April 10, 2021

Rule 70 - Accion interdictal

Substantial Aspect

2 special civil actions 

 Unlawful detainer
 Forcible entry

Action interdictal vs. Accion Publiciana

 Common Characteristic: they are both recovery of possession over real property 
 Distinguish:

I P

Recovery of possession is possession de facto Recovery of de jure possession as an

(material/physical possession) attribute of ownership

Within 1yr 1yr period has already lapsed

MTC Depends on assessed value 

Accion interdictal vs. Accion Reinvidicatoria 

I R

Possession de facto Possession of title over real property; possession de jure

MTC Depends on assessed value

What must be alleged? 

Key material facts / jurisdictional facts that could make it forcible entry/unlawful detainer. 
If not alleged, the court has no jurisdiction BUT it may be considered publiciana/reinvidicatoria.
 FE 
o Plaintiff has prior physical possession 
 Plaintiff NEED NOT BE THE OWNER 
 He may be a lessee / sublessee
 Plaintiff NEED NOT BE IN ACTUAL POSSESSION since he may also
have constructive possession
o That the defendant/s have occupied/entered/intruded into the property through
force, intimidation, threat, stealth (FITS)
o Filed within 1yr from the time of discovery of the entry by the defendant 

As long as the 3 facts are alleged, MTC has jurisdiction.

May the Plaintiff also pray for damages / reasonable damages? YES
Can the MTC still have jurisdiction if the plaintiff claims amounting to 1M? YES. Regardless of
the amount of damages / reasonable compensation, MTC has jurisdiction because it is conferred
by law

 UD
o That the defendant had a lawful right to possess by virtue of a contract entitling
the defendant to possess the property  / lease  / defendant was tolerated 
o If it was a lease, defendant has failed to pay the rentals / violated the terms of the
lease & fails to vacate after demand; if it was a mere tolerance, and failed to
vacate despite demand to vacate 
o Filed w/in 1yr from the receipt of demand to comply & vacate

In an instance where a lawyer accidentally alleges FE but it is UD, will there still be jurisdiction?
If there are variants between the title and the denomination in the case which controls the
allegations in the body of the complaint, the MTC will still have jurisdiction
If  it was not an accident? Does the MTC have jurisdiction? NO. The MTC will dismiss by lack of
jurisdiction.
If the 1yr cannot be determined? Can the MTC convert it as publiciana? YES IF the plaintiff
appends the assessed value to substantiate his complaint that he has prior possession. If it did
not append, the MTC will dismiss outright. 
 The MTC must issue an order to demand from the defendant to pay the increased
assessed value in order for it to acquire jurisdiction. 

Accion interdictal is based on the nature of the action which is the recovery of the
possession of the property

When is an action for forcible entry proper?

o Physical possession is deprived from the person entitled thereto through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth (unlawful possession) 
Unlawful detainer?
o When a person unlawfully withholds possession of real property from the person
who is entitled/who has a right after the termination of the contract & the
persons who are holding fails to vacate after being asked to do so
 Contract can be by means of lease / mere tolerance which is akin to lease

FC VS. UD

FC UD

Unlawful possession through FITS Unlawful holding after the termination of a

contract

The plaintiff who is claiming claims that he has The defendant has lawful possession at the
prior physical possession which may be by title, beginning because there was a contract but
ownership, or contract & that the defendant his possession has become unlawful because
intruded into the property of the termination

1yr from the time of discovery of entry into the 1yr from the demand to vacate / violation of
property through FITS, there is no need to contract / payment of rent
demand

The demand must state both: comply with the conditions of the contract & vacate/ What if there
had been several demands? 
 Example: owner extended the period several times 
Reckoned from the date of the receipt of the last demand to comply with the conditions &
vacate: doctrine of last demand

What kind of action is it?

 Ordinary civil action subject to summary procedure
 Ordinary civil action where one enforces and protects the right 
 Summary in nature
o Because it is a disturbance of public peace wherein the plaintiff must be restored
to his physical possession
o REMEMBER: no default in judgment because it is a prohibited motion

What are the instances where the 1st level court has special jurisdiction
 Correlate with Rule 46

Issue
 Who among the parties have the right to physical possession
o UD : who is entitled to possession

Possession over a:
 Real property
o Building
o Condo

May it be instituted by a person who is a representative? YES. Rule 7. 

