SABIO VS GORDON

Posted by kaye lee on 9:17 PM

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO
v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al. 
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006, 
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)

[Congress Power of Inquiry]

FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners  to appear as resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same
time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting
all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding.

RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only
to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees.  Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the
committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal.  The Court’s high  regard  to  such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v.  Ermita, where it categorically ruled that  “the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch.”  Verily, the Court reinforced the
doctrine in Arnault   that  “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation,  is a proper subject for investigation” and  that “the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with
Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the
Congress’ power of inquiry.  This cannot be countenanced.  Nowhere in the
Constitution is any provision granting such exemption.   The Congress’ power of inquiry,
being broad,  encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws
as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.

Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, February
11, 2014
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions seeking to declare several provisions of R.A. No. 10175
(The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners
claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL INSOFAR AS THEY REGARD CERTAIN ACTS AS CRIMES AND IMPOSE
PENALTIES FOR THEIR COMMISSION AS WELL AS WOULD ENABLE GOVERNMENT TO
TRACK DOWN AND PENALIZE VIOLATORS
 
RULING:
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access is NOT unconstitutional.
 Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should
thus be struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional
construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class
of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification that
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden
is on the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing
with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
Hing vs. Choachuy

FACTS:
 Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s)
filed a case for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order against the Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s
constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy the walls of their
building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence.  So in order to get
evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance
cameras facing the Hing’s property. Their employees even took pictures of the said
construction of the fence. The Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s for
violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued a order granting the
application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video
surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals and  the RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the
case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s

violated the Hing’s right to privacy.

HELD:
Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1)
prohibiting the “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business
office and not a residence, the owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access.

Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College GR No 202666 29 September  2014

Facts: This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu City; wherein, the
students involved posted pictures on their Facebook account of them wearing wearing
no shirt, but only brassieres from waist up. Said photos were taken while they were
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party. The said photos were reported to the
STC’s computer teacher, named Mylene Rheza Escudero. Escudero asked several of her
students to show her other photos of Julia and Julianne, above-mentioned graduating
students, they saw photos of: them along the streets of Cebu wearing clothing which
shows their black brassieres; them drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar (Private property OUTSIDE school premises); and that their Facebook accounts were
accessible to any Facebook user.
Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the school authorities. The
poor students involved were investigated and were barred to attend their highschool
graduation rites which is experienced by a person once in their lifetime.
A petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data was also filed. Petitioners (Parents
of the students involved) assert that the privacy of the children were unlawfully
invaded. Since the Facebook accounts of the children are set at “Friends Only”; That the
photos were owned by the ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Old hag, however, violated this by saving digital copies and subsequently
showed them to the STC’s officials.
RTC issued the writ and directed the respondents to file their verified written return
within 5 working days from service of the writ.
Respondent denied the petitioners allegation, among others, because there can be no
violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on
Facebook.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data.

Issue: Whether the writ of habeas data is a proper remedy?

Decision: No.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.
THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY CONFINED TO CASES OF EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS
AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES.

Ramirez vs. CA G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private
respondent in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.” In support
of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00,
in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information
on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a
violation of R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA declared the RTC’s order null and void, and
holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of
the party is a violation of R.A. 4200.

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,”
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly
record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent
to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of the qualifier “any”. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Constitutional Law – Right to Free Speech, Public Figure) 
FACTS: Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the production
and filming of the projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution”, which relates to
the non-bloody change of government that took place at EDSA, for its unlawful intrusion
upon the former’s right to privacy.
Petitioners contends that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of
speech and expression; and the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public
interest and concern and not on the individual private life of respondent senator.
ISSUE: WON the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech.
HELD: Yes. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of
public interest. Private respondent is a public figure due to his participation in the
culmination of the change of government. The right of privacy of the a “public figure” is
necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
 

F. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, Petitioner, – versus - RAUL M.

GONZALES, Respondent. G.R. No. 168338, EN BANC, February 15, 2008, PUNO, C.J.

FACTS:
On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was
planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wiretapping. On June 8, 2005,
respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that
those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to
arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was
being committed in their presence. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued a press release
giving fair warning to radio and television owners/operators to observe anti-wiretapping
law and pertinent circulars on programstandards. The acts of respondents are alleged to
be violations of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern. Respondents denied that the acts
transgress the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005
warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the
President and other personalities constitute unconstitutional prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. (YES)

RULING:
The Supreme Court applied the Content-based restriction test and ruled that
respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. With
respect to content-based restrictions, the government must show the type of harm the
speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the
imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior
restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but
only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality
already on ground. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present
danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the
following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to
discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. The records of the
case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short
of satisfying the clear and present danger test. There is no showing that the feared
violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.

Soriano vs. La Guardia G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009 Freedom of Speech
JANUARY 26, 2018

FACTS:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating
Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the
MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),
against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M.
Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC
and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:

Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as
petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue

curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent
punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights,
the public trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to
regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its
primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There
are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS M. ROMERO

III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R. CANLAS, Petitioners,
v. SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, EMPLOYMENT
AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, Respondents. G.R. NO. 174105, EN BANC,
April 2, 2009, VELASCO, JR., J

FACTS:
Petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee
an invitation, signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, the Committee on Labor,
Employment and Human Resources Development chaired by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito
Estrada will conduct a public hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the 23rd day of August 2006 at The
inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible
amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to
craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter petitioner Romero
II requested to be excused from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its
scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS)
Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 his request, being unmeritorious, was denied Senator
Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad
testificandum on petitioner Romero II directing him to appear and testify before the
Committee at its hearing on September 4, 2006 relative to the aforesaid Senate
resolutions. On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as G.R.
No. 174105, seeking to bar the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin
it from compelling petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus
issued. Observing that the Senate's motives in calling for an investigation in aid of
legislation were a political question. The respondents averred that the subject matter of
the investigation focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and the purpose of
the probe was to aid the Senate determine the propriety of amending Republic Act No.
8042 or The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting laws to protect OWWA funds in
the future.

ISSUES: Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee's inquiry is subjudice? (NO)
HELD:
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into
the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.
Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or administrative
action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose inquiries in
aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to
gather information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether
there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the
inquiry need not result in any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not
preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation. [T]he mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically
bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be
made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation. All pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and
it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time when
the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant
to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

EMILIO M. R. OSMEÑA and PABLO P. GARCIA, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. 132231,EN BANC, March 31, 1998, MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of §11(b) of R.A.
No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from selling or
giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes,
except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the
forthcoming elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmeña is candidate for President of the
Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking
reelection. They contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v.
Commission on Elections" have called into question the validity of the very premises of
that [decision]." NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against
claims that it abridged freedom of speech and of the press. In urging a reexamination of
that ruling, petitioners claim that experience in the last five years since the decision in
that case has shown the "undesirable effects" of the law because "the ban on political
advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, [but] actually worked to the
grave disadvantage of the poor candidate[s]" by depriving them of a medium which they
can afford to pay while their more affluent rivals can always resort to other means of
reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills. No empirical data
have been presented by petitioners to back up their claim, however. Argumentation is
made at the theoretical and not the practical level. Indeed, petitioners do not complain
of any harm suffered as a result of the operation of the law. They do not complain that
they have in any way been disadvantaged as a result of the ban on media advertising.
Their contention that, contrary to the holding in NPC, §11(b) works to the disadvantage
of candidates who do not have enough resources to wage a campaign outside of mass
media can hardly apply to them. TWhat petitioners seek is not the adjudication of a case
but simply the holding of an academic exercise. And since a majority of the present
Court is unpersuaded that its decision in NPC is founded in error, it will suffice for
present purposes simply to reaffirm the ruling in that case. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case of NPC v. COMELEC, which upheld the validity of §11(b)
of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged freedom of speech and of the press, is
founded in error. (NO)
RULING: [W]e have undertaken to revisit the decision in NPC v. COMELEC in order to
clarify our own understanding of its reach and set forth a theory of freedom of speech. I.
No Ad Ban, Only a Substitution of COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time for the
Advertising Page and Commercials in Mass Media The term political "ad ban," when
used to describe §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as §11(b) prohibits the
sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the
COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media.
There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of
advertising. x x x Here, x x x there is no total ban on political ads, much less restriction
on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space and air time can be
controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor candidates,
there is a substantial or legitimate governmental interest justifying exercise of the
regulatory power of the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution.

Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression

FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias,

manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano
Fugoso, to compel the
latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov
16, 1947. The
petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the
respondent refused
to issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing
groups, remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith
and confidence of
the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public
order.” Respondent
based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against
public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession,
tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is
Sec. 1119, Free
use of Public Place.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence
violating freedom of
assembly.

HELD: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech,
and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not
absolute. They can
be regulated under the state’s police power – that they should not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or society.
The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the
City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the
City of Manila;
and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or
public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of
the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing
to minimize the
risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to
authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government
no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps
in cases of national
emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places
and not for the
assembly itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down.
Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground
to believe that
the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in
CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority
Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. L-1800
January 27, 1948

FACTS:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent Mayor
Fugoso to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress
of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the Mayor Fugoso in his
defense for refusing the permit is, “that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing
upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of
public order.”
Mayor Fugoso also invoked the delegated police power to local government. The
Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila. The Municipal Board is also granted the following legislative
powers, to wit: “(p) to provide for the prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays,
disturbances and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues, . . .
parks, cemeteries and other public places” and “for the abatement of nuisances in the
same,” and “(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants.”
Section 844 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against public
peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor,
“any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or
excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose;
or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly.” Included
herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

HELD:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion
to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The
right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets
or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second
construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use
of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power
may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency.
The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from
the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., Petitioner –versus- ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN. GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, BRIG GEN. ARTHUR
ANG, CAMP AGUINALDO CAMP COMMANDER, and LT. COL. HAROLD CABUNOC, AFP
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CHIEF, Respondents G.R. No. 214986, SECOND DIVISION,
February 15, 2017, LEONEN, J.

FACTS: Jeffrey Laude was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year old US
Marine Private Joseph Scott Pemberton. Police had not been able to obtain Pemberton'
s latent fingerprints and oral swabs, because he was confined by his superiors on a ship
and placed under their custody. Pemberton was eventually transferred from his ship to
a facility in the headquarters of the AFP. However, Philippine authorities maintained
that until a case was filed against Pemberton, custody over him remained with the
United States of America. News broke out that Pemberton had been flown into Camp
Aguinaldo. Respondents state that petitioner, with his clients, forced their way inside
the premises of the Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board and gained entry
despite having been instructed by Military Police personnel not to enter the compound,
and even though the gates were closed. As narrated by respondents, petitioner
fomented disorder by inciting his clients to scale the perimeter fence, to see Pemberton.
Respondents allege that the foregoing events are of public knowledge, having been
subject of various national television, radio, internet, and print media publications.
Respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner, before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. On the same day, respondent Cabunoc called a conference at Camp
Aguinaldo, and publicly announced that a disbarment complaint had been filed against
petitioner. Respondent Cabunoc also distributed a press statement, which reads: Press
Statement: AFP files disbarment complaint against Atty. Harry Roque; Petitioner alleges
that this press statement was reported on, and generously quoted from, by media.
Petitioner asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section 18, Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court. Further, petitioner claims that respondents' acts put to
question his professional and personal reputation. Respondents argue that the press
statements are not among the contumacious acts prescribed under Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. The subject of the disbarment case pertains to a serious breach of
security of a military zone. The statements were official statements made in the
performance of a public function to address a public concern. The circumstances, which
led to the filing of the disbarment complaint and the acts alleged therein were
witnessed by the public and duly reported by the media. The filing of the disbarment
case was not meant to malign petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to the
events that transpired at Camp Aguinaldo. Respondents also claim the issue is a matter
of public interest, which is a defense in contempt proceedings such as this. With the
Laude Murder case being of public concern, petitioner has attained the status of a public
figure, susceptible of public comment in connection with his actions on the case. In any
case, respondents instituted the disbarment complaint against petitioner in good faith.
They are laymen, and are not familiar with the confidentiality rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is contempt of court. (NO)

RULING: The power to punish for contempt should be invoked only to ensure or
promote the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether
to declare as contumacious alleged violations of the confidentiality rule, we apply a
restrictive interpretation. Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule:
first, respondents' supposed public threats of filing a disbarment case against him, and
second, respondents' public statement that they had filed a disbarment complaint.
Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for releasing a
subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against
petitioner. The statements were official statements made in the performance of
respondents' official functions to address a matter of public concern. It was the
publication of an institutional action in response to a serious breach of security.
Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for
responding publicly to such public actions. This Court will not freely infringe on the
constitutional right to freedom of expression. It may interfere, on occasion, for the
proper administration of justice. However, the power of contempt should be balanced
with the right to freedom of expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling
comment on public matters. Freedom of expression must always be protected to the
fullest extent possible. The question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree (Schenck vs.
U.S., supra). The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in
cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of
expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There
must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the
freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of
grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to
restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against
contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325.)

