Excellent Journal On Indo Pak War 1965 Dsa1965200815
Excellent Journal On Indo Pak War 1965 Dsa1965200815
Excellent Journal On Indo Pak War 1965 Dsa1965200815
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T
he fighting that began in April 1965 culminated at the end of September 1965. That is a really long-time
to keep at it and yet not produce a result. Which is broadly what happened in the 1965 War between
India and Pakistan. There are narratives and counter-narratives of what is the only really indecisive
conflict between two neighbours constantly at it. All of the other wars, 1947-48, 1971 and even the
localised 1999 Kargil conflict, produced results. But this one was a strange one, because having ended in the
manner in which it did and yet a result is claimed by both. When both claim victory it is fair to say neither won.
The war began in the salt flats of the Rann of Kutch in April and ended in the shadows of the snowy peaks
of Kashmir at the end of September. This is not to say that it was an endless contest of lead all along. The
Pakistan Army initiated forays into the Rann of Kutch, to check Indian resolve and preparation. They found both
wanting in Kutch and thought Kashmir was available for plucking. So they did what they did in 1947 and sent
infiltrators in the garb of civilians to stir the hive, hoping to collect the honey when it would drop into their lap.
As in 1947 the infiltrators were soldiers in the guise of civilians, except that they didn’t plunder and
rape as they had done earlier. They were inducted to incite the local population that was ‘reeling under the
brutalities of Indian rule’, as the Pakistani narrative has all to believe. The assumption that the locals would
now welcome them as saviours, rise in revolt against India and Kashmir would become a part of Pakistan.
This simplistic plot was code-named ‘Operation Gibraltar’, borrowing from a romanticised episode from the
mythical period of Islamic history.
Once the people of Kashmir revolted ‘Operation Gibraltar’ was to be converted into ‘Operation Grand Slam’.
Except that Kashmir shepherds informed Indian authorities well in advance that there were infiltrators,
which gave India time to respond. Which it did by sending 1 Para to capture Hajipir Pass on a rainy August
night, thus cutting a critical Pakistani link. Pakistan had to prepone ‘Operation Grand Slam’, by which time
the Indian Army was well advanced in its campaign. So much so that 3 Jat under Lt Col Desmond Hyde
crossed Ichhogil Canal on the outskirts of Lahore on 3 September with negligible losses.
This was not the case elsewhere, for the main aim of ‘Operation Grand Slam’ was to cut Akhnoor from
India and all communication lines thereafter. The losses in this sector were heavy and were to remain so
through the war. Since Pakistan began the war in Kashmir and India took it to Punjab, Pakistan took it
further south to the deserts of Rajasthan and captured territory in Barmer district. Each country opening
a front that suited it, to relieve pressure on the other fronts. And that is where the narrative of the war
gets muddled, for each has a version at variance with the other. The initiator became the defender and the
defender became the attacker, so on and so forth.
Pakistan celebrates 6 September as the Defence Day. This is in recognition of the success in thwarting
Indian gains into Lahore. Lt Col Desmond Hyde, who had almost crossed into Lahore, was left perplexed
when asked to withdraw from his position of strength. And that is really where the lessons of 1965 War
begin. This stalemated war is an episode rife with incidents of immense unit level leadership and bravery,
juxtaposed with an astonishing shortfall in generalship. The opportunities that commanders of 1 Para and
3 Jat and others like them, provided to the higher military leadership were squandered by timidness, at
times, misinformation, sometimes and downright absence of foresight, many many times.
There is no antidote to that other than greater professionalism. Having been bested in 1962 by China and
brought Pakistan’s ambitions to a halt in 1965, India was well prepared to instil greater professionalism into
its armed forces by the time 1971 came. The result of that war is plain to all. Which is the greatest lesson to
learn of all, that there are no shortcuts to professionalism. What of Pakistan? The one pointer is that it has
tried the same formula three times, 1947, 1965 and 1999. None of its objectives were met, yet narratives
persist. There is a lesson in that too.
Manvendra Singh
Wars and Lessons
No one needs war; but when it happens, it
generates an inexorable momentum of its own.
India, the Golden Bird, has been a victim of foreign
assaults from time immemorial and the incursions
An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine have continued even after the moment of our
Volume 6 | Issue 11 | August 2015 emergence as a sovereign, independent nation. It
is significant, that in the five wars that we have
Chairman Shyam Sunder had to fight after independence in 1947, some part
Publisher and ceo Pawan Agrawal of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir
President Urvashi J Agrawal has been involved, as Pakistan and China, singly
Director Shishir Bhushan
and in collusion, have sought to delink it from the rest of India. Kargil
Editor-in-chief Manvendra Singh in 1999 was the last such manifestation. Hence the rationale to bracket
Corporate consultant KJ Singh
wars and locale in this edition of DSA.
Corporate communication Irrespective of the logic and comprehension, every war has taught
Mamta Jain crucial and imperative lessons for sharpened preparedness of the
Natasha
forces involved. There had been a paradigm shift in the war scenarios
Sales of ancient times till the Second World War and then subsequently
Anup Kumar Sinha from Second World War till date. India had to face the first of these five
Creative battles immediately after independence in 1947 when Pakistani troops,
Satyapal Singh disguised as tribals, invaded the princely state to try and give credence
to the spurious Two-Nation Theory. They managed to reach the gates
Representative (Europe and Americas)
Jo S Birring of Srinagar, compelling the Maharaja to seek help from Indian troops
Representative (J&K) to sweep away the invaders. This was only partially achieved before
Salil Sharma
the UN-sponsored Ceasefire was imposed. Because of this unfinished
Correspondent (Europe) business, India has had to revisit the battlefield, time and again. The
Dominika Cosic second Indo-Pakistani conflict was also challenged over Kashmir
Production and started without a formal declaration of war. This war began on
Dilshad and Dabeer August 5, 1965 and concluded on September 22, 1965.
In many ways, the Chinese attack of 1962 across a broad front
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Sundar Rawat from Aksai Chin in J&K in the west and Arunachal Pradesh in the
east was a predecessor and template for the Pakistani attack of
IT operations 1965 – the Pakistanis hoped that they would be able to do the same to
Neeraj Vaid
a psychologically depressed India. But that was not to be because of the
Photographer lessons our political and military leadership had learned.
Subhash
The 1962 War was an extensive and crucial lesson for the preparedness
Circulation and distribution of our forces. The infantry and the artillery divisions of Indian Army were
Ashok Gupta well equipped to counter the Pakistan Army. The role of Indian Army was
outstanding and well-supported by the Indian Air Force. Our courageous
E-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org
info: [email protected] Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri motivated the entire defence force
articles: [email protected] and even went to the borders to boost the morale of our army personnel
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online edition: [email protected]
and the peasantry on whose land the war was being fought (remember
advertisement: [email protected] the slogan Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan?)
As we commemorate and celebrate 50 years of a victorious abrogation
Editorial and corporate office of this Pakistani invasion in 1965, DSA attempts an introspective of
Prabhat Prakashan Tower
4/19 Asaf Ali Road invaluable lessons learnt, game changers of the war, vulnerabilities then
New Delhi-110002 (India) and our preparedness to frustrate any future Pakistani misadventure
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Opinions expressed are those of the individual
writers and do not necessarily reflect those of Team DSA extends warm greetings to fellow Indians and salutes our
the publisher and/or editors. All disputes are soldiers in uniform along with extraordinary men and women who have
subject to jurisdiction of Delhi Courts. sacrificed their todays for our tomorrows, as India unfurls the ‘Tricolour’
Defence and Security Alert is printed, published in honour of its 69th Independence Day.
and owned by Pawan Agrawal and printed at
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Stop Press: Team DSA joins me in paying homage to former Indian
at 4/19 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi (India). President Dr APJ Abdul Kalam who passed away on 27th July 2015.
Editor: Manvendra Singh
Jai Hind!
Pawan Agrawal
2 August 2015 Defence AND security alert
Bharat Ratna
Dr APJ Abdul Kalam
1931-2015
Team DSA
Contents
August 2015
A RTICLE S
Contents
Battle Of Asal Uttar
6
Indian Army
33
The Elusive CDS
16
Air Chief Marshal PV Naik (Retd)
Ayub’s Miscalculation
33
Maj Gen Ian Cardozo (Retd)
Celebrating Victory
54 Know The Chief
Brig Chitranjan Sawant (Retd) 44
CRPF
Audacious Fortunes
56 Get Connected 75
Lt Col Rohit Agarwal (Retd)
As I Look Back
59
Col Naresh K Rastogi (Retd)
Incoherent Strategies
Reactive Policies 68
Dr Ajai Sahni
BATTLE OF
ASAL UTTAR
Despite heavy enemy fire for long spells, Lt Col Caleb exercised his
command with calmness and fortitude and inspired his officers and
men to fight against the enemy fearlessly. In this action 15 enemy
Patton tanks were destroyed and nine others which were in good
working condition were captured. His cool courage, leadership and
foresight contributed greatly to this outstanding success.
E
arly in 1965, the already strained relations agreement was signed on 30 June, 1965.
between India and Pakistan worsened and Later it transpired that the attack in the
war seemed imminent. In April 1965, fighting Rann of Kutch was a diversionary attack to the
broke out in the Rann of Kutch. Indian one contemplated in Kashmir to draw Indian Forces
Police outposts were constantly shelled, followed by to the south and, away from Kashmir.
an attack by the Pakistan Army. Thus, a full-scale However, Pakistan failed in its aim.
but undeclared war erupted along the Rajasthan The unprovoked attack in Kashmir was not
and Gujarat borders. American built Pakistani long in coming. On 05 August, 1965, raiders
Patton tanks entered India and demonstrated their from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir began
effectiveness under Indian desert conditions. infiltration (Pakistan’s ‘Operation Gibraltar’).
These intruders were pushed back across the
From Babina To The Battlefield ceasefire line. Pakistan however, persisted with its
The fighting in the Rann of Kutch Sector had broadcasts of a revolution in Kashmir taking
come to an end by April 29, 1965. A boundary place to overthrow the Indian Government.
indian army
finally placed under the Command of 2 Independent
Prior to its move to Punjab in September, 1965, 3 Cavalry Armoured Brigade. Its task was to ‘Counter any
was an integral part of 1 Armoured Brigade of 1 Armoured tank threat in the XI Corps area’.
Division. 1 Armoured Division was earmarked for
operations in the Shakargarh salient. As such, all Mobilisation And Concentration
pre-operational tactical planning, reconnaissance and, As 3 Cavalry tank column was now moving during
tactical exercises without troops (TEWT) had been focused daylight, there was understandable fear of an enemy
on that area. However, someone changed 3 Cavalry’s air attack. Soon enough, aircraft appeared over
operational role to the Amritsar Sector at the last 3 Cavalry tank column. Anti-aircraft precautions were
minute (After the war, on a query by the Commandant, taken but, fortunately the aircraft turned out to be of
General JN Chaudhuri, Army Chief, replied that he the Indian Air Force. Perhaps out on a reconnaissance
himself had changed the regiment’s destination). sortie. With own aircraft in the area no enemy aircraft
This sudden change in the area of operations caused could approach the tank column unchallenged. Thus
some consternation in the minds of 3 Cavalry officers. 3 Cavalry’s move to Chabal Kalan remained unknown
But, there was little time to worry about the reasons to the enemy. Some Regimental tanks got bogged
for the change, 3 Cavalry had to move to an area in down near Chabal Kalan but, were soon recovered
the Amritsar Sector. Thus the Regiment, as part of with the help of the local farmers and, their tractors.
1 Armoured Division, came to be in Punjab, under Civilian help would remain a commendable feature
a new formation, with a fresh task, under directions throughout the ensuing operations.
of a different formation commander. The 3 Cavalry On reaching Chabal Kalan, the Commandant’s
moved to Punjab on 01 September, 1965, with the request to move further south towards Bhikhiwind
following officers on its establishment. was accepted by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade.
The Bhikhiwind area being preferred as it was in
Indian Tank Deployment the centre and in depth of 2 Independent Armoured
XI Corps was responsible for the defence of Punjab. Brigade’s operational area. At this stage 2 Independent
The 3 Cavalry’s operational area lay between Armoured Brigade was located at Bundala (Punjab)
Amritsar and Khemkaran. It was plain agricultural and 3 Cavalry was in Bhikhiwind area.
a. RHQ
i. Commandant – L
t Col Salim Caleb
ii. Second-in-command – M
ajor Bachan Singh Grewal
iii. Adjutant – C
aptain Dilip Kumar Kundu
iv. Intelligence Officer – 2
/Lt Rameshwar Singh Pathania
b. ‘A’ Squadron – M
ajor Suresh Chander Vadera
c. ‘B’ Squadron – M
ajor Prabhakar Shripad Belvalkar
d. ‘C’ Squadron – Major Narindar Singh Sandhu
e. ‘HQ’ Squadron – O
fficiating Risaldar Jagat Singh
also performed duties of 2IC vice Major
Bachan Singh Grewal SOS – 08 September, 1965
f. Quartermaster – Captain Satpal Singh
g. Regimental Medical Officer – Captain Jitendra Nath Bhargava
h. Light Aid Detachment (EME) – Captain TP Chandran
08 September, 1965
By 11:00 hours the Regiment had commenced its
move southwards on the Bhikhiwind-Khemkaran
road. ‘B’ Squadron was leading with Regimental
Headquarters and, ‘C’ Squadron, less two troops
following. ‘A’ Squadron was to move along road
Patti-Valtoha-Khemkaran. Thus the main routes
of enemy’s advance were blocked.
Major PS Belvalkar thereafter sped forward to
contact Lieut Colonel AS Vaidya (later Chief of Army
Staff) of Deccan Horse and, returned to confirm
that Deccan Horse was actually in contact with
enemy’s Chaffee and Patton tanks and any assistance
from 3 Cavalry would be most welcome. The two
‘C’ Squadron troops guarding Kulluwal Bridge
were recalled to join the Regiment.
On his way towards Khemkaran, the Commandant
met Major JM Vohra in his Sherman tank heading
Meanwhile, enemy activity continued all along the
northwards. During the short briefing that ensued,
border. Heavy fighting was reported in the Khemkaran
Major JM Vohra confirmed that Patton tanks
area. 3 Cavalry’s hour of destiny had arrived.
were heading towards Bhikhiwind.
The volume of civilian movement north along the
Khemkaran-Bhikhiwind road indicated a considerable
and sudden increase in activity. First Patton Tank Destroyed
With the leading elements of ‘B’ Squadron having
reached south of Chima Village the Regiment scored
Four Fateful Days (8-11 September)
its first hit on the Patton. ALD Charan Singh sighted,
The Regiment completed its move to Bhikhiwind
what he described as a strange form suddenly take
on 08 September, 1965. Its fighting elements,
shape of a Patton in his gunner’s sight. However,
deployed as follows:
with sure but sweating hands and a short prayer he
l ‘A’ Squadron in general area Patti.
pressed the trigger. The enemy tank burst into flames.
l ‘B’ Squadron in general area Bhikhiwind.
The first blow had been struck. A good omen indeed!
l Regimental Headquarters and ‘C’ Squadron less
The time 14:37 hours, the date, 8 September, 1965.
two troops, in area Kacha Pakka.
