F-22 Acquisition Program: Consequences For The US Air Force's Fighter Fleet, The / LT Col Christopher J. Niemi, USAF / 2012
F-22 Acquisition Program: Consequences For The US Air Force's Fighter Fleet, The / LT Col Christopher J. Niemi, USAF / 2012
F-22 Acquisition Program: Consequences For The US Air Force's Fighter Fleet, The / LT Col Christopher J. Niemi, USAF / 2012
Figure 1. The Air Force’s current inventory of fighter aircraft, by year of delivery.
(From Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces
[Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, May 2009], 9, http://www.cbo.gov
/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/101xx/doc10113/05-13-fighterforces.pdf.)
ATF’s design. Developed about a decade after the F-15, these platforms
possessed similar aerodynamic performance although their avionics
and long-range weapons remained inferior. Nonetheless, these Soviet
advancements led Air Force leaders to believe that the F-15’s decisive
air superiority advantage was fading. They wanted the ATF to preserve
the technological advantage needed to battle superior Soviet numbers
without incurring unacceptable losses.6
Seven companies presented proposals to the Air Force during the
concept-exploration phase. The service subsequently decided to incor-
porate a demonstration/evaluation phase with two contractors com-
peting in a flight-test competition using full-scale prototypes, selecting
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to lead the two teams in de-
veloping the YF-22 and YF-23, respectively. In 1991 Secretary of the
Air Force Donald Rice announced that although both designs met re-
quirements, the Lockheed Martin proposal was superior because it of-
fered “better capability at lower cost.”7 The Air Force considered the
Lockheed Martin / Boeing / General Dynamics team more likely to
deliver on its promises than the Northrop / McDonnell Douglas team,
whose reputation was tarnished by B-2 problems and the A-12 cancel-
lation.8 Thus, the ATF became the Lockheed Martin F-22.
The demonstration/evaluation phase transitioned to the engineer-
ing, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase in 1991. At that
time, the Air Force forecast that the new fighter would reach initial
operational capability (IOC) 10 years later—in 2001.9 Although the
service intended to replace approximately 790 air superiority F-15s
with F-22s, early post–Cold War cuts reduced planned production from
750 to 648 in 1991.10 At that time, it estimated the total cost of the pro-
gram at $99.1 billion in “then-year dollars.”11 Of that amount, $19.5 bil-
lion was dedicated to development (including $3.7 billion already
spent during demonstration/evaluation).12 The remaining $79.6 billion
went to production, making the average production unit cost (APUC)
$122.8 million.13
ficed for the F-22 during the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) negotiations.21
The F-22 program survived, but the aircraft needed to do more.
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition John Deutch was initially
undecided on the F-22. He advocated that the initial operational air-
craft incorporate an air-to-ground strike capability, enabling the F-22 to
eventually replace the F-117.22 In response, the Air Force moved to
broaden the F-22’s capabilities by formalizing limited air-to-ground
strike—a capability under consideration for some time. The modified
F-22 design carried two 1,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) guided by the Global Positioning System in its internal
weapon bays. Lockheed Martin incorporated this “add-on” capability
for the relatively modest sum of $6.5 million.23 For the first time, the
Air Force had modified the F-22’s design to incorporate an additional
capability other than air-to-air.
The BUR, released in 1993, further reduced the Air Force’s fighter
strength to 20 fighter wing equivalents.24 Planned F-22 production also
decreased to 442 jets, a roughly proportional cut consistent with the
new, smaller force structure. Although disappointed, the Air Force was
relieved that the F-22’s projected IOC date did not slip further beyond
2003 (since 1991 it had already slipped two years).25
stealth that strongly influenced the Air Force’s acquisition policy for
the next 20 years: “As we field combat air forces for the future, stealth
and precision must be first-order requirements.”28 His testimony to
Congress provided the most plausible F-22 justification, arguing that
the F-15C’s replacement must preserve the ability to operate over en-
emy territory: “If we want to defend United States airspace, the F-15
will work fine. But I do not know where we are going to have to go in
the year 2010 and have this fight. What I do know is I want to fight
over his guys—not over my guys—and that is what air superiority
means to us, and that is really why we need the F-22” (emphasis in
original).29 However, General McPeak also argued that we needed the
F-22 for lower-threat environments, noting that Bosnian air operations
also justified the aircraft even though pilots did not face advanced
threats there.30 The Air Force’s support for the F-22 remained consis-
tent and unified, but others were not convinced.