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING

CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, Mendoza,J.

FACTS: Comelec sought to enforce Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven
(7) days before an election.” Petitioners brought an action for prohibition to enjoin
Comelec from enforcing such provision, claiming that it constitutes a prior restraint on
the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraints.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment

of freedom of speech, expression and the press. (YES)

RULING: The Court applied the O’Brien Test under, under which even if a law furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such
governmental interest is not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Moreover,
even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should
nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is
necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. Applying the O’Brien Test
in this case, the Court ruled that Section 5.4 is invalid, because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
the suppression of freedom of expression. Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General,
the prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only
for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but
the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It
constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because
it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and
seven (7) days immediately before a local election.

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:
                Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the
OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to
their residence in their applications as new voters in Burauen, Leyte.
                The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.
                Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since
1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the
house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be
conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding
Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the
prosecution of the same.

Issue: WON due process was violated.

Held: No.
First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched
in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for
violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the
election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from
those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the
COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as
contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC,
notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be
covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by
the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were
based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s
Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
Complaint or Information.

Adiong Vs Comelec

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant
to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts
Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. â€” The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be
posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section
21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in
any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
common posted areas and/or billboards…
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections
assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of
Republic Act No. 6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.

HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No.
2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of
the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is
DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers
on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by
the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly
infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation
strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on
his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in
the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private
property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing
regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in
the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article
III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of
regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification
on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The
burden is not met in this case.)

SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner, -versus- CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING

SYSTEM, INC. and PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE, INC., Respondents. G.R. No.
162272, SECOND DIVISION, April 7, 2009, TINGA, J.
FACTS:
Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and Peoples Broadcasting
Service, Inc. (PBS) were incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both are involved
in the operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the
grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of two laws, RA No. 7477 and RA No. 7582.
RA No. 7477, granted PBS a legislative franchise to construct, install, maintain and
operate radio and television stations within the Philippines for a period of 25 years. RA
No. 7582 extended CBSs previous legislative franchise to operate radio stations for
another 25 years. The CBS and PBS radio networks are two of the three networks that
comprise the wellknown Bombo Radyo Philippines. Section 9 of RA No. 7477 and
Section 3 of RA No. 7582 contain a common provision predicated on the constitutional
mandate to democratize ownership of public utilities. The NTC issued 4 Provisional
Authorities to PBS and 6 Provisional Authorities to CBS, allowing them to install, operate
and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various locations throughout the
nation. These Provisional Authorities were issued between 1993 to 1998, or after the
enactment of RA No. 7477 and RA No. 7582. Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two
complaints both dated 1 March 1999 with the NTC, respectively lodged against PBS and
CBS. He alleged that he was "the actual and beneficial owner of 12% of the shares of
stock" of PBS and CBS separately, and that despite the provisions in RA No. 7477 and RA
No. 7582 mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of PBS and
CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering. Thus, Divinagracia commonly argued
in his 709 complaints that the failure on the part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the
mandate of their legislative franchise is a misuse of the franchise conferred upon it by
law and it continues to exercise its franchise in contravention of the law to the
detriment of the general public and of complainant who are unable to enjoy the
benefits being offered by a publicly listed company." On 1 August 2000, the NTC issued a
consolidated decision dismissing both complaints. The NTC ruled that it was not
competent to render a ruling on that issue, the same being more properly the subject of
an action for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. After the NTC
had denied Divinagracia’s motion for reconsideration, he filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals. On 18 February 2004, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision upholding the NTC. The appellate court agreed
with the earlier conclusion that the complaints were indeed a collateral attack on the
legislative franchises of CBS and PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper
mode to thresh out the issues raised in the complaints. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether quo warranto exists as an available and appropriate remedy against the
wrong imputed on private respondents.
(YES) RULING: Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
public office, position or franchise." Even while the action is maintained in the name of
the Republic, the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence such
action upon complaint, and upon good reason to believe that any case specified under
Section 1 of Rule 66 can be established by proof. The special civil action of quo warranto
is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any person to show by
what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. It is settled that
"[t]he determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to
enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the
prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the
State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a
public wrong and not a private injury." A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be
declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise
is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government. Quo
warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a government
corporation has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise. If the
courts conclude that private respondents have violated the terms of their franchise and
thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to cancel any
existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw strength from the possession of a
valid franchise. If the point has not already been made clear, then licenses issued by the
NTC such as CPCs and provisional authorities are junior to the legislative franchise
enacted by Congress. The licensing authority of the NTC is not on equal footing with the
franchising authority of the State through Congress. The issuance of licenses by the NTC
implements the legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same manner that
the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather than creates its own laws.
And similar to the inability of the executive branch to prevent the implementation of
laws by Congress, the NTC cannot, without clear and proper delegation by Congress,
prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by withholding or cancelling the licenses of
the franchisee.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEALTH

SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, et al. G.R. NO. 173034, October 09, 2007, J.
Austria-Martinez

FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino.
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect
to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a
code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. The DOH issued the assailed RIRR which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Petitioner, representing its members that are
manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk
substitutes found under Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 2006-0012 (RIRR) should be
struck down. (YES)

RULING: The advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within
the ambit of the term commercial speech-that is, speech that proposes an economic
transaction. This is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level
of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but
is nonetheless entitled to protection. An American jurisprudence provided a four-part
analysis for evaluating the validity of regulations of commercial speech: (1) The
commercial speech must concern lawful acitivity and not be misleading; (2) The asserted
governmental interest must be substantial. If both of these requirements are met, it
must next be determined whether the state regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest. Applying the test in the case at bar, first, it is not claimed that the
advertisement at issue is an unlawful activity or is inaccurate. In fact, both the
International Code and the Milk Code recognize and concede that there are instances
when breastmilk substitutes may be necessary. The absolute ban on advertising is
unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed governmental
interest of promoting the health of infants and young children. It ought to be self-
evident, for instance, that the advertisement of such products which are strictly
informative cuts too deep on free speech. The laudable concern of the respondent for
the promotion of the health of infants and young children cannot justify the absolute,
overarching ban.

Gonzales vs Katigbak
FEBRUARY 24, 2015 | KAAARINA
Gonzales vs Katigbak
G.R. No. 69500, July 22, 1985
Facts: The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim, was classified “For Adults Only.”
The main objection was the classification of the film as “For Adults Only.” For
petitioners, such classification “is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as
impermissible restraint of artistic expression.  The film is an integral whole and all its
portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential
for the integrity of the film.  Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague
speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.”
Issue: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion in classifying said film as “For Adults
Only.”
Held: No. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari solely on the ground that there
are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the
classification of Kapit sa Patalim as “For Adults Only.”
Principles found:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication
of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse.  Their effects on the
perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as
well as the prevailing cultural traits is considerable. Press freedom, as
stated in the opinion of the Court, “may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment.”[12]This is not to say that such freedom, as is the
freedom of speech, absolute.  It can be limited if “there be a ‘clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech
or free press.  If it were so, then such basic rights are emasculated.  It is,
however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua nonfor the
meaningful exercise of such right.  This is not to deny that equally basic is
the other important aspect of freedom from liability.  Nonetheless, for the
purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom from
censorship.  It is, beyond question, a well-settled principle in our juris-
diction.
3. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be
limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character
that the State has a right to prevent.  Such danger must not only be clear
but also present.  There should be no doubt that what is feared may be
traced to the expression complained of.  The causal connection must be
evident.  Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its
imminence.  The time element cannot be ignored.  Nor does it suffice if
such danger be only probable.  There is the requirement of its being well-
nigh inevitable.
4. The law, however, frowns on obscenity.
Case Digest: Daez vs Court of Appeals  G.R. No. 133507,          Feb 17, 2000,325 SCRA
856 (2000)
 
Issue:
Whether or not  land owner can still exercise their right of retention over subject 4.1685
hectares rice land despite the fact that a previous decision denying petition for
exemption under Presidential Decree 27 had long been executory.

Facts:
Daez was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Soriente, Macatulad,  Mediana and 
Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation
Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 as amended by Letter of
Instruction Armed with an affidavit, allegedly signed under duress by the respondents,
stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers,  Daez applied for the
exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as
for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents. The application of the
petitioner was denied. Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27
having been finally denied her, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same
rice land, this time under R.A. No. 6657.

On March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed  Daez to
retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to
retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct
management thereof as required by law. They appealed to DAR Secretary.

DAR Secretary affirmed the decision of the regional director. They appealed to the
Office of the President (OP).

Office of the President ruled in favor of Daez or her heirs and rendered judgment
authorizing the retention of the 4.1685 hectares of land. The application of the children
was still denied. Hence the appeal in CA.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Office of the President.

Held:
YES. Petitioner heirs of  Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject
4.1685 riceland.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform 23 , we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their
retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A.
No. 6657 24 . We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a
landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously
filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the
retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. 25 Otherwise, he is only entitled
to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, 
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even
the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. What must be
protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen
to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features.

Borjal v. CA
GR No. 126466
January 14, 1999

Facts:
Arturo Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Maximo Soliven was the
publisher and chairman of its editorial board. Borjal was among the regular writers
of The Philippien Star who runs the column Jaywalker. The case stems from the articles
written in Jaywalker, which called a certain organizer of a conference a self-proclaimed
hero.
Around that time, the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) was
organized. Its objective was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term
land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference was estimated
to cost around Php1,815,000, which would be funded through solicitations from various
sponsors. Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected as Executive Director of
the FNCLT. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business committee to
support the conference.
The Jaywalkercontained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters and other
defamatory statements. However, none of these articles named the organizer nor the
conference referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one talked about in the article,
filed a case of libel against Borjal, Soliven, and others. The trial court as well as the
appellate court found the accused guilty of libel.
Issue:
Were the courts a quo correct in convicting the accused of libel?
Ruling:
No. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although
it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at
least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. In the
case at bar, these requisites were not complied with.
Even Wenceslao admitted that he had doubts whether he was really the organizer
referred to in the articles. In fact, he admitted that there were several organizers and
that he spoke to Borjal to inquire if he was the one talked about in the articles.
Identification is grossly inadequate when even the victim is unsure that he was the
object of the attack.
The other errors revolve around the issue of whether the articles constitute privileged
communications.
The Supreme Court agrees that the articles are not within the exceptions of Article 354,
but this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The enumeration under
Article 354 is not exclusive. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged. The conference is one imbued with public interest, and Wenceslao is a public
figure. The rule is that discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable,
but it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.
Honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from
libel judgments.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition
against respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized
by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as
authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the
benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent
does not contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was
only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took
advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the
Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the
Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they
thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.’

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent

A.M. No. P-02-1651      August 4, 2003

Facts:

Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living
with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a
son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the
judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.

According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society.
They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

Held:

No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and
sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG
has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has
used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus
the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the
law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Everson v. Board of Education

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Everson (Petitioner), in his status as a taxpayer,

filed suit challenging the ability of the Respondent, Board of Education (Respondent), to
reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the transportation of their
children to and from school.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition that, while no law
respecting an establishment of religion will stand under the United States Constitution
(Constitution), neutral laws, which afford benefits to children will be upheld.
Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed suit challenging the ability of the
Respondent to reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students for the
transportation of their children to and from school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging
that the New Jersey reimbursement statute respects the establishment of religion, by
allowing the parents of parochial school students to benefit from the reimbursement
scheme. The New Jersey Court of Appeals held that the statute did not violate the
Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted
certiorari to consider the issue.

Issue. This case considers whether the parents of parochial school children can benefit
from the same services afforded to the parents of public school children.

Held. Affirmed.
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found the statute
was not unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a benefit to the parents of
all school children, distinct from any religious function in which the children engaged.

Dissent. The dissents of Justice Robert Jackson (J. Jackson) and Justice Wiley Rutledge (J.
Rutledge) stand for strict adherence to the establishment clause.

Discussion. It is important to understand, in striking down the Establishment Clause

challenge, the Supreme Court highlights the fact that funds cannot be commingled
when they are reimbursed only for transportation costs already expended. Thus,
because there is no possibility of funding parochial activities in themselves, the statute
is allowed to stand.

