I.

Rule of Law
The essential requirements for the application of the Doctrine of Part-performance have been
provided for in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. These are the existence of a
written and registered sale deed made for the sale of an immovable property and for consideration,
duly executed. The possession of such property should be transferred to the transferee and in
order to get benefit under the contract partly performed, the transferee needs show his readiness
and willingness to perform his part in the contract. Further, the transferee needs to approach the
court with a clean conscience and bona fide intention while seeking a remedy of specific relief.

II. Facts of the Case

The plaintiff, late Ponnuswamy Nader filed two suits namely O.S. No. 704 of 1981 and O.S. No.
707 of 1981 in the Principal Subordinate Court, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu seeking specific
performance of two agreements dated 16.08.1980, i.e. the agreement to sell (Exhibit A5) and the
sale deed (Exhibit A6) signed with the defendants D1(Kuppathal) and D2(Nanjammal) in respect
of the suit property measuring at 3.09 and 2.35 acres.
The plaintiff submitted that the sale was made for a consideration of Rs 1,19,500/- and the sale
deed required the sale to be completed within a period of 4 months. To this end, the plaintiff
submitted that on 07.11.1980, he received 25 cents of the property i.e. item 2 in part performance
of the contract whereupon the plaintiff paid Rs 5000 to the defendants. The plaintiff further alleged
that the defendants on the same date had asked for an extension of ten months for harvesting the
sugarcane crops on the property. The above condition was agreed to by the plaintiff and to this
end, an endorsement in regard of the same was also made to the sale deed. Thereafter, again on
27.08.1981, a subsequent extension of 3 months was granted allegedly to allow the harvest of
sugarcane crops. The same was endorsed on the sale deed (Exhibit A5). The plaintiff had filed the
suit (O.S. No. 704 of 1980) against defendants D1and D2 to get possession of the suit property.
D1 and D2 had already transferred the property to defendants D3-D5 by a deed dated 27.03.1979,
The second suit O.S. 707 of 1981 was filed as a result against D1-D5 for specific performance and
injunction against interference in the property of the plaintiff who alleged that the deed dated
27.03.1980 had been fabricated to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further submitted
that he should get the benefit of the contract as throughout the transaction, he remained ready
and willing to perform his side of the contract. It was further alleged that defendants D9 to D12
entered into a contract for purchase of the suit property from the defendants, D3-D5 subsequently
also during the pendency of the above-mentioned suits and therefore were later impleaded as a
party. Plaintiff 1 died as on 22.06.1989 and thereafter his legal representatives, namely Plaintiff P2
and P3 were added to the suit.
The pleadings in respect of the suit were filed by all parties and in the written statement filed by
D4, it was submitted that the suit property had been sold by defendants D1 and D2 to D4 through
a sale dee dt. 27.03.1980 for a sale consideration of Rs 1,75,000/- and an advance of Rs 60,000
had been paid by him in furtherance of this sale deed. The absolute possession of the property
was however transferred to him in part performance of the contract. Thus, the defendant D4 has
enjoyed absolute possession of the property. D4 further submitted that he was a bona fide
purchaser of the property and had even published his acquisition of the suit property in the
newspaper “Malai Mahar”. Thereafter, a subsequent sale of the suit property was made in favor of
defendants D9 - D12 under five different sale deeds for a valid consideration of Rs 2,02,200/-.
The present suit has been filed by the plaintiff claiming rights over the suit property pleading the
application of the doctrine of part performance1 to his case and thus alleging that he was entitled
to the property as all the rights created subsequently were subject to his rights in the property2.

III. Judicial History

The present suit before the Supreme Court is an amalgamation of two suits tried together namely
O.S. No. 704 of 1981 and O.S. No. 707 of 1981. Before the Trial Court, the suit was decreed in
favor of the plaintiff and the property was declared to belong to Plaintiff P1. Aggrieved by this
decision, the defendants filed appeals namely A.S. Nos 646 and 647 in the High Court that were
allowed.
The single bench of the High Court decided in favor of the defendants and the sale deed of the
plaintiff dated 16.08.1980 was declared unenforceable. Against this judgement, the aggrieved
plaintiffs filed L.P.A. Nos. 30 and 31 of 1999. The Division Bench of the High Court decided in
favor of the plaintiffs and upheld the decree by the trial court.
The aggrieved defendants challenged this decree of the Division bench before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court through a Special Leave Petition3. The matters in A.S.Nos.646 and 647 of 1987
were remanded to a single bench of the High Court for hearing. The decision was made by the
learned single judge in favor of the defendants and the application under Article 136 was allowed.

IV. Issues before the Supreme Court

The main issues of contention relevant to the case are
a) whether the agreement for sale (exhibit A.5) and the sale deed (exhibit A.6) had been actually
executed by the defendants D1 to D3 as alleged by the plaintiff?
b) Whether the defendants had actually parted with the possession of property in favor of the
plaintiff?
c) Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform their part of the contract as per Exhibit
A.5 and Exhibit A.6?
d) Whether the defendants D4- D12 in the O.S. No. 704 of 1980 and defendants D6-D11 in O.S.
707 of 1981 are bona fide purchasers of the suit property i.e. for consideration and without
notice?

V. Holding and Reasoning

The High Court heard both parties to the suit proceedings.

