RULE 111

Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may
be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered
as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended
party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)

Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action.
Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the
court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced
in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action
without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled. (n)

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)

Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In the cases provided for
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. (3a)

Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after arraignment
and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising
from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this
Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of
obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused
after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the
deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to
any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)

Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment rendered in a civil
action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against
the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action. (4a)

Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of

the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action
may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests. (6a)

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of a prejudicial question

are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (5a)

SUPREMETRANSPORTATION LINES VS RUZ

ACTS: Ernesto Belchez was driving Mabel Tours Bus owned by Antonio San Andres.
Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was overtaking, hit head-on the Supreme
Bus owned and registered in the name of Supreme Bus Transportation Liner, Inc., and
driven by Felix G. Ruz. On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the
Court was instituted by Antonio San Andres, owner of Mabel Tours Bus against
Supreme Transportation Liner alleging actual damage to Mabel Tours Bus and
unrealized profits for the non-use of the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent
repairs in the amount of P144,500.00 and P150,000.00, respectively. Claims for
attorney's fees of P30,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00, litigation expenses of
P20,000.00 and cost of the suit were also lodged in the complaint. Subsequently,
Supreme Bus Transportation Liner filed their answer with Counterclaim. They alleged
among others that complainant, San Andres has no cause of action against them. The
proximate cause of the vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the driver,
Ernesto Belchez, who operated the Mabel Tours Bus recklessly and in violation of traffic
laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle without regard to
the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite direction resulting
to head on collision on the lane of the Supreme Bus and, at the time of the accident,
operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside his franchise and without a registered plate. In
the decision ordered by the RTC, the complaint for damages filed by the Antonio San
Andres was dismissed for having failed to prove liability on the part of the defendant.
The counterclaim that was filed by the Supreme Transportation Liner was also
dismissed for failure to adhere to procedural requirements. RTC indicated that the
petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action disallowed their
right to recover damages from the respondent through their counterclaim. Supreme
Transportation Liner brought the counterclaim to the Court of Appeals and in the
assailed decision promulgated thereon, the CA dismissed the petitioners' appeal, stating
that the RTC had correctly ruled.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER’S COUNTERCLIAM WAS

CORRECTLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT DUE TO FAILURE TO RESERVE THE
RIGHT TO INSTITUTE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION.

RULING: NO. THE PETITIONER’S COUNTERCLAIM WAS NOT CORRECTLY

DENIED. The petitioners' counterclaim should be ALLOWED and SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED despite their failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil
action. The RTC erred on its outcome because its conclusion was founded on the
obsolete version of the Rules of Court. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the
civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless such civil action was expressly waived or reserved. The offended party
was authorized to bring an independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code provided such right was reserved. By the time
when the RTC rendered judgment on November 24, 2008, the revised relevant rule of
procedure had already been promulgated and taken effect, and it had specifically
deleted the reservation requirement vis-a-vis the independent civil actions. The
requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply to the
independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Either of
these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission or under both causes. Therefore, the petitioner’s counterclaim of
acquiring civil actions should have been accepted and granted.

SANTOS VS PIZZARO

The following facts are matters of record.

In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in
connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by
Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van’s driver and
three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical
injuries to five (5) of the van’s passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation
to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998. 2

On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron
Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action. 3 They cited
therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.

Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of
summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It
also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate
personality of Viron Transit from its officers.4

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to
file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality
of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no appeal of the decision convicting
Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed
within the prescriptive period.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action
had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it
construed petitioners’ cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of
the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to
file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.5

Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of the
complaint as summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal
department without mentioning her designation or position.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the complaint is
not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case
which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment. 6 The trial court denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration reiterating that petitioners’ cause of action was
based on quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because
the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident. 7 As
regards the improper service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the
complaint ought to be dismissed on this ground.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the
same for error in the choice or mode of appeal. 8 The appellate court also denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if the respondent trial court
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, certiorari is
still not the permissible remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they failed to
allege that the petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance
of certiorari in lieu of appeal.9
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot
be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing obligation arising
from the criminal liability of private respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought
to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The
trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause
of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action
had prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents,
the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.

Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally flawed, petitioners
implore the Court to exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules as they
allegedly have a legitimate grievance to vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and
physical injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil liability had been
adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.

In their Comment10 dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They point out that the
averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict under Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4) years
should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.

Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan
was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transit’s contention
that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the case was instituted in
the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made.

Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of

Appeals via certiorari was improper as petitioners should have appealed the adverse
order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other procedural lapses
allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification against forum-shopping;
lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed order of the trial court; and
non-indication of the full names and addresses of petitioners in the petition.

Petitioners filed a Reply11 dated September 14, 2002, while private respondents filed
a Rejoinder12 dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.

We grant the petition.

Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable.13 Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage
caused and indemnification of consequential damages.14 When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, subject to three notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly
waives the right to recover damages from the accused; second, when the offended
party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in
order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when
the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the
offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.

Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which
governed the institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to
file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—When a criminal action is instituted,

the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award
for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint
or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
filing thereof in court for trial.

Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a
result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal
circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as
to the latter’s civil liability.

Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a
separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages
against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the
institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private respondents’ civil liability arising
from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint,
the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners’ cause of action was based
on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4) years from the time the
cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.

A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with
petitioners’ claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime.
Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit,
such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based
on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the
offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil
Code.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not
arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. 15 Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-
quoted.

At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action  ex
quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining
avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex
delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not
operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as
the latter action had been expressly reserved.

The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company16 was decided upon a similar set of
facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff made an express reservation
for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted which conviction was
affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based
on quasi delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the
action was instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had
already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time based on
the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed the action holding
that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to
enforce the bus company’s subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the
enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a
felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of
the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees. This is so because
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of
a final judgment convicting the employee.

Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground
of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be
prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners’ allegations in their complaint,
opposition to the motion to dismiss17 and motion for reconsideration18 of the order of
dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.

This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of
multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the
offender.19 However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict  should be
considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against
private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages  ex
delicto.  This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for
obvious reasons.

Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of
dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be exempted from the strict
application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of securing
substantial justice.20 We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they
are entitled by law and by a final judgment of conviction based solely on a technicality. It
is our duty to prevent such an injustice.21

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the

Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively
dismissing the present action and denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, as
well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the
case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CASUPANAN VS LAROYA

Facts: 
Two vehicles, one driven by Laroya and the other owned by Capitulo and driven by
Casupanan, figured in an accident. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage toproperty. On the other hand, Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was
filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a
motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the
pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and dismiss the civil
case. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration. They insisted that the
civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
case. The MR was denied. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the RTC.

The RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. It
further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
Finally, it declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil
case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion. 

Issues:

1. Was the petition for certiorari a proper remedy?

2. Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly
file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal case. Was there a forum-shopping?

Held:

1. Yes. The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not
state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice. Absent a
declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice.
Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.

Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule
65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground
that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
2. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment. Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought. However, there is no
forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the
filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action
for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose
from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case
is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil
case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance
of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another.
Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these
articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a
criminal case may invoke these articles.

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may
be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim
in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.

Conclusion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may
be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement
of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action
under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule
111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or
filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The
first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed
instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each
other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the
civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer
or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission
he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section
1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be
litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is
prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted
in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to
run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is
independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case,
is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo
is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of
forum-shopping is erroneous.  (Casupanan vs. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26,
2002)

RIMANDO VS PEOPLE

FACTS:
The petitioner Rimando is charged with the crime of estafa through the use of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations. Petitioner was also charged with
violation of BP 22 which she was acquitted in the ground of reasonable doubt. The RTC
likewise acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa but found her civilly liable to Spouses
Aldaba.
Facts reveal that Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under the
assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest.
Convinced by Rimando’s proposal and taking into consideration their long friendship,
Sps. Aldaba gave Rimando a check in the amount of 500,000.00 as an investment in
her business.
In turn, Rimando gave Sps. Aldaba three (3) postdated checks, one for 500,000.00 and
the other two (2) for 40,000.00 each, and made them sign an investment contract with
Multitel International Holding Corporation. Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba
attempted to encash the same but were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient
funds.

In her defense, Rimando denied friendship with the spouses and that she enticed them
to invest in her own business, as she had none. She contends that her acquittal and
exoneration from the civil liability in the BP 22 cases should have barred spouses
Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in the estafa case.

ISSUE:
Is the civil liability of Rimando in the estafa case extinguished by virtue of her acquittal
and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases?

HELD:
NO, Rimando’s exoneration of the civil liability in the BP 22 case does not extinguish
her criminal liability in the estafa case.  The acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the
crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on
Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was
correctly traced from being an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to
Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as
a surety to the latter, and as such, she may be held directly liable for the value of the
issued check.

Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no effect in

the estafa case, even if both cases were founded on the same factual circumstances.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set
of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered “separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Therefore, both cases
can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects –
subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case
concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing
whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.

Hence, Rimando is still civilly liable in the estafa case despite her exoneration of her
civil liability in the BP 22 case.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION VS JANIOLA

FACTS:

This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal
proceeding filed by the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of
prejudicial question with respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent.

The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-
President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.

Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22

against private respondent with the MTC, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S.
Janiola. On September 20, 2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner
for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as
for damages.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for
the ground that private respondent claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial
question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the Respondent’s Motion to
Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical question for the following grounds:

(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon
which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue
of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and

(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a
prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this
element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner

appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in
Criminal Case on the basis of “Prejudicial Question “, with respect to the Civil Case
belatedly filed.

HELD:

This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question.

The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can
be rendered in the criminal action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action.

In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in
Civil Case filed by the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. The
Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal
Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement
between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the
prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that
private respondent issued checks that were subsequently dishonored for insufficient
funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it is clear that
the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is absent. Thus,
no prejudicial question exists.