Lemon v. Kurtzman

Brief Fact Summary. The state reimburses parochial schools for certain expenses
associated with the education of its children.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. To be valid, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose,
must not advance or inhibit religion, and must not excessively entangle church and
state.
Facts. Pennsylvania has a statute that reimburses religious schools for teacher salaries,
textbooks, and other instructional materials. Rhode Island has a similar statute that
allows the state to pay private school teachers a 15% salary supplement.

Issue. Is it constitutional for the state to provide financial assistance to religious schools
for the cost of teaching secular subjects?

Held. No. The statutes result in excessive entanglement between the government and
religion. Excessive entanglement is determined by the character and purpose of the
institution benefited, the nature of the aid given, and the resulting relationship between
the government and church.
Discussion. The framers of the United States Constitution specifically and purposefully
prohibited the establishment of a state church because of the inherent problems. The
Establishment Clause was designed to avoid state “sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”

EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO and SHERYL G. SEE, Petitioners vs HON.

LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, and RICARDO V. PARAS III, in
his capacity as Chief State Counsel, CRISTINO L. NAGUIAT, JR. and the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents G.R. No. 197930, EN BANC, APRIL 17, 2018, REYES, JR., J.:

FACTS: The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against
former DOJ Secretary Delima for her issuance of DOJ circular no. 41. Series of 2010,
known as the “Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and
Implementation of Hold DepartureOrders (HDO), Watch list Orders (WLO) and Allow
Departure Orders (ADO)” . The Petitioners questions the constitutionality of this DOJ
circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel. The petitioners
in these consolidated cases are former President Arroyo and her husband, and Efraim
and Erwin Genuino. Former DOJ Secretary De lima issued HDO and WLO against
petitioners on the ground that criminal charges of plunder, qualified theft and violation
of the Omnibus Election Code were filed against them. Petitioners, particularly Spouses
Arroyo, file temporary restraining order against the issued HDO and WLO of DOJ seeking
relief and grant from court to allow them to travel so that former president Arroyo may
seek medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief sought on a condition that
petition will file a bond of PhP2M, an undertaking that petitioners shall report to
Philippine consulate in the countries they are to visit (Germany, Singapore, USA, Italy,
Spain and Austria) and shall appoint a representative to receive on their behalf
subpoena, orders and other 641 legal processes. Petitioners complied all the conditions
instead of following the order of the court, DOJ caused for the refusal to process the
petitioners travel documents. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issued DOJ circular 41 infringes the constitutional rights of
the petitioners to travel and thus an ultra vires to the constitution.

RULING: The constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation; it is deemed written in every statute and contract. If a law or administrative rule
violates any norm of the constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In
this case, the right to travel is a guarantee of the constitution under the Bill of rights.
There are allowable restrictions in the exercise of this right which are for the interest of
national security, public safety or public health as may be provided by law. The ground
of the respondent in the issuance of DOJ circular 41 is for the petitioners to be present
during the preliminary investigation of their cases which is outside the allowable
restrictions provided by the constitution, hence, it is ultra vires and has no effect.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 99-9-141-MTCC November 25, 1999

HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER ISSUED BY JUDGE FELIPE M. ABALOS, MTCC - BRANCH 1,

DIPOLOG CITY IN CRIMINAL CASES Nos. 15521 & 15522, petitioner,
vs.
ME, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Felipe M. Abalos, who was the Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in the
Cities (MTCC) of Dapitan and Dipolog issued an order dated November 20, 1998
directing the Bureau of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List a certain Fe
Cagatan, accused in a bouncing checks case pending before his court. The Hold
Departure Order (HDO) was referred to the Court Administrator by the Justice Secretary
citing a court circular which provides that an HDO may be issued only by a Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction. Required to Comment,
Judge Abalos stated that it was an "honest inadvertence" since he was busy with his
cases in both cities "which may have caused a little confusion." The Court Administrator
recommended that Judge Abalos be reprimanded and be advised to keep abreast of
court issuances.

The Court finds the recommendation to be well-taken. SC Circular 39-97 dated June 19,
1997, as correctly cited by the Justice Secretary "limits the authority to issue hold
departure orders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive
jurisdiction" (Hold Departure Order issued by Judge Eusebio Barot, MCTC, Branch 2,
Aparri, Calayan, Cagayan, A.M. 99-8-108-MCTC, August 25, 1999 — en banc Resolution
per J. Mendoza). Considering that only the RTC is mentioned in said Circular and by
applying the rule on legal hermeneutics of express mention implied exclusion, courts
lower than the RTC — such as the MeTC, MTC, MTCC and MCTC — has no authority to
issue hold departure orders in criminal cases.

The excuse proffered by the judge herein contradicts the norm enshrined in the Code of
judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence (Canon 3, Rule 3.01). Judges should be diligent in keeping abreast with
developments in law and jurisprudence, and regard the study of law as never ending
and ceaseless process (Re: Hold departure order Dated April 13, 1998 issued by Judge
Juan C. Nartatez, MTCC-Branch 3, Davao City, A.M. No. 98-10-141-MTCC, November 18,
1998).

WHEREFORE, Judge Felipe M. Abalos is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that a

repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and DeLeon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Legaspi vs. CSC G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who
were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and
Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil
service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said
information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is
asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the
civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It
has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is
one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a

public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the
right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress

for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

CASE DIGEST : VALMONTE vs BELMONTE

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY
DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO
BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL,
petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for
failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of
public interest."

 ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon
GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

 HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is
apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke
their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the
loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those
holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny.

Government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or

governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to
the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are
afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.

Case Brief: Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

JANUARY 23, 2018 JEFF REY
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten
year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time
the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death
penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason
to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the
requirements for its imposition.
RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The
mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of
Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the
Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of
Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending
that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive
Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later
impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the
parties to mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo
and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in
question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR
filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that
the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics
showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have
become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is
cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being
an undue delegation of legislative power
HELD:
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION
19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and
each department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is :
potestas delegata non delegari potest.” (what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized
exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the
subject of lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing
complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability
of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, ET AL. G.R. No. 130716, FIRST DIVISION, DECEMBER 9,
1998, PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: Francisco Chavez, in invoking his constitutional right to information, demanded

that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses'
ill-gotten wealth. He claimed that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten
wealth involves an issue of paramount public interest since it has a debilitating effect on
the country’s economy that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the
Filipino people. The PCGG, while admitting that a compromise is in the works, claimed
that Chavez’s action is premature, since the proposed terms and conditions of the
agreements have not become effective and binding.

ISSUE: May the PCGG be required to reveal the proposed terms of compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth?

RULING: Yes.The recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a
public character. The assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the
government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people.
Thus, there is no question that Chavez has a right to PCGG's disclosure of any agreement
that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. The
question that remains is whether the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access
to information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement.
Reviewing the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the Court held that it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives,
to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided
to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during
the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in
the exploratory stage.

 
In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court
officials and employees aswitnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and
the various letters for the Impeachment ProsecutionPanel dated January 19 and 25,
2012
Facts:
 During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the
prosecution Panel manifested in aCOMPLIANCE that it would present about 100
witnesses which included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Courtofficials and
employees who will testify on matters internal to the Court and almost a thousand
documents. Letters (from letters of Hon. Abaya, Congressman and
Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager, in behalf of theHouse Impeachment Panel)
were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records, and the issuance of
certifiedtrue copies of the rolls and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations of
various cases decided by the SC forpurposes of the -Impeachment Complaint.
In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court ruling and based on the
Constitution, the pertinent laws and of the Court’s rules and policies, we shall now
determine how the Court will comply with the subpoenas and theletters of the
Prosecution Impeachment Panel.

DISCUSSION:Judicial Privilege

 
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence prohibiting the revelation of
confidential or “secret”
information that causes damage to public interest even in judicial and other proceedings
such as the
sui generis
impeachment trial. As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials involved
in all proceedings are duty-bound to observe the privileged communication and
confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration of justicewere to be preserved
 –
 
i.e.,
not even Members of the Court, on their own and without the consent of the
SupremeCourt, can testify on matters covered by the prohibitions and exclusions,
particularly with respect to matters pendingresolution before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the letters and subpoenas issued by Prosecution Impeachment Panel should
 
be favored.

IT DEPENDS. The right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitution’s own
terms, is not absolute.
Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court grants access to court records to
any person
, subject to payment offees and compliance with rules
;
 it is not necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This islimited by the
need to preserve and
 
protect the integrity of main adjudicative function
of the Court and theJudiciary.

STA CLARA HOA VS GASTON JAN. 23, 2002 (CASE DIGEST)

June 13, 2012

Facts:

Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia Gaston, the private respondents, filed a

complaint for damages with preliminary  injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction

and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court against petitioners Sta

Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA). 

The complaint alleged that the private respondents purchased their lots in Sta.

Clara Subdivision and at the time of the purchase, there was no mention or requirement

of membership in any homeowners’ association.    From that time on, they have

remained non-members of the SCHA.   They also stated  that an arrangement was made

wherein homeowners who  were non-members of the association were issued non-

member gate pass stickers for their vehicles for identification by the security guards

manning the subdivision’s entrances and exits.  This arrangement remained undisturbed

until sometime  in the middle of March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board

resolution which decreed that only its members in good standing were to be issued

stickers for use in their vehicles. 

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court had no

jurisdiction over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute between SCHA and its

members.  The proper forum must be the Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation

(HIGC).   They  stated that that the Articles of Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly

approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission , provides that the association

shall be a non-tock corporation with all the homeowners of Sta. Clara constituting its
membership.  Its by-laws also contains a provision that all real estate owners

automatically become members of the association.    Moreover, the private respondents

allegedly enjoyed the privileges of membership and abided by the rules of the

association, and even attended the general special meeting of the association

members. 

Issue:

 Whether or not the private respondents are members of SCHA

Ruling:

        

      The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to

associate.  The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very

foundation and essence of the partnership.  It should be noted that the provision

guarantees the right to form an association.  It does not compel others to form or join

one.

           Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of SCHA by the

simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws without

their express or implied consent.  True, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners
in a subdivision  to band themselves together to promote their common welfare.  But

that is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become

members of the association.  True also, membership in homeowners’ association may

be acquired in various ways – often through deeds of sale, Torrens  certificates or other

forms of evidence of property ownership.   However, when private respondents

purchased their property and obtained Transfer Certificates of Title, there was no

annotation showing automatic membership in the SCHA.   Thus, no privity of contract

arising from the title certificate exists between petitioners and private respondents. 

 
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON,
RAMONMODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO
ARANETA, PLACIDOAGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
 
G.R. No. 85279July 28, 1989
 
Facts:
 On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the
officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building,
preventing non-striking employeesfrom reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to thePublic Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused toreturn to work; and that the
SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that
thedefendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared
illegal. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands,
which included:implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) on check-off of uniondues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday
pay; conversion of temporary or contractualemployees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to thesame salaries, allowances and benefits
given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children'sallowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedlycommitted
acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices. 
Issue:
 Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike. 
Held:
 The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee therights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities,including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec.
31]. Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the
meaning of theseprovisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution wouldshow that in recognizing the right of government employees to
organize, the commissioners intended to limit the rightto the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec.
1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as"government
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original
charter,having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos.69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibitingstrikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.

December 20, 2017

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edilion
A.M. No. 1928, 3 August 1978

Facts:
    The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board
of Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rules of Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of the IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

    Edilion contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as
a lawyer in good standing to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues
and that as a consequence of this, compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void
and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:
    Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his
membership fee to the IBP.

Held:
    The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of
a distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar including payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the
requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not
in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

    The Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and
of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.

    The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent and his name stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys of the Court.

Manosca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996

Fact: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig.
Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters.
When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986,
pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national
historical landmark. The resolution was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture
and Sports At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The
motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order fixing
the provisional market and assessed values of the property and authorizing the Republic
to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of the
Constitution.  Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation
of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. On 15 February 1990, following the
filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners’ motion seeking the dismissal of
the case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. 6 Five (5) days later, or
on 20 February 1990,7 another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and
academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August
1989 with the rejection of petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ motion for the
reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court
in its 16th April 1991 order. Petitioners then lodged a petition with the Court of Appeals
which the appellate court dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the
reconsideration of the decision was denied subsequently by appellate court.

Issue: Whether  the expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that
the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: No, Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking
property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, “public use” is one which
confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by
public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by
one or many members of public, a “public advantage” or “public benefit” accrues
sufficient to constitute a public use. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear
cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded.

G.R. No. 168770 : February 9, 2011

ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO ARNAIZ, and

CIELO OUANO MARTINEZ,Petitioners, v. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
FOR THE CITY OF CEBU, Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency, pursued
a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators,
NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport.

The landowners claim the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them
that they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion
project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations
transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.

