2. G.R. No.

192558 / FEB 15, 2012

Bitoy Javier vs. RESPONDENTS Fly Ace Corporation (employee must prove tue fact pf dismissal)

FACTS: Javier filed a complaint of illegal dismissal before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and
other labor standard benefits alleging that: He was an employee of Fly Ace since Sept 2007, performing
various tasks at the respondents warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before
their delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he would be ordered to accompany the
company’s delivery vehicles During his employment, he was not issued an identification card and
payslips by the company o On May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter
the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of Mr. Ong. o Subsequently, he found
out that Mr. Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn but Annalyn refused him. Afterwards, Mr. Ong
terminated Javier without notice.

In support of his allegations, an affidavit by Benjie Valenzuela was presented saying that Javier was a
“pahinante” of Fly Ace from 2007-2008. Fly Ace on the other hand alleged that: o Javier was contracted
by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of ₱300.00 per trip. o Mr.
Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted
hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available and on Apr 2008, they no longer needed the services
of Javier.

They insisted that there was no illegal dismissal since Javier is not their employee as evinced by a copy
of its agreement with Milmar Hauling Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts of Javier bearing
the words daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay) with Javier’s signature.

ISSUES: WON Javier was a regular employee of Fly Ace Corp

RULING: NO, In an illegal dismissal case the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its
dismissal was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-
employee relationship must first be established. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove the
employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence. Javier’s claim of employment is wanting and
insufficient.

Javier simply assumed that he was an employee of Fly Ace, absent any competent or relevant evidence
to support it. o He performed his contracted work outside the premises of the respondent; o he was not
required to report to work at regular hours; he was not made to register his time in and time out every
time he was contracted to work; he was not subjected to any disciplinary sanction imposed to other
employees for company violations; he was not issued a company ; he was not accorded the same
benefits given to other employees; he was not registered with the Social Security System (SSS) as
petitioners employee; and, o he was free to leave, accept and engage in other means of livelihood as
there is no exclusivity of his contracted services with the petitioner, his services being co-terminus with
the trip only Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows a relaxation
of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of liberality does not mean a complete
dispensation of proof. o The relaxation of procedural rules is not a license to completely discount
evidence.

The quantum of proof required, however, must still be satisfied. o As such, petitioner needs to show by
substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against which he claims illegal
dismissal. The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was unsuccessful in strengthening
Javiers cause. All Valenzuela attested to was that he would frequently see Javier at the workplace where
the latter was also hired as stevedore. o Javier’s mere presence at the workplace falls short in proving
employment therein. The supporting affidavit could have, bolstered Javiers claim of being tasked to
clean grocery items when there were no scheduled delivery trips, but no information was offered in this
subject.

In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case. He
could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular employee; that Fly Ace
paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at work.
In other words, Javiers allegations did not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes
of an employer-employee relationship on the basis of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Payment on a
piece-rate basis does not negate regular employment. The term wage is broadly defined in Article 97 of
the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether
fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that the petitioner is
not covered by the SSS affect the employer-employee relationship. However, in determining whether
the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, each case must
be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered.

Sim v. NLRC G.R. No. 157376 October 2, 2007

FACTS: Javier filed a complaint of illegal dismissal before the NLRC for underpayment of salaries and
other labor standard benefits alleging that: He was an employee of Fly Ace since Sept 2007, performing
various tasks at the respondents warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before
their delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he would be ordered to accompany the
company’s delivery vehicles During his employment, he was not issued an identification card and
payslips by the company o On May 6, 2008, he reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter
the company premises by the security guard upon the instruction of Mr. Ong. o Subsequently, he found
out that Mr. Ong had been courting his daughter Annalyn but Annalyn refused him. Afterwards, Mr. Ong
terminated Javier without notice.

In support of his allegations, an affidavit by Benjie Valenzuela was presented saying that Javier was a
“pahinante” of Fly Ace from 2007-2008. Fly Ace on the other hand alleged that: o Javier was contracted
by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw basis at an agreed rate of ₱300.00 per trip. o Mr.
Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month whenever the vehicle of its contracted
hauler, Milmar Hauling Services, was not available and on Apr 2008, they no longer needed the services
of Javier.

They insisted that there was no illegal dismissal since Javier is not their employee as evinced by a copy
of its agreement with Milmar Hauling Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts of Javier bearing
the words daily manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay) with Javier’s signature.

