2

ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS

OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT
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MARGARET A. MARSHALL AND JONATHON D. BROWN

Nothing is easier than self-deceit. For what each man wishes, he also
believes to be true.
—Demosthenes, c. 383-322 BCE

How well do people know themselves? Are they equally aware of their
strengths and faults, or do they exaggerate their virtues and dismiss their
shortcomings? And what should they think? Are they better off knowing
what they are really like or are they better served by embellishing them-
selves? In 1988, Taylor and Brown examined these questions. Following a
comprehensive review of the literature, they reached two conclusions. First,
most people do not hold accurate views of themselves. Instead, they inflate
their virtues, exaggerate their ability to bring about desired outcomes, and
believe their future will be rosier than base rate data can justify. Second, if
not too extreme, these biases are generally advantageous, promoting a vari-
ety of criteria normally associated with adaptation and health. Taylor and
Brown (1988) coined the term positive illusions to refer to these beliefs. The
term illusion was chosen to highlight a simple fact: In many cases, these be-
liefs are simply too good to be true. As an example, consider that 75% of
American newlyweds believe their marriage will last throughout their lives,
yet the divorce rate in America exceeds 50% (Heaton & Albrecht, 1991).
The thesis put forth by Taylor and Brown (1988) garnered a great deal
of attention and generated a good deal of controversy (Colvin & Block, 1994;

19
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/11624-002
Self-Criticism and Self-Enhancement: Theory, Research, and Clinical
Implications, edited by E. C. Chang
Copyright © 2008 American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.
 Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993; Taylor & Brown, 1994a, 1994b). Our
goal in this chapter is to review some of this research and integrate the more
recent findings with Taylor and Brown's original position.

THE CASE FOR ACCURACY

Accurate self-knowledge has long been seen as essential for effective

functioning. For example, Jahoda (1958) defined the mentally healthy per-
son as one who is capable of perceiving the self as it actually is, without
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distorting one's perceptions to fit one's wishes, and Maslow (1950) wrote
that healthy individuals are able to accept themselves and their own nature,
with all of its discrepancies from their ideal image.
It is easy to see how such a thesis developed. Grossly inaccurate self-
views are detrimental to well-being. People who hallucinate or experience
delusions of grandeur are not paragons of mental health. Whether other, less
extreme divergences from reality are detrimental to well-being is another
matter. Taylor and Brown's theory applies only to mildly distorted self-views
that paint a self-portrait just slightly better than reality warrants. At no time
did they state or imply that excessive self-enhancement is better than mod-
erate self-enhancement. This point is often overlooked by those who have
criticized their approach (e.g., Colvin & Block, 1994).

BENEFITS OF POSITIVE ILLUSIONS

Theoretical positions aside, testing whether positive illusions have costs

or benefits requires that one first establish standards for judging what's good
or bad. Taylor and Brown (1988) dealt with this issue by identifying four
commonly agreed on criteria of mental health: (a) subjective feelings of hap-
piness, life satisfaction, and contentment; (b) the ability to engage in mean-
ingful and productive work; (c) the ability to form stable and fulfilling inter-
personal relationships; and (d) the capacity to face life's challenges and
potentially grow from them.
Of the four criteria, achievement-related outcomes appear to provide
the weakest support for Taylor and Brown's formulation. Although some stud-
ies find that positive beliefs in one's ability promote task performance, other
studies find no effect or the opposite to be true (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992;
Robins & Beer, 2001; Wright, 2000). Marshall and Brown (2004) argued
that some of this inconsistency may be due to the difficulty of the task. Posi-
tive beliefs in one's ability ought to influence task performance by affecting
how long and hard people try (Bandura, 1997). Easy tasks require little in the
way of effort and persistence, so positive beliefs in one's ability ought to have
little effect on performance of easy tasks. Extremely difficult tasks may also

20 MARSHALL AND BROWN

 Adaptation,
Positive Effective
Resilience,
Illusions Coping
Growth
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Figure 2.1. Positive illusions and psychological well-being.

fail to reveal the power of positive beliefs if people can't succeed no matter
how hard or long they try. As a consequence, moderately difficult tasks would
seem to provide the proper forum for testing the positive-illusions frame-
work.
Evidence for the other three criteria (i.e., happiness, satisfying inter-
personal relationships, and adaptation and growth) is clearer and more abun-
dant. Figure 2.1 presents a heuristic device for organizing research in this
area. The figure shows that positive illusions promote adaptation, resilience,
and growth indirectly, via their influence on positive affective states, inter-
personal relationships, and coping. In the sections that follow, we review
evidence pertinent to this model.