3 Cavalry was at war. Within minutes a second
Patton tank was hit. The Patton tank’s invincibility
Moulding The Battleground was now crumbling. ‘A’ Squadron meanwhile was
The frontage available to the enemy was restricted trying to outflank the enemy on the eastern flank.
between the Sutlej River on the east and Pakistan Number of Patton tank casualties added further
border on the west. Within this area, the to their misunderstanding and disbelief. That
Commandant had two options. Option one was to night (8/9 September, 1965) the majority of enemy
hold fast to the Bhikhiwind area (the area of its positions were withdrawn. The enemy pulled
present location). This would gain 3 Cavalry more out his Patton tanks from the eastern flank and
time for preparation of its defences, but would diverted his attention to the western flank. The
allow the enemy the additional advantage of a dispositions were as follows at this stage:
broader frontage for manoeuvre – a frontage beyond l ‘B’ Squadron on the Centre Line
3 Cavalry’s strength of three Squadrons. (Bhikhiwind-Khemkaran road).
Moreover, 3 Cavalry would have to l Regimental Headquarters on the centre line.
withdraw all its echelons which by now, had l ‘C’ Squadron on the western flank.
concentrated to its immediate north. This would l ‘A’ Squadron in reserve in place of ‘C’ Squadron
lead to chaos and confusion, resulting in on the centre line (in rear).
irreparable damage to its morale. A fierce tank battle now developed. As the first day
Option two was to move south and attack the closed (8 September, 1965), no casualties had been
advancing enemy. This would restrict the enemy, reported on the Indian side. The Regiment’s tank crew
from enlarging its frontage to boundaries within had taken to battle with mastered ease and without
3 Cavalry’s capability. It would necessitate offence much fear or tension. Meanwhile, 2/Lt PA Joseph’s
and prove excellent for the morale of a Regiment on Centurion was hit by a Patton from 800 yards, it shook
its very first wartime action. And most importantly, as the shot hit the Centurion mantlet (metal shield
3 Cavalry by attacking would not be surrendering protecting the base where the gun enters the turret).
large areas of good agricultural land and, a number 2/Lt PA Joseph got the impression that his tank gunner
of populated towns/villages to the enemy without had fired without permission. On being corrected and,
a fight. Commandant 3 Cavalry adopted option after a little inspection, it became clear that a Patton
two. He chose to move southwards to Khemkaran shell had fired but had not pierced the Centurion’s
– and bring the enemy to battle. turret mantlet. This information was quickly relayed
09 September, 1965
On 9 September, 1965, the Squadron dispositions
were as follows:
l ‘A’ Squadron readjusted its tank position to
milestone 29 on road Bhikhiwind-Khemkaran.
l ‘B’ Squadron stayed on the centre line and was
shelled by enemy medium guns.
l T he balance of ‘C’ Squadron tanks were
redeployed on the Mohamed Pura Chitt Kui
track. The day came to a close with the enemy
constantly probing Centurion defensive positions
but, withdrawing without a fight. Obviously
reconnoitring in preparation for an assault.
At 23:00 hours 8 September 1965, Captain
Nagindar Singh along with the two composite
indian army
troops was ordered to return to Raja Tal to protect ‘A’ Squadron thus watched and waited with bated
the Kulluwal Bridge area. Troops were in position breath. Around 17:30 hours, ‘A’ Squadron reported
by 07:00 hours on 9 September 1965. These two Pattons sighted. The Squadron Commander’s gunner
troops were commanded by Captain Nagindar Singh Sowar Dhirpal Singh destroyed three Pattons roughly
and Naib Risaldar Chander Bhan. in as many minutes. Two Pattons were destroyed by
To meet this western flank tank threat, 3 Cavalry Naib Risaldar Jagdeo Singh’s Centurion. The enemy
now deployed in two roughly formed semicircles. tank assault thus calmed down in fury and finally came
With tank troops at Madar-Algun-Khurd along the to a halt. Five enemy tanks lay damaged in the fields.
main road Dibbi Pura-Mohamed Pura-Lakhna. The
mouth of this horse shoe was left open between Show Of Strength
Lakhna and Madar. The second semicircle was Thereafter the Commandant ordered all Centurions
formed partly with the same tanks, that is, tanks at to ‘Open Up’ with both main gun and machine gun
Lakhna-Mohamed Pura, the Khemkaran Minor, where fire to show that 3 Cavalry’s defended position was
‘C’ Squadron had placed six tanks further south held in strength. The enemy would have to do better
on the road upto Chima and beyond. Regimental than his last attempt. As darkness set in, an Infantry
Headquarters tanks were ordered to place themselves assault was expected soon. The Artillery Op with the
north of the Rohi Nala Bridge, on the main road under Regiment was directed to lay down maximum fire on
Command of the Adjutant, with instruction to allow likely enemy tanks and Infantry assembly area and
the enemy to come through ‘only over his dead body’. start lines. However, no Infantry attack was launched.
By now, Centurions generally needed immediate
Spotters On Treetops replenishment of ammunition. ‘A’ Squadron
‘A’ Squadron had in the meantime readjusted Commander reported a balance of one AP (armour
their tank positions to meet the Patton tank’s piercing) and two HE (high explosive) rounds. Tank
assault, which were persistently trying to establish commanders now requested permission to withdraw
a road block on Bhikhiwind–Khemkaran road. for replenishment. But, the Commandant directed
‘A’ Squadron headquarters accompanied by a troop that “No one will change position or withdraw,
of tanks moved into area Dibbi Pura-Mohamed Pura. everyone will stay in their respective positions.” Later,
By 13:00 hours ‘A’ Squadron was heavily shelled. jeeps from the Intercommunication troop were used
Because of restricted visibility at ground to replenish tanks requiring ammunition. This proved
level due to high sugarcane crops in the area, a little difficult to execute at first but, after some time
observation posts (OPs) were established at selected all tanks were reasonably replenished.
treetop heights at Regimental Headquarters.
On 10 September, 1965, as the day progressed First Patton Tank Captured
it appeared that the enemy was likely to launch Major SC Vadera mounted Patton tank BA No 77651
a tank assault in the Mohamed Pura area. and, was able to start it with the help of instructions
After advising ‘A’ Squadron Commander the clearly recorded and prominently displayed by the
Commandant’s message to Major SC Vadera manufacturers. The news of the capture was radioed
ended with a bit of hard advice – “Anyone who to Regimental Headquarters and relayed to Brigade
remains cooler under this stress longer will win Tactical Headquarters and to 4 Mountain Division.
– Identify, take a good aim and then shoot well, God be It caused much jubilation all around.
with you.” Identifying of tanks became a difficult task, GOC 4 Mountain Division, Major General
as both Centurions and Pattons kept continuously on Gurbaksh Singh, after having cross-checked with
the move inside the thick growth of sugarcane fields. the Brigade Commander and the Commandant the
The INDO-PAK
I
t would not be incorrect to state that the roots of Pakistani Agenda
the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 lie in the partition Pakistan’s own aims were focused on the takeover
itself that vivisected India in 1947, a bloody and of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, which
traumatic affair that permanently scarred the Pakistan visualised as the unfinished agenda of
India-Pakistan psyche and drove Pakistan into a quest the Partition. Membership of SEATO and CENTO
for military balance with India at all costs. In the was merely a means towards this end. The results
search for a military sheet anchor against its ‘natural were gratifying and military aid poured in including
enemy’, Pakistan was an early and willing candidate M47 and M48 Patton tanks, M113 Armoured
for membership in the overlapping ‘collective security’ Personnel Carriers and heavy artillery for the
zones created by the USA after the Second World War Pakistan Army, F-86 Sabre and F-104 Starfighter
to keep the territorial ambitions of Soviet Russia in combat aircraft for the Pakistan Air Force and
check as also to prevent the ideological expansion of Gearing Class destroyers for the Pakistan Navy.
Communism in the post-Second World War world. This large-scale blood transfusion of military
Pakistan accordingly became a member of the South equipment greatly enhanced the offensive edge
East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 and of the Pakistani Armed Forces vis-à-vis India,
the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO – also known where their putative adversaries the Indian Armed
as MEDO or Middle East Defence Organisation) in Forces had been accorded a very low-priority in
1959 to pursue its own strategic agenda which totally the national priorities post–Independence. Even
diverged from that of the United States. as the Pakistani armed forces surged ahead in
Having secured the homeland (in some senses the Jammu-Rajouri-Poonch road and cut-off the entire
‘Al Qaeda’ – ie the Base), Pakistan’s military planners Poonch-Rajouri-Naushera region from the remainder
for offense had come up with a broad three part plan, of Jammu and Kashmir and then acquire it at leisure.
to be made operative at times and places of their
choosing. These were: Operation Desert Hawk in the The Shastri Manoeuvre
Rann of Kutch to draw Indian reserve forces away ‘Operation Grand Slam’ opened with an intense artillery
from Kashmir and southward towards the Gujarat barrage in the Chamb Sector on 15 August 1965,
border. This was launched on 10 April 1965 against coinciding with the entry of the Gibraltar columns into
the Indian border outpost of Sardar Post held by the Srinagar. This was followed on 1 September 1965 with
CRPF spearheaded by M47 Patton tanks of Pakistan’s an overwhelming onslaught of two Pakistani armoured
24 Cavalry, grouped with 51 Infantry Brigade Group regiments and follow-up infantry, which were initially
under 8 Infantry Division of the Pakistan Army. India opposed by the Indian 191 (Independent) Infantry
reinforced the sector with minimum forces only – the Brigade Group of three infantry battalions, but only one
ready-to-go 50 Independent Parachute Brigade in a under strength squadron light French AMX 13 tanks.
ground holding role, to be replaced by a newly raised Reinforcements in the shape of a newly organised
31 Independent Infantry Group, hurriedly created 10 Infantry Division were parcelled in piecemeal
out of the erstwhile local Sub-area Headquarters from far away Bangalore and the Indian Army held
and very weak in all types of supporting arms on here, but only just. It was then that the newly
and services, particularly armour. Jugaad is elected Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri
admirable, but there are limits beyond which made a grand strategic decision which must surely
it cannot (and should not) be exploited. rank amongst the greatest and most decisive by any
Indian Prime Minister before or since – he ordered
Pak Army Infiltration the Indian Army to take the war into Pakistan across
An offensive by infiltration into the Kashmir Valley the international border. The war that followed
by six columns of predominantly Punjabi speaking was fought along the western borders only, from
mujahideen forces raised, equipped and trained for Jammu and Kashmir in the north to Rajasthan in the
covert warfare by the US trained Special Services south possibly because in another instance of well
Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army, to enter Srinagar judged geopolitical sagacity, India chose not to escalate
coinciding with the festival of Id and create riots the war into what was then East Pakistan. This
and civil disorder to build-up a popular non-involvement was to pay overwhelming
resistance movement against the Indian The 1965 strategic dividends subsequently, in 1971,
presence in the Valley. This had been when India under a different Prime
Indo-Pak War
designated ‘Operation Gibraltar’ and Minister, won a true strategic victory over
there is certainly room for speculation also brought before Pakistan and created the new Republic
whether the Moe-e-Muqaddas riots in the Indian people the of Bangladesh. But that is a separate
Srinagar which fitted almost too neatly story, a Mahabharata by itself. Indo-Pak
into this scheme of things, were in fact a
undimmed valour hostilities in the 1965 War concluded
preliminary to the main operation itself. of their Armed on 23 September 1965, followed by
‘Operation Gibraltar’ did not succeed. Forces Indo-Pak talks at Tashkent chaperoned
The Kashmiri speaking awam of the Valley by Soviet Russia culminating in the
did not respond in adequate measure to their Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966.
Punjabi speaking co-religionists with whom they had
little cultural or social linkages, an aspect totally Post-war Assessment
overlooked by the Punjabi-centric Pakistan Army. In the opinion of some, the 1965 Indo-Pak War
The Indian Army soon got its act together and created was a pointless stalemate. Others feel that India
‘V’ Sector, an ad hoc headquarters for a composite force achieved its strategic aims by breaking the taboo
for urban counter-insurgency composed of military on crossing international borders and established
and police forces. The Indian Army had stumbled a historical precedent for strategic decision-making
almost by default on to an almost ideal solution to which paid rich dividends in 1971.
resolve the situation. Mistakes were committed on The 1965 Indo-Pak War was in fact a composite of all
the Indian side, but ultimately the Gibraltar columns these segments. The master sequence can be said to have
were decimated and defeated and the remnants been initiated almost from 1963 onwards, on a staggered
fled into the countryside where they were hunted dateline commencing with the Moe-e-Muqaddas
down. ‘Gibraltar’ was defeated, but not permanently, riots in Srinagar in 1963 with the ultimate finale
as the future revival in the Kashmir Valley of the at the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966
Hurriyat, Lashkar-e-Taiba and above all Al Qaeda and the tragic and some say mysterious demise of
and the Islamic State were to show. But all these were Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri the very
still in a future as yet distant. next day. But what it also brought before the Indian
‘Operation Grand Slam’, an armour predominant people was the undimmed valour of their Armed Forces,
offensive to be launched in conjunction always a beacon of hope and inspiration to the
with ‘Operation Gibraltar’, to capture the people of India, especially in the troubled times of
Akhnoor Bridge on the River Chenab and interdict the Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
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T
here seems to be a renewed vigour in the of what I had said. I thought it was more than likely
discussion circles not only in and around that there were more minds which needed a better
Delhi but the cognoscenti all over the country. explanation and this situation needed to be rectified.
For the uninitiated and the unwashed the The fundamental questions arising out of the issue
uproar is about OROP, a very touchy subject for many. of CDS, in my opinion, are three:
I would like to submit that there are a few who are l Do we need a CDS?
thinking beyond OROP and suchlike on ‘Enterprises l What model of CDS do we need?
of great pith and moment’. One such issue being l Is the present compromise formula acceptable?
addressed is important yet not in the public eye: The
issue of the ‘Elusive’ CDS (Chief of Defence Staff). Bureaucratic Sleight Of Hand
During my tenure as Chief of Air Staff I had a lot of I am sure everyone knows the history behind the
occasions to address the topic of CDS because there idea of CDS. However, it would be worthwhile
seemed to be a misconception doing the rounds of recalling relevant facts. According to Gen Sinha (the
power corridors that the IAF was the only Service erudite Vice Chief, Governor and more), at Gallipoli
opposed to the idea of a CDS. This was wrong and I during WW I, Gen Sir Ian Hamilton, commanding
used every opportunity to put forward the IAF point the Royal Army was desperate for Naval gunfire
of view. I thought I had, by and large, succeeded. support. He did not get it because the Admiral of the
Recently I came across a 2013 article by a senior Fleet had ordered his warships to clean the boilers.
officer which showed a total lack of understanding After the First World War, the British introduced
US President, through the Secretary for Defense. In start small and when confidence builds, up the ante.
Washington, there is a centralised Joint Chiefs of Staff The next major setback is the total absence of any
Committee (JCSC), headed by a five-star chairman. The document concerning National Strategy spelling out
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps chiefs plan, where we are and where we want to be in 20 years
train and develop human resources, leaving the theatre from now. We not only need to define our national
commanders free to handle operations independently. strategy but publish a ‘White Paper’ so the other
The smaller British, French, Canadian and Australian countries are also aware of our thinking.
Militaries place their Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine
units directly under their respective four-star Service Military Ego
chiefs. These Service chiefs answer to a five-star Within the Services, we must set our egos aside
Chief of Defence Staff, who could be from any Service. and genuinely embrace jointness. We should
The CDS reports to the minister in charge of defence. concentrate on jointness in Intel gathering; Training;
Our requirement for India must be seen through the Perspective Planning and, finally Acquisitions, to
lens of our strategic perspective, our threat evaluation, exploit advantages accruing through economies of
the future environment over our region and future scale. We need to train for jointness. We need to
battle scenarios which include an assessment of create joint billets right from the rank of Major or
our capability build-up. In the foreseeable future equivalent. We need to modify our promotion policy to
our main concerns will continue to be China and ensure that performance in joint billets (living space)
Pakistan and the two-front scenario. We are unlikely has a major effect on promotion.
to develop large-scale autonomous expeditionary A look at most countries shows that the CDS has
capabilities. Our chief requirements would continue had to be thrust upon the militaries. For example
to be deterrence against aggression and safeguarding the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 of USA which
our territory. Non-state actors will continue in made the most sweeping changes to US Department
J&K Sector. Although chances of war are remote, of Defense required it to be made a law before the
future wars will be hi-tech, short, with high energy, military accepted it. Therefore we need to have a
day/night, with high transparency of battlefield parliamentary debate, not only to educate but to iron
and heavy rate of consumption of resources. It will out differences, if any. Now in a democracy all these
involve rapidly shifting scenarios and use of Remotely things take time. Therefore the post of CDS would be
Piloted Aircraft will proliferate. I do not envisage realistically tenable only 8-10 years from now.
operations away from mainland. Some out-of-area
contingencies, however, cannot be ruled out. What Model Of CDS Do We Need?