Procedural Aspect 

1. Complaint (initiatory complaint)

 Verification
 Docket fees
 Certification
2. The court will go over the allegations of the complaint and check if it has
jurisdiction and may dismiss outright in proper cases
2. Summons 
2. Answer
 Remember: no default judgment if the defendant fails to answer
5. The court will set the case within 30 days for preliminary conference 
 The judge will make earnest efforts to settle the case 
 If there has been no settlement, the court will proceed for stipulations and admissions of
facts
  If based on the pleadings filed / stipulation of fact trial could ensue on the controverted
facts 
 Can it be subject to mediation? YES. 
 What if the plaintiff fails to attend? The defendant may move for dismissal with
prejudice
 What if the defendant fails to attend? The plaintiff may move that the judgment be
rendered based on the allegation in the complaint 
 What if both did not appear? The judge motu proprio can dismiss with prejudice the
complaint for failure to prosecute 
6. Submit position within 10days from the order of the preliminary
conference 

Prohibited Pleadings & Motion 

 If the judge can dismiss motu proprio if there is no lupon 
 What if there is an MR of the motion to dismiss? Is it allowed? YES because that is an
MR of interlocutory order. What is prohibited is an MR of the final order.
o What is a final order: order to dismiss 
 Remedy? Refile. You cannot appeal.

7. Judgment
 MR/MFNT is prohibited 
 Notice of Appeal (15days) Rule 40
 Immediately executory notwithstanding appeal
o Except:
 When there is a supersedeas bond which should be also posted with
15days
 If there are no monetary awards. File a motion to fix the
supersedeas bond 
 Can the plaintiff withdraw the supersedeas bond? YES from the
RTC
 Pay the monthly rentals while on appeal
 If fails: motion to execute the pending appeal 
 Can the plaintiff apply for provisional remedy? YES. He may file
for preliminary injunction.
 What if the plaintiff appealed? Can the defendant file a provisional
remedy? YES. 

Advice:
 Focus on the topics / familiarize with the bar topics 

April 17, 2021

Rule 71 - Contempt

Contempt is any act which demean, disrespect the order of the court or those acts which
disobey the processes of the court.
It is an inherent power of the courts  because the purpose is to protect the dignity and
authority of the court. 
 To preserve and protect the court.
 How about in quasi-judicial agencies, it is inherent? 
o NO. They have contempt if the law grants such power.
o In the absence of an express grant, it does not have. 
 What is the remedy then if there are acts constituting direct or indirect
contempt if there is no express grant?
 As to indirect contempt, they may file a petition in the RTC of
where the said agency is holding office.
 Ex: SSS, file in the RTC of Quezon City

Nature 
 Broader
 Stricter

2 kinds of contempt
 Direct 
o Directly degrade / demean the court
o Those done in the presence of the court
o Summary in nature
 Summary insofar as the procedure, that it does not required hearing
because it was committed facie curae. (Judge Wagan rephrasing Lorenzo
vs. DMAP)
 Indirectly
o Out-of-court acts
o Constructive contempt
o Acts which are not done in the presence or so near the court

Direct Contempt

Acts of Direct Contempt/ Contempt in facie curae 

 Any act / misbehavior in the presence of the court or near the court to interrupt the
proceedings before the same
o Ex: can be done when there is an ocular inspection
 Disrespect
o Ex: offensive language
o In Lorenzo vs. DMAP, the court recognized the freedom of the parties to interpret
in good faith and that it was made in legitimate publications or channels
o In Hidalgo vs. Balmes, it was explained the difference between defamation and
contemptuous language. 
 Offensive behavior towards others
o 1st & last time Judge exercised contempt: 
 There was a case of arraignment, the mother of the private complainant
was the girlfriend of the accused. The information alleged that the
respondent inflicted physical injuries. During arraignment, it was the first
time that the mother saw the boyfriend. When the Clerk of Court called
the accused, the mother cursed the accused while Judge was there. The
statements were offensive and Judge asked her to stop 3x. 
 “Bakit ‘di ba ako pwede sumigaw?”
  Judge then contemned her summarily. 
 “You are hereby cited for contempt and subject to
imprisonment and she was sent to jail.”
 Judge amended the order to 5hrs and ordered a release. 
 Failure to subscribe to an oath / affirmation 
 Failure to answer the question when required 
 Failure to subscribe a deposition / affidavit
o Remember: modes of discovery in CivPro

