N . L-18148. F b a 28, 1963.

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, e ecutor of the testate estate

of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted
heirs, namel : ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO
BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners, s. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE
HERMOGENA REYES, namel : FRANCISCO REYES,
ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.

Descent and distribution; Estate proceedings; Determination

b probate court of question as to title to propert ; General rule
and e ceptions. While as a general rule question of title to
property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate pro-
ceedings, except where one of the parties prays merely for the
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which
case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate ction
(Garcia . Garcia, 87 Phil. 353; Guingguing . Abu-ton, 48 Phil.
144), however, when the parties are all heirs of the deceased, it is
optional on them to submit to the probate court a question as to
title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual . Pascual, 73 Phil.
561; Ma alac . Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661).
Same; Same; Same; Probate courts ented ith jurisdiction to
tr contro ersies bet een heirs regarding o nership of properties
allegedl belonging to deceased. The jurisdiction to try
controversies between heirs of the defeased regarding the owner-
ship of properties alleged to belong to his estate is vested in

36

368 S PREME CO R REPOR S ANNO A ED

Bernardo s. Co rt of Appeals

probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an adminis-

tration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution
of the residue among the heirs and legatees, and by liquidation is
meant the determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses (Flores . Flores, 48 Phil.
982).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Probate court ested ith ju-
risdiction to determine if properties belong to conjugal partner-
ship. The question of whether certain properties involved in a
testate proceeding belong to the conjugal partnership or to the
husband exclusively, is a matter within the jurisdiction of the
probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent
which is to be distributed among his heirs.
O nership; Wai er b part ho raises an objection. Where
a party, by presenting a project of partition including therein
disputed lands, puts in issue the question of ownership of the
lands, they can not thereafter, just because of an opposition
thereto, withdraw the issue from the jurisdiction of the court.
There is a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are
the ones who set the court in motion (Cunanan . Amparo, 80
Phil. 229, 232), and they can not be permitted to complain if the
court, after due hearing, adjudges the question against them
(Ma alac . Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661).
Estoppel; Silence ith kno ledge of the facts required. To
constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts
and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act
constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works
no estoppel (21 C.J. 1152-1153).

PETITION for review b certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ambrosio Padilla La Offices for petitioners.
Romerico F. Flores for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition b certiorari for the review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court
in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine
the validit of the deed of donation in question and to pass
upon the question of title or ownership of the properties
mentioned therein.
The facts are briefl stated in the appealed decision of
369

. 7, B A 28, 1963 369

Bernardo s. Co rt of Appeals
the Court of Appeals as follows:

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife.

The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist
Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October
9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his
cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed
Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed
Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon
petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the
deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral
relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco
and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia,
Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in
the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary
heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was
alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16,
1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor s project of
partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their
own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to
the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and
February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition
for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties,
followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal
issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted
heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the
will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively
and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes
had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that
the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or
grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even
assuming that they could question the validity of the donation,
the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a
separate civil action.
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part,
argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the
original conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal
presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that
since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili
did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could
not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M.
Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void
 370

370 S PREME CO R REPOR S ANNO A ED

Bernardo s. Co rt of Appeals

without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that

is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that,
considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of
the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during
the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does
not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728
in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no
attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both
projects of partition and directed the executor to file another,
dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of
the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the
deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the
deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased
Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were
conjugal properties of the deceased spouses. On September 27,
1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and
emphasizing the contention previously raised in their
memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes
involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio
Capili and taking exception to the court s declaration of the
nullity of the donation without stating facts or provision of law on
which it was based. The motion for new trial was denied in an
order dated October 3, 1960.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed

from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition
for review b certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate
court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having
limited and special jurisdiction, had generall no power to
adjudicate title and erred in appl ing the e ception to the
rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistentl held that
as a general rule, question as to title to propert cannot be
passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,1 e cept
where one of the parties pra s merel for the inclusion or
e clusion from the inventor of the propert , in which case
the probate court ma pass provisionall upon the

_______________
 1 B . C , 10 P . 386; D V. A , 13 P . 274;
F . OB , 13 P . 359; G .A , 37 P . 71; L .
O , 46 P . 644; O .T &B , G.R. N . L-7635, J 25,
1955; R . A , G.R. N . L-4377, J 23, 1953; M .
M , G.R. N . L-4656, F 23, 1953.