4.1. Arguments tendered by the Appellants

The learned advocate argued that the trial court had erred in its findings in regard to the legitimacy
of the Ex. A.5 and Ex. A.6 as it had not taken all facts into consideration. It gave a finding that
the deed and the agreement to sell submitted by the defendants D1- D5 dated 27.03.1979 was
fabricated and on this basis alone Ex. A.5 and Ex. A.6 were held to be genuine documents. He
adduced evidence to weaken the case for the plaintiff showing that P1 had not come to the court
with clean hands and further that according to the evidence adduced and the facts proved before

1
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s 53-A.
2 Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s 48.
3 INDIA CONST. art. 136.
the court no possession of any part of the property could have been transferred to the plaintiff.
Lastly, the plaintiff has failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that due to all the reasons above, the
plaintiffs were not entitled to receive the benefit of the part-performance of the contract.

4.2. Arguments tendered by the Respondents

The advocate for the respondents argued that the trial court had rightly considered the evidence
and decided the documents submitted in furtherance of the sale deed and the agreement to sale
signed between defendants D1 & D2 and D4 on 27.03.1979 was fabricated. He further submitted
that the defendant had enough funds at his disposal for making the payment of the suit property
and was therefore ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Thus, the plaintiff was to
be allowed the possession of the suit property in part performance of the Contract.

4.3. Decision by the High Court

The Court declared that any application for specific relief can be made only by a person whose
claim is bona fide, made without suppression of any material fact. Thus, in the present case the
plaintiff was entitled to no benefit due to the doctrine of part performance.
It further noted that the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands. It declared that the
plaintiff had suppressed material facts that 25 cents of the suit property had been transferred to
him, as the suit property was never delimitated and according to the land documents (Adangal
Extracts for the fasil year) under cultivation of the sugarcane crop. Further, the Court reasoned
that the defendants would never have transferred any part of such property for the payment of a
paltry sum of 5000 made by the plaintiff which was less than 1/20th the value of the suit property.
Thus, the plaintiff never had any possession over the suit property.
It was further held that for the doctrine of part performance to apply there should be a readiness
and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. The Court clarified
the interpretation of the phrase to imply one who is ready to perform the essential terms of the
contract both in reference to his financial capacity as well as the conduct 4of the plaintiff seeking
performance.5 The plaintiff shall be required to prove both availability of funds for payment of
consideration as well as his readiness and willingness in context of performance of the contract.6
In the present case the plaintiff failed to prove either of the two essential requirements. The Court
reported
“Further, a perusal of Ex.A.29 would also make it clear that the plaintiffs were not having the means to pay the
balance sale consideration at the time of execution of Exs.A.5 and A.6 or later.”7
The Court further clarified that such plea that the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his
part in the contract can be taken even by a subsequent transferee8. Therefore, it was decided that
in reference to the present appeal filed by the subsequent transferee, defendant D4, the plaintiff
was not entitled to the possession of the property.
It was further declared by the Court that the plaintiff had failed to prove the validity of Exhibits
A.5 and A.6 as well as the documents for extension. Since, for the application of the doctrine of

4 Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (2005) 6 SCC 243 (SC).

5 M/S J.P. Builders & Anr. vs A. Ramadas Rao & Anr. (2011) 1 SCC 429 (SC); Coromandel Indag Products Pvt. Ltd. v.
Garuda Chit & Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 8 SCC 601 (SC).
6 N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr.R. Jagan Mohan Rao (1995) 5 SCC 115 (SC).
7 K.Raju & Ors. v. P. Ramalingam & Ors. LQ 2014 HC 15048 (HC)
8 Ram Awadh through Legal Representatives & Ors. vs Achbalbar Dubey & Anr. (2000) 2 SCC 428 (SC).
part performance, a registered sale deed is a necessary requirement9, in the present case the
transferee has no claim to the property. Moreover, the subsequent transferees were declared to be
bona fide purchasers and thus the suit was liable to be dismissed.

4.4. Decision of the Supreme Court

In the SLP filed against the decree of the High Court, it upheld the appreciation of evidence as
well as the conclusion reached by the High Court. However, the Apex Court declared that the
plaintiff be entitled to a compensation of Rs 5,00,000 in the interest of justice.

VI. Critical Analysis

In the instant case, the Courts have clearly laid down and discussed the essential requirements for
the application of the principle of part-performance. These are the requirement of a registered sale
deed, the contract must be for consideration, the transferee must have done something in
furtherance of the contract and should be ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
The transferee further needs to be in possession of the property in question and the transferee
cannot exercise the right over such property when it has been sold subsequently to a bona fide
transferee. The Court elaborates on each requirement and provides adept reasoning to back the
findings relating to the re-appreciation of evidence.
In the present case the scope of discretion of court is carved out as an exception in reference to
the remedy of specific relief. It has been declared that under Sec. 2010 that in all cases where in the
interests of justice the Court is required to refuse granting the remedy of specific relief because it
may cause undue hardship to the other party, the Court may decide to do so.11 However, the same
judgement shall be required to be guided by reasonable judicial considerations and cannot be
exercised arbitrarily12.
Thus, in the present case, the Court decided that plaintiffs were not entitled to the specific relief
of injunction claimed by them as they could neither prove the existence of a registered sale deed
nor was it satisfactorily proved that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract. Moreover, the plaintiff had no possession over the property. Lastly, the subsequent
purchasers in possession have been proved to be bona fide transferees and a decision to grant the
property in favor of the plaintiff would cause severe hardships to the defendants already in
possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit was rightly decreed and dismissed.

9 Vasanthi v. Venugopal AIR 2017 SC 1569 (SC).

10 Specific Relief Act 1963, s 20(2).
11 Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. (1999) 5 SCC 77 (SC).
12 Sardar Singh v. Krishna Devi (1994) 4 SCC 18 (SC).