Successful handling of above scenarios requires This is the second fundamental question to be
quick decisions; a high-level of synergy between the addressed. In USA the chain of command runs
government and military leadership; a thorough from the President, through the Secretary of
understanding of hi-tech and availability of Defense to the Theatre or Combat Cdr. The Service
resources to match the pace of battle. All these and Chiefs support the Combat Cdr by providing
many other factors lead me to the conclusion that facilities like Spl Ops, Transport support, Strategic
a CDS in the future will become inevitable. Now forces etc. The Combat Cdr now has a force
it is not like waving a magic wand. You wave and using all assets required to employ the Air/Land
say ‘CDS’ and, hey presto, there he is. We have to doctrine. The CDS or, in this case the Chairman,
prepare the ground for progressing onto a viable Jt Chiefs of Staff, is the principal military adviser
CDS regime. So what do we need to do? to the President, the National Security Council and
the Secretary of Defense. He heads the Jt Chiefs of Staff
Integrating Three Services With MoD Committee of which the three Service chiefs are
This is mandatory. If this does not happen we members along with the Marines component.
cannot move forward. Governments over the USA has global interests. For operations far from
last six decades have ignored this issue. What homeland the policy of having Theatre Commands
this has done is that ours is the only country in works efficiently. What this also implies is that each
the world where the security apparatus functions Theatre has to be by and large self-sufficient. This
without military participation in decision-making. is costly and only a couple of countries could afford
What is worse is that the benefit of years of it. Similarly other models of CDS exist. We have to
operational experience and advice is denied to choose a model based on our strategic environment
the government. The MoD has paid lip service to and not blindly adopt foreign models. We must see
integration. Nothing has happened on the ground. what improvements our model can provide over the
The bureaucracy is quite happy because they have present system. The guiding principle is that policy,
the ear of the ministers and any failures or delays resource allocation and setting of priorities must be
can, conveniently, be attributed to the ‘attached the exclusive domain of the Central Staff.
offices’. Integration cannot happen overnight. I had Individual Services will manage their own Service
suggested to the then RM time and again to start within the framework centrally set. Something
small, let us say at Director level. Let some civil akin to centralised planning and decentralised
Directors work in Service HQs and some Colonel execution with a policy oriented CDS or central
/equivalent Service officers work in MoD. We need to staff and management oriented Service staffs. This
T
he defeat at the hands of the Chinese in
October/November 1962 reflected poorly
on the capacity of the then political
leadership to handle issues of governance
and national security. The military setbacks having
been the result of the neglect of the vital aspects of
organisation, equipment and operational readiness
of the Armed Forces, as also political interference
in its internal affairs, there was a great trust
deficit between these two vital pillars of the Indian
establishment. The credibility of the country’s
foreign policy thrust based on non-alignment and
appeasement of the Chinese was perceived as flawed
and the intelligence apparatus was not only suspect,
but seemed to be in some disarray.
The Pakistanis no doubt perceived the political
situation in India as one where the political leadership
under Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was weak,
divided and in any case pacifist. How wrong they were
proved is another matter altogether; Shastri came
out as a hero to us youngsters in the Indian Army.
in power and had put in place an offensive defence during April and May 1965. This was brought to a
concept through the creation of a formidable obstacle halt through a ceasefire negotiated by Prime Minister
system using the existing canal system adjacent to Harold Wilson of the United Kingdom on 30 June 1965.
the border, boosted with ditch-cum-bunds in the In due course, this was followed by arbitration through
more vital sectors, thus releasing significant force a three member International Tribunal.
levels for offensive operations against what was The leadership in Pakistan was apparently
presumed to be a numerically larger Indian Army. buoyed by the outcome of these operations in the
Rann of Kutch which they perceived as a vindication
Equipment Status of their belief about the lack of preparedness of
The equipment held by units and formations the Indian Armed forces, as also the fragility of the
of the Indian Army was largely of World War II Indian political leadership. This perception obviously
vintage: personal weapons of infantry units being propelled the Pakistani leadership to initiate action for
the .303 bolt action Lee-Enfield rifles and light induction of infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir, to
machine guns; tank holdings based on four regiments be followed by military action against India.
equipped with Centurions and the remainder with
vintage Shermans and Stuarts, together with a couple Major Pakistani Errors Of Judgement
of AMX-13 light tank regiments; artillery regiments The first major error of judgement was the
based on vintage 25 pounder and 76 mm mountain presumption about the Rann of Kutch operations
guns; vintage 40 mm anti-aircraft guns and so on. best summarised by quoting from a Pakistani analyst,
Consequent to the 1962 conflict, some spasmodic Brigadier Shaukat Qadir who writes: “Early the
induction of equipment did take place. Even so, same year Pakistan Army had successfully defended
at the onset of the 1965 conflict the Indian Army itself against the Indian attempted incursion in the
was still far from being modernised in terms of Rann of Kutch, but that chapter was closed since
weapons and equipment. Units and formations were the dispute had been referred for arbitration. Why
still largely organised and equipped in the therefore should Pakistan embark on a venture that
traditional British Indian Army mode (It is another might lead to war remains an unanswered question
matter altogether that the British Army had itself to date, particularly when we were aware that such
shed much of its traditional philosophy in context of a venture in which we were considered the aggressor
being part of the Cold War Western military alliances would result in the severance of aid from the US,
like NATO, SEATO, CENTO etc). which ultimately happened? It is a matter of historical
On the other hand, having joined up in military record that Bhutto, then foreign minister, convinced
alliances like SEATO and CENTO, the Pakistan Ayub Khan, the president, that the Indian response
Army had absorbed much of the American-led to our incursions in Kashmir would not be across
Western equipping philosophy that dominated these the international boundary and would be confined to
alliances. For instance, each infantry battalion of the Kashmir. He must have offered powerful diplomatic
Pakistan Army had eight medium machine guns and arguments as forcefully and articulately as he could,
eight 106 mm anti-tank weapons, as also two light but despite that I find it difficult to comprehend how
machine guns in each section against one in each Ayub accepted such an argument which was militarily
section in the infantry battalions of the Indian Army; untenable and, while Ayub could be accused of many
giving the Pakistani units the capacity to bring to bear things, he was far from being militarily unwise.”
greater automatic firepower and anti-tank capability The second error was the presumption
in the battle zone. Of even more significance in terms about local support for the infiltration into
of giving them significant capabilities, each infantry Jammu and Kashmir about which Shaukat Qadir
division of the Pakistan Army had, on its order of has this to say: “For some obscure reason, Pakistan
battle, a reconnaissance and support battalion that undertook Operation Gibraltar, without preparing the
had an imposing inventory of 48 mobile 106 mm grounds for it or seeking guarantees of local support
anti-tank weapons and 48 medium machine guns or even attempting to assess the mood of the Kashmiri
that provided the flexibility of considerable additional people. Pakistan went into Operation Gibraltar
firepower. Pakistani tank regiments were largely without any preliminary preparations and undertook
equipped with the more state-of-the-art M-47 and a guerrilla operation inside Indian held Kashmir
M-48 Patton tanks provided by the USA together with with a large number of regular soldiers, some SSG
their holdings of vintage Sherman and Chaffee tanks. elements and a smattering of irregulars, expecting to
be welcomed by the local population and raise them
The Kutch Episode up in arms against the Indian Government. They were
Given the perception of the Pakistani military and destined to be rudely disillusioned. Far from rising
political leadership about the state of affairs on the up in arms, the local population denied any support
Indian side both politically and militarily, it was and, in many instances handed over the infiltrators
not surprising that in March 1965 they decided to Indian troops. An act for which they should not
to ‘test the waters’ as it were, by initiating military be held to blame in any way, since by then they
action in the Rann of Kutch in support of ostensible were reconciled to staying within the Indian Union
territorial claims in the area. A series of military and Pakistan had made no preparations for such a
actions by both sides with debatable results ensued venture. It was to take another twenty four years for
T
here are three things about the 1965 Indo-Pak
Conflict which draw attention. First is
the strategic scenario in the subcontinent
which attracted General Ayub Khan and
Zulfiqar Bhutto to undertake the botched operations
(conflict initiation). Second is the strategy which
Pakistan establishment followed through 1964-65, to
primarily aim at wresting J&K (conflict progression).
Third and last is the negotiation which resulted in
the handing back of the crucial gain India made,
the Hajipir Pass (conflict termination). In these three
events the story of the two years of conflict (not 22 days
as is customarily believed) can be told threadbare.
I intend to do that briefly from my perspective and
understanding of Conflict Initiation, detailing the
operations in J&K and only mentioning the other
theatres of conflict – Punjab, Rajasthan and Kutch.
In doing so, I also wish to dilute all perceptions which
exist in Pakistan that its Armed Forces won
for it a decisive military victory.
Browning machine guns, mortars and explosives, to which Ayub imagined was in his favour, the support
exploit the wide gaps in the Indian Army defences. of the Kashmir people, had obviously been assumed
Their task was to execute stealth attacks on the without any preparations. ‘Operation Gibraltar’
Indian Army, cause panic, create turbulence in the rear failed to achieve its objectives and was virtually
areas, tie-down reserves, interdict the Jammu-Srinagar over by 12 August 1965. It set the stage for
highway and finally converge at Srinagar where an Indian riposte in the Uri sector.
a Revolutionary Council was to be set-up after the
overthrow of the State government. Ayub personally India’s Riposte
spoke to the commanders of the various columns “India cannot go on pushing the Pakistanis off
promising them that the people of Kashmir were its territory. If infiltration continues, we will have
awaiting their arrival and would join them in battling to carry the fight to the other side.” Thus spoke
the Indian Army. Some of the known forces were: Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, whose
l Salahuddin Force: Gulmarg, Srinagar and Mandi personality had been assessed by Ayub as one
l K Force: Uri incapable of hard military decisions. It was virtually
l Khalid Force: Tithwal the hot pursuit of today which the Prime Minister
l Nusrat Force: Rajouri-Mendhar authorised the Army for its mission. Attacks were
l Ghaznavi Force: Poonch-Rajouri carried out in Uri and Bugina bulge to recapture
l Babar Force: Nowshera-Chamb some heights occupied by the Pakistan Army but
l Tariq Force: Kargil the coup de main was the decision to capture the
l Qasim Force: Gurez Hajipir Pass and thus the Hajipir Bulge, straighten
l Khilji Force: Kel-Minimarg the bulge and link Poonch and Uri. The same had
The operations under ‘Operation Gibraltar’ are well been achieved in 1947-48 but could not be retained
described by Maj Gen Afsir Karim of the Indian Army, under intense Pakistani pressure.
one of the well-known personalities of India’s strategic The 68 Infantry Brigade under Brig Zoru Bakshi,
community and a famous paratrooper. Although he MVC (later Lt Gen), which was placed under 19 Infantry
has mentioned that the Gibraltar Force had a strength Division was tasked to capture Hajipir with a pincer
of almost 30,000 men alternative sources astride the Uri-Poonch Road from the direction
appear to suggest a lower strength. The HQs of Uri. The operation was called ‘Operation
of the Force was at Murree alongside the Bakshi’ and was supplemented from
Presumptions
Pakistan HQs 12 Division and probably the south by 93 Infantry Brigade
placed under command of Maj Gen with which conducting ‘Operation Faulad’. As an
Akhtar Malik the GOC of that division. Ayub worked ex Commander of today’s Uri Brigade
The simultaneity of launch may have were irrational and also ex GOC 19 Infantry Division
caught the Indian troops off guard as it is my honour to write about the
trans Line of Control intelligence was displaying a poor operations conducted over the terrain
sketchy although the contiguity and strategic which I have had the pleasure to walk
the similarity of ethnicity should have mind over several times and appreciate it on
given the Indian Army enough scope to the map too. Hajipir Bulge was held by a
detect such concentrations and intent. The brigade with a full battalion deployed on the
Gibraltar Force elements were discovered mostly defences of the pass. The operation was planned as
by nomads in the high altitude areas where they a set piece one with five battalions, two launched
intended to mingle with the Bakarwal population from the west (direction of Sar and Sank) and two
which abounds there in the summer months. The from the east (direction of Bedori) with one in reserve
deployment of the Indian Army was not as dense as and was launched on the night of 26 August. On
it is today, with only 19 (Dagger) Infantry Division the eastern thrust a battalion was to capture Bedori
looking after both the Line of Control (then Ceasefire and exploit up to the defences close to Hajipir and
Line or CFL) and the rear area security in the Valley. link-up with the western thrust. The latter involved
The area south of Pir Panjal was the responsibility the capture of Sar and Sank and thereafter another
of 25 (Ace) Infantry Division where at least three to battalion passing through and capturing the western
four such forces of varying strength were infiltrated. shoulder. In the event it was the western thrust by
The Indian Army did suffer casualties particularly 1 PARA that succeeded in early capture of Sar and
in the Tangdhar Sector but Nasta Chun (Sadhana) Sank. Thereafter, in a classic case of manoeuvre
Pass remained secure from the infiltrators. The in the mountains Major Ranjit Dayal, company
forested area between Gulmarg and Baramulla along commander 1 PARA, sought permission to exploit
Sultanpur Kandi, Odur and Tangmarg remained a the opening and continue to the pass to capture it.
potent area for bases which had to be destroyed by He rapidly advanced to the base of Hajipir leading his
deliberate search and destroy operations as much as exhausted men with personal example, overcame the
in the Khag-Sutharan forest of Budgam. resistance on the northern slopes and captured the
The intended occupation of Srinagar, the airfield western shoulder. A unit followed in the wake from
and the radio station did not materialise as the the west capturing Bisali. The strategic importance
Force was detected well in time and engaged before of Hajipir was well realised by the Pakistan Army
it reached the outskirts of Srinagar. The major factor which counter-attacked in strength evicting the unit
A
s the Indian Army gets down to recalling There were serious disparities in the capabilities of the
the 1965 War with Pakistan, there is the two opposing armies. Indian Army had been locked into
need to know some basic facts about this a futile argument with the Ministry of Defence to have
conflict. The genesis of 1965 War goes back 21 instead of 17 infantry divisions. Ministry of Defence
to Pakistan’s failed attempt to grab J&K soon after had also worked overtime to keep the Indian Army starved
independence. India’s defeat in 1962 at the hands of contemporary weapons systems, especially when
of China and the serious weaknesses that surfaced Pakistan Army was being armed with the state-of-the-art
in the Indian Army during that conflict encouraged weapon systems under the American Aid programme.
Pakistan to try one more time to grab J&K. Indian Army had in all 608 tanks of Second World
There was the impression in Pakistan that if sufficient War vintage, (including 180 Centurion and 90 AMX
numbers of infiltrators are pushed into the valley, there light tanks of mid-forties period) 625 artillery pieces
would be a general uprising and then Pakistan Army of various calibre and 35 infantry brigades for the
could move in and take over Kashmir Valley. Military western front, which included a number of mountain
rule in Pakistan made it easier for it to follow this line brigades/divisions as well. These mountain formations
of thinking. To divert India’s attention towards the were neither equipped nor trained for plains warfare. As
south-west, Pakistan, during June 1965, did some against this Pakistan had 765 tanks (which included
ingress into the Rann of Kutch area. 352 state-of-the-art Patton tanks) 552 artillery pieces of
all calibres and 26 infantry brigades and 9,000 Razakars.
Phase One Pakistan had two armoured divisions against one with
Sometime later, this was followed by large-scale the Indian Army. Pak guns had better range and higher
infiltration into the valley. Indian Army reacted with calibre. It is only in infantry (if one included mountain
alacrity and was able to check infiltration, strike formations) that Indian Army had some advantage,
across the Line of Control (LoC) at some of the bases whereas Pak had distinct advantage in the quality and
of these infiltrators and captured Hajipir Pass, where number of tanks and was to conduct operations on
Major Ranjit Dayal won his Maha Vir Chakra (MVC). the ‘interior lines’. Even the uninitiated would know
Pakistan struck back in the Chamb-Jaurian Sector that tanks play dominant role in plains warfare.
of J&K, where it enjoyed great advantage due to Therefore, one may ask as to how this disparity, in
terrain and India’s limitations to deploy sufficient capabilities had come about against another belligerent
troops, more so armour. Indian Air Force responded neighbour, so soon after the 1962 debacle!
well, but unfortunately targeted own troops.
