertisement" and
"election propaganda" suffers from overbreadth, thereby producing a "chilling effect," constituting prior restraint.

On the other hand, respondent posits in its Comment and Opposition13 dated March 8, 2013, that the petition should be denied based on the following reasons:

Respondent contends that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available to petitioners, because the writ of certiorari is only available against the
COMELEC's adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, while the writ of prohibition only lies against the exercise of judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions. Said writs
do not lie against the COMELEC's administrative or rule-making powers.

Respondent likewise alleges that petitioners do not have locus standi, as the constitutional rights and freedoms they enumerate are not personal to them, rather,
they belong to candidates, political parties and the Filipino electorate in general, as the limitations are imposed on candidates, not on media outlets. It argues that
petitioners' alleged risk of exposure to criminal liability is insufficient to give them legal standing as said "fear of injury" is highly speculative and contingent on a
future act.

Respondent then parries petitioners' attack on the alleged infirmities of the Resolution's provisions.

Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with R.A. No. 9006 as this would truly give life to the constitutional
objective to equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling the playing field between candidates/political parties with
enormous resources and those without much. Moreover, the COMELEC's issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution
which vests on the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass media, to wit:
Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim
to ensure equal opportunity, and equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

This being the case, then the Resolutions cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Next, respondent claims that the provisions are not vague because the assailed Resolutions have given clear and adequate mechanisms to protect broadcast stations
from potential liability arising from a candidate's or party's violation of airtime limits by putting in the proviso that the station "may require buyer to warrant under
oath that such purchase [of airtime] is not in excess of size, duration or frequency authorized by law or these rules." Furthermore, words should be understood in the
sense that they have in common usage, and should be given their ordinary meaning. Thus, in the provision for the right to reply, "charges" against candidates or
parties must be understood in the ordinary sense, referring to accusations or criticisms.

Respondent also sees no prior restraint in the provisions requiring notice to the COMELEC for appearances or guestings of candidates in bona fide news broadcasts. It
points out that the fact that notice may be given 24 hours after first broadcast only proves that the mechanism is for monitoring purposes only, not for censorship.
Further, respondent argues, that for there to be prior restraint, official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression must be done in advance
of actual publication or dissemination. Moreover, petitioners are only required to inform the COMELEC of candidates'/parties' guestings, but there is no regulation as
to the content of the news or the expressions in news interviews or news documentaries. Respondent then emphasized that the Supreme Court has held that
freedom of speech and the press may be limited in light of the duty of the COMELEC to ensure equal access to opportunities for public service.

With regard to the right to reply provision, respondent also does not consider it as restrictive of the airing of bona fide news broadcasts. More importantly, it
stressed, the right to reply is enshrined in the Constitution, and the assailed Resolutions provide that said right can only be had after going through administrative due
process. The provision was also merely lifted from Section 10 of R.A. No. 9006, hence, petitioner ABC is actually attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9006, which
cannot be done through a collateral attack.

Next, respondent counters that there is no merit to ABC's claim that the Resolutions' definition of "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" suffers from
overbreadth, as the extent or scope of what falls under said terms is clearly stated in Section 1 (4) of Resolution No. 9615.

It is also respondent's view that the nationwide aggregate total airtime does not violate the equal protection clause, because it does not make any substantial
distinctions between national and regional and/or local broadcast stations, and even without the aggregate total airtime rule, candidates and parties are likely to be
more inclined to advertise in national broadcast stations. Respondent likewise sees no merit in petitioners' claim that the Resolutions amount to taking of private
property without just compensation. Respondent emphasizes that radio and television broadcasting companies do not own the airwaves and frequencies through
which they transmit broadcast signals; they are merely given the temporary privilege to use the same. Since they are merely enjoying a privilege, the same may be
reasonably burdened with some form of public service, in this case, to provide candidates with the opportunity to reply to charges aired against them.

Lastly, respondent contends that the public consultation requirement does not apply to constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC, pursuant to Section 1,
Chapter I, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. Indeed, Section 9, Chapter II, Book VII of said Code provides, thus:

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.

However, Section 1, Chapter 1, Book VII of said Code clearly provides:

Section 1. Scope. -This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and
colleges.

Nevertheless, even if public participation is not required, respondent still conducted a meeting with representatives of the KBP and various media outfits on
December 26, 2012, almost a month before the issuance of Resolution No. 9615.

On April 2, 2013, petitioner GMA filed its Reply,14 where it advanced the following counter-arguments:

According to GMA, a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to question the herein assailed Resolutions, which should be considered as a "decision, order or
ruling of the Commission" as mentioned in Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 1. Petition for Certiorari,· and Time to File. - Unless otherwise provided by law, or by any specific provisions in these Rules, any decision, order or ruling of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

GMA further stressed that this case involves national interest, and the urgency of the matter justifies its resort to the remedy of a petition for certiorari.

Therefore, GMA disagrees with the COMELEC's position that the proper remedy is a petition for declaratory relief because such action only asks the court to make a
proper interpretation of the rights of parties under a statute or regulation. Such a petition does not nullify the assailed statute or regulation, or grant injunctive relief,
which petitioners are praying for in their petition. Thus, GMA maintains that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy.

GMA further denies that it is making a collateral attack on the Fair Election Act, as it is not attacking said law. GMA points out that it has stated in its petition that the
law in fact allows the sale or donation of airtime for political advertisements and does not impose criminal liability against radio and television stations. What it is
assailing is the COMELEC's erroneous interpretation of the law's provisions by declaring such sale and/or donation of airtime unlawful, which is contrary to the
purpose of the Fair Election Act.

GMA then claims that it has legal standing to bring the present suit because:
x x x First, it has personally suffered a threatened injury in the form of risk of criminal liability because of the alleged unconstitutional and unlawful conduct of
respondent COMELEC in expanding what was provided for in R.A. No. 9006. Second, the injury is traceable to the challenged action of respondent COMELEC, that is,
the issuance of the assailed Resolutions. Third, the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy sought in petitioner GMA's Petition, among others, for the Honorable
Court to nullify the challenged pertinent provisions of the assailed Resolutions.15

On substantive issues, GMA first argues that the questioned Resolutions are contrary to the objective and purpose of the Fair Election Act. It points out that the Fair
Election Act even repealed the political ad ban found in the earlier law, R.A. No. 6646. The Fair Election Act also speaks of "equal opportunity" and "equal access,'' but
said law never mentioned equalizing the economic station of the rich and the poor, as a declared policy. Furthermore, in its opinion, the supposed correlation
between candidates' expenditures for TV ads and actually winning the elections, is a mere illusion, as there are other various factors responsible for a candidate's
winning the election. GMA then cites portions of the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the bills that led to the enactment of the Fair Election
Act, and alleges that this shows the legislative intent that airtime allocation should be on a "per station" basis. Thus, GMA claims it was arbitrary and a grave abuse of
discretion for the COMELEC to issue the present Resolutions imposing airtime limitations on an "aggregate total" basis.

It is likewise insisted by GMA that the assailed Resolutions impose an unconstitutional burden on them, because their failure to strictly monitor the duration of total
airtime that each candidate has purchased even from other stations would expose their officials to criminal liability and risk losing the station's good reputation and
goodwill, as well as its franchise. It argues that the wordings of the Resolutions belie the COMELEC's claim that petitioners would only incur liability if they
"knowingly" sell airtime beyond the limits imposed by the Resolutions, because the element of knowledge is clearly absent from the provisions thereof. This makes
the provisions have the nature of malum prohibitum.

Next, GMA also says that the application of the aggregate airtime limit constitutes prior restraint and is unconstitutional, opining that "[t]he reviewing power of
respondent COMELEC and its sole judgment of a news event as a political advertisement are so pervasive under the assailed Resolutions, and provoke the distastes or
chilling effect of prior restraint"16 as even a legitimate exercise of a constitutional right might expose it to legal sanction. Thus, the governmental interest of leveling
the playing field between rich and poor candidates cannot justify the restriction on the freedoms of expression, speech and of the press.

On the issue of lack of prior public participation, GMA cites Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code, pertinent portions of which provide, thus:

Section 82. Lawful election propaganda. - Lawful election propaganda shall include:

xxxx

All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all
the interested parties were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be published in two newspapers of general
circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within one week after the authorization has been granted.

There having been no prior public consultation held, GMA contends that the COMELEC is guilty of depriving petitioners of its right to due process of law.

GMA then concludes that it is also entitled to a temporary restraining order, because the implementation of the Resolutions in question will cause grave and
irreparable damage to it by disrupting and emasculating its mandate to provide television and radio services to the public, and by exposing it to the risk of incurring
criminal and administrative liability by requiring it to perform the impossible task of surveillance and monitoring, or the broadcasts of other radio and television
stations.

Thereafter, on April 4, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Supplemental Comment and Opposition17 where it further
expounded on the legislative intent behind the Fair Election Act, also quoting portions of the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee, allegedly
adopting the Senate Bill version setting the computation of airtime limits on a per candidate, not per station, basis. Thus, as enacted into law, the wordings of Section
6 of the Fair Election Act shows that the airtime limit is imposed on a per candidate basis, rather than on a per station basis. Furthermore, the COMELEC states that
petitioner intervenor Senator Cayetano is wrong in arguing that there should be empirical data to support the need to change the computation of airtime limits from
a per station basis to a per candidate basis, because nothing in law obligates the COMELEC to support its Resolutions with empirical data, as said airtime limit was a
policy decision dictated by the legislature itself, which had the necessary empirical and other data upon which to base said policy decision.

The COMELEC then points out that Section 2 (7),18 Article IX (C) of the Constitution empowers it to recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending and in furtherance of such constitutional power, the COMELEC issued the questioned Resolutions, in faithful implementation of the legislative intent and
objectives of the Fair Election Act.

The COMELEC also dismisses Senator Cayetano's fears that unauthorized or inadvertent inclusion of his name, initial, image, brand, logo, insignia and/or symbol in
tandem advertisements will be charged against his airtime limits by pointing out that what will be counted against a candidate's airtime and expenditures are those
advertisements that have been paid for or donated to them to which the candidate has given consent.

With regard to the attack that the total aggregate airtime limit constitutes prior restraint or undue abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression, the
COMELEC counters that "the Resolutions enjoy constitutional and congressional imprimatur. It is the Constitution itself that imposes the restriction on the freedoms
of speech and expression, during election period, to promote an important and significant governmental interest, which is to equalize, as far as practicable, the
situation of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign 'war chests."'19

Lastly, the COMELEC also emphasizes that there is no impairment of the people's right to information on matters of public concern, because in this case, the
COMELEC is not withholding access to any public record.

On April 16, 2013, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order20 (TRO) in view of the urgency involved and to prevent irreparable injury that may be caused to the
petitioners if respondent COMELEC is not enjoined from implementing Resolution No. 9615.

On April 19, 2013 respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Early Resolution of the Consolidated Petitions.21

On May 8, 2013, petitioners ABS-CBN and the KBP filed its Opposition/Comment22 to the said Motion. Not long after, ABC followed suit and filed its own Opposition to
the Motion23 filed by the respondent.
In the interim, respondent filed a Second Supplemental Comment and Opposition24 dated April 8, 2013.

In the Second Supplemental Comment and Opposition, respondent delved on points which were not previously discussed in its earlier Comment and Supplemental
Comment, particularly those raised in the petition filed by petitioner ABS-CBN and KBP.

Respondent maintains that certiorari in not the proper remedy to question the Constitutionality of the assailed Resolutions and that petitioners ABS-CBN and KBP
have no locus standi to file the present petition.

Respondent posits that contrary to the contention of petitioners, the legislative history of R.A. No. 9006 conclusively shows that congress intended the airtime limits
to be computed on a "per candidate" and not on a "per station" basis. In addition, the legal duty of monitoring lies with the COMELEC. Broadcast stations are merely
required to submit certain documents to aid the COMELEC in ensuring that candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits.

Also, as discussed in the earlier Comment, the prior notice requirement is a mechanism designed to inform the COMELEC of the appearances or guesting of
candidates in bona fide news broadcasts. It is for monitoring purposes only, not censorship. It does not control the subject matter of news broadcasts in anyway.
Neither does it prevent media outlets from covering candidates in news interviews, news events, and news documentaries, nor prevent the candidates from
appearing thereon.

As for the right to reply, respondent insists that the right to reply provision cannot be considered a prior restraint on the freedoms of expression, speech and the
press, as it does not in any way restrict the airing of bona fide new broadcasts. Media entities are free to report any news event, even if it should turn out to be
unfavourable to a candidate or party. The assailed Resolutions merely give the candidate or party the right to reply to such charges published or aired against them in
news broadcasts.

Moreover, respondent contends that the imposition of the penalty of suspension and revocation of franchise or permit for the sale or donation of airtime beyond the
allowable limits is sanctioned by the Omnibus Election Code.

Meanwhile, RMN filed its Petition on April 8, 2013. On June 4, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution25 consolidating the case with the rest of the petitions and requiring
respondent to comment thereon.

On October 10, 2013, respondent filed its Third Supplemental Comment and Opposition.26 Therein, respondent stated that the petition filed by RMN repeats the
issues that were raised in the previous petitions. Respondent, likewise, reiterated its arguments that certiorari in not the proper remedy to question the assailed
resolutions and that RMN has no locus standi to file the present petition. Respondent maintains that the arguments raised by RMN, like those raised by the other
petitioners are without merit and that RMN is not entitled to the injunctive relief sought.

The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, although the subject of the present petitions are Resolutions promulgated by the COMELEC relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and local
elections, nevertheless the issues raised by the petitioners have not been rendered moot and academic by the conclusion of the 2013 elections. Considering that the
matters elevated to the Court for resolution are susceptible to repetition in the conduct of future electoral exercises, these issues will be resolved in the present
action.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS

Matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are presented before the Court. So the
Court does again in this particular case.

Proper Remedy

Respondent claims that certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies that petitioners have taken to question the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC.
Technically, respondent may have a point. However, considering the very important and pivotal issues raised, and the limited time, such technicality should not deter
the Court from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. "[T]his Court has in the past seen
fit to step in and resolve petitions despite their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public importance of the tile issues raised therein.27

It has been in the past, we do so again.

