Jonny McIntosh - Knowledge & Reality

5/13/2021 Jonny McIntosh - Knowledge & Reality
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READING LISTS Below are readings and essay questions for tutorials in Knowledge & Reality. Many of the readings
are available online, and all are easily obtained from the college or other libraries in Oxford, but if
Early Modern Philosophy you are struggling to get hold of anything, email me, as I have PDF copies of nearly everything.
Knowledge and Reality
Ethics I have (generally) divided the reading for each topic into CORE READING and FURTHER
Mind READING, with more introductory texts marked with a star (*). Focus on the Core Reading
Logic and Language suggestions in writing tutorial essays, and use the Further Reading suggestions as starting points
Mathematics for exploring topics in more depth during vacations. You will find more suggestions in the Faculty
Cognitive Science Reading List.
Philosophical Logic
The default plan is to cover the TUTORIAL TOPICS, with four weeks on topics in epistemology
LECTURES and three weeks on topics in metaphysics. I’ve left the last week open, so as to allow you to choose
a topic yourself. Options include, but are not limited to, the OTHER TOPICS. (These are divided
Frege and Tarski, HT 2018 into topics in Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Self-Study, the latter being those you will most
Philosophy of Logic, HT 2017 likely have looked at in first year for General Philosophy, and so might feel comfortable exploring
General Philosophy, HT 2016 on your own.)
The current version of this reading list was put together in light of my experience using previous
incarnations in teaching Knowledge & Reality to undergraduates in Oxford over the years. I’m
grateful to various friends and colleagues for advice and discussion of it, especially Alex
Kaiserman, Brent Madison, and Nick Tasker. If you’re teaching a similar course, and want to
make use of the list at all, as occasional emails suggest people sometimes do, please feel free.
TUTORIAL TOPICS
1. Agrippa’s Trilemma
2. Contextualism
3. Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits I
4. Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits II
5. Modality
6. Time
7. Persistence
8. TBA
OTHER TOPICS
Epistemology:
The A Priori
Testimony
Disagreement
Epistemic Injustice
Other Minds
Metaphysics:
Causation
Properties
Race
Objects
Dispositions
Time Travel
Meta-Ontology
Self-Study:
jonnymcintosh.com/syllabuses/102/ 1/23
The Analysis of Knowledge
Epistemic Closure
Internalism & Externalism
Scepticism
Induction
Perception
Personal Identity
ANTHOLOGIES, COLLECTIONS, and TEXTBOOKS
There are no set textbooks but it will be useful to do some reading over the vacation beforehand.
The following are all recommended:
*Alvin I. Goldman and Matthew McGrath (2015) Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction

(OUP).
*E. J. Lowe (2002) A Survey of Metaphysics (OUP).
*Duncan Pritchard (2016) Epistemology, 2nd ed. (OUP).
*Alyssa Ney (2014) Metaphysics: An Introduction (Routledge).
While most of the readings can be obtained online, it’s often useful to have good anthologies and
collections of papers in epistemology and metaphysics, so as to be able to read around a bit more
widely. The following are all recommended, containing many key readings and more besides.
Jaegwon Kim, Daniel Korman, and Ernest Sosa, eds. (2009) Metaphysics: An Anthology, 2nd ed.
(Blackwell). Referred to below as KK&S.
Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (OUP).
Referred to below as L&Z.
Ted Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds. (2008) Contemporary Debates in
Metaphysics (Wiley Blackwell). Referred to below as SH&Z.
Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, and Matthew McGrath, eds. (2008) Epistemology: An
Anthology, 2nd ed. (Blackwell). Referred to below as SKF&M.
Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, eds. (2014) Contemporary Debates in
Epistemology, 2nd edition (Wiley Blackwell). Referred to below as ST&S.
TUTORIAL TOPICS
EPISTEMOLOGY
1. AGRIPPA’S TRILEMMA
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What is Agrippa’s trilemma, or the regress problem? Which responses to it, if any, are defensible?
CORE READING
*Michael Huemer (2010) ‘Foundations and Coherence’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and
Matthias Steup, eds. A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd edition (Blackwell), pp. 22-33.
Laurence Bonjour (1978) ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?’ in American

Philosophical Quarterly 15(1), pp. 1–13. Reprinted in SKF&M.
Ernest Sosa (1980) ‘The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of
Knowledge’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5(1), pp. 3–26. Reprinted in SKF&M.
Peter Klein (1999) ‘Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons’ in Philosophical
Perspectives 13, pp. 297-325. Reprinted in SKF&M.
FURTHER READING
In exploring this topic in more depth, start with the relevant debates in ST&S, which could easily
have served as CORE READING. James Pryor’s contribution is particularly important: his
dogmatism is, alongside Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism, one of the main
foundationalist developments of recent years. You can look at the issues surrounding it in more
detail if you do the SCEPTICISM topic. Greco and Sosa, eds. (1999) contains a couple of useful
discussions: Williams’s ‘Skepticism’, defending a non-standard position that he calls
contextualism—but be warned: this is a different view to the one we look at in doing the
CONTEXTUALISM topic—and Bonjour’s ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’,
which sets out the sorts of considerations that led him to abandon the coherentism of his (1985)
for a form of foundationalism. For an important problem facing both internalist and externalist
forms of foundationalism—the problem of easy knowledge—see Cohen (2002). For more on
infinitism, see the papers in Turri and Klein, eds. (2014). Other good introductions include the
two Stanford Encyclopedia entries, Hasan and Fumerton (2000/16) and Olsson (2003/17), and
Fumerton (2018).
Laurence Bonjour (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Harvard UP), Part Two.
Stewart Cohen (2002) ‘Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge’ Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 65(2), pp. 309–29.
Richard Fumerton (2018) ‘Regress Arguments and Skepticism’ in Diego Machuca and Baron
Reed, eds. Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present (Bloomsbury).
John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds. (1999) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell).
Ali Hasan and Richard Fumerton (2000/16) ‘Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification’
in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/
Erik Olsson (2003/17) ‘Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification’ in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/
John Turri and Peter D Klein, eds. (2014) Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological
Infinitism (OUP).
PAST PAPER QUESTIONS
‘A belief is justified only if it is justified by a mental state with propositional content. The only
mental states with propositional content are beliefs. Therefore, immediate justification is
impossible.’ Discuss. (2018)
Can one provide a foundationalist justification for foundationalism itself? (2017)
Should one try to ensure one’s beliefs rest on certain foundations? (2016)
‘One is justified in holding a belief B only if one has some reason to think it likely to be true. A
reason to think B likely to be true cannot be anything other than some other belief or beliefs that
indicate the truth of B. So there is no viable foundationalism that does not collapse into a form of
coherentism.’ Discuss. (2015)
2. CONTEXTUALISM
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What is epistemic contextualism? How does it differ from subject-sensitive invariantism, i.e. what
Feldman calls subject contextualism? Is it correct? Does it offer a satisfactory response to
scepticism?
CORE READING
*Richard Feldman (2010) ‘Contextualism’ in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup,
eds. A Companion to Epistemology, 2nd edition (Blackwell), pp. 12-22.
*Keith DeRose (1999) ‘Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense’ in John Greco and Ernest
Sosa, eds. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell), pp. 187-205.
Ernest Sosa (2000) ‘Skepticism and Contextualism’ in Philosophical Issues 10, pp. 1–18.
John Hawthorne (2004) Knowledge and Lotteries (OUP), Ch. 4. Reprinted as ‘Sensitive Moderate
Invariantism’ in SKF&M.
FURTHER READING
In working further on this topic, start by getting a good sense of what epistemic contextualism is.
The best way to do this is to think about alternative views, including classical invariantism and
subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI). Classical invariantism is defended in Brown (2006). SSI is
defended by Hawthorne in the Core Reading. Think also about different ways in which
contextualism can be developed. Lewis (1996) is important here. DeRose fleshes out his case for
contextualism and replies to objections in his (2009). McKenna (2015) is a useful survey of recent
work. The debate between contextualists and SSIs raises questions about the role of pragmatic
factors, such as practical interests, in knowledge. Fantl and McGrath (2009) is a great discussion
of this, and one of the best books in epistemology of the last wee while. Kim (2017) a survey of the
recent debate. ST&S is also useful here, containing accessible debates between Fantl and
McGrath and Baron Reed over whether pragmatic factors affect knowledge, as well as Conee and
Cohen over contextualism itself. The latter includes, among other things, discussion of whether
contextualism provides a satisfactory response to the sceptic. See also DeRose (2017), developing
his contextualist treatment of sceptical and lottery puzzles.
Jessica Brown (2006) 'Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres' in Philosophical