Positive Illusions, Happiness, and Well-Being

After years of focusing on the "negative" side of psychological life, psy-

chologists have recently turned their attention to studying psychological
health and well-being (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Sheldon & King,
2001). Among the many topics being examined are happiness, contentment,
and life satisfaction (Diener & Seligman, 2002). Across cultures, the way
people evaluate themselves predicts these emotional states (Diener & Di-
ener, 1995). People who think well of themselves, believe they are capable of
bringing about desired outcomes, and are optimistic about the future are hap-
pier and more satisfied with their lives than are those who lack these percep-
tions, even when these perceptions are illusory.
Positive emotion, in turn, promotes adaptation and well-being. Com-
pared with unhappy people, happy people are more creative, sociable, and
energetic, and more caring, helpful, and involved in community affairs

PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT 21

 (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). They also live longer. Danner,
Snowdon, andFriesen (2001) examined autobiographies of 180 Catholic nuns,
composed when the nuns were in their early 20s. Each sister was asked to
write a short sketch of her life at the time she entered the convent, and these
autobiographies were later coded for the presence of positive emotional con-
tent. Women who expressed the most positive emotion lived nearly 7 years
longer than did those who expressed the least positive emotion. It is espe-
cially notable that these effects appeared more than 50 years after the essays
were written.
Frederickson's (1998, 2001) build-and-broaden model seeks to explain
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why positive emotional states are beneficial. The model proposes that posi-
tive emotional states promote well-being (a) by leading people to think more
flexibly and creatively, (b) by increasing activity level and social contacts,
and (c) by directly reducing cardiovascular reactivity to stressful life events.
In combination, these processes help happy people cope better with life stress
than those who are more dysphoric or dyspeptic (Folkman & Moskowitz,
2000).

Positive Illusions, Social Relationships, and Weil-Being

When Taylor and Brown published their findings in 1988, there was
virtually no research on the role of illusions in romantic relationships. Since
then, research in this area has proliferated, and three findings have emerged.
First, people view their relationship partners in unrealistically positive terms.
They believe their partner is better than most other people, and they view
their partner more positively than their partners view themselves or are viewed
by others (Gagne & Lydon, 2004; Murray & Holmes, 1997; Murray, Holmes,
& Griffin, 1996a, 1996b). Second, couples view their relationship in unreal-
istically positive terms. They believe their love is stronger than other people's
love and that the problems that beset other people's relationships, such as
poor communication skills or incompatible interests, pose less of a threat to
their own relationship (Buunk & van der Eijnden, 1997; Rusbult, Van Lange,
Wildschut, Yovetich, &. Verette, 2000). Third, couples believe that they
have more control over their relationship's outcomes than do most other
people and that they are more apt to remain together than are most other
couples (Powers, Lyons, Montel, & Shaked, 2001; Murray & Holmes, 1997).
Moreover, this relationship superiority bias occurs across cultures (Endo,
Heine, & Lehman, 2000). In short, when thinking about their relationships,
people exhibit the same three biases Taylor and Brown (1988) identified as
being characteristic of self-perceptions: They view their relationship in overly
positive terms, exaggerate their ability to bring about desired outcomes, and
are unrealistically optimistic.
These tendencies predict relationship success. People who idealize their
partner and view their relationship in overly positive terms are more satisfied