On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga
who originally owned six [6] of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven
others, successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the
condemned lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint
for reconveyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The RT rendered a
decision directing MCIAA to reconvey the lands.

Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers
entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the
Ouanos.
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers
entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the
Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to
repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand.

The RTC dismissed the Ouanos’ complaint for reconveyance. The CA denied their appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimonial evidence of the petitioners proving the
promises, assurances and representations by the airport officials and lawyers are
inadmissbale under the Statute of Frauds.

HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

CIVIL LAW: Condominium and Subdivision

Under the rule on the Statute of Frauds, as expressed in Article 1403 of the Civil Code, a
contract for the sale or acquisition of real property shall be unenforceable unless the
same or some note of the contract be in writing and subscribed by the party charged.
Subject to defined exceptions, evidence of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents.

MCIAA’s invocation of the Statute of Frauds is misplaced primarily because the statute
applies only to executory and not to completed, executed, or partially consummated
contracts.

Petition is GRANTED.

REPUBLIC v. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, GR No. 185124, 2012-01-25

Facts:
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-
Marigadao Irrigation Project.
it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a portion
of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91... square meters.
NIA filed an Amended Complaint to include Leosa Nanette A. Agdeppa and Marcelino
Viernes as registered owners of Lot No. 3039.
NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the
properties... after depositing with the Philippine National Bank the amount of ?
19,246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.
respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim.
[6] They alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their
land, because it was not a sovereign political entity;... that NIA's valuation of their
expropriated... properties was inaccurate because of the improvements on the land that
should have placed its value at ?5 million; and that NIA never negotiated with the
landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and
irreparable damages to their properties... valued at ?250,000.
the lower court issued an Order stating it would issue a writ of possession in favor of  
NIA upon the determination of the fair market value of the properties, subject of the
expropriation proceedings.
The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated
should be ?65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR).
As regards the improvement on the properties, the report recommended the following
compensation:... a. P200 for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4) years old... b.
P150 for each gmelina tree that are more than one (1) year old... c. P164 for each coco
tree... d. P270 for each banana clump[1
NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the Decision of the RTC
to the CA,... the CA... affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It ruled that the
committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the properties and...
improvements for the purpose of arriving at the just compensation, properly performed
its function.
Aggrieved by the appellate court's Decision, NIA now comes to this Court via a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
OF JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND AND THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON BASED ON
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS.
Ruling:
the Petition is not meritorious.
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's
gain, but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[32] The constitutional
limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the... market
value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in
the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the
property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time
of the... actual taking by the government.
In the instant case, we affirm the appellate court's ruling that the commissioners
properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose
properties were expropriated by petitioner.
In the instant case, the committee members based their recommendations on reliable
data and, as aptly noted by the appellate court, considered various factors that affected
the value of the land and the improvements.[3

Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001

Fact: Respondent initiated before the RTC of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three
(3) parcels of land in Rosario, Cavite. More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court
upheld the right of respondent to expropriate the land of the petitioner.
Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner contending that said lot
would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence
would not be utilized for a public purpose. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether the said expropriation is for public purpose.

Held: Yes, the “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this
jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as the court has ruled
that the taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. The term “public use” has
acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying
strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. the Court has also held that what ultimately emerged is a
concept of public use which is just as abroad as “public welfare.”

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

Facts:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court
of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement.
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila],
answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it denied that it was either necessary
or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that if the
construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes
were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense
and without disturbing the resting places of the dead.
 

Issues Ratio:
Whether or not, the argument of lack of necessity to expropriate is a valid reason to
dismiss the expropriation proceeding.
In ruling in the negative, the Supreme Court cited several cases and explained that: In
the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary,
the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those
questions (the necessity and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the
legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it
(the necessity and the expediency) * * *. It (the legislature) may designate the particular
property to be condemned, and its determination in this respect cannot be reviewed by
the courts.

Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005

Fact: On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a

special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu,
involving Lots of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. After depositing ₱9,500.00
with the Philippine National Bank, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter,
the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
₱4,062.10 as just compensation. In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons,
filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it
“denied knowledge of the matter.” Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to
the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim.
in 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding
that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939
because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of ₱4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. In view of “the differences in money value from 1940 up to
the present,” the court adjusted the market value at ₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6%
interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings,
until full payment.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim for failure to pay. in 1992, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title
with the (RTC) seeking an absolute and exclusive possession of the property. in 2001,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners elevated the case to the
CA but the Ruling of the RTC was upheld and affirmed.

Issue: Whether the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession of his
property when party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been
assessed or agreed upon?

Held: Yes, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,26
however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that “the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from
private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation which
the court defined as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just.”

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO. v. WMC RESOURCES INT'L. PTY. LTD., GR NO.
162331, 2006-11-20
Facts:
the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary of
WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio
FTAA... for... the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and commercial
exploration of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387 hectares
located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North
Cotabato in accordance with Executive
Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the Columbio
FTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with petitioner
Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the
Tampakan Companies'... exercise of their right of first refusal to purchase the subject
shares
In an Agreement dated 6 October 2000, however, the Tampakan Companies sought to
exercise its right of first refusal. Thus, in a letter dated 13 October 2000, petitioner
assailed the Tampakan Companies' exercise of its right of first refusal,... on 10 January
2001,... WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another Sale and
Purchase
Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate
vehicle which would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA
activities.
After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications of
Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA
from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the assailed Order
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc.,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office
of the President
Issues:
the propriety of the application to the Columbio FTAA of Republic Act No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40 thereof requiring the approval of
the President of the assignment or transfer of... financial or technical assistance
agreements
Ruling:
Columbio FTAA was entered into by the Philippine Government and WMC Philippines on
22 March 1995, undoubtedly before the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 took effect on 14
April 1995.
it... is undisputed that said FTAA was granted in accordance with Executive Order No.
279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991, which does not
contain any similar condition on the transfer or assignment of financial or technical
assistance agreements.
what petitioner would want this Court to espouse is the retroactive application of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 to the Columbio FTAA, a valid agreement concluded prior
to the naissance of said piece of legislation.
This posture of petitioner would clearly contradict the established legal doctrine that
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the contrary
is expressly stated or necessarily implied from the language used in the law.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless
therein otherwise provided."
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication
in the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to
apply retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply only
prospectively,... Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that We are to
apply the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 retrospectively to the Columbio FTAA, the lack
of presidential approval will not be fatal as to render the transfer illegal, especially since,
as in the instant case, the... alleged lack of presidential approval has been remedied
when petitioner appealed the matter to the Office of the President which approved the
Order of the DENR Secretary... in the La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos[15] case, involving the same FTAA subject of the instant case:... when the
transferee of an FTAA is another foreign corporation, there is a logical application of the
requirement of prior approval by the President of the Republic and notification to
Congress in the event of assignment or transfer of an FTAA
On the other hand, when the transferee of the FTAA happens to be a Filipino
corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical
It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of
the obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in existing laws... and to fall
within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of... the existing
contract, but the impairment must be substantial
Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President
with respect to assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the
Columbio FTAA, would be tantamount to an... impairment of the obligations under said
contract as it would effectively restrict the right of the parties thereto to assign or
transfer their interests in the said FTAA.
imposing a new condition apart from those already contained in the agreement, before
the parties to the Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its rights and interest in the
said agreement, Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, if made to apply to the
Columbio
FTAA,... will effectively modify the terms of the original contract and thus impair the
obligations of the parties
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
Principles:
It is engrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of
the obligation of contract does not prohibit every change in existing laws... and to fall
within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of... the existing
contract, but the impairment must be substantial... a... law which changes the terms of
a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction
something different from that provided in its terms, is law which impairs... the
obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.

PHILRECA v. Secretary of Interior

Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. v. Secretary of Interior and Local
Government
G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003
Puno, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to annul as unconstitutional sections
193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code. A class
suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric
cooperatives organized and existing under P.D. No. 269 who are members of petitioner
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). Petitioners contend
that pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 269, as amended, and the provision in the
loan agreements of the government of the Philippines with the government of the
United State of America, they are exempt from payment of local taxes, including
payment of real property tax. With the passage of the Local Government Code,
however, they allege that their tax exemptions have been invalidly withdrawn. In
particular, petitioners assail Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code on the
ground that the said provisions discriminate against them, in violation of the equal
protection clause. Further, they submit that the said provisions are unconstitutional
because they impair the obligation of contracts between the Philippine Government and
the United States Government.
ISSUE:
Did Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code violate the equal protection
clause?
HELD:
NO. The pertinent parts of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code provide:
Section 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this
Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government-owned and controlled corporations,
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock
and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code.

RE: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, EN BANC, August 19, 2009,
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:
In his letter dated May 22, 2009 addressed to the Chief Justice, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi,
administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., wrote: xxx The Hon. Court
Administrator Jose Perez pointed out to the need of complying with OCA Circular No.
42-2005 and Rule 141 that reserves this "privilege" to indigent persons. While judges
are appointed to interpret the law, this type of law seems to be extremely detailed with
requirements that do not leave much room for interpretations. In addition, this law
deals mainly with "individual indigent" and it does not include Foundations or
Associations that work with and for the most Indigent persons. As seen in our Article of
Incorporation, since 1985 the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. reached-out to the
poorest among the poor, to the newly born and abandoned babies, to children who
never saw the smile of their mother, to old people who cannot afford a few pesos to pay
for "common prescriptions", to broken families who returned to a normal life. In other
words, we have been working hard for the very Filipino people, that the Government
and the society cannot reach to, or have rejected or abandoned them. Can the Courts
grant to our Foundation who works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same
option granted to indigent people? xxx

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Courts can grant to foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants even if
the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people. (NO)

RULING:
To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to foundations like the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees
granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and
underprivileged people. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free
access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Sec. 11. Free
access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty. The importance of the right to free access to
the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal assistance cannot be denied.
A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on the ground
that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to
give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor. In implementation of
the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated rules,
specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court, which
respectively state thus: Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his
action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and
hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. Such authority
shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of
transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The
amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from
paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent,
unless the court otherwise provides. Any adverse party may contest the grant of such
authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court.

People v Deniega 251 SCRA 626 (637)

Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution
was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers
without the presence of a counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that
the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the crime and
the basis of the lower court’s conviction to the accused was based on their
alleged extrajudicial confessions.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellants based on
their extrajudicial confession.

Held: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and
jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental
requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be
express and 4) the confession must be in writing.
The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was
inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial
investigation. It seems that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial
investigation. Citing People vs Javar, the court reiterated that any statement obtained in
violation of the constitutional provision, or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. “Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.” Thus, because of these defects in
observing the proper procedural requirements of the constitution on custodial
investigation the accused-appellants were acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. MACAM [238 SCRA 306; G.R. NOS. 91011-12; 24 NOV 1994]
Tuesday, February 10, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Prosecution’s version:
On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque
and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam)
located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former
to have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions
of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D.
Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused
had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and
pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia
Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room
upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she
was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but
survived. The total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00.

Defense’s version:

Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito’s
house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling
card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he
went with the accused inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes
and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up,
he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the
said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying “kailangan
patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such phrase he
escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his
brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved
in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they went to the
factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his
payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards
and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain
things.

After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their
faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC
General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification.
Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said
case.

Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was
valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible.

Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution

even before trial. A police line-up is considered a “critical” stage of the proceedings. Any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible.
HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant’s identification
at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused
did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.

The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from
questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said
information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.

The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining

outside the house served as a looked out.

Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is

guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to
suffer reclusion perpetua.

Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder,
Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997,
assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.
PETER PAUL ABALLE Y MENDOZA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
HONORABLE JUDGE BERNARDO V. SALUDARESG.R. No. L-64086, 15 March 1990
FACTS:
Jennie, a minor, was found dead in their sala and there were no eyewitnesses to the biz
arre killing. On the following day, a police team sought the accused Aballe for questionin
g. They found him just as he was coming out of the communal bathroom in Saypon and 
wearing what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt. Upon seeing them, the accused wit
hout anyone asking him, orally admitted that he killed Jennie. He made thereafter an ext
rajudicial confession that he killed Jennie but without counsel. He later on disavowed his 
extrajudicial confession on the ground that it in the absence of counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of Aballe was established beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Yes. Even with the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession since it was not shown that t
he youthful offender was ever represented by counsel, the guilt of the accused has been 
established beyond reasonable doubt. It is well to note that even before the taking of th
e extrajudicial confession, the accused, upon being picked up as he was coming out of th
e communal bathroom and wearing a T-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to 
cover with his hands, suddenly broke down and knelt before the police and confessed th
at he killed Jennie. The testimony of police on Aballe’s oral confession is competent evid
ence to positively link the accused to the aforesaid killing.