Locus Standi

Every time a constitutional issue is brought before the Court, the issue of locus standi is raised to question the personality of the parties invoking the Court's
jurisdiction. The Court has routinely made reference to a liberalized stance when it comes to petitions raising issues of transcendental importance to the country.
Invariably, after some discussions, the Court would eventually grant standing.28

In this particular case, respondent also questions the standing of the petitioners. We rule for the petitioners. For petitioner-intervenor Senator Cayetano, he
undoubtedly has standing since he is a candidate whose ability to reach out to the electorate is impacted by the assailed Resolutions.

For the broadcast companies, they similarly have the standing in view of the direct injury they may suffer relative to their ability to carry out their tasks of
disseminating information because of the burdens imposed on them. Nevertheless, even in regard to the broadcast companies invoking the injury that may be caused
to their customers or the public - those who buy advertisements and the people who rely on their broadcasts - what the Court said in White Light Corporation v. City
of Manila29 may dispose of the question. In that case, there was an issue as to whether owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates may have the requisite
standing on behalf of their patrons' equal protection claims relative to an ordinance of the City of Manila which prohibited "short-time" or "wash-up" accommodation
in motels and similar establishments. The Court essentially condensed the issue in this manner: "[T]he crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have
the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights."30 The Court then went on to hold:
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that
party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary
interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. The constitutional component of standing doctrine
incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most
obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of
the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the
Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. x x x

xxxx

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-ininterest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal
protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. x x x

xxxx

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into
play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on
the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners
claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance
suffers from overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.31

If in regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their clients, with more reason should establishments which
publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of
their own freedom of the press. So, we uphold the standing of petitioners on that basis.

SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS

Aggregate Time Limits

COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements.
This essentially consists in computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done
on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately obvious that there was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and
political parties would be able to campaign through the air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the power of the COMELEC to do or not. The Court
holds that it is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so.

a. Past elections and airtime limits

The authority of the COMELEC to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006 [2001])32 - one hundred (120) minutes of television
advertisement and one-hundred· eighty (180) minutes for radio advertisement. For the 2004 elections, the respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
652033 implementing the airtime limits by applying said limitation on a per station basis.34 Such manner of determining airtime limits was likewise adopted for the
2007 elections, through Resolution No. 7767.35 In the 2010 elections, under Resolution No. 8758,36 the same was again adopted. But for the 2013 elections, the
COMELEC, through Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, chose to aggregate the total broadcast time among the different broadcast media, thus:
Section 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through Mass Media. - All parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to
media time and space for their election propaganda during the campaign period subject to the following requirements and/or limitations:

a. Broadcast Election Propaganda

The duration of an air time that a candidate, or party may use for their broadcast advertisements or election propaganda shall be, as follows:

For Candidates/Registered Not more than an aggregate total of one hundred (120) minutes of
Political parties for a National television advertising, whether appearing on national, regional, or local,
Elective Position free or cable television, and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio
advertising, whether airing on national, regional, or local radio, whether by
purchase or donation

For Candidates/Registered Not more than an aggregate total of sixty (60) minutes of television
Political parties for a Local Elective advertising, whether appearing on national, regional, or local, free or cable
Position television, and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertising, whether airing on
national, regional, or local radio, whether by purchase or donation.

In cases where two or more candidates or parties whose names, initials, images, brands, logos, insignias, color motifs, symbols, or forms of graphical representations
are displayed, exhibited, used, or mentioned together in the broadcast election propaganda or advertisements, the length of time during which they appear or are
being mentioned or promoted will be counted against the airtime limits allotted for the said candidates or parties and the cost of the said advertisement will likewise
be considered as their expenditures, regardless of whoever paid for the advertisements or to whom the said advertisements were donated.

x x x x37

Corollarily, petitioner-intervenor, Senator Cayetano, alleges:

6.15. The change in the implementation of Section 6 of R.A. 9006 was undertaken by respondent Comelec without consultation with the candidates for the 2013
elections, affected parties such as media organizations, as well as the general public. Worse, said change was put into effect without explaining the basis therefor and
without showing any data in support of such change. Respondent Comelec merely maintained that such action "is meant to level the playing field between the
moneyed candidates and those who don i have enough resources," without particularizing the empirical data upon which such a sweeping statement was based. This
was evident in the public hearing held on 31 January 2013 where petitioner GMA, thru counsel, explained that no empirical data on he excesses or abuses of
broadcast media were brought to the attention of the public by respondent Comelec, or even stated in the Comelec

Resolution No. 9615. Thus –

xxxx

Chairman Brillantes

So if we can regulate and amplify, we may amplify meaning we can expand if we want to. But the authority of the Commission is if we do not want to amplify and we
think that the 120 or 180 is okay we cannot be compelled to amplify. We think that 120 or 180 is okay, is enough.

Atty. Lucila

But with due respect Your Honor, I think the basis of the resolution is found in the law and the law has been enterpreted (sic) before in 2010 to be 120 per station, so
why the change, your Honor?

Chairman Brillantes

No, the change is not there, the right to amplify is with the Commission on Elections. Nobody can encroach in our right to amplify. Now, if in 2010 the Commission felt
that per station or per network is the rule then that is the prerogative of the Commission then they could amplify it to expand it. If the current Commission feels that
120 is enough for the particular medium like TV and 180 for radio, that is our prerogative. How can you encroach and what is unconstitutional about it?

Atty. Lucila

We are not questioning the authority of the Honorable Commission to regulate Your Honor, we are just raising our concern on the manner of regulation because as it
is right now, there is a changing mode or sentiments of the Commission and the public has the right to know, was there rampant overspending on political ads in
2010, we were not informed Your Honor. Was there abuse of the media in 2010, we were not informed Your Honor. So we would like to know what is the basis of the
sudden change in this limitation, Your Honor .. And law must have a consistent interpretation that [is]our position, Your Honor.

Chairman Brillantes

But my initial interpretation, this is personal to this representation counsel, is that if the Constitution allows us to regulate and then it gives us the prerogative to
amplify then the prerogative to amplify you should leave this to the discretion of the Commission. Which means if previous Commissions felt that expanding it should
be part of our authority that was a valid exercise if we reduce it to what is provided for by law which is 120-180 per medium, TV, radio, that is also within the law and
that is still within our prerogative as provided for by the Constitution. If you say we have to expose the candidates to the public then I think the reaction should come,
the negative reaction should come from the candidates not from the media, unless you have some interest to protect directly. Is there any interest on the part of the
media to expand it?

Atty. Lucila

Well, our interest Your Honor is to participate in this election Your Honor and we have been constantly (sic) as the resolution says and even in the part involved
because you will be getting some affirmative action time coming from the media itself and Comelec time coming from the media itself. So we could like to be both
involved in the whole process of the exercise of the freedom of suffrage Your Honor.

Chairman Brillantes

Yes, but the very essence of the Constitutional provision as well as the provision of 9006 is actually to level the playing field. That should be the paramount
consideration. If we allow everybody to make use of all their time and all radio time and TV time then there will be practically unlimited use of the mass media ....

Atty. Lucila

Was there in 2010 Your Honor, was there any data to support that there was an unlimited and abuse of a (sic) political ads in the mass media that became the basis of
this change in interpretation Your Honor? We would like to know about it Your Honor.

Chairman Brillantes

What do you think there was no abuse in 201 O?

Atty. Lucila

As far as the network is concern, there was none Your Honor.

Chairman Brillantes

There was none ..... .

Atty. Lucila

I'm sorry, Your Honor ...

Chairman Brillantes

Yes, there was no abuse, okay, but there was some advantage given to those who took ... who had the more moneyed candidates took advantage of it.

Atty. Lucila

But that is the fact in life, Your Honor there are poor candidates, there are rich candidates. No amount of law or regulation can even level the playing filed (sic) as far
as the economic station in life of the candidates are concern (sic) our Honor.38

Given the foregoing observations about what happened during the hearing, Petitioner-Intervenor went on to allege that:

6.16. Without any empirical data upon which to base the regulatory measures in Section 9 (a), respondent Comelec arbitrarily changed the rule from per station basis
to aggregate airtime basis. Indeed, no credence should be given to the cliched explanation of respondent Comelec (i.e. leveling the playing field) in its published
statements which in itself is a mere reiteration of the rationale for the enactment of the political ad ban of Republic Act No. 6646, and which has likewise been foisted
when said political ad ban was lifted by R.A. 9006.39

From the foregoing, it does appear that the COMELEC did not have any other basis for coming up with a new manner of determining allowable time limits except its
own idea as to what should be the maximum number of minutes based on its exercise of discretion as to how to level the playing field. The same could be
encapsulized in the remark of the COMELEC Chairman that "if the Constitution allows us to regulate and then it gives us the prerogative to amplify then the
prerogative to amplify you should leave this to the discretion of the Commission."40

The Court could not agree with what appears as a nonchalant exercise of discretion, as expounded anon.

b. COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis for changing the interpretation and implementation of the airtime limits

There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without
limitations - or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be
concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to
simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must
be properly explained with sufficient basis.

Based on the transcripts of the hearing conducted by the COMELEC after it had already promulgated the Resolution, the respondent did not fully explain or justify the
change in computing the airtime allowed candidates and political parties, except to make reference to the need to "level the playing field." If the "per station" basis
was deemed enough to comply with that objective in the past, why should it now be suddenly inadequate? And, the short answer to that from the respondent, in a
manner which smacks of overbearing exercise of discretion, is that it is within the discretion of the COMELEC. As quoted in the transcript, "the right to amplify is with
the COMELEC. Nobody can encroach in our right to amplify. Now, if in 2010 the Commission felt that per station or per network is the rule then that is the prerogative
of the Commission then they could amplify it to expand it. If the current Commission feels that 120 is enough for the particular medium like TV and 180 for radio, that
is our prerogative. How can you encroach and what is unconstitutional about it?"41

There is something basically wrong with that manner of explaining changes in administrative rules. For one, it does not really provide a good basis for change. For
another, those affected by such rules must be given a better explanation why the previous rules are no longer good enough. As the Court has said in one case:

While stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable, there is no demand that the NTC slavishly follow precedent. However, we think it essential, for
the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different
result is warranted, or ?f need be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently
establish a decision as having rational basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. And any
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.42

What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement and accountability which elevates administrative rules to the level of
respectability and acceptability. Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and rational basis for any changes in those rules by which
they are supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical departure from the previous ones.

c. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting "aggregate" basis in the determination of allowable airtime

The law, which is the basis of the regulation subject of these petitions, pertinently provides:

6.2. (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of
television advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.

(b) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement
and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation; x x x

The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in all television or radio
stations. Senator Cayetano has called our attention to the legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed - that it should be on a "per station" basis.43
This is further buttressed by the fact that the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually repealed the previous provision, Section ll(b) of Republic Act No. 6646,44 which
prohibited direct political advertisements -the so-called "political ad ban." If under the previous law, no candidate was allowed to directly buy or procure on his own
his broadcast or print campaign advertisements, and that he must get it through the COMELEC Time or COMELEC Space, R.A. No. 9006 relieved him or her from that
restriction and allowed him or her to broadcast time or print space subject to the limitations set out in the law. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 9006, felt that the
previous law was not an effective and efficient way of giving voice to the people. Noting the debilitating effects of the previous law on the right of suffrage and
Philippine democracy, Congress decided to repeal such rule by enacting the Fair Election Act.

In regard to the enactment of the new law, taken in the context of the restrictive nature of the previous law, the sponsorship speech of Senator Raul Roco is
enlightening:

The bill seeks to repeal Section 85 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sections 10 and 11 of RA 6646. In view of the importance of their appeal in connection with the
thrusts of the bill, I hereby quote these sections in full:

"SEC. 85. Prohibited forms of election propaganda. - It shall be unlawful:

"(a) To print, publish, post or distribute any poster, pamphlet, circular, handbill, or printed matter urging voters to vote for or against any candidate unless they hear
the names and addresses of the printed and payor as required in Section 84 hereof;

"(b) To erect, put up, make use of, attach, float or display any billboard, tinplate-poster, balloons and the like, of whatever size, shape, form or kind, advertising for or
against any candidate or political party;

"(c) To purchase, manufacture, request, distribute or accept electoral propaganda gadgets, such as pens, lighters, fans of whatever nature, flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, shirts, hats, bandannas, matches, cigarettes and the like, except that campaign supporters accompanying a candidate shall be allowed to wear
hats and/or shirts or T-shirts advertising a candidate;

"(d) To show or display publicly any advertisement or propaganda for or against any candidate by means of cinematography, audio-visual units or other screen
projections except telecasts which may be allowed as hereinafter provided; and

"(e) For any radio broadcasting or television station to sell or give free of charge airtime for campaign and other political purposes except as authorized in this Code
under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant thereto;

"Any prohibited election propaganda gadget or advertisement shall be stopped, confiscated or tom down by the representative of the Commission upon specific
authority of the Commission." "SEC. 10. Common Poster Areas. - The Commission shall designate common poster areas in strategic public places such as markets,
barangay centers and the like wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election propaganda to announce or further their candidacy.

"Whenever feasible, common billboards may be installed by the Commission and/or non-partisan private or civic organizations which the Commission may authorize
whenever available, after due notice and hearing, in strategic areas where it may readily be seen or read, with the heaviest pedestrian and/or vehicular traffic in the
city or municipality.

The space in such common poster areas or billboards shall be allocated free of charge, if feasible, equitably and impartially among the candidates in the province, city
or municipality. "SEC. 11. Prohibite,d Forms of Election Propaganda. - In addition to the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: (a) to draw, paint, inscribe, write, post, display or puolicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether private or public, except
in common poster areas and/or billboards provided in the immediately preceding section, at the candidate's own residence, or at the campaign headquarters of the
candidate or political party: Provided, That such posters or election propaganda shall in no case exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in area; Provided, further, That at
the site of and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, streamers, not more than two (2) feet and not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) each may be displayed
five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally, and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally; and

"(b) For any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or give for free of charge
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Big. 881. Any mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during
the campaign."

The repeal of the provision on the Common Poster Area implements the strong recommendations of the Commission on Elections during the hearings. It also seeks to
apply the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712, 31 March 1992. Here a unanimous
Supreme Court ruled: The COMELEC's prohibition on the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except [in] designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.