371

. 7, B A 28, 1963 371

Bernardo s. Co rt of Appeals

question without prejudice to its final determination in a

separate action.2 However, we have also held that when the
parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is
optional to them to submit to the probate court a question
as to title to propert , and when so submitted, said probate
court ma definitel pass judgment thereon (Pascual v.
Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Ma alac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil.
661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters
affecting propert under judicial administration ma be
taken cogni ance of b the court in the course of intestate
proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not
prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, ma it be said correctl that
the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the power of the probate court in this case to
adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to
whether the properties herein involved belong to the
conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena
Re es, or to the deceased husband e clusivel ?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue
is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced b
appellants that the trial court had completel no authorit
to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its
decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind
even those who had invoked its authorit and submitted to
its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a
creature of law and parties to an action can not vest,
e tend or broaden it. If appellants contention is correct,
then there can be no e ception to the no-jurisdiction theor .
But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo
(supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Pedro Tuason: Determination of title to propert is within
the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding
Soriano s objection (that the probate court lacked
jurisdiction to order the deliver of the possession of the
lots to the estate) relates e clusivel to the procedure,
which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects
_______________

2G .G . 67 P . 353; G .A , 48 P . 144.

372

372 C A A D
Bernardo s. Co rt of Appeals

onl personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an

independent ordinar action) which ma be waived .
Strictl speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over
the person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction
to tr controversies between heirs of a deceased person
regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to
his estate, has been recogni ed to be vested in probate
courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration
proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution
of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation
means determination of all the assets of the estate and
pa ment of all the debts and e penses.3 Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent s liquidated estate
among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding
is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each
part is required to bring into the mass whatever
communit propert he has in his possession. To this end,
and as a necessar corollar , the interested parties ma
introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties
in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of
the decedent s estate are before the court, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents
necessar to the complete settlement of such estate, so long
as no interests of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controvers is
the question of ownership of certain of the properties
involved whether the belong to the conjugal
partnership or to the husband e clusivel . This is a matter
properl within the jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessaril has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in
order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be
distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now
represented because of her death, b her heirs who have
been substituted upon petition of the e ecutor himself and
who have appeared voluntaril . There are no third par-

_______________
 3F .F , 48 P . 982.
4G .G , 67 P . 353, 355.

373

. 7, B A 28, 1963 373

Bernardo s. Co rt of Appeals

ties whose rights ma be affected. It is true that the heirs

of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-
husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to
the conjugal propert . And it is this right that is being
sought to be enforced b her substitutes. Therefore, the
claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to
the testator and, consequentl , it complies with the
requirement of the e ception that the parties interested
(the petitioners and the widow, represented b dents) are
all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionall that the have never
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate
court, for the purpose of the determination of the question
of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne
b the admitted facts. On the contrar , it is undisputed
that the were the ones who presented the project of
partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the
testator s asset. The respondents, as representatives or
substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of
partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals
said, In doing so all of them must be deemed to have
submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding.
Certainl , the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as the
do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus,
have the court take it for granted that their theor as to
the character of the properties is correct, entirel without
regard to the opposition of the respondents . In other
words, b presenting their project of partition including
therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that the were
donated b the wife to her husband), petitioners
themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the
properties which is well within the competence of the
probate court and just because of an opposition thereto,
the can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance
or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainl ,
there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the
objection are the ones who set the court in motion. The
can not be permitted to complain if the court,

_______________
 5C .A , s pra.

374

374 C A A D
Bernardo s. Co rt of Appeals

after due hearing, adjudges question against them.

Finall , petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are
estopped to raise the question of ownership of the
properties involved because the widow herself, during her
lifetime, not onl did not object to the inclusion of these
properties in the inventor of the assets of her deceased
husband, but also signed an e tra-judicial partition of those
inventoried properties. But the ver authorities cited b
appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor
must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his
rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel,
because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. In
the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did
because of the deed of donation she e ecuted in favor of her
husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-
vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been
e ecuted with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
being in accordance with law, the same is hereb affirmed
with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Beng on, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,

Concepcion, Re es, J.B.L., Paredes, Di on and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., did not take part.

Decision affirmed.

No e . Recover of rentals allegedl due the estate

does not come within the jurisdiction of a probate court and
should be b separate suit commenced b the
administrator, not b mere motion b the administrator in
the probate proceedings, because of the absence of e press
statutor authori ation to coerce the lessee debtor into
defending himself in the probate court (Be ore, et al. .
Camon, L-21034, April 30, 1966). Even matters affecting
propert under judicial administration ma not be taken
cogni ance of b the court in the course of intestate pro-
ceedings, if the interests of third persons are prejudiced
 _______________

6M .O , 73 P . 661.
7 21 C.J. 1152-1153.

375

. 7, B A 28, 1963 375

Bernardo s. Co rt of Appeals

(Cunanan . Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 282).

As to other cases defining the scope of the jurisdiction of
a probate court, see Olave v. Canlas, et al., L-12709, Feb.
23, 1962, 4 SCRA 463, and the annotation thereunder.
______________

C g 2021 Ce a B S , I c. A g e e ed.