GIOS SAMAR Vs DTC CAA

6/9/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 896

G.R. No. 217158. March 12, 2019.1

GIOS-SAMAR, INC., represented by its Chairperson,
GERARDO M. MALINAO, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Monopoly; Concession Agreement; The

grant of a concession agreement to an entity, as a winning bidder,
for the exclusive development, operation, and maintenance of any
or all of the Projects, does not by itself create a monopoly violative
of the provisions of the Constitution.—We find that the grant of a
concession agreement to an entity, as a winning bidder, for the
exclusive development, operation, and maintenance of any or all
of the Projects, does not by itself create a monopoly violative of the
provisions of the Constitution. Anglo-Fil Trading
Corporation teaches that exclusivity is inherent in the grant of a
concession to a private entity to deliver a public service, where
Government chooses not to undertake such service. Otherwise
stated, while the grant may result in a
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1 EN BANC.

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Gios-Samar, Inc. vs. Department of Transportation and
Communications
monopoly, it is a type of monopoly not violative of law. This is

the essence of the policy decision of the Government to enter into
concessions with the private sector to build, maintain and operate
what would have otherwise been government-operated services,
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000179ee43902cb8e39ec4000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/95
such as airports. In any case, the law itself provides for built-in
protections to safeguard the public interest, foremost of which is
to require public bidding. Under the BOT Law, for example, a
private-public partnership (PPP) agreement may be undertaken
through public bidding, in cases of solicited proposals, or through
“Swiss challenge” (also known as comparative bidding), in cases of
unsolicited proposals.
Same; Same; The Constitution provides that the State may, by
law, prohibit or regulate monopolies when the public interest so
requires.—In any event, the Constitution provides that the State
may, by law, prohibit or regulate monopolies when the public
interest so requires. Petitioner has failed to point to any provision
in the law, which specifically prohibits the bundling of bids, a
detail supplied by the respondent DOTC as implementing agency
for the PPP program for airports. Our examination of the petition
and the relevant statute, in fact, provides further support for the
dismissal of the present action.
Abuse of Dominant Position; An entity is not prohibited from,
or held liable for prosecution and punishment for, simply securing
a dominant position in the relevant market in which it operates. It
is only when that entity engages in conduct in abuse of its
dominant position that it will be exposed to prosecution and
possible punishment.—Originally, monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade were governed by, and penalized under,
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code. This provision has since
been repealed by RA No. 10667, or the Philippine Competition
Act, which defines and penalizes “all forms of anticompetitive
agreements, abuse of dominant position, and anticompetitive
mergers and acquisitions.” RA No. 10667 does not define what
constitutes a “monopoly.” Instead, it prohibits one or more entities
which has/have acquired or achieved a “dominant position” in a
“relevant market” from “abusing” its dominant position. In other
words, an entity is not prohibited from, or held liable for
prosecution and punishment for, simply securing a dominant
position in the relevant market in which it operates. It is only
when

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that entity engages in conduct in abuse of its dominant

position that it will be exposed to prosecution and possible
punishment.
“Dominant Position,” Defined; Words and Phrases.—Under
RA No. 10667, “dominant position” is defined as follows: Sec. 4.
Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act: x x x x (g) Dominant
position refers to a position of economic strength that an entity or
entities hold which makes it capable of controlling the relevant
market independently from any or a combination of the following:
competitors, customers, suppliers, or consumers[.]
Relevant Market; Words and Phrases; “Relevant market”
refers to the market in which a particular good or service is sold
and which is a combination of the relevant product market and the
relevant geographic market.—“Relevant market” refers to the
market in which a particular good or service is sold and which is a
combination of the relevant product market and the relevant
geographic market. The determination of a particular relevant
market depends on the consideration of factors which affect the
substitutability among goods or services constituting such
market, and the geographic area delineating the boundaries of the
market. An entity with a dominant position in a relevant market
is deemed to have abused its dominant position if it engages in a
conduct that would substantially prevent, restrict, or lessen
competition.
Combination in Restraint of Trade; Anticompetitive
Agreements; Republic Act (RA) No. 10667 does not define what a
“combination in restraint of trade” is. What it does is penalize
anticompetitive agreements.—RA No. 10667 does not define what
a “combination in restraint of trade” is. What it does is penalize
anticompetitive agreements. Agreement refers to “any type of form
or contract, arrangement, understanding, collective
recommendation, or concerted action, whether formal or
informal.” The following agreements are considered anti
competitive: Sec. 14. Anticompetitive Agreements.— (a) The
following agreements, between or among competitors, are per se
prohibited: (1) Restricting competition as to price, or components
thereof, or other terms of trade; (2) Fixing price at an auction or
in any form of bidding including cover bidding, bid suppression,
bid rotation and market allocation and other analogous practices
of bid manipulation; (b) The following agreements, between or
among

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competitors which have the object or effect of substantially

preventing, restricting or lessening competition shall be
prohibited: (1) Setting, limiting, or controlling production,
markets, technical development, or investment; (2) Dividing or
sharing the market, whether by volume of sales or purchases,
territory, type of goods or services, buyers or sellers or any other
means; (c) Agreements other than those specified in (a) and (b) of
this section which have the object or effect of substantially
preventing, restricting or lessening competition shall also be
prohibited: Provided, Those which contribute to improving the
production or distribution of goods and services or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefits, may not necessarily be deemed a
violation of this Act. An entity that controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with another entity or entities, have
common economic interests, and are not otherwise able to decide
or act independently of each other, shall not be considered
competitors for purposes of this section.
Anti-Dummy Law; For liability for violation of Section 2 of the
Anti-Dummy Law (Commonwealth Act No. 108) to attach, it must
first be established that there is a law limiting or reserving the
enjoyment or exercise of a right, franchise, privilege, or business to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least a certain percentage of which is owned by such citizens.—
Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Dummy Law, was enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain
economic activities to Filipino citizens or corporations. Section 2 of
said law states: Sec. 2. Simulation of minimum capital stock.—In
all cases in which a constitutional or legal provision requires that,
in order that a corporation or association may exercise or enjoy a
right, franchise or privilege, not less than a certain per centum of
its capital must be owned by citizens of the Philippines or of any
other specific country, it shall be unlawful to falsely simulate the
existence of such minimum stock or capital as owned by such
citizens, for the purpose of evading said provision. The president
or managers and directors or trustees of corporations or
associations convicted of a violation of this section shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than five nor more than
fifteen years, and by a fine not less than the value of the right,
franchise or privilege, enjoyed or acquired in violation of the
provisions hereof but in no case less than five thousand pesos. For
liability for violation of Section 2 to

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attach, it must first be established that there is a law limiting

or reserving the enjoyment or exercise of a right, franchise,
privilege, or business to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least a certain percentage of which
is owned by such citizens. Moreover, it must be shown by evidence
that a corporation or association falsely simulated the existence of
the minimum required Filipino stock or capital ownership to enjoy
or exercise the right, franchise, privilege, or business.
Supreme Court; Questions of Fact; Save for the single specific
instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article
VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of
questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Supreme
Court (SC) because it is not a trier of facts.—In fine, while this
Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and
the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary
writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek
resolution of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance
provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases
the resolution of which depends on the determination of questions
of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are
not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or
rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these
are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory
agencies. This is the raison d’etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism
designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental
tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule
which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the
transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the
issue or cause raised.
Same; Jurisdiction; Seven (7) years after the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 129, the Philippines ratified
the 1987 Constitution; Article VII, Section 5(1) of which provides
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC), which is an
exact reproduction of Section 5(1), Article X of the 1973
Constitution.—In 1981, this Court’s original jurisdiction over
extraordinary writs became concurrent with the CA, pursuant to
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) or The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. BP 129 repealed RA No. 296 and

granted the CA with “[o]riginal jurisdiction to issue writs

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of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo

warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.” In addition, Section 21(2) of BP 129
bestowed the RTCs (formerly the CFIs) with original (and
consequently, concurrent with the Supreme Court) jurisdiction
over actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and
consuls. Seven years after the enactment of BP 129, the
Philippines ratified the 1987 Constitution; Article VII, Section
5(1) of which provides the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, which is an exact reproduction of Section 5(1), Article X of
the 1973 Constitution.
Same; Transcendental Importance Doctrine; It was in Chavez
v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 (2002), when, for the
first time, it appeared that the transcendental importance doctrine
could, apart from its original purpose to overcome objections to
standing, stand as a justification for disregarding the proscription
against direct recourse to the Supreme Court (SC).—It was in
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 (2002), when,
for the first time, it appeared that the transcendental importance
doctrine could, apart from its original purpose to overcome
objections to standing, stand as a justification for disregarding the
proscription against direct recourse to the Court. Chavez is an
original action for mandamus filed before the Court against the
Public Estates Authority (PEA). There, the petition sought,
among others, to compel the PEA to disclose all facts on the PEA’s
then ongoing renegotiations to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. On
the issue of whether the nonobservance of the hierarchy of courts
merits the dismissal of the petition, we ruled that: x x x The
principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases
involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the
Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The
instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public. The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to
the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which
falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5,

Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary
jurisdiction over the instant case.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Certiorari; Up to this
date, the requirement of alleging facts with certainty remains in
Sections 1

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to 3 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.—Up to this

date, the requirement of alleging facts with certainty remains in
Sections 1 to 3 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, the Court, aware of its own limitations, decreed in
Section 2, Rule 3 of its Internal Rules that it is “not a trier of
facts,” viz.: Sec. 2. The Court Not a Trier of Facts.—The Court is
not a trier of facts; its role is to decide cases based on the findings
of fact before it. Where the Constitution, the law or the Court
itself, in the exercise of its discretion, decides to receive evidence,
the reception of evidence may be delegated to a member of the
Court, to either the Clerk of Court or one of the Division Clerks of
Court, or to one of the appellate courts or its justices who shall
submit to the Court a report and recommendation on the basis of
the evidence presented.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; This doctrine of hierarchy of
courts guides litigants as to the proper venue of appeals and/or the
appropriate forum for the issuance of extraordinary writs.—This
doctrine of hierarchy of courts guides litigants as to the proper
venue of appeals and/or the appropriate forum for the issuance of
extraordinary writs. Thus, although this Court, the CA, and the
RTC have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus, parties are directed, as a rule, to file their petitions before
the lower-ranked court. Failure to comply is sufficient cause for
the dismissal of the petition. This Court has interchangeably
referred to the hierarchy of courts as a “principle,” a “rule,” and a
“doctrine.” For purposes for this discussion, however, we shall
refer to it as a doctrine.
Judicial Power; Judicial power is no longer confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights
that were legally demandable and enforceable.—Judicial power is
no longer confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual

controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable. The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides that judicial power also includes the
duty of the courts “x x x to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.”

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Supreme Court; Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court; Direct

recourse to the Supreme Court (SC), on grounds of grave abuse of
discretion, was still allowed only when the questions presented
were legal.—It must be stressed, that this grant of expanded
power of judicial review did not result to the abandonment of the
Angara model. Direct recourse to the Court, on grounds of grave
abuse of discretion, was still allowed only when the questions
presented were legal.
Pleadings and Practice; The 1987 Constitution also took away
the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure.—For the first time,
the Court was granted with the following: (1) the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights; and (2) the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The 1987
Constitution also took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. Pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power, the
Court promulgated new sets of rules which effectively increased
its original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA:
(1) A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; (2)
A.M. No. 0 8-1-16-SC or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and
(3) A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases.
Referral of Cases to the Court of Appeals; The consistent
practice of the Supreme Court (SC) in these cases (that is, referring
such petitions to the Court of Appeals [CA] for the reception of
evidence) is a tacit recognition by the Court itself that it is not
equipped to be a trier of facts.—In practice, however, petitions for
writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan which

were originally filed before this Court invariably found their way
to the CA for hearing and decision, with the CA’s decision to be
later on brought before us on appeal. Thus, in Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the first ever
amparo petition, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the
CA for the conduct of hearing, reception of evidence, and decision.
We also did the same in: (1) Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 660
SCRA 84 (2011); (2) Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 681 SCRA 678
(2012); and (3) International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace South-

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east Asia (Philippines), 776 SCRA 434 (2015). The consistent

practice of the Court in these cases (that is, referring such
petitions to the CA for the reception of evidence) is a tacit
recognition by the Court itself that it is not equipped to be a trier
of facts.
Supreme Court; Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court; Aside
from the special civil actions over which it has original
Jurisdiction, the Supreme Court (SC), through the years, has
allowed litigants to seek direct relief from it upon allegation of
“serious and important reasons.”—Aside from the special civil
actions over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court, through
the years, has allowed litigants to seek direct relief from it upon
allegation of “serious and important reasons.” The Diocese of
Bacolod v. Commission on Elections (Diocese) summarized these
circumstances in this wise: (1) when there are genuine issues of
constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance; (3) cases of first impression; (4) the constitutional
issues raised are better decided by the Court; (5) exigency in
certain situations; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a
constitutional organ; (7) when petitioners rightly claim that they
had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of
respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of
expression; [and] (8) the petition includes questions that are
“dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy,
or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders

complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.”
Same; Jurisdiction; The presence of one or more of the so-
called “special and important reasons” is not the decisive factor
considered by the Supreme Court (SC) in deciding whether to
permit the invocation, at the first instance, of its original
jurisdiction over the issuance of extraordinary writs.—We take
this opportunity to clarify that the presence of one or more of the
so-called “special and important reasons” is not the decisive factor
considered by the Court in deciding whether to permit the
invocation, at the first instance, of its original jurisdiction over
the issuance of extraordinary writs. Rather, it is the nature of
the question raised by the parties in those “exceptions”
that enabled us to allow the direct action before us.