In December 1993, the General Accounting Office (GAO) presented
a classified F-22 report to Congress. An unclassified version, along with
public testimony, followed in early 1994.31 The report assessed the
F-15 as superior to projected air threats in four of five performance cat-
egories (flight performance, radar, long-range missiles, short-range
missiles, and range). Additionally, the report analyzed seven countries
whose air forces represented potential threats to future air superiority
missions. It concluded that (except for China) each of those air forces
possessed between 188 and 460 fighter aircraft, far fewer than the
number of US air superiority F-15s in service at that time. Further-
more none of them had more than a handful of advanced fighter air-
craft with performance in the F-15’s class. Finally, the report predicted
that high costs likely would prevent proliferation of these aircraft. In
short the GAO recognized that the F-22 greatly improved air superior-
ity capabilities but contended that the F-15 could adequately meet air
superiority requirements through at least 2014. Based on this assess-
ment, it recommended that the Air Force delay IOC for seven years.
force structure decisions.”44 The only silver lining was that the Air
Force had received a “promise to support production of two wings of
F-22 strike aircraft,” which would restore total F-22 production to the
400–500 range—a promise never kept.45
James Roche later quantified the exact requirement at 381, after in-
cluding training, test, and attrition F-22s in the total.49 The AEF re-
quirement formed the foundation of the Air Force’s F-22 acquisition ar-
gument throughout production years.
In 2001 President George W. Bush appointed Donald Rumsfeld secre-
tary of defense with a mandate to reform the DOD. Secretary Rums-
feld used the word transformation to describe the process of preparing
the department for new and different threats in the post–Cold War
world. During early testimony to the House Appropriations Commit-
tee, he also made clear the need for recapitalization: “The Tomahawk
cruise missile program, the F-15, F-18 and the F-16 aircraft flying to-
day, were developed in the 1970s. . . . Because of the long procure-
ment holiday of the 1990s, we have been left a poor hand. We must re-
solve to leave a better hand to our successors.”50 The only question
concerned which acquisition programs supported transformation.
Even at this early point, Secretary Rumsfeld appeared skeptical about
the F-22 program; in fact, he did not mention the Air Force’s highest
acquisition priority a single time during his testimony.
By late 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld had concluded that additional F-22s
did not support his transformation vision, so he sought additional pro-
duction cuts. Massive cost overruns, combined with a high-profile ac-
quisition scandal involving senior acquisition executive Darleen
Druyun, undermined the Air Force’s ability to defend the program.51
Late in 2004, Presidential Budget Directive 753 removed production
funding after FY 2008, effectively ending production at 183 F-22s.52
The Air Force spent the next five years trying to overturn this decision
but ultimately secured support for only four additional F-22s
However, the F-22’s utility for these missions depends very much on
the threat. In the absence of radar-dependent surface threats, it offers
no advantage over older fourth-generation aircraft in air-to-ground mis-
sions. The next question addresses how much this performance cost.
