SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 172637. April 22, 2015.]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS AND EMILY ROSE KO LIM

CHAO , petitioners, vs. MARY ANN T. CASTRO , respondent.

DECISION

BRION , J : p

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari led by petitioner O ce of the

Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) against respondent Assistant City Prosecutor
Mary Ann T. Castro ( respondent), assailing the decision 1 and resolution 2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated February 13, 2006 and May 2, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 78933.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Sometime in 2001, Mariven Castro (Mariven) purchased on credit a Fuso Canter
vehicle from KD Surplus. Mariven executed a promissory note, and then issued six (6)
post-dated checks to KD Surplus. The checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for
insu ciency of funds when presented for encashment. Mariven inquired from Emily
Rose Ko Lim Chao (Emily), the owner-manager of KD Surplus, if it was still possible to
just return the vehicle in exchange for the issued checks. 3
At around 2:00 p.m. on September 16, 2002, Mariven's wife, Rose l Castro
(Rosefil), accompanied by his (Mariven's) sister, herein respondent, brought the Fuso
Canter to KD Surplus' yard for appraisal and evaluation. Emily inspected the vehicle and
found out that it had a defective engine, as well as a rusty and dilapidated body. Emily
thus refused to accept the vehicle.
Rose l requested the security on duty, Mercedito Guia ( Guia), to register in the
company's security logbook the fact of entry of the motor vehicle in the premises of KD
Surplus. Guia refused to do so as it was already past 5:00 p.m. Upon the prodding of
Rose l, Guia inserted an entry on the upper right portion of the logbook's entry page for
the date September 16, 2002, stating that the vehicle had been "checked-in" on that day.
This entry was signed by Rosefil.
The respondent then left the premises of KD Surplus, but returned there a few
moments later on board a Philippine National Police-Special Weapons and Tactics
(PNP-SWAT) vehicle. The respondent signed on the inserted entry in the logbook as a
witness, and then brought this logbook outside of KD Surplus' premises. The
respondent again left KD Surplus in order to photocopy the logbook. She returned on
board the PNP-SWAT vehicle after 30 minutes, and handed the logbook to the security
guard. The respondent also asked Emily to sign a yellow pad paper containing a list of
the issued checks, and told her to return these checks. When Emily refused, the
respondent threatened to le cases against Emily; the respondent also threatened
Emily's staff with lawsuits if they will not testify in her favor.
On September 26, 2002, Emily led an administrative complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 6713 (the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public O cials
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 and Employees) against the respondent before the O ce of the Ombudsman
(Visayas). The case was docketed as OMB-V-A-0508-1.
The respondent essentially countered that the case Emily led was a harassment
suit. She further maintained that the police arrived at the premises of KD Surplus ahead
of her.
The Ombudsman's Rulings
In its decision 4 dated May 6, 2003, the Ombudsman found the respondent guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposed on her the
penalty of "three (3) months suspension from the service without pay." The
Ombudsman held that the respondent's act of summoning the PNP-SWAT to go with
her to KD Surplus, and riding on their vehicle, overstepped the conventions of good
behavior which every public o cial ought to project so as to preserve the integrity of
public service. It added that the respondent had encouraged a wrong perception that
she was a "dispenser of undue patronage." 5 The Ombudsman reasoned out as follows:
To our mind, the presence of SWAT in the vicinity was totally uncalled for
as there were neither serious nor even a slight indication of an imminent danger
which would justify their presence. Verily, we cannot string along with the
complainant's attempt to justify her aforesaid act as an act of prudence
because it is very clear that her recourse to the military by calling some
members of the SWAT PNP to go with her to complainant's shop was a display
of overbearingness and a show of haughtiness. Certainly, respondent cannot
deny that if she were not Asst. City Prosecutor Mary Ann Castro, it would be
impossible for her to get in a snap of a nger the services of this elite police
team whose assistance she availed not for a legitimate purpose but for her
personal aggrandizement. Her power and in uence as a public o cial had
indeed come into play which she had abused by not using it properly. Hence, we
cannot make any other conclusion except that the presence of the SWAT was
purposely intended to brag of her clout in the military to possibly bring about
fears and apprehension on the part of complainant and the latter's employees. 6
The respondent moved to reconsider this decision, but the Ombudsman denied
her motion in its Order 7 dated July 14, 2003.
Proceedings before the CA
The respondent led a petition for review before the CA challenging the May 6,
2003 decision and July 14, 2003 order of the Ombudsman. In its February 13, 2006
decision, the CA modi ed the Ombudsman's ruling, and found the respondent liable for
simple misconduct only.
The CA held that the Ombudsman's suspension order was not merely
recommendatory. It also ruled that the respondent was not denied due process since
she submitted a counter-a davit where she refuted, among others, Emily's claim that
she went to the premises of KD Surplus on board a PNP-SWAT vehicle. The CA also
held that the respondent was not suspended for her act of calling for police assistance,
but for abusing her position as the Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu City. According to
the CA, the respondent used her o ce's in uence, prestige and ascendancy to use the
PNP-SWAT for a purely personal matter.
The CA thus found the respondent liable for simple misconduct only, and
reduced the penalty of suspension imposed on her to one (1) month and one (1) day. It
held that the respondent's acts were not characterized by the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules.
