Chua vs.

Torres

G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005,

CHRISTINE CHUA, Petitioner

- versus -

JORGE TORRES and ANTONIO BELTRAN, Respondents.

A complaint for damages was lodged before the Regional Trial Court. The complaint was filed by
Christine Chua impleading her brother Jonathan Chua as a necessary co-plaintiff. Named as defendants
in the suit were herein respondents Jorge Torres and Antonio Beltran.

Significantly, while Jonathan Chua was named as a plaintiff to the suit, it was explicitly qualified in the
second paragraph of the complaint that he was being impleaded here-in as a necessary party-plaintiff.
There was no allegation in the complaint of any damage or injury sustained by Jonathan, and the prayer
therein expressly named petitioner as the only party to whom respondents were sought to recompense.
Neither did Jonathan Chua sign any verification or certification against forum-shopping, although
petitioner did sign an attestation, wherein she identified herself as the principal plaintiff.

Upon motion of respondents, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
Jonathan Chua had not executed a certification against forum-shopping stressing Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: whether the absence of the signature in the required verification and certification against forum-
shopping of a party misjoined as a plaintiff is a valid ground for the dismissal of the complaint.

Held:

The SC ruled that it is not so, and that the RTC erred in dismissing the instant complaint. There is no
judicial precedent affirming or rejecting such a view, but we are comfortable with making such a
pronouncement. A misjoined party plaintiff has no business participating in the case as a plaintiff in the
first place, and it would make little sense to require the misjoined party in complying with all the
requirements expected of plaintiffs.
At the same time, Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
proceeded with separately.

Clearly, misjoinder of parties is not fatal to the complaint. The rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the
ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties. Moreover, the dropping of misjoined parties from the
complaint may be done motu proprio by the court, at any stage, without need for a motion to such
effect from the adverse party. Section 11, Rule 3 indicates that the misjoinder of parties, while
erroneous, may be corrected with ease through amendment, without further hindrance to the
prosecution of the suit.

It should then follow that any act or omission committed by a misjoined party plaintiff should not be
cause for impediment to the prosecution of the case, much less for the dismissal of the suit. After all,
such party should not have been included in the first place, and no efficacy should be accorded to
whatever act or omission of the party. Since the misjoined party plaintiff receives no recognition from
the court as either an indispensable or necessary party-plaintiff, it then follows that whatever action or
inaction the misjoined party may take on the verification or certification against forum-shopping is
inconsequential. Hence, it should not have mattered to the RTC that Jonathan Chua had failed to sign
the certification against forum-shopping, since he was misjoined as a plaintiff in the first place. The fact
that Jonathan was misjoined is clear on the face of the complaint itself, and the error of the RTC in
dismissing the complaint is not obviated by the fact that the adverse party failed to raise this point. After
all, the RTC could have motu proprio dropped Jonathan as a plaintiff, for the reasons above-stated which
should have been evident to it upon examination of the complaint.

De Guzman, et al. vs. Chico Case Digest

Angelina De Guzman, et al. vs. Gloria A. Chico

G.R. No. 195445. December 7, 2016

Facts
The subject of this case is a property situated at 7-A 32 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City,
previously registered under the name of petitioners, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 164900.

On May 24, 2006, the property was sold at a public auction of tax delinquent properties conducted by
the City Government of Makati City. Respondent was the winning bidder at the public auction, and the
City Government of Makati executed a Certificate of Sale in her favor on even date. Petitioners failed to
redeem the property within the one-year period. Thus, on July 12, 2007, respondent filed with the RTC
of Makati City an application for new certificate of title (LRC Case No. M-4992). On December 28, 2007,
after hearing, the RTC ordered that the title over the property be consolidated and transferred in the
name of respondent. The Register of Deeds of Makati consequently cancelled TCT No. 164900 and
issued a new order, TCT No. T-224923, in favor of respondent. Afterwards, in the same court,
respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of possession. The motion was, however, denied by the
court for failure to set the motion for hearing.

On January 14, 2009, respondent filed (for the same property), an Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Possession (LRC Case No. M-5188) with the RTC of Makati City. This ex parte petition was raffled
to Branch 59 (court a quo ).

On April 1, 2009, the court a quo issued an Order granting respondent's ex parte petition and ordered
the issuance of a writ of possession in her favor. The writ was subsequently issued on August 7, 2009.
On August 28, 2009, petitioners filed an urgent motion to cite respondent in contempt, and to nullify the
proceedings on the ground that LRC Case No. M-5188 contained a defective/false
verification/certification of non-forum shopping.

On September 11, 2009, respondent filed her comment/opposition. She alleged that petitioner's
objection to the certification against forum shopping was deemed waived for failure to timely object
thereto. She also claimed that forum shopping does not exist.

RTC Ruling

Denied petitioners motion. It ruled that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
filed by respondent in LRC Case No. M-5188, although denominated as a petition, is not an initiatory
pleading, and, thus, does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping.
CA Ruling

The CA ruled that there is no forum shopping. Prior to the filing of the ex parte petition in LRC Case No.
M-5188, RTC Branch 62 has already denied respondent's motion for issuance of a writ of possession in
LRC Case No. M-4992. The CA added that there can be no forum shopping because the issuance of a writ
of possession is a ministerial function and is summary in nature, thus, it cannot be said to be a judgment
on the merits but simply an incident in the transfer of title.

Issues

Whether a certificate against forum shopping is required in a petition or motion for issuance of a writ of
possession.

Whether the issuance of a writ of position is warranted.

SC Rulings

No certificate against forum shopping

is required in a petition or motion for

issuance of a writ of possession.

We affirm the ruling of the CA that a certificate against forum shopping is not a requirement in an ex
parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession is not a complaint or other initiatory pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its
form or the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. A petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession does not aim to initiate new litigation, but rather issues as an incident or
consequence of the original registration or cadastral proceedings. As such, the requirement for a forum
shopping certification is dispelled.

We also cannot subscribe to petitioners' narrow view that only cases covered by foreclosure sales under
Act No. 3135 are excused from the requirement of a certificate against forum shopping.

Based on jurisprudence, a writ of possession may be issued in the following instances: (a) land
registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as The Land Registration Act;
(b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third
person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; ( c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (d) in execution sales.

We note that there is no law or jurisprudence which provides that the petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession depends on the nature of the proceeding in which it is filed. Thus, we find no logical
reason for petitioners' contention that only cases covered by Act No. 3135 are exempt from the
requirement of a certificate against forum shopping. As explained in the previous paragraphs, by its very
nature, a writ of possession is a mere incident in the transfer of title. It is an incident of ownership, and
not a separate judgment. It would thus be absurd to require that a petition for the issuance of this writ
to be accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

The issuance of a writ of possession is

warranted.

Contrary therefore, to petitioners' contentions, the CA did not err in upholding the writ of possession in
this case. In St. Raphael Montessori School, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, an action involving the
application of Act No. 3135, this Court recognized that the writ of possession was warranted not merely
on the basis of the law, but ultimately on the right to possess as an incident of ownership. The right to
possess a property merely follows the right of ownership, and it would be illogical to hold that a person
having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession. Precisely, the basis for the grant
of the writ of possession in this case is respondent's ownership of the property by virtue of a tax
delinquency sale in her favor, and by virtue of her absolute right of ownership arising from the
expiration of the period within which to redeem the property.

More, respondent's ownership over the property is affirmed by the final and executory judgment in LRC
Case No. M-4992. To be clear, a writ of possession is defined as a writ of execution employed to enforce
a judgment to recover the possession of land, commanding the sheriff to enter the land and give its
possession to the person entitled under the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 114103 is hereby AFFIRMED.