ISSUES: WON Javier was a regular employee of Fly Ace Corp

RULING: NO, In an illegal dismissal case the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its
dismissal was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-
employee relationship must first be established. It is incumbent upon private respondent to prove the
employee-employer relationship by substantial evidence. Javier’s claim of employment is wanting and
insufficient.

Javier simply assumed that he was an employee of Fly Ace, absent any competent or relevant evidence
to support it. o He performed his contracted work outside the premises of the respondent; o he was not
required to report to work at regular hours; he was not made to register his time in and time out every
time he was contracted to work; he was not subjected to any disciplinary sanction imposed to other
employees for company violations; he was not issued a company ; he was not accorded the same
benefits given to other employees; he was not registered with the Social Security System (SSS) as
petitioners employee; and, o he was free to leave, accept and engage in other means of livelihood as
there is no exclusivity of his contracted services with the petitioner, his services being co-terminus with
the trip only Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows a relaxation
of the rules of procedure and evidence in labor cases, this rule of liberality does not mean a complete
dispensation of proof. o The relaxation of procedural rules is not a license to completely discount
evidence.

The quantum of proof required, however, must still be satisfied. o As such, petitioner needs to show by
substantial evidence that he was indeed an employee of the company against which he claims illegal
dismissal. The lone affidavit executed by one Bengie Valenzuela was unsuccessful in strengthening
Javiers cause. All Valenzuela attested to was that he would frequently see Javier at the workplace where
the latter was also hired as stevedore. o Javier’s mere presence at the workplace falls short in proving
employment therein. The supporting affidavit could have, bolstered Javiers claim of being tasked to
clean grocery items when there were no scheduled delivery trips, but no information was offered in this
subject.

In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that the above elements exist in his case. He
could not submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a regular employee; that Fly Ace
paid his wages as an employee, or that Fly Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at work.
In other words, Javiers allegations did not establish that his relationship with Fly Ace had the attributes
of an employer-employee relationship on the basis of the above-mentioned four-fold test. Payment on a
piece-rate basis does not negate regular employment. The term wage is broadly defined in Article 97 of
the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether
fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor does the fact that the petitioner is
not covered by the SSS affect the employer-employee relationship. However, in determining whether
the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, each case must
be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered

Plantation Bay Resort and Spa vs. Dubrico

G.R. No. 182216. December 4, 2009

Facts:

Efren Belarmino (Belarmino) challenge the Court of Appeals Resolution dismissing their petition and
affirming the Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)in favor of herein
respondents.

Dubrico, Villaflor and Ngujo are former employees of Plantation Bay located in Cebu, of which Belarmino
is the Manager. On several dates Plantation Bay issued a series of memoranda and conducted seminars
relative to its drug-free workplace policy, Plantation Bay, in compliance with Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), conducted surprise random drug tests on its employees.
The drug tests, said to have been carried out with the assistance of the Philippine National Police-Scene
of Crime Operations (SOCO), were administered on about 122 employees by the Martell Medical Trade
and Lab Services (Martell), a drug testing laboratory. And confirmatory tests were conducted by the
Philippine Drug Screening Laboratory, Inc. (Phil. Drug), a Department of Health-accredited laboratory.

Dubrico failed to take the drug test conducted, hence, he was issued a memorandum requiring him to
appear in a mandatory conference. Before the scheduled conference, Dubrico explained in writing his
failure to undergo the drug test, he averring that, inter alia, the procedure for the random drug testing
was not followed such that he was not informed about his selection; and that he was at the appointed
time and place for the pre-test meeting but that the duty manager was not around, hence, he left and
failed to be tested. Dubrico was later tested and found positive for use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu).Twenty other employees were found positive for use of shabu including Godfrey
Ngujo (Ngujo) and Julius Villaflor (Villaflor).

In compliance with separate memoranda issued by the management of Plantation Bay, the employees
submitted their explanations on the result of the tests, which explanations were found unsatisfactory,
hence, Plantation Bay dismissed them.

Dubrico, Ngujo and Villaflor and three others filed their respective complaints for illegal dismissal,
questioning the conduct of the drug tests without the presence of the DOLE Regional Director or his
representative. Labor Arbiter dismissed the employees’ complaints, holding that in testing positive for
the use of shabu, they were guilty of serious misconduct, hence, Plantation Bay validly terminated their
employment; and that they were afforded due process, they having been issued memoranda as to the
mandatory investigation and given the chance to, as they did refute the results of the drug tests by
submitting results of recent drug tests.