For the foregoing reasons, we commend to our colleagues the early passage of Senate Bill No. 1742. In so doing, we move one step towards further ensuring "free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections" as mandated by the Constitution.45

Given the foregoing background, it is therefore ineluctable to conclude that Congress intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by which the
candidates, political parties, citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies
and platforms of governance, and for the electorate to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates. In this regard, the media is also
given a very important part in that undertaking of providing the means by which the political exercise becomes an interactive process. All of these would be
undermined and frustrated with the kind of regulation that the respondent came up with.

The respondent gave its own understanding of the import of the legislative deliberations on the adoption of R.A. No. 9006 as follows:

The legislative history of R.A. 9006 clearly shows that Congress intended to impose the per candidate or political party aggregate total airtime limits on political
advertisements and election propaganda. This is evidenced by the dropping of the "per day per station" language embodied in both versions of the House of
Representatives and Senate bills in favour of the "each candidate" and "not more than" limitations now found in Section 6 of R.A. 9006.
The pertinent portions of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742 read as follows:

House Bill No. 9000:

SEC. 4. Section 86 of the same Batas is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 86. Regulation of Election Propaganda Through Mass Media.

x x x           x x x          x x x

A) The total airtime available to the candidate and political party, whether by purchase or by donation, shall be limited to five (5) minutes per day in each television,
cable television and radio stations during the applicable campaign period.

Senate Bill No. 1742:

SEC. 5. Equal Access to Media Space and Time. -All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media space and time. The following
guidelines may be amplified by the COMELEC.

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. The total airtime available for each registered party and bona fide candidate whether by purchase or donation shall not exceed a total of one (1) minute per day
per television or radio station. (Emphasis supplied.)

As Section 6 of R.A. 9006 is presently worded, it can be clearly seen that the legislature intended the aggregate airtime limits to be computed on per candidate or
party basis. Otherwise, if the legislature intended the computation to be on per station basis, it could have left the original "per day per station" formulation.46

The Court does not agree. It cannot bring itself to read the changes in the bill as disclosing an intent that the COMELEC wants this Court to put on the final language of
the law. If anything, the change in language meant that the computation must not be based on a "per day" basis for each television or radio station. The same could
not therefore lend itself to an understanding that the total allowable time is to be done on an aggregate basis for all television or radio stations. Clearly, the
respondent in this instance went beyond its legal mandate when it provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law it is supposed to implement. As we
held in Lakin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:47

The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issued
for that purpose should always be in accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should
remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.48

In the case of Lakin, Jr., the COMELEC's explanation that the Resolution then in question did not add anything but merely reworded and rephrased the statutory
provision did not persuade the Court. With more reason here since the COMELEC not only reworded or rephrased the statutory provision - it practically replaced it
with its own idea of what the law should be, a matter that certainly is not within its authority. As the Court said in Villegas v. Subido:49

One last word. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the
will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no
presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid
of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. In the appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be
conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of
the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.50

So it was then. So does the rule still remains the same.

d. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes against the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press

The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience,
the need to access the means and media for such dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the
right to speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by
which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the "aggregate-based"
airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.

Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law. "[F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of
civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy."51 Accordingly, the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a
compelling state interest.

In regard to limitations on political speech relative to other state interests, an American case observed:

A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and
circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and
other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.
The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent substantial, rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech. The
$1,000 ceiling on spending "relative to a clearly identified candidate," 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(l) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), would appear to exclude all citizens and groups except
candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most effective modes of communication. Although the Act's limitations on
expenditures by campaign organizations and political parties provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate, they would have required restrictions in
the scope of a number of past congressional and Presidential campaigns and would operate to constrain campaigning by candidates who raise sums in excess of the
spending ceiling.52

Section 9 (a) ofCOMELEC Resolution No. 9615 comes up with what is challenged as being an unreasonable basis for determining the allowable air time that
candidates and political parties may avail of. Petitioner GMA came up with its analysis of the practical effects of such a regulation:

5.8. Given the reduction of a candidate's airtime minutes in the New Rules, petitioner GMA estimates that a national candidate will only have 120 minutes to utilize
for his political advertisements in television during the whole campaign period of 88 days, or will only have 81.81 seconds per day TV exposure allotment. If he
chooses to place his political advertisements in the 3 major TV networks in equal allocation, he will only have 27.27 seconds of airtime per network per day. This
barely translates to 1 advertisement spot on a 30-second spot basis in television.

5.9. With a 20-hour programming per day and considering the limits of a station's coverage, it will be difficult for 1 advertising spot to make a sensible and feasible
communication to the public, or in political propaganda, to "make known [a candidate's] qualifications and stand on public issues".

5.10 If a candidate loads all of his 81.81 seconds per day in one network, this will translate to barely three 30-second advertising spots in television on a daily basis
using the same assumptions above.

5.11 Based on the data from the 2012 Nielsen TV audience measurement in Mega Manila, the commercial advertisements in television are viewed by only 39.2% of
the average total day household audience if such advertisements are placed with petitioner GMA, the leading television network nationwide and in Mega Manila. In
effect, under the restrictive aggregate airtime limits in the New Rules, the three 30-second political advertisements of a candidate in petitioner GMA will only be
communicated to barely 40% of the viewing audience, not even the voting population, but only in Mega Manila, which is defined by AGB Nielsen Philippines to cover
Metro Manila and certain urban areas in the provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, Rizal, Batangas and Pampanga. Consequently, given the voting population
distribution and the drastically reduced supply of airtime as a result of the New Rules' aggregate airtime limits, a national candidate will be forced to use all of his
airtime for political advertisements in television only in urban areas such as Mega Manila as a political campaign tool to achieve maximum exposure.

5.12 To be sure, the people outside of Mega Manila or other urban areas deserve to be informed of the candidates in the national elections, and the said candidates
also enjoy the right to be voted upon by these informed populace.53

The Court agrees. The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits - leveling the playing
field - does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure. In this particular instance, what the COMELEC has done is analogous to letting a bird fly after one has clipped its wings.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to
really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and
dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such
candidate to express himself - a form of suppression of his political speech.

Respondent itself states that "[t]elevision is arguably the most costeffective medium of dissemination. Even a slight increase in television exposure can significantly
boost a candidate's popularity, name recall and electability."54 If that be so, then drastically curtailing the ability of a candidate to effectively reach out to the
electorate would unjustifiably curtail his freedom to speak as a means of connecting with the people.

Finally on this matter, it is pertinent to quote what Justice Black wrote in his concurring opinion in the landmark Pentagon Papers case: "In the First Amendment, the
Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors.
The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that
it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government."55

In the ultimate analysis, when the press is silenced, or otherwise muffled in its undertaking of acting as a sounding board, the people ultimately would be the victims.

e. Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people's right to suffrage

Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to determine their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have
in government. Thus, the primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of such
birthright. It was said that:

x x x As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the
means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of
good government and the common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever
possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This, fundamentally, is the
reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality. x x x56 It has also been said that "[ c ]ompetition in ideas
and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms."57 Candidates and political parties need adequate breathing
space - including the means to disseminate their ideas. This could not be reasonably addressed by the very restrictive manner by which the respondent implemented
the time limits in regard to political advertisements in the broadcast media.

f. Resolution No. 9615 needs prior hearing before adoption

The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on January 15, 2013 then came up with a public hearing on January 31, 2013 to explain what it had done, particularly
on the aggregate-based air time limits. This circumstance also renders the new regulation, particularly on the adoption of the aggregate-based airtime limit,
questionable. It must not be overlooked that the new Resolution introduced a radical change in the manner in which the rules on airtime for political advertisements
are to be reckoned. As such there is a need for adequate and effective means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and implemented. In this regard, it is not
enough that they be published - or explained - after they have been adopted.

While it is true that the COMELEC is an independent office and not a mere administrative agency under the Executive Department, rules which apply to the latter
must also be deemed to similarly apply to the former, not as a matter of administrative convenience but as a dictate of due process. And this assumes greater
significance considering the important and pivotal role that the COMELEC plays in the life of the nation. Thus, whatever might have been said in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,58 should also apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to promulgating rules and regulations which adversely
affect, or impose a heavy and substantial burden on, the citizenry in a matter that implicates the very nature of government we have adopted:

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it
gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing
for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law.

A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a
corrective measure (revoking in the process the previous holdings of past Commissioners) or merely as construing Section 142(c)(l) of the NIRC, as amended, but has,
in fact and most importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion" within the classification of locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally
manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. x x x In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law;
verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then
ignored.59

For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime is declared
defective and ineffectual.

g. Resolution No. 9615 does not impose an unreasonable burden on the broadcast industry

It is a basic postulate of due process, specifically in relation to its substantive component, that any governmental rule or regulation must be reasonable in its
operations and its impositions. Any restrictions, as well as sanctions, must be reasonably related to the purpose or objective of the government in a manner that
would not work unnecessary and unjustifiable burdens on the citizenry. Petitioner GMA assails certain requirements imposed on broadcast stations as unreasonable.
It explained:

5.40 Petitioner GMA currently operates and monitors 21 FM and AM radio stations nationwide and 8 originating television stations (including its main transmitter in
Quezon City) which are authorized to dechain national programs for airing and insertion of local content and advertisements.

5.41 In light of the New Rules wherein a candidate's airtime minutes are applied on an aggregate basis and considering that said Rules declare it unlawful in Section 7(
d) thereof for a radio, television station or other mass media to sell or give for free airtime to a candidate in excess of that allowed by law or by said New Rules:

"Section 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda -During the campaign period, it is unlawful: x x x x x x x x x

(d) for any newspaper or publication, radio, television or cable television station, or other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give
free of charge print space or air time for campaign or election propaganda purposes to any candidate or party in excess of the size, duration or frequency authorized
by law or these rules;

x x x           x x x          x x x

(Emphasis supplied)

petitioner GMA submits that compliance with the New Rules in order to avoid administrative or criminal liability would be unfair, cruel and oppressive.

x x x x.

5.43 In the present situation wherein airtime minutes shall be shared by all television and radio stations, broadcast mass media organizations would surely encounter
insurmountable difficulties in monitoring the airtime minutes spent by the numerous candidates for various elective positions, in real time.

5.44 An inquiry with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) bears out that there are 372 television stations and 398 AM and 800 FM radio stations
nationwide as of June 2012. In addition, there are 1, 113 cable TV providers authorized by the NTC to operate within the country as of the said date.

5.45 Given such numbers of broadcast entities and the necessity to monitor political advertisements pursuant to the New Rules, petitioner OMA estimates that
monitoring television broadcasts of all authorized television station would involve 7,440 manhours per day. To aggravate matters, since a candidate may also spend
his/her broadcasting minutes on cable TV, additional 281,040 manhours per day would have to be spent in monitoring the various channels carried by cable TV
throughout the Philippines. As far as radio broadcasts (both AM and FM stations) are concerned, around 23,960 manhours per day would have to be devoted by
petitioner OMA to obtain an accurate and timely determination of a political candidate's remaining airtime minutes. During the campaign period, petitioner OMA
would have to spend an estimated 27,494,720 manhours in monitoring the election campaign commercials of the different candidates in the country.1âwphi1

5.46 In order to carry-out the obligations imposed by the New Rules, petitioner OMA further estimates that it would need to engage and train 39,055 additional
persons on an eight-hour shift, and assign them all over the country to perform the required monitoring of radio, television and cable TV broadcasts. In addition, it
would likewise need to allot radio, television, recording equipment and computers, as well as telecommunications equipment, for this surveillance and monitoring
exercise, thus imputing additional costs to the company. Attached herewith are the computations explaining how the afore-said figures were derived and the
conservative assumptions made by petitioner OMA in reaching said figures, as Annex "H".

5.47 Needless to say, such time, manpower requirements, expense and effort would have to be replicated by each and every radio station to ensure that they have
properly monitored around 33 national and more than 40,000 local candidates' airtime minutes and thus, prevent any risk of administrative and criminal liability.60

The Court cannot agree with the contentions of GMA. The apprehensions of the petitioner appear more to be the result of a misappreciation of the real import of the
regulation rather than a real and present threat to its broadcast activities. The Court is more in agreement with the respondent when it explained that:

The legal duty of monitoring lies with the Comelec. Broadcast stations are merely required to submit certain documents to aid the Comelec in ensuring that
candidates are not sold airtime in excess of the allowed limits. These documents include: (1) certified true copies of broadcast logs, certificates of performance, and
certificates of acceptance, or other analogous record on specified dates (Section 9[d][3], Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Section 6.2, R.A. 9006; and (2) copies of all
contract for advertising, promoting or opposing any political party or the candidacy of any person for public office within five (5) days after its signing (Section 6.3,
R.A. 9006).

*****

[T]here is absolutely no duty on the broadcast stations to do monitoring, much less monitoring in real time. GMA grossly exaggerates when it claims that the non-
existent duty would require them to hire and train an astounding additional 39,055 personnel working on eight-hour shifts all over the country.61

The Court holds, accordingly, that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the Reporting Requirement for the COMELEC's monitoring is reasonable.