Further, Pakistan by restricting this aggression in Phase Two
the Chamb-Jaurian Sector was under the mistaken The Indian war plan was simple. On the Punjab
impression that India would confine fighting to J&K front it was to advance and establish bridgeheads
only. Upto here one could term as phase 1 of the war. across Ichhogil Canal and threaten Lahore and no
The only course open to India to relieve pressure more. India had no obstacle system of its own in this
in the Chamb-Jaurian Sector was, to launch sector to base its defences. It was expected that Pak
counteroffensive in the plains sectors of J&K and in would expend its offensive potential in its efforts to
Punjab. This counteroffensive took Pakistan completely eliminate this threat to Lahore. However reserves were
by surprise and proved a game changer in this held in this sector to deal with any counteroffensive
war. Indian Armoured Division, which was initially by Pak. To ensure safety of the Punjab sector, one
located in the Amritsar Sector, was sidestepped Centurion regiment from the armoured division was
to Samba-Jammu Sector, in complete secrecy, left behind in this sector. Centurion was the only tank
adding to the element of surprise. Indian offensive with the Indian Army, which could stand up to the
was essentially aimed at relieving pressure against Patton tank with which Pakistan Army was equipped.
Akhnoor, (Chamb-Jaurian) which provided vital link Though this shedding of one Centurion regiment
to Poonch-Rajouri Sector and an opening to Jammu. weakened the armoured division and with it, Indian
Army’s offensive potential, it ensured safety of the
Insufficient Weaponry Punjab sector. Where resources are limited, allocating
However Indian Army was in no state to go to war with these to tasks is a Hobson’s choice. Compromises
Pakistan, but was left with no option other than to react. have to be made and risks accepted.
O
n 01 August 1964, Air Marshal Arjan Singh grown into a well-equipped, highly-trained force of
took over as the Chief of Air Staff from about 17 squadrons. Its inventory had B-57 bomber,
Air Marshal AM Engineer. He was charged F-104 Starfighter and F-86 Sabre as fighter aircraft,
with the responsibility of supervising the SA-16 Albatross amphibian aircraft, H-43 helicopter
swift expansion and training of the Indian Air Force for maritime recce and air-sea rescue, RB-57 for high
(IAF). It was then expected that within a period of five altitude recce and C-130 Hercules and Bristol as
years, the Indian armed forces would total a million transport aircraft. The F-104 Starfighter was, indeed,
men and be equipped with modern weapon-systems. the ‘star’ fighter of the PAF. It was among the first
It was firmly believed that once the modernisation airplanes that were capable of flying at twice the speed
process was completed, Pakistan would have little of sound (Mach 2) and was armed with a rapid-firing
chance of a successful military adventure against India. 20 mm gun and two Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles
Nonetheless, in April 1965, the first indication of (AIM 9B). It had a radar for interception and fire
Pakistan’s nefarious intentions became apparent; when control. It was expected to be of particular use towards
its forces started encroaching into Indian Territory intercepting and shooting down of the night bomber.
in the Kutch area of Gujarat. This was well before
the military ‘balance of power’ had tilted decisively
in favour of India. The continued inflow of massive
American military aid had made the Pakistani Armed
Forces overly confident. Furthermore, as things stood
then, its governance was a military dictatorship under
Field Marshal Ayub Khan. These factors predisposed
Pakistan to even have the temerity to deploy Main
Battle Tanks (MBTs) in a
border skirmish between
the paramilitary patrols of
the two neighbours.
On 01 September,
with the Pakistani
forces pressing across IAF Gnat
the Jaurian Sector; the
Indian Army found that it The IAF, on its part, was equipped with 26 fighter
could not fight entirely on and four bomber squadrons; there were also
its own; since the Pakistan 13 squadrons of transport aircraft and five helicopter
Air Force (PAF) was also units, making it a formidable force of 43 squadrons.
harassing it constantly. On its inventory, the IAF fighter aircraft fleet included
The Army needed air Hunter, Gnat, Mystere, Vampire, Toofani (Ouragon)
defence and tactical and MIG-21 (a single squadron was under ‘raising’ at
support; but the necessary the time). The bomber fleet was represented by the
arrangements for the same Canberra only. Dakota, Packet, Ai-12, Il-14, Caribou
Air Marshal Arjan Singh, DFC had never been made in and Otter comprised the transport ‘line-up’. The Mi-4
(later Marshal of the conjunction with the IAF. and Alloutte represented the helicopter component.
Indian Air Force)
Numerically speaking, in 1965, the IAF was
The Contending Forces approximately three times the strength of the PAF.
By 1965, both the IAF as well as the PAF had come It is pertinent to note that six squadrons of Vampire
a long way since the partition of 1947. The PAF had and three of Toofani fighters were definitely outdated
Ayub’s
Miscalculation
Although many have termed the result of the
1965 War with Pakistan as a stalemate, it would be Maj Gen
more appropriate to say that it was Pakistan that lost Ian Cardozo
AVSM, SM (Retd)
the war. Pakistan failed miserably once again in her The writer was
aim of annexing Jammu and Kashmir by force although commissioned at the
Indian Military Academy
all factors were in her favour. On the contrary, into the 1st Battalion
the Fifth Gorkha Rifles
it resulted in the near total destruction of one (Frontier Force) where
of her armoured divisions. he received his basic
grounding as a young
P
officer. Wounded and
akistan’s obsession to take Jammu and massive military aid had been disabled at the battle of
Kashmir by force tempted her early in 1965 received from the United States Sylhet in Bangladesh
to replicate her earlier failed attempt of in 1971, he overcame
amounting to US$ 1.5 billion.
the handicap of losing
1947-48. General Ayub Khan who had come This included 200 M-45 Patton a leg and became
to power through a military coup apparently felt that tanks, one squadron of M-114 the first officer of the
the situation was too good to be ignored. India had supersonic Starfighters, four Indian Army to be
suffered a severe reverse in the Sino-Indian War approved for command of
squadrons of F-86 Sabre jet an Infantry Battalion and
of 1962 – her economy had suffered substantially,
fighters and two squadrons of subsequently, also the
reorganisation of her forces was incomplete, arms-aid first war-disabled officer
B-75 bombers. This completely
after the war with China was only for the mountains to command an Infantry
and that too had yet to be absorbed. Pandit Nehru upset the military balance and Brigade. Thereafter,
had died and the new leadership had yet to be relative strength between India he commanded an
and Pakistan. Diplomatically Infantry Division and
tested. Taking these factors into consideration,
retired in 1993 from his
Pakistan felt that the opportunity needed to be taken Pakistan had excellent relations
appointment as Chief of
advantage of. Her own economy was sound due to with the USA and she had Staff of a Corps
a good agricultural harvest and her industries were substantially improved her in the East.
picking up. Significant economic assistance and relations with China.
I
n the summer of ’64, voices within Pakistan reservations about the viability of the project. Ayub
favouring the use of force to wrest Kashmir from gave Major General Akhtar Malik, the commander of
India started becoming stronger and louder. The Pakistan’s 12 Infantry Division the authority to plan
President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan and execute the military operation. ‘Operation Gibraltar’
had just formed the ‘Kashmir Publicity Committee’, with and ‘Grand Slam’ thus came into being.
a mandate to ‘keep the Kashmir issue alive’ and this
Committee, in February 1965, put together a proposal Invasion By Infiltration
to send troops of the Pakistan Army, disguised as General Malik’s plan consisted of two components.
Kashmiri guerrillas, into the Indian state of Jammu and The first, code named ‘Operation Gibraltar’, envisaged
Kashmir, to foment an uprising against the government. the infiltration of thousands of regular and irregular
The underlying belief was that such an uprising, in troops dressed as Kashmiri guerrillas into Jammu
conjunction with armed military intervention, could and Kashmir, to create an uprising in the state and
wrest the state from India. The proposal mooted by tie down Indian security forces in combatting the
the Committee was supported by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, guerrillas. This was to be followed by an armoured
the then foreign minister of Pakistan, but was not too thrust by 12 Infantry Division across the Chamb
well received by Ayub and his Army Chief, General Sector to threaten Akhnoor. While approving the
Musa, who feared that such an act could lead to war plan, Ayub increased its scope to the capture of
with India. It received a quiet burial, but strangely, two Akhnoor for which additional resources were allotted
months later, Ayub accorded approval to the proposal, to the Division. Preparations for ‘Operation Gibraltar’
despite the fact that the Army Chief still had serious then commenced in earnest. On 1 August 1965, the
each equipped with two squadrons of Patton tanks and against an Indian counter attack! The advance was
one squadron of Sherman M-36B2 tank destroyers. resumed only after last light on 3 September. This gave
These regiments were from Pakistan’s newly raised India just the time needed to reinforce the defences at
6 Armoured Division. Artillery was massed to give the Jaurian and at the Fatwal Ridge – two positions which
force tremendous firepower. This consisted of 4 Corps the enemy had to overcome if he was to reach Akhnoor.
Artillery Brigade and the 7 Division Artillery Brigade. Among the many reasons proffered for the change in
The total firepower was a formidable 110 artillery command, three have some semblance of credibility. One
guns plus a light anti-aircraft gun battery and explanation was that Yahya was a close friend of Ayub
artillery locating resources. Three infantry brigades and with the fall of Akhnoor imminent, he lobbied with
were made available for the offensive. Ayub to give him command and Ayub obliged to help an
In terms of Infantry, the force levels were 2:1 in favour old friend. Another reason that has been proffered was
of Pakistan, but in armour the ratio was 6:1 in their that Malik belonged to the Ahmadiyya sect and Ayub
favour. More importantly, the AMX 13 tank held by did not want an Ahmadiyya to become a war hero. Both
20 Lancers was a light tank which was decidedly these theories while possible, appear unlikely. Perhaps
inferior to the newly acquired Patton tanks deployed the change had something to do with Ayub’s belief that
by Pakistan, both in terms of the main gun and armour the capture of Akhnoor would lead to a general war
protection. Pakistan also had a 6:1 superiority in with India – a possibility that he wished to avoid. Why
artillery. In addition, the two locating regiments available then did Ayub sanction the operation if he feared such
with them gave them a further advantage in terms of a possibility? The reasons for the change will perhaps
locating the Indian gun positions and making their remain an enigma but Pakistan lost a grand opportunity
neutralisation easier through counter-bombardment. to capture Akhnoor and place India on the back foot – an
This restricted the Indian artillery capability opportunity which she was not to get again.
to retaliate and to support their own forces. With the launch of operations by India across
the International Border on 6 September, Pakistan
Execution Of The Plan was forced to pull back the major component of
The overall plan for ‘Grand Slam’ involved three phases. its offensive forces from the Chamb Sector and a
The first phase was the most critical and envisaged a stalemate developed in the sector which was to
move up to the Manawar Wali Tawi after overrunning continue till the declaration of the ceasefire.
the defences of 191 Infantry Brigade west of Tawi, in Undoubtedly, Pakistan missed a golden opportunity
Laleali, Deva, Sakrana and Chamb by 4 Sector and to capture Akhnoor, which lay ripe for the picking, had
102 Infantry Brigade. The second phase envisaged the they moved with speed on day one itself, bypassing
capture of Akhnoor by 10 Infantry Brigade. The third opposition en route and making a breach over the
phase envisaged exploiting success by 102 Infantry Munawar Wali Tawi. That would have turned the
Brigade on axis Akhnoor-Jhangar-Dharmshal, defences of 191 Infantry Brigade. A dash to Akhnoor on
link-up with the infiltrating forces operating there and 2 September would have met with no opposition, but
thereafter capture Rajouri. Alternately, if feasible, the the impact on India would have been catastrophic. The
plan called for the capture of Jammu. entire defences of the sector stretching from Poonch
The Pakistani plan was bold, but was dependent on to Naushera were dependent on the single bridge
speed if Akhnoor was to be captured. At the point of across the Chenab River at Akhnoor and would have
application, the two enemy assaulting brigades had been impossible to maintain. The National Highway
only a thinly strung out battalion, 6 Sikh LI opposing to Srinagar would have been threatened and Jammu
them. Against the might of two armoured regiments, would have remained extremely vulnerable. Indeed,
equipped with the latest tanks, were just two troops the course of the war would have changed. Pakistan
of AMX 13 tanks. The terrain favoured the movement would have been able to justify the aggression, stating
of armoured forces and in real terms, the enemy had that it had been necessitated by India’s capture of the
a superiority in excess of 10:1 at the point of decision. Hajipir Pass and world opinion would largely have
It still took them the better part of the day to breach remained ambivalent to Pakistani aggression.
the defences of 6 Sikh LI. The 15 Kumaon, deployed
at Mandiala, however held on and withdrew only later Heroes Of Akhnoor
on orders after last light. The enemy made no attempt That India was saved the blushes can be attributed
to bypass the opposition, breach the Munawar Wali to the resistance put up by 191 Infantry Brigade
Tawi and isolate the brigade. Had it done so, it would Group, especially to the heroism and courage of
have had a clear run to Akhnoor on the next day, 6 Sikh LI, 15 Kumaon and the squadron of
2 September. That was the first stroke of luck for India. 20 Lancers, which delayed the enemy on the critical
first day. After all, the enemy had to advance just
Change Of Command 5 to 7 km in open country where no natural obstacle
On 2 September, for some strange and inexplicable existed upto the Munawar Wali Tawi and no anti-tank
reasons, the command of the enemy forces changed mines too had been laid to hinder the attacker. On
hands. Malik was relieved of the command of the the second day, it was providence that intervened
offensive forces and the same was handed over to with the inexplicable change in command. Truly,
General Yahya Khan. There was a lull in the battle and Pakistan missed a great opportunity to change the
Yahya took up a defensive posture, ostensibly to guard course of the war, even before it had begun.
Brig
Rahul K Bhonsle
(Retd)
The writer is Director
Security Risks Asia, an
Asian risk and knowledge
management consultancy
based in New Delhi
and specialises in risk
management and
future warfare.
1965
A Tribute to Courage
and Resoluteness
Today our national goal remains that of securing economic growth
and development. This precludes strategic offensive and it is generally
perceived that the nation will not go to war unless it is forced to. This
is evident from the operational tasks assigned to the Indian Armed
Forces as are evident in discussions in the open domain. The three
Services are required to be prepared for a war to dominate Pakistan and
deter China. Thus a two-front war scenario is realistically appraised
and in both the cases strategic defensive remains the primary option
with variation for a more robust posture to ‘dominate’ Pakistan.
I
ndo-Pak War 1965 was one of the finest hours of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri led him
in the history of independent India which saw to commit the blunder of launching his nation into
Indian Armed Forces triumph after the perceived a war which was unwinnable. Shastri’s unwavering
humiliation of 1962 by an adversary who was determination was reflected by the military leadership
better armed. The Indian military demonstrated led by Chief of the Army Staff General JN Chaudhuri and
admirable resilience in coming on top of an opponent Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh General Officer Commanding
that was fed on a false sense of superiority in strategy, in Chief Western Command. To General Harbaksh goes
tactics and military equipment and was led by a the credit of successes on the Western Front, which
dictator who lacked the sagacity to appreciate the covered the entire belt from Jammu and Kashmir up to
intrinsic strength of India’s leadership. Ganganagar in North Rajasthan. The Indian Air Force
under Marshal of the Air Force the then Air Chief Marshal
Underestimating India Arjan Singh similarly distinguished in outmatching the
Pakistan’s President Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s gross Pakistan Air Force equipped with superior aircraft and
misreading of the diminutive yet resolute personality technology provided by the United States.
In 1965 India traditionally adopted a defensive The statement reflected the advantages of the
strategy given the necessity for restraint, preservation strategic defensive. Prewarning the opponent of
of national power, adverse impact on the economy consequences of abandoning restraint is in-built
and providing greater options for effective employment in the same while in the military field it enables
of military force. Today the Indian Armed Forces choosing the most appropriate response in terms of
leadership tempered in the War of Liberation of timing and theatre of operations.
