E F Carrit
E F Carrit
E F Carrit
Carritt, E. F.
Anthony Skelton
about a different kind of “fact, namely an obligation” (1938: 140; 1947: 42). Carritt
thinks this insufficient to fend off worries about moral realism. Intriguingly, he con
fronts an error theory on which all moral judgments are false because the moral
properties they posit do not obtain (1938: 140). He does so because he accepts an
error theory in aesthetics, on which all aesthetic judgments are false because the
aesthetic properties they posit do not obtain (1947: 181; 1938: 140, 132), and because
for him the “chief argument” against moral realism involves arguing that moral
judgments are analogous to aesthetic judgments on just this score. He has to estab
lish that there is sufficient difference between the two kinds of judgment to justify
an error theory about aesthetic but not moral judgments.
To do this, Carritt relies on a range of arguments. The main one begins with the
observation that views about what possesses beauty vary from society to society,
from individual to individual, and from time to time within the same individual.
A love poem is beautiful when one is in love, but grotesque when one’s beloved has
forsaken one. Mountains were admired in the nineteenth but not in the seventeenth
century (1938: 142; 1947: 178). Carritt suggests that the best explanation of these
differences is that they reflect mere differences in an individual’s or a society’s
conception of what is meaningful or with one’s or a society’s affective association
with the objects of aesthetic judgment (1938: 142; 1947: 177). Differences in these
conceptions or associations are a result of mere differences in mood or spirit, not
distorted perceptions of objective aesthetic value, rendering them purely subjec
tive. Carritt concludes, on this basis, that there are no aesthetic facts. Insofar as
aesthetic judgments assert that something has or lacks the quality of beauty, they
are all false. He argues that this separates moral judgments from aesthetic judg
ments. There is some variability in moral judgments, but it is not possible to doubt
that there are moral truths about what we owe to others (1938: 145; 1947: 44, 183).
There is a problem with Carritt’s argument. An argument like his for accepting an
error theory in aesthetics might be provided for an error theory in ethics. Although
some judgments in ethics, one might grant, do not appear to depend on conceptions
of meaningfulness or on affective associations as in aesthetics, there might be other
subjective factors on which they do depend that might give us reason for thinking
that there are no facts to which ethical judgments refer. One might note moral vari
ability across cultures and argue that it is best explained as resulting from cultural
differences rather than poorly formed beliefs about a moral reality. Carritt might
reply that certain moral judgments, about the value of motives and about obligations
to those with whom we have relations, cannot be doubted (1938: 145; 1947: 182).
But this is unlikely to convince those who lack Carritt’s credence level in common
sense and who are more impressed with the fact of disagreement about, and the
cultural variability in, moral claims. And it is not clear that those who want to defend
truth in aesthetics cannot argue similarly that some things – the treasury building at
Petra or the Taj Mahal in Agra – just are beautiful.
In normative ethics, Carritt is best known for his (often pithy) criticisms of utili
tarianism and for his articulation and defense of a brand of deontology familiar
from the works of H. A. Prichard and W. D. Ross (see prichard, h. a.; ross, w. d.).
carritt, e. f. 3
thinks that if Ted has a greater amount of moral merit than Fred, we ought to benefit
Ted more than Fred even if doing so produces fewer units of surplus aggregate good.
Nor can the view capture the importance that common sense attaches to the obli
gation to keep one’s promises. Suppose X has promised Y that he will help Y, but that
X can, by helping Z, provide slightly more good to Z to whom he has made no prom
ise. And suppose that X cannot help both. Utilitarianism suggests that X ought to
help Z, though this is not our moral judgment.
These are not Carritt’s most original criticisms. He is among the first to articulate
the objection that utilitarianism justifies punishing the innocent (Sverdlik 2012).
“[I]t would … appear that, if prevention of crime be the whole justification and
nature of punishment, then the hanging of an innocent man who is universally
believed guilty is as ideal an instance of punishment as can be conceived” (1928: 109;
see also 71; 1947: 65). He remarks that more sophisticated brands of ideal utilitari
anism might capture the obligations of justice, desert, and promise‐keeping by argu
ing that their ground rests (exclusively) on the value of fitting with “some as yet
unrealized rule or pattern of my own whole life or the life of some ideal community
or of mankind, a rule to which my fulfillment of the obligation would conform”
(1947: 68; see also Joseph 1931). Carritt rejects this position: there is no obligation
to conform to a rule or pattern or ideal unless the rule or pattern or ideal is a good
one, and, he argues, the goodness will depend, at least partly, on “its demanding for
its realization the fulfilment of obligations” (1947: 68).
This fails to impugn a different variety of ideal utilitarianism. On this view, the
obligations of justice, desert, and promise‐keeping rest not on the value of conform
ity to an ideal or rule or pattern; rather, the (exclusive) ground of these obligations
is the noninstrumental evil of the acts of injustice, punishing the innocent, and
promise‐breaking (Ewing 1948). The state of affairs in which justice is not done, the
innocent are punished, and promises are broken is worse than the state of affairs in
which justice is done, only the guilty are punished, and promises are kept. In this
way, ideal utilitarianism might capture our intuitions about justice, desert, and
promise‐keeping.
Against this view, Carritt can wield a powerful argument. He notes that there
appear to be cases in which one can, by producing one injustice, prevent several
more injustices from taking place. This version of utilitarianism says we should
commit the injustice. But we do not think it right to murder one man even if by
doing so we prevent two men from being murdered (1928: 108). This version of
ideal utilitarianism does not have an easy time deflecting this worry.