Studies 130(3), pp. 407-435.
Keith DeRose (2009) The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume
1 (OUP).
— (2017) The Appearance of Ignorance: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2 (OUP).
Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath (2009) Knowledge in an Uncertain World (OUP), Ch. 2.
Brian Kim (2017) 'Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology' in Philosophy Compass 12(5), pp.
1–14.
David Lewis (1996) 'Elusive Knowledge' in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(4), pp. 549–
567. Reprinted in SKF&M.
Robin McKenna (2015) 'Recent Work: Contextualism in Epistemology' in Analysis 75(3), pp.
489–503.
Might whether S knows that p depend on the moral considerations against S’s believing that p?
(2019)
EITHER
(a) Is epistemology a pastime which destroys its own subject matter?
OR
(b) In what sense, if any, does knowledge depend on practical interests? (2018)
Does the context-sensitivity of the word ‘know’ tell us anything about knowledge itself? (2017)
Is there any reason to think that ‘knows’ is context sensitive? What significance would it have for
epistemology if this were so? (2016)
3. WILLIAMSON I
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What is the connection between Williamson’s claim that knowledge is a mental state and his claim
that knowledge is unanalysable? Are these claims defensible?
CORE READING
Timothy Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits (OUP), Introduction and Ch. 1 and 2.
The following aren’t mandatory, and you should prioritise reading Knowledge and its Limits
itself, but they’ll help you get a sense of what’s innovative and controversial about Williamson’s
approach:
Gilbert Harman (2002) ‘Reflections on Knowledge and Its Limits’ in The Philosophical Review
111(3), pp. 417–28.
Frank Jackson (2002) ‘Critical Notice of Knowledge and Its Limits by Timothy Williamson’ in
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80(4), pp. 516–21.
E. J. Lowe (2002) ‘Critical Notice: Is Knowing a State of Mind?’ in International Journal of
Philosophical Studies 10(4), pp. 483–503.
FURTHER READING
Our topic for this week and next is Tim Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology, set out in his
Knowledge and its Limits. This is the most influential book of the past 40 or so years in
epistemology, and arguably in analytic philosophy more generally, so it is well worth studying in
depth. (I’ve assumed you’re familiar from first year work in General Philosophy with the Gettier
problem and various responses to it. If you’re not familiar with these, let me know before the start
of term so that I can suggest a slightly different set of topics in epistemology.) In thinking about
the main themes, you’d do well to look at some of the critical responses in Greenough and
Pritchard, eds. (2009), together with Williamson’s replies. Particularly recommended are the
pieces by Quassim Cassam and Elizabeth Fricker. See also the debate between Williamson and
Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew in ST&S, Nagel (2013), Hyman (2014), and the papers in the
Carter, Gordon, and Jarvis, eds. (2017)—especially the editors’ Introduction, and the papers by
Smith and by Ichikawa and Jenkins. But perhaps the main thing to look at is Ch. 3 of Knowledge
and its Limits, which, as Williamson says, deepens the critique of internalism. It’s usefully read in
combination with Yablo (2003). McGlynn (2014) is a nice monograph on the topic, and will be
usefully read in connection with whatever you choose to focus on next week too.
J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis, eds. (2017) Knowledge First:
Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (OUP).
Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, eds. (2009) Williamson on Knowledge (OUP).
John Hyman (2014) '“The most general factive stative attitude”' in Analysis 74(4), pp. 561–565.
Aidan McGlynn (2014) Knowledge First? (Palgrave Macmillan).
Jennifer Nagel (2013) ‘Knowledge as a Mental State’ in Tamara Szabó Gendler and John
Hawthorne, eds. Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol. 4 (OUP).
Stephen Yablo (2003) ‘Causal Relevance’ in Philosophical Issues 13, pp. 316–328.
Are there unanalysable factive mental states? (2017)
EITHER
(a) How important is the concept of luck in epistemology?
OR
(b) Is knowledge prior to belief? (2016)
EITHER
(a) What, if anything, is wrong with the view that knowledge is rationally held reliably true belief?
OR
(b) Is knowledge the most general factive mental state? (2015)
‘It’s too easy to come up with counterexamples to putative analyses of knowledge in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions, so we should abandon the attempt to construct such
analyses.’ Is this a compelling argument? And should we give up the project of analysing
knowledge? (2014)
4. WILLIAMSON II
TOP
This week is an opportunity to get a deeper grasp of Knowledge and its Limits. Skim through the
book and select one of the following topics, writing an essay that critically assesses Williamson’s
views on it. Working through some of the other topics in subsequent vacations will give you a good
grasp of a range of issues in contemporary epistemology.
A. Luminosity
Timothy Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits (OUP), Ch. 4.
Selim Berker (2008) ‘Luminosity Regained’ in The Philosopher’s Imprint 8(2), pp. 1–22.
Amia Srinivasan (2015) ‘Are We Luminous?’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
90(2), pp. 294–319.
B. The KK Principle
Daniel Greco (2015a) ‘Iteration Principles in Epistemology I: Arguments For’ in Philosophy

Compass 10(11), pp. 754–764.
— (2015b) ‘Iteration Principles in Epistemology II: Arguments Against’ in Philosophy Compass
10(11), pp. 765–771.
Sebastian Liu (2020) ‘(Un)Knowability and Knowledge Iteration’ in Analysis 80(3), pp. 474–86.
C. Sensitivity and Safety
John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2009) ‘Knowledge and Objective Chance’ in Patrick
Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, eds. Williamson on Knowledge (OUP). See also
Williamson's reply.
Timothy Williamson (2009) ‘Probability and Danger’ in The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 4, pp.
1-37.
D. Scepticism
Stephen Schiffer (2009) ‘Evidence = Knowledge: Williamson’s Solution to Skepticism’ in Patrick

Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, eds. Williamson on Knowledge (OUP). See also
Williamson's reply.
Ofra Magidor (2018) ‘How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are
Envatted’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. 92, pp. 151–181.
E. Evidence
Juan Comesaña and Holly Kantin (2010) ‘Is Evidence Knowledge?’ in Philosophy and
Clayton Littlejohn (2017) ‘How and Why Knowledge is First’ in J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon,
and Benjamin Jarvis, eds. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (OUP).
F. Assertion
Matthew Weiner (2005) ‘Must We Know What We Say?’ in The Philosophical Review 114(2), pp.
227–51.
Jennifer Lackey (2007) ‘Norms of Assertion’ in Noûs 41(4), pp. 594–626.
In order to know that p, must one’s evidence rule out all possibilities in which not-p? (2019)
Can we rely on deductive reasoning to extend our knowledge? (2019)
What, if anything, is the difference between the way I come to know about my own mind and the
way I come to know about the minds of others? (2019)
EITHER
(a) Are there any mental states such that one is always in a position to know whether one is in
them?
OR
(b) Do you have the same evidence as your brain-in-a-vat counterpart? (2018)
5. MODALITY
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
Should modality be explained in terms of possible worlds? If so, how are possible worlds
themselves to be explained? If not, how, if at all, is modality to be explained?
CORE READING
*Ross Cameron (2010) ‘The Grounds of Necessity’ in Philosophy Compass 5(4), pp. 348–58.
David Lewis (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell), Ch. 1. Reprinted in KK&S as ‘A
Philosopher's Paradise: The Plurality of Worlds’.
Kit Fine (1994) ‘Essence and Modality’ in Philosophical Perspectives 8, pp. 1–16. Reprinted in
KK&S.
Robert Stalnaker (2009) ‘Modality and Possible Worlds’ in Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, and Gary S
Rosenkrantz, eds. A Companion to Metaphysics, 2nd edition (Blackwell).
FURTHER READING
If you’re working on this topic in more depth, the rest of Lewis (1986) is essential. The second
chapter defends Lewis’s extreme realism from various objections, and the third presents
objections to various rival views. The fourth and final chapter defends counterpart theory, his
alternative to the view that there are transworld identities. Loux, ed. (1979) is also very useful,
collecting together various classic papers. Many of them defend what Vetter (2011) calls classical
actualism, agreeing with Lewis that modality is to be explained in terms of possible worlds, but
disagreeing with him in holding that possible worlds themselves may be explained in terms of
actual entities—propositions (Adams), states of affairs (Plantinga), or properties (Stalnaker), for
example. Sider’s paper in L&Z, ‘Reductive Theories of Modality’, is an accessible survey of some
of the main issues, as is Melia (2003), an introduction for advanced undergraduates, discussing,
among other things, Quinean scepticism about modality and modalism, the view that modality is
to be understood, not in terms of quantification over possible worlds, but in terms of primitive
modal operators, ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’. See also the debate in SH&Z between Bricker,
defending a form of extreme realism, and Melia, defending the actualist view that possible worlds
are sets of sentences. Recent years have seen a proliferation of alternative approaches, and you’ll
want to think about some of these too. Rosen (1990) defends fictionalism, the view that possible
worlds are a useful fiction. Sider (2011) elaborates on the quasi-conventionalism that he sketches
towards the end of his piece in L&Z. Thomasson (2007) defends a form of non-cognitivism about
modality—similar to the non-cognitivism you might already be familiar with from metaethics.
Think also about the approaches of new actualists, who seek to explain modality in terms of
actual entities, but without appeal to possible worlds. See Vetter (2011), discussing Fine’s
essentialist approach as well as her own dispositionalism, for a discussion of some of the issues.
Michael J. Loux, ed. (1979) The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality
(Cornell UP).
*Joseph Melia (2003) Modality (Acumen).
Gideon Rosen (1990) ‘Modal Fictionalism’ in Mind 99(395), pp. 327–354. Reprinted in KK&S.
Ted Sider (2011) Writing the Book of the World (OUP), Ch. 12.
Amie Thomasson (2007) ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics’ in Philosophical
Topics 35(1), pp. 135–60.
Barbara Vetter (2011) ‘Recent Work: Modality without Possible Worlds’ in Analysis 71(4), pp.
742–54.
Are there impossible worlds? (2019)
‘There could have been no concrete objects. Therefore, possible worlds are not concrete objects.’
Discuss. (2018)
Can modality be understood in terms of possible worlds, or does the notion of a possible world
presuppose a prior understanding of modality? (2017)
‘If possible worlds are needed to explain modality, it is better not to explain modality.’ Do you
agree? (2016)
6. TIME
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What is McTaggart’s paradox? What, if anything, does it tell us about the nature of time?
CORE READING
*Robin Le Poidevin (2003) Travels in Four Dimensions: The Enigmas of Space and Time, (OUP),
Ch. 8.
J. M. E. McTaggart (1908) ‘The Unreality of Time’ in Mind 17(68), pp. 457-74.