The F-22 program embraced many leading-edge technologies. It was
the first operational air-to-air fighter to incorporate stealth, integrated
avionics, thrust vectoring, and supercruise. Congress, especially the
House of Representatives, expressed concern about the F-22 from the
beginning because members believed that the Air Force had a “highly
unrealistic assumption of outyear funding levels.”61 By 1993 the GAO,
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and Defense Science Board had ex-
pressed concern about the discontinuity between the DOD’s projected
funding levels and projected program costs.62 Continuing perturbations
due to technical challenges and funding instability forced the Air Force
to restructure the F-22 program in 1993, 1994, 1996, and 1997—while
developmental cost simultaneously increased by $5 billion.63
Diminished congressional confidence in the Air Force’s ability to
control program costs led to the FY 1998 cost caps. When those caps
were originally set, near-unanimous consensus existed regarding pro-
jected developmental costs among the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), JET, Air Force,
and CBO. All of them estimated the EMD cost at $18.7 billion and the
total research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) cost at
approximately $22.4 billion.64 Unanticipated technical problems that
came to light a few years later prevented the four independent esti-
mates from predicting the later cost overruns. By 2007 the cost of total
RDT&E had ballooned to approximately $30.4 billion, about 36 percent
more than the FY 1998 congressional limit and 56 percent more than
planned at the beginning of EMD.65
Unlike forecasts of developmental expenses, estimates of production
costs varied widely in 1997. The Air Force had the lowest estimate but
still expected production to cost billions more than the $43.4 billion
limit imposed by Congress. The CBO, OSD CAIG, and JET predicted
higher production costs although all estimates were lower than the ac-
tual costs.66 The author could find no explanation for why Congress set
the production cap at $43.4 billion, a level inadequate to fund 339 F-22s
under the best of circumstances. By FY 2009, Congress had adjusted the
original $43.4 billion production limit to $37.6 billion since inflation
was in fact lower than assumed in the original FY 1998 legislation.67 As
production drew to a close, an estimate for the total cost for mass pro-
ducing 179 aircraft (EMD money funded eight “preproduction” aircraft
conforming to production standards) came to $34.1 billion—about 90
percent of the total allocated for 339 F-22s in the FY 1998 legislation.
The F-22’s APUC was $191.6 million—56 percent higher than the
$122.8 million planned at the beginning of EMD.68
Figure 3 compares these cost performance numbers to those of other
fighter developmental programs. It depicts the total growth of program
cost throughout EMD (except for the F-35, which will not complete
EMD for many years) and demonstrates that despite the F-22’s unprec-
edented cost increases, they remained roughly consistent with those of
other cutting-edge technology defense programs. For example, F-14
program costs increased 45 percent during its EMD.69 Furthermore,
since beginning EMD, the F-35 program has experienced a 58 percent
growth in the cost of RDT&E and an 81 percent growth in projected
APUC, already exceeding the total growth of the F-22 program.70 Since
the F-35 EMD will continue for many years, additional developmental
problems (and cost increases) will almost certainly emerge. Nonethe-
less, total planned production thus far has been only modestly affected
because the Air Force, Navy, and Marines (along with the services of
several partner nations) desperately need the F-35 to recapitalize thou-
sands of aging fighters. Thus, the F-22’s cost overruns, though substan-
tial, were not the primary factor in curtailing production.
Actual Cost/Projected
Cost
? F-14
F-16
1.4 F-18E/F
F-22
1.2
F-35
(F-35 EMD
is not complete.)
1
0.8
Why 187?
The ATF was designed for a specific mission—countering the Soviet
Union’s advanced fighter aircraft. The dissolution of that state effec-
tively eliminated this threat and simultaneously undermined the Air
Force’s threat-based argument. The service continued to argue vigor-
ously that fighting large numbers of advanced fighters remained a
valid requirement, even as the post-Soviet development of Russian ad-
vanced fighters slowed to a crawl. The failure of potential adversaries
such as Iraq, North Korea, or Iran to acquire significant numbers of ad-
vanced air-to-air fighters further undermined the Air Force’s argument.
Against this backdrop, two factors further weakened the service’s po-
sition. First, as described in the earlier historical analysis, Air Force of-
ficials made overly optimistic claims about F-22 capabilities. Although
intended to convince congressional and DOD skeptics that the F-22
was a good investment, these claims significantly damaged the Air
Force’s credibility and ultimately limited its ability to defend the pro-
gram. Second, the Air Force (and Lockheed Martin) repeatedly demon-
strated that they could not accurately predict the program’s total cost
or timeline—a fact made clear by multiple cost overruns and program
restructurings. By the late 1990s, these factors, in combination with a
limited air-to-air threat, exacerbated the Air Force’s difficulty in secur-
ing additional program funding. However, the F-22 retained strong
congressional support, particularly from those districts and states di-
rectly involved with production. The FY 1998 cost caps enabled Con-
gress to limit total expenditures without alienating these influential
constituencies.