Penalty
 MTC & other equivalent - not exceeding 200PHP, or imprisonment not exceeding 1day
or both
 RTC & other equivalent - not exceeding 2,000PHP, or imprisonment not exceeding
10days or both

Remedies
 NO APPEAL
o It is immediately executory and non-appealable
 Petition for certiorari / prohibition
o There must be a bond
o Bond is conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgement should the
petition should be decided against him
 If first level court, RTC 
 Requisites for the execution of judgment to be suspended:
o Petition for C/P
o There is a bond
o Bond is conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgement should the
petition should be decided against him

How commenced?
 Motu proprio
 By “move” 
o The court then and there may conduct 
o No need of a hearing since there may be a summary judgment

Indirect / Constructive contempt

 There must be a hearing and opportunity in order the respondent may be heard

Acts constituting
 Misbehavior of the court officer or any court staff 
o Ex of officers:
 May include private individuals
 Receiver
 Executor
 Administrator
 Liquidator
 Commissioner
 Assessor
 Examiner
 Lawyer (officer of the court)
  Disobedience to the lawful order of the court / resistance to a lawful of the court
o In Oca vs. Custodio there was an open disobedience to the order of the court
o Different from obstruction
 Abuse or any unlawful interference which does not constitute direct contempt
 Conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice
 Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority
o Also applies when a person pretends to be a sheriff
o It would not preclude usurpation because contempt is different from crimes
 Failure to obey subpoena 
 Rescue or attempted rescue of a person or property in the custody if an officer by virtue
of an order or process of a court held by him
o Those properties capable of manual delivery 

Cybercrime Warrant - Contempt (R71)

 If the PNP fails to submit the return of the warrant / complete inventory / affidavit 
 Fails to simultaneously turn-over the seized items 
 Prosecutor moves the items…
o If there is failure to file a return. Will he file a separate petition? NO. He would
just file a motion for a “show cause” order or verified petition.

How commenced?
 Motu proprio by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt
o Called as a “show cause” order
 Motion for the court to issue a “show cause” order
 Verified petition for charge of indirect contempt 
o Verified
o Docket fees
o Certificate of Forum Shopping
o Appended dox

Kinds of Contempt Proceedings

 Criminal / punitive
o Dominant purpose: impose punishment as to the acts that demean the court
 Civil /remedial
o Dominant purpose: enforcement of a proper order for the benefit of the other
parties

Contempt is sui generis

 Reason: in nature it is criminal as to the sanctions imposed, but it may be imposed either
in criminal or civil cases, and it can proceed independently from the cases.
Domagas vs Jensen= FORCIBLE ENTRY IS A REAL ACTION AND IN PERSONAM

DOCTRINE: From the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very nature and
purpose, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the
plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the
New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession
thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or
occupation of the property.

FACTS: On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The summons and the complaint
were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was
relayed to the Sheriff by her (the respondent's) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent's
house at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan The Sheriff left the summons and complaint
with Oscar Layno, who received the same. The petitioner assails the decision of the CA, alleging that
the appellate court erred in holding that the respondent's complaint for ejectment is an action quasi
in rem. The petitioner insists that the complaint for forcible entry is an action in personam; therefore,
substituted service of the summons and complaint on the respondent, in accordance with Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, is valid.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the respondent's complaint for ejectment is an action quasi
in rem.

HELD: No. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam. An action
for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a REAL ACTION AND IN PERSONAM because the plaintiff seeks
to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code,29
for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the
plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the
property.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not
voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of
the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in
Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also
with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Thus, any judgment of the
court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
HILADO VS SANCHEZ= JURISDICTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS MTC EXCEPT AGRARIAN DISPUTE

DOCTRINE: On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 33, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7691 provides that Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court and Metropolitan Trial Court, have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases for unlawful
detainer. The proceedings in ejectment cases are covered by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and the
Rules on Summary Procedure. However, such courts have no original jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure issued
by the DARAB implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and appellate
jurisdiction of the DARAB.

FACTS: Celso "Nene" Zayco was the owner of a large parcel of agricultural land. y. The property and the
portions thereof were occupied and cultivated by tenants. Subsequently, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) granted Emancipation Patents to the twenty (20) tenants on the property. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Kabankalan approved Resolution No. 96-39, reclassifying
the property partly as property for light industry, and the rest as residential. The respondent filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against the twenty (20) petitioners, who were all occupants-farmers on
the property, with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Kabankalan City.

ISSUE: Whether the MTCC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent.