Arthur Prior (1967) Past, Present, and Future (OUP), Ch. 1.
D. H. Mellor (1998) Real Time II (Routledge), Ch. 7.
FURTHER READING
For a general guide to the various issues in the philosophy of time, Dainton (2010) is hard to beat.
If you’re working on the topic in more depth, I recommend you keep it to hand as you work
through the main debates. Inspired by McTaggart, these are usually posed in terms of a
distinction between A-theorists, like Prior, and B-theorists, like Mellor. Zimmerman, ed. (2004)
contains some now-classic discussions of the main A-theory, presentism, while Prosser (2017) is a
recent book-length defence of the B-theory, focused on explaining various aspects of our
experience of time that seem to tell against the view. You’ll also find an accessible debate between
Dean Zimmerman and Jack Smart in SH&Z, with Zimmerman defending presentism and Smart
defending the B-theory. Think also about other A-theories, however, particularly the so-called
growing block and moving spotlight views. There is some relatively recent discussion of the
former in Bennett and Zimmerman, eds. (2014); the latter has long been regarded the poor
relation among A-theories, but see Cameron (2015) for a recent and influential attempt to revive
it. In thinking more about McTaggart, start with Dummett (1960), an influential discussion and
partial defence of the argument for the unreality of time. Then try Fine (2006), a fantastic paper,
offering an interesting interpretation of Dummett’s position. Be warned, however: the Fine’s hard
going—and the Dummett’s harder than it might initially seem. Lastly, to think more about issues
in the philosophy of time, you might also think about TIME TRAVEL.
Karen Bennett and Dean Zimmerman, eds. (2014) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 8 (OUP),
Ch. 9-11.
Ross Cameron (2015) The Moving Spotlight: An Essay on Time and Ontology (OUP).
Barry Dainton (2010) Time and Space, 2nd edition (Acumen), Ch. 1 to 7.
Michael Dummett (1960) ‘A Defense of McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time’ in The
Philosophical Review 69(4), pp. 497–504.
Kit Fine (2006) ‘The Reality of Tense’ in Synthese 150(3), pp. 399-414. A longer version appears
as ‘Tense and Reality’ in his (2005) Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers (OUP).
Simon Prosser (2017) Experiencing Time (OUP).
Dean Zimmerman, ed. (2001) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 1. (OUP), Part I.
EITHER
(a) ‘If time travel were possible, I could kill my own grandfather. I can’t kill my own grandfather.
So time travel is impossible.’ Discuss.
OR
(b) Can any sense be made of the question of how quickly time passes? What are the consequences
of your answer for the metaphysics of time? (2019)
‘While the past seems settled, the future seems open.’ What is the best explanation of this
apparent asymmetry? (2018)
EITHER
(a) Is backward time travel possible if, and only if, time is circular?
OR
(b) Why does time, but not space, seem to pass? (2017)
‘It is manifest in our experience that time passes.’ Is this so? What follows for how we should
understand the nature of time? (2016)
7. PERSISTENCE
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
Is there a genuine problem of change? If so, how, if at all, is it to be solved?
CORE READING
*Roxanne Marie Kurtz (2006) ‘What’s the Problem?’ in Sally Haslanger and Roxanne Marie
Kurtz, eds. (2006) Persistence: Contemporary Readings (MIT Press). Referred to below as
H&K.
David Lewis (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell), pp. 202-204. Reprinted in KK&S and
in H&K.
Ted Sider (2001) Four Dimensionalism (OUP), Ch. 4, esp. §§6 and 9.
Sally Haslanger (2003) ‘Persistence through Time’ in L&Z.
FURTHER READING
To at least a first approximation, the problem of change arises out of the fact that we understand
persistence through change to be a matter of one and the same object having incompatible
properties. Yet no object can have incompatible properties. Isn’t persistence through change, as
we understand it, therefore impossible? Standard responses to the problem accept that no object
can have incompatible properties, but insist that this can be reconciled with a correct
understanding of persistence through change. Different theorists attempt the reconciliation in
different ways, however, offering more or less revisionary accounts of persistence through change:
perdurantists, like Lewis, argue that it is a matter of one and the same object having different
temporal parts with incompatible properties; exdurantists (also known as stage theorists), like
Sider, argue that it is a matter of different temporal counterparts having incompatible properties;
while endurantists, like Haslanger, argue (roughly) that it is a matter of one and the same object
having incompatible properties itself but at different times. H&K contains many classic papers on
the issues, usefully arranged into thematic groups. SH&Z is also useful, containing a paper by
Sider defending exdurantism and a paper by Hawthorne attacking the idea that the debate should
be regarded as one about whether or not temporal parts (or counterparts) exist. See also Macbride
(2001), arguing that the debate overlooks various alternative accounts of change; Koslicki (2003),
on Sider’s argument from vagueness; and Magidor (2016), arguing that a host of argument offered
in the literature are strictly orthogonal to the debate between endurantists and perdurantists. You
might also want to think about overlap between this topic and OBJECTS. See, e.g., McGrath
(2007) on the argument from coincidence or co-location. Lastly, you might want to think about
some non-standard responses to the problem. Priest (2006) argues there are good reasons for
thinking change produces dialethias, or true contradictions, while Hofweber (2009) and
Einheuser (2012) argue there’s no real problem of change in the first place, only a meta-problem.
Iris Einheuser (2012) ‘Is There a (Meta-)Problem of Change?’ in Analytic Philosophy 53(4), pp.
344-51.
Thomas Hofweber (2009) ‘The Meta-Problem of Change’ Noûs 43(2), pp. 286-314.
Kathrin Koslicki (2003) ‘The Crooked Path from Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism’ in
Philosophical Studies 114(1/2), pp. 107–134.
Fraser Macbride (2001) ‘Four New Ways to Change Your Shape’ in Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 79(1), pp. 81–89.
Matthew McGrath (2007) ‘Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence’ in Dean W.
Zimmerman, ed. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3 (OUP).
Ofra Magidor (2016) ‘Endurantism vs. Perdurantism: A Debate Reconsidered’ in Noûs 50(3), pp.
509-532.
Graham Priest (2006) In Contradiction, 2nd edition (OUP), Ch. 12.
EITHER
(a) ‘If there’s a problem of temporary intrinsics, then there’s also a problem of contingent
intrinsics.’ Discuss.
OR
(b) ‘Let O1 and O2 be any two spatially separated objects. Consider the fusion of O1’s temporal
part between t1 and t2 and O2’s temporal part between t2 and t3. If there is such an object, it
travels faster than the speed of light. So perdurantism ought to be rejected on the grounds that it
is incompatible with the laws of physics.’ Is this a fair objection to perdurantism? (2019)
Is it ever true to say of two atoms that they once were, or will be, numerically identical? (2018)
Is the property of being-F-at-t a relational property? How does this affect the argument from
temporary intrinsics? (2017)
‘The following two claims are in tension: (1) There can be change over time; (2) At least some non-
essential properties of objects are intrinsic.’ Explain how this tension might most plausibly be
thought to arise. How would you propose to resolve it? (2016)
8. TBA
OTHER TOPICS
EPISTEMOLOGY
THE A PRIORI
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What is a priori knowledge? Do we have any? If so, how do we acquire it? Are there any
contingent truths that can be known a priori?
CORE READING
*Carrie Jenkins (2008) 'A Priori Knowledge: Debates and Developments' in Philosophy Compass
3(3), pp. 436–450.
Philip Kitcher (1980) 'A Priori Knowledge' in The Philosophical Review, 89(1), pp. 3–23.
Laurence Bonjour and Michael Devitt (2014) 'Is There a Priori Knowledge?' in Matthias Steup,
John Turri, and Ernest Sosa, eds. (2014) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 2nd edition
(Wiley Blackwell).
Saul Kripke (1980) Naming and Necessity (Blackwell), pp. 34–39, 48-50, 53–58, 99-105, and
108-109. The relevant extracts are reprinted in Paul Moser, ed. (1987) A Priori Knowledge
(OUP).
FURTHER READING
In getting a better grasp of this topic, I think it’s particularly helpful to understand how the notion
of the a priori has figured in the history of philosophy. At the very least, you’ll want to look at
Quine (1953). Though it doesn’t actually contain the expression “a priori”, it’s a renowned attack
on what Bonjour calls moderate empiricism, and attempts to put a form of radical empiricism in
its place. You’ll find good discussion of the issues in the first few chapters of Bonjour (1998), and a
recent attempt to resuscitate moderate empiricism in the face of Quine’s attack in Boghossian
(2003). In exploring contemporary work by other philosophers on the a priori, you should follow
up the relevant references in Jenkins (2008). You’ll want to think, in the first place, about
accounts of the a priori from the likes of Field and Peacocke, as well as Jenkins herself.
Boghossian and Peacocke (2000) contains many key contributions to recent debate, including a
paper by Kitcher reflecting on critical reaction to his (1980) paper. You’ll also want to think about
Kripke, and alleged instances of contingent a priori truths. To that end, try Hawthorne (2002)
and Chalmers (2008). (This is an issue that you’ll most likely encounter again if you do
Philosophy of Mind, and certainly if you do Philosophical Logic.) Lastly, have a think a bit about
whether the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is significant. Williamson (2013)
is a recent paper arguing that it isn’t; Casullo (2015) is a response.
Laurence Bonjour (1998) In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge UP).

Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, eds. (2000) New Essays on the A Priori (OUP).
Paul Boghossian (2003) 'Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense' in Grazer Philosophische Studien 66,
pp. 15-35. Reprinted in his (2008) Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers (OUP).
Alberto Casullo (2015) 'Four Challenges to the A Priori: A Posteriori Distinction' in Synthese
192(9), pp. 2701–2724.
David J. Chalmers (2008) 'Two‐Dimensional Semantics' in Ernie Lepore and Barry C. Smith, eds.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language (OUP).
John Hawthorne (2002) 'Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge' in Philosophy and
W. V. O. Quine (1951) 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in The Philosophical Review 60(1), pp. 20–
43. Reprinted in his (1961) From a Logical Point of View, revised edition (Harvard).
Tim Williamson (2013) 'How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori
Knowledge?' in Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, ed. The A Priori in Philosophy (OUP).
If I call to mind an equilateral triangle, and by manipulating the image in my imagination come to
believe that equilateral triangles have three lines of symmetry, is my belief justified a priori or a
posteriori? (2019)
In what sense, if any, is a priori knowledge justified ‘independently of experience’? (2018)
Are all the propositions knowable by humans either ‘matters of fact’, or ‘relations of ideas’, as
Hume maintained? (2016)
EITHER
(a) Are there any contingent truths that are knowable a priori?
OR
(b) Does an appeal to intellectual intuition play a role in explaining how we are able to have a
priori knowledge? (2015)
TESTIMONY
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
Can one know that something is the case simply because one has been told that it is? If not, does it
follow that we know far less than we ordinarily take ourselves to know?
CORE READING
*John Greco (2012) 'Recent Work on Testimonial Knowledge' in American Philosophical

Quarterly 49(1), pp. 15–28.
Elizabeth Fricker (1994) 'Against Gullibility' in Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti,
eds. Knowing From Words (Kluwer Academic Publishers), pp. 125-61. Reprinted in SKF&M.
Tyler Burge (1993) 'Content Preservation' in The Philosophical Review 102(4), pp. 457-88.
Reprinted with a Postscript in Tyler Burge (2013) Cognition Through Understanding (OUP),
and in SKF&M.
Jennifer Lackey (2006) 'It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in
the Epistemology of Testimony' in Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, eds. The Epistemology of
Testimony (OUP), pp. 160-89.
NOTE: You’ll find abridged versions of Fricker (1994) and Burge (1993) reprinted, alongside
useful commentary, in Sven Bernecker, ed. (2006) Reading Epistemology (Blackwell). I
recommend that you read these in the first instance rather than the original, unabridged versions.
FURTHER READING
Coming soon.
Must S know that p for T to know that p on S’s say-so? (2018)
Can one acquire a priori justification by means of testimony? (2017)
How readily should one believe what others tell one? (2016)
EITHER
(a) ‘Understanding other people’s eye-witness accounts affords one epistemic access to states of
affairs they have observed and now report, in much the same way that one’s memory affords one
present access to past states of affairs which one oneself once observed.’ Discuss.
OR
(b) To what extent does one’s dependence on others for much of what one knows compromise
one’s ability to take responsibility for one’s own beliefs? (2015)
DISAGREEMENT
TOP
Coming soon.
Can two epistemic peers with the same evidence rationally disagree? (2018)
EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
How should the notions of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice be defined? Are they
distinctively epistemic forms of injustice?
CORE READING
*Axel Gelfert (2014) A Critical Introduction to Testimony (Bloomsbury), Ch. 10, pp. 193-214.
Miranda Fricker (2007) Epistemic Injustice (OUP), Ch. 1 and 7.
Ishani Maitra (2010) ‘The Nature of Epistemic Injustice’ in Philosophical Books 51, pp. 195-211.
David Coady (2017) ‘Epistemic Injustice as Distributive Injustice’ in Ian James Kidd, José
Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., eds. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
(Routledge).
FURTHER READING
Coming soon.
‘Epistemic injustice is just the unjust distribution of epistemic goods. Therefore, there is no
distinctive phenomenon of epistemic injustice.’ Discuss. (2018)
Is someone who is committing an epistemic injustice epistemically irresponsible? (2017)
What is epistemic injustice? (2016)
Is there a distinct phenomenon of epistemic injustice? (2015)
OTHER MINDS
TOP
Coming soon.
What, if anything, is the difference between the way I come to know about my own mind and the
way I come to know about the minds of others? (2019)
Is scepticism about other minds fundamentally different from skepticism about the external
world? (2017)
‘One’s knowledge that other conscious persons exist broadly similar to oneself is based on an
inference to the best explanation.’ Do you agree? (2016)
‘There are no reasons to be sceptical about the existence of other conscious persons that are not
equally reasons to be sceptical about the existence of mind-independent solid objects with size,
shape and location.’ Do you agree? (2015)
METAPHYSICS
CAUSATION
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What is the most promising philosophical account of the relation between causes and their
effects?
CORE READING
*Michael Loux and Thomas Crisp (2017) Metaphysics, 4th edition (Routledge), Ch. 6.
David Hume (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §VII. Various editions, and
available online: http://www.davidhume.org/texts/ehu.html.
J. L. Mackie (1965) 'Causes and Conditions' in American Philosophical Quarterly 2(4), pp. 245–
264 (skip §§5-7). Reprinted Sosa and Tooley, eds. (1993) Causation (OUP), referred to below as
S&T, and in KK&S.
Elisabeth Anscombe (1971) 'Causation and Determination' in her (1981) Metaphysics and the
Philosophy of Mind: Collected Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 (Blackwell). Reprinted in S&T
and KK&S.
David Lewis (1973) 'Causation' in The Journal of Philosophy 70(17), pp. 556–567. Reprinted in
his (1986) Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 (OUP), with additional postscripts, S&T, and KK&S.
FURTHER READING
The literature for this topic is huge. Unless you’re studying him for Early Modern Philosophy, you
needn’t worry too much about the ins and outs of the scholarly debate over Hume’s views on
causation, but you will want to look at discussion of the other Core Readings, especially the
Mackie and the Lewis. For discussion of Mackie, see the first paper by Jaegwon Kim in S&T and
Scriven (2007). For discussion of Lewis, see the second paper by Kim in S&T, as well as the
papers by Horwich and Bennett. In order to overcome difficulties with his (1973) view, Lewis
developed a different counterfactual theory, which is presented in his paper ‘Causation as
Influence’ in Collins, Hall, and Paul, eds. (2004). Menzies (2001/14) provides a great overview of
the issues surrounding these and other counterfactual approaches. You should also have a look at
other approaches to causation. Perhaps the main one is the interventionist approach, a non-
reductionist counterfactual approach that draws on the work of the computer scientist Judea
Pearl. Woodward (2001/16) is a good introduction. If you’re interested in probablistic approaches,
see in the first instance Hitchcock (1997/2018). Another approach worth looking at is the physical
process acccount defended by the likes of Wesley Salmon. See his paper in S&T, though perhaps
the best introduction is his (2002). His view has fallen out of favour somewhat recently, however.
Part of its appeal was the promise of an account of preemption cases, but on further examination,
it’s not so clear. There’s some nice discussion in Hall (2009). The other pieces in S&T are
recommended; indeed, the editors’ introduction and the papers by Davidson and Tooley are all
essential reading. See also the debate between Carroll and Schaffer in SH&Z over whether or not
there’s anything more to causal necessity than mere regularity. Lastly, try Psillos (2003) for a
good overview of the issues. It’s a little too advanced to count as genuinely introductory, but
provides detailed discussion of the Core Reading and other important approaches, including
interventionism.
John Collins, Ned Hall, and Laurie Paul, eds. (2004) Causation and Counterfactuals (MIT Press).
*Ned Hall (2009) 'Causation' in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, eds. The Oxford Handbook of
Contemporary Philosophy (OUP).
Christopher Hitchcock (1997/2018) 'Probabilistic Causation' in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/.
Peter Menzies (2001/14) 'Counterfactual Theories of Causation' in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/.
Stathos Psillos (2003) Causation & Explanation (Acumen), Part I.
Wesley Salmon (2002) 'Causation' in Richard Gale, ed. The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics
(Blackwell).
Michael Strevens (2007) 'Mackie Remixed' in J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and H. S. Silverstein,
eds. Causation and Explanation (MIT Press).
James Woodward (2001/8) 'Causation and Manipulability' in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-mani/.
In what sense, if any, do causes necessitate their effects? (2019)
If a short-circuit starts a house fire, which triggers a sprinkler system that puts out the fire, did the
short-circuit cause the failure of the house to burn down? (2018)
If x prevents y from preventing c from causing e, does this make x a cause of e? (2017)
Should we explain causation in terms of counterfactuals, counterfactuals in terms of causation, or