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Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court; The only circumstance

when the Supreme Court (SC) may take cognizance of a case in the
first instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in the
exercise of its constitutionally-expressed task to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s proclamation of
martial law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
—To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does not
clothe us with the power to tackle factual questions and play the
role of a trial court. The only circumstance when we may take
cognizance of a case in the first instance, despite the presence of
factual issues, is in the exercise of our constitutionally-expressed
task to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
President’s proclamation of martial law under Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. The case before us does not fall
under this exception.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of
courts recognizes the various levels of courts in the country as they
are established under the Constitution and by law, their ranking
and effect of their rulings in relation with one another, and how
these different levels of court interact with one another.—The
doctrine of hierarchy of courts recognizes the various levels of
courts in the country as they are established under the
Constitution and by law, their ranking and effect of their rulings

in relation with one another, and how these different levels of
court interact with one another. It determines the venues of
appeals and the appropriate forum for the Issuance of
extraordinary writs. Since the creation of the Court in 1901, and
save for certain exceptions, it does not, as a rule, retry questions
of facts. Trial courts such as the MTCs and the RTCs, on the other
hand, routinely decide questions of fact and law at the first
instance, in accordance with the jurisdiction granted to them by
law. While the CA and other intermediate courts can rule on both
questions of fact and law, the Supreme Court, in stark contrast,
generally decides only questions of law. This is because the Court,
whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction, is
not equipped to receive and evaluate evidence in the first
instance. Our sole role is to apply the law based on the findings of
facts brought before us. Notably, from the 1901 Rules until the
present 1997 Revised Rules of Court, the power to ascertain facts
and receive and evaluate evidence in relation thereto is lodged
with the trial courts.

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Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court; By directly filing a case

before the Supreme Court (SC), litigants necessarily deprive
themselves of the opportunity to completely pursue or defend their
causes of actions.—Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts also proceeds from considerations of due process. While the
term “due process of law” evades exact and concrete definition,
this Court, in one of its earliest decisions, referred to it as a law
which hears before it condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial. It means that every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society. Under the
present Rules of Court, which governs our judicial proceedings,
warring factual allegations of parties are settled through
presentation of evidence. Evidence is the means of ascertaining,
in a judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact. As
earlier demonstrated, the Court cannot accept evidence in the first
instance. By directly filing a case before the Court, litigants
necessarily deprive themselves of the oportunity to completely
pursue or defend their causes of actions. Their right to due

process is effectively undermined by their own doing.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of
courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; (2) prevent further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket; and (3) prevent the inevitable
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower
court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as the
court better equipped to resolve factual questions.—The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; (2) prevent further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket; and (3) prevent the inevitable
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower
court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as the
court better equipped to resolve factual questions. Strict
adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is an effective
mechanism to filter the cases which reach the Court. As of
December 31, 2016, 6,526 new cases were filed to the Court.
Together with the reinstated/revived/reopened cases, the Court
has a total of 14,491

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cases in its docket. Of the new cases, 300 are raffled to the
Court En Banc and 6,226 to the three Divisions of the Court. The
Court En Banc disposed of 105 cases by decision or signed
resolution, while the Divisions of the Court disposed of a total of
923 by decision or signed resolution.
Same; Same; When a question before the Supreme Court (SC)
involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the
resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the
question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling
reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of
the case. Such question must first be brought before the proper
trial courts or the Court of Appeals (CA), both of which are
specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.—For the
guidance of the bench and the bar, we reiterate that when

a question before the Court involves determination of a
factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the legal
issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question
regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling
reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount
importance of the case. Such question must first be
brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of
which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual
questions.

LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Monopoly; View that monopolization should not be
lightly inferred especially since efficient business
organizations are rewarded by the market with growth.—
Monopolization should not be lightly inferred especially
since efficient business organizations are rewarded by the
market with growth. Due to the high barriers to economic
entry and long gestation periods, it is reasonable for the
government to bundle infrastructure projects. There is,
indeed, a difference between abuse of dominant position in
a relevant market and combinations in restraint of trade.
The Petition seems to have confused these two (2)
competition law concepts and it has not made clear which
concept it wished to apply. Further, broad allegations
amounting to a generalization that certain corporations
allow themselves to serve as dummies for cartels or
foreigners cannot hold ground in this Court. These
constitute criminal acts. The Constitution requires that
judicial action proceed carefully and always from a

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presumption of innocence. Tall tales of conspiratorial actions

— though they may be salacious, make for interesting fiction, and
are fodder for social media — do not deserve any judicial action.
Broad generalizations of facts without corresponding evidence
border on the contemptuous.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; View that although the

Constitution grants original and concurrent jurisdiction with the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and the Court of Appeals (CA) over
actions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court (SC) generally does not receive
evidence, and thus, rarely makes findings of facts contested by the
parties at first instance.—Although the Constitution grants
original and concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals over actions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, this
Court generally does not receive evidence, and thus, rarely makes
findings of facts contested by the parties at first instance.
Same; Jurisdiction; Concurrent Jurisdiction; View that in
situations where several courts may exercise jurisdiction either
originally or on an appeal, the court that first seized of the issues
holds jurisdiction over the case, to the exclusion of the rest.—
Jurisdiction is the competence “to hear, try[,] and decide a case.”
It is a power that is granted by the Constitution and by law. In
situations where several courts may exercise jurisdiction either
originally or on an appeal, the court that first seized of the issues
holds jurisdiction over the case, to the exclusion of the rest.
Jurisdiction, or the competence to proceed with the case, requires
several elements. To determine jurisdiction, courts assess: (1) the
remedy or the procedural vehicle for raising the issues; (2) the
subject matter of the controversy; (3) the issues as framed by the
parties; and (4) the processes served on the parties themselves
vis-à-vis the constitutional or law provisions that grant
competence. Related to jurisdiction is our application of the
doctrine of granting the primary administrative jurisdiction,
when statutorily warranted, to the executive department. This is
different from the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
or the doctrine of respect for the hierarchy of courts, which are
matters of justiciability, not jurisdiction.

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Same; Hierarchy of Courts; View that the doctrine of

avoidance is palpable when the Supreme Court (SC) refuses to
decide on the constitutional issue by ruling that the parties have
not exhausted administrative remedies, or that they have violated
the doctrine of respect for the hierarchy of courts.—The doctrine of

avoidance is palpable when we refuse to decide on the
constitutional issue by ruling that the parties have not exhausted
administrative remedies, or that they have violated the doctrine
of respect for the hierarchy of courts. These are specific variants
or corollaries of the rule that the case should be ripe for
constitutional adjudication.
Supreme Court; View that the Supreme Court (SC) should
avoid projecting hypothetical situations where none of the parties
can fully argue simply because they have not established the facts
or are not interested in the issues raised by the hypothetical
situations.—When interpretations of a constitutional provision
are equally valid but lead to contrary results, this Court should
exercise judicial restraint and allow the political forces to shed
light on a choice. This Court steps in only when it discerns clear
fallacies in the application of certain norms or their
interpretation. Judicial restraint requires that this Court does not
involve itself into matters in which only those who join in
democratic political deliberation should participate. As
magistrates of the highest court, we should distinguish our role
from that of an ordinary citizen who can vote. Judicial restraint is
also founded on a policy of conscious and deliberate caution. This
Court should refrain from speculating on the facts of a case and
should allow parties to shape their case instead. Likewise, this
Court should avoid projecting hypothetical situations where none
of the parties can fully argue simply because they have not
established the facts or are not interested in the issues raised by
the hypothetical situations. In a way, courts are mandated to
adopt an attitude of judicial skepticism. What we think may be
happening may not at all be the case. Therefore, this Court should
always await the proper case to be properly pleaded and proved.
Plainly put, majority opinions that rule on constitutional issues as
obiter dictum is dangerous not only because it is injudicious, but
also because it undermines the constitutional framework of
governance.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Prohibition.

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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Macario M. De Guia for petitioner.
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for
respondent CAAP.

JARDELEZA, J.:

The 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court
promulgated, pursuant to its provisions, granted us
original jurisdiction over certain cases. In some instances,
this jurisdiction is shared with Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs) and the Court of Appeals (CA). However, litigants
do not have unfettered discretion to invoke the Court’s
original jurisdiction. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts
dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is allowed only
to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation
of paramount or transcendental importance of the action.
This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a
constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the
Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks
assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
On December 15, 2014, the Department of
Transportation and Communication1 (DOTC) and its
attached agency, the Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-Qualify
and Bid2 (Invitation) on the airport development,
operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao,
Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), and Puerto
Princesa Airports (collectively, Projects).3 The total
_______________
1 Renamed as Department of Transportation under Section 15 of

Republic Act No. 10844 or the Department of Information and Communications
Technology Act of 2015.
2 Rollo, p. 17.
3 Id., at p. 4.

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cost of the Projects is P116.23 Billion, broken down as

follows:4
The Invitation stated that the Projects aim to improve

services and enhance the airside and landside facilities of
the key regional airports through concession agreements
with the private sector. The Projects will be awarded
through competitive bidding, following the procurement
rules and procedure prescibed under Republic Act (RA) No.
6957,6 as amended by RA No. 77187 (BOT Law), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The concession
period would be for 30 years.8
On March 10, 2015, the DOTC and the CAAP issued the
Instructions to Prospective Bidders (ITPB),9 which
provided that prospective bidders are to prequalify and bid
for the development, operations, and maintenance of the
airports, which are now bundled into two groups
(collectively, the Bundled Projects), namely:
_______________
4 See Invitation to Prequalify and Bid. Id.

5 Rollo, p. 17.
6 An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance
of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for Other Purposes.
7 An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957, entitled
“An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and
Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for
Other Purposes.”
8 Rollo, p. 17.
9 Id., at pp. 18-107.

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Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo

Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol
(Panglao)10

The costs of Bundle 1 and Bundle 2 are P50.66 Billion
and P59.66 Billion, respectively. The Puerto Princesa
Airport project was not included in the bundling.11
The general procedure for the bidding of the Bundled
Projects stated that “[p]rospective [b]idders may bid for
only Bundle 1 or Bundle 2, or bid for both Bundle 1 and
Bundle 2. x x x The [Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards
Commitee (PBAC)] shall announce in a Bid Bulletin prior
to the Qualifications Submission Date[,] its policy on
whether a [p]rospective [b]idder may be awarded both
bundles or whether a [p]rospective [b]idder may only be
awarded with one (1) bundle.”12
The submission of the Pre-Qualification Queries was
scheduled for April 3, 2015 and the submission of
Qualification Documents on May 18, 2015.13
On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc.,
represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao
(petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and invoking the
transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present
petition for prohibition.14 Petitioner alleges that it is a
nongovernmental organization composed of subsistence
farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the
victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on government
assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and
livelihood.15 It assails the constitutionality of the bundling
of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP
from proceeding with the bidding of the same.
_______________
10 Id., at p. 24.
11 Id.
12 Id., at p. 35.
13 Id., at p. 6.
14 Id., at pp. 3-16.
15 Id., at p. 3.

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Petitioner raises the following arguments:

First, the bundling of the Projects violated the

“constitutional prohibitions on the anti-dummy and the
grant of opportunity to the general public to invest in
public utilities,”16 citing Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.17 According to petitioner, bundling would
allow companies with questionable or shaky financial
background to have direct access to the Projects “by simply
joining a consortium which under the bundling scheme
adopted by the DOTC said [P]rojects taken altogether
would definitely be beyond the financial capability of any
qualified, single Filipino corporation.”18
Second, bundling violates the constitutional prohibition
on monopolies under Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution because it would allow one winning bidder to
operate and maintain several airports, thus establishing a
monopoly. Petitioner asserts that, given the staggering cost
of the Bundled Projects, the same can only be undertaken
by a group, joint venture outfits, and consortiums which
are susceptible to
_______________
16 Id., at p. 7.
17 Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public
utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or
association must citizens of the Philippines.
18 Rollo, p. 10.

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combinations and schemes to control the operation of the

service for profit, enabling a single consortium to control as
many as six airports.19
Third, bundling will “surely perpetrate an undue
restraint of trade.”20 Mid-sized Filipino companies which
may have previously considered participating in one of the
six (6) distinct Projects will no longer have a realistic
opportunity to participate in the bidding because the
separate projects became two (2) gargantuan projects. This
effectively placed the Projects beyond the reach of medium-
sized Filipino companies.21
Fourth, the PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it
bundled the projects without legal authority.22
Fifth, bundling made a mockery of public bidding
because it raised the reasonable bar to a level higher than
what it would have been, had the projects been bidded out
separately.23
In support of petitioner’s prayer, for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, it states that there is extreme urgency to enjoin
the bidding of the Bundled Projects so as not to cause
irreparable damage and injury to the coffers of the
government.24
In its comment,25 the DOTC counters that: (1) the
petition is premature because there has been no actual
bidding yet, hence there is no justiciable controversy to
speak of; (2) petitioner has no legal standing to file the suit
whether as a tax-
_______________
19 Id., at pp. 10-11.

20 Id., at p. 12.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id., at p. 13.
24 Id., at pp. 13-14.
25 Id., at pp. 214-229.

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payer or as a private individual; (3) petitioner’s allegation

on the violation of anti-dummy and equal opportunity
clauses of the Constitution are speculative and conjectural;
(4) Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution is not
applicable to the bidding process assailed by petitioner; (5)
the bundling of the Projects does not violate the
prohibitions on monopolies or combinations in restraint of
trade; and (6) the DOTC and the CAAP did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.26
For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated
the basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner had not alleged any special and compelling
reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court. The
case should have been filed with the trial court, because it
raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a
full-blown trial.27 The CAAP also maintains that petitioner
has neither legal capacity nor authority to file the suit and
that the petition has no cause of action.28
In its reply,29 petitioner argues that it need not wait for
the conduct of the bidding to file the suit because doing so
would render useless the very purpose for filing the
petition for prohibition.30 As it is, five groups have already
been prequalified to bid in the Bundled
31
Projects. Petitioner also submits that direct recourse to
this Court is justified as the “matter of prohibiting the
bidding process of the x x x illegally bundled projects are
matters of public interest and transcendental
32
importance.” It further insists that it has legal standing
to
_______________
26 Id., at pp. 218-219.

27 Id., at pp. 241-244.
28 Id., at pp. 244-245.
29 Id., at pp. 271-280, 284-286.
30 Id., at p. 271.
31 Id., at p. 274.
32 Id., at p. 284. Emphasis omitted.

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file the suit through Malinao, its duly authorized

representative.33
The main issue brought to us for resolution is whether
the bundling of the Projects is constitutional.
Petitioner argues that the bundling of the Projects is
unconstitutional because it will: (i) create a monopoly; (ii)
allow the creation and operation of a combination in
restraint of trade; (iii) violate anti-dummy laws and
statutes giving citizens the opportunity to invest in public
utilities; and (iv) enable companies with shaky financial
backgrounds to participate in the Projects.

I

While petitioner asserts that the foregoing arguments
involve legal (as opposed to factual) issues, our
examination of the petition shows otherwise. As will be
demonstrated shortly, petitioner’s arguments against the
constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects are
inextricably intertwined with underlying questions of fact,
the determination of which require the reception of
evidence. This Court, however, is not a trier of fact. We
cannot resolve these factual issues at the first instance. For
this reason, we DISMISS the petition.