MANLICLIC VS CALAUNAN

Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI
and driven by petitioner Mauricio
Manliclic collided with the owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by
respondent Modesto Calaunan and
driven by Marcelo Mendoza. The accident happened at around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock
in the morning of 12 July 1988 at
approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan,
Plaridel, Bulacan. The front right side of
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to
the shoulder on the right and then
fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the
left and stopped 7 to 8 meters
from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
treatment to the Manila Central
University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred
to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
A criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December
1991, respondent filed a complaint
for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City.
The criminal case was tried ahead of
the civil case. When the civil case was heard counsel for respondent prayed that the
transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case
in as much as these witnesses are
not available to testify in the civil case.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan
and against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI. The trial court ordered the herein petitioners to pay the respondents
jointly and solidarily the amount of
P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials
used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and anotherP100,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P15,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the petitioners are also to pay
costs. Petitioners appealed the
decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible
error in the decision of the trial court,
affirmed it in all respects. On the other hand, petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the
Court of Appeals of the charge of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising
from, or based on, quasi-delict.
Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the
collision, while petitioner PRBLI was
sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly
petitioner Manliclic. Petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but
on the ground that he is not the
author of the act complained of
 FACTS

Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI
and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic collided with the owner-type jeep with plate
number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza. The accident happened at around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12
July 1988 at approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay
Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear
left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall
on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left
and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision. Respondent suffered minor injuries
while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to the Manila Central
University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. A
criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City. The criminal
case was tried ahead of the civil case. When the civil case was heard counsel for
respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies
in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case. On 22 July 1996, the trial court
rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI. The trial court ordered the herein petitioners to pay the respondents jointly
and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the
repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as
moral damages and anotherP100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the petitioners are
also to pay costs. Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no
reversible error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects. On the other
hand, petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. From the
complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or
based on, quasi-delict. Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless
imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly petitioner Manliclic. Petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable
doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of.

ISSUE/S

Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding
the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his
part?

RATIO:

Yes. Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: (b) Extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a

declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The
afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and
not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111],
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. A quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all
its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. In other words, if an
accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising
from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an
accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on
the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak
of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if
any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of. As regards civil
liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana. RULING WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No.
55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages
shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be
lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners. )

SPOUSES JOSE VS SPOUSES SUAREZ

Facts: 

Jose offered to lend money to Spouses Suarez at 1% to 2% interest daily. Spouses

Suarez accepted the offer. Later, the interest rate was increased to 5% per day.
Spouses Suarez would then issue checks in favor of Jose in payment of the amount
borrowed from them with the agreed 5% daily interest.

In 2004, Sps. Suarez filed a Complaint against Jose seeking to nullify the 5% interest
per day, alleging that same is iniquitous, contrary to morals, done under vitiated consent
and imposed using undue influence by taking improper advantage of their financial
distress.

Jose, on the other hand, filed several cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Sps.
Suarez.

Sps. Suarez filed motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of
prejudicial question. They claimed that if the 5% interest per month is nullified and loans
are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks subject of the B.P. Blg.
22 cases are not only fully paid but are also in fact overpaid.

The motion to suspend was denied. Hence, Sps. Suarez filed before the RTC a “Motion
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Temporary Restraining Order” seeking to restrain
the MTCCs from further proceeding with the B.P. Blg. 22 cases on the ground of
prejudicial question. The RTC granted the motion. CA affirmed. Hence, petitioners
appealed.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a prejudicial question exists such that the outcome of the validity of
the interest rate is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent spouses in
the criminal case.
2. Whether or not respondent spouses are guilty of forum shopping.

Held:

1. No. There is none.

A prejudicial question has two essential elements:  (i) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of
respondents in the criminal cases. The cause or reason for the issuance of a check is
inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P. Blg. 22. What the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, which is a malum prohibitum, and not the
purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.

Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void
for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases
because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. The
primordial question is whether the law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check
has been issued.

2. Yes. There is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in
one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings
in other tribunals. Forum shopping is the act of one party against another, when an
adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly
favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or by special civil action of
certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.

Respondents filed their motions to suspend proceedings in the MTCCs hearing the B.P.
Blg. 22 cases but unfortunately, the same were denied. Failing to get the relief they
wanted, respondents sought before the RTC, the suspension of the criminal
proceedings which was granted. Respondents tried to extricate themselves from the
charge of forum shopping by explaining that after the denial of their motions to suspend,
their only remedy was the application for preliminary injunction in the civil case—a relief
which they had already asked for in their complaint and which was also initially not
granted to them. Any which way the situation is viewed, respondents’ acts constituted
forum shopping since they sought a possibly favorable opinion  from one court after
another had issued an order unfavorable to them. (Sps. Carolina and Reynaldo Jose vs.
Sps. Laureano and Purita Suarez, G.R. No.  176795, June 30, 2008)

MARBELLA-BOBIS VS BOBIS
Facts: 

On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce. Without said marriage having been annulled, Isagani contracted a second
marriage with petitioner Imelda on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with
a certain Julia. An information for bigamy was filed against Isagani based on Imelda's
complaint. Sometime thereafter, Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license. Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend
the criminal case.

Issue: 

Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy?

Held:

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon
which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the
defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in
the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action
may proceed. Its two essential elements are:

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. 

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. 
Isagani, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. He was for
all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of
a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of
the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. 

Respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has
to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite -
usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is
void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held
in Landicho v. Relova:

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity
of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. (Bobis vs Bobis Digest, G.R. No.
138509, July 31, 2000)