HELD: NO. However, such courts have no original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
disputes under Rep. Act No. 6657, as amended, and the Rules of Procedure issued by the DARAB
implementing said laws, which are within the exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction of the DARAB.
The DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform
programs. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any
incident involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. We held that
the MTCC has no jurisdiction over an ejectment case where the issue of possession is inextricably
interwoven with an agrarian dispute.
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals= JURISDICTIONAL INFIRMITIES, NO ALLEGATION

DOCTRINE: Forcible entry must be ruled out as there was no allegation that petitioner was denied
possession of the land in question through any of the means stated in Sec. 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court.
Neither was the action one for unlawful detainer as there was no lease agreement between the parties,
and the demand to vacate by petitioner on private respondents did not make the latter tenants of the
former. Petitioner should therefore avail of other remedies provided for by law to recover possession of
subject property.

FACTS: Constancio Espiritu (petitioner) lodged a complaint against Gideon Natividad and Jose Caysip
(respondents) with the MTC of Baliuag, Bulacan, for unlawful detainer and recovery of reasonable
rentals for the use of the land; he claims that respondents illegally occupied on his land by building a
chapel thereon although no building permit was ever issued for its construction; that they did not
comply with notices and demands for the removal of the chapel.

Respondent that since petitioner did not allege his prior possession of the property and subsequent
deprivation thereof through any of the means in Sec 1 of Rule 70 (FISTS), he should ventilate his right of
possession by way of an action other than unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition for alleged jurisdictional
infirmities

While petitioner is correct in stating that the nature of an action as well as the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, a careful scrutiny of the complaint reveals that
petitioner’s cause of action is neither for unlawful detainer nor for forcible entry but some other action
involving recovery of possession. In forcible entry the deprivation of physical possession of land or
building is effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer the
unlawful withholding of possession is made after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the issue centers on who was in prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer the
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the right to
possess the subject property.
Sarona v. Villegas= ULAWFUL OR FORCIBLE?

DOCTRINE: The law and jurisprudence leave no doubt in our mind that what determines the cause of
action is the nature of defendants' entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which
may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, entry
is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed
within one year from the date of the last demand.

FACTS: On January 28, 1963, plaintiffs lodged with the Municipal Court, Unlawful Detainer Case.
Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the municipal court. They say that the case is one of forcible entry, and the reglementary one-year
period had elapsed before suit was started.

The municipal court overturned the motion to dismiss. The municipal court's judgment directed
defendants to vacate the premises. Defendants, on appeal to the court of First Instance of Davao. Such
court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the case, ruling that the suit is one of forcible entry
(not unlawful detainer) and was started beyond the reglementary one-year period.

ISSUE: Whether the case involves one of forcible entry or unlawful detainer

HELD: This is a case of forcible entry. It is plain that the foregoing rules define two entirely distinct
causes of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the
beginning — forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally
acquired possession lawfully — unlawful detainer.

Espiritu v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE: FORCIBLE ENTRY.--- In forcible entry the deprivation of physical possession of land or
building is effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer the
unlawful withholding of possession is made after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the issue centers on who was in prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer the
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the right to
possess the subject property.

FACTS: On 6 January 1994 petitioner Constancio Espiritu lodged a complaint against private respondents
Gideon Natividad and Jose Caysip with the Municipal Trial Court of Baliaug, Bulacan, for unlawful
detainer and recovery of reasonable rentals for the use of land plus attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

Petitioner alleged in his complaint that private respondents Gideon Natividad and Jose Caysip had been
illegally occupying/squatting on his land by building a chapel thereon although no building permit was
ever issued for its construction. He also claimed that notices and demands for the removal of the chapel
were made but private respondents failed to comply therewith.

Private respondents, on the other hand, averred in their answer that petitioner had no valid cause of
action against them as the property in question was donated to their congregation, the Church of Christ,
and thus owned by their church and not by them. They further claimed that the Municipal Trial Court of
Baliuag, did not acquire jurisdiction over the case as it did not fall within the meaning of "any action"
under Rule 72 (now Rule 70) of the Revised Rules of Court. They maintained that since petitioner failed
to allege that he had prior possession of the property, and that he was deprived of possession thereof
through any of the means specified in Sec. 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 70), petitioner
should ventilate his right of possession by way of an action other than unlawful detainer or forcible
entry.

ISSUE: WON the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the action.

Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit. While petitioner is correct in stating that the nature of an
action as well as the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint, a careful
scrutiny of the complaint reveals that petitioner's cause of action is neither for unlawful detainer nor for
forcible entry but some other action involving recovery of possession.

Clearly, the complaint failed to aver facts constitutive of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
Forcible entry must be ruled out as there was no allegation that petitioner was denied possession of the
land in question through any of the means stated in Sec. 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court. Neither was the
action one for unlawful detainer as there was no lease agreement between the parties, and the demand
to vacate by petitioner on private respondents did not make the latter tenants of the former. 13
Petitioner should therefore avail of other remedies provided for by law to recover possession of subject
property.

Spouses Muñoz v. Court of Appeals= FAILURE TO AVER FACTS= PUBLICIANA OR REINVINDICATORIA

DOCTRINE: When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the action
should either be accion publiciana or reivindicatoria in the Regional Trial Court.

FACTS: Respondent Nicolas P. Garcia filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Masantol-Macabebe, Masantol, Pampanga. He alleged that he is the co-owner of the subject
lot and said lot was tenanted by Loreto Garcia; and that the petitioners constructed their houses on a
portion of the lot without the knowledge and consent of the owners. Respondent further stated that
despite the demands made by him, the petitioners refused to vacate their houses.

In their answer, petitioners Sps. Munoz et. al claimed that tenant, Loreto Garcia is already deemed the
owner of the land pursuant to P.D. 27. They also invoked the alternative defenses: (1) lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Municipal Trial Court, the case being an accion publiciana which is exclusively
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court; and (2) that they are farmworkers of the lot, and are entitled to
security of tenure on the land pursuant to Section 6 of RA 6657 and that they had erected their houses
and had continuously resided on the premises in issue since 1976 or for a period of twelve years before
the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE: WON the complaint filed by respondent before the MCTC was for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer or an accion publiciana.

The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "unlawful detainer." However, respondent alleged
therein that from the start, the possession of the petitioner was unlawful as it was stated that the
defendants have constructed their houses on the questioned premises stealthily, that is, without the
knowledge and consent of his co-owners. This allegation clearly characterized the complaint as one for
forcible entry and not for unlawful detainer.

While it is true that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the complaint failed to state
that Loreto Garcia was in prior possession of the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And,
while the complaint stated that the petitioners obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it
failed to aver when this entry was accomplished or when the private respondent learned of such entry.
The failure of the private respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal
because this will determine the start of the counting of the one year period for the filing of the summary
action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the action should either be accion publiciana or reivindicatoria in the Court of First Instance.

Villegas v. Court of Appeals= UNLAWFUL DETAINER SPRING NOT ONLY IN CONTRACT BUT ALSO WITH
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

DOCTRINE: Under Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that the act of withholding
possession which could be the subject matter of an ejectment suit is that which results from any
(emphasis supplied) contract. In other words, an unlawful detainer case can spring not only from a
contract of lease but may also spring from a compromise agreement which is also a contract such as in
the case at bar.

ISSUE: WON private respondent should be ordered to vacate the leased premises and to pay rentals
therefor from December 1, 1976 up to the time he surrenders possession of the leased premises to
herein petitioner at the rate of P 375.00 a month.

Unlawful detainer is defined as the act of withholding the possession of land or building from another
who is entitled to it after the expiration or termination of the right of the illegal detainer to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, when one year had not yet elapsed from the time
the original possession had become illegal (Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 728). Under Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Court, it is provided that the act of withholding possession which could be the subject
matter of an ejectment suit is that which results from any (emphasis supplied) contract. In other words,
an unlawful detainer case can spring not only from a contract of lease but may also spring from a
compromise agreement which is also a contract such as in the case at bar.

Spouses Velasco v. Laigo= IMPLIED NEW LEASE= TACITA RECONDUCCION

DOCTRINE: Under Article 1670 of the Civil Code, a new lease is implied if the lessee continues enjoying
the thing leased for 15 days after the termination of the original contract, unless notice to the contrary
has been previously given by either party. Conversely, if a notice of the termination of the lease is given,
the fact that the lessee continues to stay for 15 more days is not a ground for inferring a new lease.Thus,
an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following requisites are found to exist:
(a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired; (b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice
to vacate; and (c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the acquiescence of
the lessor.This implied renewal of the lease is not for the original period of the contract, but for the
periods established by Article 1682 and 1687 of the Civil Code.