A

Petitioner claims that the bundling of the Projects
violates the constitutional provisions on monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade under Section 19, Article
XII of the Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies

while the public interest
_______________
33 Id., at p. 285.

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so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair

competition shall be allowed.

In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,34 we
clarified that the Constitution does not prohibit the
operation of monopolies per se.35 With particular respect to
the operation of public utilities or services, this Court, in
Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro,36 further clarified
that “[b]y their very nature, certain public services or
public utilities such as those which supply water,
electricity, transportation, telephone, telegraph, etc. must
be given exclusive franchises if public interest is to be
served. Such exclusive franchises are not violative of the
law against monopolies.”
In short, we find that the grant of a concession
agreement to an entity, as a winning bidder, for the
exclusive development, operation, and maintenance of any
or all of the Projects, does not by itself create a monopoly
violative of the provisions of the Constitution. Anglo-Fil
Trading Corporation teaches that exclusivity is inherent in
the grant of a concession to a private entity to deliver a
public service, where Government chooses not to undertake
such service.37 Otherwise stated, while the grant may
result in a monopoly, it is a type of monopoly not violative
of law. This is the essence of the policy decision of the
Government to enter into concessions with the private
sector to build, maintain and operate what would have
otherwise been government-operated services, such as
airports. In any case, the law itself provides for built-in
protections to safeguard the public interest, foremost of
_______________
34 G.R. Nos. 124360 & 127867, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 330.
35 Id., at p. 357.
36 Nos. L-54958 & L-54966, September 2, 1983, 124 SCRA 494, 522.
37 Id. See also Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7718, and Section 2.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the BOT Law, as amended.

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which is to require public bidding. Under the BOT Law, for

example, a private-public partnership (PPP) agreement
may be undertaken through public bidding, in cases of
solicited proposals, or through “Swiss challenge” (also
known as comparative bidding), in cases of unsolicited
proposals.
In any event, the Constitution provides that the State
may, by law, prohibit or regulate monopolies when the
public interest so requires.38 Petitioner has failed to point to
any provision in the law, which specifically prohibits the
bundling of bids, a detail supplied by the respondent DOTC
as implementing agency for the PPP program for airports.
Our examination of the petition and the relevant statute,
in fact, provides further support for the dismissal of the
present action.
Originally, monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade were governed by, and penalized under, Article
18639 of
_______________
38 Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, supra note 34 at p.

355.
39 Art. 186. Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade.—
The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum period or a fine
ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall enter into any contract or agreement
or shall take part in any conspiracy or combination in the form of a
trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent
by artificial means free competition in the market;
2. Any person who shall monopolize any merchandise or object
of trade or commerce, or shall combine with any other person or
persons to monopolize said merchandise or object in order to alter
the price thereof by spreading false rumors or making use of any
other artifice to restrain free competition in the market;
3. Any person who, being a manufacturer, producer, or
processor of any merchandise or object of commerce or an importer
of any merchandise or object of commerce from any foreign country,
either as principal or agent, wholesaler or retailer, shall combine,
conspire or agree in any manner with any

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the Revised Penal Code. This provision has since been

repealed by RA No. 10667, or the Philippine Competition
Act, which defines and penalizes “all forms of
anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominant position,
and anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions.”40
RA No. 10667 does not define what constitutes a
“monopoly.” Instead, it prohibits one or more entities which
has/have acquired or achieved a “dominant position” in a
“relevant market” from “abusing” its dominant position. In
other words, an entity is not prohibited from, or held liable
for prosecution and punishment for, simply securing a
dominant position in the relevant market in which it
operates. It is only when that
_______________
person likewise engaged in the manufacture, production, processing,

assembling or importation of such merchandise or object of commerce or
with any other persons not so similarly engaged for the purpose of making
transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce, or of increasing the market
price in any part of the Philippines, of any such merchandise or object of
commerce manufactured, produced, processed, assembled in or imported
into the Philippines, or of any article in the manufacture of which such
manufactured, produced, or imported merchandise or object of commerce
is used.
If the offense mentioned in this article affects any food substance,
motor fuel or lubricants, or other articles of prime necessity, the penalty
shall be that of prisión mayor in its maximum and medium periods it
being sufficient for the imposition thereof that the initial steps have been
taken toward carrying out the purposes of the combination.
Any property possessed under any contract or by any combination
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, and being the subject thereof,
shall be forfeited to the Government of the Philippines.
Whenever any of the offenses described above is committed by a
corporation or association, the president and each one of its agents or
representatives in the Philippines in case of a foreign corporation or
association, who shall have knowingly permitted or to prevent the
commission of such offense, shall be held liable as principals thereof.
40 See Sections 2(t) and 55(a) of Republic Act No. 10667.

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entity engages in conduct in abuse of its dominant position

that it will be exposed to prosecution and possible
punishment.
Under RA No. 10667, “dominant position” is defined as
follows:
Sec. 4. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act:

x x x x
(g) Dominant position refers to a position of economic
strength that an entity or entities hold which makes it
capable of controlling the relevant market independently
from any or a combination of the following: competitors,
customers, suppliers, or consumers[.]

“Relevant market,” on the other hand, refers to the
market in which a particular good or service is sold and
which is a combination of the relevant product market and
the relevant geographic market.41 The determination of a
particular relevant market depends on the consideration of
factors which affect the substitutability among goods or
services constitut-
_______________
41 Sec. 4. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act:

x x x x
(k) Relevant market refers to the market in which a particular good or
service is sold and which is a combination of the relevant product market
and the relevant geographic market, defined as follows:
(1) A relevant product market comprises all those goods and/or
services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the
consumer or the customer, by reason of the goods and/or services’
characteristics, their prices and their intended use; and
(2) The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the
entity concerned is involved in the supply and demand of goods and
services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently
homogenous and which can be distinguished from neighboring areas
because the conditions of competition are different in those areas.

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ing such market, and the geographic area delineating the

boundaries of the market.42 An entity with a dominant
position in a relevant market is deemed to have abused its
dominant position if it engages in a conduct that would
substantially prevent, restrict, or lessen competition.43
_______________
42 Sec. 24. Relevant Market.—For purposes of determining the

relevant market, the following factors, among others, affecting the
substitutability among goods or services constituting such market and the
geographic area delineating the boundaries of the market shall be
considered:
(a) The possibilities of substituting the goods or services in question,
with others of domestic or foreign origin, considering the technological
possibilities, extent to which substitutes are available to consumers and
time required for such substitution;
(b) The cost of distribution of the good or service, its raw materials, its
supplements and substitutes from other areas and abroad, considering
freight, insurance, import duties and nontariff restrictions; the
restrictions imposed by economic agents or by their associations; and the
time required to supply the market from those areas;
(c) The cost and probability of users or consumers seeking other markets;
and
(d) National, local or international restrictions which limit access by
users or consumers to alternate sources of supply or the access of
suppliers to alternate consumers.
43 Sec. 15. Abuse of Dominant Position.—It shall be prohibited for
one or more entities to abuse their dominant position by engaging in
conduct that would substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition:
(a) Selling goods or services be low cost with the object of driving
competition out of the relevant market: Provided, That in the
Commission’s evaluation of this fact, it shall consider whether the entity
or entities have no such object and the price established was in good faith
to meet or compete with the lower price of a competitor in the same
market selling the same or comparable product or service of like quality;
(b) Imposing barriers to entry or committing acts that prevent
competitors from growing within the market in an anticompetitive
manner except those that develop in the market as a result of or

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_______________
arising from a superior product or process, business acumen, or legal

rights or laws;
(c) Making a transaction subject to acceptance by the other parties of
other obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the transaction;
(d) Setting prices or other terms or conditions that discriminate
unreasonably between customers or sellers of the same goods or services,
where such customers or sellers are contemporaneously trading on similar
terms and conditions, where the effect may be to lessen competition
substantially: Provided, that the following shall be considered permissible
price differentials:
(1) Socialized pricing for the less fortunate sector of the economy;
(2) Price differential which reasonably or approximately reflect
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from differing methods, technical conditions, or quantities in which
the goods or services are sold or delivered to the buyers or sellers;
(3) Price differential or terms of sale offered in response to the
competitive price of payments, services or changes in the facilities
furnished by a competitor; and
(4) Price changes in response to changing market conditions,
marketability of goods or services, or volume;
(e) Imposing restrictions on the lease or contract for sale or trade of
goods or services concerning where, to whom, or in what forms goods or
services may be sold or traded, such as fixing prices, giving preferential
discounts or rebate upon such price, or imposing conditions not to deal
with competing entities, where the object or effect of the restrictions is to
prevent, restrict or lessen competition substantially: Provided, That
nothing contained in this Act shall prohibit or render unlawful:
(1) Permissible franchising, licensing, exclusive merchandising
or exclusive distributorship agreements such as those which give
each party the right to unilaterally terminate the agreement; or
(2) Agreements protecting intellectual property rights,
confidential information, or trade secrets;

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Here, petitioner has not alleged ultimate facts to

support its claim that bundling will create a monopoly, in
violation of the Constitution. By merely stating legal
conclusions, petitioner did not present any sufficient
allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief
petitioner prayed for. In Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-
Gran,44 we held that “[a] pleading should state the
ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense
asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or
conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is
valid or legal, or is just, fair, and reasonable, are mere
conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is
void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public
policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are
mere conclusions of law.”45 The present action should thus
be dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause of
action.46
_______________
(f) Making supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the

purchase of other goods or services from the supplier which have no direct
connection with the main goods or services to be supplied;
(g) Directly or indirectly imposing unfairly low purchase prices for the
goods or services of, among others, marginalized agricultural producers,
fisherfolk, micro-, small-, medium-scale enterprises, and other
marginalized service providers and producers;
(h) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling price on
their competitors, customers, suppliers or consumers, provided, that
prices that develop in the market as a result of or due to a superior
product or process, business acumen or legal rights or laws shall not be
considered unfair prices; and
(i) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers, provided, that limitations that develop in the
market as a result of or due to a superior product or process, business
acumen or legal rights or laws shall not be a violation of this Act:
x x x x
44 G.R. No. 197380, October 8, 2014, 738 SCRA 33.
45 Id., at p. 45. Emphasis and citation omitted.
46 Id.

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Similarly, RA No. 10667 does not define what a

“combination in restraint of trade” is. What it does is
penalize anticompetitive agreements. Agreement refers to
“any type of form or contract, arrangement,
understanding, collective recommendation, or concerted
action, whether formal or informal.”47 The following
agreements are considered anti competitive:
Sec. 14. Anticompetitive Agreements.—

(a) The following agreements, between or among
competitors, are per se prohibited:
(1) Restricting competition as to price, or components
thereof, or other terms of trade;
(2) Fixing price at an auction or in any form of bidding
including cover bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation and
market allocation and other analogous practices of bid
manipulation;
(b) The following agreements, between or among
competitors which have the object or effect of substantially
preventing, restricting or lessening competition shall be
prohibited:
(1) Setting, limiting, or controlling production, markets,
technical development, or investment;
(2) Dividing or sharing the market, whether by volume
of sales or purchases, territory, type of goods or services,
buyers or sellers or any other means;
(c) Agreements other than those specified in (a) and (b)
of this section which have the object or effect of
substantially preventing, restricting or lessening
competition shall also be prohibited: Provided, Those which
contribute to improving the production or distribution of
goods and services or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while al-
_______________
47 Republic Act No. 10667, Sec. 4(b). Emphasis supplied.

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lowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, may

not necessarily be deemed a violation of this Act.
An entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with another entity or entities, have
common economic interests, and are not otherwise able to
decide or act independently of each other, shall not be
considered competitors for purposes of this section.

The bundling of the Projects is an an arrangement made
by the DOTC and the CAAP in the conduct of public
bidding. The question that arises is whether the same
constitutes an anticompetitive agreement prohibited by RA
No. 10667. However, to resolve this, we refer to the factors
enumerated in Section 26 of RA No. 10667 on the
determination of anticompetitive agreements or conduct:
Sec. 26. Determination of Anticompetitive Agreement or

Conduct.—In determining whether anticompetitive
agreement or conduct has been committed, the Commission
shall:

(a) Define the relevant market allegedly affected
by the anticompetitive agreement or conduct,
following the principles laid out in Section 24 of this
Chapter;
(b) Determine if there is actual or potential
adverse impact on competition in the relevant
market caused by the alleged agreement or conduct,
and if such impact is substantial and outweighs the
actual or potential efficiency gains that result from
the agreement or conduct;
(c) Adopt a broad and forward-looking perspective,
recognizing future developments, any overriding need to
make the goods or services available to consumers, the
requirements of large investments in infrastruc-

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ture, the requirements of law, and the need of our

economy to respond to international competition, but
also taking account of past behavior of the parties involved

and prevailing market conditions;
(d) Balance the need to ensure that competition is not
prevented or substantially restricted and the risk that
competition efficiency, productivity, innovation, or
development of priority areas or industries in the general
interest of the country may be deterred by overzealous or
undue intervention; and
(e) Assess the totality of evidence on whether it is more
likely than not that the entity has engaged in
anticompetitive agreement or conduct including whether
the entity’s conduct was done with a reasonable commercial
purpose such as but not limited to phasing out of a product
or closure of a business, or as a reasonable commercial
response to the market entry or conduct of a competitor.
(Emphasis supplied)

Similar to its assertion that bundling will create a
monopoly prohibited by law, we find that petitioner, again,
utterly failed to sufficiently state a cause of action, by
failing to plead ultimate facts to support its conclusion that
bundling, as an arrangement, is in restraint of trade or
results in unfair competition under the provisions of RA
No. 10667.
Even granting that the petition sufficiently pleads a
cause of action for the foregoing violations, there is a need
to receive evidence to test the premises of petitioner’s
conclusions.
To illustrate, applying the facts and claims relative to
the violation of the proscription against monopolies, what
RA No. 10667, in fact, prohibits and punishes is the
situation where: (1) an entity, having been granted an
exclusive franchise to maintain and operate one or more
airports, attains a domi-