Bangladesh in 1971, the misadventure by Pakistani Underlying the strategic defensive is the principle of
regular forces in Kargil in 1999 and many years restraint borne out of the logic of war avoidance and
of fighting insurgency and terrorism has the aura retention of military power for effective employment at
of confidence which was relatively untested in the place and time of one’s own choosing. A sagacious
1965. Thus there would be infinite wariness in political and military opponent would read the intent
the opposition for an adventure. Moreover force and flexibly readjust aims and objectives
accretion provides a distinct advantage to India
vis-à-vis Pakistan which could be assessed as Pak Misreading
anything from 1:2 to 2.5 considering not just the Pakistan’s military leadership lacked accountability
numbers but the combat potential of the tanks, to its people and thus was intent on following the
fighter aircraft and warships. However despite these predetermined offensive strategy. This was despite
advantages the strategy remains defensive. heavy losses suffered in the Rann of Kutch by
A comparison of the strategic defensive as adopted in Pakistan which were estimated to be 300 or three
1965 and as envisaged today will therefore be relevant times the Indian number of 98. Ayub Khan completely
to understand advantages of the same and measures misread Prime Minister Shastri’s resolve and his
to be undertaken for a successful outcome in the case deeper understanding of matters military and
of a conventional war including the nuclear option. persisted with the second phase of the 1965 offensive
in Jammu and Kashmir.
India’s Defensive Strategy Pakistan infiltrated the Gibraltar Force in the
India operated on the premise of the strategic Kashmir Valley with the aim of raising the civil
defensive in 1965. This was a well-considered population to revolt in August 1965. On 1 September
option based on holistic appraisal of the need for ‘Operation Grand Slam’ was launched by Pakistan
national and military rebuilding as a consequence in the Chamb Sector with the aim of capturing the
of the trauma of 1962. There was the food crisis Akhnoor Bridge and cutting off areas in the North in
of the 1950’s which had led to import of wheat the Rajouri belt. These operations were undertaken
from the United States under PL 480, Soviet Union even as ceasefire post the Kutch action was
and others. While military strength, capability signed by both sides on 1 July.
and morale had been restored, there was natural
aversion to, ‘testing the sword’, in another Chaudhuri Doctrine
confrontation with uncertainty of outcome. Moreover Having anticipated this perfidy, Indian Chief of the
on the west, Pakistan had been equipped with Army Staff General JN Chaudhuri issued
modern American military equipment while orders to implement plans for an offensive
Selection
India fought with dated Gnat fighters and in Punjab threatening the most vital
Centurion tanks. Strategic defensive of Lahore political objective Lahore. This was the
was thus a natural preference. was seminal as offensive component of India’s defensive
On the other hand Pakistan adopted strategy, wherein when forced upon
the strategic offensive in 1965. This it hurt the core of by circumstances of the campaign or
was based on the reverse logic of Pakistani national a threat to a vital area, an aggressive
superiority in arms and a military response is initiated on a front of
leadership that was not accountable pride and one’s own choosing. The aim of such a
to the travesty imposed by war on its prestige manoeuvre is to threaten the vitals of the
people. Pakistan’s offensive strategy mainly enemy with a view to force him to retract and
comprised of launching operations in the review his own offensive.
Rann of Kutch as a prelude to ‘Operation Gibraltar’ and In this the selection of Lahore was seminal
‘Grand Slam’ in Jammu and Kashmir. as it hurt the core of Pakistani national pride
India checkmated the first phase in Kutch and and prestige situated on the Grand Trunk
Prime Minister Shastri was quick to warn Pakistan Road connecting Delhi-Amritsar and Lahore in
not to misread Indian intention and avoid a larger pre-partitioned India. As Indian 11 Corps undertook
conflagration. As Major KC Praval highlights in an offensive on a broad front with a view to contact
his seminal historical work, Indian Army After the Ichhogil Canal, one of the battalions, 3 Jat crossed
Independence, speaking in the Lok Sabha on over the same and reached the outskirts of Lahore
28 April 1965 Shastri said, “If Pakistan continues to in Batapur locality on 7 September creating a storm
discard reason and persists in its aggressive activities, in the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. While
our Army will defend the country and it will decide its lodgement could not be sustained, this set the stage
own strategy and the employment of its manpower for a considerable campaign of attrition that followed
and equipment in the manner it deems best.” in the Western Theatre. This included destruction of
INDIAN NAVY
The tasks envisaged were: first, to carry out sweeps off seek went on for five continuous days and Ghazi
the West Coast of Pakistan to disrupt the Port of Karachi was kept under continuous pressure by the
and inflict heavy damage on port installations; next, Indian Navy’s ships and aircraft. Because of this
the destruction of Pakistan Naval Forces if ordered; relentless anti-submarine action, Ghazi, which was
third, provision of general support for the defence of the the only submarine in the entire subcontinent (the
major ports on the West Coast and fourth, the provision Indian Navy only acquired its first submarine in
of general cover and protection to our merchant 1967), could not make any impact on the war.
ships in the Arabian Sea, especially those plying to and Seahawk aircraft of Indian Naval Air Squadron
from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. (INAS) 300, then located at Jamnagar in Gujarat,
India’s policy, however, was not to escalate the were placed under the operational control of the
conflict by a direct confrontation at sea. Given the Indian Air Force on 02 September 1965 for offensive
Government’s determination to limit the scope of the action against the enemy. All Naval Air Squadrons
conflict as much as possible, the role assigned to the – INAS 300 (Seahawk fighter squadron), INAS 310
Navy during the war was mainly a defensive one. (Alize anti-submarine aircraft squadron), INAS 550
Nevertheless, the Indian Navy remained vigilant to (Seahawk and Alize trainer squadron) and INAS 551
ensure the safety of Indian ports, guard the country’s (Kiran jet trainer squadron) were deployed for
entire coastline and above all protect India’s shipping reconnaissance and anti-shipping roles and for the
from interference by the Pakistan Navy. Whereas air defence of Indian seaports.
most of Pakistani shipping was carried on neutral On the eve of the ceasefire on 23 September 1965,
bottoms, India’s shipping was largely borne by Indian a false statement broadcast by the Pakistan Radio
ships – 250 of them were owned by India, while only claimed that an Indian frigate, INS Brahmaputra
30 merchant ships belonged to Pakistan. had been sunk in the Arabian Sea, by the Pakistani
Intelligence on the disposition of the Pak naval submarine Ghazi. After the war, the Indian Navy
forces had indicated that the Pak submarine Ghazi invited the world press and Naval Attachés of all
was at sea and was likely to have been deployed off countries accredited to India, to have a cup of tea
Bombay for anti-shipping operations and the Pak Fleet on board Brahmaputra at the Naval Dockyard,
had been proceeding to sea everyday for exercises and Bombay, which was hosted by the Fleet Commander,
returning to its anchorage in the evening. Rear Admiral BA Samson.
The Indian Fleet was led by the Flagship Mysore – a In his letter to the Navy, the then Defence
sleek cruiser powered by an 80,000 shaft horsepower Minister YB Chavan expressed the government’s
steam plant with state-of-the-art command and appreciation for the role played by the Navy
control facilities. Mysore’s nine 6 inch guns, during the war as follows:
controlled by the latest fire control equipment, “I greatly appreciate the silent but efficient
could deliver two and a half tonnes of explosives a role which the Navy played in the defence of the
minute on the target. Mysore also had eight 4 inch country. The Navy protected islands which were
guns for surface and anti-aircraft operations and vital to our security, guarded our ports and the
twelve 40 mm Bofors AA guns. In fact her punch long Indian coast line. All merchant ships destined
and looks were legendary and she was popularly for our ports reached safely and our international
referred to as the Queen of the Orient. trade was not permitted to be interfered with by the
Flying the flag of Rear Admiral BA Samson, Mysore Pakistan Navy. I take this opportunity to emphasise
sailed for offensive patrols on the West Coast, again that the Navy has done and achieved all that
accompanied by Brahmaputra, Beas, Betwa, Khukri, the Government desired of it, within the bounds and
Kirpan, Kuthar, Talwar, Rana, Rajput, Ranjit and compass allotted to it”.
P
rakash Mishra joined the Indian Police
Service in 1977 and he was allotted to
the Odisha Cadre. He is a postgraduate
in Applied Economics and also
a Law graduate.
During his 36 years of Police career, he
has held several positions of eminence both
at the State and the Centre. In his home
State Odisha he served as SP Security
(1988-90), DIG (Security) to CM, DIG
Bhubaneswar Range (1996-98), DIG Crime
Branch (1988-89), Director (Sports & Youth the kidnapping of Ms Rubiya Sayeed, killing of
Services) (1999-2000), IG (Admin) (2000-01), Station Director of Doordarshan Srinagar, killing of
CMD (Police Housing Corporation) (2006-2009), Air Force personnel at Srinagar etc.
DG-cum-Director of Intelligence (2009-2010), DG He has undergone several training courses of
Home Guards and DG Fire Services (2010), DGP international repute, viz specialised training on
Odisha (2012-14) and CMD, Odisha State Road interrogation, international Terrorism and non-verbal
Transport Corporation. At the Centre he served as communication from FBI National Academy,
SP/DIG, CBI (1990-96), IG RPF (2001-2003), Joint USA, ATAP programme on interdicting Terrorist
Director NPA, Hyderabad (2003-05, ADG/Spl DG, Organisation in New Mexico, USA and training on
NIA (2010-12) and Director General, National International Terrorism conducted by JICA, Tokyo.
Disaster Reponse Force and Civil Defence (2012). Prakash Mishra is an eminent speaker on
As Director Intelligence, Odisha he initiated a slew various police subjects, national security,
of measures against Naxals in the State. As the DGP intelligence, investigations, Left Wing Extremism,
of Odisha, during 2012-14, his effective anti-Naxal counter-terrorism etc.
strategies could effectively contain the Naxal He is recipient of Police Medal for Meritorious
menace in the State resulting in the neutralisation Service (1994), President’s Police Medal for
of several Naxal leaders and in drastic reduction of Distinguished Service (2001) and Odisha
SF casualties. As Spl Director NIA, he supervised Governor’s Medal (2006).
investigation and trials of several important cases of He has held the charge of Special Secretary (Internal
national and international ramifications. As DIG, CID Security) in Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi
Odisha, he investigated the sensational Australian looking after the internal Security matters of the
Missionary Graham Stains’ murder case and the country with particular emphasis on the North-east,
offenders were brought to justice. As SP/DIG CBI, counter-terrorism and Left Wing Extremism from
supervised several important investigations including 8th July, 2014 to 21st December, 2014.
T
he month of August 2015 will witness India was a major morale booster for the nation and its
and its Armed Forces commemorating fifty Armed Forces. The success came in the backdrop of
years of India-Pakistan War 1965. This the debacle of 1962 Indo-China conflict. The political
war was significant in many aspects and establishment had clearly understood the need to
strengthen its security apparatus and modernise vis-à-vis Pakistan. The war, as per experts, ended in
its Armed Forces to meet the future challenges from a stalemate; however India had once again prevented
its neighbours especially Pakistan and China. The Pakistan from annexing Kashmir. Indian Army displayed
focus shifted to the Armed Forces that went in for exemplary aggressiveness and highest level of morale to
major expansion, reorganisation, restructuring redeem its honour and bring glory to the nation.
and modernisation. It must be amply clear that the
above process takes considerable time, resources Present Day Scenario
and effort. The Pakistan establishment had never While a lot has been commented upon by various
reconciled to its failure to annex Kashmir in 1948. analysts on the lessons learnt in war, what is
Every government in Pakistan has focused on this imperative is to analyse our vulnerabilities then and
unfinished agenda till date. It had clearly realised how well are we prepared now. Accurate and timely
that given the size of both the countries, it was intelligence of adversary is a major contributing factor
unlikely to succeed in any future conflict against for success in war. It may be worth recording the old
India. Pakistan also felt that post-1962 debacle and saying “Forewarned is Forearmed”. Unfortunately
the death of Prime Minister Nehru in 1964, India intelligence regarding activities of Pakistan and its
was both politically and militarily at its weakest. intentions were found wanting. They were mostly
It therefore was a great opportunity once again to inaccurate and misleading. Post 1965 War India went
execute its nefarious designs. in for establishment of Research and Analysis Wing
(R&AW) in 1968 to beef up its external intelligence
Commencement Of Operations both during peace and war. The intelligence
The skirmishes in Rann of Kutch in April-May 1965 apparatus also got reviewed post Indo-Pak conflict
emboldened Pakistan and were seen as a prelude of 1971 and Kargil Operations 1999 in a major way.
to conduct of major operations in Jammu and There is multiplicity of intelligence agencies and
Kashmir which were launched in August 1965. surveillance assets at the centre and state level. Lack
Both sides were able to gain success in various of Intra and Inter-ministerial coordination as also the
areas along the Ceasefire Line. The launch of one-upmanship of various intelligence agencies
‘Operation Grand Slam’ by Pakistan to Our to gain prominence continues to be a major
annex Akhnoor and cut-off Kashmir in future impediment which needs to be corrected.
early September was thwarted by the The quality of intelligence including tactical
Indian Army. It was a major failure
planning will intelligence has considerably improved
and an important turning point of have to cater for with the availability of Unmanned Aerial
the war. India in a brilliant strategic a multiple front Vehicles (UAVs), satellites etc. The
move, therefore decided to expand threat and prepare process of dissemination of intelligence
the area of conflict further south in has also been streamlined with the
Punjab for which plans had been well
for related establishment of suitable structures.
conceived by the Indian Army. contingencies However intelligence can never be enough
and we must continue with our present
Operations In Punjab efforts to further improve this aspect.
The overall strategy was to launch multiple operations
towards Lahore and Kasur. Operations in Punjab Border Management
(‘Operation Riddle’) were conducted under aegis of Infiltration along the Line of Control (LoC) and
Vajra Corps, the oldest Corps of Indian Army. The International border has been part of Pakistan
operations were characterised by surprise, speed strategy. It adopted the same during 1965 War and
and aggressiveness and were launched along the subsequently continues to support non-state actors
Grand Trunk Road to Lahore, Khalra-Lahore and to foment trouble in India. This vulnerability has
Khemkaran-Kasur road. Major gains were made in got addressed in a major way with the construction
these areas. Indian forces crossed the Ichhogil Canal of counter-infiltration obstacles along the LoC and
and soon were threatening the outskirts of Lahore. This fencing of International Border. The border is being
area saw some hard fought and exemplary infantry effectively managed by deployment of paramilitary
actions in the battles of Dograi and Barki. The desperate forces, beefing up by army in critical areas as also
Pakistan Army launched a counter-offensive further deployment of modern surveillance assets. These
south in Khemkaran by its elite Armoured Division actions have seen a visible drop in infiltration.
with the aim of threatening Amritsar. It met with stiff The paramilitary forces and other assets must
resistance and faced with major annihilation of its be integrated in overall plans so as to optimise
front line US made Patton tanks in the famous Battle of given resources for better application in war. They
Asal Uttar. The area of Bhikhiwind came to be known can play a prominent role for rear area security.
as Patton Nagar. It may be pertinent to mention here We must continue with effective vigilance and
the obituary of Patton tanks aptly made by President further strengthen the counter-infiltration posture to
Radhakrishnan during his post-war visit to this area in defeat Pakistan’s nefarious designs.
following words “Born in Detroit, Died in Bhikhiwind”. The war clearly brought out the importance of
The proclamation of ceasefire on 22 September 1965 plains sector of Punjab and Jammu region where
saw major territorial gains made by the Indian Army Pakistan launched its determined armour thrust to
Restructuring Of Forces
The process of expansion and reorganisation of
Armed Forces started post 1962. This was still
in process when the 1965 War started. However
having learnt the lessons they were in a better
state to fight which was evident during the war.
The performance of Armed Forces during 1971
conflict bears testimony to the fact of our ability
to give a crushing defeat to Pakistan which led
to its bifurcation and creation of Bangladesh.