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 The respondent and the Ombudsman led their respective motions for
reconsideration. In its resolution of May 2, 2006, the CA denied these motions for lack
of merit.
The Present Petition and the Respondent's Comment
In the present petition for review on certiorari, 8 the Ombudsman essentially
argued that the respondent's act of using her o ce's in uence to use the PNP-SWAT
for a purely personal matter constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. It argued that the respondent exhibited irresponsibility and corruption, and
showed her lack of integrity when she took advantage of her position as Assistant City
Prosecutor to summon the assistance of the elite SWAT Team in order to pressure and
harass Emily.
In her Comment, 9 the respondent countered that she had been denied due
process since the act of calling for police assistance was not one of the speci c acts
cited in Emily's complaint as constituting abuse of authority.
OUR RULING
After due consideration, we modify the assailed CA decision and
resolution. We agree with the Ombudsman's ruling that the respondent is
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but modify
the imposed penalty .
No denial of due process
We clarify at the outset that contrary to the respondent's claim, her act of
seeking police assistance and riding on a PNP-SWAT vehicle when she went to the
premises of KD Surplus formed part of Emily's allegations. In Emily's a davit-
complaint, she mentioned that she saw the respondent on board the SWAT vehicle
twice: rst, when the respondent rst arrived at the premises of KD Surplus; and
second, when she returned there after photocopying the company's security logbook.
We emphasize that the respondent refuted these allegations in her counter-
a davit: she admitted that she asked for police assistance while on her way to KD
Surplus, but maintained that she was on board a Revo car owned by one Jojo Obera.
According to the respondent, she sought police assistance because of a possibility
that a trouble might ensue between the parties. The respondent also stated that the
police arrived at KD Surplus ahead of her.
To us, the respondent would have found no need to state that: (1) she was on
board a Revo vehicle when she went to KD Surplus; (2) point out that the police arrived
ahead of her; and (3) explain why she sought the help of the police, if Emily did not
allege that she (respondent) was on board a SWAT vehicle when she went to KD
Surplus on two occasions.
Due process is satis ed when a person is noti ed of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the
ling of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. Due
process is simply the opportunity given to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of . 1 0
As earlier stated, the respondent refuted Emily's allegations in her counter-
a davit. The respondent cannot now feign ignorance of the fact that her act of calling
for police assistance vis-à-vis riding on board the SWAT vehicle, was not among those
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 included in the charge against her. In addition, the security guard on duty, Guia, stated in
his a davit 1 1 (which was attached to Emily's a davit-complaint) that the respondent
"arrived riding in a SWAT PNP vehicle with Body No. 240, . . . she signed the logbook as
a witness on the inserted entry." 1 2 Since these allegations formed part of Emily's
a davit-complaint, the Ombudsman has the power to determine the respondent's
administrative liability based on the actual facts recited in this affidavit complaint.
The Court's ruling in Avenido v. CSC 1 3 is particularly instructive:
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be
drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is
su cient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what
is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of
the offense.
We reiterate that the mere opportunity to be heard is su cient. As long as the
respondent was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with; what the law abhors is an
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 1 4
Notably, when the case was called for a preliminary conference, the respondent
opted to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record.
The respondent's liability
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a nding of
guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 1 5 The standard of substantial evidence is
satis ed when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for
the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
even preponderant. 1 6
In the present case, the respondent's acts of seeking out the assistance of the
SWAT and riding on their vehicle on two occasions en route to KD Surplus are factual
matters that the Ombudsman and the CA have passed upon. It is settled that factual
ndings of the O ce of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are a rmed
by the CA. Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in petitions led under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court; the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to
review evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof. 1 7 The task of this
Court in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is limited to the review of errors of
law that the CA might have committed. The issue that remains to be resolved, therefore,
is whether the CA correctly found the respondent liable for simple misconduct.
To our mind, the respondent's acts of involving an elite police team like the SWAT
in a matter purely personal to her and riding on their vehicle in going to and from the
premises of KD Surplus are uncalled for: these were a haughty and an excessive display
of the in uence that she could wield, ultimately aimed at helping Mariven and Rose l to
compel Emily to accept the "depreciated" vehicle, and to return the bum checks issued
by Mariven. These send the wrong impression that public o cials could use and exploit
the police force for their personal interests.
While it may be true that the respondent merely wanted to ensure the safety of
the parties in the event that an untoward incident may happen between Emily and
Rose l, the calling of the SWAT was clearly an overkill; there was also no justi cation
for her to ride in a SWAT vehicle. By calling out the SWAT to the premises of KD Surplus