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nant position in that market; and (2) abuses such dominant

position by engaging in prohibited conduct, i.e., acts that
substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition in
market of airport development, operations and
maintenance. Thus, for petitioner to succeed in asserting

that such a prohibited situation legally obtains, it must
first establish, by evidence, that indeed: (1) the relevant
market is that of airport development, maintenance, and
operation (under the facts-based criteria enumerated in
Section 24 of RA No. 10667); (2) the entity has achieved a
dominant position (under the facts-based criteria
enumerated in Section 27 of RA No. 10667) in that relevant
market; and (3) the entity commits acts constituting abuse
of dominant position (under the facts based criteria
enumerated in Section 27 of RA No. 10667).
In addition, to support the legal conclusion that
bundling is an anticompetitive agreement, there must be
evidence that: (1) the relevant market is that of airport
development, maintenance, and operation (under the
facts-based criterion enumerated in Section 24 of RA No.
10667); (2) bundling causes, or will cause, actual or
potential adverse impact on the competition in that
relevant market; (3) said impact is substantial and
outweighs the actual or potential efficiency gains that
results from bundling; and (4) the totality of evidence
shows that the winning bidder, more likely than not
engaged, in anticompetitive conduct.
The Court, however, is still not a trier of facts. Petitioner
should have brought the challenge before a tribunal,
specially equipped to resolve the factual and legal issues
presented.48
_______________
48 Under Republic Act No. 10667, the Congress created the Philippine
Competition Commission (PCC), an independent quasi-judicial body
(Section 5), which it vested with original and primary jurisdiction over the
enforcement and implementation of the Philippine Competition Act. The
PCC was granted the express power to conduct inquiry, investigate, and
hear and decide on cases involving

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B

We now jointly discuss petitioner’s remaining

allegations, namely, that bundling of the Projects: (i)
violates the anti-dummy law and the constitutional
provision allegedly giving citizens the opportunity to invest
in public utilities; (ii) is in grave abuse of discretion; and
(iii) enables companies with shaky financial backgrounds to
participate in the Projects.
Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Dummy Law, was enacted to limit the
enjoyment of certain economic activities to Filipino citizens
or corporations.49 Section 2 of said law states:
Sec. 2. Simulation of minimum capital stock.—In all

cases in which a constitutional or legal provision requires
that, in order that a corporation or association may exercise
or enjoy a right, franchise or privilege, not less than a
certain per centum of its capital must be owned by citizens
of the Philippines or of any other specific country, it shall be
unlawful to falsely simulate the existence of such minimum
stock or capital as owned by such citizens, for the purpose of
evading said provision. The president or managers and
directors or trustees of corporations or associations
convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than five nor more than fifteen
years, and by a fine not less than the value of the right,
franchise or privilege, enjoyed or acquired in violation of the
provisions hereof but in no case less than five thousand
pesos.
_______________
any violation of the Act motu proprio or upon complaint of an interested

party or referral by a regulatory agency (Section 12).
49 Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188456, September
10, 2009, 599 SCRA 69, 147.

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For liability for violation of Section 2 to attach, it must

first be established that there is a law limiting or reserving
the enjoyment or exercise of a right, franchise, privilege, or
business to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or

associations at least a certain percentage of which is owned
by such citizens.50 Moreover, it must be shown by evidence
that a corporation or association falsely simulated the
existence of the minimum required Filipino stock or capital
ownership to enjoy or exercise the right, franchise,
privilege, or business.
In this case, petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts
showing how the bundling of the Projects violated the Anti-
Dummy Law. It did not identify what corporation or
association falsely simulated the composition of its stock
ownership. Moreover, it did not allege that there is a law
limiting, reserving, or requiring that infrastructure or
development projects must be awarded only to
corporations, a certain percentage of the capital of which is
exclusively owned by Filipinos. Executive Order (EO) No.
65,51 even exempts contracts for
infrastructure/development projects covered by the BOT
Law from the 40% foreign ownership limitation.
For the same reasons above, petitioner’s allegation that
bundling violated Section 11,52 Article XII of the
Constitution
_______________
50 Id., at pp. 147-148.

51 Promulgating the Eleventh Regular Foreign Investment Negative
List, issued on October 29, 2018 by President Rodrigo R. Duterte.
52 Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized
under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in

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— which prescribes a 60% Filipino ownership

requirement for franchises, certificate, or for the operation
of public utilities — must be rejected.
Petitioner’s argument that, bundling of the Projects gave
shady companies direct access to the Projects, also raises
questions of fact. Foremost, petitioner does not identify
these “shady companies.” Even assuming that petitioner is
referring to any or all of the five companies who have been
prequalified to bid in the projects,53 its assertion that these
companies are not financially able to undertake the project
raises a question of fact, financial ability being a
prequalification requirement. As already stated earlier,
such question is one which this Court is ill-equipped to
resolve.54
Finally, the allegation that bundling is in grave abuse of
discretion is a conclusion of law. As shown, no facts were
even alleged to show which specific law was violated by the
decision to bundle the Projects.
In short, these three above arguments of petitioner must
be dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead a cause of
action. Even assuming that petitioner’s causes of action
were prop-
_______________
public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors

in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to
their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of
the Philippines.
53 Rollo, p. 274.
54 Sec. 5.4(c) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the
BOT Law requires, for purposes of prequalification, proof of the
companies’ or consortia’s net worth or a letter testimonial from a domestic
universal/commercial bank or an international bank with a
subsidiary/branch in the Philippines or any internal bank recognized by
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas attesting that the prospective project
proponent and/or members of the consortium are banking with them, and
that they are in good financial standing and/or qualified to obtain credit
accommodations from such banks to finance the projects.

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erly alleged, the resolution of said issues would still require

the determination of factual issues which this Court simply
cannot undertake.
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent
jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus55 (extraordinary writs), direct recourse
to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions
of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the
Constitution under Section 18, Article VII,56 cases the
resolution of which depends on the determination of
questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the
Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not
equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and
evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the
primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory
agencies.57 This is the raison d’etre behind the doctrine of
hierar-
_______________
55 Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 9(1)
and 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 or The Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980.
56 Sec. 18.
x x x x
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from
its filing.
x x x x
57 See Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social
Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017, 824 SCRA 164,
citing Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, G.R. No. 143951, October 25, 2005,
474 SCRA 153, 160-162. See also Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine
Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 287, 308;
Chua v. Ang, G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA 229, 238-
239; Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. No.
155001, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 575, 584; Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152, 179.

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chy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering

mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the
more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution.
It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an
invocation of the transcendental importance or
constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised.

II

For a better understanding of our ruling today, we
review below, in light of the Court’s fundamental
constitutional tasks, the constitutional and statutory
evolution of the Court’s original and concurrent
jurisdiction, and its interplay with related doctrines,
pronouncements, and even the Court’s own rules, as
follows:

(a) The Court’s original and concurrent jurisdiction;
(b) Direct recourse to the Court under the Angara58
model;
(c) The transcendental importance doctrine;
(d) The Court is not a trier of facts;
(e) The doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
(f) The Court’s expanded jurisdiction, social rights, and
the Court’s constitutional rulemaking power under
the 1987 Constitution;
(g) Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts: The
case of The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections;59
(h) Hierarchy of courts as a constitutional imperative;
and
(i) Hierarchy of courts as a filtering mechanism.
_______________
58 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 3 Phil. 139 (1936).

59 G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, 747 SCRA 1.

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A
The Court’s original and
concurrent jurisdiction

The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over petitions
for extraordinary writs predates the 1935 Constitution.
On June 11, 1901, the Second Philippine Commission,
popularly known as the Taft Commission, enacted Act No.
136, or An Act Providing For the Organization of Courts in
the Philippine Islands.60 Act No. 136 vested the judicial
power of the Government of the Philippine Islands unto the
Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance (CFI), courts of
justices of the peace, together with such special jurisdiction
of municipal courts, and other special tribunals as may be
authorized by law.61 Under Act No. 136, the Supreme
Court had original jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec. 17. Its Original Jurisdiction.—The Supreme Court

shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto in the cases and in the
manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and
to hear and determine controversies thus brought before it,
and in other cases provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

The Code of Civil Procedure62 (1901 Rules) referred to in
Section 17 of Act No. 136, in turn, provided that the
Supreme
_______________
60 Johnson, Cecil David, Courts in the Philippines, Old: New, Michigan

Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 314 (Feb. 1916).
61 Act No. 136, Sec. 2.
62 Act No. 190 or An Act Providing a Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands, enacted on
August 7, 1901 and became effective on September 1, 1901.

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Court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the CFIs

in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus proceedings over
any inferior tribunal, board, or officer and in quo
warranto and habeas corpus proceedings.63 Likewise, the
1901 Rules stated that the Court shall have original
jurisdiction by certiorari and mandamus over the
proceedings of CFIs wherever said courts have acted
without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or in case of
a mandamus proceeding, when the CFIs and judges thereof
unlawfully neglect the performance of a duty imposed by
law.64
Notably, Sections 496 and 497 of the 1901 Rules
proscribed the Court not only from reviewing the evidence
taken in the court below but also from retrying questions of
fact, viz.:
Sec. 496. General Procedure in the Supreme Court.—

The Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, affirm, reverse, or modify any final judgment,
order, or decree of a Court of First Instance, regularly
entered in the Supreme Court by bill of exceptions, or
appeal, and may direct the proper judgment, order, or
decree to be entered, or direct a new trial, or further
proceedings to be had, and if a new trial shall be
granted, the court shall pass upon and determine all
the questions of law involved in the case presented
by such bill of exceptions and necessary for the final
determination of the action.
Sec. 497. Hearings Confined to Matters of Law, With
Certain Exceptions.—In hearings upon bills of exception, in
civil actions and special proceedings, the Supreme Court
shall not review the evidence taken
_______________
63 See Code of Civil Procedures, Sections 514, 515, 516, 519, and 526.
64 Code of Civil Procedures, Sections 514, 515, 516, and 519.

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in the court below, nor retry the questions of fact,

except as in this section hereafter provided; but shall
determine only questions of law raised by the bill of
exceptions. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

On July 1, 1902, the Congress enacted the Philippine
Bill65 or the first “Constitution” of the Philippines under
the American occupation.66 The Philippine Bill retained
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court conferred under
Act No. 136, with the caveat that the legislative
department might add to such jurisdiction.67 Thus, in
Weigall v. Shuster,68 one of the earliest cases of the Court,
we held that the Philippine Commission could increase, but
not decrease, our original jurisdiction under Act No. 136.
On December 31, 1916, Act No. 2657 or the
Administrative Code was enacted, which included the
“Judiciary Law” under Title IV, Chapter 10. It was revised
on March 10, 1917 through the Revised Administrative
Code,69 which increased the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court by adding those cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.70
_______________
65 An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the
Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other

Purposes.
66 Johnson, David Cecil, Courts in the Philippines, Old: New, Michigan
Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 316 (Feb. 1916).
67 Philippine Bill of 1902, Sec. 9. That the Supreme Court and the
Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and
exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided, and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said
Islands, subject to the power of said Government to change the practice
and method of procedure. x x x
68 11 Phil. 340 (1908).
69 Act No. 2711 or An Act Amending the Administrative Code.
70 Revised Administrative Code, Sec. 138.

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On May 14, 1935, 33 years after the enactment of the

Philippine Bill, the Philippines ratified the 1935
Constitution. Like its predecessor, the 1935 Constitution
adopted the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in existing laws, i.e., Act No. 136, the 1901 Rules,
and the Revised Administrative Code. Section 3, Article
VIII of the 1935 Constitution states that, “[u]ntil the
[Congress] shall provide otherwise the Supreme Court
shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may
be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution. x x x”71 The 1935 Constitution further stated
that the Congress may not deprive the Supreme Court of
its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls.72
On December 31, 1935, Commonwealth Act No.
73
3, amending the Revised Administrative Code, created
the Court of Appeals (CA) and granted it “original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary
writs and process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”74
On June 17, 1948, the Congress enacted RA No. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1948. Section 17 of RA No. 296 vested the Supreme Court
with “original and exclusive jurisdiction in petitions for the
issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Court of Appeals.” It also provided that the Supreme
_______________
71 Constitution (1935), Art. VIII, Sec. 3, as amended.

72 Constitution (1935), Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
73 An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on
the Judiciary, by Reducing the Number of Justices of the Supreme Court and
Creating the Court of Appeals and Defining Their Respective Jurisdictions,

Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
74 Commonwealth Act No. 3. Sec. 3, as amended.

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Court shall exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction

with CFIs:
x x x x
1. In petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus;
2. In actions between the Roman Catholic Church and
the municipalities or towns, or the Filipino Independent
Church for controversy as to title to, or ownership,
administration or possession of hospitals, convents,
cemeteries or other properties used in connection therewith;
3. In actions brought by the Government of the
Philippines against the Roman Catholic Church or vice
versa for the title to, or ownership of, hospitals, asylums,
charitable institutions, or any other kind of property; and
4. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations
of law concerning monopolies and combinations in restraint
of trade.

RA No. 5440 amended RA No. 296 on September 9,
1968, deleting numbers 3 and 4 mentioned above.75
Several years later, on January 17, 1973, the Philippines
ratified the 1973 Constitution. Article X of the same is
dedicated to the Judiciary. Section 5(1) of the said article
provides for the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, viz.:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:
_______________
75 See Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5440 or An Act Amending Sections
Nine and Seventeen of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

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(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases

affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
x x x x

Where the 1935 Constitution only referred to the
original jurisdiction which the Supreme Court possessed at
the time of its adoption, the 1973 Constitution expressly
provided for the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs.
In 1981, this Court’s original jurisdiction over
extraordinary writs became concurrent with the CA,
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) or The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. BP 129 repealed RA
No. 29676 and granted the CA with “[o]riginal jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.”77 In
addition, Section 21(2) of BP 129 bestowed the RTCs
(formerly the CFIs) with original (and consequently,
concurrent with the Supreme Court) jurisdiction over
actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers
and consuls.
Seven years after the enactment of BP 129, the
Philippines ratified the 1987 Constitution; Article VII,
Section 5(1) of which provides the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, which is an exact reproduction of
Section 5(1), Article X of the 1973 Constitution.
_______________
76 Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Sec. 47.

77 Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Sec. 9(i).

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B
Direct recourse to the Court under
the Angara model

Direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction over
the issuance of extraordinary writs started in 1936 with
Angara v. Electoral Commission.78 Angara is the first case
directly filed before the Court after the 1935 Constitution
took effect on November 15, 1935. It is the quintessential

example of a valid direct recourse to this Court on
constitutional questions.
Angara was an original petition for prohibition seeking
to restrain the Electoral Commission from taking further
cognizance of an election contest filed against an elected
(and confirmed) member of the National Assembly. The
main issue before the Court involved the question of
whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy.79
We took cognizance of the petition, ruling foremost that
the Court has jurisdiction over the case by virtue of its
“power of judicial review under the Constitution”:
x x x [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate

constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invali-
_______________
78 Supra note 58.