Modernisation and restructuring of Armed Forces
is a continuous process which is based on various
factors viz envisaged threat perception, geopolitical
realities etc. This has enabled us to optimise our level. While we have gone in for establishment of
forces in a manner that the areas of responsibilities Integrated Defence Staff, the one point advice to the
today are reduced and are much better managed. government is still not possible for want of Chief of
We have also been able to create dedicated forces Defence Staff despite recommendation by various
for offensive operations. We need to equip our committees. Creation of above is imperative to bring
forces with the best and latest weapon platforms in greater synergy between Services, joint planning,
to meet the future challenges. Our dependence on integration and optimum utilisation of resources.
external purchases has to reduce which can only
be done by indigenisation of defence industry and Integrated Training
restructuring of Defence Research and Development Success in war for a country is directly proportional to
Organisation (DRDO) and making them more how well-trained, equipped and motivated are
accountable. Modernisation requires Another its Armed Forces. The 1965 War brought
tremendous resources and time out a number of shortcomings in our
but also the political will to take hard
issue of
training at tactical and operational
and timely decisions for acquisition. concern has been levels. These have been reviewed and
Any delay in this regard will be at the lack of integration the curriculum has been suitably
cost of national security. modified at formation and training
of Services to establishments. Integrated training at
External Linkages And Diplomacy jointly prosecute formation levels and with other Services
The war did witness some movements plans continues to be a focus area based on
by China in support of Pakistan with envisaged threat perception.
minimal effect. However in future conflict
we will have to factor the growing strategic Logistics Sustenance
relationship between these two countries. This can History bears testimony to the fact that wars can
be seen in the form of build-up of infrastructure be won if the country has a strong economic base
in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and other areas, and has the ability to sustain the efforts of its
provisions of latest weapons, nuclear and missile Armed Forces for a prolonged period of operations.
technologies, support in various international We have made reasonable progress in this regard.
forums etc. Our future planning will have to cater However what is required is to make up the
for a multiple front threat and prepare for related deficiencies of our weapon systems, ammunition and
contingencies. Our diplomacy will have to play a equipment as also build-up our infrastructure and
major role in mitigating such linkages and creating logistic facilities in border areas.
our own support base in international forums.
Conclusion
Joint Planning And Integration The Indian Army today is one of the most
Another issue of concern has been lack of professional, well-trained and motivated armies in
integration of Services to jointly prosecute plans. the world. It can justifiably be proud of its valour
Lack of coordination between Indian Army and and dedication to the nation. The need of the
Indian Air Force was visible during 1965 operations. hour is to speed up the process of modernisation,
Air power in future wars will play an important acquisition, build-up of infrastructure, making up
role. The success of any future conflict will be of the deficiencies and restructuring of its Armed
dependent upon integration of effort at national Forces to meet the future challenges.
“Because things are the way they are, things will not stay the way they are.” – Bertolt Brecht.
W
inning or losing wars is sometimes a pronounced naivety for its wars with India since 1947
matter of perception; a matter of the till date and now with homegrown terrorists within the
mind more than of clinical analysis. Pakistani heartland. Not the least, Indian apologists
Matters become rather more complicated rationalise the disastrous 1962 Sino-Indian War and
when narrow nationalism, sepia mindsets and clever ‘Operation Pawan’ in Sri Lanka in a like manner.
propaganda enter the fray to dilute harsh reality with Globally, it is rare that any claim of Victory has
euphemistic myth created by clever spin doctoring. been unanimously accepted as reality. For instance, in
When realisation does seep in as it eventually the past 100 years, the credit for untrammelled total
must, apologists on the losing side use the tactic victory belongs only to USA which led a consortium
of rationalisation to suggest that the winning side of nations to win World War II decisively. This point
used unethical means; that their (the losing sides) is better understood when one realises, still using
soldiers won but obtuse politicians, inept diplomacy, USA as an example that since its ‘total Victory’ in
luck, chance and even God failed the nation. August 1945, America has ‘won’ all its military
German apologists did exactly this at Versailles campaigns, battles, engagements and skirmishes
post World War I; the American establishment has but ended up ‘losing’ the war … Korea, Vietnam, Iraq
rationalised their near and far abroad wars post 1945 and its redux a decade later and now Afghanistan;
in this manner. Pakistan has done similarly with they all offer staggering proof of this reality.
helped USA keep a tight watch over Southeast Asia, and Chaffee Regiments. The 1965 London-based
China and the Malacca Straits. Unhappy with the IISS handbook on Military Balance revealed that
Pakistani proximity to USA, USSR started helping Pakistan had tank parity with India but better
India militarily and politically but without openly quality tanks. Pakistan’s artillery too was far
antagonising Pakistan or China. NATO also played a superior in quality compared to India’s.
balancing act and post 1962 assisted India by way l It also received 100 F-86 Sabre jets, one squadron
of limited access to weapons and supply systems. of F-104 Starfighters, 30 B-57 bombers and four
Pakistan had secretly hoped that the help India was C-130 transport aircraft.
getting from USA/NATO/Russia could be cashed in l Not the least, Foreign Minister Bhutto and his
later by getting the same powers to get India to agree foreign office and military confidantes created a
to Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir and avoided criticising deliberate euphoria that the Indians were down
these supplies. Realising around 1963 that its and out and that Pakistan must take military
expectation of diplomatic support for Kashmir wasn’t advantage of this vulnerability while it had a
going to happen, Pakistan became critical and started chance. The Kutch settlement in Pakistan’s favour
courting China, ceding the geostrategically important removed the last vestige of doubt and emboldened
5,000 sq km Shaksgam Valley to it. This caused India Bhutto’s assertions. ‘Operation Gibraltar’ and
grave concern. Pakistan was (wrongly, it turned out) its attendant ‘Operation Grand Slam’ were
playing up to China assuming that it would use force thus planned contingencies premised on
against India in the event of an Indo-Pak war. Bhutto ‘Victory’ in its widest application.
had averred in the Pakistan National Assembly in 1963
that, “in the event of war, Pakistan would be helped The Indian Situation
by the most powerful nation in Asia”. It was with this During this period, India was on a relative low. The
aggressive Pakistani mindset that Kutch happened 1962 War had crushed Nehru in spirit and reputation;
in 1965; followed by the 23 day long September war. singed and scarred the Indian psyche. Dying a broken
man, he was succeeded by low-profile, understated
The Pakistani Swagger and under-rated Lal Bahadur Shastri as PM. Left
It was substantial and, from the Pakistani perspective, bereft of many friends, the country was slowly
justified, fuelled by what Pakistani spin-masters picking itself up from the despair and shame of 1962;
presented to the world as a runaway victory in Kutch reorganising its forces and struggling with serious food
in April 1965 with India left sulking and defensive. shortages; accepting US PL-480 food aid and facing
The swagger hinged on: widespread anti-Hindi language riots. On the positive
l An antediluvian conviction highlighted by US side, steel-nerved Shastri empowered the Armed
author Stephen Cohen in The Pakistan Army Forces to plan for war including taking proactive
whereby one Pakistani equalled ten Indians; action if push came to shove. In fact, ‘Op Ablaze’
were push-overs for macho Pakistanis. With the (May-July 1965) war-gamed India’s offensive options,
1947-48 Indo-Pak War left undecided, this core some of which were fielded in August-September 1965.
belief of superiority; of carrying the Mughal legacy This government support for aggressive action positively
forward got reinforced. affected the mojo of the Armed Forces and restored their
l Field Marshal Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister self-belief and this reflected in the war that followed.
both held the Indian PM in contempt. Post an
airport lounge meeting at a stopover at Karachi Events Leading To The September War
Airport, both of them are on record deriding the Despite a UN mediated ceasefire (CF) effective
Indian PM; a feeling which was reinforced when January 1949, relations between the two countries
the Kutch skirmish showed the Indian leadership remained blighted. Kashmir remained the main issue which
as timid, tentative and unsure. led to the 1965 War. The ‘Uneasy Ceasefire’ was evident in
l An obsession that Kashmir must be militarily the number of border violations by Pakistan: 488 in 1963,
won since diplomatic annexation was untenable 1,522 in 1964 and over 1,800 in January-July 1965.
and that Kashmiri Muslims would aid Pakistani On 09 April 1965, Pakistan ‘tested the waters’ as
annexation. The decision taken was that it was President Ayub would unabashedly confess later,
Kashmir ‘now or never’. by transgressing in Kutch. Though India thwarted
l A perception abetted by China that India post 1962 this offensive, Pakistan felt emboldened by the ‘silent
was in disarray; a state that India was fervently spectator’ stance of the world community led by USA. The
seeking to improve with new raisings and weaponry UN negotiated settlement was also in Pakistan’s favour.
after which period India could not be defeated. This The Bhutto driven ‘Op Gibraltar’ of August 1965 that
was magnified in the Pakistani mind by a belief that followed was Pakistan’s last effort to resolve the ‘K’ Question
if Pakistan attacked, close ally China would open militarily by an ‘Algerian’ type of ‘people-supported’
a second front; keeping India’s forces tied down. struggle. The 8,000 strong force (planned to expand to
l The endless flow of state-of-the-art American 30,000) comprised men from the Regular Army, Azad
arms fuelled brash confidence in the US trained Kashmir Militia, Frontier Scouts, Mujahids and Razakars.
officers about winning. Under the 5 and a half On 05 August 1965, the armed infiltrators crossed the
Division plan, Pakistan fielded nine regiments CFL between Jammu and Kargil into J&K to ‘liberate’
of M47/48 Patton tanks to add to its Sherman Kashmir but were defeated at launch itself.
E
mboldened by its success in Kutch in
April 1965, Pakistan evolved operation
Gibraltar in J&K which was launched
in August-September 1965. This was a
massive infiltration campaign designed to create
chaos in J&K and incite the populace to revolt
against the government. Operation Gibraltar failed
because while launching this operation, Pakistan
failed to assess the ground realities inside the state
of J&K. The expected open support from locals never
materialised. Even pro-Pakistan political parties did
not come out in open support of the infiltrators.
Moreover, the quick and firm retaliation of the
Indian security forces made sure that Pakistan Army
could not make gains anywhere.
Celebrating
Victory
General Ayub Khan had failed to assess his adversary, Shastriji.
Shastriji was a votary of Ahimsa but once it came to killing the
enemy to defend the motherland, he was second to none. Both Ayub
and later Yahya made a mistake in assessing the fighting spirit of
the Hindu soldier and what they mistakenly called Hindu India.
With the result the puffed up Generals across the border lost all the
wars they fought against Hindu India.
L
al Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of General Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan
India ordered the Indian Army to cross the made the second major mistake of launching
international border in Punjab and launch ‘Operation Grand Slam’. Their tanks and crack infantry
a two-pronged attack on Pakistan. It was a regiments were ordered to cross Chamb-Jaurian and
magnificent masterstroke of high-level strategy that capture Akhnoor to fan out in the plains of Jammu
broke the back of attacking forces of Pakistan in the and cut the vital lines of communications and supply
Chamb-Akhnoor Sector of Jammu and Kashmir. The of the Indian Army located in J&K. His supposed
wily attackers had no choice but to withdraw from master move was to paralyse the Indian Army by
their winning position and rush to the defence of their starving them of rations, ammunition and weaponry,
homeland – Punjab. Shastriji’s strategic move to cross not forgetting reinforcements.
the international border and attack towards Lahore The Pakistan Army initially met with major
and Sialkot was indeed a game changer. successes as their armour cut deep into the
Pakistan Army, thereafter, could never achieve its Indian Territory. Gen Ayub Khan had issued a
Aim of War to wrest Kashmir by force and annex it with special Order of the Day congratulating Generals,
Pakistan. That was a long cherished dream of their officers and troops of his army on their major military
founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. It may be recalled achievements. The Indian Air Force fighter jets were
that Jinnah’s dreams were dashed in 1947 when the not a bugbear to their tanks as the old time planes
Indian Army had landed at the Srinagar Airport to were shot down. “You have pierced the enemy flesh
turn the tide and stop the attacking of Pakistan tribals with your teeth, bite deep and let him bleed”, said old
commanded by regular Pakistan Army officers in their Ayub in one of his statements to his soldiers.
tracks. Jinnah kept waiting at Abbottabad cantonment
for a green signal from its army to move ceremonially The Blunder
into Srinagar to accept the surrender of representatives And yet for no rhyme or reason Gen Ayub Khan made
of the Hindu Dogra ruler, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh but a major mistake of his military career. He ordered
returned home deeply disappointed. a change of command at their advancing infantry
division level by replacing the GOC and putting
Pakistan’s Game Plan Major General Yahya Khan in the saddle. The change
Pakistan’s military rulers had made the Himalayan of command halted the fast pace forward and there
blunder of underestimating the will power of Prime was a period of inaction for a day plus. It gave time to
Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and the fighting the Indian Generals to regroup their forces and tie their
capability of the Indian Army. President Ayub Khan loose ends. It remains unexplained why Gen Ayub Khan
of Pakistan made the greatest mistake of his life by changed the General Officer Commanding of the strike
launching ‘Operation Gibraltar’ and sending thousands division at a crucial moment.
of his army soldiers into Kashmir in disguise in the The morale of the Indian soldiers in the Akhnoor
summer of 1965 to sabotage lines of communications area was rather low. They did not perceive any major
of the Indian Army and incite the Kashmiri Muslims to reinforcement coming from India nor was there any
rise in revolt against occupation of their homeland by material change in the battle plan. The civil population
the Hindus of Indian Army. The aim was not achieved was also perplexed. They had never anticipated such
as the said operation failed to take-off. In fact the local ferocious attack from Pakistan, an underdog until
Kashmiri kisans and Gujjar herdsmen were the first then. What had emboldened Pakistan’s planners and
ones to inform the Indian Army of the massive enemy executors was their information that the Indian Army
infiltration. Their element of surprise was lost and their was incapable of fighting against Pakistan. Its
‘Operation Gibraltar’ collapsed like a house of cards. disastrous defeat in the 1962 India-China War and
T
he correlation between ability to toil and
corresponding returns in terms of better
fortune was aptly put by Hollywood producer
Samuel Goldwyn when he said, “The harder
I work, the luckier I get”. In the case of soldiers this
concept is better epitomised in the adage “Fortune
favours the brave”. Reading the exploits of some of
the heroes of the 1965 Indo-Pak War, I came to a
conclusion that while there is a lot of wisdom in
these words, there is room for slight modification.
In a battlefield with bullets flying thick and fast,
shrapnel from a hundred projectiles seeking their
unfortunate prey to kill or maim, difference between
finding the bullet with your name on it and giving it
a skip is often a matter of chance and probability.
But to actually cheat the projectile even after it
has been delivered to the correct address can be
attributed to nothing but pure luck. Bravery in war
is so commonplace that lady luck is probably too
hard pressed to serve every instance. But there
are some notable instances during that war when
she did manage to reach on time.
Major (Later Lt Gen) Ranjit Singh Dayal, became
a household name after leading 1 Para attacks on
successive enemy held features over three days,
ultimately capturing the vital Hajipir Pass. Beginning
on 25 August 1965, this was the first large-scale foray
by Indian Forces across the Ceasefire Line (CFL) at
a time when war had not been formally declared.
Pakistani infiltrators had been coming across in large
numbers, supported and augmented by their regular
troops, in a repeat of the tribal invasion of 1947. The
towns. This was put into action on 6th September before he could fire at the CO. A little later Col Hayde
and as part of this offensive 3 Jat under Lt Col narrowly missed being shot down by enemy aircraft
(later Brig) Desmond E Hayde was tasked to capture which strafed their position, though his second in
a Pakistani village called Dograi. The village lay on command, Maj Marwah, wasn’t as lucky.
the Grand Trunk Road between Amritsar and Lahore. The next incident took place on 8th September,
Over the next 17 days, 3 Jat fought some of the fiercest after the battalion had fallen back from Dograi and
battles of the war, capturing Dograi not once but taken up position on the Upper Bari Doab Canal
twice. The first time was on 6th September itself, when halfway between the border and Dograi. They had dug
the Indian offensive caught the Pakistanis ill-prepared shallow trenches and the CO was sitting on the edge
and the Jats brushed aside minor opposition, rushing of one such trench when their position came under
headlong and capturing their objective within 8 hours attack by enemy tanks. One tank shell landed very
of crossing the International Boundary. Due to a close to where he was sitting, killing Lt KP Singh,
series of unfortunate miscommunications or lack the Intelligence Officer, instantly. A shrapnel struck
of adequate communications, they were ordered Col Hayde in the small of the back too and would
to fall back closer to the International Boundary, have been fatal but for the fact that it hit his water
frittering away the territorial gains. bottle, causing a minor injury in his back instead
The Jat’s next tryst with Dograi was on of cutting through his spine. His lucky run didn’t
21st September, when they attacked and captured it end there. The impact knocked him into the trench
yet again. This time around it was a much tougher nut and moments later another shell landed precisely
to crack, since it had been reinforced by an adequately where he had been sitting. Two such narrow escapes
warned and well-protected enemy. But Col Hayde led within a span of a couple of minutes do show that
his battalion to the capture of Dograi for the second Col Hayde’s luck must have been working overtime.
time, just before the war came to an end with the He survived, to lead the battalion to glorious victory at
ceasefire being declared on 23rd September. Dograi and was also awarded the Maha Vir Chakra,
retiring as a Brigadier years later.