neither? (2016)
PROPERTIES
TOP
Coming soon.
In what sense, if any, is the property of being red more natural than the property of being red-or-
green? (2019)
Are necessarily co-extensive properties identical? (2018)
When x instantiates F, is there a relation of instantiation that is instantiated by x and F? (2017)
EITHER
(a) ‘The best explanation for the similarity of various metals is that they all contain free electrons.
The best explanation for the similarity of various cubic things is that they all instantiate the
universal cubicity.’ Are these claims on a par? Does the latter give us good reason to believe that
the universal cubicity exists?
OR
(b) ‘All categorisation of things into kinds depends upon the interests, purposes, and technological
ability of those doing the categorising. So there is at best only a difference of degree between social
kinds and natural kinds.’ What, if anything, is correct about this claim? What significance does
your answer have for the debate over the reality of race? (2016)
RACE
TOP
Coming soon.
‘Race… is something to be rid of.’ (HASLANGER) Is it? (2019)
What might it mean to say that a kind is ‘socially constructed’? Are racial kinds socially
constructed in this sense? (2018)
Are races social kinds or natural kinds? (2017)
EITHER
(a) ‘The best explanation for the similarity of various metals is that they all contain free electrons.
The best explanation for the similarity of various cubic things is that they all instantiate the
universal cubicity.’ Are these claims on a par? Does the latter give us good reason to believe that
the universal cubicity exists?
OR
(b) ‘All categorisation of things into kinds depends upon the interests, purposes, and technological
ability of those doing the categorising. So there is at best only a difference of degree between social
kinds and natural kinds.’ What, if anything, is correct about this claim? What significance does
your answer have for the debate over the reality of race? (2016)
OBJECTS
TOP
Coming soon.
‘Either every class of objects has a fusion, or none do; anything else is metaphysically arbitrary.’
Discuss. (2019)
EITHER
(a) Are there tables or only atoms arranged table-wise?
OR
(b) Is it possible for objects of the same kind to coincide? (2018)
‘It is not vague how many things exist. Therefore, it cannot be vague whether composition occurs.’
Does this establish that composition cannot be vague? (2017)
‘There are at least as many distinct sets of conditions under which objects compose to form
another as there are distinct kinds of composite object.’ What can be said in favour of this view? Is
it correct? (2016)
DISPOSITIONS
TOP
Coming soon.
Are any dispositions extrinsic? (2018)
Is it possible that an object that is disposed to M when S does not in fact M when S? If so, does this
refute counterfactual analyses of dispositions? (2017)
Can the claim that an object is disposed to M when C be explained in counterfactual terms? (2015)
TIME TRAVEL
TOP
Coming soon.
EITHER
(a) ‘If time travel were possible, I could kill my own grandfather. I can’t kill my own grandfather.
So time travel is impossible.’ Discuss.
OR
(b) Can any sense be made of the question of how quickly time passes? What are the consequences
of your answer for the metaphysics of time? (2019)
EITHER
(a) Is backward time travel possible if, and only if, time is circular?
OR
(b) Why does time, but not space, seem to pass? (2017)
Is time travel possible? What does this tell us about the nature of time? (2015)
META-ONTOLOGY
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What do we mean when we ask ‘what is there?’ and how should such questions be investigated?
CORE READING
*Francesco Berto and Matteo Plebani (2015) Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary
Guide (Bloomsbury), esp. Part 1—though if you have time, Part 2 is well worth reading too.
W. V. O. Quine (1948) 'On What There Is' in The Review of Metaphysics 2(5), pp. 21-38.
Reprinted in his (1980) From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edition, revised (Harvard UP) and
in KK&S.
Rudolf Carnap (1950) 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' in Revue Internationale de
Philosophie 4, pp. 20-40. Reprinted in his (1956) Meaning and Necessity, 2nd edition
(University of Chicago Press) and in KK&S.
Peter van Inwagen (1998) 'Meta-Ontology' in Erkenntnis 48(2/3), pp. 233–250. Reprinted in his
(2001) Ontology, Identity, and Modality (CUP).
Stephen Yablo (1998) 'Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?' in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supp. Vol. 72, pp. 229–261. Reprinted in his (2010) Things (OUP) and in KK&S.
FURTHER READING
In working further on this topic, you could do worse than work through the chapters of Part 2 of
Berto and Plebani (2015), looking more closely at individual papers defending the views they
discuss. Try the paper by Kris McDaniels in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman, eds. (2009) for
an example of the Ontological Pluralism discussed in Ch. 4, and Linnebo (2012) for an example of
Neo-Fregeanism. For the Neo-Carnapianism discussed in Ch. 5, try Hirsch (2002), Thomas
Hofweber’s paper in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman, eds. (2009), and Thomasson (2008).
Fictionalism, discussed in Ch. 8 of Berto and Plebani (2015), is defended by Stephen Yablo in the
piece above. For Meinongianism, discussed in Ch. 7, start with Reicher (2006/19). Fine (2012) is
an example of the Grounding Approach discussed in Ch. 8. You’ll find other various useful papers
in Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman, eds. (2009), along with a handy editors’ introduction. Two
other recommendations: Lewis and Lewis (1970), a dialogue between two philosophers discussing
whether there are holes, is a must-read, while Effingham (2013) is a fantastic introductory book,
aimed at undergraduates and discussing issues of meta-ontology in relation to debates in specific
areas of metaphysics. It can be profitably read in working further not just on meta-ontology, but
also on topics such as POSSIBLE WORLDS, TIME, and PERSISTENCE.
David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, eds. (2009) Metametaphysics: New
Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (OUP).
Tim Crane (2011) 'Existence and Quantification Reconsidered' in Tuomas Tahko, ed.
Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (CUP). Reprinted in his (2013) The Objects of
Thought (OUP).
*Nikk Effingham (2013) An Introduction to Ontology (Polity).
Kit Fine (2012) 'Guide to Ground' in Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder, eds. (2012)
Metaphysical Grounding (CUP).
Eli Hirsch (2002) 'Quantifier Variance and Realism' in Philosophical Issues 12(1), pp. 51–73.
Reprinted in his (2010) Quantifier Variance and Realism (OUP).
David Lewis and Stephanie Lewis (1970) 'Holes' in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48(2), pp.
206–212. Reprinted in KK&S.
Øystein Linnebo (2012) 'Metaontological Minimalism' in Philosophy Compass 7(2), pp. 139–151.
Maria Reicher (2006/19) 'Nonexistent Objects' in E. Zalta, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/.
Amie Thomasson (2008) 'Existence Questions' in Philosophical Studies 141(1), pp. 63–78.
What, if anything, ground truths about what grounds what? (2018)
What is the best methodology for resolving ontological disputes? (2015)
‘The standard of ontological commitment in metaphysics is the same as that in the sciences – one
is committed to what one quantifies over in one’s best theory. Accordingly, it cannot be correct to
castigate metaphysics as unscientific.’ Discuss. (2013)
Are ontological disputes merely verbal disputes over the choice of conventional linguistic
framework? (2012)
FOR SELF-STUDY
THE ANALYSIS of KNOWLEDGE
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What philosophical account, if any, can be given of propositional knowledge?
CORE READING
*Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Mattheus Steup (2001/2017) ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’ in E.
Zalta, ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/knowledge-analysis/
Edward Craig (1987) ‘The Practical Explication of Knowledge’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 87, pp. 211–226.
Linda Zagzebski (1999) ‘What is Knowledge?’ in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, eds. The Blackwell
Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell).
William Lycan (2006) ‘On the Gettier Problem Problem’ in Stephen Hetherington, ed.
Epistemology Futures (OUP).
FURTHER READING
In setting the Core Reading for this topic, I’ve assumed you’re familiar with the Gettier problem
from first year work on Knowledge for General Philosophy. If that’s not the case, let me know, and
I’ll suggest some slightly different readings. If you haven’t already, you should also look at the
readings for the WILLIAMSON I topic.
Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida, and Peter D Klein, eds (2017) Explaining Knowledge: New
Essays on the Gettier Problem (OUP).
Edward Craig (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
(OUP).
Stephen Hetherington, ed. (2018) The Gettier Problem (Cambridge UP).
Jennifer Nagel (2012) ‘Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in
Epistemology’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85(3), pp. 495–527.
Ernest Sosa (2007) A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. I (OUP),
Ch. 2.
Brian Weatherson (2003) ‘What Good are Counter-Examples?’ in Philosophical Studies 115(1),
pp. 1–31.
Timothy Williamson (2013) ‘Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic’ in Inquiry 56(1), pp. 1–14.
‘Gettier cases force us to choose between (a) accepting that knowledge requires infallible
justification of a kind we almost never have and (b) accepting that some beliefs amount to
knowledge simply by luck.’ Do they? If so, which should we choose? (2020)
What philosophical problems, if any, would a successful analysis of knowledge help us solve?
(2020)
EITHER
(a) Can knowledge be analysed as true belief arrived at through the exercise of epistemic virtue?
OR
(b) ‘Externalism in epistemology ought to be rejected on the grounds that it allows for knowledge
to be acquired through the exercise of epistemic vice.’ Discuss. (2019)
EITHER
(a) What, if anything, is wrong with the view that knowledge is rationally held reliably true belief?
OR
(b) Is knowledge the most general factive mental state? (2015)
EPISTEMIC CLOSURE
TOP
Coming soon.
Can we rely on deductive reasoning to extend our knowledge? (2019)
EITHER
(a) How important is the concept of luck in epistemology?
OR
(b) Is knowledge prior to belief? (2016)
Can one know that one has hands while not being in a position to know that one is not a handless
brain in a vat? Why might the issue seem important? (2013)
Suppose that I would still believe P, were P false. Does it follow that I do not in fact know that P?
(2010)
INTERNALISM and EXTERNALISM

