SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000.]

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR

NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 December 1994 which affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay respondent spouses Nestor
Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for
exemplary damages and P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.*
Petitioner claims absence of factual and legal basis for the award of damages.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem
Nicolas resided at No. 51 M. Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment
leased to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing" Concepcion, who also resided in
the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then
engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with
office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis.
Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing capital on condition that after
her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally
between her and Nestor.

Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo C. Concepcion, brother of the
deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and
accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence. He shouted, "Hoy
Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para
umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para
magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing." 1

To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latter’s dare, to see some
relatives of the Concepcion family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However,
those whom they were able to see denied knowledge of the alleged affair. The same
accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two (2) confronted Florence
at the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo
backtracked saying that he just heard the rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however,
Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening
her that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about
the affair, he would kill Florence.

As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to
the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased
to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much so that the
business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no longer cope with
their commitments to their clients and customers. To make matters worse, Allem
Nicolas started to doubt Nestor’s fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels
during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband. Consequently,
Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages.
Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil
suit against him for damages. chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of
being Florence’s lover. He reasoned out that he only desired to protect the name and
reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he sought an appointment with
Nestor through Florence’s son Roncali to ventilate his feelings about the matter.
Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and
amiable manner, and then only casually asked the latter about his rumored affair with
his sister-in-law.

In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion raises
the following issues: (a) whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to
private respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether there is basis to review the
facts which are of weight and influence but which were overlooked and misapplied by
the respondent appellate court.

Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court of

Appeals was without legal basis to justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by
respondent spouses does not fall under Arts. 26 2 and 2219 3 of the Civil Code since it
does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. Neither does it
involve prying into the privacy of another’s residence or meddling with or disturbing the
private life or family relation of another. Petitioner also insists that certain facts and
circumstances of the case were manifestly overlooked, misunderstood or glossed over
by respondent court which, if considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the
credibility of the witnesses for private respondents and the manner by which the
testimonial evidence was analyzed and evaluated by the trial court, petitioner criticized
the appellate court for not taking into account the fact that the trial judge who penned
the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses of
respondent spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the case. Thus, his
decision rendered was flawed.

The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts. 4 The reason behind this is that the Supreme Court respects
the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses, considering that it
is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 5 Thus it
accords the highest respect, even finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of
the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it.

The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the credibility
of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court;
however, its factual findings may nonetheless be reversed if by the evidence on record
or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred. 6 In this respect, the Court is not
generally inclined to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals unless its
findings are erroneous, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the trial court of origin. 7 This
rule of course cannot be unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge who penned
the decision was not the one who heard the case, because not having heard the
testimonies himself, the judge would not be in a better position than the appellate
courts to make such determination. 8

However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence
was not the one who rendered the judgment but merely relied on the record of the case
does not render his judgment erroneous or irregular. This is so even if the judge did not
have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies not having heard all the witnesses
speak nor observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court
generally will not find any misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly assumed under
the principle of regularity of performance of duties of public officers that the transcripts
of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the judge himself.
virtual law library
chanrobles.com :

Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt as to the
factual findings of the court a quo? We find none. A painstaking review of the evidence
on record convinces us not to disturb the judgment appealed from. The fact that the
case was handled by different judges brooks no consideration at all, for preponderant
evidence consistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by private
respondents as to foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, everytime a Judge who heard a case,
wholly or partially, dies or leaves the service, the case cannot be decided and a new
trial will have to be conducted. That would be absurd; inconceivable.

According to petitioner, private respondents’ evidence is inconsistent as to time, place

and persons who heard the alleged defamatory statement. We find this to be a
gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for the respondents are
unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the afternoon at the front door of
the apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbors,
and later on, with the accusation being repeated in the presence of Florence, at the
terrace of her house. That this finding appears to be in conflict with the allegation in the
complaint as to the time of the incident bears no momentous significance since an
allegation in a pleading is not evidence; it is a declaration that has to be proved by
evidence. If evidence contrary to the allegation is presented, such evidence controls,
not the allegation in the pleading itself, although admittedly it may dent the credibility
of the witnesses. But not in the instant case.

It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as witnesses

the persons they named as eyewitnesses to the incident and that they presented
instead one Romeo Villaruel who was not named as a possible witness during the pre-
trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruel’s testimony is not credible and should never
have been accorded any weight at all, petitioner capitalizes on the fact that a great
distance separates Villaruel’s residence and that of private respondents as reflected in
their house numbers, the former’s number being No. 223 M. Concepcion St., while that
of the Nicolas spouses, No. 51 along the same street. This being so, petitioner
concludes, Villaruel could not have witnessed the ugly confrontation between Rodrigo
and Nestor. It appears however from Villaruel’s testimony that at the time of the
incident complained of, he was staying in an apartment inside the compound adjacent
to that of the Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223 is not
stated. What is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor Nicolas were
neighbors on 14 July 1985. chanrobles.com : chanrobles.com.ph

There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial evidence of
private respondents but these are not of such significance as to alter the finding of facts
of the lower court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor, for
they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 9 Inconsistencies in the testimonies
of witnesses with on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of
their testimonies. 10

All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by
the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject petitioner’s posture that no
legal provision supports such award, the incident complained of neither falling under
Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It does not need further elucidation that the
incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of respondent
Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its
inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the
human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a
concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of
every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it
dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly
humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted — then the laws are indeed
defective. 11 Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and
damages are provided for violations of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind.

It is petitioner’s position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those
enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations
mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not
preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions
against a person’s dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or
abusive language. 12 Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although
incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. chanrobles.com : red

There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of
petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting language. Petitioner attempted to
exculpate himself by claiming that he made an appointment to see Nestor through a
nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could talk with Nestor to find out the truth
about his rumored illicit relationship with Florence. He said that he wanted to protect
his nephews and nieces and the name of his late brother (Florence’s husband). 13 How
he could be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how he would
protect his nephews and nieces and his family’s name if the rumor were true, he did not
say. Petitioner admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the
telephone about the issue, with the latter vehemently denying the alleged immoral
relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the strength of the denial of his
sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor, even in public, to the latter’s
humiliation.

Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never knew
respondent, had never seen him before, and was unaware of his business partnership
with Florence, his subsequent declarations on the witness stand however belie this lack
of knowledge about the business venture for in that alleged encounter he asked Nestor
how the business was going, what were the collection problems, and how was the
money being spent. He even knew that the name of the business, Floral Enterprises,
was coined by combining the first syllables of the name Florence and Allem, the name
of Nestor’s wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him
and Florence which Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go
with him to speak to his relatives who were the source of his information. Nestor went
with him and those they were able to talk to denied the rumor.

We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth about the
rumor and why he was not satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and
Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the latter’s privacy and hurl
defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife and children, neighbors and
friends, accusing him — a married man — of having an adulterous relationship with
Florence. This definitely caused private respondent much shame and embarrassment
that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without feeling distraught and
debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was
none. This is why a few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner
demanding public apology and payment of damages, which petitioner ignored.

If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually

happen, then there would have been no cause or motive at all for them to consult with
their lawyer, immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a response from
petitioner, file an action for damages against the latter. That they decided to go to
court to seek redress bespeaks of the validity of the their claim. On the other hand, it is
interesting to note that while explaining at great length why Florence Concepcion
testified against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why the Nicolas spouses,
persons he never knew and with whom he had no dealings in the past, would sue him
for damages. It also has not escaped our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by private
respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the
Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case, otherwise
her name would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer
that it was not for her to decide and that she could not do anything about it as she was
not a party to the court case.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167,
holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for
attorney’s fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.