The Labor Arbiter discredited the drug test results presented by the employees as the tests were taken
more than 72 hours after the conduct of the random drug tests. On appeal, the NLRC, affirmed the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Upon motion for reconsideration, it, however, reversed its Decision and
declared that respondents were illegally dismissed.
 NLRC held that the results of the confirmatory drug tests cannot be given credence since they were
conducted prior to the conduct by the employer of the drug tests. It ratiocinated:

Considering the indubitable documentary evidence on record notably submitted by respondents

[petitioners herein] themselves, we agree with complainants that either or both drug tests and
confirmatory tests conducted on them were fabricated, farce or sham. For how could one “confirm”
some thing which was yet to be established or discovered? Needless to say, the drug testing should
always come ahead of the confirmatory testing, not the other way around. We thus agree with
complainants that if the drug tests against them were true, the supposed confirmatory tests conducted
on them were not based on their urine samples that were the subject of the drug tests. Or that is the
confirmatory tests were correct, these could not have been gotten from their urine samples which were
yet to undergo drug testing. At any rate, there is not only doubt that on the version of respondents but
also their conduct is highly suspicious based on their own evidence. Thus, we now rule that respondents
were not really into drugs.

On the issue of due process, the NLRC abandoned its earlier statement that it was the SOCO which
conducted the drug tests, this time declaring that it was Martell which actually administered them. It
added that respondents were not given the opportunity to examine the evidence and confront the
witnesses against them through their counsel.

Plantation Bay appealed to the Court of Appeals, in which the appellate court affirmed the NLRC
Resolution with modification by deleting the award of damages. Hence, Plantation Bay elevate the
matter to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the termination of the services of respondents, relied on the results of the
random drug tests undertaken by an accredited and licensed drug testing facility, and if the results
turned out to be questionable or erroneous, they should not be made liable therefore.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.

While it is a well-settled rule, also applicable in labor cases, that Issue not raised below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal, there are exceptions thereto among which are for reasons of public policy or
interest.

The NLRC did not err in considering the issue of the veracity of the confirmatory tests even if the same
was raised only in respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision, it being crucial in
determining the validity of respondents’ dismissal from their employment. Technical rules of procedure
are not strictly adhered to in labor cases. In the interest of substantial justice, new or additional
evidence may be introduced on appeal before the NLRC. Such move is proper, provided due process is
observed, as was the case here, by giving the opposing party sufficient opportunity to meet and rebut
the new or additional evidence introduced.
The Constitution no less directs the State to afford full protection to labor. To achieve this goal,
technical rules of procedure shall be liberally construed in favor of the working class in accordance with
the demands of substantial justice. On the merits, the petition just the same fails. The importance of
the confirmatory test is underscored in Plantation Bay’s own “Policy and Procedures,” in compliance
with Republic Act No. 9165, requiring that a confirmatory test must be conducted if an employee is
found positive for drugs in the Employee’s Prior Screening Test, and that both tests must arrive at the
same positive result.

Records show the following timeline, based on the reports on respondents’ respective drug tests
administered by Martell and confirmatory tests undertaken by the Phil. Drug:

Name Drug Test Confirmatory Test

Romel Dubrico Urine sample received on 09/29/04 at 5:14 p.m. Issued on 09/29/04 at 3:57 p.m.

Godfrey Ngujo Urine sample received on 09/29/04 at 5:24 p.m. Issued on 09/29/04 at 3:57 p.m.

Julius Villaflor Urine sample received on 09/29/04 at 5:32 p.m. Issued on 09/29/04 at 4:15 p.m.

As reflected in the above matrix, the confirmatory test results were released earlier than those of
the drug test, thereby casting doubts on the veracity of the confirmatory results.

Indeed, how can the presence of shabu be confirmed when the results of the initial screening were not
yet out?

Plantation Bay’s arguments that it should not be made liable thereof and that the doubt arising from the
time of the conduct of the drug and confirmatory tests was the result of the big volume of printouts
being handled by Martell do not thus lie. It was Plantation Bay’s responsibility to ensure that the tests
would be properly administered, the results thereof being the bases in terminating the employees’
services.

Time and again, we have ruled that where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for
termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. The burden is on
the employer to prove that the termination of employment was for a valid and legal cause. For an
employee's dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (b) the employee must
be afforded due process.