In sum, we hold that while there was no extension of lease for a continuous period until 2025, an
implied lease for a successive yearly period existed between the parties when respondents failed to
timely give a written notice to vacate to petitioners

FACTS:

On August 31, 1976, they leased out a 3,243-sq.m. portion of the property (property) to spouses Velasco
for a period of 20 years, commencing from September 1, 1976 to August 31, 1996, renewable for
another 10 years. The improvements were sold at public auction and were awarded to Bernardo
Duldulao (Duldulao) as the highest bidder. Spouses Velasco, nevertheless, remained in possession of the
property.

y.Thus, when the lease expired on August 31, 2006, Atty. Rillera demanded that spouses Velasco vacate
the property.Spouses Velasco, however, refused, claiming that the lease was extended until 2025.On
March 6, 2007, respondents filed the unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1061-BG, with
the MTC of Bauang, La Union on the ground of expiration of the lease.

ISSUE: Whether the lease contract was extended or renewed after the expiration of the lease period in
2006

HELD: NO.In unlawful detainer cases, the elements to be proved and resolved are the fact of lease and
the expiration or violation of its terms. Specifically, the essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1)
the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the
possessor's right to hold possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building
after the expiration or termination of the right to possess; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the
rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the filing of the action
within one year from the date of the last demand received by the defendant.

Thus, an implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in when the following requisites are found to
exist:

(a) the term of the original contract of lease has expired;

(b) the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate; and

(c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor

In this case, petitioners occupied the property for more than 15 days following the expiration of the
period in August 31, 2006. Records show that the written notice to vacate was given only on October 4,
2006, or after an implied lease already commenced. This implied lease was for a year to year period
pursuant to Article 1687, because the term of the expired Lease Agreement provided for the payment of
annual rents

In sum, we hold that while there was no extension of lease for a continuous period until 2025, an
implied lease for a successive yearly period existed between the parties when respondents failed to
timely give a written notice to vacate to petitioners. Considering this, at the time the complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed on March 6, 2007, respondents had no right to eject petitioners because an
implied lease had already commenced.

Javelosa v. Court of Appeals= WORD UNLAWFULLY WITHHOLDING IS SUFFICIENT

DOCTRINE: We have ruled in a long line of cases that "in an action for unlawful detainer, a simple
allegation that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient for the words
`unlawfully withholding' imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning,
having no other source than a contract, express or implied, possession which had later expired as a right
and is being withheld by defendant." Thus, in the case at bar, private respondents' allegation in their
complaint that petitioner was unlawfully withholding possession of the land from them is sufficient to
make out a case for unlawful detainer.

FACTS: This case involves a 2061 sq.m land owned by petitioner Gregorio Javelosa. Sometime in the 70’s,
Javelosa mortgaged said land to Jesus Jalbuena to secure several loans which were never paid by
Javelosa. Thus, Jalbuena, as mortgagee, foreclosed on the land and purchased it as highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale.

During the one-year period of redemption, Javelosa filed an action against Jalbena at the RTC Iloilo City
to annul the mortgage contracts and public auction sale claiming that the mortgage contracts were
illegal and the conduct of the foreclosure sale was irregular.
Despite receipt of the demand letter on June 4, 1993, Javelosa refused to vacate said lot. Thus, on
August 6, 1993, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal detainer before the MTC iin Cities, Iloilo
City

ISSUE: WON the complaint filed before the MTC in Cities is not an unlawful detainer suit but one for
accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

HELD: No. The complaint for Unlawful Detainer case was proper. The heirs alleged in their complaint
that they are the registered owners of the subject land and therefore, entitled to possession thereof;
that petitioners were illegally occupying the premises without their consent and thus unlawfully
withholding possession from them; and, despite receipt of their demand to vacate the premises,
petitioner refused to leave the property. On the face of the complaint, it also appears that private
respondents were seeking to recover merely the physical possession or posession de facto of the subject
land.

It is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions for forcible entry but not in
unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that MTC case filed against petitioner is one for unlawful
detainer, petitioner's prior possession of the land is of no moment.