79 Angara averred that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
case because it involves the interpretation of the Constitution. The
Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Electoral Commission,
asserted that the Electoral Commission cannot be the subject of a writ of
prohibition because it is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, or person
within the purview of Sections 226 and 516 of the 1901 Rules. Pedro
Ynsua raised the same argument. Id., at pp. 153-155.

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date an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn

and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. x x x80
In Angara, there was no dispute as to the facts.

Petitioner was allowed to file the petition for prohibition
directly before us because what was considered was
the nature of the issue involved in the case: a legal
controversy between two agencies of the
government that called for the exercise of the power
of judicial review by the final arbiter of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court.
Several years later, another original action for
prohibition was filed directly before the Court, this time
seeking to enjoin certain members of the rival political
party from “continuing to usurp, intrude into and/or hold or
exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied
by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal.” In Tañada and
Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al.81 we were confronted with the
issue of “whether the election of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias — a
member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate — on behalf of its
Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination x x x of the
party having the second largest number of votes.
x x x x.”82 There, this Court proceeded to resolve the
constitutional issue raised without inquiring into the
propriety of direct recourse to us. Similar with Angara, the
question before us, then, was purely legal.
_______________
80 Id., at p. 158.
81 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
82 Id., at p. 1068. Italics in the original.

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The Angara model of direct recourse would be followed

and allowed by the Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee,83 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na
mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,84
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic

of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP),85 Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,86
Belgica v. Ochoa,87
_______________
83 G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991, 203 SCRA 767. The issues
before us are: (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the
motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations under
the doctrine of separation of powers; and (2) whether the the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee has power under Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of
legislation. Id., at pp. 774-777.
84 G.R. No. 160262, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44. The issues
before us are: (1) whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one-year bar provided in the
Constitution; and (2) whether this is a political question that is beyond the
ambit of judicial review. Id., at pp. 105, 120-126.
85 G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008, 568 SCRA 402. The substantive
issues are: (1) whether the respondents violated constitutional and
statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information
(under Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution) when they
negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and (2) whether the
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain violate the Constitution
and the laws (i.e., Sections 1, 15, and 20, Article X of the 1987
Constitution; Section 3, Article 10 of Republic Act No. 9054 or the Organic
Act of Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao; Section 52 of Republic
Act No. 8371 or The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997). Id., at pp.
465-582.
86 G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635 SCRA 783. The issue is
whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of the
Supreme Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Id., at pp. 790, 817.
87 G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1. The substantive
issues are: (1) As to Congressional Pork Barrel – whether

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Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,88 Araullo v. Aquino III,89 Saguisag v.

Ochoa, Jr.,90 Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines,91 to
name
_______________
the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of constitutional provisions on
(a) separation of powers; (b) nondelegability of legislative power; (c) checks
and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
autonomy; and
(2) As to Presidential Pork Barrel – Whether or not the phrases (a)
“and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or
destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized
by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional
insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power. Id., at
pp. 88, 106-108.
88 G.R. No. 207563, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146. The substantive
issue is whether the RH law is unconstitutional because it violates the
following rights provided under the 1987 Constitution: (1) right to life; (2)
right to health; (3) freedom of religion and the right to free speech; (4) the
family; (5) freedom of expression and academic freedom; (6) due process;
(7) equal protection; (8) involuntary servitude; (9) delegation of authority
to the Food and Drugs Administration; and (10) autonomy of local
governments/Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Id., at p. 274.
89 G.R. No. 209569, July 1, 2014, 728 SCRA 1. The substantive issues
are: (1) whether the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) violates
Section 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: “No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.” (2) whether the DAP, National Budget Circular No. 541,
and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar as (a) they treat
the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn
from government agencies as “savings” as the term is used in Section
25(5), in relation to the provisions of the General Apporopriations Acts
(GAAs) of

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a few. To stress, the common denominator of all these

cases is that the threshold questions presented
before us are ones of law.

C
The transcendental importance doctrine

In 1949, the Court introduced a legal concept that will
later underpin most of the cases filed directly before us —
the doctrine of transcendental importance. Although this
doctrine was originally used to relax the rules on locus
standi or legal standing, its application would later be
loosely extended as an independent justification for direct
recourse to this Court.
_______________
2011, 2012 and 2013; (b) they authorize the disbursement of funds for
projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the Executive
Department; and (c) they “augment” discretionary lump sum
appropriations in the GAAs. (3) whether or not the DAP violates: (a) the
Equal Protection Clause; (b) the system of checks and balances; and (c) the
principle of public accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
considering that it authorizes the release of funds upon the request of
legislators. Id., at pp. 59-60.
90 G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444, January 12, 2016, 779 SCRA 241, 321-
333. The issues are: (1) whether the President may enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities under Article
XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution; and (2) whether the provisions
under Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement are consistent with the
Constitution, as well as with existing laws and treaties (i.e., the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement). Id., at p. 337.
91 G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017, 832 SCRA 282. The issue is whether
or not under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, it is
mandatory for the Congress to automatically convene in joint session in
the event that the President proclaims a state of martial law and/or
suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the Philippines or
any part thereof.

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We first used the term “transcendental importance” in

Araneta v. Dinglasan.92 Araneta involved five consolidated
petitions before the Court assailing the validity of the
President’s orders issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act
No. 671, or “An Act Declaring a State of Total Emergency
as a Result of War Involving the Philippines and
Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and
Regulations to Meet such Emergency.”93 Petitioners rested
their case on the theory that Commonwealth Act No. 671
had already ceased to have any force and effect.94 The main
issues for resolution in Araneta were: (1) whether
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force; and
relatedly, (2) whether the executive orders issued pursuant
thereto were valid. Specifically, the Court had to resolve
the issue of whether Commonwealth Act No. 671 (and the
President’s Emergency Powers) continued to be effective
after the opening of the regular session of Congress.
In overruling the objection to the personality or
sufficiency of the interest of petitioners in bringing the
actions as taxpayers,95 this Court declared that “[a]bove all,
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
96
procedure.” Thus, and similar with Angara, direct
recourse to the Court in Araneta is justified because
the issue to be resolved there was one of law; there
was no dispute as to any underlying fact. Araneta has
since then been followed by a myriad of cases97
_______________
92 84 Phil. 368 (1949).

93 Id., at p. 374.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id., at p. 373.
97 See Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Lim, G.R. No. 187916,
November 25, 2014, 742 SCRA 1; Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78; Chavez v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441; Automotive
Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) v.

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where transcendental importance was cited as basis for

setting aside objections on legal standing.
It was in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority98 when, for
the first time, it appeared that the transcendental
importance doctrine could, apart from its original purpose
to overcome objections to standing, stand as a justification
for disregarding the proscription against direct recourse to
the Court. Chavez is an original action for mandamus filed
before the
_______________
Romulo, G.R. No. 157509, January 18, 2005, 449 SCRA 1; Bayan (Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587,
138680 & 138698, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449; Integrated Bar the
Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81;
Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA
789; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782,
December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 837; Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750; Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R.
No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343; Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835. See also Padilla v.
Congress of the Philippines, supra note 91; Ocampo v. Mendoza, G.R. No.
190431, January 31, 2017, 816 SCRA 300; Intellectual Property
Association of the Philippines v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016,
797 SCRA 134; Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, G.R. No.
193462, February 4, 2014, 715 SCRA 247; Liberal Party v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 393; Guingona, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 448;
Francisco, Jr. v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154117, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 50;
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410; Province of North Cotabato v.
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain (GRP), supra note 85; Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
151445, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 739; Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No.
149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49; Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 111610, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 28; and De Guia v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 420.
98 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 57.

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Court against the Public Estates Authority (PEA). There,

the petition sought, among others, to compel the PEA to
disclose all facts on the PEA’s then ongoing renegotiations
to reclaim portions of Manila Bay.99 On the issue of
whether the nonobservance of the hierarchy of courts
merits the dismissal of the petition, we ruled that:
x x x The principle of hierarchy of courts applies

generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is
not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases
involving factual issues. The instant case, however,
raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case
without determining any factual issue related to the case.
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which
falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to
exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant
case.100 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

D
The Court is not a trier of facts

In 1973, the dictum that the Supreme Court is not trier
of facts first appeared in jurisprudence through the
concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Querube
Makalintal in Chemplex (Philippines), Inc. v.
101
Pamatian. Chemplex involved a petition
for certiorari against an order recognizing the validity and
legitimacy of the election of directors on the board of a
private corporation. In his concurrence to the majority deci-
_______________
99 Id., at pp. 170-171.

100 Id., at p. 179.
101 No. L-37427, June 25, 1974, 57 SCRA 408.

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sion dismissing the petition, Chief Justice Querube

Makalintal wrote:
Judge Pamatian issued the order now assailed

herein after he heard the parties and received
relevant evidence bearing on the incident before him,
namely, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction as prayed for by the defendants. He issued
the writ on the basis of the facts as found by him, subject of
course, as he himself admitted, considering the
interlocutory nature of the injunction, to further
consideration of the case on the merits after trial. I do not
see that his factual findings are arbitrary or
unsupported by the evidence. If anything, they are
circumspect, reasoned out and arrived at after
serious judicial inquiry.
This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is beyond
its function to make its own findings of certain vital
facts different from those of the trial court, especially
on the basis of the conflicting claims of the parties
and without the evidence being properly before it.
For this Court to make such factual conclusions is
entirely unjustified — first, because if material facts are
controverted, as in this case, and they are issues being
litigated before the lower court, the petition for certiorari
would not be in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court; and, secondly, because it preempts the primary
function of the lower court, namely, to try the case on
the merits, receive all the evidence to be presented
by the parties, and only then come to a definite
decision, including either the mainte-

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nance or the discharge of the preliminary injunction it has

issued.
The thousands of pages of pleadings, memoranda,

and annexes already before this Court and the
countless hours spent in discussing the bare
allegations of the parties — as to the factual aspects
of which the members are in sharp disagree-ment —
merely to resolve whether or not to give due course
to the petition, demonstrate clearly why this Court,
in a case like this, should consider only one question,
and no other, namely, did the court below commit a
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order
complained of, and should answer that question without
searching the pleadings for supposed facts still in dispute
and not those set forth in the order itself, and in effect
deciding the main case on the merits although it is yet in its
preliminary stages and has not entered the period of
trial.102 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

The maxim that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
will later find its way in the Court’s majority opinion
in Mafinco Trading Corporation v. Ople.103
Mafinco involved a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition to annul a Decision of the Secretary of Labor,
finding that the old National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) had jurisdiction over the complaint filed against
Mafinco Trading Corporation for having dismissed two
union members. The crucial issue brought before the Court
was whether an employer-employee relationship existed
between petitioner and the private respondents. Before
resolving the
_______________
102 Id., at pp. 412-413. Concurring Opinion of CJ. Querube Makalintal.

103 No. L-37790, March 25, 1976, 70 SCRA 139, 161.

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issue on the basis of the parties’ contracts, the Court made

the following pronouncements:
The parties in their pleadings and memoranda injected

conflicting factual allegations to support their diametrically
opposite contentions. From the factual angle, the case has
become highly controversial.
In a certiorari and prohibition case, like the
instant case, only legal issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved
may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts.
Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
require that in the verified petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition the petitioner should
allege “facts with certainty.”
In this case, the facts have become uncertain.
Controversial evidentiary facts have been alleged.
What is certain and indubitable is that a notarized
peddling contract was executed.
This Court is not a trier of facts. It would be
difficult, if not anomalous, to decide the
jurisdictional issue on the basis of the parties
contradictory factual submissions. The record has
become voluminous because of their efforts to
persuade this Court to accept their discordant
factual statements.
Pro hac vice the issue of whether Repomanta and
Moralde were employees of Mafinco or were independent
contractors should be resolved mainly in the light of their
peddling contracts. A different approach would lead this
Court astray into the field of factual controversy where its
legal pronouncements would

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not rest on solid grounds.104 (Emphasis supplied)

The Rules of Court referred to above is the 1964 Rules of
Court. Up to this date, the requirement of alleging facts
with certainty remains in Sections 1 to 3 of Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court.
Meanwhile, the Court, aware of its own limitations,
decreed in Section 2, Rule 3 of its Internal Rules105 that it
is “not a trier of facts,” viz.:
Sec. 2. The Court Not a Trier of Facts.—The Court is

not a trier of facts; its role is to decide cases based on the
findings of fact before it. Where the Constitution, the law or
the Court itself, in the exercise of its discretion, decides to
receive evidence, the reception of evidence may be delegated
to a member of the Court, to either the Clerk of Court or one
of the Division Clerks of Court, or to one of the appellate
courts or its justices who shall submit to the Court a report
and recommendation on the basis of the evidence presented.

E
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Starting in 1987, the Court, in two cases, addressed the
penchant of litigants to seek direct recourse to it from
decisions originating even from the municipal trial courts
and city courts.
In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,106 the Court’s original
jurisdiction over special civil actions for mandamus was
invoked to com-
_______________
104 Id., at pp. 160-161.

105 Administrative Matter No. 10-4-20-SC, May 4, 2010.

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pel a Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to issue summary

judgment in a case for illegal detainer. There, we declared
in no uncertain terms that:
x x x As a matter of policy[,] such a direct recourse to this

Court should not be allowed. The Supreme Court is a
court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by
the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.
It cannot and should not be burdened with the task
of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its
original jurisdiction to issue the so-called

extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor[.] Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings
before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other
tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another, are not controllable by the Court of
Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ
is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals
or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ’s
procurement must be presented. This is and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that
courts and lawyers must strictly observe.107 (Emphasis
supplied)
_______________
106 No. L-74766, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 753.

107 Id., at p. 766.

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This so-called “policy” was reaffirmed two years later in

People v. Cuaresma,108 which involved a petition for
certiorari challenging the quashal by the City Fiscal of an
Information for defamation on the ground of prescription.
In dismissing the petition, this Court reminded litigants to
refrain from directly filing petitions for extraordinary writs
before the Court, unless there were special and important
reasons therefor. We then introduced the concept of
“hierarchy of courts,” to wit:
x x x This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs

of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It
is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly
Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ,
enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with
the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate

Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter’s competence to
issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those “in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.” This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according
to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after
all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judi-
_______________
108 G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415.