22 MARSHALL AND BROWN

 with their relationship, more committed to it, and more apt to remain to-
gether than are those who are more accurate and balanced (Murray & Holmes,
1993,1997,1999; Murray et al., 1996a, 1996b). The effect is strongest when
both partners exhibit these tendencies, providing evidence for an effect we
call illusion collusion. Simply put, happy, satisfied, and committed couples
support one another's positive biases and illusions.
Doing so benefits not only the relationship but also health and well-
being. A wealth of evidence shows that relationships are good medicine.
People who turn to someone in times of trouble cope better than do those
who go it alone (Cohen & Wills, 1985). When it comes to buffering the
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adverse effects of stress, the perception of support seems to be most impor-

tant. Those who believe they are loved and supported are better able to with-
stand life stress than are those who feel unloved and unsupported. Positive
illusions predict these perceptions. People who think well of themselves and
are optimistic are especially apt to perceive their relationships as being strong
and supportive (Bonanno, Rennicke, & Dekel, 2005; see also Brissette,
Scheier, & Carver, 2002).

Positive Illusions, Stress, and Coping

Most people face trouble in their lives at one point or another. They
may lose their jobs, confront a natural disaster, be victimized by crime, or
grieve the loss of a loved one. The manner in which people deal with stress-
ful events like these has been a hotbed of research activity for nearly 50
years. The upshot of this research is that people are exceptionally resilient.
Although many people are initially shaken when stressful life events occur,
most recover in a relatively short time (Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman,
1978; Diener, 1994; Schulz & Decker, 1985; Taylor, 1983). Some even re-
port that their lives changed for the better. For example, many cancer pa-
tients feel a greater sense of purpose, increased spirituality, and more appre-
ciation for friends and family (Carver &. Antoni, 2004; Taylor, 1983; Taylor,
Kemeny, Bower, Gruenewald, & Reed, 2000). Of course, not everyone copes
well with adversity, and some people require counseling or other forms of
treatment to help them adjust, but most people who face major life events
return to a level of psychological functioning that is at least as positive as the
one they enjoyed before the event occurred.
Coping with traumatic experiences often involves restoring a positive
sense of self-worth, reasserting control over one's life, finding meaning in the
experience, and reclaiming an optimistic view of the future. In other words,
recovery from traumatic events often involves restoring the positive illusions
that were in place prior to the experience. Positive illusions drive the recov-
ery process. People regain a favorable self-image, recapture perceived con-
trol, and reclaim optimism by construing events in overly positive ways. For
example, they believe that they are coping better than are most other vic-

PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT 23

 tims and have more control over the course of their disease than they actu-
ally do. They also construct a view of the future that is unrealistically opti-
mistic in light of their condition. These illusions are subtle and are respon-
sive to the realities of the situations individuals face, but they are also at least
somewhat unrealistic (Taylor et al., 2000).
The benefits of positive illusions are strongest when self-reports of dis-
tress are gathered, but the effect also occurs when more objective indicators
are examined. Bonanno and colleagues explored coping and adaptation in a
group of civilians exposed to urban combat during Bosnia's civil war (Bonanno,
Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002). Mental health professionals examined
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each participant, and their ratings of psychological well-being were corre-

lated with the participants' tendency to view themselves in overly positive
terms. A positive relationship emerged, indicating that self-enhancement
biases predicted well-being under times of stress. A second study found a
similar pattern among people coping with the premature death of a spouse,
and a follow-up study found a similar effect among New Yorkers coping with
the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bonanno et al., 2005).
Research on optimism and coping provides additional evidence for the
link between illusions and well-being. A large body of research shows that
optimism plays a key role in how people cope with life-threatening experi-
ences (Carver et al., 1993). For example, in one study of men undergoing
coronary artery bypass surgery, Scheier and colleagues (1989) found that
optimists recovered more quickly from surgery and were faster to resume their
normal activities than were pessimists.
Other studies have found that optimism confers benefits even when it
is unrealistic. Taylor et al. (1992) studied 550 gay men who had tested for the
presence of the AIDS virus (HIV). About half of the men were HIV posi-
tive; the other half were HIV negative. After receiving their test results,
the men were asked to indicate their agreement with a number of state-
ments (e.g., "I feel safe from AIDS because I've developed an immunity"; "I
think my immune system [is] more capable of fighting the AIDS virus than
are the immune systems of other gay men"). These items were combined to
create an index of how optimistic the men were that they would not de-
velop AIDS. In realistic terms, people who are HIV positive are much more
likely to develop AIDS than are people who are HIV negative. Neverthe-
less, men who knew they were HIV positive were significantly more opti-
mistic about not developing AIDS than were men who knew they were
HIV negative. Moreover, this optimism was linked with lower levels of
psychological distress and the adoption of health-promoting behaviors, such
as a proper diet, exercise, and rest. In this study, then, even unrealistic opti-
mism was beneficial.
Lazarus and his colleagues have provided a useful framework for under-
standing these effects (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Launier, 1978).
These investigators have identified two types of coping strategies. One cop-