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 and by riding on their vehicle, she clearly wanted to project an image of power and
in uence meant to intimidate, bully, and/or browbeat Emily. How the respondent
managed to convince an elite police force like the SWAT to accompany her, and to
allow her to use their vehicle in a matter purely personal to her, does not favorably
reflect on her as well as on the police.
However, we do not agree with the CA that the respondent is guilty of simple
misconduct.
Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and de nite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public o cer." 1 8 In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or agrant disregard of established rules, must be
manifest and established by substantial evidence. Grave misconduct necessarily
includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct. Thus, a person charged with grave
misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not
involve any of the elements to qualify the misconduct as grave. 1 9
We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct
should relate to or be connected with the performance of the o cial
functions and duties of a public o cer . 2 0 The respondent in the present case
summoned the SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid her brother and sister-in-
law. There was no link between the respondent's acts and her o cial functions as a city
prosecutor. In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr., 2 1 the Court explained that:
. . . Misconduct in o ce has been authoritatively de ned by Justice
Tuazon in Lacson v. Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in o ce has a de nite
and well-understood legal meaning. By uniform legal de nition, it is a
misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an o cer and not
such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from
the character of the o cer . . . It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or
malfeasance warranting removal from o ce of an o cer must have direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of o cial duties amounting
either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge
the duties of the office . . . ."
The respondent's actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, an administrative offense which need not be related to the
respondent's o cial functions. 2 2 In Pia v. Gervacio , 2 3 we explained that acts may
constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they tarnish
the image and integrity of his/her public o ce. Additionally and contrary to the CA's
ruling, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service may or may not be
characterized by corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules. 2 4
In Manhit v. O ce of the Ombudsman (Fact Finding & Intelligence Bureau) , 2 5 the
Court had the occasion to de ne "gross" and "prejudicial" in connection with the offense
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as follows:
The word "gross" connotes "something out of measure; beyond
allowance; not to be excused; agrant; shameful" while "prejudicial" means
"detrimental or derogatory to a party; naturally, probably or actually bringing
about a wrong result." 2 6
In Mariano v. Roxas , 27 the Court ruled that the offense committed by a CA
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 employee in forging some receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations, was not
misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because her acts
had no direct relation to or connection with the performance of her o cial duties." We
similarly ruled in Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian Reform 2 8 that the offense
committed by the employee in selling fake Uni ed Vehicular Volume Program
exemption cards to his o cemates during o ce hours was not grave misconduct, but
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Notably, the Court has also considered the following acts or omissions, among
others, as constituting conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service:
misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of o ce, failure to report back to work
without prior notice, failure to safekeep public records and property, making false
entries in public documents and falsification of court orders. 2 9
In these lights, we hold that the Ombudsman correctly ruled that the
respondent's acts of seeking the assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board a
SWAT vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and not
misconduct, since there is no nexus between these acts and her o cial functions. As
long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his/her public
o ce, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public o cer or
employee. 3 0
With regard to the other acts alleged by Emily in her a davit-complaint, the
Ombudsman and the CA already ruled that the respondent is not administratively liable
for her acts of taking the company logbook outside of the premises of KD Surplus; and
for handing a yellow paper containing a list of the checks issued by Mariven to Emily for
the latter's signature. We see no reason to overturn their ndings and conclusions in the
absence of any showing that these had been arrived at arbitrarily.
We additionally note that Guia, stated in his a davit that the respondent
"borrowed the security logbook for the purpose of securing a photocopy" and later
returned it to him. We thus nd unpersuasive Emily's claim that the respondent took the
security logbook outside of the company's premises without permission.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classi ed as a grave
offense with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense.
Since this is the rst time that the respondent had committed these acts, we deem it
proper to impose on her the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, we MODIFY the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated February 13, 2006 and May 2, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 78933. Respondent Mary Ann T. Castro is declared guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and is suspended from service for six (6) months and
one (1) day.
SO ORDERED .
Carpio, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 34-44; penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
2. Id. at 46-48.