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cial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions

for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. x x x
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at
this time, and to enjoin strict adherence thereto in
the light of what it perceives to be a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have
their applications for the so-called extraordinary
writs, and sometime even their appeals, passed upon
and adjudicated directly and immediately by the
highest tribunal of the land. x x x109 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citation omitted)

This doctrine of hierarchy of courts guides litigants as to

the proper venue of appeals and/or the appropriate forum
for the issuance of extraordinary writs. Thus, although this
Court, the CA, and the RTC have concurrent original
jurisdiction110 over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,
parties are directed, as a rule, to file their petitions before
the lower-ranked court.
_______________
109 Id., at pp. 423-424.

110 Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 9(1)
and 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.

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Failure to comply is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the

petition.111
This Court has interchangeably referred to the
hierarchy of courts as a “principle,”112 a “rule,”113 and a
“doctrine.”114 For purposes for this discussion, however, we
shall refer to it as a doctrine.

F
The Court’s expanded jurisdiction, social rights,
and the Court’s constitutional rule-making power
under the 1987 Constitution

With the 1987 Philippine Constitution came significant
developments in terms of the Court’s judicial and
rulemaking powers.
_______________
111 Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005,
455 SCRA 460, 472.
112 See Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction
Development Company, G.R. No. 196795, March 7, 2018, 857 SCRA 549;
Rama v. Moises, G.R. No. 197146 (Resolution), August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA
222; Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare
and Development, supra note 57; Dynamic Builders & Construction Co.
(Phil.), Inc. v. Presbitero, Jr., G.R. No. 174202, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA
90, 107.
113 See Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines
(PBOAP) v. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), G.R. No.
202275, July 17, 2018, 872 SCRA 50; Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170,
June 6, 2018, 865 SCRA 509; De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781,
October 10, 2017, 843 SCRA 1; Roy III v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246,
November 22, 2016, 810 SCRA 1, 93.
114 See Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v.
Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 230651, September 18, 2018, 880
SCRA 349; Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018,
862 SCRA 684; Trillanes IV v. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451,
March 14, 2018, 859 SCRA 271; Bureau of Customs (BOC) v. Gallegos,
G.R. No. 220832, February 28, 2018, 857 SCRA 57 (Resolution).

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First, judicial power is no longer confined to its

traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving
rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.115
The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides that judicial power also includes the
duty of the courts “x x x to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.” In Araullo v. Aquino
III, former Associate (now Chief) Justice Bersamin
eruditely explained:
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the

duty of the courts of justice not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” It has thereby
expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable.
x x x x
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope
and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by
a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
_______________
115 Araullo v. Aquino III, supra note 89 at pp. 67-68.

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discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any

branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the
text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.116 (Italics
supplied)

It must be stressed, however, that this grant of
expanded power of judicial review did not result to the
abandonment of the Angara model.117 Direct recourse to
the Court, on grounds of grave abuse of discretion, was still
allowed only when the questions presented were legal.
Second, in addition to providing for “self-executory and
ready for use”118 civil and political rights, the 1987
Constitution also contained provisions pertaining to what
has been termed as “social rights.” Esteemed
constitutionalist and member of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, explained:
x x x But as will be seen, the 1987 Constitution advances

beyond what was in previous Constitutions in that it seeks
not only economic social justice but also political social
justice.
x x x The guarantees of civil and political rights found
principally in the Bill of Rights are self-executory and ready
for use. One can assert those rights in a court of justice.
Social rights are a different phenomenon. Except to the

extent that they prohibit the government from embarking
in activity contrary to the ideals of social justice, they gen-
_______________
116 Id., at pp. 67-68, 74.

117 Id., at pp. 70-78.
118 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, p. 1192, 2005 ed.

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erally are not rights in the strict sense that the rights in the
Bill of Rights are. x x x In legal effectiveness, they are
primarily in the nature of claims of demands which people
expect government to satisfy, or they are ideals which
government is expected to respect. x x x119

This, in turn, gave rise to a slew of litigation invoking
these so-called “social rights.”120 In Oposa v. Factoran,
Jr.,121 for example, this Court famously recognized an
enforceable right to a balanced and healthful ecology under
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Third, the Supreme Court’s rulemaking power was
enhanced under the new Constitution, to wit:
x x x x
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:

x x x x x x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide
_______________
119 Id.
120 See Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April
25, 2017, 824 SCRA 327; Espina v. Zamora, Jr., G.R. No. 143855,
September 21, 2010, 631 SCRA 17; Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA
746; Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R.
No. 122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408; Basco v. Phil. Amusements
and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
121 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

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a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy

disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.122 (Italics in the
original)

For the first time, the Court was granted with the
following: (1) the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights; and (2)
the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies. The 1987 Constitution also took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure.123
Pursuant to its constitutional rulemaking power,124 the
Court promulgated new sets of rules which effectively
increased its original and concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and the CA: (1) A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo;125 (2) A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC or the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data;126 and (3) A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC
or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.127
_______________
122 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19,

1999, 301 SCRA 96, 111.
123 Id., at p. 112.
124 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).
125 A petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person

whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity. It may be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any
of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. (Sections 1 and
3)
126 This is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlaw-

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Under these Rules, litigants are allowed to seek direct

relief from this Court, regardless of the presence of
questions which are heavily factual in nature. In the same
vein, judgments in petitions for writ of amparo, writ
of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan rendered by lower-
ranked courts can be appealed to the Supreme Court on
questions of fact, or law, or
_______________
ful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private

individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. It may be filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public
data filed of government offices. (Sections 1 and 3, par. 2)
127 Two remedies may be availed of under this Rule: a writ of
kalikasan and a writ for continuing mandamus. The former is a remedy
available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people’s organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity,
involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. A
petition for the issuance of this writ may be filed with the Supreme Court
or with any stations of the Court of Appeals. (Sections 1 and 3, Rule 7)
A writ of continuing mandamus, on the other hand, may be issued

when “any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection
with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or
regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” A petition for its issuance
may be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising Jurisdiction over the
territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred or with the
Court of Appeals or this Court. (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 8)

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both, via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the 1997 Rules of Court.128
In practice, however, petitions for writ of amparo, writ
of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan which were originally
filed before this Court invariably found their way to the CA
for hearing and decision, with the CA’s decision to be later
on brought before us on appeal. Thus, in Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo,129 the first
ever amparo petition, this Court ordered the remand of the
case to the CA for the conduct of hearing, reception of
evidence, and decision.130 We also did the same in:
(1) Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo;131 (2) Saez v.
Macapagal-Arroyo;132 and (3) International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines).133 The consistent practice of
the Court in these cases (that is, referring such petitions to
the CA for the reception of evidence) is a tacit recognition
by the Court itself that it is not equipped to be a trier of
facts.
Notably, our referral of the case to the CA for hearing,
reception of evidence, and decision is in consonance with
Section 2, Rule 3 of our Internal Rules which states that if
the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, decides to
receive evidence, it may delegate the same to one of the
appellate courts for report and recommendation.
_______________
128 See Section 19 of The Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data and Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.
129 G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1.
130 Id., at p. 12. See also Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos.
184379-80, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 545, 552-553.
131 G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA
84, 96-97.
132 G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012, 681 SCRA 678.
133 G.R. No. 209271, December 8, 2015, 776 SCRA 434.

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G
Exceptions to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts

Aside from the special civil actions over which it has
original jurisdiction, the Court, through the years, has
allowed litigants to seek direct relief from it upon
allegation of “serious and important reasons.” The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections134 (Diocese)
summarized these circumstances in this wise:
(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that

must be addressed at the most immediate time;
(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance;
(3) cases of first impression;
(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by
the Court;
(5) exigency in certain situations;
(6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional
organ;
(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law that could free them from the injurious effects of
respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of
expression; [and]
(8) the petition includes questions that are “dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders

complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy.”135
_______________
134 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 59.

135 Id., at pp. 45-50.

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A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases136 of

the
_______________
136 The first exception referred to Aquino III v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 623; and Magallona
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, 655 SCRA 476. In Aquino III
v. Comelec, the issue is whether Republic Act No. 9716, which created an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur, is
constitutional. In Magallona v. Ermita, the issue is the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9522 adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and
classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. Both presented
questions of law.
The second exception was based on Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003, 402
SCRA 612; and Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) v. Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), G.R. No. 192088, October
9, 2012, 682 SCRA 602. In Agan, we noted that the facts necessary to
resolve the legal questions are well established and, hence, need not be
determined by a trial court. In IDEALS, INC., the issue was the validity of
the award by the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management of the
Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant to Korea Water Resources Corporation.
The third exception was based on Government of the United States of
America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA
623; Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA
336; and Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009, 587
SCRA 79. In Purganan, the issue is whether prospective extradites are

entitled to a notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued, and whether they are entitled to bail and provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending. Significantly, the Court declared
that the issues raised are pure questions of law. The issue in Mallion is
whether a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bars a subsequent
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license.
While in Soriano, the issue is whether the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board has the power to issue preventive suspension
under Presidential Decree No. 1986 or The Law Creating

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foregoing exceptions would reveal a common denominator

— the issues for resolution of the Court are purely legal.
Similarly, the Court in Diocese decided to allow direct
recourse in said case because, just like Angara, what was
involved was the resolution of a question of law, namely,
whether the limitation on the size of the tarpaulin in
question violated the right to free speech of the Bacolod
Bishop.
We take this opportunity to clarify that the presence of
one or more of the so-called “special and important reasons”
is not
_______________
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board. Both cases
presented questions of law.
The fourth exception cited Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4,
1994, 235 SCRA 135, which involves the constitutionality of Section 187 of
the Local Government Code, also a question of law.
The fifth exception did not cite any jurisprudential antecedent.
The sixth exception referred to Albano v. Arranz, No.

L-19260, January 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 386, where the sole issue is whether
respondent Judge Manuel Arranz committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing a preliminary injunction ordering the Board of Canvassers and the
Provincial Treasurer to refrain from bringing the questioned returns to
Manila, as instructed by the Commission on Elections, also a question of
law.
The seventh exception did not provide for a jurisprudential basis.

The eight exception cited Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9,
2004, 431 SCRA 534; Commission on Elections v. Quijano-Padilla, G.R.
No. 151992, September 18, 2002, 389 SCRA 353; and Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718.
Chavez dealt with the constitutionality of the “Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence.” In Quijano-Padilla, the issue is whether a successful bidder
may compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceed the amount appropriated by Congress
for the project. In Buklod, the issues are whether Executive Order Nos.
191 and 223 violated Buklod members’ right to security of tenure and
whether then President Joseph Estrada usurped the power of Congress to
abolish public office. All these cases presented questions of law.

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the decisive factor considered by the Court in deciding

whether to permit the invocation, at the first instance, of
its original jurisdiction over the issuance of extraordinary
writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question raised
by the parties in those “exceptions” that enabled us
to allow the direct action before us.
As a case in point, we shall focus our discussion on
transcendental importance. Petitioner after all argues that
its direct resort to us is proper because the issue raised
(that is, whether the bundling of the Projects violates the
constitutional proscription on monopoly and restraint of
trade) is one of transcendental importance or of paramount
public interest.
An examination of the cases wherein this Court used
“transcendental importance” of the constitutional issue
raised to excuse violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts would show that resolution of factual issues was not
necessary for the resolution of the constitutional issue/s.
These cases include Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,137
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc.,138 Jaworski v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,139 Province of Batangas v. Romulo,140 Aquino
III v. Commission on Elections, 141 Department of Foreign
Affairs v. Falcon,142 Capalla v. Commission on Elections,143
Kulayan v. Tan, 144 Funa v. Manila Economic & Cultural

Office,145 Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista,146
_______________
137 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 57.

138 Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., supra
note 57 at p. 646.
139 G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004, 419 SCRA 317, 323-324.
140 G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 736, 757.
141 Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, supra note 136.
142 G.R. No. 176657, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 644, 669-670.
143 G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012, 673 SCRA 1, 238.
144 G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, 675 SCRA 482, 493-494.
145 Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, supra note 97.
146 G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015, 760 SCRA 652.

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and Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales.147 In all these cases,

there were no disputed facts and the issues involved
were ones of law.
In Agan, we stated that “[t]he facts necessary to resolve
these legal questions are well established and, hence, need
not be determined by a trial court,”148 In Jaworski, the
issue is whether Presidential Decree No. 1869 authorized
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation to
contract any part of its franchise by authorizing a
concessionaire to operate internet gambling.149 In Romulo,
we declared that the facts necessary to resolve the legal
question are not disputed.150 In Aquino III, the lone issue is
whether RA No. 9716, which created an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur, is
constitutional.151 In Falcon, the threshold issue is whether
an information and communication technology project,
which does not conform to our traditional notion of the
term “infrastructure,” is covered by the prohibition against
the issuance of court injunctions under RA No.
8975.152 Similarly, in Capalla, the issue is the validity and
constitutionality of the Commission on Elections’
Resolutions for the purchase of precint count optical
scanner machines as well as the extension agreement and

the deed of sale covering the same.153 In Kulayan, the issue
is whether Section 465 in relation to Section 16 of the Local
Government Code authorizes the respondent governor to
declare a state of national
_______________
147 Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, supra note 114.

148 Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., supra
note 57 at p. 646.
149 Jaworski v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, supra
note 139 at p. 321.
150 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, supra note 140 at pp. 756-757.
151 Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, supra note 136 at p. 630.
152 Department of Foreign Affairs v. Falcon, supra note 142 at p. 669.
153 Capalla v. Commission on Elections, supra note 143 at p. 46.

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emergency and to exercise the powers enumerated in his

Proclamation No. 1-09.154 In Funa, the issue is whether the
Commission on Audit is, under prevailing law, mandated to
audit the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural
Office.155 In Ferrer, the issue is the constitutionality of the
Quezon City ordinances imposing socialized housing tax
and garbage fee.156 In Ifurung, the issue is whether Section
8(3) of RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 is
constitutional.157
More recently, in Aala v. Uy,158 the Court En Banc,
dismissed an original action for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus, which prayed for the nullification of an
ordinance for violation of the equal protection clause, due
process clause, and the rule on uniformity in taxation. We
stated that, not only did petitioners therein fail to set forth
exceptionally compelling reasons for their direct resort to
the Court, they also raised factual issues which the Court
deems indispensable for the proper disposition of the case.
We reiterated the time-honored rule that we are not a trier
of facts: “[T]he initial reception and appreciation of
evidence are functions that [the] Court cannot perform.