24 MARSHALL AND BROWN

 ing strategy, termed problem-focused coping, involves taking active steps to
deal with the source of stress. For example, a person who is laid off from work
may immediately start looking for another job. This coping style is problem-
focused because the person's efforts are directed at resolving the source of
stress. A second coping strategy, termed emotion-focused coping, attempts to
manage the emotional distress that arises from a stressful experience. Some-
times emotion-focused coping is constructive (e.g., under stressful circum-
stances, a person may exercise to alleviate anxiety); other times it is destruc-
tive (e.g., a person under stress can abuse alcohol or drugs in an effort to
reduce anxiety).
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Which of these strategies do optimists use ? Numerous studies have found

that optimists are more inclined than pessimists to use problem-focused cop-
ing strategies (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996; Carver et al., 1993; Scheier et
al, 1989; Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986). When faced with a stressful
situation, optimists seek out relevant information and actively attempt to
solve their problems, either by directly attacking the source of distress or by
looking at the situation in ways that cast things in the most positive light
(e.g., believing they have learned a lot from the experience and are a better
person for having gone through it).
In summary, the picture that emerges from the research we have been
discussing is not one of an optimistic person who blithely assumes everything
will be fine and then does nothing to bring about this state of affairs. Instead,
optimists adopt constructive, problem-focused coping strategies. They set goals
and then actively set about to attain them. They look at their situation in
the most positive terms and attempt to construe benefit from tragedy. In
colloquial terms, they "make lemonade out of lemons."

THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF POSITIVE ILLUSIONS

Positive illusions are not always adaptive. In this section, we review

three circumstances that pose potential problems.

Positive Illusions and Interpersonal Evaluations

Modesty is generally valued in our culture, and people who publicly

"blow their horn" risk opprobrium and rejection. At the same time, people
enjoy the company of those who are optimistic and exhibit a strong sense of
personal agency. For these reasons, we should not be surprised to find that
the evidence linking self-enhancing illusions to interpersonal evaluations is
mixed. Some studies find a negative correlation between self-enhancement
and interpersonal evaluations (Colvin, Block, &. Funder, 1995; John & Rob-
ins, 1994; Paulhus, 1998), whereas others find the opposite to be true
(Brendgen, Vitaro, Turgeon, Poulin, & Wanner, 2004; Taylor, Lerner,

PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT 25

 Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003b). Still others have found that self-
enhancing people make a positive first impression but are later disliked
(Paulhus, 1998), or are disliked only if they have recently been threatened or
thwarted (Heatherton & Vohs, 2000; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). In short,
whether self-enhancement engenders interpersonal acceptance or rejection
is uncertain. One thing is clear, however: Self-enhancing people perceive
their relationships as being more supportive and fulfilling than do those who
are more balanced or self-deprecating (Bonanno et al., 2005; Dougall, Hyman,
Hayward, McFeeley, & Baum, 2001). Insofar as perceived support from oth-
ers is a valuable resource in times of stress, these positive beliefs would seem
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to have salutary consequences.