Brushes With Death Three brave men across three theatres of operation,
During both the battles for Dograi and in the actions bound together by their audacity and good fortune.
during the intervening period, Col Hayde continued to Each of them survived to personally play a significant
have the uncanny knack of being wherever the fighting role in ensuring ultimate victory for the country,
was thickest. His utter disregard for personal safety providing decisive leadership at critical junctures. It
led the Jat troops to label him as a Bawla (Mad) CO. was as if fortune was actually watching over them,
Fate did take up the temptations he offered on several indulgently placing a protective hand to keep them
occasions and he had a couple of narrow brushes with from harm’s way, knowing their sheer audacity would
death. The first two were on 6th September, the very prevent them from looking out for themselves. So,
first day of operations, when he suddenly came face while there were many brave men in that war, not all
to face with the enemy and his own carbine failed to of them were similarly favoured by fortune. I therefore
fire. But Lance Naik Kunwar Lal, Col Hayde’s orderly, like to believe that fortune may not always favour the
disposed the enemy soldier off with a well-aimed shot brave, but it does do it’s bit for the audacious.
Col
Naresh K Rastogi
(Retd)
The writer had an
eventful career in the
Army including active
participation in the
1965 War in Khemkaran
as Signals officer and
1971 War with Infantry
in Jessore-Khulna,
now Bangladesh. After
commanding 8 Madras
he got a chance to
serve overseas in the
Italian and French
multinationals
for 12 years.
AS I Look Back
Defences for the assaulting troops! I was bewildered. We had
no defence stores, so digging of trenches was the only answer.
Unfortunately Signals Company has the biggest problem. All
the radio operators and linemen were busy. Just a few drivers
available for this job. It was then one Sabre strafed us for about
45 minutes. We cursed the IAF. My regret was that though it was
flying so low, I did not shoot it down with my sten gun.
T
he 1965 operations in Khemkaran Sector left Advance And Preliminary Operations
a deep impression on my mind, which I would On the 5th morning I reached Khemkaran Sector
cover in three parts, restricting myself to my dressed in civvies but travelling in an army jeep with
personal experiences and my personal views only. the tactical sign concealed. The driver had his helmet
On the 4th September 1965 the entire Corps was and rifle, I had my sten gun, so much for the secrecy
on the move including our 4 Mountain Division and and surprise. On the narrow roads, with the road
7 Mountain Brigade. My Signal Company moved with signs missing; MPs in a state of bewilderment; tea
them but I had to wait till midnight to collect the and biscuit stalls all along the roads; all the heavy
Top Secret Operation Order. Our plan was very simple. vehicles stuck-up; none knew where to proceed to;
On the morning of the 6th launch a surprise attack on but my driver somehow managed to reach while I
the Ichhogil Canal converting the canal into anti-tank quickly glanced through the Op Order.
defence. Pakistan Armoured Division located in Quetta Linemen had laid the cables along the roads; but
would take at least 48 hours to react; by then the the unit locations were not decided nor of the Brigade
defences should be made impregnable. However the HQs. First thing they asked me for food since our
unfolding was a comedy of errors on both sides. The B echelon had not fetched up. I had only a few rupees
dice only declared the partial winner. in my pocket; in any case from which market do I
procure food for them? Luckily, the villagers were a complete chaos. Weapons, packs and many stores
jubilant and helped us in many ways. Sitting on a lying all around; number of vehicles lying exposed to
charpoy with chapatti and gur and a glass of lassi was air strike; A depressing sight. I retrieved three or four
a memorable experience. The units that I met were jeeps which I used during the operations. Their owners
anxious about their scattered troops, heavy weapons somehow did not come forward to claim these. While
and ammunition and the B echelon vehicles. I located returning I gave lift to the wounded soldiers asking
the Brigade HQs in a grove where all the vehicles them where to drop them but they had no knowledge;
had been parked. Radio Silence had been imposed luckily the villagers informed us the new location for
and the lines mostly were not connected to the Unit Brigade HQs at Cheema village, with a feature 11r on
exchanges so I had to depend on my jeep. the road side. Commander immediately asked me to
forget everything else but prepare the defences.
Confusion Confounded
The 4 Grenadiers were to launch the attack at Defensive Battle
Theh Pannu at 0600 hours, preceded by H-hr Defences for the assaulting troops! I was bewildered.
bombardment; Engineers to blow up the bridge on We had no defence stores, so digging of trenches was
the canal. Since the main party had not arrived the the only answer. Unfortunately Signals Company
H-hr was postponed by two hours; however there has the biggest problem. All the radio operators and
was no way to contact the Engineer Company. They linemen were busy. Just a few drivers available for
reached Theh Pannu at the scheduled time where this job. It was then one Sabre strafed us for about
they surprised the enemy post. But where was 45 minutes. We cursed the IAF. My regret was that
our Infantry? Own pre H-hr bombardment made though it was flying so low, I did not shoot it down
them pull back only to find the gleaming rifles of with my sten gun. Of course we had no anti-aircraft
4 Grenadiers in the FUP (forming up place). Brigadier defence. The trench where I was crouching was just
David Siddhu, Commander 7 Mountain Brigade, with about 2 feet deep; 50 mm bullets on my left and on
the nerves of steel did not allow the fire to be opened my right. Thank God no casualty.
as the FUP location would be given away though It seems our information as usual was absolutely
Lt Col Farhat Bhatti, Commanding Officer wrong. The Pak Armoured Division was not in Quetta
4 Grenadiers was insistent that the Pak soldiers but had assembled for launching their attack on the
masquerading as Sikhs were fast approaching them 8th. That explains the failure of the 7 Grenadiers
for an assault. What a miraculous escape for the attack. Organising defences around Asal Uttar was
Engineers under my friend Maj Satish Thareja! the best command decision ever made. 1/9 GR along
Attack by 7 Grenadiers was postponed till the with 18 Raj Rif of the neighbouring 62 Mountain
evening. Radio Silence had been lifted partially, yet Brigade was holding paper thin defences against the
no contact with them. I, accompanied with GSO3, mighty armoured division of Pattons, at Asal Uttar just
Capt Abdul Rasul Khan of 4 Grenadiers reached ahead of us – Brigade HQs and 4 Grenadiers astride
their location, leaving the jeep about 2 km behind the road Khemkaran-Bhikhiwind. On the 8th morning
the FUP. From a distance I could recognise the voice 1/9 GR were pushed back and the 4 Grenadiers
of the operator at Bde HQs shouting hoarsely but front line came in direct contact. Fortunately Capt
the operator at the Battalion had been forbidden to YR Khanna of Ordnance who would disappear every
respond. His voice was feared to reach the enemy post morning, hence the butt of our envy, would return in
and give away surprise. Having met their officers we the evening to be the pet of Commander, managing
waited at the nearby school rooftop. The pre H-hour to cut the miles of red tapes applied even during the
bombardment was spectacular. On our way back it actual war and brought in 106 mm Recoilless Guns
took considerable time to locate the jeep at night since and other necessities from the Ordnance Depots.
the driver had selected a low-lying spot and pulled What a relief! Also it speaks very high of the training
across the camouflage net. But it refused to start. and the motivation of the Infantry troops to put these
Grudgingly after wasting about an hour we moved in action immediately and achieve excellent results.
back on foot. Crops, shoulder high all along the border Luckily the terrain and the crops favoured us. The
could be the places for the enemy to hide. Villagers enemy tanks restricted to roads and tracks advanced
at the dead of night were hospitable and directed us in troops. Our tanks in support had to hold their fire
correctly. We made to the HQs by about 4 am. Luckily since their range was much less and at a distance
one of the radio operators was brewing tea. As I was Patton armour would have just shaken off the shells.
sipping tea, Commander fully dressed in his red tabs The 4 Grenadiers held their fire, opening only when
appeared. After briefing him I enquired as to why the tanks closed in. Three tanks on the main road
should he make it easy for the enemy to single him were damaged and the fourth abandoned. Perhaps
out. “One sweats the whole life for these ranks and at it was a probing attack so they withdrew. They tried
the historic moment you want me to conceal these”. He outflanking, but not much headway.
continued, “In any case why haven’t you shaved yet?”
Soon after daylight I went back to fetch my jeep Abdul Hamid’s Marksmanship
carrying a jerry can of petrol. I saw some wounded On the 9th the defences were better prepared and
soldiers trudging back with hanging morose face, early morning attack was well repulsed. CQMH
carrying some heavy equipment even. FUP area was Abdul Hamid had destroyed 3 tanks with his brand
Revisiting 1965
India Pakistan War
Till today the Indian leadership has made continuous efforts to
‘organise peace’, which is always marred by the cross-border terrorism,
mistrust and lack of will from the other side to resolve the conflict.
But one may keep the hope that we learn from our histories and give
peace a chance, nevertheless the same history also taught us that
fortune favours the brave one, the prepared one.
“In the utilisation of our limited resources, we have always given primacy to plans
and projects for economic development. It would, therefore, be obvious for anyone
who is prepared to look at things objectively that India can have no possible interest
in provoking border incidents or in building-up an atmosphere of strife ... In these
circumstances, the duty of Government is quite clear and this duty will be discharged
fully and effectively ... We would prefer to live in poverty for as long as necessary but
we shall not allow our freedom to be subverted.”
─ Lal Bahadur Shastri During Indo-Pak 1965 War
D
espite knowing the fact that wars will only In words of former Director, History Division, MoD,
lead to bloodshed, irreparable damage and UP Thapliyal, “The conflict which was engineered
scarred histories, sometimes the untamed by Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch was subsequently
ambition of a few minds, blinded with carried over to Kashmir with the launch of ‘Operation
power, force a peace-loving nation into war. The Gibraltar’ – an ingenious military strategy to push the
Indo-Pak War of 1965, also known as the Second Kashmir question into centre stage internationally.”
Kashmir War, was one such conflict. The twentytwo
days battle began in August 1965 and lasted till Kutch Prelude
September 1965. It was a consequence of a series The immediate trigger for the war was the conflicting
of border disputes that occurred between India claims over the ‘Rann of Kutch’ in April 1965. As
and Pakistan. The border skirmishes increased the per the observations made by the United Nations
tensions between both the nations; this was followed Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
by confrontation between paramilitary forces and (UNMOGIP), “The early months of 1965 saw
subsequently between the armies of both the nations. the increase in tensions between the Indo-Pak
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin who mediated between the adversary’s leadership. The gallant air warriors,
them. The biggest challenge while negotiating the despite limitations in terms of lack of intelligence,
Tashkent Declaration was the negotiation for the return radar cover, surface-to-air missiles, operational
of territories captured by both the sides, particularly, training and obsolete aircraft, tilted the battle in
on the issue of return of Hajipir in exchange of Chamb. favour of India. The Indian Air Warriors created
Although New Delhi was willing to return Hajipir to havoc in adversaries’ mind and territory both.
Islamabad but simultaneously wanted Islamabad to Notwithstanding the IAF’s constraints, Pakistan
relinquish the use of force. Nevertheless, this peace Air Force experienced an attrition rate that was
accord couldn’t provide remedy to ailing relationship 21 per cent higher than that of the IAF. In his book,
between both the countries. 1965 War - The Inside Story, while highlighting the
limitations of IAF, author RD Pradhan writes, “What
Post-war afterthoughts McNamara said was true, but nonetheless offensive.
The declassified documents from the United States USA did not offer any aid and India’s Air Force was
from the period 1964-1968 also throw light on few mostly the same “museum”. With that background,
important issues with regards to 1965 War. Firstly, it was an exhilarating moment when some of those
it clearly underlines the Indo-Pak perennial conflict. ‘junk’ planes, such as Mysteres, Vampiers and Hunters
A State Department memo of January 27, 1964 performed brilliantly against Pakistan’s sophisticated
acknowledged the US ‘low’ leverage in respect of both F-86s. In fact, the indigenously built Gnat, a small
and the futility of asking the UN Security Council beaver like fighter, brought down several F-86s.”
to discuss Kashmir. Secondly, the intention of
Pakistan to wage a war against India can be clearly Pak ‘Imaginary Victory’ Syndrome
seen. As per the record letter dated May 12, 1965, The war also witnessed the failure on part of Pakistan
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan Foreign Minister to accept the idea of ‘peaceful coexistence’ advocated
argued, “that since India’s military strength was by India’s Panchsheel principles and reiterated by
growing” and “is at present in no position to the then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri.
risk a ground war, it was time to strike.” Aristotle It also saw Pakistan’s use of ‘proxy war’
Thirdly, the decision to go on war was said “It is not as tool against India and to ‘bleed India
later regretted by Ayub, which as per through a thousand cuts’. It also exhibit
the declassified documents reveals,
enough to win
Pakistan’s miscalculation based on the
Ayub unwisely fell in with his plans, a war; it is more assumption that Indian Armed Forces
inflicting lasting damage on Pakistan won’t be able to face Pakistan aggression
and his own position. In April 1966 he
important to
after Indo-China 1962 debacle. China’s
told the Cabinet: “I want it understood organise the position, especially after this war towards
that never again will we risk 100 million India, was seen in favourable light by
peace.”
Pakistanis for 5 million Kashmiris – never Pakistan. It also highlighted the Pakistan’s
again.” Fourthly, there is substantial evidence, leadership’s imprudent and reckless attitude
which indicates Pakistan’s attempt to rope in China not only towards India but also towards their own
in war. The CIA was convinced that there was people. Quite well summarised by Altaf Gauhar, the
“some secret understanding” between China and Pakistan Secretary of the Ministry of Information and
Pakistan before the war but “China will avoid direct, Broadcasting in Pakistan said, “The result: few people
large-scale, military involvement in the Indo-Pakistan outside armed forces realise how close Pakistan came
War,” the document revealed. Thereafter US warned to disaster in the 1965 war ... unless all the facts of
China against interfering in the war. 1948, 1965 and 1971 are made public, our people will
go on living in a false world scoring imaginary victories
Unique Features against fictitious adversaries.”
Apart from the display of the highest level of bravery, To conclude, some 2,300 years ago around 300 BC
valour and unshakable determination of the Indian ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle once said that “It
Armed Forces, the 1965 War was unique in many is not enough to win a war; it is more important to
ways. The deployment of tanks was one of the high organise the peace.” And peace relies heavily on political
points of the battle. The Battle of Asal Uttar was will to do so. Fifty years back during 1965 War, the
the biggest tank battle fought after World War II. then Defence Minister YB Chavan’s thoughts resonated
After 1947 India Pakistan division, the 1965 War the same idea when he wrote, “The ball is now in the
witnessed one of the largest troops deployments in political court again – where it should be – and not the
Kashmir region. The war largely saw main action military one. I hope we have the vision and courage to
between the foot soldiers and armoured units along accept this challenge to (our) political leadership.” And
with intermittent use of air power. The war spanned till today the Indian leadership have made continuous
for twentytwo days and resulted in heavy casualties efforts to ‘organise peace’, which is always marred by the
on both sides with no significant advantage to any of cross-border terrorism, mistrust and lack of will from the
the sides. However the losses were relatively heavy other side to resolve the conflict. But one may keep the
on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks hope that we learn from our histories and give peace a
and 3,800 troops. The 1965 War exhibited the chance, nevertheless the same history also taught us that
‘shock effect’ generated by the Indian Air Force on fortune favours the brave one, the prepared one.
governments at the Centre and State, may have made first DG, DIA, many
intelligence initiatives
in J&K, it is time for us to discard the baggage of including abroad were
taken by him.
history and take all suitable and firm measures,
both in the external and internal dimensions, to fully
integrate J&K into its parent nation.