These are functions best left to the trial courts.” 159
To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does
not clothe us with the power to tackle factual questions and
play the role of a trial court. The only circumstance when
we may take cognizance of a case in the first instance,
despite the presence of factual issues, is in the exercise of
our constitutionally-expressed task to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s
proclamation of martial law under
_______________
154 Kulayan v. Tan, supra note 144 at p. 492.

155 Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, supra note 97 at p.
272.
156 Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, supra note 146 at p. 667.
157 Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, supra note 114.
158 G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017, 814 SCRA 41.
159 Id. at p. 66.

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Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.160 The case

before us does not fall under this exception.

H
Hierarchy of courts is a
constitutional imperative

Strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
should not be a matter of mere policy. It is a constitutional
imperative given (1) the structure of our judicial system
and (2) the requirements of due process.
First. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts recognizes the
various levels of courts in the country as they are
established under the Constitution and by law, their
ranking and effect of their rulings in relation with one
another, and how these different levels of court interact
with one another.161 It determines the venues of appeals
and the appropriate forum for the Issuance of

extraordinary writs.162
_______________
160 Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, 829 SCRA 1.

See also Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177
SCRA 668, where we looked into whether or not there exist factual bases
for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. Albeit, we resolved the issue by
merely considering the pleadings filed by the parties, their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented.
161 Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW)
v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 207132 &
207205, December 6, 2016, 812 SCRA 452, 499.
162 See People v. Cuaresma, supra note 108 at p. 424.

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Since the creation of the Court in 1901,163 and save for

certain exceptions, it does not, as a rule, retry questions of
facts.164 Trial courts such as the MTCs and the RTCs, on
the
_______________
163 In the case of Guico v. Mayuga, 63 Phil. 328 (1936), we held that:
Our appellate jurisdiction in this case is limited to
reviewing and examining the errors of law incurred by the
Court of Appeals, in accordance with the provisions of Section
138, No. 6, of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 3.
x x x x
Rule 47(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides, in
respect to cases brought to it in connection with its
appellate jurisdiction, that only questions of law may be
raised therein and that the court has the power to order motu
proprio the dismissal thereof if in its opinion they are without
merit. Id., at p. 331. (Emphasis supplied)
164 Code of Civil Procedure, Sec. 497. Hearings Confined to Matters

of Law, With Certain Exceptions.—In hearings upon bills of exception, in
civil actions and special proceedings, the Supreme Court shall not
review the evidence taken in the court below, nor retry the
questions of fact, except as in this section hereafter provided; but
shall determine only questions of law raised by the bill of
exceptions. But the Supreme Court may review the evidence taken in
the court below, and affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment there
rendered, as justice may require, in the following cases:
1. If assessors sat with the judge in the hearing in the court
below, and both the assessors were of the opinion that the findings
of the facts and judgment in the action are wrong and have certified
in writing their dissent therefrom, and their reasons for such
dissent, the Supreme Court may in connection with the hearing on
the bill of exceptions, review the facts upon the evidence adduced in
the court below, and shall give to the dissent aforesaid such weight
as in the opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court it is entitled
to, and upon such review shall render such judgment as is found
just;

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other hand, routinely decide questions of fact and law at

the first instance, in accordance with the jurisdiction
granted to them by law.165 While the CA and other
intermediate courts can rule on both questions of fact and
law, the Supreme
_______________
2. If before the final determination of an action pending in the

Supreme Court on bill of exceptions, new and material evidence be
discovered by either party, which could not have been discovered
before the trial in the court below, by the exercise of due diligence,
and which is of such a character as probably to change the result,
the Supreme Court may receive and consider such new evidence,
together with that adduced on the trial below, and may grant or
refuse a new trial, or render such other judgment as ought, in view
of the whole case, to be rendered, upon such terms as it may deem
just. The party seeking a new trial, or a reversal of the judgment on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, may petition the Supreme
Court for such new trial, and shall attach to the petition affidavits
showing the facts entitling him to a new trial and the newly
discovered evidence. Upon the filing of such petition in the
Supreme Court, the court shall, on notice to both parties, make
such order as to taking further testimony by each party, upon the
petition, either orally in court, or by depositions, upon notice, as it
may deem just. The petition, with the evidence, shall be heard at
the same time as the bill of exceptions;
3. If the excepting party filed a motion in the Court of First
Instance for a new trial, upon the ground that the findings of fact
were plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence, and the
judge overruled said motion, and due exception was taken to his
overruling the same, the Supreme Court may review the evidence
and make such findings upon the facts, and render such final
judgment, as justice and equity require. But, if the Supreme Court
shall be of the opinion that this exception is frivolous and not made
in good faith, it may impose double or treble additional costs upon
the excepting party, and may order them to be paid by the counsel
prosecuting the bill of exceptions, if in its opinion justice so
requires. (Emphasis supplied)
165 Supra note 161 at pp. 499-500.

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Court, in stark contrast, generally decides only questions of

law. This is because the Court, whether in the exercise of
its original or appellate jurisdiction, is not equipped to
receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance. Our sole
role is to apply the law based on the findings of facts
brought before us.166 Notably, from the 1901 Rules167 until
the present 1997 Revised Rules of Court,168 the power to
ascertain facts and receive and evaluate evidence in
relation thereto is lodged with the trial courts.
In Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. (Alonso),169 this
Court had occasion to articulate the role of the CA in the
judicial hierarchy, viz.:
The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by

litigants. The CA stands between the RTC and the
Court, and its establishment has been precisely to
take over much of the work that used to be done by
the Court. Historically, the CA has been of the

greatest help to the Court in synthesizing the facts,
issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible
manner and in identifying errors that ordinarily
might escape detection. The Court has thus been
freed to better discharge its constitutional duties and
perform its most important work, which, in the words of
Dean Vicente G. Sinco, “is less concerned with the decision
of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and
obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined
with the direction of national policies, momentous economic
and
_______________
166 Aspacio v. Inciong, No. L-49893, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 180, 184.
167 Code of Civil Procedure, Secs. 56 and 132.
168 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 30, Sec. 5 and Rule 5, Sec. 1.
169 G.R. No. 188471, April 20, 2016, 618 SCRA 619.

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social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority

and its impact upon fundamental rights.”170 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)

Accordingly, when litigants seek relief directly from the
Court, they bypass the judicial structure and open
themselves to the risk of presenting incomplete or disputed
facts. This consequently hampers the resolution of
controversies before the Court. Without the necessary facts,
the Court cannot authoritatively determine the rights and
obligations of the parties. The case would then become
another addition to the Court’s already congested dockets.
Thus, as we explained in Alonso:
x x x Their nonobservance of the hierarchy of courts has

forthwith enlarged the docket of the Court by one more
case, which, though it may not seem burdensome to the
layman, is one case too much to the Court, which has to
devote time and effort in poring over the papers submitted
herein, only to discover in the end that a review should have

first been made by the CA. The time and effort could have
been dedicated to other cases of importance and impact on
the lives and rights of others.171

Second. Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts also proceeds from considerations of due process.
While the term “due process of law” evades exact and
concrete definition, this Court, in one of its earliest
decisions, referred to it as a law which hears before it
condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial. It means that every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern
society.172 Under the present Rules of Court, which governs
_______________
170 Id., at pp. 627-628.

171 Id. at p. 627.
172 Unites States v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104, 111 (1908).

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our judicial proceedings, warring factual allegations of

parties are settled through presentation of evidence.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining, in a judicial
proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact:173 As
earlier demonstrated, the Court cannot accept evidence in
the first instance. By directly filing a case before the Court,
litigants necessarily deprive themselves of the oportunity
to completely pursue or defend their causes of actions.
Their right to due process is effectively undermined by
their own doing.
Objective justice also requires the ascertainment of all
relevant facts before the Court can rule on the issue
brought before it. Our pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan174 is enlightening:
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone

knows, the raison d’etre of courts. This essential
function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment

of all the material and relevant facts from the
pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the
parties, and second, after that determination of the facts
has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to
the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively,
definitely and finally.
It is for this reason that a substantial part of the
adjective law in this jurisdiction is occupied with
assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the
Court; for obviously, to the extent that adjudication
is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that
extent there is faultiness in the approximation of
objective justice. It is thus the obligation of lawyers no
less than of
_______________
173 Rules of Court, Rule 128, Sec. 1.

174 G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 212.

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judges to see that this objective is attained; that is to say,

that there no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation
or distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware of
any fact material and relevant to the action, or surprised by
any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during
the trial.175 (Emphasis supplied)

I
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts as a
filtering mechanism

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1)
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction;176 (2) prevent further over-
crowding of the Court’s docket;177 and (3) prevent the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in
the adjudication of cases which often have to be remanded
or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the

rules of procedure, or as the court better equipped to
resolve factual questions.178
Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is
an effective mechanism to filter the cases which reach the
Court. As of December 31, 2016, 6,526 new cases were filed
to the Court. Together with the
reinstated/revived/reopened cases, the Court has a total of
14,491 cases in its docket. Of the new cases, 300 are raffled
to the Court En Banc and 6,226 to the three Divisions of
the Court. The Court En Banc disposed of 105 cases by
decision or signed resolution, while the Divisions
_______________
175 Id., at p. 221.
176 People v. Cuaresma, supra note 108 at p. 424.
177 Id.
178 Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217
SCRA 633, 652.

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of the Court disposed of a total of 923 by decision or signed

resolution.179
These, clearly, are staggering numbers. The
Constitution provides that the Court has original
jurisdiction over five extraordinary writs and by our
rulemaking power, we created four more writs which can
be filed directly before us. There is also the matter of
appeals brought to us from the decisions of lower courts.
Considering the immense backlog facing the court, this
begs the question: What is really the Court’s work? What
sort of cases deserves the Court’s attention and time?
We restate the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel
in Angara that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of
the Constitution. Hence, direct recourse to us should be
allowed only when the issue involved is one of law.
However, and as former Associate Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza reminds, the Court may still choose to avoid
passing upon constitutional questions which are
confessedly within its jurisdiction if there is some other

ground on which its decision may be based.180 The so-
called
_______________
179 The Judiciary Annual Report of 2016 to June 2017, p. 13. The US
Supreme Court, in contrast, received 6,305 filings in its 2016 term, heard
only 71 cases in arguments, and disposed 68 cases in 61 signed opinions.
(2017 Year-end Report on the Federal Judiciary, p. 13, accessed at
<https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/

2017year-endreport.pdf>) This to us shows the US Court’s impressive

control over its case docket through a judicious use of its discretionary
authority. With particular application to cases invoking the US Court’s
original jurisdiction, it appears that the so-called “appropriateness test” is
being judiciously applied to sift through the cases filed before it. (See
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 488 U.S. 990 [1988]; California v. West Virginia,
454 U.S. 1027 [1981]; Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976); Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 [1972])
180 Ret. Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, Judicial Review of
Constitutional Questions, p. 89 (2004), citing Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

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“seven pillars of limitations of judicial review”181 or the

“rules of avoidance” enunciated by US Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority182 teaches that:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of

legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions “is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.”
2. The Court will not “anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.”
“It is0. not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a

constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.”
3. The Court will not “formulate a rule of constitutional
law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it
is to be applied.”
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question,
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application.
Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court
_______________
181 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., supra note 84 at p. 160.
182 297 U.S. 288 (1936).

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will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of
a state challenging its decision of a question under the
Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute
upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured
by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.
Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in
the performance of his official duty will not be entertained.
In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of
a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In
Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal
Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits.
7. “When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.” 183
(Citations omitted)
_______________
183 Id., at pp. 347-348.

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Meanwhile, in Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na

mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc.,184 the Court summarized the foregoing “pillars” into
six categories and adopted “parallel guidelines” in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, to wit:
The foregoing “pillars” of limitation of judicial review,

summarized in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding

a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be
formulated only as required by the facts of
the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on
some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the
party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of
constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been

adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the

exercise of judicial power;
2. the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal
_______________
184 Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., supra note 84.

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and substantial interest in the case such

that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3. the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.185 (Citations
omitted)

Thus, the exercise of our power of judicial review is
subject to these four requisites and the further requirement
that we can only resolve pure questions of law. These
limitations, when properly and strictly observed, should aid
in the decongestion of the Court’s workload.
To end, while reflective deliberation is necessary in the
judicial process, there is simply no ample time for it given
this Court’s massive caseload.186 In fact, we are not
unaware of the proposals to radically reform the judicial
structure in an attempt to relieve the Court of its backlog
of cases.187 Such proposals are, perhaps, borne out of the
public’s frustration over the slow pace of decision-making.
With respect, however, no overhaul would be necessary if
this Court commits to be more judicious with the exercise
of its original jurisdiction by strictly implementing the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
_______________
185 Id., at pp. 161-162. See also Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 90
at pp. 324-325.
186 86 Kurland, Philip B., Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court: Time for a Change, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 616, 620 (1974), accessed on
March 7, 2019 at <https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/
clr/vo159/iss4/3/>.
187 87 See Vicente V. Mendoza, Proposed judicial revisions will weaken
judiciary, Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 29, 2018, accessed on
January 28, 2019 at <https://opinion.inquirer.net/117068/
proposedjudicial-revisions-will-weaken-judiciary>.

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Accordingly, for the guidance of the bench and the

bar, we reiterate that when a question before the
Court involves determination of a factual issue
indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the
Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless
of the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons,
such as the transcendental or paramount
importance of the case. Such question must first be
brought before the proper trial courts or the CA,
both of which are specially equipped to try and
resolve factual questions.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin (CJ.), Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe,

Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando,
Carandang and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., I concur to J. Leonen. We do not abandon
here the doctrine of transcendental importance.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring Opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I agree with the disposition of this case as proposed in

the Decision written by Associate Justice Francis H.
Jardeleza. To clarify the reasons for my vote, I add the
following brief points.