People vs. Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin, Albino Bagas (accused- appellant)
and Diascoro Vinas – GR 104383, July 12, 2001

FACTS This is an appeal from the decision of the Caloocan RTC Branch 131 convicting the
accused of the complex crime of robbery with a bad and double rape. On February
1991, a group of 8 men entered the house of Perlita Lacsamana and stole valuables
amounting to Php728K. In the course of the robbery, 2 gang members raped
Lacsamana's niece and employee. Four days after the incident, the police, together with
Federico Ampatin, went to a handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City to look for a
certain “Mario”. The police ordered the factory workers to lie down and, after some
threats and hitting him on the neck with the butt of a pistol, told Ampatin to point at
anyone (“magturo ka ng kahit sino”). Ampatin, out of fear, pointed at the first person
that he saw, who was the accused-appellant. The police thereafter brought the accused
to the police station to be presented to the complainants. At the station, Lacsamana
asked the accused-appellant if he knew Vinas and Amestuzo, but he answered in the
negative. Then the police told the complainants that the accused-appellant was a
suspect in the robbery so the complainants started hitting and kicking the accused-
appellant. They only stopped when the police intervened.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the accused was deprived of the right to counsel from the time he was
arrested to the time he was presented to the witnesses for identification.
(2) Whether the manner of out-of-court identification was irregular and, therefore,
inadmissible in court.

HELD
(1) NO. The guarantees of sec. 12 (1) of the Bill of Rights or the so-called Miranda rights
of the accused may only be invoked while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation begins from the time when the police no longer ask general questions
about the crime, but start focusing on the suspect and attempt to elicit incriminating
questions in the course of the investigation. The object of the Miranda rights is to
ensure that the accused is protected from possible intimidation or coercion from law
enforcement officers who may force him to admit to a crime that he did not commit.
The police line-up is not yet included in the custodial investigation as it is the witnesses
who are asked questions during the line-up. In this regard, the inquiry has not yet
shifted from investigatory to accusatory. Moreover, during the line-up, there was no
evidence that the accused was interrogated by the police, nor were there any
incriminating statements elicited from him.
(2) YES. There is no law prescribing a specific manner of identification in criminal cases.
A police line-up is, therefore, an acceptable way for the complainants to identify the
suspect in a crime. However, the court also applies the circumstances test enunciated in
the case of People vs. Teehankee, which had the following factors:
1. the witness's opportunity to view criminal at the time of the crime
2. the witness's degree of attention at that time
3. the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness
4. the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of the identification
5. the length of time between the crime and the identification
6. the suggestiveness of the identification process The Court found that the out-of-court
identification in this case failed the last criterion because of the police's announcement
to the complainants that the accused-appellant was a suspect in the crime. This was
considered improperly suggestive because it was not the complainants themselves who
pointed to or identified the accused-appellant. There was, therefore, no spontaneity nor
objectivity in the identification.

People vs. Anthony Escordial – GR 138934-35, January 16, 2002

FACTS
 Escordial was convicted for robbery with rape and sentenced to death by the Bacolod
RTC. Michelle Darunday, the rape victim, did not know what the suspect looked like
because she was blindfolded at the time the crime was committed. She would only
recognize him if she heard his voice and felt the rough bumps on skin, as he was talking
to her while he was raping her. However, her roommate claimed that she saw the
suspect, even though she was blindfolded, because of the light that filtered in from a
lamp post outside their room; that's why she gave a physical description to the police
officers. In the course of their investigation, the police found that the suspect's
description fit that of a worker in the Coffee Break Corner, where the accused was
employed. When the police officers arrived at the cafe, they asked the owner for the
accused's whereabouts. They went to the location stated by the owner and found the
accused in a basketball court. He was then invited for questioning. The rape victim was
already at the station when the accused arrived. According to her testimony, the
accused blushed when he saw her. He also tried talking to her, asking her if she really
knew him, but she did not respond. He was asked to take off his shirt and she confirmed
that he was indeed her assailant because of a keloid at the back of his neck and his
voice.

ISSUES
(1) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused was lawful.
(2) Whether the accused's Miranda rights were violated.

HELD
(1) NO. He was arrested while he was watching a basketball game. He was not caught in
flagrante delicto. Neither was he arrested immediately after the consummation of the
crime because he was only “invited” for questioning a week after the incident. However,
the defect was cured when he voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
(2) YES, insofar as he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation.
Nevertheless, the Court noted that the accused did not, at any time, admit to
committing the crime, even when he claimed that he was being tortured by the police.
Therefore, there was no uncounselled confession obtained from him. The Court also
found that, although the out-of-court identification of the accused was inadmissible as
evidence since he was not assisted by counsel at that time, the in-court identification
was definitely a valid ground for his conviction. In fact, it was actually the in-court
identification that formed the basis for the RTC's decision, not the out-of-court
identification.

In Re: BERNAS G.R. Nos. 133583-85

 FACTS: For automatic review are decisions promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur finding appellant Roberto Bernas y Nacario guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape of her two minor daughters. When
first arraigned on the charges, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not
guilty. When the case was submitted for decision, the prosecution moved to reopen the
case to present the Birth Certificate of the victims as well as the Marriage contract of
the parents. This motion was granted over the objection of the defense counsel. Before
the prosecution presented its evidence, appellant, through his counsel, moved for the
change of his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, a Motion which the RTC granted.
Appellant was thus rearraigned and pleaded guilty to the charges. The defense waived
its right to present evidence and submitted them for decision based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The RTC then rendered the assailed decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

RULING: NO. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. This right
finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court.
Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an Information. The facts
stated in the body of the Information determine the crime that the accused stands
charged and for which he must be tried. This recital of the essentials of a crime
delineates the nature and cause of accusation against an accused. Other than the
allegation of carnal knowledge, no other element of rape as defined by law is alleged in
the Information. Since the Information fails to allege the essential elements of qualified
rape, appellant should not have been convicted of that crime. Otherwise, his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him
would be violated

PEOPLE V MONTERON (GR. NO. 130709) FACTS: On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen
year-old Mary Ann Martenez was walking home fromWangan National Agricultural
School, Davao City. While she was walking on a secluded portionof the road, Mary Ann
was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to see where the stonecame from; she
was hit again on the mouth. She fell down unconscious. When Mary Ann cameto, she
found herself lying on the grass naked. Accused-appellant was lying on top of her,
alsonaked. She struggled but accused-appellant, who was stronger, restrained her. He
placed hispenis on top of her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She frantically
grabbed his erect penis and pushed it away from her.

ISSUE: Whether accused is guilty of consummated rape.

HELD:
Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses
and the n e g a t i v e a v e r m e n t s o f t h e a c c u s e d , t h e f o r m e r u n d i s p u t e
d l y d e s e r v e s m o r e c r e d e n c e a n dentitled to greater evidentiary weight. In the
case at bar, Mary Ann Martenez positively identifiedaccused-appellant as her molester.
Mary Ann’s testimony pointing to accusedappellant as theauthor of th crime is
corroborated by her cousin Arnel Arat. Accused-appellant has commencedthe
commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing himself and the
victimand lying on top of her, but he did not perform all the acts of execution which
should producethe felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. © case at bar, it was Mary Ann’s violent resistance which
prevented the insertion of accused-appellant’s penis in her vagina. The foregoing
conclusion is supported by the medical findings of Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma that Mary
Ann’s hymen was intact and had no laceration.

People vs. Quitlong G.R. No. 121562 July 10, 1998

FACTS

On October 1994, the victim Jonathan Calpito Y Castro, along with his friends and Gosil
and Adjaro were caught in an argument with a fishball vendor when they claimed to
shortchanged by the vendor. The accused were seen to have rushed to them and
cornered Calpito which lead to his being stabbed. He was rushed to the hospital but he
was not able to survive. The defense gave no alibi and admitted the presence of
accused-appellants at the vicinity of the crime scene but interposed denial by appellants
of any participation in the commission of the crime. Nonita de los Reyes and Lydia
Cultura, both sidewalk vendors, corroborated the story of the Quitlong brothers.
According to Nonita and Lydia, it was a certain Mendoza who stabbed Calpito. On 21
April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions of the
prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sub-rebuttal evidence,
rendered its decision: “RONNIE QUITLONG Y FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG Y FRIAS and
EMILIO SENOTO, JR. Y PASCUA were adjudged by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased Jonathan Calpito y Castro in the sums of P50,000.00
for the latter's death; P35,700.00 as consequential damages; and P100,000.00 as moral
damages, plus their proportionate shares in the costs. There being no indication that the
remaining accused, Jesus Mendoza, whom they claim to be the one who stabbed the
victim, and several John Does could be arrested/identified and arrested shortly, let the
case against them be, as it is hereby, archived without prejudice to its prosecution upon
their apprehension.”

Ronnie Quitlong appealed with the Supreme Court averring that the RTC erred in its
judgement. Senoto averred that the trial court has erred in finding conspiracy among
the accused and argues that the crime committed is homicide, not murder, given the
circumstances.

ISSUE

Whether or not the herein three accused may be held guilty as co-principals by reason
of conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the victim, Calpito, there being no dispute that
the latter died due to the solitary stab inflicted on him.

DECISION The Supreme Court established, through witnesses, that it was Ronnie
Quitlong who stabbed Calpito. And that the rest were just mere accomplices since the
act of holding the victim while Ronnie Quitlong was about to stab him does not
demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be a
basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals. It occurred at the spur of
moment. The two accomplices, appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,
were subject to the imposition of the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion
temporal maximum to death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
them, each may be held to suffer the indeterminate sentence of anywhere from prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, as the
minimum penalty, to anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal minimum, as the
maximum penalty. The trial court correctly imposed the payment of a civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim. The consequential (actual) damages in the
amount of P35,700.00 not having been substantiated, except for the amount
P12,000.00 paid to the memorial chapel, is disallowed. The award of moral damages
recoverable under Article 2219 (1), in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code is
reduced from P100,000.00 to P20,000.00. Appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of
the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P50,000.00, to reimburse them the actual damages of P12,000.00 and to
pay moral damages of P50,000.00. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,
are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of the crime, and each shall suffer the
indeterminate sentence of nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor minimum
period, as minimum penalty, to thirteen (13) years and nine (9) months and ten (10)
days of reclusion temporal minimum period, as maximum penalty. Appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are also hereby held solidarily liable with appellant
Ronnie Quitlong in the payment of the damages hereinabove mentioned.

Acebedo vs. Sarmiento [GR L-28025, 16 December 1970] First Division, Fernando (J): 7
concur. 3 on official leave

Facts: It was shown that on 3 August 1959, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga a criminal information for damage to property through reckless
imprudence against David Acebedo y Dalman and a certain Chi Chan Tan. As there were
no further proceedings in the meantime, Acebedo on 19 May 1965 moved to dismiss
the criminal charge. Judge Malcolm G. Sarmient was not in agreement as shown by his
order of denial of 10 July 1965. Then, after two more years, came the trial with the
complainant having testified on direct examination but not having as yet been fully
cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial set for 7 June 1967 such witness did not
show up. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel for Acebedo, however,
not only objected but sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused
to speedy trial. The Judge this time acceded, but would likewise base his order of
dismissal, orally given, on the cross-examination of complainant not having started as
yet. Later that same day, the Judge did reconsider the order and reinstated the case, his
action being due to its being shown that the cross-examination of the complainant had
already started. Acebedo filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether Acebedo is entitled to have the case dismissed based on the right ofteh
accused to speedy trial.

Held: The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be
free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy in the
event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were
restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal
of the case. The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated not only when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, but also when,
without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without having his case tried. An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest
opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an
unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself
is necessarily delayed. It is not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends
to remove from the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-62810 July 25, 1983

EULALIA MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. FABIAN VER, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and GEN.
HAMILTON DIMAYA, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, respondents.

Arturo V. Romero for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

PLANA,  J.:

This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eulalia Martin on behalf of her husband, Pvt.
Francisco Martin.

Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. On or about April 14, 1981,
when he was still in the service, he allegedly sold two grenades to one Rogelio Cruz at
P50.00 each, one of which exploded during a picnic in Laoag City on April 17, 1981
causing the death of three persons, including Rogelio Cruz, and injuries to three others.

According to respondents, Pvt. Martin has admitted to Cpl. Lucio Tuppal, Philippine
Army, having sold the grenades to Rogelio Cruz in Laoag City, although this is denied by
Pvt. Martin.