Further, it is apropos to note that, pursuant to Resolution No. 9631,62 the respondent revised the third paragraph of Section 9 (a). As revised, the provision now reads:

Appearance or guesting by a candidate on any bona fide newscast, bona fide news interview, bona fide news documentary, if the appearance of the candidate is
incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary, or on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events, including but not
limited to events sanctioned by the Commission on Elections, political conventions, and similar activities, shall not be deemed to be broadcast election propaganda
within the meaning of this provision. For purposes of monitoring by the COMELEC and ensuring that parties and candidates were afforded equal opportunities to
promote their candidacy, the media entity shall give prior notice to the COMELEC, through the appropriate Regional Election Director (RED), or in the case of the
National Capital Region (NCR), the Education and Information Department (EID). If such prior notice is not feasible or practicable, the notice shall be sent within
twenty-four (24) hours from the first broadcast or publication.1awp++i1 Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection
with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
Sections 10 and 14 of these Rules."63

Further, the petitioner in G.R. No. 205374 assails the constitutionality of such monitoring requirement, contending, among others, that it constitutes prior restraint.
The Court finds otherwise. Such a requirement is a reasonable means adopted by the COMELEC to ensure that parties and candidates are afforded equal
opportunities to promote their respective candidacies. Unlike the restrictive aggregate-based airtime limits, the directive to give prior notice is not unduly
burdensome and unreasonable, much less could it be characterized as prior restraint since there is no restriction on dissemination of information before broadcast.
Additionally, it is relevant to point out that in the original Resolution No. 9615, the paragraph in issue was worded in this wise:

Appearance or guesting by a candidate on any bona fide newscast, bona fide news interview, bona fide news documentary, if the appearance of the candidate is
incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary, or on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events, including but not
limited to events sanctioned by the Commission on Elections, political conventions, and similar activities, shall not be deemed to be broadcast election propaganda
within the meaning of this provision. To determine whether the appearance or guesting in a program is bona fide, the broadcast stations or entities must show that
(1) prior approval of the Commission was secured; and (2) candidates and parties were afforded equal opportunities to promote their candidacy. Nothing in the
foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-
spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under Sections 10 and 14 of these Rules.64

Comparing the original with the revised paragraph, one could readily appreciate what the COMELEC had done - to modify the requirement from "prior approval" to
"prior notice." While the former may be suggestive of a censorial tone, thus inviting a charge of prior restraint, the latter is more in the nature of a content-neutral
regulation designed to assist the poll body to undertake its job of ensuring fair elections without having to undertake any chore of approving or disapproving certain
expressions.

Also, the right to reply provision is reasonable

In the same way that the Court finds the "prior notice" requirement as not constitutionally infirm, it similarly concludes that the "right to reply" provision is
reasonable and consistent with the constitutional mandate.

Section 14 of Resolution No. 9615, as revised by Resolution No. 9631, provides:

SECTION 14. Right to Reply. - All registered political parties, party-list groups or coalitions and bona fide candidates shall have the right to reply to charges published
or aired against them. The reply shall be given publicity by the newspaper, television, and/or radio station which first printed or aired the charges with the same
prominence or in the same page or section or in the same time slot as the first statement.

Registered political parties, party-list groups or coalitions and bona fide candidates may invoke the right to reply by submitting within a nonextendible period of forty-
eight hours from first broadcast or publication, a formal verified claim against the media outlet to the COMELEC, through the appropriate RED. The claim shall include
a detailed enumeration of the circumstances and occurrences which warrant the invocation of the right to reply and must be accompanied by supporting evidence,
such a copy of the publication or recording of the television or radio broadcast, as the case may be. If the supporting evidence is not yet available due to
circumstances beyond the power of the claimant, the latter shall supplement his claim as soon as the supporting evidence becomes available, without delay on the
part of the claimant. The claimant must likewise furnish a copy of the verified claim and its attachments to the media outlet concerned prior to the filing of the claim
with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC, through the RED, shall view the verified claim within forty-eight ( 48) hours from receipt thereof, including supporting evidence, and if circumstances
warrant, give notice to the media outlet involved for appropriate action, which shall, within forty-eight ( 48) hours, submit its comment, answer or response to the
RED, explaining the action it has taken to address the claim. The media outlet must likewise furnish a copy of the said comment, answer or response to the claimant
invoking the right to reply.

Should the claimant insist that his/her right to reply was not addressed, he/she may file the appropriate petition and/or complaint before the Commission on
Elections or its field offices, which shall be endorsed to the Clerk of Court.

The attack on the validity of the "right to reply" provision is primarily anchored on the alleged ground of prior restraint, specifically in so far as such a requirement
may have a chilling effect on speech or of the freedom of the press.

Petitioner ABC states, inter alia:

5 .14 5. A "conscious and detailed consideration" of the interplay of the relevant interests - the constitutional mandate granting candidates the right to reply and the
inviolability of the constitutional freedom of expression, speech, and the press - will show that the Right to Reply, as provided for in the Assailed Resolution, is an
impermissible restraint on these fundamental freedoms.

5.146. An evaluation of the factors set forth in Soriano (for the balancing of interests test) with respect to the present controversy will show that the Constitution
does not tilt the balance in favor of the Right to Reply provision in the Assailed Resolution and the supposed governmental interest it attempts to further.65

The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest, fair and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a
right to reply.66 Given that express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the Fundamental Law itself has weighed in on the balance to be struck between the
freedom of the press and the right to reply. Accordingly, one is not merely to see the equation as purely between the press and the right to reply. Instead, the
constitutionallymandated desiderata of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections would necessarily have to be factored in trying to see where the
balance lies between press and the demands of a right-to-reply.

Moreover, as already discussed by the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections.67

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be
burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. x x x68

Relevant to this aspect are these passages from an American Supreme Court decision with regard to broadcasting, right to reply requirements, and the limitations on
speech:

We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 US 495, 502-503, 96 L Ed
1098, 72 S Ct 777. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection. Thus, although other
speakers cannot be licensed except under laws that carefully define and narrow official discretion, a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the
Commission decides that such an action would serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity." Similarly, although the First Amendment protects newspaper
publishers from being required to print the replies of those whom they criticize, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 US 241, 41 L Ed 2d 730, 94 S Ct 2831, it
affords no such protection to broadcasters; on the contrary, they must give free time to the victims of their criticism. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 US. 367,
23 L Ed 2d 371, 89 S Ct 1794.

The reasons for these distinctions are complex, but two have relevance to the present case. First, the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen not only in public, but also in the privacy
of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 US 728, 25 L Ed
2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484. Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from
unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for
an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a
harm that has already taken place.

Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Although Cohen's written message might have been incomprehensible to a first
grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without
restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children.
We held in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629, that the government's interest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents' claim to authority in their
own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the
concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.69

Given the foregoing considerations, the traditional notions of preferring speech and the press over so many other values of society do not readily lend itself to this
particular matter. Instead, additional weight should be accorded on the constitutional directive to afford a right to reply. If there was no such mandate, then the
submissions of petitioners may more easily commend themselves for this Court's acceptance. But as noted above, this is not the case. Their arguments simplistically
provide minimal importance to that constitutional command to the point of marginalizing its importance in the equation.

In fine, when it comes to election and the exercise of freedom of speech, of expression and of the press, the latter must be properly viewed in context as being
necessarily made to accommodate the imperatives of fairness by giving teeth and substance to the right to reply requirement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED, Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, therefore, NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is
upheld and remain in full force and effect.

In view of this Decision, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on April 16, 2013 is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183173, August 24, 2016

THE CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND THE PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, Petitioners, v. EJERCITO LIM, DOING BUSINESS AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CAPT. ERNESTO
LIM, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on May 28, 2008,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petition for prohibition of the
respondent,2 and enjoined the petitioners from enforcing Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03-211; any and all of their revisions;
and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order for being null and void.

Antecedents

Petitioners Executive Director and Chairman of the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD), Messrs. Winston G. Arzaga and Vicente A. Sandoval,
respectively, were the public officials tasked with the duty of executing and implementing A.O. No. 00-05 and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order, while the
PCSD was the government agency responsible for the governance, implementation, and policy direction of the Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan. On the
other hand, the respondent was the operator of a domestic air carrier doing business under the name and style Bonanza Air Services, with authority to engage in non-
scheduled air taxi transportation of passengers and cargo for the public. His business operation was primarily that of transporting live fish from Palawan to fish
traders.3

The PCSD issued A.O. No. 00-05 on February 25, 2002 to ordain that the transport of live fish from Palawan would be allowed only through traders and carriers who
had sought and secured accreditation from the PCSD. On September 4, 2002, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) sent to the PCSD its communication to the effect
that ATO-authorized carriers were considered common carriers, and, as such, should be exempt from the PCSD accreditation requirement. It attached to the
communication a list of its authorized carriers, which included the respondent's air transport service.4

The respondent asserted that he had continued his trade without securing the PCSD-required accreditation; that the PCSD Chairman had started harassing his clients
by issuing Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of 2002, which contained a penal clause imposing sanctions on the availment of transfer services by unaccredited
aircraft carriers such as cancellation of the PCSD accreditation and perpetual disqualification from engaging in live fish trading in Palawan; that due to the serious
effects of the memorandum, the respondent had sent a grievance letter to the Office of the President; and that the PCSD Chairman had nonetheless maintained that
the respondent's business was not a common carrier, and should comply with the requirement for PCSD accreditation.

In disregard of the prohibition, the respondent continued his business operation in Palawan until a customer showed him the Notice of Violation and Show Cause
Order issued by the PCSD to the effect that he had still made 19 flights in October 2002 despite his failure to secure accreditation from the PCSD; and that he should
explain his actuations within 15 days, otherwise, he would be sanctioned with a fine of P50,000.00.5

According to the respondent, he had not received the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order.6

The respondent filed a petition for prohibition in the CA, which issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) upon his application after finding that there were sufficient
grounds to issue the TRO.7 After the petitioners did not file their comment despite notice, the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon his posting of the
injunction bond for P50,000.00.8

The petitioners countered that the petition for prohibition should have been dismissed because A.O. No. 00-05 was in accord with the mandate of the Constitution
and of Republic Act No. 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act);9 that Resolution No. 03-211 had meanwhile amended or repealed portions of A.O. No.
00-05, thereby rendering the issues raised by the petition for prohibition moot and academic;10 that by virtue of such developments, the PCSD accreditation was now
required for all carriers, except those belonging to the Government; that on August 18, 2003, the respondent had received another notice regarding the enactment of
Resolution No. 03-211; and that they had subsequently dispatched to the respondent on September 9, 2003 another show cause order in view of his continued non-
compliance with Resolution No. 03-211.11

The salient portions of Resolution No 03-211 read:

SECTION 3. A new Paragraph 1.5 is hereby added to Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 00-05, as amended, as follows:

"CARRIER - any natural or juridical person or entity, except the Government, that is engaged or involved in the transportation of live fish or any other aquatic fresh or
saltwater products, whether or not on a daily or regular manner or schedule and whether or not for compensation, from any point within or out of the Province of
Palawan under a contract or transportation, whether or not in writing, through the use of aircrafts, seacrafts, land vehicles or any other mode of transportation,
whether or not registered, mechanical or motorized in nature, and whether or not such persons or entities are common carriers or not as defined by law and
regardless of the place of registration of such persons or entities as well as the crafts and vehicles used or employed by them."

xxxx

SECTION 5. The new section 2 for Administrative Order No. 00-05, as amended, shall read as follows:

"Section 2. Accreditation. Before it can proceed with the transport or carriage of live fish or any other aquatic fresh or saltwater products within or out of the
Province of Palawan, a CARRIER must secure a CERTIFICATE OF ACCREDITATION from the PCSD."12

The respondent then filed a supplemental petition alleging that due to the implementation of Resolution No. 03-211, his carriers were forbidden to transport or
deliver fish from Palawan to his clients resulting in loss of income amounting to P132,000.00; and that such supervening event was a mere scheme to circumvent the
TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA.

As stated, the CA promulgated its assailed decision on May 28, 2008, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Administrative Order No. 00-05, Series of 2002, Resolution No. 03-211, and any and all of its revisions, and the Notice
of Violation and Show-Cause Order are declared NULL and VOID. The injunctive writ previously issued by this Court prohibiting the Respondents from implementing
or enforcing the said issuance(s) is declared PERMANENT. Costs against the Respondents.

SO ORDERED.13

Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.

Issues

The sole issue for determination is whether or not the CA erred in declaring A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03-211; and the the Notice of Violation and
Show Cause Order null and void for having been issued in excess of the PCSD's authority.

The petitioners submit the following grounds for consideration, to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTIONS 4, 6, 16, AND 19 OF RA 7611 AS LIMITATIONS TO THE POWER OF THE PCSD TO PROMULGATE
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 00-05.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PCSD'S ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 05 (sic) IS AN ENCROACHMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTION OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 00;.05 AND ITS REVISIONS WERE PROMULGATED PURSUANT TO THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE PCSD.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 00-05 AND ITS REVISIONS POSSESS ALL THE REQUISITES OF A VALID ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROMULGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 00-05 AND ITS REVISIONS IS VESTED SOLELY IN THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN.14

Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition for review on certiorari, and reverse the decision of the CA.

1.
Procedural Matters

We first deal with the propriety of the petition for prohibition for the purpose of annulling the challenged administrative issuances.

Administrative agencies possess two kinds of powers, the quasi legislative or rule-making power, and the quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. The first
is the power to make rules and regulations that results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers.15 The issuance of the assailed A.O. No. 00-05, Resolution. No. 03-211 and the other issuances by the PCSD was in the exercise of the
agency's quasi-legislative powers. The second is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act that is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.16

The challenge being brought by the petitioners rests mainly on the theory that the CA should not have interpreted the functions of the PCSD, particularly those
provided for in Sections 4, 6, 16, and 19 of R.A. No. 7611, as limitations on the power of the PCSD to promulgate A.O. No. 00-05. Clearly, what was assailed before the
CA was the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the PCSD as an administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function. The
question thus presented was a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, and exclusively and originally pertained to the proper Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Indeed, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court expressly states that any person "whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation" may bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court "to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder." The judicial course to raise the issue against such validity should
have adhered to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts except only if the respondent had sufficient justification to do otherwise. Yet, he utterly failed to show
justification to merit the exception of bypassing the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, by virtue of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution,17 the Court's power to
evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature.
In this regard, the Court has categorically observed in Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission 18 that if what is being assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative functions, then the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the Constitution is within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.19

To accord with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, therefore, the petition for prohibition should have been originally brought in the proper Regional Trial Court as a
petition for declaratory relief.

We also need to remind that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an administrative order issued in the exercise of a quasi legislative function.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or
are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.20 Its lies
against the exercise of judicial or ministerial functions, not against the exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of the writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.21 In other words,
prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.22

Nevertheless, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on this case on the merits if only to facilitate its speedy resolution. In proper cases, indeed, the rigidity of
procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. The power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the
purposes of justice so require cannot be questioned.23

2.
Substantive Matters

Were A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03-211; and the the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order null and void for having been issued in excess of
the PCSD's authority?

We answer the query in the negative.

R.A. No. No. 7611 has adopted the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan consistent with the declared policy of the State to protect, develop, and conserve
its natural resources. The SEP is a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan to protect and enhance the Province's natural resources
and endangered environment.