“Most people have concluded long ago that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has been
hurting Pakistan and Kashmir more than India.”
─ US political commentator Michael Krepon
T
he captivatingly scenic and enormously Notwithstanding Pakistan’s proxy war and myriad
strategic state of Jammu and Kashmir, since machinations, the Indian state has also to ponder
its stormy accession to the Union of India seriously that, even after 67 years of accession to
on 26 October 1947, has, more often than the Indian Union, why has Kashmir not emotionally
not, displayed an uneasy coexistence with the liberal, integrated itself fully into the Indian mainstream.
secular and, unquestionably, generous environs of Is the Indian state in some form of denial as regards
its parent nation. That countless soldiers, innocent the political aspirations and angst of the people of the
citizens, policemen and even some local political Valley – within the framework of Indian integrity – also
leaders have sacrificed their lives to give the restive needs introspection. The Kashmiri ethos of Sufism and
state a semblance of peace, progress and, importantly, Kashmiryat is essentially closer to the multi-plural,
democracy, will be stating the obvious. That the chief inclusive and secular moorings of the Indian state than
perpetrator of all violence, terrorism and public unrest the divisive, extremist forms of the Islamic faith, on the
in J&K is neighbouring Pakistan is a universally ascendant, in violence stricken and sectarian Pakistan.
accepted fact. Thus ravaged by Pak inflicted conflict and Mistakenly, Pakistan considers Kashmir as India’s
a few internecine contradictions within, J&K endures as Achilles heel but that J&K is a flashpoint for conflict
an illogical and perhaps a fatal obsession for Pakistan. between the two nuclear neighbours is also a stark reality.
Like most intractable problems, the J&K conundrum The Indira-Sheikh Accord reiterated the accession of the
also has both an external and internal dimension to erstwhile princely state to India as final and the Sheikh
its resolution. Thus there is a conflict of Kashmir had dropped the demand for any plebiscite to determine
(external dimension foisted by Pakistan) and the the final status of J&K. The Accord, however, allowed the
conflict in Kashmir (the internal dimension) – if the Government of India to impose President’s Rule in the
Indian state can rise to the challenges of the latter, state, if required. As a sop to the Kashmiris, Article 370 of
the former will gradually lose its relevance! the Indian Constitution was retained and the Residuary
Powers were to remain with the J&K Assembly.
Significant Benchmarks The 2015 elections to the state assembly witnessed a
Covering the historical facets and various nuances of record turnout of over 65 per cent and after protracted
the Kashmir conundrum will be rather voluminous to negotiations, for the first time in its history, a coalition of
be covered in this article but it is essential that certain two ideologically, diametrically opposite political parties,
benchmarks on J&K, since 1947, are recapitulated the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the BJP joined
as relevant for an overall analysis. Some of these are hands to form a coalition government in J&K. The state
briefly enunciated below: government uneasily plods on and has yet to achieve any
l O verall 5,000 Pathan tribesmen/Pak Army credible success in governance or in establishing law and
personnel masquerading as Razakars invaded order effectively in the state. The PDP is considered by
J&K in October 1947. many in India as being ‘soft’ on separatists. Meanwhile the
l Maharaja Hari Singh, ruler of J&K, signed the right wing BJP, which self-proclaims to be ultra-nationalist,
Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947; appears to be caving in frequently to the PDP on state
accepted by the Governor General of India, Lord issues, including pertaining to security.
Mountbatten on 27 October 1947. Indian troops
were immediately flown to Srinagar airport Article 370
to save the Valley and drive out the Pakistani Article 370 is a law in the Constitution of India which
Razakars/troops. grants special status to J&K within the Union of India. This
l Indian troops stabilised the situation, saving law ordains that except for foreign affairs, defence, finance
the capital Srinagar and to some extent, pushed and communications, the Indian Parliament will require
back the Pakistani invaders. Reportedly, the approval of the state government for introduction
Sheikh Abdullah prevailed upon Pt Nehru not to or application of any other laws on aspects other than
commit the Indian Army in the Gilgit-Baltistan region mentioned ibid. During its introduction at the time of the
as its population were not Kashmiris. Meanwhile, enactment of the Constitution, Article 370 fell under the
Pt Nehru, on Mountbatten’s advice, chose to go to the Constitution of India’s Part XXI called ‘Temporary and
UN on 1 January 1948 on Pak aggression in J&K. Transitional Provisions’. On 27 November 1963, Pt Nehru
l UN adopted two Resolutions on 13 August 1948 himself confirmed on the floor of Parliament that he
and 5 January 1949 providing for a plebiscite had earlier made the statement that “Article 370 of the
to be held by India under UN supervision but Constitution would be eroded progressively.” But as the
after Pak withdraws its troops from J&K and also years have passed, Article 370 appears to have become
disbands its Azad Kashmir forces in the state. The effectively permanent and for the local leaders of the
latter conditions have always been glossed over Kashmir Valley an emotive issue.
conveniently by Pakistan in international fora.
l The Regent of J&K, Yuvraj Karan Singh, issued AFSPA
a proclamation on 25 November 1949 that The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA)
legally declared the state’s assimilation to the was enacted by the Indian Parliament on
Constitution of India. Article 370, which confers 11 September 1958, which confers special powers
some special rights on the state of J&K, was to the armed forces in ‘disturbed areas’. The Act is
incorporated in the Indian Constitution in 1950. central to the operations of the security forces who
l Sheikh Abdullah became the PM of J&K in 1951 require legal immunity while operating in areas
after elections to J&K’s Constituent Assembly afflicted by insurgency and terrorism. However, some
were held. However, on grounds of treason, the state governments, certain citizens and NGOs have
Sheikh was arrested in 1953. been demanding withdrawal of this Act on the grounds
l On 15 February 1954, J&K Constituent Assembly that it is ‘draconian’ in its implementation and some
with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as Chief Minister NGOs have dubbed it, unfairly, as a ‘license to kill’.
ratified the state’s Accession to India. As regards J&K, the present CM and even the
After many years in political wilderness, previous one, have advocated repealing AFSPA from
Sheikh Abdullah became the CM of J&K in 1975, J&K. An unbiased look at the current security situation
signed the landmark Kashmir Accord with then does not recommend the withdrawal of the Act in the
PM Indira Gandhi and stayed on as CM of the state present security scenario. However, whenever the
till his death in 1982. In his last years and especially security situation normalises, the Army may revisit
after Pakistan’s decisive defeat in the 1971 War with the necessity of AFSPA in J&K’s hinterland and leave
Bangladesh’s emergence, Kashmir’s tallest political leader it to the state police and the central police/paramilitary
ever, Sheikh Abdullah had come to the conclusion that forces to handle internal security while the Army
J&K’s future was best served with it being a part of India. concentrates on manning the Line of Control (LoC).
Incoherent Strategies
Reactive Policies
The most insistent problem in Kashmir is not Pakistan. Nor is it the
Kashmiris. The problem is India’s abysmal leadership, the lack of
vision, of consistency and of dedication to purpose among a deeply
corrupted political elite and a political culture of expediency and
of short-term gains, both in Srinagar and in Delhi. Unless this deep
and tragic flaw is addressed, the theatre of human suffering will
continue to play out in J&K, with the principal actors flailing about
aimlessly, like puppets on strings.
I
nsanity, it has been remarked, is doing the same short of lunacy. For decades, the national leadership
thing over and over again and expecting different has failed to evolve anything resembling a coherent
results. By this measure, India’s ‘policy’ on Kashmir strategy of response, ceding the initiative entirely to the
and on the Pakistan-backed movement of Islamist adversary, reacting fitfully to each new provocation and
subversion and terrorism there, has been nothing celebrating accidental gains as great strategic victories.
‘military minds’ that advise precision bombings, strengths; the creation of covert capacities to
‘limited war’ and even, occasionally, the threat inflict direct harm (not necessarily through violent
of tactical nukes. Tit for tat responses and, as retaliation) on sponsoring State and non-State
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar expressed it, actors in Pakistan; a vast augmentation of our
‘neutralising terrorists with terrorists only’, are intelligence capacities on Pakistani soil – capacities
some lesser variations on this theme. Elaborating that appear to have been systematically eroded or
on one such position before he became the dismantled over the past decades; capacities to
National Security Adviser (NSA), Ajit Doval warned contest Pakistan’s strategic overreach in the wider
Pakistan, “You can do one Mumbai, you may lose Asian region and capacities to counter Pakistan’s
Balochistan”. None of these options are backed by immensely successful international efforts to
any realistic assessment of capacity, capability or continue to receive support and aid from a range of
consequence and reflect, essentially, ‘masculine’ countries through patterns of blackmail, including
postures, intended to stave off legitimate criticisms nuclear blackmail, as well as subordination, as in
of the infirmity of the State and its leadership. the case of its current relationship to China and
There are also the ‘good people’ who dream of past relationship to USA.
creating a ‘strong, stable and democratic Pakistan’, Crucially, at the core of India’s reorientation,
even as they ignore the deeply flawed democracy must be the recognition that Pakistan’s existence is
and ailing state we have in our own country; even as itself in question – hence its claims on Kashmir do
they refuse to face up to the reality that they lack the not need to be taken as a permanent ‘given’ in the
most rudimentary instrumentalities – beyond their geostrategic equation.
ineffectual good intentions – to secure the objectives
they articulate and even as they studiously ignore No Protracted Conflict Paradigm
the entrenched dynamic of radicalism and Islamist It is abundantly clear that the Modi regime
extremism that permeates all aspects of state, does not have any coherent conception of any
society and politics in Pakistan. such ‘protracted conflict’ paradigm of response.
In over sixty five years of confrontation with The ‘Doval doctrine’, as some commentators
Pakistan, among the most protracted of contemporary have chosen to describe the NSA’s prior and
conflicts in the world, these rudimentary, rash, rudimentary articulations of this strategy, appears
unthinking notions are the best we have been able to have failed to win traction with the country’s
to evolve. And this is just in the realm of purported present political masters, who continue to look for
‘doctrine’; in reality, we remain trapped in perpetual quick and flashy public spectacles and show no
and defensive reaction, with the rare exception stomach for a sustained strategic approach that
of 1971, when India seized the opportunity and could actually compel Pakistan to abandon its
initiative to dismember Pakistan. criminal support to terrorist proxies.
But ‘India’s problem in Kashmir’ is not
Great Expectations just Pakistan. A long history of political
When Ajit Doval was appointed NSA, it was mismanagement, adventurism, neglect, corruption
assumed that the Modi government would adopt and sheer incompetence prepared this troubled
a protracted conflict perspective in dealing province for the campaigns of destabilisation,
with Pakistan. Doval had, shortly before his radicalisation and terrorism that Pakistan
appointment, publicly articulated the notion of eventually executed here. For decades before
the ‘defensive offence mode’, arguing that India separatist terrorism swept across J&K, a process
should “work on the vulnerabilities of Pakistan”, of Islamist radicalisation had been visible, backed
which, he argued further, were “many, many times by Pakistan’s mischief and by petrodollars flowing
higher than that of India ... Once they find that in unchecked and unaccounted from West Asia.
India has shifted gears from the defensive mode The Indian establishment continued to sing
to one of defensive offence, they will find that it paeans to ‘Kashmiriyat’ and the unique patterns of
(sponsoring terrorism) is unaffordable for them.” Sufi Islam – liberal, tolerant and all embracing
Among the broad components of this strategy, – that were thought to be integral to the values
Doval had spoken of economic instrumentalities, of the people of this region; but it did nothing
Pakistan’s politics and bringing about Pakistan’s to protect this stream from the vigorous and
isolation internationally. well-funded onslaught to which it was being
It is not clear whether India has, in fact, existing subjected across the Valley and beyond. Indeed,
capacities to impose unbearable costs on Pakistan, the State confers virtual immunity from law,
but it is abundantly clear that the country needs to with rare exception, on anyone operating
create such capacities, given Pakistan’s persistent under the cover of religion – a pattern that is
support to terrorism and proxy war and its unfortunately not restricted to J&K, but afflicts
relentless hostility to the very idea and existence State action across the country. It was this
of India. A coherent strategy of protracted conflict radicalised, Salafist, Islam that eventually came
would include, among others, instrumentalities to form the core of the separatist mobilisation and
of competitive attrition to undermine Pakistan’s eventual terrorism in J&K, despite the pretensions
limited enduring economic and administrative of some separatist formations.
British Activity
Recently, Britain (perhaps on US behest) has also
engineered an MoU between the Afghan intelligence
and the ISI that virtually gives power to ISI to exercise
United Liberation Front (PULF) aims to establish its writ in Afghanistan. The Taliban are making gains
an Islamic country in India’s northeast and whose through their summer offensive even as the ISI is
leaders are based in Chandel District of Manipur present in Beijing during parleys between the Chinese
where the army convoy was recently ambushed. and Afghani Taliban. The ISIS too is slowly but firmly
According to recent reports, some 3,000 radio establishing itself in the Af-Pak region on both
controlled explosive devices have been If sides of the Durand Line supported by
supplied to ULFA through China-ISI the Pakistan Taliban. These dynamics
it were including those discussed in preceding
channels. The China-Pakistan unholy
not for Chinese paragraphs plus the Chinese strategic
nexus needs to be watched on other
fronts as well. One example is nuclear and other lodgement in Gilgit-Baltistan and the
Maldives with over 1,000 uninhabited support, Pakistan China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will
have deleterious effect on the levels of
islands, which has been methodically would not dare to terrorism in J&K. The current rallies
radicalised through the LeT, which is a
continue her in Srinagar and Tral with waiving of
proxy both for China and Pakistan. Then
South India may be sitting on a tinderbox proxy war Pakistani flags may well be pointers to
as well with Al Qaeda having sponsored collusive China-Pakistani effort to raise the
level of terrorism in J&K.
the Kerala based PFI (Popular Front of India)
currently lying dormant.
Foreign-inspired Violence
It is unlikely that Pakistan will curb its proxy war
Inexplicable US Role
against India. Conversely, it is likely to step it up
Despite all the casualties suffered by US and NATO
with Chinese backing, especially when the only way
in Afghanistan because of Pakistani proxies, the US
for the military and ISI to keep Pakistan under their
continues to support the Pakistani military ostensibly
thumb is confrontation with India and Afghanistan.
due to its continued presence in Afghanistan and
A new terror group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TeT) parading
has supplied over 14 combat aircraft, 59 military openly in Sopore with ISIS type black flags, carrying
trainer jets and 374 armoured personnel carriers to assault rifles and making demands on the public
Pakistan as part of Excessive Defence Articles (EDA) akin to Taliban doesn’t augur well. Hopefully given
besides approving a billion dollars worth of sale of time, the PDP-BJP alliance will be able to stabilise the
military hardware, identifying Pakistan, ironically region. Safe return of Kashmiri Pandits would do well
for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency for J&K, as would development of infrastructure and
operations. In 2009, the Centre of the Harvard investments that can usher jobs for the unemployed
Kennedy School had pointed to clear evidence of youth. The security forces will continue to manage the
misuse of USAID to Pakistan citing proof: US provided levels of violence but the administration must deliver
US$ 1.5 million to reimburse Pakistan for damage to and grass root organisations like the Panchayat must
navy vehicles which had never been used in combat; be fully empowered. What must also be focused at the
US$ 15 million for Pakistani Army bunkers that were national level on the collusive China-Pakistan efforts
never built; US$ 30 million for Pakistani road building to destabilise India at the sub-conventional level. In
but no evidence of construction; US$ 55 million for this context, there is urgent need to establish credible
helicopter maintenance of national fleet that was not deterrence against the China-Pakistan proxy wars by
performed; Pakistan military received US$ 80 million going fully proactive. This is a dirty war and idealism
per month for military operations during ceasefire should not be a stand-alone factor, because the cost
periods when troops were in barracks; Musharraf of always following an inward looking policy is much
once complained army helicopters needed more higher. Our foreign policy must have a balanced mix
spare parts and support, despite US having provided of realism and idealism. We must get surreptitious
US$ 8 million worth of Cobra parts over previous handle on the fault lines of our adversaries, rather
six months; ‘great majority’ of the Coalition Support than them controlling ours.
July 2015
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