After an initial investigation conducted by the Laoag City PC and INP authorities, a report
was submitted to the Ministry of National Defense which referred the matter to the
Chief of Staff, AFP, who in turn directed the Inspector General to conduct another
investigation.
On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined (restricted to barracks) at Fort
Bonifacio pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, infra. The following year, he was
discharged from the service effective as of May 5, 1982. On November 17, 1982 the
instant petition was filed. The following month, i.e., December 3, 1982, Pvt. Martin was
charged for violation of the 85th and 97th Articles of War, which read:

ART. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to

Soldiers.—Any  soldier who sells or wrongfully disposes of or willfully or
through neglect injures or losses any horse, arms, ammunition,
accouterments, equipment, clothing, or other property issued for use in
the military service, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

ART. 97. General Article.—Though not mentioned in these articles, all

disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline and all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military
service shall be taken cognizance of by a general or special or summary
court-martial according to the nature and degree of the offense, and
punished at the discretion of such court.

The charge sheet stipulates the following charges:

CHARGE I: Violation of the 85th Article of War.

Specification: In that Private Martin assigned with the Headquarters and

Headquarters Service Battalion, First Infantry Division, Philippine Army on
or about 14 April 1981 at Laoag City wrongly disposed of by sale to Rogelio
Cruz two (2) grenades.

CHARGE II: Violation of the 97th Article of War.

Specification: In that Private Francisco Martin, ... on or about the month of

April 1981 at Laoag City, unlawfully and without authority had in his
possession two (2) hand grenades thus committing an act prejudicial to
good order and military discipline and of a nature that will bring discredit
to the military establishment.

The petitioner contends that having been discharged from the military service, he is no
longer subject to court-martial even if the offenses of which he is charged were
committed while he was still subject to military law. He therefore, concludes that his
continued detention pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War (which authorizes the
arrest/confinement of any person subject to military law who is charged with an offense
under the Articles of War) is illegal and he, accordingly, should be released. This posture
has no merit.

Generally, court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the

Philippines ceases upon discharge or other separation from such service. This however,
is but a general rule. The Articles of War in terms prescribe some exceptions designed to
enhance discipline and good order within the military organization. Thus, court-martial
jurisdiction as to certain cases of fraud and misappropriation of military hardware and
other government property is not extinguished by discharge or dismissal pursuant to the
95th Article of War.

ART. 95. Frauds Against the  Government.—Any person subject to military

law ...

Who steals, embezzles, knowingly and willingly misappropriates, applies to

his own use or benefit or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any
ordnance, arms, equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, stores,
money, or other property of the Government furnished or intended for
the military service thereof ...

Shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by

such other punishment as a court-martial may adjudge, or by any or all of
said penalties. And if any person, being guilty of any of the offenses
aforesaid while in the service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of
the Philippine Constabulary receives his discharge or is dismissed from the
service, he shall continue to be liable to be arrested and held for trial and
sentence by a court-martial in the same manner and to the same extent as
if he had not received such discharge nor been dismissed. (Emphasis
supplied.)

It was on the basis of the foregoing legal provision, among others, that this Court
sustained the court-martial of the petitioner in De la Cruz vs. Alcaraz, et al. after his
reversion to inactive status, for misappropriation of public funds committed while he
was still in the active military service. The Court, thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, said:

There is no question that although appellant had been reverted to inactive

(civilian) status in the reserve force of the Philippine Army, he is still
amenable to investigation and court-martial under the Artitles of War by
the Philippine Navy for alleged acts of misappropriation of government
funds committed while he was still in the active military service. As
correctly held by the Court below, appellant's case falls within the
 provisions of Article 95 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408,
as amended), which provides as follows: ...

The lower Court did not, therefore, err in refusing to enjoin appellant's
investigation by the naval authorities on charges that he had
misappropriated public property while he was still in the service of the
Philippine Navy, specially since petitioner admits that he is still a member
of the Reserve Force." (99 Phil. 130 at 131-132.).

We conclude that despite his discharge from the military service, the petitioner is still
subject to military law for the purpose of prosecuting him for illegal disposal of military
property, and his preventive detention thereunder — pending trial and punishment for
the said offense committed when he was in the military service — is lawful.

Alternatively, petitioner maintains that even assuming that the jurisdiction of the
military authorities to try and punish him was not abated by his discharge from military
service, the denial to him of his constitutional right to speedy trial (he having been
confined from the date of his arrest on May 5, 1981 up to December 3, 1982 when he
was formally charged — a period of I year and 7 months) entitles him to be released on
habeas corpus.

The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution apply to all persons, including
those subject to military law, (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546;
Cayaga vs. Tangonan, 66 SCRA 216; Go vs. Olivas, 74 SCRA 230; Romero vs. Ponce Enrile,
75 SCRA 429.) To quote Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2:

The Constitution is a law for rulers and for people equally in war and in
peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all
times and under all circumstances.

It would indeed be parodoxical if military men who are called upon in times of the
gravest national crises to lay down their lives in defense of peace and freedom would be
the very people to be singled out for denial of the fundamental rights for which they risk
their lives.

For denial of a constitutional right to the accused, the hearing tribunal may lose its
jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings. In such a case, habeas corpus would lie to
obtain the release of the accused. (Gumabon vs. Director, 37 SCRA 420; Acevedo vs.
Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183; Flores vs. People, 61
SCRA 331; Dacuyan vs. Ramos, 85 SCRA 487, Ventura vs. People, 86 SCRA 188; Romero
vs. Ponce Enrile, 75 SCRA 429; Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, supra; Go vs. Olivas, supra.)
In the case at bar, the petitioner claims that he has been denied his constitutional right
of speedy trial because the charges against him were filed only about 1 year and 7
months after his arrest.

There was no such denial. As stated by this Court in a per  curiam decision: "x... the test
of violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from
the time the information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the
information, which in the instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is
therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial of
the right to speedy trial." (People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226 at 236.)

At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to
precise quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative,
consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case.
As expressed in Barker vs. Wingo, 33 L. Ed 2d 101:

... the right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different
concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons
and cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it
is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the
right must be asserted or considered waived ...

... a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is
subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution
and the defendant are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as
length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
delay, in determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been
denied ...

Returning to the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to the petitioner unfortunately
resulted in the death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who allegedly bought the
handgrenades from the petitioner) and very serious injuries to three others whose
testimony is vital to the preferment of charges and prosecution of the petitioner. It is
therefore not unreasonable to heed the claim of respondents that the delay complained
of was occasioned by the unavailability of witnesses, a claim which has not at all been
challenged or denied by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed, without prejudice to the
petitioner seeking his provisional release on bail from the military authorities or the
Ministry of National Defense. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

PEREZ V. ESTRADA                                                    AM No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001

FACTS:

On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association
representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout
the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of
full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief
Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17
April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.

HELD:

NO. In Estes v. Texas,  US The Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial
proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal defendant:
"Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then
subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony.
Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects
him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his
defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public."
The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the
courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial
means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused
shall take precedence over the people's right to information. The accused has the right
to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life and
liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.

IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to
ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the
task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will
only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."

Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the
life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample
safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is
a price too high to pay.

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015.

17MAY
En Banc
[BERSAMIN, J.]
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP
General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims that before judgment of
conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden
of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the
exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution
has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing
that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a
flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition,
and his social standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to
bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is
mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong
evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?
HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The
strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity
for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of
his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.
Case Brief: Government of Hongkong vs Olalia
APRIL 2, 2019 JEFF REY
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by
the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest
were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was
upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the
extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by
the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the
same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge
subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and
will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further
appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited
in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if
they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further
desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees
from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent
judge. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue
Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a
harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of
America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and
Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same
being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following
trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental
law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the
worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the
ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
People vs. Dela PEÑA (2018)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAXIMO DELA PEÑA ET. AL

G.R. No. 219581, January 31, 2018

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: Appellant was charged, with the crime of piracy defined under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 532 allegedly committed as follows that on or about the 24th day of
September 2005, along the river bank of Barangay San Roque, Province of Samar, the
accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to gain, by
means of force and intimidation, feloniously take and carry away valuable items (13
sacks of dried coconuts valued at P7,537.00; 2 pieces automatic watch valued at
P6,796.00; 1 piece ([S]audi gold) valued at P4,731.00; 1 [N]okia cellphone 3350 valued at
P3,615.00[;] 1 unit Briggs and [Stratton] 16 horse power with propeller valued at
P26,000.00[;] cash money worth [P]1,000.00, all amounting to P49,679.00 to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner.

Appellant interposed an alibi and claimed that the Information did not state that the
vessel in question was in Philippine waters.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of piracy.

Ruling: Yes, the elements of piracy under PD 532 are all present.

Section 2(d) of PD 532 defines piracy as follows: Any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof,
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed
by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in
Philippine waters shall be considered as piracy.
Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters" is defined as follows: [A]ll bodies of
water, .x x x and all other waters belonging to the Philippines x x x and other submarine
areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.

It is clear that a river is considered part of Philippine waters. The Information also clearly
alleged that the vessel's cargo, equipment, and personal belongings of the passengers
were taken by the appellant and his armed companions. The appellant was able to seize
these items when he, along with armed companions, boarded the victims' pump boat
and seized control of the same.

Ratio Decidendi: Positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be
fabricated and is inherently unreliable.

Gist: This is an appeal assailing the Decision of the CA which affirmed with modification
the decision of the RTC finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
piracy.

CAGANG v. SANDIGANBAYAN   G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018 Inordinate
Delay, Right to speedy disposition of Cases
MARCH 25, 2019

FACTS:

Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan’s denial to quash the Informations and
Order of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman’s alleged
inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.

In February 10, 2003, Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint

alleging the graft and corruption at the Vice Governor’s Office, Sarangani Province by
diverting public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as
“dummies.” The complaint was referred to the Commission on Audit for audit
investigation.

On November 17, 2011, the OMB filed Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents against Cagang, Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Mangalen.

Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest.
Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the
Informations. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Roque v. Ombudsman,  he argued that
the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of
cases.  The OMB, on the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that there
was no showing that delay in the filing was intentional, capricious, whimsical, or
motivated by personal reasons.

The Sandiganbayan denied the Motions to Quash/Dismiss.

It also found that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information,
considering that 40 different individuals were involved with direct participation in more
or less 81 different transactions.

Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him violated
his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not inordinate delay exists in this case.

RULING:

What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by

“mere mathematical reckoning.” It requires consideration of a number of factors,
including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the information, to
conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the
submission of the case for decision. Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable
postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into account.

Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is deemed
to have commenced.

In Dansal v. Fernandez, this Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition of
cases does not only include the period from which a case is submitted for resolution.

Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus, the right may
be invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or inquest.
To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary
investigation violates the accused’s right to due process and the speedy disposition of
cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The burden of
proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law
or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the
burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. If
the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that
no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a
competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a
given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain
the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result.
The timely invocation of the accused’s constitutional rights must also be examined on a
case-to-case basis.

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will
result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not
determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the
facts and circumstances surrounding each case. 

Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely
manner. The failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right.

Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights
during this period, choosing instead to wait until the information was filed against him
with the Sandiganbayan.

The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division that factfinding investigations are

included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is ABANDONED.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Against the appellee, Elisea Ylagan, a complaint for physical injuries was filed in the
justice of the peace court of Batangas, Province of Batangas. After preliminary
investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the
provincial fiscal filed an information charging her with serious physical injuries. Upon
arraignment, the defendant pleaded not guilty to the information; whereupon the
private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the
dismissal of the case, which motion was granted by the court. The attorney for the
defendant said nothing about the dismissal of the case.
Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another information in the same
justice of the peace court, charging the same defendant with the same offense of
serious physical injuries. After another preliminary investigation, the case was again
forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the information filed in the justice of the
peace court was reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a plea of
double jeopardy, based on section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After a
hearing, the court sustained the plea and dismissed the case. From this order of
dismissal, an appeal was taken by the Government.
Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
"A person cannot be tried for an offense, nor for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, for which he has been previously brought to trial in a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined,
when the case is dismissed or otherwise terminated before judgment without the
consent of the accused."
It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, a defendant in a criminal
prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions: (1)
In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3) after
he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or information.
Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has been once in
jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. It is true that in United
States vs. Ballentine (4 Phil., 672; 1 Philippine Decisions 575, and in other subsequent
cases, including People vs. Belisario (G. R. No. 33416), [1] this court has held that there is
no jeopardy until the investigation of the charges has actually been commenced by the
calling of a witness; but we are now convinced that such a view should be abandoned.
There is no provision or principle of law requiring such a condition for the existence of
legal jeopardy. All that the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly
joined." Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the
accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add a
particle to the danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going
through the process of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary investigation,
arraigned, and required to plead and stand trial.
The rule against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of second
punishment, but against being again tried for the same offense. This is the principle
underlying both section 23 and section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Commenting on said section 23, this court, in Julia vs. Sotto (2 Phil, 247, 252, 253), said:
"Without the safeguard this article establishes in favor of the accused, his fortune,
safety, and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness,
who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he
might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own will and pleasure.
The accused would never be free from the cruel and constant menace of a never-ending
charge, which the malice of the complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended"
over his head, were it not that the judiciary is exclusively empowered to authorize, by
an express order to that effect, the repetition of a complaint or information once
dismissed in the cases in which the law requires that this be done. Such is, in our
opinion, the fundamental reason of the article of the law to which we refer. Thanks to
this article, the accused, after being notified of the order dismissing the complaint may,
as the case may be, either rest assured that he will not be further molested, or prepare
himself for the presentation of a new complaint. In either case, the order gives him full
information as to what he may hope or fear, and prevents his reasonable hopes from
being dissipated as the result of an equivocal and indefinite legal situation. To this
much, at least, one who has been molested, possibly unjustly, by a prosecution on a
criminal charge, is entitled."
Counsel for the government, however, contends that the previous case brought against
the appellee was dismissed with her consent, on the theory that the phrase "without
the consent of the accused", used in section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
should be construed to mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against the will of
the accused". We can not accept such a theory. We believe it a sound rule to lay down,
that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the
case does not constitute a consent within the meaning of section 28 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the same
offense is as important as the other constitutional rights of the accused in a criminal
case. Its waiver can not, and should not, be predicated on mere silence.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Vickers, and Butte , JJ., concur.