Towards this end, the PCSD was established as the administrative machinery for the SEP's implementation. The creation of the PCSD has been set forth in Section 16
of R.A. No. 7611, to wit:

SEC. 16. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development. - The governance, implementation and policy direction of the Strategic Environmental Plan shall be exercised
by the herein created Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD), hereinafter referred to as the Council, which shall be under the Office of the President. x
xx

The functions of the PCSD are specifically enumerated in Section 19 of R.A. No. 7611, which relevantly provides:

SEC. 19. Powers and Functions. - In order to successfully implement the provisions of this Act, the Council is hereby vested with the following powers and functions:

1. Formulate plans and policies as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act;

2. Coordinate with the local governments to ensure that the latter's plans, programs and projects are aligned with the plans, programs and policies of the
SEP;

3. Call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the Government, and on private entities and organizations for cooperation and
assistance m the performance of its functions;

4. Arrange, negotiate for, and accept donations, grants, gifts, loans, and other funding from domestic and foreign sources to carry out the activities and
purposes of the SEP;

5. Recommend to the Congress of the Philippines such matters that may require legislation in support of the objectives of the SEP;

6. Delegate any or all of its powers and functions to its support staffs, as hereinafter provided, except those which by provisions of law cannot be delegated;

7. Establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical competence and moral character and prescribe a compensation and
staffing pattern;

8. Adopt, amend and rescind such rules and regulations and impose penalties therefor for the effective implementation of the SEP and the other provisions
of this Act;

9. Enforce the provisions of this Act and other existing laws, rules and regulations similar to or complementary with this Act;

10. Perform related functions which shall promote the development, conservation, management, protection, and utilization of the natural resources of
Palawan; and
 11. Perform such other powers and functions as may be necessary in carrying out its functions, powers, and the provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the PCSD had the explicit authority to fill in the details as to how to carry out the objectives of R.A. No. 7611 in protecting and enhancing Palawan's
natural resources consistent with the SEP. In that task, the PCSD could establish a methodology for the effective implementation of the SEP. Moreover, the PCSD was
expressly given the authority to impose penalties and sanctions in relation to the implementation of the SEP and the other provisions of R.A. No. 7611. As such, the
PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-95 and Resolution No. 03-211 was well within its statutory authority.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 28, 2008; DECLARES
VALID and EFFECTIVE Administrative Order No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03-211; and all their revisions, as well as the Notice of Violation and Show Cause
Order issued to the respondent; LIFTS the permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining petitioner Palawan Council for Sustainable Development
from enforcing Administrative Order No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03-211; and all their revisions, as well as the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order
issued to the respondent; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 217872

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI) and ATTY. MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, in her own behalf and as President of ALFI, JOSE S.
SANDEJAS, ROSIE B. LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS, EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALV ACION C. MONTEIRO, MARIETTA C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M.
BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI, and MILDRED C. CASTOR , Petitioners
vs.
HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, Secretary-Designate of the Department of Health; NICOLAS B.LUTERO III, Assistant Secretary of Health, Officer-in-Charge, Food and Drug
Administration; and MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO, Officer in-Charge, Center for Drug Regulation and Research, Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221866

MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, in her own behalf and as counsel of Petitioners, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, ROSIE B. LUISTRO, ELENITA S.A. SANDEJAS, EMILY R. LAWS
EILEEN Z. ARANETA, SALVACION C. MONTEIRO MARIETTA C. GORREZ, ROLANDO M. BAUTISTA, RUBEN T. UMALI, and MILDRED C. CASTOR, Petitioners
vs.
HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, Secretary-Designate of the Department of Health; NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, Assistant Secretary of Health; NICOLAS B. LUTERO III, Assistant
Secretary of Health, Officer-in-Charge, Food and Drug Administration; and MARIA LOURDES C. SANTIAGO, Officer-in-Charge, Center for Drug Regulation and
Research, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Subject of this resolution is the Omnibus Motion1 filed by the respondents, thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking partial reconsideration of the August
24, 2016 Decision (Decision),2 where the Court resolved the: [1] Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction (G.R. No. 217872); and the [2] Petition for Contempt of Court (G.R. No. 221866), in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, the case docketed as G.R No. 217872 is hereby REMANDED to the Food and Drugs Administration which is hereby ordered to observe the basic
requirements of due process by conducting a hearing, and allowing the petitioners to be heard, on the re-certified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs
and devices, including Implanon and lmplanon NXT, and to determine whether they are abortifacients or non-abortifacients.

Pursuant to the expanded jurisdiction of this Court and its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, the Court hereby:

1. DIRECTS the Food and Drug Administration to formulate the rules of procedure in the screening, evaluation and approval of all contraceptive drugs and devices
that will be used under Republic Act No. 10354. The rules of procedure shall contain the following minimum requirements of due process: (a) publication, notice and
hearing, (b) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene, (c) the standard laid down in the Constitution, as adopted under Republic Act No. 10354, as to what
constitutes allowable contraceptives shall be strictly followed, that is, those which do not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization, (d) in
weighing the evidence, all reasonable doubts shall be resolved in favor of the protection and preservation of the right to life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization, and (e) the other requirements of administrative due process, as summarized in Ang Tibay v. CIR, shall be complied with.

2. DIRECTS the Department of Health in coordination with other concerned agencies to formulate the rules and regulations or guidelines which will govern the
purchase and distribution/ dispensation of the products or supplies under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10354 covered by the certification from the Food and Drug
Administration that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it will not be used as an abortifacient subject to the following minimum due
process requirements: (a) publication, notice and hearing, and (b) interested parties shall be allowed to intervene. The rules and regulations or guidelines shall
provide sufficient detail as to the manner by which said product and supply shall be strictly regulated in order that they will not be used as an abortifacient and in
order to sufficiently safeguard the right to life of the unborn.

3. DIRECTS the Department of Health to generate the complete and correct list of the government's reproductive health programs and services under Republic Act
No. 10354 which will serve as the template for the complete and correct information standard and, hence, the duty to inform under Section 23(a)(l) of Republic Act
No. 10354. The Department of Health is DIRECTED to distribute copies of this template to all health care service providers covered by Republic Act No. 10354.

The respondents are hereby also ordered to amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations to conform to the rulings and guidelines in G.R. No. 204819 and related
cases.

The above foregoing directives notwithstanding, within 30 days from receipt of this disposition, the Food and Drugs Administration should commence to conduct the
necessary hearing guided by the cardinal rights of the parties laid down in CIR v. Ang Tibay.

Pending the resolution of the controversy, the motion to lift the Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.

With respect to the contempt petition, docketed as G.R No. 221866, it is hereby DENIED for lack of concrete basis.

SO ORDERED.3

Arguments of the Respondents

Part 1: Due Process need not be

complied with as the questioned
acts of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) were in
the exercise of its Regulatory Powers
In the subject Omnibus Motion, the respondents argued that their actions should be sustained, even if the petitioners were not afforded notice and hearing, because
the contested acts of registering, re-certifying, procuring, and administering contraceptive drugs and devices were all done in the exercise of its regulatory
power.4 They contended that considering that the issuance of the certificate of product registration (CPR) by the FDA under Section 7.04, Rule5 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354 (RH-IRR) did not involve the adjudication of the parties' opposing rights and liabilities through an adversarial
proceeding, the due process requirements of notice and hearing need not be complied with.6

Stated differently, the respondents assert that as long as the act of the FDA is exercised pursuant to its regulatory power, it need not comply with the due process
requirements of notice and hearing.

Corollary to this, the respondents wanted the Court to consider that the FDA had delineated its functions among different persons and bodies in its organization.
Thus, they asked the Court to make a distinction between the "quasi-judicial powers" exercised by the Director-General of the FDA under Section 2(b)7 of Article 3,
Book I of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9711,8 and the "regulatory/administrative powers" exercised by the FDA under Section 2(c )
(1) 9 of the same. For the respondents, the distinction given in the above-cited provisions was all but proof that the issuance of CPR did not require notice and
hearing.

After detailing the process by which the FDA's Center for Drug Regulation and Research (CDRR) examined and tested the contraceptives for non-abortifacience, 10 the
respondents stressed that the Decision wreaked havoc on the organizational structure of the FDA, whose myriad of functions had been carefully delineated in the IRR
of R.A. No. 9711. 11 The respondents, thus, prayed for the lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order (TR0).  12

Part 2: The requirements of due

process need not be complied with as
the elements of procedural due
process laid down in Ang Tibay v.
CIR are not applicable

The respondents further claimed in their omnibus motion that the requirements of due process need not be complied with because the standards of procedural due
process laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR  13 were inapplicable considering that: a) substantial evidence could not be used as a measure in determining whether a
contraceptive drug or device was abortifacient; 14 b) the courts had neither jurisdiction nor competence to review the findings of the FDA on the non-abortifacient
character of contraceptive drugs or devices; 15 c) the FDA was not bound by the rules of admissibility and presentation of evidence under the Rules of Court; 16 and d)
the findings of the FDA could not be subject of the rule on res judicata and stare-decisis.  17

The respondents then insisted that Implanon and Implanon NXT were not abortifacients and lamented that the continued injunction of the Court had hampered the
efforts of the FDA to provide for the reproductive health needs of Filipino women. For the respondents, to require them to afford the parties like the petitioners an
opportunity to question their findings would cause inordinate delay in the distribution of the subject contraceptive drugs and devices which would have a dire impact
on the effective implementation of the RH Law.

The Court's Ruling

After an assiduous assessment of the arguments of the parties, the Court denies the Omnibus Motion, but deems that a clarification on some points is in order.

Judicial Review

The powers of an administrative body are classified into two fundamental powers: quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. Quasi-legislative power, otherwise known as
the power of subordinate legislation, has been defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations
intended to carry out the provisions of law and implement legislative policy. 18 "[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof." 19 The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power through the promulgation of regulations
of general application does not, as a rule, require notice and hearing. The only exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and mandates that the
regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate investigation.20

Quasi-judicial power, on the other hand, is known as the power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply,
in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself.21 As it involves the exercise of discretion in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper
exercise of quasi-judicial power requires the concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative body and two, the
observance of the requirements of due process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.22

On the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its "regulatory powers" and, therefore, beyond judicial review, the
Court holds that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that
the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law." The Court's power cannot be curtailed by the FDA's invocation of its regulatory power.

In so arguing, the respondents cited Atty. Carlo L. Cruz in his book, Philippine Administrative Law.

Lest there be any inaccuracy, the relevant portions of the book cited by the respondents are hereby quoted as follows:

xxx.

B. The Quasi-Judicial Power

xxx

2. Determinative Powers

To better enable the administrative body to exercise its quasi judicial authority, it is also vested with what is known as determinative powers and functions.
Professor Freund classifies them generally into the enabling powers and the directing powers. The latter includes the dispensing, the examining, and
the summary powers.

The enabling vowers  are those that permit the doing of an act which the law undertakes to  regulate  and which would be unlawful with government approval.  The
most common example is the issuance of licenses to engage in a particular business or occupation, like the operation of a liquor store or restaurant. x x
x. 23 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

From the above, two things are apparent: one, the "enabling powers" cover "regulatory powers" as defined by the respondents; and two, they refer to a subcategory
of a quasi-judicial power which, as explained in the Decision, requires the compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Nowhere from the above-
quoted texts can it be inferred that the exercise of "regulatory power" places an administrative agency beyond the reach of judicial review. When there is grave abuse
of discretion, such as denying a party of his constitutional right to due process, the Court can come in and exercise its power of judicial review. It can review the
challenged acts, whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial, quasi-judicial or regulatory power. In the past, the Court exercised its power of judicial review over
acts and decisions of agencies exercising their regulatory powers, such as DPWH, 24 TRB, 25 NEA, 26 and the SEC,27 among others. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission
on Elections,28 the Court properly exercised its power of judicial review over a Comelec resolution issued in the exercise of its regulatory power.

Clearly, the argument of the FDA is flawed.

Petitioners were Denied their

Right to Due Process

Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must
be compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof. 29 Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes
with the rights of a person to his property.30 Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by
the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it.31

The undisputed fact is that the petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to due process of law.

As expounded by the Court, what it found to be primarily deplorable is the failure of the respondents to act upon, much less address, the various oppositions filed by
the petitioners against the product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices. Instead of
addressing the petitioners' assertion that the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices fell within the definition of an "abortifacient" under Section 4(a) of the RH
Law because of their "secondary mechanism of action which induces abortion or destruction of the fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,"32 the respondents chose to ignore them and proceeded with the registration, recertification, procurement,
and distribution of several contraceptive drugs and devices.

A cursory reading of the subject Omnibus Motion shows that the respondents proffer no cogent explanation as to why they did not act on the petitioners' opposition.
As stated by the Court in the Decision, rather than provide concrete action to meet the petitioners' opposition, the respondents simply relied on their challenge
questioning the propriety of the subject petition on technical and procedural grounds. 33 The Court, thus, finds the subject motion to be simply a rehash of the earlier
arguments presented before, with the respondents still harping on the peculiarity of the FDA's functions to exempt it from compliance with the constitutional
mandate that "no person shall be deprived oflife, liberty and property without due process of law."

The law and the rules demand

compliance with due process
requirements

A reading of the various provisions, cited by the respondents in support of their assertion that due process need not be complied with in the approval of
contraceptive drugs or devices, all the more reinforces the Court's conclusion that the FDA did fail to afford the petitioners a genuine opportunity to be heard.

As outlined by the respondents themselves, the steps by which the FDA approves contraceptive drugs or devices, demand compliance with the requirements of due
process viz:

Step 1. Identify contraceptive products in the database. Create another database containing the following details of contraceptive products: generic name, dosage
strength and form, brand name (if any), registration number, manufacturer, MAH, and the period of validity of the CPR.

Step 2. Identify contraceptive products which are classified as essential medicines in the Philippine Drug Formulary.

Step 3. Retrieve the contraceptive product's file and the CPR duplicate of all registered contraceptive products. Create a database of the contraceptive product's
history, including its initial, renewal, amendment, and/or variation applications.