In 2003 planned production decreased to 276 under the FY 1998 pro-
gram’s cost caps as cost overruns continued to mount. The AEF argu-
ment proved no more effective than the threat-based one from the de-
cade prior; therefore, the cost cap remained the de facto limit. Clearly,
Congress could have repealed the production cap (as it had done with
the developmental cap in FY 2002) but did not support additional pro-
duction. In the end, the Air Force could not have fought harder for the
F-22: the dogmatic support for the program by General Moseley and
Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne evidently played a key role
in their unprecedented dismissal.71
Primarily, the Air Force acquired only 187 F-22s because they were
both too expensive and too specialized. The aircraft could have exe-
cuted combat missions any time after attaining IOC in 2005, but the
nation simply did not need its unique capabilities in those conflicts.
Since becoming operational, the F-22 has conducted only deterrence
deployments and homeland defense intercepts—missions hardly wor-
thy of its unmatched prowess and cost. Meanwhile, F-15Es, F-16s,
F/A-18s, and A-10s continued to prove their utility, flying combat in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Furthermore, F-15Cs updated with new,
advanced radars, avionics, and weapons remain competitive with all
air-to-air platforms currently fielded by potential adversaries.
As production began to wind down, the Air Force could not convince
Congress to raise total program funding, despite the exceptional perfor-
mance demonstrated by the F-22. Figure 4 depicts how decreased pro-
duction (after the 1997 QDR) offset increased developmental and pro-
duction costs, keeping total outlay under the FY 1998 cap. In the end,
the Air Force fielded just 25 percent of the F-22s originally planned
and less than half of its long-standing requirement of 381. The service
must consider this disparity between required and actual production
numbers in future acquisition programs.
800 90
Start EMD
700 80
70
600
60
F-22 Production
QDR
500
Projected Production Run
50
FY 1998 Caps
400 Projected Developmental Cost
40 ($ billion)
Projected Total Program Cost
300 Bottom-Up ($ billion)
Review 30
200
20
100 10
EMD
0 0
1990 1995 2000 2005
Alternative Possibilities
The F-22 acquisition program adversely affected recapitalization of
the fighter fleet in two ways. First, 187 F-22s cannot recapitalize the
entire air superiority F-15 fleet as originally planned; F-15Cs will need
to remain in service for many years to supplement the F-22s.72 Second,
and more significantly, the Air Force delayed multirole, close air sup-
port, and SEAD fighter recapitalization during the F-22 acquisition. As
a consequence, today’s average age for Air Force fighters is twice the
historical norms, and the service will not field significant numbers of
new fighter aircraft for many years. Could the Air Force have avoided
this predicament? It missed two key opportunities. First, the Air Force
could have delayed the start of EMD, reassessed ATF requirements,
and modified the F-22 design to broaden its capabilities. Second, it
could have acquired additional fourth-generation aircraft to mitigate
developmental risk with the F-35.
Conclusion
The ATF’s overly specialized design constituted a fundamental flaw
in the uncertain post–Cold War environment. The Air Force subse-
quently missed the best opportunity to adapt the F-22 when it issued
the EMD contract without modification to ATF requirements. Through-
out EMD, the service remained overly focused on the F-22 at the ex-
pense of A-10, F-15E, and F-16 recapitalization. When acquisition even-
tually shifted to the F-35, the Air Force largely ignored its F-22
experience and failed to plan for inevitable developmental problems
with the F-35. Despite massive cost overruns and schedule delays, the
Air Force continues to hope that the F-35 can solely recapitalize 1,770
aging F-15Es, F-16s, and A-10s. However, continuing developmental
problems and the emerging national fiscal crisis threaten to under-
mine this strategy.
Although stealth is a powerful enabler for offensive systems, its
greatest advantage lies in its ability to dramatically increase aircraft
survivability against radar-dependent threats. Consequently, stealth’s
utility depends on the presence of those threats. By insisting on ac-
quiring only stealth fighters (regardless of the cost), the Air Force as-
sumes that future adversaries will not counter stealth technology and
ignores the fact that many air combat operations continue to occur in
low-threat environments. For example, allied fourth-generation fight-
ers operated freely over large portions of Iraq (both in 1991 and 2003),
Serbia, and Libya from the beginning of those conflicts. Future hostili-
ties likely will continue this long-standing historical trend, and cur-
rently fielded stealth assets can mitigate risk to operations in high-
threat environments where fourth-generation fighters are most
vulnerable.