Plantation Bay failed to indubitably prove that respondents were guilty of drug use in contravention of
its drug-free workplace policy amounting to serious misconduct, respondents are deemed to have been
illegally dismissed.

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) Petitioner v. ON. VOLUNTARY

ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. MAGSALIN AND HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Respondents.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL is a duly registered union and the
certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a five-star
hotel owned and operated by respondent Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. Hyatt's General
Manager, David C. Pacey, issued a Memorandum informing all hotel employees that hotel security have
been instructed to conduct a thorough bag inspection and body frisking in every entrance and exit of the
hotel. He enjoined employees to comply therewith.

Angelito Caragdag, a waiter at the hotel's Cafe Al Fresco restaurant and a director of the union, refused
to be frisked by the security personnel.The incident was reported to the hotel's Human Resources
Department (HRD), which issued a Memorandum to Caragdag requiring him to explain in writing within
forty-eight (48) hours from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.The following
day, Caragdag again refused to be frisked by the security personnel.Thus, the HRD issued another
Memorandum requiring him to explain.

The HRD imposed on Caragdag the penalty of reprimand for the incident, which was considered a first
offense, and suspended him for three days for the February 6, 2001 incident, which was considered as a
second offense. Both penalties were in accordance with the hotel's Code of Discipline.

Subsequently, when Mike Moral, the manager of Hyatt's Cafe Al Fresco and Caragdag's immediate
superior, was about to counsel two staff members, Larry Lacambacal and Allan Alvaro, at the training
room, Caragdag suddenly opened the door and yelled at the two with an enraged look.In a disturbing
voice he said, "Ang titigas talaga ng ulo n'yo.Sinabi ko na sa inyo na huwag kayong makikipagusap sa
management habang ongoing pa ang kaso!" (You are very stubborn. I told you not to speak to
management while the case is ongoing!) Moral asked Caragdag what the problem was and informed him
that he was simply talking to his staff. Moral also told Caragdag that he did not have the right to
interrupt and intimidate him during his counseling session with his staff.

In a Memorandum issued on the same date, Moral held Caragdag liable for Offenses Subject to
Disciplinary Action (OSDA) 3.01 of the hotel's Code of Discipline, i.e., "threatening, intimidating,
coercing, and provoking to a fight your superior for reasons directly connected with his discharge of
official duty." Thus, Caragdag was imposed the penalty of seven days suspension in accordance with the
hotel's Code of Discipline.

Still later, on March 2, 2001, Caragdag committed another infraction.At 9:35 a.m. on the said date,
Caragdag left his work assignment during official hours without prior permission from his Department
Head.oral found Caragdag liable for violating OSDA 3.07, i.e., "leaving work assignment during official
working hours without prior permission from the department head or immediate superior," and
suspended him for three days.

On June 1, 2001, the hotel, through Atty. Juancho A. Baltazar, sent Caragdag a Notice of Dismissal.

Caragdag's dismissal was questioned by petitioner, and the dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration
upon agreement of the parties. The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision and ruled that the three
separate suspensions of Mr. Caragdag are valid, his dismissal is legal and OSDA 4.32 of Hyatt's Code of
Discipline is reasonable

ISSUE: Whether theCargdag is entitled to finacial assistance.

RULING: No. The grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed
for just causes is based on equity. In Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co.v. NLRC, we ruled that severance
compensation, or whatever name it is called, on the ground of social justice shall be allowed only when
the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct or for causes which reflect adversely on the
employee's moral character.

Here, Caragdag's dismissal was due to several instances of willful disobedience to the reasonable rules
and regulations prescribed by his employer.he Voluntary Arbitrator pointed out that according to the
hotel's Code of Discipline, an employee who commits three different acts of misconduct within a twelve
(12)-month period commits serious misconduct.He stressed that Caragdag's infractions were not even
spread in a period of twelve (12) months, but rather in a period of a little over a month.Records show
the various violations of the hotel's rules and regulations were committed by Caragdag.He was
suspended for violating the hotel policy on bag inspection and body frisking.He was likewise suspended
for threatening and intimidating a superior while the latter was counseling his staff.He was again
suspended for leaving his work assignment without permission.Evidently, Caragdag's acts constitute
serious misconduct.

Caragdag's dismissal being due to serious misconduct, it follows that he should not be entitled to
financial assistance.To rule otherwise would be to reward him for the grave misconduct he
committed.We must emphasize that social justice is extended only to those who deserve its compassion.

ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. and ROBERT KUAN, Chairman, Petitioners, v. ESTRELITO NOTARIO,
Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. employed respondent as In-House Security Guard. His work consisted
mainly of monitoring the video cameras. Justin Tibon reported to the management of petitioner hospital
about the loss of his mint green traveling bag at the time of respondent's duty. The cameras failed to
record any incident of theft at room 257.
Respondent explained that on the subject dates, he was the only personnel on duty as nobody wanted
to assist him. Because of this, he decided to focus the cameras on the Old and New Maternity Units, as
these two units have high incidence of crime.
Finding the written explanation of respondent to be unsatisfactory, petitioner hospital served on
respondent a copy of the Notice of Termination.
Respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner hospital and its Chairman. Labor
Arbiter dismissed respondents complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. On appeal by the
respondent, the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It stated that
petitioners failed to submit proof that there was an existing Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in the
CCTV monitoring system, particularly on the focusing procedure.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the NLRC. CA dismissed
petitioners' petition for certiorari, affirming the NLRC's finding that while respondent may appear to be
negligent in monitoring the cameras on the subject dates, the same would not constitute sufficient
ground to terminate his employment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the incident is valid cause for termination of employment?

RULING: No. To effectuate a valid dismissal from employment by the employer, the Labor Code has set
twin requirements, namely: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the
Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. This
first requisite is referred to as the substantive aspect, while the second is deemed as the procedural
aspect.

An employer can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes which must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal
was indeed for a valid and just cause.

Under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employee for gross and habitual
neglect of duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual. Gross
negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated
failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. A single or
isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. Under
the prevailing circumstances, respondent exercised his best judgment in monitoring the CCTV cameras
so as to ensure the security within the hospital premises. Verily, assuming arguendo that respondent
was negligent, although this Court finds otherwise, the lapse or inaction could only be regarded as a
single or isolated act of negligence that cannot be categorized as habitual and, hence, not a just cause
for his dismissal.

Where the dismissal was without just cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor
Code, as amended, mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement.

The awards of separation pay and backwages are not mutually exclusive and both may be given to
respondent. An employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages and
reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded to the employee. In awarding
separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded
shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of service.

LBC Express-Vis, Inc. vs. Monica C. Palco G.R. No. 217101 | February 12, 2020

FACTS: Respondent Monica C. Palco filed a complaint for sexual harassment before the Danao City
Prosecutor’s Office, alleging that she was harassed by her supervisor, Arturo Batucan; and that her
employer, petitioner LBC Express-Visayas, failed to take immediate action on the matter. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of Palco. The National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals
likewise ruled in favor of the respondent. In view thereof, LBC filed this petition, arguing that they
should not be liable for constructive dismissal, and that it cannot be held liable for the sexual acts of
Batucan.

ISSUES: Whether or not the sexual harassment done to Monica Palco constitutes to her constructive
dismissal.

RULING: Yes, the sexual harassment done to Palco can be a compelling reason for her to complain
against constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal occurs when an employer makes and employee’s
continued employment impossible, unreasonably or unlikely, or has made an employee’s working
conditions or environment harsh, hostile, and unfavorable, such that the employee feels obliged to
resign from his or her employment. One of the ways by which hostile or offensive work environment is
created is through the sexual harassment of an employee. Palco posited in this case that her resignation
was not voluntary but was borne out of the hostile work environment brought about by Batucan’s
sexual harassment. Thus, this petition was denied by the Supreme Court.