Step 4. Conduct a preliminary review of the following:

a. general physiology of female reproductive system, including hormones involved, female reproductive cycle, and conditions of the female reproductive system
during pregnancy.

b. classification of hormonal contraceptives;

c. regulatory status of the products in benchmark countries; and

d. mechanism of action of hormonal contraceptives based on reputable journals, meta-analyses, systemic reviews, evaluation of regulatory authorities in other
countries, textbooks, among others.

Step 5. Issue a notice to all concerned MAHs, requiring them to submit scientific evidence that their product is non-abortifacient, as defined in the RH Law
and Imbong.
Step 6. Post a list of contraceptive products which were applied for re-certification for public comments in the FDA website.

Step 7. Evaluate contraceptive products for re-certification.

A. Part I (Review of Chemistry, Manufacture and Controls)

1. Unit Dose and Finished Product Formulation

2. Technical Finished Product Specifications

3. Certificate of Analysis

B. Part II (Evaluation of Whether the Contraceptive Product is Abortifacient)

1. Evaluation of the scientific evidence submitted by the applicant and the public.

2. Review and evaluation of extraneous evidence, e.g., scientific journals, meta-analyses, etc.

Step 8. Assess and review the documentary requirements submitted by the applicant. Technical reviewers considered scientific evidence such as meta-analyses,
systemic reviews, national and clinical practice guidelines and recommendations of international medical organizations submitted by the companies, organizations
and individuals, to be part of the review.34 [Emphases and Underlining supplied]

The Court notes that the above-outlined procedure is deficient insofar as it only allows public comments to cases of re-certification. It fails to allow the public to
comment in cases where a reproductive drug or device is being subject to the certification process for the first time. This is clearly in contravention of the mandate
of the Court in lmbong that the IRR should be amended to conform to it.

More importantly, the Court notes that Step 5 requires the FDA to issue a notice to all concerned MAHs and require them to submit scientific evidence that their
product is non-abortifacient; and that Step 6 requires the posting of the list of contraceptive products which were applied for re-certification for public comments in
the FDA website.

If an opposition or adverse comment is filed on the ground that the drug or devise has abortifacient features or violative of the RH Law, based on the
pronouncements of the Court in Im bong or any other law or rule, the FDA is duty-bound to take into account and consider the basis of the opposition.

To conclude that product registration, recertification, procurement, and distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices by the FDA in the exercise of
its regulatory power need not comply with the requirements of due process would render the issuance of notices to concerned MAHs and the posting of a list of
contraceptives for public comment a meaningless exercise. Concerned MAHs and the public in general will be deprived of any significant participation if what they will
submit will not be considered.

Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the IRR of the RH Law (RH-IRR),35 relied upon by the respondents in support of their claims, expressly allows the consideration of conflicting
evidence, such as that supplied by the petitioners in support of their opposition to the approval of certain contraceptive drugs and devices. In fact, the said provision
mandates that the FDA utilize the "best evidence available" to ensure that no bortifacient is approved as a family planning drug or device. It bears mentioning that
the same provision even allows an independent evidence review group (ERG) to ensure that evidence for or against the certification of a contraceptive drug or device
is duly considered.

Structure of the FDA

As earlier mentioned, the respondents argue that the Decision "wreaked havoc on the organizational structure of the FDA, whose myriad of functions have been
carefully delineated under R.A. No. 9711 IRR."36 Citing Section 7.04, Rule 7 of the RH-IRR, the FDA insists that the function it exercises in certifying family planning
supplies is in the exercise of its regulatory power, which cannot be the subject of judicial review, and that it is the Director-General of the FDA who exercises quasi-
judicial powers, citing Section 2(b) of Article 3, Book I of the RH-IRR.37

The FDA wants the Court to consider that, as a body, it has a distinct and separate personality from the Director-General, who exercises quasi-judicial power. The
Court cannot accommodate the position of the respondents. Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by Section 7 of R.A. No. 9711,38 provides that "(a) The FDA
shall be headed by a director-general with the rank of undersecretary, xxx." How can the head be separated from the body?

For the record, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 9711, also recognizes compliance with the requirements of due process, although the
proceedings are not adversarial. Thus:

Section 5. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3720, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health
(DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy,
quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with
regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health
products, as determined by the FDA;

"xxx

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report
to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient,
or any person;

"G) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified com plaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for
registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty (60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management
plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

"(l) To strengthen the post market surveillance system in monitoring health products as defined in this Act and incidents of adverse events involving such products;

"(m) To develop and issue standards and appropriate authorizations that would cover establishments, facilities and health products;

"(n) To conduct, supervise, monitor and audit research studies on health and safety issues of health products undertaken by entities duly approved by the FDA;

"(o) To prescribe standards, guidelines, and regulations with respect to information, advertisements and other marketing instruments and promotion, sponsorship,
and other marketing activities about the health products as covered in this Act;

"(p) To maintain bonded warehouses and/or establish the same, whenever necessary or appropriate, as determined by the director-general for confiscated goods in
strategic areas of the country especially at major ports of entry; and

"(q) To exercise such other powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this Act. [Emphases
supplied]

The Cardinal Rights of Parties in

Administrative Proceedings as
laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR

In Ang Tibay v. CJR,39 the Court laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support thereof;

2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3) The decision must have something to support itself;

4) The evidence must be substantial;

5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and

7) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. 40

In the Decision, the Court found that the FDA certified, procured and administered contraceptive drugs and devices, without the observance of the basic tenets of
due process, that is, without notice and without public hearing. It appeared that, other than the notice inviting stakeholders to apply for certification/recertification of
their reproductive health products, there was no showing that the respondents considered the opposition of the petitioners. Thus, the Court wrote:

Rather than provide concrete evidence to meet the petitioners' opposition, the respondents simply relied on their challenge questioning the propriety of the subject
petition on technical and procedural grounds. The Court notes that even the letters submitted by the petitioners to the FDA and the DOH seeking information on the
actions taken by the agencies regarding their opposition were left unanswered as if they did not exist at all. The mere fact that the RH Law was declared as not
unconstitutional does not permit the respondents to run roughshod over the constitutional rights, substantive and procedural, of the petitioners.

Indeed, although the law tasks the FDA as the primary agency to determine whether a contraceptive drug or certain device has no abortifacient effects, its findings
and conclusion should be allowed to be questioned and those who oppose the same must be given a genuine opportunity to be heard in their stance. After all, under
Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 3720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711, the FDA is mandated to order the ban, recall and/ or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, after due
process.

Due to the failure of the respondents to observe and comply with the basic requirements of due process, the Court is of the view that the certifications/re-
certifications and the distribution of the questioned contraceptive drugs by the respondents should be struck down as violative of the constitutional right to due
process.
Verily, it is a cardinal precept that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, the courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a party's right
to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or
administrative) where he stands to lose the same.41

The Court stands by that finding and, accordingly, reiterates its order of remand of the case to the FDA.

Procedure in the FDA; No Trial-Type Hearing

The Court is of the view that the FDA need not conduct a trial-type hearing. Indeed, due process does not require the conduct of a trial-type hearing to satisfy its
requirements. All that the Constitution requires is that the FDA afford the people their right to due process of law and decide on the applications submitted by MAHs
after affording the oppositors like the petitioners a genuine opportunity to present their science-based evidence. As earlier pointed out, this the FDA failed to do. It
simply ignored the opposition of the petitioners. In the case of Perez, et al. v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, et al.,  42 it was stated that:

A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.

In the fairly recent case of Vivo v. Pagcor,43 the Court explained:

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as
applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type
hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals elaborates on the well-established meaning of
due process in administrative proceedings in this wise:

x x x Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of
the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity
for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. [Emphasis supplied; citations omitted]

Best Evidence Available

Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 5. In all cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicialbodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantialevidence, or the amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

As applied to certification proceedings at the FDA, "substantial evidence" refers to the best scientific evidence available, 44 "including but not limited to: meta
analyses, systematic reviews, national clinical practice guidelines where available, and recommendations of international medical organizations," needed to support a
conclusion whether a contraceptive drug or device is an abortifacient or not. The FDA need not be bound or limited by the evidence adduced by the parties, but it can
conduct its own search for related scientific data. It can also consult other technical scientific experts known in their fields. It is also not bound by the principle
of stare decisis or res judicata, but may update itself and cancel certifications motu proprio when new contrary scientific findings become available or there arise
manifest risks which have not been earlier predicted.

On the Competence of the Court

to review the Findings of the FDA

The fact that any appeal to the courts will involve scientific matters will neither place the actions of the respondents beyond the need to comply with the
requirements of Ang Tibay nor place the actions of the FDA in certification proceedings beyond judicial review.

It should be pointed out that nowhere in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, are the courts ousted of their jurisdiction whenever the issues involve questions of
scientific nature. A court is not considered incompetent either in reviewing the findings of the FDA simply because it will be weighing the scientific evidence
presented by both the FDA and its oppositors in determining whether the contraceptive drug or device has complied with the requirements of the law.

Although the FDA is not strictly bound by the technical rules on evidence, as stated in the Rules of Court, or it cannot be bound by the principle of stare decisis or res
judicata, it is not excused from complying with the requirements of due process. To reiterate for emphasis, due process does not require that the FDA conduct trial-
type hearing to satisfy its requirements. All that the Constitution requires is that the FDA afford the people their right to due process of law and decide on the
applications submitted by the MAHs after affording the oppositors, like the petitioners, a genuine opportunity to present their sciencebased evidence.

The Appellate Procedure;

Appeal to the Office of the President

Incidentally, Section 32 of R.A. No. 3720 and Section 9 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 247 provide that any decision by the FDA would then be appealable to the
Secretary of Health, whose decision, in tum, may be appealed to the Office of the President (OP). Thus:

Sec. 32. The orders, rulings or decisions of the FDA shall be appealable to the Secretary of Health. - An appeal shall be deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of
appeal and posting of the corresponding appeal bond.

An appeal shall not stay the decision appealed from unless an order from the Secretary of Health is issued to stay the execution thereof.
Sec. 9. Appeals. - Decisions of the Secretary (DENR, DA, DOH or DOST) may be appealed to the Office of the President. Recourse to the courts shall be allowed after
exhaustion of all administrative remedies.

In view thereof, the Court should modify that part of the Decision which allows direct appeal of the FDA decision to the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 As stated in the
said decision, the FDA decision need not be appealed to the Secretary of Health because she herself is a party herein. Considering that the Executive

Secretary is not a party herein, the appeal should be to the OP as provided in Section 9.

On the Prayer to Lift the TRO

The respondents lament that the assailed decision undermines the functions of the FDA as the specialized agency tasked to determine whether a contraceptive drug
or device is safe, effective and non-abortifacient. They also claim that the assailed decision requiring notice and hearing would unduly delay the issuance of CPR
thereby affecting public access to State-funded contraceptives. Finally, in a veritable attempt to sow panic, the respondents claim that the TRO issued by the Court
would result in "a nationwide stockout of family planning supplies in accredited public health facilities and the commercial market. "45

On this score, it should be clarified that the Decision simply enjoined the respondents from registering, recertifying, procuring, and administering only those
contraceptive drugs and devices which were the subjects of the petitioners' opposition, specifically Implanon and Implanon NXT. It never meant to enjoin the
processing of the entire gamut of family planning supplies that have been declared as unquestionably non-abortifacient. Moreover, the injunction issued by the Court
was only subject to the condition that the respondents afford the petitioners a genuine opportunity to their right to due process.

As the Decision explained, the Court cannot lift the TRO prior to the summary hearing to be conducted by the FDA. To do so would render the summary hearing an
exercise in futility. Specifically, the respondents would want the Court to consider their argument that Implanon and Implanon NXT have no abortifacient effects.
According to them, "the FDA tested these devices for safety, efficacy, purity, quality, and non-abortiveness prior to the issuance of certificates of registration and
recertification, and after the promulgation of Imbong." 46 The Court, however, cannot make such determination or pronouncement at this time. To grant its prayer
to lift the TRO would be premature and presumptuous. Any declaration by the Court at this time would have no basis because the FDA, which has the mandate and
expertise on the matter, has to first resolve the controversy pending before its office.

This Court also explained in the Decision that the issuance of the TRO did not mean that the FDA should stop fulfilling its mandate to test, analyze, scrutinize, and
inspect other drugs and devices. Thus:

Nothing in this resolution, however, should be construed as restraining or stopping the FDA from carrying on its mandate and duty to test, analyze, scrutinize, and
inspect drugs and devices. What are being enjoined are the grant of certifications/re-certifications of contraceptive drugs without affording the petitioners due
process, and the distribution and administration of the questioned contraceptive drugs and devices including Implanon and Implanon NXT until they are determined
to be safe and non-abortifacient.47

On Delay

The respondents claim that this judicial review of the administrative decision of the FDA in certifying and recertifying drugs has caused much delay in the distribution
of the subject drugs with a dire impact on the effective implementation of the RH Law.

In this regard, the respondents have only themselves to blame. Instead of complying with the orders of the Court as stated in the Decision to conduct a summary
hearing, the respondents have returned to this Court, asking the Court to reconsider the said decision claiming that it has wreaked havoc on the organizational
structure of the FDA.

Had the FDA immediately conducted a summary hearing, by this time it would have finished it and resolved the opposition of the petitioners.1âwphi1 Note that there
was already a finding by the FDA, which was its basis in registering, certifying and recertifying the questioned drugs and devices. The pharmaceutical companies or
the MAHs need not present the same evidence it earlier adduced to convince the FDA unless they want to present additional evidence to fortify their positions. The
only entities that would present evidence would be the petitioners to make their point by proving with relevant scientific evidence that the contraceptives have
abortifacient effects. Thereafter, the FDA can resolve the controversy.

Indeed, in addition to guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law,48 the Constitution commands that "all
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies."49

WHEREFORE, the August 24, 2016 Decision is MODIFIED. Accordingly, the Food and Drug Administration is ordered to consider the oppositions filed by the
petitioners with respect to the listed drugs, including Implanon and Implanon NXT, based on the standards of the Reproductive Health Law, as construed in lmbong v.
Ochoa, and to decide the case within sixty (60) days from the date it will be deemed submitted for resolution.

After compliance with due process and upon promulgation of the decision of the Food and Drug Administration, the Temporary Restraining Order would be deemed
lifted if the questioned drugs and devices are found not abortifacients.

