Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
IAC
G.R. No. 65295, March 10, 1987
Facts:
Respondent Dionisio had a shot or two of liquor in the dinner meeting with his boss.
On his way him, his car crashed against the petitioner’s dump truck.
He alleged that the car headlights suddenly failed and when it switched on again, on bright, the
dump truck was looming and was not able to avoid colliding against it.
Respondent suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
He filed an action for damages in CFI claiming that the proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which the Carbonel, the driver, had parked the dump truck.
Petitioner contended that proximate cause of Dionisio’s injuries was his own recklessness in driving
fast at the time of the accident while under the influence of liquor, without the headlights on and
without a curfew pass. Petitioner Phoenix also contended it exercised due rare in selection and
supervision of the dump truck driver.
CFI ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed with modification as to the award of damages. Both courts
held that negligence on the part of the driver and that the negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident and Dionisio’s injuries.
On appeal, petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in
which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause
determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. Petitioner also raised the “last clear
chance” doctrine, that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, Dionisio had the “last clear
chance” of avoiding the accident and hence, having failed to take that, he must bear his injuries
alone.
Issue:
WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was not the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel, with the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other
words.
Held:
Yes. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care."
We agree with the CFI and the IAC that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's
negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put
in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and
efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone
driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause.
What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent
manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed
a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk
the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as
to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dumptruck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man
must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Under Article2179, the
task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's —
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in
chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or
"immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent
acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental
importance are the nature of the negligent actor omission of each party and the character and gravity of
the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.
Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had
allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the
following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the
manner in which the dumptruck is parked when away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of
culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.