PSB v. Bermoy
PSB v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005
 
FACTS: Based on a complaint filed by petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (“petitioner”),
respondents Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy (“respondent spouses”) were charged with
estafa thru falsification of a public document in the Regional Trial Court.
Upon arraignment, respondent spouses pleaded “not guilty” to the charge and the case
was set for trial.
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed, with leave of court, a demurrer
to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to identify respondent spouses as
the accused. The trial court dismissed the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied petition
holding that the trial court was correct in granting the demurrer to evidence for
insufficiency of evidence on account of lack of proper identification of the accused.  But
even assuming that the trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no longer be
reviewed either on appeal or on petition for certiorari for it would violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy.
Thus this petition. The Solicitor General contends that the trial court’s dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion thus, double
jeopardy does not apply in this case.
 
ISSUE: W/N Double Jeopardy is applicable in the case at bar?
 
HELD: YES. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 requires the following elements in
the first criminal case:
 
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction;
 
(b)   The court had jurisdiction;
 
(c)    The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
 
(d)   He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express
consent.[15]
 
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the express consent or upon
motion of the accused does not result in double jeopardy.  However, this rule is subject
to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or on
the denial of the right to speedy trial.[16]  A dismissal upon demurrer to evidence falls
under the first exception.  Since such dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to an
acquittal.
 
As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the elements required in Section 7 were all
present in Criminal Case No. 96-154193. Thus, the Information for estafa through
falsification of a public document against respondent spouses was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction.  The trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the
persons of respondent spouses.  Respondent spouses were arraigned during which they
entered “not guilty” pleas.  Finally, Criminal Case No. 96-154193 was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense became vested on respondent spouses.
 
Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]ny party may appeal from a
final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy.”
 
Here, petitioner seeks a review of the 21 April 1998 Order dismissing Criminal Case No.
96-154193 for insufficiency of evidence. It is in effect appealing from a judgment of
acquittal. By mandate of the Constitution and Section 7, the courts are barred from
entertaining such appeal as it seeks an inquiry into the merits of the dismissal.

In RE Habeas Corpus. Aclaraction vs. Gatmaitan [GR L-39115, 26 May 1975] En Banc,
Aquino (J): 7 concur, 1 concur in result, 3 filed separate concurring opinions

Facts: Segifredo L. Aclaracion functioned as a temporary stenographer in the Gapan

branch of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija from 1 October 1969 to 21
November 1971. His appointment expired on 21 November 1972 while he was working
as a temporary stenographer in the CFI of Manila. Thereafter, he was employed as a
stenographer in the Public Assistance and Claims Adjudication Division of the Insurance
Commission, where he is now working. After Aclaracion had ceased to be a court
stenographer, the Court of Appeals required him to transcribe his stenographic notes in
two cases decided by the Gapan court which had been appealed (Muncal vs. Eugenio,
CA-GR 49711-R and Paderes vs. Domingo, CA-GR 52367-R). He failed to comply with the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals. He was declared in contempt of court. On May 29
and July 29, 1974 Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan and Justice Jose N. Leuterio, Chairmen of
the Third and Seventh Divisions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, ordered the Chief
of Police of Makati, Rizal (Colonel Ruperto B. Acle), to arrest Aclaracion, a resident of
that municipality, and to confine him in jail until he submits a complete transcript of his
notes in the said cases. Aclaracion was arrested on 21 June 1974 and incarcerated in the
municipal jail. In a petition dated 12 July 1974 he asked the Court of Appeals that he be
not required to transcribe his notes in all the cases tried in the Gapan court. He
suggested that the testimonies in the said cases be retaken. The Third Division of the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of 7 August 1974 ordered the release of Aclaracion.
Later, he transcribed his notes in the Muncal case. However, the warden did not release
him because of the order of arrest issued by the Seventh Division. On 9 August 1974
Aclaracion filed in the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus. He advanced the
novel contention that to compel him to transcribe his stenographic notes, after he
ceased to be a stenographer, would be a transgression of the rule that "no involuntary
servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted" (Sec. 14, Art. IV, Bill of Rights, 1972 Constitution).

Issue: Whether the fact that a former court stenographer was compelled to transcribe
his stenographic notes is a transgression of the right against involuntary servitude.

Held: An Appellate Court may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe his
stenographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or incidental to its appellate jurisdiction
and is a part of its inherent powers which are necessary to the ordinary and efficient
exercise of its jurisdiction and essential to the due administration of justice. The
provision of section 12, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that "upon the approval of the
record on appeal the clerk shall direct the stenographer or stenographers concerned to
attach to the record of the case 5 copies of the transcript of the oral evidence referred
to in the record on appeal" includes stenographers who are no longer in the judiciary.
The traditional made of exercising the court's coercive power is to hold the recalcitrant
or negligent stenographer in contempt of court if he does not comply with the order for
the transcription of his notes and imprison him until he obeys the order. Another
sanction to compel the transcription is to hold in abeyance the transfer, promotion,
resignation or clearance of a stenographer until he completes the transcription of his
notes.

US VS POMPEYA
G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

FACTS:

This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of
Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for
willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service
on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance.

Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the
complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is
unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which
guarantees the liberty of the citizens.

The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the
said law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of
their rights therein guaranteed

HELD:

The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the
specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the
municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so
required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the
community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the
existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for
those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309
falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and
justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and
that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor
in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

U.S. Supreme Court

Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897)

Robertson v. Baldwin

No. 334
Argued December 15, 1896

Decided January 25, 1897

165 U.S. 275

Syllabus

Section 4598 of the Revised Statutes is not unconstitutional by reason of its authorizing
justices of the peace to issue warrants to apprehend deserting seamen and deliver them
up to the master of their vessel.

The judicial power of the United States is defined by the Constitution, and does not
prevent Congress from authorizing state officers to take affidavits, to arrest and commit
for trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to
perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power, rather
than a part of it.

Section 4598 and 4599, insofar as they require seamen to carry out the contracts
contained in their shipping articles, are not in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment
forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, and it cannot be open to doubt that the
provision against involuntary servitude was never intended to apply to such contracts.

The contract of a sailor has always been treated as an exceptional one, and involving to
a certain extent the surrender of his personal liberty during the life of the contract.

This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of
California, rendered August 5, 1895, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued upon the
petition of Robert Robertson, H. H. Olsen, John Bradley, and Morris Hanson.

The petition set forth in substance that the petitioners were unlawfully restrained of
their liberty by Barry Baldwin, Marshal for the Northern District of California, in the
county jail of Alameda County, by virtue of an order of commitment, made by a United
States commissioner, committing them for trial upon a charge of disobedience of the
lawful orders of the master of the American barkentine Arago; that such commitment

Page 165 U. S. 276

was made without reasonable or probable cause, in this, that at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, petitioners were held on board the Arago against
their will and by force, having been theretofore placed on board said vessel by the
Marshal for the District of Oregon, under the provisions of Rev.St. § 4596, subdivision 1,
and §§ 4598, 4599, the master claiming the right to hold petitioners by virtue of these
acts; that §§ 4598 and 4599 are unconstitutional and in violation of Section 1 of Article
III of, and of the Fifth Amendment to, the Constitution; that § 4598 was also repealed by
Congress on June 7, 1872, 17 Stat. 262, and that the first subdivision of § 4596 is in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment in that it compels involuntary servitude.

The record was somewhat meager, but it sufficiently appeared that the petitioners had
shipped on board the Arago at San Francisco for a voyage to Knappton, in the State of
Washington, thence to Valparaiso, and thence to such other foreign ports as the master
might direct, and return to a port of discharge in the United States; that they had each
signed shipping articles to perform the duties of seamen during the course of the
voyage, but, becoming dissatisfied with their employment, they left the vessel at
Astoria, in the State of Oregon, and were subsequently arrested, under the provisions of
Rev.Stat. §§ 4596 to 4599, taken before a justice of the peace, and by him committed to
jail until the Arago was ready for sea (some sixteen days), when they were taken from
the jail by the marshal, and placed on board the Arago against their will; that they
refused to "turn to" in obedience to the orders of the master, were arrested at San
Francisco, charged with refusing to work in violation of Rev.Stat. § 4596, were
subsequently examined before a commissioner of the circuit court, and by him held to
answer such charge before the District Court for the Northern District of California.

Shortly thereafter they sued out this writ of habeas corpus, which, upon a hearing
before the district court, was dismissed, and an order made remanding the prisoners to
the custody of the marshal.

ORLANDO L. SALVADOR v. PLACIDO L. MAPA, GR No. 135080, 2007-11-28

Facts:
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans,... Several
loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines,
Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan transactions, the
Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined
under Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were
known cronies of then President
Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at
the time the loan was granted.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and
representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of Sections 3(e)
and (g) of Republic Act
No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the respondents... the
Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution,[6] dismissing the complaint. The
Ombudsman conceded that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of
preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed... the complaint holding that the
offenses charged had already prescribed,... It bears mention that the acts complained of
were committed before the issuance of BP 195 on March 2, 1982. Hence, the
prescriptive period in the instant case is ten (10) years as provided in the (sic) Section 11
of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions between 1978 and
1981 transpired at the time when there was yet no Presidential Order or Directive
naming, classifying or categorizing them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.
the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on October 8, 1992
under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61, dated
November 9, 1992, was issued defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference
in determining... behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be considered the
bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses committed, they become ex-post
facto laws which are proscribed by the Constitution.
The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it on
July 27, 1998.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. 3019 HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED ITS COMPLAINT.
WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND MEMORANDUM ORDER NO.
61 ARE EX-POST FACTO LAW[S]
Ruling:
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,[13] thus:
[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because,
as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries
of the... loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the
offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be
computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.
Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the discovery of the
offenses, and since discovery could not have been made earlier than October 8, 1992,
the date when the Committee was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed
by the respondents had not... yet prescribed when the complaint was filed on October
4, 1996.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable
implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution
is clear beyond... reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of
constitutionality.
In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61
are not ex post facto laws.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the
passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such
action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed;
or (c) which... changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense in order... to convict the defendant.[22] This Court added
two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful; or (f) that which... deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws.
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the
shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not mete out
penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely
provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is,
therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule that the subject administrative and
memorandum orders are ex post facto.
CUMMINGS V. MISSOURI

CUMMINGS V. MISSOURI, 4 Wallace 277 (1866). Acting against the interests of

congressional Republicans, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a provision in the
Missouri constitution of 1865 that required public and corporation officers, attorneys,
teachers, and clergymen, as a qualification of entering the duties of their office, to take
an oath that they had never given aid to the rebellious Confederate states or expressed
sympathy with the secessionist cause. The requirement, ruled the Court, violated the
federal constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder—legislative acts that allow an
individual or group to be singled out and punished without a trial.