After the final resolution by the Food and Drug Administration, any appeal should be to the Office of the President pursuant to Section 9 of E.O. No. 247.

As ordered in the August 24, 2016 Decision, the Food and Drug Administration is directed to amend the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 10354 so that
it would be strictly compliant with the mandates of the Court in lmbong v. Ochoa.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019

INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY: VENANCIO A. ROXAS, SATURNINO V. PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL, HERMINILDO V. CRUZ,
ALLAN F. TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P. MONDEJAR, ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN O. CRISANTO, EDGAR ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO,
JOSENEL ALVARAN, AND CRISENCIO NERI, JR., PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS.

ATTY. RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,

WILLIAM M. MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, AND ARESENIO C. CABANILLA, PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS,

[G.R. No. 214637]

REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA, JIMMY E. ACLAO, WILFREDO V. OMERES, PASCUA B. GALLADAN, VICTOR M. MACOY, JR., EDWIN C. TRABUNCON,
WILFREDO A. PATERNO, FEDERICO ELLIOT, AND ROMEO R. MACOLBAS, PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; SECRETARY
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; ACTING DIRECTOR FRANKLIN JESUS B. BUCAYU, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS;
AND JAIL CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT DIONY DACANAY MAMARIL, BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases1 is the legality of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10592,2 which states:

SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time
allowance as provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3
of the same Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.

The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are
likewise subject to the management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC.3

The Case

On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).4 For reference, the modifications are underscored as follows:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a
counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal,
if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance:  Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may
motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused:  Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are
excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days
of preventive imprisonment.

ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

1. By conditional pardon;

2. By commutation of the sentence; and

3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.

ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of
any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period
of his sentence:

1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during
detention;

3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good
behavior during detention;

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
and

5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each
month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.

An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct.

ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive
imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours
following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the
period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or
catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.

This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.

ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be
revoked. (Emphases ours)

Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became effective on April 18, 2014.5 Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its
Section 4, Rule 1 that directs the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring
(TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC.6

G.R. No. 212719

On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction)7 was filed against respondents DOJ Secretary De
Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J. Evangelista acting as the attorney-in-fact8 of convicted prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely: Venancio
A. Roxas, Saturnino V. Paras, Edgardo G. Manuel, Herminildo V. Cruz, Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C. Marquez, Julito P. Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang, Jonathan O.
Crisanto, Edgar Echenique, Janmark Saracho, Josenel Alvaran, and Crisencio Neri, Jr. (Roxas et al.). Petitioners filed the case as real parties-in-interest and as
representatives of their member organizations and the organizations' individual members, as a class suit for themselves and in behalf of all who are similarly situated.
They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in accordance with
Article 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it implements. They are puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR) and the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) to retroactively apply the law when the prisoners' records are complete and the distinctions between the pertinent
provisions of the RPC and R.A. No. 10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners submit that the simple standards added by the new law, which are matters of record, and
the creation of the Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) should not override the constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and due
process of law aside from the principle that penal laws beneficial to the accused are given retroactive effect.

Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. filed a Petition (In Intervention).9 He incorporates by reference the Roxas et al. petition,
impleads the same respondents, and adds that nowhere from the legislative history of R.A. No. 10592 that it intends to be prospective in character. On July 22, 2014,
the Court resolved to grant the leave to intervene and require the adverse parties to comment thereon.10

Another Petition-in-Intervention11 was filed on October 21, 2014. This time, the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) served as counsel for William M. Montinola,
Fortunato P. Visto, and Arsenio C. Cabanilla (Montinola et al.), who are also inmates of the NBP. The petition argues that Section 4, Rule I of the IRR is facially void for
being contrary to the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; it discriminates, without any reasonable basis, against those who would have been benefited
from the retroactive application of the law; and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the authority of respondents to promulgate. In a Resolution dated
November 25, 2014, We required the adverse parties to comment on the petition-in-intervention.12

On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment13 to the Petition of Roxas et al. and Petition-in-Intervention of Atty.
Saguisag, Sr. More than two years later, or on July 7, 2017, it filed a Comment14 to the Petition-in-Intervention of Montinola et al.

G.R. No. 214637

On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition15 was filed by Reynaldo D. Edago, Peter R. Torida, Jimmy E. Aclao, Wilfredo V. Omeres, Pascua B.
Galladan, Victor M. Macoy, Jr., Edwin C. Trabuncon, Wilfredo A. Paterno, Federico Elliot, and Romeo R. Macolbas (Edago et al.), who are all inmates at the Maximum
Security Compound of the NBP, against DOJ Secretary De Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas, BUCOR Acting Director Franklin Jesus B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief
Superintendent (Officer-in-Charge) Diony Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the petition are as follows:
A.

SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 10592 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND THEREBY VOID AND ILLEGAL FOR BEING CONTRARY AND ANATHEMA TO R.A. 10592.

a. R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have prospective application.

b. Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code providing that penal laws that are beneficial to the accused shall have
retroactive application.

c. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and the intent of Congress when it enacted R.A. 10592.

B.

SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENTS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS
PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

a. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

b. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due process.16

Per Resolution17 dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered to file their comment to the petition. In compliance, BJMP Chief Mamaril filed a Comment18 on
December 10, 2014, while the OSG did the same on February 9, 201519 in behalf of all the respondents.

Subsequently, Edago et al. filed a Motion with Leave of Court to File and Admit Reply,20 attaching therein said Reply. On July 28, 2015, We granted the motion and
noted the Reply.21

The Court's Ruling

The petition is granted.

Procedural Matters

Actual case or controversy

Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply with all the elements of justiciability as the requirement of an actual case or controversy vis-a-
vis the requirement of ripeness has not been complied with. For them, the claimed injury of petitioners has not ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's
intervention: First, the MSEC has not been constituted yet so there is effectively no authority or specialized body to screen, evaluate and recommend any applications
for time credits based on R.A. No. 10592. Second, none of petitioners has applied for the revised credits, making their claim of injury premature, if not anticipatory.
And third, the prison records annexed to the petition are neither signed nor certified by the BUCOR Director which belie the claim of actual injury resulting from
alleged extended incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately filed this case after obtaining their prison records and computing the purported
application of the revised credits for GCTA under R.A. No. 10592.

We disagree.

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.22 As to the requirement of actual case or controversy, the Court stated in Province of North Cotabato, et al. v.
Gov't of the Rep. of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al.:23

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or
mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence, x x x.

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
act complained of.24

There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such
provision violates the Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as the challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on
petitioners and those detained and convicted prisoners who are similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or threatened injury and they have sustained or are
immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending, petitioners are languishing in jail. If their
assertion proved to be true, their illegal confinement or detention in the meantime is oppressive. With the prisoners' continued incarceration, any delay in resolving
the case would cause them great prejudice. Justice demands that they be released soonest, if not on time.

There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation of the MSEC. Petitioners Edago et al. correctly invoked Our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon.
Aguirre.25 There, We dismissed the novel theory that people should wait for the implementing evil to befall on them before they could question acts that are illegal or
unconstitutional, and held that "[by] the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act." Similar to Pimentel, Jr., the real issue in this case is whether the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by
Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. Concrete acts are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe.26 An
actual case may exist even in the absence of tangible instances when the assailed IRR has actually and adversely affected petitioners. The mere issuance of the subject
IRR has led to the ripening of a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. If this Court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to
consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention,27 the same can be said for an IRR. Here, petitioners need not wait for the creation of the MSEC and
be individually rejected in their applications. They do not need to actually apply for the revised credits, considering that such application would be an exercise in
futility in view of respondents' insistence that the law should be prospectively applied. If the assailed provision is indeed unconstitutional and illegal, there is no better
time than the present action to settle such question once and for all.28

Legal standing

We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress which may claim any injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative
function to amend, modify or repeal laws and that the challenged acts of respondents have no direct adverse effect on petitioners, considering that based on records,
there was no GCTA granted to them.

It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to be enforced."

"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The concept has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must [be] shown
that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute complained of.29

In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR because they are prisoners currently serving their respective sentences at the NBP. They
have a personal stake in the outcome of this case as their stay in prison will potentially be shortened (if the assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void)
or their dates of release will be delayed (if R.A. No. 10592 is applied prospectively). It is erroneous to assert that the questioned provision has no direct adverse effect
on petitioners since there were no GCTAs granted to them. There is none precisely because of the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the act
complained of rather than an evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further, the submission of certified prison records is immaterial in determining whether or
not petitioners' rights were breached by the IRR because, to repeat, the possible violation was already fait accompli by the issuance of the IRR. The prison records
were merely furnished to show that respondents have prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and that petitioners will be affected thereby.

Propriety of legal remedy:

Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the petitions-in-intervention, should be dismissed because such petitions are proper
only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR is an administrative issuance of respondents made in
the exercise of their rule-making or quasi-legislative functions.

True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate remedy to assail the validity of the subject IRR as it was issued in the exercise of respondents' rule-
making or quasi-legislative function. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that "petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials."30 In Araullo v. Aquino III,31 former Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice, Lucas P. Bersamin, explained the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, thus:

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are
the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is
expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or
officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the
superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature
that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without
authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding
its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of
the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the
writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz.:

xxxx

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that
the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal
or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective
remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself,
while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function of the
writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to
desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds
prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal
relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may
appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition
may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and
executive officials.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or
affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate
cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances.32

In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised herein so as to finally resolve the question on the validity of Section 4, Rule 1 of the
IRR, which is purely legal in nature. This is also because of the public importance of the issues raised,33 and the interest of substantial justice,34 not to mention the
absence of any dispute as to any underlying fact.35

Hierarchy of courts

Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the petitions-in-intervention, should still be dismissed for failure to observe the rule
on hierarchy of courts. According to them, this Court's jurisdiction over actions assailing the validity of administrative issuances is primarily appellate in nature by
virtue of Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution.36 An action assailing the validity of an administrative issuance is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
which, under Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, a petition for declaratory relief filed
before the RTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the proper remedy to question the validity of the IRR.37

Indeed, under Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the question presented here is a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, which exclusively and originally pertained to
the proper RTC.38 Fundamentally, there is no doubt that this consolidated case captioned as petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to declare the
unconstitutionality and illegality of Section 4 Rule 1 of the IRR; thus, partaking the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which We only have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution. In accordance with Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, the special civil action of declaratory relief
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to this Court in exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
of serious implications, and those of transcendental importance and of first impression.39 As the petitions clearly and specifically set out special and important reasons
therefor, We may overlook the Rules. Here, petitioners Edago et al. are correct in asserting that R.A. No. 10592 and its IRR affect the entire correctional system of the
Philippines. Not only the social, economic, and moral well-being of the convicts and detainees are involved but also their victims and their own families, the jails, and
the society at large. The nationwide implications of the petitions, the extensive scope of the subject matter, the upholding of public policy, and the repercussions on
the society are factors warranting direct recourse to Us.

Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense substantive justice on the numerous affected inmates. It is a must to treat this consolidated case
with a circumspect leniency, granting petitioners the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case rather than lose their liberty on the basis of
technicalities.40 It need not be said that while this case has been pending, their right to liberty is on the line. An extended period of detention or one that is beyond
the period allowed by law violates the accused person's right to liberty.41 Hence, We shunt the rigidity of the rules of procedure so as not to deprive such
birthright.42 The Court zealously guards against the curtailment of a person's basic constitutional and natural right to liberty.43 The right to liberty, which stands
second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.44 At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to liberty that cannot
be taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes provided by law.45

Substantive Issues

Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive
effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws.46

In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well
entrenched.47 It has been sanctioned since the old Penal Code.48

x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the
accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried
over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22 x x x. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not
retrospective, variously contained in the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex defuturo, judex de proeterito (the law
provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and good law justify
this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it, the exception
was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science.49

According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to
punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict
justice."50

Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC applies to said Code51 and its amendments,52 as well as to special laws,53 such as
Act No. 2126,54 Presidential Decree No. 603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No. 8294,58 R.A. No. 9344,59 and R.A. No. 10586,60 to cite a few.

But what exactly is a penal law?

A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:

A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.61

Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation.62

Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the
power to pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the term "penal statutes" all statutes which command or prohibit certain
acts, and establish penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission.63

Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature,
and provide for their punishment.64

The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural rules.65 Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions
does not make it penal in nature.66

In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No. 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of
the RPC as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to the RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to
the accused cannot be applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties lighter should be considered penal laws in accordance with
Article 22 of the RPC.

We concur.

While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a penalty67 as it addresses the rehabilitation component68 of our correctional
system, its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of
imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.

The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It
precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes
they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending their sentence and increasing their
punishment.69 Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.

In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL, respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would indicate the need
for "new procedures and standards of behavior" to fully implement the law by the BUCOR (as to persons serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to
accused who are under preventive detention). It is alleged that the amendments introduced are substantial and of utmost importance that they may not be
implemented without a thorough revision of the BUCOR and the BJMP operating manuals on jail management. In particular, the establishment of the MSEC is said to
be an administrative mechanism to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR superintendents and the BJMP jail wardens must follow uniform guidelines in
managing, screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct of prisoners prior to their recommendation to the heads of the two bureaus on who may be granted
time allowances.

Respondents fail to persuade Us.

Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to stay in the place of his confinement despite the existence of a calamity or
catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere modifications of the RPC that have been implemented by the BUCOR
prior to the issuance of the challenged IRR. In view of this, the claim of "new procedures and standards of behavior" for the grant of time allowances is untenable.

It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was enacted,70 prisoners have already been entitled to deduct the period of preventive
imprisonment from the service of their sentences. In addition, good conduct time allowance has been in existence since August 30, 1906 upon the passage of Act No.
1533.71 Said law provided for the diminution of sentences imposed upon convicted prisoners in consideration of good conduct and diligence.72 Under Act No. 1533
and subsequently under Article 97 of the RPC, the time allowance may also apply to detention prisoners if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as
may be assigned to them.73 Such prerequisite was removed by R.A. No. 10592.

Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Public Instruction, the wardens or officers in charge
of Insular or provincial jails or prisons were mandated to make and keep such records and take such further actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
Act No. 1533.74 When the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932,75 the Director of Prisons was empowered to grant allowances for good conduct whenever lawfully
justified.76 With the effectivity of R.A. No. 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority is now vested on the Director of the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the
Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail.77

Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the recommending body for the grant of GCTA and TASTM.78 They are tasked to manage, screen
and evaluate the behavior and conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify whether said prisoner has actually studied, taught or
performed mentoring activities.79 The creation of the MSEC, however, does not justify the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law
was its formation set as a precondition before its beneficial provisions are applied. What R.A. No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG
are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations on the classification system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be necessary to implement its
provisions.80 Clearly, respondents went outside the bounds of their legal mandate when they provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law to be
enforced.

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.81

The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the issuance of the assailed IRR and even before the enactment of R.A. No. 10592, a Classification
Board had been handling the functions of the MSEC and implementing the provisions of the RPC on time allowances. While there is a noble intent to systematize
and/or institutionalize existing set-up, the administrative and procedural restructuring should not in any way prejudice the substantive rights of current detention and
convicted prisoners.

Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of behavior in granting GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In essence, the definition of what
constitutes "good conduct" has been invariable through the years, thus:

Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the rules of the prison, and has labored with diligence and fidelity upon all such tasks as have been
assigned to him."82

BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good behavior and who has no record of breach of discipline or violation of prison rules and regulations."83

IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs,
productive participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled with faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations"84

Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on his behavior or conduct while in prison.85 Likewise, the certificate/diploma issued upon
successful completion of an educational program or course (i.e., elementary, secondary and college education as well as vocational training) forms part of the
record.86 These considered, the Court cannot but share the same sentiment of Roxas et al. It is indeed perplexing why it is complex for respondents to retroactively
apply R.A. No. 10592 when all that the MSEC has to do is to utilize the same standard of behavior for the grant of time allowances and refer to existing prison records.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid
insofar as it provides for the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time
allowance for loyalty. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology are REQUIRED to RE-
COMPUTE with reasonable dispatch the time allowances due to petitioners and all those who are similarly situated and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release
from imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are being confined thereat for any other lawful cause.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

G.R. No. 238822, October 09, 2019

MELLIEMOORE M. SAYCON, PETITIONER, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL NINETEENTH DIVISION) AND ROEL R. DEGAMO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, A., JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari1 brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging the Resolution2 dated January 11, 2018 and the Reso1ution3 dated March 7,
2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11422, which respectively granted the prayer of respondent Roel R. Degamo (Roel) for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and a Writ of Preliminary injunction (WPI). The injunctive reliefs enjoined the implementation of the Decision4 dated March 2,
2017 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-V-A-16-0197, finding Roel guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposed on him the penalty of Dismissal from
Service.

Factual Antecedents

The petitioner, Melliemoore Maicom Saycon (Melliemoore), filed an administrative complaint against Roel and several other public officers in the Province of Negros
Oriental. According to Melliemoore, Roel and his co-respondents (i.e., Provincial Budget Officer Marichu A. Alperto, Provincial Accountant Teodorico G. Reyes, and
Provincial Treasurer Danilo C. Mendez) caused the release of public funds belonging to the province, without a corresponding appropriation in the budget.5

The funds subject of this case came from the proposed budget of Roel, which he submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Oriental on October 16, 2012
during his first term as governor. The proposed budget included an item for "Intelligence Expenses" in the amount of P10,000,000.00.6

On January 15, 2013, the appropriation ordinance for Fiscal Year 2013 was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. However, instead of including the proposed
item for "Intelligence Expenses," the amount was appropriated for Gender and Development, one of the programs and activities under the Office of the Provincial
Governor.7 Roel vetoed the "deletion or non-inclusion" of the item on "Intelligence Expenses." The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for its part, did not override the veto.
Subsequently, or on March 22, 2013, the approved Annual Budget for the province was submitted to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Regional
Office VII for review.8

Despite the absence of an appropriation, Roel allegedly proceeded to issue a Memorandum addressed to the Provincial Budget Officer, Provincial Treasurer, and
Provincial Accountant, directing the release of the Intelligence Fund without further delay. They complied with the directive, and on April 16, 2013, the amount of
P10,000,000.00 "for the payment of expenses of different activities related to intelligence operation" was released to the Office off the Provincial Governor.9 The
Provincial Budget Officer sent a letter on the same day to Roel, registering her objection to the disbursement of the funds, there being no available appropriation for
the item.10 The Provincial Accountant and Treasurer also registered their separate objections to the release of the cash advance for the same reasons.11

The DBM Regional Office VII Director, through a letter dated May 17, 2013, informed the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that the appropriation of P10,000,000.00 for
Gender and Development is inoperative because it was vetoed and the veto was not overridden. Furthermore, the DBM Regional Office VII Director stated that Roel's
veto on the Intelligence Fund cannot operate to re-enact the item in the appropriations ordinance. The proper subject of a veto is an item of appropriation in the
appropriations ordinance. There being no Intelligence Fund item in the province's appropriation ordinance, Roel's veto is void.12

The Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. VII agreed with the opinion of the DBM Regional Office VII. It found the disbursement of the Intelligence Fund, in
the absence of an appropriation, to be a violation of Section 305(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 716013 and Section 4(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445.14

Roel submitted his counter-affidavit to the OMB, where he argued that the expenses for the Intelligence Fund are deemed included in the appropriations ordinance.
According to him, the Intelligence Fund is already part of the Annual Investment Program approved by the Local Development Council. He also argued that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan acted outside its authority in deciding not to include the item in the appropriations ordinance. As such, the deletion of the Item did
not have a legal effect.15

Meanwhile, Roel's co-respondents, who were respectively holding the positions of Provincial Budget Officer, Provincial Accountant, and Provincial Treasurer, denied
conspiring with Roel to disburse the subject funds. The alleged conspiracy, they claim, is further negated by their written objections to the release of the funds.16

Ruling of the OMB

In a Decision17 promulgated on March 2, 2017, the OMB dismissed the complaint against the co-respondents of Roel. This notwithstanding, the OMB found
substantial evidence to hold Roel administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding substantial evidence to hold respondent ROEL RAGAY DEGAMO liable for Grave Misconduct, he is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM
SERVICE with accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from
taking civil service examination.

In the event that the penalty of Dismissal can no longer be enforced due to separation from service of respondent ROEL RAGAY DEGAMO, the penalty shall be
converted into a Fine in an amount equivalent to respondents' salary for one (1) year, payable to the Office of the Ombudsman, and may be deductible from
respondent's retirement benefits, accrued leave credits or any receivable from their office.

Further, the administrative charge for Grave Misconduct against MARICHU ABIERA ALPUERTO, DANILO CUAL MENDEZ and TEODORICO GUEVARA REYES is DISMISSED
for lack of substantial evidence.
xxxx

SO ORDERED.18

Aggrieved, Roel filed a petition for review with the CA, pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. His petition also prayed for the issuance of a TRO, arguing that he
has a clear and unmistakable right to be protected from the enforcement of an irregular and persecutory decision. He further stated that he would suffer great,
irreparable injury, as his dismissal from service would "scandalize government service" in Negros Oriental.19

Ruling of the CA

In the first assailed Resolution20 dated January 11, 2018, the CA held that Roel successfully established his entitlement to the injunctive relief. The release of the
subject funds occurred in 2013, during the first term of Roel as governor. Considering that he was elected for another term during the 2013 elections, the CA held
that the condonation doctrine should have been applied.21 On this basis, the CA directed the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the OMB from implementing its decision to
dismiss Roel from government service:

WHEREFORE, finding the reasons stated therein to be of sufficient urgency, and so as not to render the reliefs prayed for in the Petition moot and academic pending
the resolution of petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order by Roel R.
Degamo is hereby GRANTED.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:

1) Let a Temporary Restraining Order be issued, effectively immediately (sic) and valid for sixty (60) days, enjoining and restraining herein respondents Office of
the Ombudsman Visayas and Department of the Interior and Local Government and their representatives from implementing, carrying out, or enforcing the 2
March 2017 Decision of public respondent Ombudsman.

Petitioner is DIRECTED to post a bond in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), within five (5) days from notice of this Resolution, failing
which, this Order shall automatically be deemed revoked;

2) The respondents are directed to file their Comment on the Petition (not a motion to dismiss) within ten (10) days from notice to which petitioner may file a
reply within five (5) days from receipt.

In their Comment on the Petition for Review, respondents shall likewise incorporate their Comment on petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and to show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted; and

3) The parties are directed to promptly notify this Court of any pending and/or subsequent filing of any case involving the same parties and issues.

SO ORDERED.22

Melliemoore then filed a Comment, which likewise sought the reconsideration of the CA Resolution dated January 11, 2018. Melliemoore argued that the OMB did
not err in finding substantial evidence against Roel, when he directed the release of public funds without a corresponding appropriation.23 She also assailed the
application of the condonation doctrine since Roel was not elected to the position of Governor, but merely succeeded to the office by operation of law. Melliemoore
also disagreed with the CA's resolution granting the TRO.24

The CA, in its second assailed Resolution25 dated March 7, 2018, did not find the comment and motion of Melliemoore meritorious. Thus, the CA issued the WPI
through the second assailed resolution, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:

1. DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of [Melliemoore];

2. GRANT the issuance of a [WPI] effective immediately upon the expiration of the [TRO] issued in this case enjoining the respondents, their officers and agents, and
all persons acting under them from enforcing and implementing the Decision dated 2 March 2017 in OMB-V-A-16-097, unless sooner revoked by this Court and/or
until the instant petition is resolved, under the same bond previously posted by petitioner in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

3. GRANT [Melliemoore's] Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment, praying for an extension of five (5) days from 25 January 2018 or until
30 January 2018;

4. GRANT [Melliemoore's] Manifestation with Second Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment, praying for a further extension of five (5)
days from 30 January 2018 or until 4 February 2018 to file the Comment;
5. NOTE [Melli moore's] Comment with Manifestation and Motion for Reconsideration (of the Court's Resolution dated January 11, 2018 and Issuance of [TRO])
and/or Motion to Recall [TRO];

6. DENY the Office of the Solicitor General's Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment praying for thirty (30) days from 25 January 2018 or until 24 February 2018
within which to file its Comment; and

7. DIRECT the parties to file their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Failure of which shall deem the Court to submit the instant
petition for decision.

SO ORDERED.26

Aggrieved, Melliemoore filed the present petition for certiorari with the Court. She alleges that the CA erred in granting the TRO and the WPI enjoining the OMB from
implementing its Decision dated March 2, 2017, primarily because the condonation doctrine does not apply to Roel. Since Roel was not "elected" to the governor
position in 2011, Melliemoore argues that his subsequent election in the 2013 midterm elections does not count as a re-election that would warrant the application
of the condonation doctrine. Furthermore, there being no vested right to a public office, the CA should not have granted the injunctive writs in Roel's favor.27

Roel, on the other hand, disputed the allegations in the petition. He asserts that he has a legal right over the office unless he is removed for cause. Roel also insists
that the CA properly applied the condonation doctrine in his favor.28

The Court is, therefore, confronted with the issue of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in enjoining the OMB
from implementing the decision dismissing Roel from government service.

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

The CA gravely abused its discretion

in issuing the injunctive relief in
favor of Roel, despite the absence of
a vested right and urgent necessity
to prevent serious damage.

For an injunctive writ to issue, there must be a showing that the applicant is entitled to the relief being demanded.29 This is one of the essential requisites of a writ of
preliminary injunction, which was explained in City Government of Butuan, et al. v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., et al. 30 as follows:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a
person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.

As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property
sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the
right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the
conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that
right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a
right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act
prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law.31 (Emphases ours)

Thus, in applying for the issuance of a TRO or a WPI, it was incumbent upon Roel to show first that he has a right clearly founded on or granted by law.

The Rules of Procedure of the OMB32 also explicitly state that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Pursuant to this, the OMB has the duty to
implement its decisions as a matter of course. An officer who refuses to comply with the order of the OMB may even be subjected to disciplinary action.33

The Court has recognized in Ombudsman v. Samaniego 34 that providing for the immediate execution of OMB decisions in administrative cases is a valid exercise of the
OMB's constitutionally-granted rule-making power. As a special rule that specifically applies to the OMB's administrative cases, it supersedes the general procedure
under Section 12,35 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

In this regard, the Court ruled in Samaniego that the issuance of an injunctive writ to stay the implementation of the OMB's decision is an encroachment on the part
of the CA on the rule-making power of the OMB.36 Following this ruling, the CA should not have issued the challenged TRO and WPI to enjoin the implementation of
Roel's dismissal from service. It should also be emphasized that there can be no vested interest or absolute right to an office. No less than the Constitution dictates
that "[p]ublic office is a public trust."37 As such, public service or office cannot be considered a property right.38
More importantly, the enforcement of the OMB's decision would not result in grave and irreparable injury to Roel. Neither is there an urgent necessity for the
issuance of an injunctive writ in order to prevent serious damage to Roel as a public officer. The respondent in an administrative case, who is meted with the
penalty of dismissal from the service, is considered under preventive suspension in the event that an appeal is made, and that appeal becomes successful. The
respondent official is also entitled to receive the salary and other emoluments not received by reason of the removal. 39

Verily, there is no basis for the issuance of a TRO or a WPI in favor of Roel. He did not have an absolute right to the office of the governor. There was also no urgent
necessity or serious, irreparable damage that would result in the immediate implementation of the OMB's decision because Roel is deemed under preventive
suspension during the pendency of his appeal with the CA. Should the CA grant his appeal, he would be paid the salary and monetary benefit accruing to his
position.40

Needless to state, the Court's decision in this case is limited to the question of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in the issuance of the challenged resolutions. The findings of the Court pertain only to the impropriety of the injunction against the implementation of the OMB's
Decision dated March 2, 2017 in OMB-V-A-16-1097, which found Roel liable for Grave Misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of Dismissal from the Service.
Thus, the Court, through this decision, cannot pre-empt the resolution of the other issues pending before the CA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated January 11, 2018 and the Resolution dated March 7,
2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 11422 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued
pursuant to these resolutions are DISSOLVED, and the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to proceed immediately with the resolution of respondent Roel R. Degamo's
appeal.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.