An all-stealth Air Force fighter fleet deserves reconsideration even
today. Stealth technology demands significant trade-offs in range, secu-
rity, weapons carriage, sortie generation, and adaptability. Stealth pro-
vides no advantage in conflicts such as those in Afghanistan or Iraq
(since 2003), and (despite its obvious utility) it cannot guarantee suc-
cess in future struggles with a near-peer adversary. Most importantly,
the cost of F-22s and F-35s threatens to reduce the size of the Air
Force’s fielded fighter fleet to dangerously small numbers, particularly
in the current fiscal environment. These facts suggest that the Air
Force should reconsider its long-standing position that fifth-generation
fighters are the only option for recapitalizing its fighter fleet.
Notes
1. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Depart-
ment of Defense, February 2010), 47, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as
_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. A fighter wing equivalent is defined as 72 primary-mission aircraft
designated for operational combat use, not including aircraft utilized for testing, training,
and attrition reserve.
2. Senate, “Air Force Tactical Aircraft Programs,” Statement of Lt Gen Herbert J. Carlisle,
USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Department of the Air Force, to
the Committee on Armed Services, Airland Subcommittee, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 24 May 2011,
4, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/05%20May/Carlisle%2005-24-11.pdf.
3. “Air Force Gen. T. Michael Moseley Transcript, Part One” [interview by Timothy
Clark], Government Executive, 31 October 2007, http://www.govexec.com
/dailyfed/1007/103107gg1.htm.
4. One hundred seventy-nine F-22s were built and funded through production monies,
beginning with number 17. Earlier, 16 F-22s were built for dedicated test and evaluation pur-
poses, but only eight of those were “production-representative.” Throughout, the article re-
fers to 187 total F-22s produced, including both “production” and “production-representative”
aircraft.
5. General Accounting Office, The Advanced Tactical Fighter’s Costs, Schedule, and Perfor-
mance Goals (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, January 1988), 15, http://www
.gao.gov/assets/150/146085.pdf.
6. Bill Sweetman, F-22 Raptor (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing Company, 1998), 10–11.
7. “Donald Rice Declares YF-22/YF119 a Winner in ATF Contest,” You Tube, video file, 23 April
1991, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9kR9aTZ9W3s.
8. David F. Bond, “Risk, Cost Sway Airframe, Engine Choices for ATF,” Aviation Week and
Space Technology 134, no. 17 (29 April 1991). (All references to Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology are derived from the LexisNexis Academic database.)
9. Sweetman, F-22 Raptor, 27.
10. Kevin N. Lewis, Downsizing Future USAF Fighter Forces: Living within the Constraints of
History (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 21–22, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph
_reports/2006/MR480.pdf.
11. General Accounting Office, F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned (Wash-
ington, DC: General Accounting Office, March 1994), 1, http://www.gao.gov/assets
/220/219340.pdf. “Then-year” dollars represent the estimated cost as paid throughout pro-
gram execution. All figures are then-year dollars unless otherwise noted and are rounded to
one decimal place.
12. Senate, Statement of Cindy Williams, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Con-
gressional Budget Office, on Modernizing Tactical Aircraft, before the Subcommittee on Airland
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 16 April 1997, 12, http://www
.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/42xx/doc4295/1997doc20-Entire.pdf.
13. General Accounting Office, Changing Conditions Drive Need for New F/A-22 Business
Case (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, March 2004), 6, http://www.gao.gov
/assets/250/241714.pdf. APUC represents the total procurement cost divided by the number
procured. It does not include research and development (including “preproduction” test air-
craft) or facility construction. Procurement acquisition unit cost (PAUC) represents the en-
tire program’s cost, including all research and development, program-specific support equip-
ment, facility construction, and initial spare parts, divided by the number procured. Here
APUC is calculated by dividing the production cost estimate by 648.
14. Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin Leuschner, Defense Planning in a Decade
of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review and Quadrennial Defense Review
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 97, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/monograph_reports/2007/MR1387.pdf; and House, Statement of Lane Pierrot, Senior Ana-
lyst, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office, on Aging Military Equipment, be-
fore the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Committee on Armed Services, 106th Cong., 1st
sess., 24 February 1999, 11, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/10xx
/doc1096/022499.pdf.