United States Supreme Court

CUMMINGS v. STATE OF MISSOURI(1866)

No. 45
Argued: Decided: December 1, 1866

[71 U.S. 277, 279]   IN January, 1865, a convention of representatives of the people of
Missouri assembled at St. Louis, for the purpose of amending the constitution of the
State. The representatives had been elected in November, 1864. In April, 1865, the
present constitution-amended and revised from the previous one-was adopted by the
convention; and in June, 1865, by a vote of the people. The following are the third, sixth,
seventh, ninth, and fourteenth sections of the second article of the constitution:

SEC. 3. At any election held by the people under this Constitution, or in pursuance of any
law of this State, or under any ordinance or by-law of any municipal corporation, no
person shall be deemed a qualified voter, who has ever been in armed hostility to the
United States, or to the lawful authorities thereof, or to the government of this State; or
has ever given aid, comfort, countenance, or support to persons engaged in any such
hostility; or has ever, in any manner, adhered to the enemies, foreign or domestic, of
the United States, either by contributing to them, or by unlawfully sending within their
lines, money, goods, letters, or information; or has ever disloyally held communication
with such enemies; or has ever advised or aided any person to enter the service of such
enemies; or has ever, by act or word, manifested his adherence to the cause of such
enemies, or his desire for their triumph over the arms of the United States, or his
sympathy with those engaged in exciting or carrying on rebellion against the United
States; or has ever, except under overpowering compulsion, submitted to the authority,
or been in the service, of the so-called 'Confederate States of America;' or has ever left
this State, and gone within the lines of the armies of the so-called 'Confederate States of
America,' with the purpose of adhering to said States or armies; or has ever been a
member of, or connected with, any order, society, or organization, inimical to the
government of the United States, or to the government of this State; or has ever been
engaged in guerilla warfare against loyal inhabitants of the United States, or in that
description of marauding commonly known as 'bush-whacking;' or has ever knowingly
and willingly harbored, aided, or countenanced any person so engaged; or has ever
come into or left this State, for the purpose of avoiding enrolment for or draft [71 U.S.
277, 280]   into the military service of the United States; or has ever, with a view to
avoid enrolment in the militia of this State, or to escape the performance of duty
therein, or for any other purpose, enrolled himself, or authorized himself to be enrolled,
by or before any officer, as disloyal, or as a southern sympathizer, or in any other terms
indicating his disaffection to the Government of the United States in its contest with
rebellion, or his sympathy with those engaged in such rebellion; or, having ever voted at
any election by the people in this State, or in any other of the United States, or in any of
their Territories, or held office in this State, or in any other of the United States, or in
any of their Territories, or under the United States, shall thereafter have sought or
received, under claim of alienage, the protection of any foreign government, through
any consul or other officer thereof, in order to secure exemption from military duty in
the militia of this State, or in the army of the United States: nor shall any such person be
capable of holding in this State any office of honor, trust, or profit, under its authority;
or of being an officer, councilman, director, trustee, or other manager of any
corporation, public or private, now existing or hereafter established by its authority; or
of acting as a professor or teacher in any educational institution, or in any common or
other school; or of holding any real estate or other property in trust for the use of any
church, religious society, or congregation. But the foregoing provisions, in relation to
acts done against the United States, shall not apply to any person not a citizen thereof,
who shall have committed such acts while in the service of some foreign country at war
with the United States, and who has, since such acts, been naturalized, or may hereafter
be naturalized, under the laws of the United States and the oath of loyalty hereinafter
prescribed, when taken by any such person, shall be considered as taken in such sense.

SEC. 6. The oath to be taken as aforesaid shall be known as the Oath of Loyalty, and shall
be in the following terms:
'I, A. B., do solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with the terms of the third
section of the second article of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, adopted
in the year eighteen hundred and sixty-five, and have carefully considered the
same; that I have never, directly or indirectly, done any of the acts in said section
specified; that I have always been truly and loyally on the side of the United
States against all enemies thereof, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith
and allegiance to the United States, and will support the Constitution and laws
thereof as the supreme [71 U.S. 277, 281]   law of the land, any law or ordinance
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; that I will, to the best of my ability,
protect and defend the Union of the United States, and not allow the same to be
broken up and dissolved, or the government thereof to be destroyed or
overthrown, under any circumstances, if in my power to prevent it; that I will
support the Constitution of the State of Missouri; and that I make this oath
without any mental reservation or evasion, and hold it to be binding on me.'
Ex post facto law, law that retroactively makes criminal conduct that was not criminal
when performed, increases the punishment for crimes already committed, or changes
the rules of procedure in force at the time an alleged crime was committed in a way
substantially disadvantageous to the accused.

The Constitution of the United States forbids Congress and the states to pass any ex
post facto law. In 1798 it was determined that this prohibition applies only to criminal
laws and is not a general restriction on retroactive legislation. Implicit in the prohibition
is the notion that individuals can be punished only in accordance with standards of
conduct that they might have ascertained before acting. The clause also serves, in
conjunction with the prohibition of bills of attainder, as a safeguard against the historic
practice of passing laws to punish particular individuals because of their political beliefs.
In 1867, in Cummings v. Missouri and Ex parte Garland, the United States Supreme
Court condemned as both bills of attainder and ex post facto laws the passage of post-
American Civil War loyalty-test oaths, which were designed to keep Confederate
sympathizers from practicing certain professions.
The policies underlying ex post facto laws are recognized in most developed legal
systems, reflected in the civil law maxim nulla poena sine lege (“no punishment without
law”), a principle whose roots are embedded in Roman law. In England Parliament is not
prohibited from passing ex post facto laws. However, following the common-
law tradition, judges have refused to interpret legislation retroactively unless Parliament
has clearly expressed such an intention.
CITATION
71 US 277 (1867)
ARGUED
Mar 17, 1866; Mar 16, 1866; Mar 19, 1866; Mar 20, 1866
DECIDED
Jan 14, 1867

Facts of the case

Following the Civil War, Congress and Missouri adopted provisions that required
persons in specified professional occupations to take an oath that they have never given
aid to the rebellion and secession. Missouri convicted a priest who refused to take the
oath. A former Confederate congressman asked the Supreme Court for permission to
practice without taking the federal oath.
Question

Do the state and national oaths violate prohibitions against ex post facto laws and bills
of attainder of the Constitution?

Conclusion

Field, writing for a divided Court, held that both state and national oath laws were
unconstitutional. The oath laws transformed acts that had not been forbidden into
crimes and increased the punishment of acts that were known to be crimes. The oath
laws were also bills of attainder since they were legislative acts that inflicted
punishment without the benefit of a trial by a judge.

BOCEA vs. Teves Case Digest

 0

Facts:

On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No.
9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials
and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Each
Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from
the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3)
terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe
a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the
issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it
inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without
trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to
impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets;
that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is
immediately executory.

Issue:

Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.

Held:

No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or

members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are
a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. 

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to
inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the
termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences
thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the
concerned employee are amply protected. (BOCEA vs. Teves, G.R. No. 181704,
December 6, 2011, 661 SCRA 589)

Feria vs CA, GR No. 122954, February 15, 2000; 525 SCRA 525_digested

Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings –Habeas Corpus)
Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the
judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of
Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued
detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to
due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case
does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the
petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the
case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of
a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and
that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the  habeas
corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently
shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his
conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the
discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.
Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his
criminal records.
Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may
also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioner’s claim is anchored on
the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding
the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right
to due process.Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there
is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which
serves as the legal basis for his detention.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the
petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to
exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for
the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of
the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima
facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof
to show that the restraint is illegal.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged,
its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.

NAVA v. GATMAITAN G.R. No. L-4855|11 October 1951

FACTS:

On 22 October 1950, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
decreed by virtue of the following Proclamation No. 210 issued by President Elpidio
Quirino. The immediate cause for the issuance of Proclamation No. 210, was the
apprehension and detention of lawless elements in whose possession strong and
convincing evidence was allegedly found showing that they are engaged in rebellious,
seditious and otherwise subversive acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not, a person covered by Proclamation No. 210 which has been
formally charged with rebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies, may be
entitled to bail.

RULING: Yes. Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution, “all
persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged
with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong.” The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is certainly not a capital offense, because it is penalized only by prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed Php20,000.00. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are separate and co-equal. If the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the suspension of the right to bail, they
would have very easily provided that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong and except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. The
right to bail; along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and counsel; to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to have a speedy
and public trial; to meet the witnesses face to face; and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, tends to aid the accused to prove his
innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension of the distinct right to bail or to be
provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply the suspension of all his other rights
(even the rights to be tried by a court) that may win for him ultimate acquittal and,
hence, absolute freedom. The latter result is not insisted upon for being patently
untenable.

RODRIGUEZ vs ARROYO
AUGUST 28, 2018  GRACEZYL BLANCO LEAVE A COMMENT
Noriel H. Rodriguez vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS
AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT.
AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an
officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name
HARRY, ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN BONG PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN
G.R. No. 191805
November 15, 2011
FACTS: Noriel Rodriguez (petitioner) is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP members as an enemy of the
state, making its members an easy target of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
On September 6, 2009, Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio
Carlos in Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get
inside a car where more men in civilian clothing were waiting (1 was holding a .45
caliber pistol).
The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced him to confess that he is
a member of the New People’s Army (NPA). Rodriguez remained silent until they
reached a military camp belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was then subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine
Army. Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and then
pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez cannot answer, he is
repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was also coerced to sign several documents
to declare that he is a surenderree.
On September 17, 2009,  Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him
(accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan). They insisted to
take Rodriguez home with them to Manila.
Rodriguez arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went
inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite Rodriguez’s effort to
stop them.
On November 3, Rodriguez and his girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men
are following them on the streets, jeepney and MRT.
On December 7, Rodriguez filed  a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.
The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt.
Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt.
Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan.
Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double agent, and had been working as their
informant/infiltrator in the fight against NPA rebels.
Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-general, insisted on her
immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as president).
Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged the
abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of the Philippine Army. SC directed the
Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa, Tolentino,
Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture.  As to Calog and
Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On President Arroyo, the case was
dismissed on account of her immunity from suits.
ISSUE:
1. WON President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent by virtue of her
presidential immunity from suit
2. WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in writs of
amparo and habeas data cases.
HELD:
(1) CA’s rationale does not stand anymore since the presidential immunity from suits
only applies during her incumbency. “Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or
from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not
beyond.”
“A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed
during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with
disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the
search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.”
Term vs Tenure: The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another.
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to limit the president’s
immunity from suits during their tenure (and not term).
“It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit
to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of
amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.”
(2) Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of
Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his
rights.
Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or
administrative liability, but this should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility.
“In the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of
the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on
the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry,
but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance.”
“Despite maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No.
191805, and allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo
and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence
that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his
rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial
evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan.”
SC affirmed the decision of the CA, but with modifications. The case is dismissed with
respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin
Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

EDGARDO NAVIA v. VIRGINIA PARDICO, GR No. 184467, 2012-06-19

Facts:
For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation
and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be
shown by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried... out by,
"or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the government] or a political
organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on
the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons."... his petition for review on certiorari
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
Corporation[8] (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at
7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam, Malolos City. The...
arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolita's son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico
(Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate,
she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle.
One of them immediately asked Lolita where... they could find her son Bong. Before
Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with
them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them
for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.[9]
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of
Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.[10] The supervisor of the security
guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties' respective versions diverge.
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her
husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together
with Bong the night before.
In the course of the investigation on Ben's disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that
petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the
logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when in truth and in fact she never
witnessed his actual... release. The last time she saw Ben was when she left him in
petitioners' custody at the security office.[27]
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition
for Writ of Amparo[28] before the RTC of Malolos City.
Issues:
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.
4.1.1.  WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS HAVE
COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBAND'S RIGHT TO
LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.
4.1.2.  WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.
4.1.3.  WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.
[39]
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it
proper and appropriate, as follows:
(a)  To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately conduct
a deep and thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and
Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of
[Benhur] Pardico,... utilizing in the process, as part of the investigation, the documents
forming part of the records of this case;
(b)  To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the
witnesses who testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their
safety and security; and
(c)  To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the
circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the
[petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the
pertinent... documents and admissions forming part of the record of this case, and take
whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.
Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director
Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos
City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia
Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST IS

DISCRETIONARY UPON THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE.
Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]

Doctrine: Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression

FACTS: This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias,

manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano
Fugoso, to compel the
latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov
16, 1947. The
petitioner requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public meeting”. However, the
respondent refused
to issue such permit because he found “that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing
groups, remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith
and confidence of
the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public
order.” Respondent
based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against
public peace, and
penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession,
tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any
unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is
Sec. 1119, Free
use of Public Place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence
violating freedom of
assembly.

HELD: The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech,
and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not
absolute. They can
be regulated under the state’s police power – that they should not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment
of others having equal rights, nor to the rights of the community or society.
The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the
City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the
City of Manila;
and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or
public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of
the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing
to minimize the
risk of disorder.
The court favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to
authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government
no such unlimited
power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps
in cases of national
emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places
and not for the
assembly itself.
The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck down.
Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground
to believe that
the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in