IRST DIVISION was summarily dismissed from handling them when the instant complaint for

sum of money was filed.

[G.R. No. 168251 : July 27, 2011]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
JESUS M. MONTEMAYOR, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE D. MILLORA,
RESPONDENT. In its Decision [10] dated October 27, 1999, the RTC ordered Vicente to pay
Jesus his monetary obligation amounting to P300,000.00 plus interest of 12%
DECISION from the time of the filing of the complaint on August 17, 1993 until fully
paid.  At the same time, the trial court found merit in Vicente's counterclaim
DEL CASTILLO, J.: and thus ordered Jesus to pay Vicente his attorney's fees which is equivalent
to the amount of Vicente's monetary liability, and which shall be set-off with
When the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear and unequivocal, it must the amount Vicente is adjudged to pay Jesus, viz:
be executed strictly according to its tenor.
WHEREFORE, premises above-considered [sic], JUDGMENT is hereby
[1] [2]
This Petition for Review on Certiorari   assails the Decision   dated May 19, rendered ordering defendant Vicente D. Millora to pay plaintiff Jesus M.
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81075, which dismissed Montemayor the sum of P300,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per
the petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated annum counted from the filing of the instant complaint on August 17, 1993
September 6, 2002 [3] and October 2, 2003 [4] of the Regional Trial Court until fully paid and whatever amount recoverable from defendant shall be set
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98 in Civil Case No. Q-93-17255. off by an equivalent amount awarded by the court on the counterclaim
representing attorney's fees of defendant on the basis of "quantum meruit"
Factual Antecedents for legal services previously rendered to plaintiff.

On July 24, 1990, respondent Atty. Vicente D. Millora (Vicente) obtained a No  pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs of suit.
loan of P400,000.00 from petitioner Dr. Jesus M. Montemayor (Jesus) as
evidenced by a promissory note [5] executed by Vicente.  On August 10, 1990, SO ORDERED. [11]
the parties executed a loan contract [6] wherein it was provided that the loan
has a stipulated monthly interest of 2% and that Vicente had already paid the On December 8, 1999, Vicente filed a Motion for Reconsideration [12] to which
amount of P100,000.00 as well as the P8,000.00 representing the interest for Jesus filed an Opposition. [13]  On March 15, 2000, Vicente filed a Motion for
the period July 24 to August 23, 1990. the Issuance of a Writ of Execution [14] with respect to the portion of the RTC
Decision which awarded him attorney's fees under his counterclaim.  Jesus
Subsequently and with Vicente's consent, the interest rate was increased to filed his Urgent Opposition to Defendant's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
3.5% or P10,500.00 a month.  From March 24, 1991 to July 23, 1991, or for Execution [15] dated May 31, 2000.
a period of four months, Vicente was supposed to pay P42,000.00 as interest
but was able to pay only P24,000.00.  This was the last payment Vicente In an Order [16] dated June 23, 2000, the RTC denied Vicente's Motion for
made.  Jesus made several demands [7] for Vicente to settle his obligation but Reconsideration but granted his Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution of
to no avail. the portion of the decision concerning the award of attorney's fees.

Thus, on August 17, 1993, Jesus filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Intending to appeal the portion of the RTC Decision which declared him liable
Complaint [8] for Sum of Money against Vicente which was docketed as Civil to Jesus for the sum of P300,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per
Case No. Q-93-17255.  On October 19, 1993, Vicente filed his annum counted from the filing of the complaint on August 17, 1993 until fully
Answer [9] interposing a counterclaim for attorney's fees of not less than paid, Vicente filed on July 6, 2000 a Notice of Appeal. [17]  This was however
P500,000.00.  Vicente claimed that he handled several cases for Jesus but he denied by the RTC in an Order [18] dated July 10, 2000 on the ground that the
Decision has already become final and executory on July 1, 2000. [19]
Petitioner's Arguments
Meanwhile, Jesus filed on July 12, 2000 a Motion for Reconsideration and
Clarification [20] of the June 23, 2000 Order granting Vicente's Motion for the Jesus contends that the trial court grievously erred in ordering the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution.  Thereafter, Jesus filed on September 22, implementation of the RTC's October 27, 1999 Decision considering that
2000 his Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. [21]  After the hearing same does fix the amount of attorney's fees.  According to Jesus, such
on the said motions, the RTC issued an Order [22] dated September 6, 2002 disposition leaves the matter of computation of the attorney's fees uncertain
denying both motions for lack of merit. The Motion for Reconsideration and and, hence, the writ of execution cannot be implemented.  In this regard,
Clarification was denied for violating Section 5, [23] Rule 15 of the Rules of Jesus points out that not even the Sheriff who will implement said Decision
Court and likewise the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, for can compute the judgment awards.  Besides, a sheriff is not clothed with the
violating Section 6, [24] Rule 15 of the same Rules. authority to render judicial functions such as the computation of specific
amounts of judgment awards.
Jesus filed his Motion for Reconsideration [25] thereto on October 10, 2002 but
this was eventually denied by the trial court through its Order [26] dated Respondent's Arguments
October 2, 2003.
Vicente counter-argues that the October 27, 1999 RTC Decision can no longer
Ruling of the Court of Appeals be made subject of review, either by way of an appeal or by way of a special
civil action for certiorari because it had already attained finality when after its
Jesus went to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari [27] under  Rule  65  of  the promulgation, Jesus did not even file a motion for reconsideration thereof or
interpose an appeal thereto.  In fact, it was Vicente who actually filed a
Rules of Court. motion for reconsideration and a notice of appeal, which was eventually
denied and disapproved by the trial court.
On May 19, 2005, the CA issued its Decision the dispositive portion of which
provides: Our Ruling