15. John D. Morrocco, “U.S. Uses Gulf War to Frame New Strategy,” Aviation Week and
Space Technology 140, no. 3 (17 January 1994).
16. Air Force Personnel Center, accessed 12 September 2012, http://www.afpc.af.mil/.
17. Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner, Defense Planning, 39.
18. General Accounting Office, Status of the Air Force’s Efforts to Replace the A-10 Aircraft
(Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, September 1988), 19, http://www.gao.gov
/assets/150/146941.pdf.
19. Michael D. Williams, Acquisition for the 21st Century: The F-22 Development Program
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 111, http://www.dtic.mil
/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA421919.
20. John D. Morrocco, “McPeak Sees Alternatives to Modernization Cuts,” Aviation Week
and Space Technology 141, no. 13 (26 September 1994).
21. Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner, Defense Planning, 57. The A/F-X and Multirole
Fighter technologies were rolled into the Joint Attack Strike Technology program, which in
turn became the Joint Strike Fighter.
22. David A. Fulghum, “Pentagon to Kill A/F-X, Retain F-22,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology 138, no. 24 (14 June 1993). At Holloman AFB, New Mexico, F-22s replaced F-117s
when the latter were retired in 2008.
23. John D. Morrocco, “F-22 to Have Limited Ground Attack Capability,” Aviation Week
and Space Technology 138, no. 22 (31 May 1993).
24. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, DC: Depart-
ment of Defense, October 1993), 28.
25. Fulghum, “Pentagon to Kill A/F-X.”
26. Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner, Defense Planning, 46.
27. David A. Fulghum, “Cost, Mission Disputes Jeopardize F-22,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology 140, no. 14 (4 April 1994); and David A. Fulghum, “Big F-22 Budget Drives Search
for Flaws,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 142, no. 15 (10 April 1995).
28. Merrill A. McPeak, Selected Works, 1990–1994 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,
1995), 224, http://ebooks.gutenberg.us/AU_Press_Collection/Books/McPeak/McPeak.pdf.
29. Ibid., 142.
30. Morrocco, “U.S. Uses Gulf War.” According to General McPeak, “So for me the F-22
makes sense whether we have to fight the Russians or police Bosnian airspace or whatever”
(ibid.).
31. General Accounting Office, F-15 Replacement Is Premature, 5.
32. Obaid Younossi et al., Lessons Learned from the F/A-22 and F/A-18E/F Development
Programs (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 4, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand
/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG276.pdf. Presently the F-22 can employ only older
AIM-9M missiles rather than the newer AIM-9Xs (already fielded on F-15s and F-16s).
33. Fulghum, “Cost, Mission Disputes.”
34. John D. Morrocco, “Lockheed Says Delay Would Hike F-22 Cost,” Aviation Week and
Space Technology 141, no. 9 (29 August 1994): 24.
35. David A. Fulghum and John D. Morrocco, “Deutch Demands Cuts, Services Scramble
Anew,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 141, no. 9 (29 August 1994).
36. Morrocco, “Lockheed Says,” 24.
37. David A. Fulghum, “Expanding Roles May Shield F-22,” Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology 146, no. 1 (6 January 1997).
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Assessments of actual capabilities are based on the author’s experience as an F-22 pi-
lot since 2002.
41. Fulghum, “Expanding Roles.”
42. The author is referring to 18 F-15Cs fielded in 2000 with upgraded APG-63V2 radars,
having very similar capability to the F-22’s APG-77. Additional F-15Cs are being upgraded
with the newer APG-63V3.
43. Fulghum, “Big F-22 Budget Drives.”
44. William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Depart-
ment of Defense, May 1997), [79], http://hawk.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/32542
/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/904a2c94-8ef7-4098-8b03-2edfc4b992aa/en/qdr97
.pdf.
45. David A. Fulghum, “Critics Vow to Fight over Joint-STARS Cut,” Aviation Week and
Space Technology 146, no. 25 (16 June 1997).
46. Ronald O’Rourke, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress,
CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 16 July 2009), 9,
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/1574_Previous_Version_2009-07-16
.pdf.