TOP
Coming soon.
EITHER
(a) Can knowledge be analysed as true belief arrived at through the exercise of epistemic virtue?
OR
(b) ‘Externalism in epistemology ought to be rejected on the grounds that it allows for knowledge
to be acquired through the exercise of epistemic vice.’ Discuss. (2019)
‘Sameness of normative standards is a transitive relation between cases; indistinguishability is

not.’ Is this a problem for internalism? (2019)
Does externalism about justification imply that one can have knowledge despite disregarding
available evidence? (2017)
‘Externalist accounts of knowledge implausibly imply that a subject can know that P even if they
are being unreasonable in believing that P.’ Is this so? (2014)
SCEPTICISM
TOP
Coming soon.
In order to know that p, must one’s evidence rule out all possibilities in which not-p? (2019)
EITHER
(a) Are there any mental states such that one is always in a position to know whether one is in
them?
OR
(b) Do you have the same evidence as your brain-in-a-vat counterpart? (2018)
‘This sceptical doubt…with respect to…the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur’d,
but must return upon us every moment.’ (HUME) Is it rational, or is it a pathology, constantly to
doubt the veracity of one’s senses? (2016)
EITHER
(a) Are there any reasons to think that ‘know’ is context-sensitive, other than its potentially
affording a response to scepticism?
OR
(b) ‘The best responses to the problem of external world scepticism ultimately concede a lot to the
sceptic.’ Discuss. (2014)
INDUCTION
TOP
Coming soon.
EITHER
(a) ‘A wise man proportions his beliefs to the evidence.’ (HUME) What truth, if any, is there in
this claim?
OR
(b) ‘If the universe is uniform, inductive inferences are warranted. If the universe is not uniform,
no non-deductive inferences are warranted. So we may as well make inductive inferences.’
Discuss. (2019)
Does the best explanation of observed regularities imply the existence of unobserved regularities?
(2018)
EITHER
(a) Can induction inform us about the past?
OR
(b) Can it ever be the case that the observation of a non-raven confirms ‘All ravens are black’ to a
greater extent than does the observation of a black raven? (2017)
‘To say that valid predictions are those based on past regularities, without being able to say which
regularities, is…pointless.’ (GOODMAN) How does this remark bear on the problem of what
justifies us in making inferences from a finite number of instances to a general law subsuming
these instances? (2016)
PERCEPTION
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What, if anything, do illusions and hallucinations tell us about the nature of perception?
CORE READING
*Tim Crane and Craig French (2005/15) ‘The Problem of Perception’ in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
Howard Robinson (1994) Perception (Routledge), Ch. II and VI.