Out of these criticisms emerges a distinct brand of moderate deontology. Carritt
thinks that we have four obligations: those of justice (distributive and retributive,
including obligations of realizing an equitable distribution of satisfaction and of
other goods, of rewarding the morally meritorious and punishing the guilty in pro
portion to their merit or guilt, of promise‐keeping, of gratitude, and of recompense);
of improvement (to promote surplus virtue, aesthetic experience, intelligent activity,
etc.); of beneficence (to promote surplus – innocent – pleasure and liberty); and of
prudence (to promote one’s own satisfaction) (1947: 96–116). Interestingly, he does
carritt, e. f. 5
such demonstration must consist in deducing obligations from something more cer
tain, and what can be more certain than that a man whom I have promised to pay for
an unpleasant bit of work, and who has done it, has a claim to the payment promised?
This is as self‐evident as the axioms of mathematics … or the principles of logic …
[neither] of which can be proved from anything more certain. (1947: 2–3; see also
43–4; 1925: 574)
Second, moral philosophy ought not influence practice directly: it is liable to corrupt
it with theoretical generalizations contradicting “men’s reflective conclusions on
simple moral questions” (1947: 6; see also 1925: 575, 576; 1928: 70). But such con
clusions are the philosopher’s only data, so that in the case of a conflict between a
philosopher’s view and such conclusions, we must assume that the philosopher is
wrong. Carritt’s worry in part is that moral philosophy may have a less than salutary
influence on behavior. It may enable those searching for an excuse to avoid doing
what is morally required (1925: 576).
This is not to say that moral philosophy has no effect on practice. The “prime
value” of moral philosophy is “purely speculative” (1925: 576; see also 1928: 71;
1947: 6). Its function is to clarify our moral views and terminology and to protect us
against prejudice and the warping effects of bad philosophy. This has an indirect
effect on practice: “a truer moral philosophy releases us from the false dogmatisms
which may … corrupt our practice” (1925: 577). It does this when it eliminates bad
philosophy and articulates a theory that is a “truer generalization of the verdicts of
reflective conscience upon particular situations” (1947: 8).
This appears to contrast with the view of moral philosophy taken by philoso
phers working in the generation before Carritt. Sidgwick thinks that we “study
Ethics … for the sake of Practice: and in practice we are concerned with particulars”
6 carritt, e. f.
(1907: 215; see sidgwick, henry). He holds that in part the philosopher’s “function
is to tell men what they ought to think, rather than what they do think” (1907: 373).
Rashdall contends that it is possible to establish what we ought to do by “application
to particular cases of principles already admitted” (1894: 462).
It is not clear how deep the disagreement is, however. Carritt is worried about
contradicting “men’s reflective conclusions on simple moral questions.” Sidgwick
and Rashdall might be keen to respect the same conclusions, though they may
disagree about which theory provides the “truer generalization of the verdicts of
reflective conscience.” They may share the worry about the warping effects of
moral philosophy and be keen to ward against it. But there may be more complex
cases where appeal to men’s reflective conclusions reveals nothing clear or certain.
We might deal with these by reference to the “common quality in all our known
duties,” since this may give us a “clue in more doubtful situations” (1928: 31). But
this may not be fruitful. In such situations, a direct appeal to moral philosophy
may prove directly practically useful. We may even agree with Rashdall that in
these cases “there is a likelihood of their being better answered by those [moral
philosophers] who have thought about them than by those who have not” (1894:
466; cf. Carritt 1928: 71).
Carritt was a socialist in politics. His views about the practical value of philosophy
did not prohibit him from making strong pronouncements about distributive jus
tice. He holds, for instance, that one’s right to distribute one’s property upon one’s
death in the way one wants is “easily … overridden by the claims of other persons to
equal liberty and opportunities of happiness or improvement.” Indeed, he thinks
that a child has no claim (with some exceptions) to inherit from its parents what will
raise it “above the level of equality” (1947: 171). These are quite radical claims, mak
ing it hard to motivate the (common) worry that an intuitionist position like Carritt’s
is mired in “parochial dogmatism” (Murphy 1949: 269).
REFERENCES
Ayer, A. J. 1936. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Gollancz.
Carritt, E. F. 1925. “Ethics in Philosophical Education,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 22,
pp. 573–7.
Carritt, E. F. 1928. The Theory of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carritt, E. F. 1935. Morals and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carritt, E. F. 1938. “Moral Positivism and Moral Aestheticism,” Philosophy, vol. 50, pp. 131–47.
Carritt, E. F. 1947. Ethical and Political Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ewing, A. C. 1948. “Utilitarianism,” Ethics, vol. 58, pp. 100–11.
Joseph, H. W. B. 1931. Some Problems in Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murphy, Arthur E. 1949. “Who Are ‘We’? A Discussion of Carritt’s Ethical and Political
Thinking,” Philosophical Review, vol. 58, pp. 265–71.
carritt, e. f. 7
Rashdall, Hastings 1894. “The Limits of Casuistry,” International Journal of Ethics, vol. 4,
pp. 459–80.
Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sidgwick, Henry 1907. The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. London: Macmillan.
Sverdlik, Steven 2012. “The Origins of ‘The Objection’,” History of Philosophy Quarterly,
vol. 29, pp. 79–101.
FURTHER READINGS
Carritt, E. F. 1937. “An Ambiguity of the Word ‘Good’,” Proceedings of the British Academy,
vol. 23, pp. 51–80.
Carritt, E. F. 1960. Fifty Years a Don. Library of University College, Oxford: Privately Printed.
Hurka, Thomas 2014. British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.