47. Christopher Bolkom, F-22A Raptor, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Con-
gressional Research Service, 5 March 2009), 6, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin
/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496273.
48. Robert Wall, “USAF Readies Strategy for Increased F-22 Buy,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology 153, no. 21 (20 November 2000).
49. David A. Fulghum, “Roche on Warpath,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 158, no.
9 (3 March 2003).
50. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Testimony Prepared for Delivery on the
2002 Defense Department Amended Budget to the House Appropriations Committee,” 16
July 2001, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=405.
51. Leslie Wayne, “Air Force Campaigns to Save Jet Fighter,” New York Times, 13 January
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/13/business/13fighter.html.
52. Amy Butler and David A. Fulghum, “SIT DOWN: Is Silence Golden? Not for the Pen-
tagon, Say Critics, Who Accuse Civilian Leaders of Quashing Dissent,” Aviation Week and
Space Technology 162, no. 1 (2 January 2005).
53. Government Accountability Office, Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22
Quantities and Increased Capabilities (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office,
March 2005), 3, http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/245641.pdf.
54. David A. Fulghum, “Raptor’s Edge,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 170, no. 6 (9
February 2009). Exchange ratio refers to the number of enemy aircraft shot down for each
loss of a friendly fighter.
55. S-300/Favorit (SA-10 “Grumble” / SA-20 “Gargoyle”), Jane’s Defense and Equipment
Technology, 23 December 2011, http://jdet.janes.com.
56. The F-15E, a multirole version of the air-to-air F-15C, retains most of the F-15C’s air-
to-air capabilities although it is heavier and less maneuverable. The Air Force uses the F-15E
primarily for air-to-ground missions.
57. Fulghum, “Raptor’s Edge.”
58. Younossi et al., Lessons Learned, 4. This is an assessment of each aircraft’s maximum
range during subsonic cruise. Although the F-22 is more efficient than the F-15 or F-16 at
supersonic speeds, supersonic flight significantly reduces the range of all three aircraft.
59. “Response to F-22 Washington Post Article by Jeff Smith,” 10 July 2009, [1], http://
hatch.senate.gov/public/_files/USAFResponse.pdf.
60. Michael Bruno and Warwick Graham, “Mulled to Death,” Aviation Week and Space
Technology 171, no. 4 (27 July 2009).
61. Younossi et al., Lessons Learned, 60.
62. Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner, Defense Planning, 34–35.
63. Robert Wall, “F-22 Software, Cost Scrutinized,” Aviation Week and Space Technology
152, no. 3 (17 January 2000).
64. Senate, Statement of Cindy Williams, 12. The JET EMD estimate ($18.7 billion) added
to developmental/evaluation costs ($3.7 billion) equals $22.4 billion. The CBO and OSD
CAIG estimated it slightly higher at $22.5 billion.
65. Gertler, F-22 Fighter Program, 9.
66. Senate, Statement of Cindy Williams, 12. Their respective estimates for production of
339 aircraft were as follows: Air Force ($48.3 billion), CBO ($65.7 billion), OSD CAIG ($64.4
billion), and JET ($61.2 billion). Interestingly, the CBO, OSD CAIG, and JET estimates from
1997 were within 10 percent of the actual APUC.
67. Gertler, F-22 Fighter Program, 10.
68. Ibid., 9.
69. Younossi et al., Lessons Learned, 10.
70. Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Report, F-35 as of December 31, 2010, 4, 15,
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/F-35-SAR.pdf. Figure 3 depicts 78 percent growth in the pro-
jected F-35 PAUC as reported in this selected acquisition report. For additional F-35 reports
from 1996 through 2007, see http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/logistics_material_readiness
/acq_bud_fin/09-F-1079_JSF_SARS_1996_Present.pdf.
71. Amy Butler, “Empty Nest,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 173, no. 45 (19 Decem-
ber 2011): 61.
72. The Air Force maintains three operational active duty squadrons of F-15Cs although
the Air National Guard now operates most of them.
73. David C. Aronstein, Michael J. Hirschberg, and Albert C. Piccirillo, Advanced Tactical
Fighter to F-22 Raptor: Origins of the 21st Century Air Dominance Fighter (Reston, VA: Ameri-
can Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1998), 157.