Tim Crane (2001) Elements of Mind (Cambridge UP), Ch. 1 and 5.
Michael G. F. Martin (2004) ‘The Limits of Self-Awareness’ in Philosophical Studies 120(1), pp.
37–89.
FURTHER READING
In thinking more about what Crane and French are calling the problem of perception—the
problem, roughly speaking, of explaining how our common-sense conception of perception can be
sustained in light of the existence of illusions and hallucinations—follow up their references,
making sure to think about the main pros and cons of sense-datum theories, adverbialism,
intentionalism, and naive realism. You’ll find many of the key readings in Noë and Thompson,
eds. (2002) and in Byrne and Logue, eds. (2009), and introductory discussion of the main
positions in Fish (2010). Soteriou (2016)—focused on naive realism and other forms of
disjunctivism but discussing sense-datum and intentional theories along the way—is a bit more
advanced, but strongly recommended. See also Nudds (2009), a useful survey of recent critical
work on naive realism. You also ought to think a bit about certain other debates in the philosophy
of perception. For discussion of how perception gives us knowledge or justified belief about the
world, see Lyons (2016) and the entries for SCEPTICISM and for AGRIPPA’S TRILEMMA.
For discussion of issues concerning the so-called contents of perception, see Siegel (2005/16). For
discussion of so-called causal theories of perception, see the papers by Grice, Lewis, and Snowdon
in Noë and Thompson, eds. (2002) and Ch. 7 of Fish (2010).
Alex Byrne and Heather Logue, eds. (2009) Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings (MIT Press).
*William Fish (2010) Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge).
Jack Lyons (2016) ‘The Epistemological Problems of Perception’ in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/
Matthew Nudds (2009) ‘Recent Work in Perception: Naive Realism and its Opponents’ in
Analysis 69(2), 334-346.
Alva Noë and Evan Thompson, eds. (2002) Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy
of Perception (MIT Press).
Susanna Siegel (2005/16) ‘The Contents of Perception’ in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-contents/
Matthew Soteriou (2016) Disjunctivism (Routledge).
Do perceptual experiences always give prima facie justification to believe their contents? (2019)
‘One sees if and only if the scene before one’s eyes causes matching visual experience.’ Discuss.
(2018)
Given that light travels at a finite speed, does this imply that we do not visually perceive how
things are now but how they were? (2017)
‘In perception one is directly aware of mind-independent objects with size, shape and other
perceptible qualities.’ Is there compelling reason to abandon this common sense view? (2016)
PERSONAL IDENTITY
TOP
ESSAY QUESTION
What does it take for a person x identified at one time to be numerically identical to a person y
identified at some other time? Why might the answer to this question be thought to matter? Does
it?
CORE READING
*Eric T. Olson (2002/15) 'Personal Identity' in E. Zalta, ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
Bernard Williams (1970) 'The Self and the Future' in Philosophical Review 79(2), pp. 161–180.
Reprinted in his (1973) Problems of the Self (CUP), and in KK&S.
Sydney Shoemaker (1984) 'Personal Identity: A Materialist Account' in Sydney Shoemaker and
Richard Swinburne Personal Identity (Blackwell). Reprinted in Peter van Inwagen and Dean
Zimmerman, eds. (1998) Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Blackwell).
Derek Parfit (1984) Reasons and Persons (OUP), Ch. 12: 'Why Our Identity is Not What Matters'.
Eric Olson (2003) 'An Argument for Animalism' in Raymond Martin and John Barresi, eds.
(2003) Personal Identity (Blackwell), and in KK&S.
Note that Raymond Martin and John Barresi, eds. (2003) Personal Identity (Blackwell), besides
Olson’s paper, also contains the papers by Williams and Parfit, a helpful editors’ introduction, and
various other important papers on this topic. I refer to it below as M&B.
If you’re working on this topic in more depth, Locke’s discussion in his An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (Bk II, Ch. 27) is essential reading, as are the famous replies from Thomas
Reid and Joseph Butler. These are usefully collected, along with various other pieces, in Perry, ed.
(2008). You’ll also want to think a bit about Williams. For some discussion, see the piece by
Nozick in M&B, Noonan (1982), and John Perry’s piece ‘Williams on The Self and the Future’ in
Perry, ed. (2008). Otherwise, you should focus on Parfit and animalism. M&B contains a number
of pieces discussing Parfit: those by Lewis, Korsgaard, Unger, Sosa, Martin, Schechtman, and
Johnston, as well as Parfit’s own ‘The Unimportance of Identity’. Lewis’s response is particularly
important, and will seem less ad hoc if you’ve encountered his views on persistence more
generally. For discussion of animalism, you’ll have to look elsewhere. Snowdon (1990) is an
important statement and defence of the position. For other discussions, see Olson (2004),
Shoemaker (2008), Madden (2011), and the collection, Blatti and Snowdon, eds. (2016)—the last
containing a piece by Parfit arguing against animalism. For a recent book on personal identity,
aimed at undergraduates, try Kind (2015).
Stephan Blatti and Paul Snowdon, eds. (2016) Animalism (OUP).

*Amy Kind (2015) Persons and Personal Identity (Polity Press).
Rory Madden (2011) 'Externalism and Brain Transplants' in Karen Bennett and Dean
Zimmerman, eds. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 6 (OUP).
Harold Noonan (1982) 'Williams on “The Self and the Future”' in Analysis 42(3), pp. 158–163.
Eric Olson (2004) 'Animalism and the Corpse Problem' in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
82(2), pp. 265–274.
John Perry, ed. (2008) Personal Identity, 2nd edition (University of California Press).
Sydney Shoemaker (2008) 'Persons, Animals, and Identity' in Synthese 162(3), pp. 313–324.
Paul Snowdon (1990) 'Persons, Animals, and Ourselves' in Christopher Gill, ed. The Person and
the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (OUP). Reprinted in Tim Crane
and Kati Farkas, eds. (2004) Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology (OUP).

‘Since the claim that S1 is psychologically connected with S2 presupposes that S1 and S2 are
identical, the psychological-continuity account of personal identity is circular.’ Discuss. (2019)
Are you an animal? What, if anything, does your answer imply about the metaphysics of personal
identity through time? (2018)
Is it easier to survive fission than to survive fusion? (2017)
What is involved in person A at time t1 being identical with person B at another time, t2? Is this a
metaphysical question, a moral question, or something else? (2016)

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Home Knowledge & Reality

ANTHOLOGIES, COLLECTIONS, and TEXTBOOKS

*Alvin I. Goldman and Matthew McGrath (2015) Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction

Laurence Bonjour (1978) ‘Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?’ in American

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Can one provide a foundationalist justification for foundationalism itself? (2017)

Jessica Brown (2006) 'Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres' in Philosophical

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Are there unanalysable factive mental states? (2017)

Timothy Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits (OUP), Ch. 4.

Timothy Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits (OUP), Ch. 5.

Daniel Greco (2015a) ‘Iteration Principles in Epistemology I: Arguments For’ in Philosophy

C. Sensitivity and Safety

Timothy Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits (OUP), Ch. 7.

Timothy Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits (OUP), Ch. 8.

Stephen Schiffer (2009) ‘Evidence = Knowledge: Williamson’s Solution to Skepticism’ in Patrick

Timothy Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits (OUP), Ch. 9.

Can we rely on deductive reasoning to extend our knowledge? (2019)

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Are there impossible worlds? (2019)

J. M. E. McTaggart (1908) ‘The Unreality of Time’ in Mind 17(68), pp. 457-74.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is there a genuine problem of change? If so, how, if at all, is it to be solved?

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Laurence Bonjour (1998) In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge UP).

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

In what sense, if any, is a priori knowledge justified ‘independently of experience’? (2018)

*John Greco (2012) 'Recent Work on Testimonial Knowledge' in American Philosophical

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Must S know that p for T to know that p on S’s say-so? (2018)

Can one acquire a priori justification by means of testimony? (2017)

Miranda Fricker (2007) Epistemic Injustice (OUP), Ch. 1 and 7.

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Is someone who is committing an epistemic injustice epistemically irresponsible? (2017)

What is epistemic injustice? (2016)

Is there a distinct phenomenon of epistemic injustice? (2015)

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

In what sense, if any, do causes necessitate their effects? (2019)

Should we explain causation in terms of counterfactuals, counterfactuals in terms of causation, or

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Are necessarily co-extensive properties identical? (2018)

When x instantiates F, is there a relation of instantiation that is instantiated by x and F? (2017)

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

‘Race… is something to be rid of.’ (HASLANGER) Is it? (2019)

Are races social kinds or natural kinds? (2017)

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Are any dispositions extrinsic? (2018)

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

What, if anything, ground truths about what grounds what? (2018)

What is the best methodology for resolving ontological disputes? (2015)

What philosophical account, if any, can be given of propositional knowledge?

PAST PAPER QUESTIONS

Can we rely on deductive reasoning to extend our knowledge? (2019)

INTERNALISM and EXTERNALISM