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 3. Emily claimed that the arrangements of the return of the vehicle and the refund of the
purchase price had not yet been finalized. The respondent, on the other hand,
maintained that Emily already agreed to replace the Fuso Canter with another vehicle.
4. Rollo, pp. 55-61.
5. Id. at 58.
6. Id. at 57-58.

7. Id. at 59-61.
8. Id. at 7-28.
9. Id. at 95-118.
10. See Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196231, September
4, 2012, 679 SCRA 614, 659.
11. Rollo, p. 125.
12. Id.

13. 576 Phil. 654, 661 (2008), citing Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 106498,
June 28, 1993, 223 SCRA 747, 754.

14. Supra note 10.

15. See Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218, May
31, 2011, 649 SCRA 667, 680.
16. See Nacu v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA
766, 776.

17. See Pia v. Gervacio, Jr., G.R. No. 172334, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 220, 230.
18. See Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, 508 Phil. 569, 579 (2005), citing Bureau of
Internal Revenue v. Organo, G.R. No. 149549, February 26, 2004, 424 SCRA 9; and
Castelo v. Florendo, A.M. No. P-96-1179, October 10, 2003, 413 SCRA 219.
19. Office of the Ombudsman v. Miedes, Sr., 570 Phil. 464, 473 (2008).
20. See Pat-og, Sr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 567,
585.
21. 367 Phil. 162, 166 (1999), citations omitted.
22. See Michaelina Ramos Balasbas v. Patricia B. Monayao, G.R. No. 190524, February 17,
2014.
23. Supra note 17, at 231, citing Avenido v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 177666, April
30, 2008, 553 SCRA 711.
24. See Espiña v. Cerujano, et al., 573 Phil. 254, 263 (2008).
25. 559 Phil. 251 (2007).
26. Id. at 262-263.
27. 434 Phil. 742, 751 (2002).

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 28. 515 Phil. 421 (2006).
29. Supra note 15.

30. Id.

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