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition for certiorari The petition lacks merit.
is DENIED and the assailed Orders are AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
The October 27, 1999 Decision of the RTC
SO ORDERED. [28] is already final and executory, hence, immutable.

Not satisfied, Jesus is now before this Court via a Petition for Review At the outset, it should be stressed that the October 27, 1999 Decision of the
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. RTC is already final and executory. Hence, it can no longer be the subject of
an appeal.  Consequently, Jesus is bound by the decision and can no longer
Issue impugn the same. Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a decision that has
attained finality can no longer be modified even if the modification is meant
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINALITY OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION OF to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. The doctrine of finality of
OCTOBER 27, 1999, AS WELL AS THE ORDERS OF SEPTEMBER 6, 2002 AND judgment is explained in Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo: [30]
OCTOBER 2, 2003, THE LEGAL ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED IN THIS CASE IS
WHETHER X X X [DESPITE] THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC AMOUNT IN THE Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
DECISION REPRESENTING RESPONDENT'S COUNTERCLAIM, THE SAME thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in
COULD BE VALIDLY [OFFSET] AGAINST THE SPECIFIC AMOUNT OF AWARD any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
MENTIONED IN THE DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. [29] be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the same time a principal creditor of the other;
highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative (2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the
of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and latter has been stated;
sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or
orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; (3) That the two debts be due;
otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the
main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule (4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality. [31] (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,
commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
To stress, the October 27, 1999 Decision of the RTC has already attained
finality. "Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, "A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are determined.  It is not
amendment or reversal.  Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its necessary that it be admitted by the debtor.  Nor is it necessary that the
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.  Except for correction of credit appear in a final judgment in order that it can be considered as
clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no liquidated; it is enough that its exact amount is known.  And a debt is
prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed already in definite figures
neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This which do not require verification, but also when the determination of the
is the principle of immutability of final judgment." [32] exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation x x x." [33]

The amount of attorney's fees is In Lao v. Special Plans, Inc., [34] we ruled that:
ascertainable from the RTC Decision.
Thus, compensation is possible. When the defendant, who has an unliquidated claim, sets it up by way of
counterclaim, and a judgment is rendered liquidating such claim, it can be
Jesus contends that offsetting cannot be made because the October 27, 1999 compensated against the plaintiff's claim from the moment it is liquidated by
judgment of the RTC failed to specify the amount of attorney's fees. He judgment. We have restated this in Solinap v. Hon. Del Rosario [35] where we
maintains that for offsetting to apply, the two debts must be liquidated or held that compensation takes place only if both obligations are liquidated.
ascertainable.  However, the trial court merely awarded to Vicente attorney's
fees based on quantum meruit without specifying the exact amount thereof. In the instant case, both obligations are liquidated. Vicente has the obligation
to pay his debt due to Jesus in the amount of P300,000.00 with interest at
We do not agree. the rate of 12% per annum counted from the filing of the instant complaint
on August 17, 1993 until fully paid.  Jesus, on the other hand, has the
For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set forth in Articles obligation to pay attorney's fees which the RTC had already determined to be
1278 and 1279 of the Civil Code, quoted below, must be present. equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from Vicente. The said attorney's
fees were awarded by the RTC on the counterclaim of Vicente on the basis of
ARTICLE 1278.  Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their "quantum meruit" for the legal services he previously rendered to Jesus.
own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.
In its Decision, the trial court elucidated on how Vicente had established his
ARTICLE 1279.  In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary: entitlement for attorney's fees based on his counterclaim in this manner:

(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the
Defendant, on his counterclaim, has established the existence of a lawyer-
client relationship between him and plaintiff and this was admitted by the It is therefore clear that in the execution of the RTC Decision, there are two
latter. Defendant had represented plaintiff in several court cases which parts to be executed. The first part is the computation of the amount due to
include the Laguna property case, the various cases filed by Atty. Romulo Jesus. This is achieved by doing a simple arithmetical operation at the time of
Reyes against plaintiff such as the falsification and libel cases and the execution. The principal amount of P300,000.00 is to be multiplied by the
disbarment case filed by plaintiff against Atty. Romulo Reyes before the interest rate of 12%.  The product is then multiplied by the number of years
Commission on Bar Integration. Aside from these cases, plaintiff had made that had lapsed from the filing of the complaint on August 17, 1993 up to the
defendant his consultant on almost everything that involved legal opinions. date when the judgment is to be executed.  The result thereof plus the
principal of P300,000.00 is the total amount that Vicente must pay Jesus.
More particularly in the Calamba, Laguna land case alone, plaintiff had
agreed to pay defendant a contingent fee of 25% of the value of the property The second part is the payment of attorney's fees to Vicente. This is achieved
for the latter's legal services as embodied in the Amended Complaint signed by following the clear wordings of the above fallo  of the RTC Decision which
and verified by plaintiff (Exh. 5). Aside from this contingent fee, defendant provides that Vicente is entitled to attorney's fees which is equivalent to
had likewise told plaintiff that his usual acceptance fee for a case like the whatever amount recoverable from him by Jesus. Therefore, whatever
Laguna land case is P200,000.00 and his appearance fee at that time was x x amount due to Jesus as payment of Vicente's debt is equivalent to the
x P2,000.00 per appearance but still plaintiff paid nothing. amount awarded to the latter as his attorney's fees. Legal compensation or
set-off then takes place between Jesus and Vicente and both parties are on
The lawyer-client relationship between the parties was severed because of even terms such that there is actually nothing left to execute and satisfy in
the instant case. The court is however fully aware of defendant's stature in favor of either party.
life - a UP law graduate, Bar topnotcher in 1957 bar examination, former
Senior Provincial Board Member, Vice-Governor and Governor of the province In fact, the RTC, in addressing Jesus' Motion for Reconsideration and
of Pangasinan, later as Assemblyman of the Batasang Pambansa and is Clarification dated July 12, 2000 had already succinctly explained this matter
considered a prominent trial lawyer since 1958. For all his legal services in its Order dated September 6, 2002, viz:
rendered to plaintiff, defendant deserves to be compensated at least on a
"quantum meruit" basis. [36] Notwithstanding the tenor of the said portion of the judgment, still, there is
nothing to execute and satisfy in favor of either of the herein protagonists
The above discussion in the RTC Decision was then immediately followed by because the said decision also states clearly that "whatever amount
the dispositive portion, viz: recoverable from defendant shall be SET-OFF by an equivalent
amount awarded by the Court on the counterclaim representing
WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered attorney's fees of defendant on the basis of "quantum meruit" for
ordering defendant Vicente D. Millora to pay plaintiff Jesus M. Montemayor legal services previously rendered to plaintiff" x x x.
the sum of P300.000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum counted
from the filing of the instant complaint on August 17, 1993 until fully paid Said dispositive portion of the decision is free from any ambiguity. It
and whatever amount recoverable from defendant shall be set off by unequivocably ordered that any amount due in favor of plaintiff and against
an equivalent amount awarded by the court on the counterclaim defendant is set off by an equivalent amount awarded to defendant in the
representing attorney's fees of defendant on the basis of "quantum form of counterclaims representing attorney's fees for past legal services he
meruit" for legal services previously rendered to plaintiff. rendered to plaintiff.

No pronouncement as to attorney's fees and costs of suit. It will be an exercise in futility and a waste of so precious time and
unnecessary effort to enforce satisfaction of the plaintiff's claims against
SO ORDERED. [37] (Emphasis supplied.) defendant, and vice versa because there is in fact a setting off of each other's
claims and liabilities under the said judgment which has long become
final. [38]  (Emphasis in the original.)

A reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision would clearly show
that no ambiguity of any kind exists. Furthermore, if indeed there is any
ambiguity in the dispositive portion as claimed by Jesus, the RTC had already
clarified it through its Order dated September 6, 2002 by categorically stating
that the attorney's fees awarded in the counterclaim of Vicente is of an
amount equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from him by Jesus.  This
clarification is not an amendment, modification, correction or alteration to an
already final decision as it is conceded that such cannot be done anymore. 
What the RTC simply did was to state in categorical terms what it obviously
meant in its decision.  Suffice it to say that the dispositive portion of the
decision is clear and unequivocal such that a reading of it can lead to no
other conclusion, that is, any amount due in favor of Jesus and against
Vicente is set off by an equivalent amount in the form of Vicente's attorney's
fees for past legal services he rendered for Jesus.

  WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.  The

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81075 which dismissed the petition for certiorari  seeking to annul and set
aside the Orders dated September 6, 2002 and October 2, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98 in Civil Case No. Q-93-17255,
is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro.

Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.