Malayang Samahan ng manggagawa sa greenfield vs Ramos

FACTS: Petitioner MSMS, (local union) is an affiliate of ULGWP (federation). A local union election was
held under the action of the federation. The defeated candidates filed a petition for impeachment. The
local union held a general membership meeting. Several union members failed to attend the meeting.
The local union requested the company to deduct the union fines from the wage of those union
members who failed to attend the general membership meeting. The Secretary General of
the federation disapproved the resolution imposing the Php50 fine. The company then sent a reply to
petitioner’s request stating it cannot deduct fines without going against certain laws. The imposition of
the fine became the subject of a bitter disagreement between the Federation and the local union
culminating to the latter’s declaration of general autonomy from the former. The federation asked the
company to stop the remittance of the local union’s share in the education funds. The company led a
complaint of interpleader with the DOLE. The federation called a meeting placing the local union under
trusteeship and appointing an administrator. Petitioner union officers received letters from
the administrator requiring them to explain why they should not be removed from the office and
expelled from union membership. The officers were expelled from the federation.
The federation advised the company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their
separation pursuant to the Union Security Clause in the CBA. The Federation filed a notice of strike with
the NCMB to compel the company to effect the immediate termination of the expelled union officers.
Under the pressure of a strike, the company terminated the 30 union officers from employment. The
petitioners filed a notice of strike on the grounds of discrimination; interference; mass dismissal of union
officers and shop stewards; threats, coercion and intimidation ; and union busting. The petitioners
prayed for the suspension of the effects of their termination. Secretary Drilon dismissed the petition
stating it was an intra-union matter. Later, 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive
suspension. The union members staged a walk-out and officially declared a strike that afternoon. The
strike was attended by violence.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the company was illegal dismissal.
2. Whether or not the strike was illegal.
3. Whether or not petitioners can be deemed to have abandoned their work.

HELD:
1. Yes. The charges against respondent company proceeds from one main issue – the termination of
several employees upon the demand of the federation pursuant to the union security clause. Although
the union security clause may be validly enforced, such must comply with due process. In this case,
petitioner union officers were expelled for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty to the federation. The
company did not inquire into the cause of the expulsion and merely relied upon the federation’s
allegations. The issue is not a purely intra-union matter as it was later on converted into a termination
dispute when the company dismissed the petitioners from work without the benefit of a separate notice
and hearing. Although it started as an intra-union dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the BLR, to
remand the same to the BLR would intolerably delay the case and the Labor Arbiter could rule upon it.
As to the act of disaffiliation by the local union; it is settled that a local union has the right to disaffiliate
from its mother union in the absence of specific provisions in the federation’s constitution prohibiting
such. There was no such provision in federation ULGWP’s constitution.

2. No. As to the legally of the strike; it was based on the termination dispute and petitioners believed in
good faith in dismissing them, the company was guilty of ULP. A no-strike, no lockout provision in the
CBA can only be invoked when the strike is economic. As to the violence, the parties agreed that the
violence was not attributed to the striking employees alone as the company itself hired men to pacify
the strikers. Such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike illegal.

3. As to the dismissal of the petitioners; respondents failed to prove that there was abandonment
absent any proof of petitioner’s intention to sever the employee-employer relationship.
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS vs. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE and/or SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB

FACTS: Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholastica's College Westgrove (SSCW), a
Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations,
got pregnant out of wedlock, married the father of her child, and was dismissed by SSCW. SSCW is a
catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In May 2001, SSCW hired the petitioner as
an Assistant to SSCW’s Director of the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate. Sometime
in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of wedlock. When SSCW learned of the
petitioner’s pregnancy, Sr. Edna Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCW’s Directress, advised her to file a
resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she
would not resign from her employment just because she got pregnant without the benefit of marriage.
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in writing why she should not
be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which
amounts to serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic school. On June
4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a letter, which, in part, reads: To us, pre-
marital sex between two consenting adults without legal impediment to marry each other who later on
married each other does not fall within the contemplation of "disgraceful or immoral conduct" and
"serious misconduct" of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and the Labor Code of the
Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal is a valid exercise of management prerogative on the ground of
serious misconduct

Rulings: No. There being no valid basis in law or even in SSCW’s policy and rules, SSCW’s dismissal of the
petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a valid exercise of management prerogative. In sum,
the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there was no just cause for the termination
of her employment. SSCW failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish that the petitioner’s
conduct, i.e., engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and conceiving a child out of wedlock, assessed in
light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.

The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal
as the charge against the petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on the bare allegations of SSCW.

In turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s dismissal, failing
to recognize that the labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in ruling for the respondents. Under
these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an unmarried woman gives birth out of
wedlock:(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively
liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause complications for both mother and child but it does not
give cause for administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under
those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as
expressed in the Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems irrespective of
dogmatic origins. (2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other
thanthe mother, then there is a cause for administrative sanction against either the father or the
mother.

In such a case, the "disgraceful and immoral conduct" consists of having extramarital relations with a
married person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our
statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial employees have been sanctioned
for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.

In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child was unmarried. Therefore,
respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct simply because she gave birth to
the child Christian Jeon out of wedlock.