Illusions, Narcissism, and Aggression

The link between illusions and aggression is also of interest. Although

low self-esteem and negative self-views are risk factors for real-world aggres-
sion (Donnellan, Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005), some labo-
ratory studies have found that people with inflated self-views are prone to
aggression when their feelings of self-worth are threatened (Baumeister, Smart,
& Boden, 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). In these studies, self-
enhancement is generally measured with the Narcissistic Personality Inven-
tory, a measure of narcissistic tendencies in the general population (Raskin
& Terry, 1988). Narcissism is a multifaceted construct, characterized not
only by self-aggrandizement but also by an exaggerated sense of entitlement,
a lack of empathy, and a tendency to exploit others for personal gain. To date,
researchers have not firmly established which of these dimensions predicts ag-
gression, although it appears that tendencies toward exploitation and entitle-
ment are more directly linked with aggression than is self-aggrandizement
(Washburn, McMahon, King, Reinecke, & Silver, 2004).

Positive Illusions and Decision Making

Critics of the positive-illusions approach have pointed to situations in

which people make important life decisions, such as deciding whether to
have a medical procedure or where to invest their retirement. People need to
be attentive to the costs and benefits of their choices in situations like these,
and some studies have found that people who exaggerate their belief to bring
about desired outcomes make poorer choices when making decisions under
uncertainty (Fenton-O'Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, & Willman, 2003). Op-
timism has also been linked to gambling and an inability to learn from con-
tingent feedback when risks are unlikely to pan out (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu,
2004). In situations like these, positive illusions appear to be a liability.
Not all evidence supports this conclusion, however. Other studies find
that people who exhibit self-enhancing illusions pay attention to negative

26 MARSHALL AND BROWN

 information when it's likely to be useful and are highly sensitive to the con-
tingencies between their actions and outcomes (Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996;
McFarlin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984). Like the gambler in the Kenny
Rogers song, self-enhancing people seem to "know when to hold 'em, know
when to fold 'em" (Aspinwall, Richter, & Hoffman, 2001). The key variable
seems to be the objective contingency between actions and outcomes. If the
task is uncontrollable (as is true in many artificial laboratory settings), posi-
tive illusions may well prove maladaptive, as people will persist in courses of
action that are destined to fail. If, however, people have some control over
the outcome (as is usually true in the real world), positive illusions will prob-
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ably be beneficial, as people who are efficacious and optimistic will work
hard to bring about a desired outcome (Fournier, de Ridder, & Bensing, 2002).
This flexibility underscores another important point about the nature
of positive illusions. Some researchers view positive illusions as having a trait-
like quality. From this perspective, across situations, some people are self-
enhancing, some are accurate, and some are self-deprecating. Others reject
this claim, arguing that self-enhancement is sensitive to subtle situational
variations and contingencies, showing a great deal of situational specificity
(see Taylor et al., 2003b; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003b,
for a discussion of these positions). One way to resolve these competing posi-
tions is to assume that self-enhancement is a trait that incorporates flexibility
and a keen awareness of when self-enhancement biases are apt to be advanta-
geous and when they are likely to be ineffective (Aspinwall & Staudinger,
2003). Rather than rigidly adhering to one approach or another, people rely
on an armamentarium of self-enhancement devices to offset threatening life
events. Sometimes these devices will entail direct efforts to alter the event
and sometimes they will involve efforts designed to alleviate distress.

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In 1988, Taylor and Brown surveyed the literature on accuracy and self-
knowledge and reached two conclusions: Most people regard themselves in
overly positive terms and, under many circumstances, doing so is a benefit,
not a liability. Support for their first conclusion is overwhelming (Brown,
1986, 1991, 1998). Hundreds of studies have found that people view them-
selves, their ability to bring about desired outcomes, and their future in terms
that are too good to be true. Of course, not everyone exhibits these tenden-
cies and situational factors can attenuate or even eliminate them, but the
tendency is a general one, even in cultures that put a premium on modesty
and humility (Brown, 2003; Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Kurman, 2001;
Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi,
2003).

PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT 27

 Although the evidence relating illusions to well-being is less consis-
tent, we believe the preponderance supports Taylor and Brown's (1988) claim.
Under most situations, people who regard themselves in positive terms be-
lieve they are in control of their lives and look forward to a bright and pros-
perous future fare better than do those who lack these perceptions. To be
sure, excessively positive self-relevant beliefs can be problematic, but this
fact was never in dispute. As noted earlier, Taylor and Brown never claimed
that the more self-aggrandizement, the better.
In this regard, we think it would be fruitful to consider the relation
between illusions and self-esteem. People who think well of themselves gen-
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erally feel good about themselves, which raises the possibility that self-
esteem underlies the effects attributed to positive thinking. Indeed, many
researchers use the term positive self-concept as a synonym for high self-es-
teem, and negative self-concept as a synonym for low self-esteem, and some of
the research that has been conducted to test Taylor and Brown's formulation
has examined self-esteem as a proxy for positive illusions. We think using
self-esteem as a substitute for positive thinking is inadvisable. Although they
are highly correlated, people's thoughts and feelings about themselves are
distinguishable and have different origins and consequences (Bemichon,
Cook, & Brown, 2003; Brown, 1993; Brown & Marshall, 2001, 2006; Dutton
& Brown, 1997).
This distinction may be particularly important when considering the
costs and benefits of positive illusions. Although research in this area is just
beginning, early findings suggest that positive illusions are beneficial when
they are accompanied by high self-esteem but detrimental when they are
accompanied by low self-esteem (Barry, Frick, & Killian, 2003; Nathanson,
Kurt, & Paulhus, 2005; Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004;
Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004)-
We also believe that progress could be made by changing the method-
ological approach that dominates research in this area. Virtually all investi-
gations that have tested Taylor and Brown's formulation have calculated a
predictor variable by combining perception with reality. For example, Colvin,
Block, and Funder (1995) asked participants to evaluate themselves. Later the
participants were evaluated by a group of observers, and a self-enhancement
index was formed by subtracting the observer ratings from the self-ratings.
This discrepancy score was then used as a predictor variable. This approach
assumes that people who view themselves as positively as they are viewed by
others are equivalent to those who view themselves as negatively as they are
viewed by others (i.e., both groups receive a difference score = 0.00). We
doubt that people who know they are well-liked are psychologically equiva-
lent to those who know they are disliked.
The use of difference scores also means that only people who lack tal-
ent, attractiveness, or intelligence can be classified as self-aggrandizing. As-
suming that "being bad" at something has negative consequences, this prop-

28 MARSHALL AND BROWN

 DPessimism DBalance ^Optimism

O)
_c
'3
00

i
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Poor Health Moderate Good Health

Health

Figure 2.2. Hypothetical relationship between optimism, health, and well-being.

erty of difference scores virtually guarantees a negative correlation between

self-enhancement and some criterion.
John and Robins (1994) attempted to avoid these problems by calcu-
lating a residual score rather than a difference score (see also Kwan, John,
Kenny, Bond, & Robins, 2004; Paulhus, 1998). In their research, they first
regressed self-evaluations on peer ratings and then used the residual as a pre-
dictor variable in further analyses. The residual represents the amount of
variance in self-evaluations that cannot be explained by peer evaluations.
This approach avoids the pitfalls of a difference score, but it does not fully
capture the complexity of the relationship between truth, fiction, and well-
being. A residual score is akin to examining a main effect term in a regres-
sion equation that controls for other predictors. As such, it fails to consider
the possible interaction between self-views and reality.
Figure 2.2 illustrates why this issue is important to consider. The figure
shows a hypothetical data pattern regarding the relation between actual
health, optimism, and well-being. A Health X Optimism interaction is present,
such that beliefs don't matter much when health is good, matter a little when
health is moderate, and matter a great deal when health is poor. Obviously,
these data are only hypothetical, and we are only speculating that this pat-
tern best describes the relation among health, perception, and well-being.
The important point, however, is that none of the investigations we reviewed
in this chapter would have detected such an effect, because none included
separate estimates of reality and self-perception.
As we see it, the issue here is not simply a methodological one. At the
heart of the Taylor and Brown model is the claim that positive beliefs, even

PSYCHOLOGICAL BENEFITS OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT 29

 if somewhat illusory, are beneficial to well-being. This claim can properly be
tested only by considering the interaction between self-views and objective
reality. Doing so will yield greater insight into the truth about fiction.

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