74. General Accounting Office, F-15 Replacement Is Premature, 2. F-15s shot down 31 of
the 33 Iraqi fighters downed during the Gulf War, and the worldwide F-15 fleet has a 104-to-0
record in air-to-air combat.
75. Lewis, Downsizing Future USAF Fighter Forces, 88. Twenty-eight percent of the US Air
Force’s air superiority fighter fleet deployed to Operation Desert Storm versus 63 percent of
long-range attack, 41 percent of attack, 35 percent of multirole, and 57 percent of SEAD
fleets.
76. Dr. Daniel L. Haulman, USAF Manned Aircraft Combat Losses, 1990–2002 (Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 9 December 2002), http://www.afhra.af
.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070912-043.pdf. Some evidence indicates that a US
Navy F/A-18 was shot down by an Iraqi MiG-25 during the first Gulf War, but no official de-
termination has been made, and evidence remains inconclusive. This is the only possible
US loss in air-to-air combat since the Vietnam War.
77. Aronstein, Hirschberg, and Piccirillo, Advanced Tactical Fighter, 157–58.
78. Government Accountability Office, DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncer-
tain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions (Washington, DC: Gov-
ernment Accountability Office, July 2010), 27, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308236.pdf.
79. David Bond, “Health of Stealth,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 158, no. 9 (3
March 2003): 21.
80. “Floor Statement by Senator John McCain on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program,”
website of Senator John McCain, Arizona, 5 December 2011, http://mccain.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.FloorStatements&ContentRecord_id=0FDCC4CC
-EA5C-882C-25A3-DE5218AACB05. Senator McCain described excessive concurrency as “the
grand, enormously expensive lesson of the Joint Strike Fighter program” (ibid.).
81. General Accounting Office, Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 Aircraft
Should Be Reduced (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, April 1995), 2, http://www
.gao.gov/assets/230/221075.pdf.
82. For the F-35 costs identified in this paragraph, see Department of Defense Selected
Acquisition Report, F-35 as of December 31, 2010, 4, 15, 38. F-22 developmental cost and
APUC both increased 56 percent from 1991 through 2007. The F-35 has already experienced
58 percent developmental and 81 percent APUC cost increases (compared to the 2001 base-
line). However, at $125.2 million (APUC), the Air Force variant will be slightly less expen-
sive than the other F-35 variants, compared to the overall program average of $132.8 million
(APUC).
83. Senate, “Air Force Tactical Aircraft Programs,” 9.
84. Christopher Drew, “Military Contractors Brace for Cutbacks,” New York Times, 26 Jan-
uary 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/business/military-contractors-brace-for
-cutbacks.html.
85. Senate, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Current and Future Roles, Missions, and Ca-
pabilities of U.S. Military Air Power, Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services,
111th Cong., 1st sess., 30 April 2009, 27, http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts
/2009/04%20April/Airland/09-24%20-%204-30-09.pdf.
86. Bond, “Risk, Cost Sway Airframe.”
87. Robert Wall and David A. Fulghum, “USAF Reviews Plans for JSF, F-22, and U-2,” Avi-
ation Week and Space Technology 156, no. 19 (13 May 2002).
88. Younossi et al., Lessons Learned, 2. By the 1980s, the Navy had concluded that it did
not need to counter the enemy aircraft threat with a dedicated air-to-air fighter; thus, the
Navy replaced the F-14 with the multirole F/A-18E/F.
89. Ibid., 5. The F/A-18E/F program actually cost 2 percent less than forecast at the be-
ginning of EMD.
90. “DOD Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) Program Acquisition Cost Summary as of
June 30, 2008,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, 20 August 2008.
91. Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces (Washing-
ton, DC: Congressional Budget Office, May 2009), 12, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default
/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/101xx/doc10113/05-13-fighterforces.pdf.
92. US Navy designations: F/A-18E, F/A-18F, and EA-18G Growler. Jane’s Defense and Equip-
ment Technology, 13 June 2011, http://jdet.janes.com. The F/A-18E/F number does not in-
clude the “Growler” electronic combat variant.
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