I
Indeed, the claims made by petitioner GIOS-SAMAR,
Inc. require a more contextual appreciation of the evidence
that it

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may present to support its claims. The nature of its various

allegations requires the presentation of evidence and
inferences, which should, at first instance, be done by a
trial court.1
Monopolization should not be lightly inferred especially
since efficient business organizations are rewarded by the
market with growth. Due to the high barriers to economic
entry and long gestation periods, it is reasonable for the
government to bundle infrastructure projects. There is,
indeed, a difference between abuse of dominant position in
a relevant market2 and combinations in restraint of
trade.3 The Petition seems to have confused these two (2)
competition law concepts and it has not made clear which
concept it wished to apply.
Further, broad allegations amounting to a
generalization that certain corporations allow themselves
to serve as dummies for cartels or foreigners cannot hold
ground in this Court. These constitute criminal acts. The
Constitution requires that judicial action proceed carefully
and always from a presumption of innocence. Tall tales of
conspiratorial actions — though they may be salacious,
make for interesting fiction, and are fodder for social media
— do not deserve any judicial action. Broad generalizations
of facts without corresponding evidence border on the
contemptuous.
Although the Constitution grants original and
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and
the Court of Appeals over actions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus,
this Court generally does not receive evidence, and thus,
rarely makes findings of facts contested by the parties at

first instance. In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections,4 this Court held:
_______________
1 See Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25,
2017, 824 SCRA 327, 404-405 [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
2 Rep. Act No. 10667 (2015), Ch. III, Sec. 15.
3 Const., Art. XII, Sec. 19.
4 751 Phil. 301; 747 SCRA 1 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

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The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of

courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective
and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the
facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before
them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of
law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute,
or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they
are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those
territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the
all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence
as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such
action. The consequences, of course, would be national in
scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to
courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts,
such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an
appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and
law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This
nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the
actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has
original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike

the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is
competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel
unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by
breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the light of
new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of
bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of
first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of
Appeals, this court promulgates these doc-

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Communications
trinal devices in order that it truly performs that

role.5 (Citation omitted)

This is true whether the remedy used is the original
action for certiorari or prohibition, regardless of whether
this is brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or the
expanded power to examine if there has been grave abuse
of discretion by any government branch or
6 7
instrumentality, as held in Araullo v. Aquino III, among
others.
Through the classic eloquence of the ponente, this case
reiterates the doctrine that the finding of grave abuse of
discretion made by this Court in its original jurisdiction is
generally only over cases where the material facts are not
contested. Further, this case highlights that petitioners
bear the burden of clearly and convincingly elaborating on
why the doctrine of respect for the hierarchy of courts may
have been apparently violated.8
Reiterating these rules is important. A single instance
when a ruling is laid means mere ratio decidendi. Ratio
decidendi, when repeated in several various compositions
of this Court, endows it with the status of an evolving
doctrine. When reiterated in a number of cases over the
years, an evolving doctrine becomes canon. The ratio
decidendi, baring other factors, is strengthened with
reiteration and reexamination of its rationale in

subsequent cases.
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 329-330; pp. 43-44.

6 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
7 737 Phil. 457; 728 SCRA 1 (2014) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
8 See Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, 602 Phil.
342, 360; 583 SCRA 428, 442 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]; Bagabuyo v.
Commission on Elections, 593 Phil. 678, 689; 573 SCRA 290, 296 (2008)
[Per J. Brion, En Banc]; and Civil Service Commission v. Department of
Budget and Management, 502 Phil. 372, 384; 464 SCRA 115, 132 (2005)
[Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

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However, to be more precise, I propose that we clarify

that even if the issues raised are questions of law, this
Court is not devoid of its discretion to deny addressing the
constitutional issues entirely.
This means restating the difference between the concept
of jurisdiction and justiciability in constitutional
adjudication.

II

Jurisdiction is the competence “to hear, try[,] and decide
a case.”9 It is a power that is granted by the Constitution
and by law.10 In situations where several courts may
exercise jurisdiction either originally or on an appeal, the
court that first seized of the issues holds jurisdiction over
the case, to the exclusion of the rest.11
Jurisdiction, or the competence to proceed with the case,
requires several elements. To determine jurisdiction, courts
assess: (1) the remedy or the procedural vehicle for raising
the issues;12 (2) the subject matter of the controversy;13 (3)
the issues as framed by the parties;14 and (4) the processes
served on the parties themselves vis-à-vis the
constitutional or law provisions that grant competence.15
_______________
9 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 8,

2017, 835 SCRA 1.
10 Id.
11 See Laquian v. Baltazar, 142 Phil. 531; 31 SCRA 552 (1970) [Per
CJ. Concepcion, Second Division].
12 City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, 748 Phil.
473, 517; 742 SCRA 524, 568 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
13 Id., at p. 515; p. 566.
14 Dy v. Yu, 763 Phil. 491, 518; 762 SCRA 357, 384 (2015) [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
15 City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, supra at
p. 516; p. 568.

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Related to jurisdiction is our application of the doctrine

of granting the primary administrative jurisdiction, when
statutorily warranted, to the executive department.16 This
is different from the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies17 or the doctrine of respect for the hierarchy of
courts,18 which are matters of justiciability, not
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot be waived.19
Determining whether the case, or any of the issues
raised, is justiciable is an exercise of the power granted to a
court with jurisdiction over a case that involves
constitutional adjudication. Thus, even if this Court has
jurisdiction, the canons of constitutional adjudication in
our jurisdiction allow us to disregard the questions raised
at our discretion.
The general rule with respect to justiciability is one of
constitutional avoidance. That is, before we proceed with
even considering how a word or phrase in the Constitution
is violated, we first examine whether there is an actual
case or controversy. The justiciability of a controversy is
often couched in four (4) elements: (1) that there is an
actual case or controversy;20 (2) that the party raising the
issues has locus standi;21
_______________
16 Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines (PBOAP) v.

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), G.R. No. 202275, July 17,
2018, 872 SCRA 50.
17 Id., at p. 89.
18 The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, supra note 4 at
pp. 329-330; p. 43.
19 Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 706 Phil. 442, 450; 693 SCRA 456, 465 (2013) [Per J.
Mendoza, Third Division].
20 Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines (PBOAP) v.
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), supra.
21 Id.

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Communications
(3) that the case is ripe for adjudication;22 and (4) that the
constitutional issue is the very lis mota of the case.23
The third element may be rephrased into two (2)
queries. The court considers whether the case has already
become moot,24 or whether the issues that call for
constitutional interpretation are prematurely raised.25
The doctrine of avoidance is palpable when we refuse to
decide on the constitutional issue by ruling that the parties
have not exhausted administrative remedies,26 or that they
have violated the doctrine of respect for the hierarchy of
courts.27 These are specific variants or corollaries of the
rule that the case should be ripe for constitutional
adjudication.
The fourth element allows this Court to grant or deny
the reliefs prayed for by any petitioner if there is a
statutory or procedural rule that can be applied to resolve
the issues raised, rather than deal with the interpretation
of a constitutional issue.28
Angara v. Electoral Commission29 imbues these rules
with its libertarian character.
Principally, Angara emphasized the liberal deference to
another constitutional department or organ given the
majoritarian and representative character of the political
deliberations in their forums. It is not merely a judicial

stance dictated by courtesy, but is rooted on the very
_______________
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Baldo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 607 Phil. 281; 589 SCRA 306
(2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].
25 See Corales v. Republic, 716 Phil. 432; 703 SCRA 623 (2013) [Per J.
Perez, En Banc].
26 Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017, 814 SCRA 41, 66
[Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
27 Id., at p. 54.
28 See General v. Urro, 662 Phil. 132; 646 SCRA 567 (2011) [Per J.
Brion, En Banc].
29 63 Phil. 139 (1936) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].

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Communications
nature of this Court. Unless congealed in constitutional or

statutory text and imperatively called for by the actual and
noncontroversial facts of the case, this Court does not
express policy. This Court should channel democratic
deliberation where it should take place.
When interpretations of a constitutional provision are
equally valid but lead to contrary results, this Court should
exercise judicial restraint and allow the political forces to
shed light on a choice. This Court steps in only when it
discerns clear fallacies in the application of certain norms
or their interpretation. Judicial restraint requires that this
Court does not involve itself into matters in which only
those who join in democratic political deliberation should
participate. As magistrates of the highest court, we should
distinguish our role from that of an ordinary citizen who
can vote.
Judicial restraint is also founded on a policy of conscious
and deliberate caution. This Court should refrain from
speculating on the facts of a case and should allow parties
to shape their case instead. Likewise, this Court should
avoid projecting hypothetical situations where none of the
parties can fully argue simply because they have not

established the facts or are not interested in the issues
raised by the hypothetical situations.30 In a way, courts are
mandated to adopt an attitude of judicial skepticism. What
we think may be happening may not at all be the case.
Therefore, this Court should always await the proper case
to be properly pleaded and proved.
Plainly put, majority opinions that rule on constitutional
issues as obiter dictum is dangerous not only because it is
_______________
30 See Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines

(PBOAP) v. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), supra note 16;
Republic v. Roque, 718 Phil. 294; 706 SCRA 273 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-
Bernabe, En Banc]; and Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.
v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil. 452; 632 SCRA 146 (2010) [Per J.
Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

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Communications
injudicious, but also because it undermines the

constitutional framework of governance.

III

Thus, I propose that we further tame the concept that a
case’s “transcendental importance”31 creates exceptions to
justiciability. The elements supported by the facts of an
actual case, and the imperatives of our role as the Supreme
Court within a specific cultural or historic context, must be
made clear. They should be properly pleaded by the
petitioner so that whether there is any transcendental
importance to a case is made an issue. That a case has
transcendental importance, as applied, may have been too
ambiguous and subjective that it undermines the
structural relationship that this Court has with the
sovereign people and other departments under the
Constitution. Our rules on jurisdiction and our
interpretation of what is justiciable, refined with relevant
cases, may be enough.
However, consistent with this opinion, we cannot wholly

abandon the doctrinal application of cases with
transcendental importance.32 That approach just does not
apply in this case. Here, we have just established that
cases calling for questions of fact generally cannot be cases
from which we
_______________
31 See Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949) [Per J. Tuason,

En Banc] involving the Emergency Power Act. This Court took cognizance
of the cases in Araneta, saying for the first time that “the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.”
32 See Province of Batangas v. Romulo, 473 Phil. 806, 827; 429 SCRA
736, 757 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]; Jaworski v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 464 Phil. 375, 285; 419 SCRA 317,
323 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc]; and Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc., 450 Phil. 744, 805; 402 SCRA 612,
646 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

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Communications
establish transcendental importance. Generally, we follow

the doctrine of respect for hierarchy of courts for matters
within our concurrent original jurisdiction.

IV

Critically, the nuances of the cases we find justiciable
signal our philosophy of adjudication. Even as we try to
filter out and dispose of the cases pending in our docket,
this Court’s role is not simply to settle disputes. This Court
also performs the important public function of clarifying
the values embedded in our legal order anchored on the
Constitution, laws, and other issuances by competent
authorities.
As this Court finds ways to dispose of its cases, it should
be sensitive to the quality of the doctrines it emphasizes
and the choice of cases on which it decides. Both of these
will facilitate the vibrant democracy and achievement of

social justice envisioned by our Constitution.
Every case filed before this Court has the potential of
undoing the act of a majority in one (1) of the political and
coequal departments of our government. Our Constitution
allows that its congealed and just values be used by a
reasonable minority to convince this Court to undo the
majority’s action. In doing so, this Court is required to
make its reasons precise, transparent, and responsive to
the arguments pleaded by the parties. The trend, therefore,
should be to clarify broad doctrines laid down in the past.
The concept of a case with transcendental importance is
one (1) of them.
Our democracy, after all, is a reasoned democracy: one
with a commitment not only to the majority’s rule, but also
to fundamental and social rights.
Even as we recall the canonical doctrines that inform
the structure of our Constitution, we should never lose
sight of the innovations that our fundamental law has
introduced. We have envisioned a more engaged citizenry
and political forums

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Communications
that welcome formerly marginalized communities and

identities. Hence, we have encoded the concepts of social
justice, acknowledged social and human rights, and
expanded the provisions in our Bill of Rights.
We should always be careful that in our desire to
achieve judicial efficiency, we do not filter cases that bring
out these values.
This Court, therefore, has a duty to realize this vision.
The more guarded but active part of judicial review
pertains to situations where there may have been a deficit
in democratic participation, especially where the hegemony
or patriarchy ensures the inability of discrete and insular
minorities to participate fully. While this Court should
presume representation in the deliberative and political
forums, it should not be blind to present realities.
Certainly, this case falls woefully short of these noble
expectations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—Following the hierarchy of courts, a special civil

action for certiorari assailing an order of the Regional Trial
Court should be filed with the Court of Appeals and not
with the Supreme Court. (De Castro vs. Fernandez, Jr., 515
SCRA 682 [2007])
The Anti-Dummy Law has been enacted to limit the
enjoyment of certain economic activities to Filipino citizens
or corporations; The Court is not aware of any
constitutional or statutory provision classifying as a
nationalized activity the lease or provision of goods and
technical services for the automation of an election. (Roque,
Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 599 SCRA 69 [2009])

——o0o——
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6/9/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 896

G.R. No. 217158. March 12, 2019.1

Constitutional Law; Monopoly; Concession Agreement; The

214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

monopoly, it is a type of monopoly not violative of law. This is

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 215

that entity engages in conduct in abuse of its dominant

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

competitors which have the object or effect of substantially

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 217

attach, it must first be established that there is a law limiting

Reorganization Act of 1980. BP 129 repealed RA No. 296 and

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo

falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5,

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 219

to 3 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.—Up to this

no longer confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Supreme Court; Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court; Direct

writ of amparo, writ of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan which

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 221

east Asia (Philippines), 776 SCRA 434 (2015). The consistent

or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court; The only circumstance

Constitution and by law, their ranking and effect of their rulings

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 223

Direct Recourse to the Supreme Court; By directly filing a case

pursue or defend their causes of actions. Their right to due

224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

guidance of the bench and the bar, we reiterate that when

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 225

presumption of innocence. Tall tales of conspiratorial actions

Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; View that although the

226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Hierarchy of Courts; View that the doctrine of

the doctrine of respect for the hierarchy of courts.—The doctrine of

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 227

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

1 Renamed as Department of Transportation under Section 15 of

228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cost of the Projects is P116.23 Billion, broken down as

The Invitation stated that the Projects aim to improve

4 See Invitation to Prequalify and Bid. Id.

Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and for

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 229

Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo

230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioner raises the following arguments:

First, the bundling of the Projects violated the

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 231

combinations and schemes to control the operation of the

19 Id., at pp. 10-11.

232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

payer or as a private individual; (3) petitioner’s allegation

26 Id., at pp. 218-219.

VOL. 896, MARCH 12, 2019 233