Echanes v. Spouses Hailar

Settled is the rule that the only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is
entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. In an
unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue
of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine
who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would
not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

A portion of Lot No. 2297-A is currently occupied by respondents. Petitioner sent respondents a Notice
to Vacate. Despite receipt of said demand letter, respondents refused to vacate the premises. Petitioner
filed a Complaint for Ejectment with Damages before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

According to petitioner, respondents' continued possession and occupation of the subject lot is out of
tolerance and permission granted to them by petitioner and her parents. In their Answer, respondents
countered that the father of respondent Adoracion Joven Hailar purchased the subject lot from the late
Eduardo Cuenta after World War II as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 12141-C in the name of his
father issued in 1959. From then on, respondent Adoracion Joven Hailar and her siblings occupied and
exercised acts of dominion, and have been in possession of the land exclusively, publicly, continuously
for more than 40 years as evidenced by tax declarations and realty tax payments made by them.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff is entitled to recover the physical possession of the subject property.
HELD: NO. In an action for forcible entry and detainer, if plaintiff can prove prior physical possession in
himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner, but, on the other hand, if he cannot
prove such prior physical possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry and detainer even if
he should be the owner of the property.

Alviar v. Pampolina= ACTION FOR OWNERSHIP IS NOT A BAR

DOCTRINE: An action for ownership is not a bar to an action for forcible entry and detainer.

FACTS: On May 25, 1935, more than 720 tenants filed an action (civil case No. 6663) in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna against Colegio de San Jose, praying that defendant be compelled to respect its
contracts of lease with plaintiffs on some parcels of lands located in San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna

To these complaints, the defendants filed motions for dismissal alleging that the justice of the peace
court had no jurisdiction because there was already an action for title pending then in the Court of First
Instance, which was civil case No. 8039 above mentioned. The justice of the peace denied the motion
for dismissal on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaints constitute forcible entry and
detainer falling within his jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the justice of peace court has jurisdiction over cases for forcible entry and
detainer

YES. . Furthermore, well known is the rule that an action for ownership is not a bar to an action for
forcible entry and detainer. Whether title is necessarily involved in an action for forcible entry and
detainer is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence presented by both parties at the trial,
and that question can be reviewed only on appeal and not by certiorari proceedings in the Court of First
Instance.

Javelosa v. Court of Appeals= PRIOR POSSESSION IS ONLY FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY

DOCTRINE: Again, it is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions for forcible
entry but not in unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that the MTC case filed against petitioner is one
for unlawful detainer, petitioner's prior possession of the land is of no moment

Petitioner failed to pay his loans and Jalbuena, as mortgagee, foreclosed on the land and purchased it as
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale. During the one-year period of redemption, petitioner-mortgagor
filed an action against the mortgagee at the RTC Iloilo City to annul the mortgage contracts and public
auction sale. He claimed that the mortgage contracts were illegal and the conduct of the foreclosure
sale was irregular.

While the case was pending, the period of redemption prescribed. Consequently, the mortgagee
consolidated title over the land, caused the cancellation of the mortgagor's title and the issuance of a
new title in his name. Thereafter, petitioner obtained an Order from the RTC restraining the mortgagee
from further effecting the foreclosure sale of the property.

Petitioner, in his Answer, asserted his ownership over the disputed land. He claimed that he had a TCT in
his name but that the mortgagee (father and predecessor-in-interest of private respondents), in bad
faith, was able to cause his title to be cancelled and a new title issued in his name despite the pendency
of the RTC case questioning the award of the subject land to the mortgagee in the foreclosure
proceedings. Thus, petitioner denied he was illegally occupying the land. He claimed that he was legally
entitled to the continued possession thereof by virtue of pending legal incidents in his RTC case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale, from which transactions the mortgagee (predecessor-in-
interest of private respondents) derived his title.

ISSUE: : WON petitioner is entitled to the physical possession of the property. – NO

Again, it is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions for forcible entry but not
in unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that the MTC case filed against petitioner is one for unlawful
detainer, petitioner's prior possession of the land is of no moment. Private respondents are entitled to
its possession from the time title was issued in their favor as registered owners. An action for unlawful
detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of their right
to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied.

Under the Rules, if the mortgaged property is not redeemed within one year from the foreclosure sale,
the purchaser at public auction is entitled to possession of the property. To obtain possession, the
vendee or purchaser may either ask for a writ of possession or bring an appropriate independent action,
such as a suit for ejectment, which private respondents did. The RTC case assailing the public auction
sale of the property and seeking annulment of mortgages did not preclude the filing of an ejectment
Feliciano v. Court of Appeals= EJECTMENT IS SEPARATE FROM ANNULMENT OF MORTGAGTE

DOCTRINE: The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with
respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land
or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon the different cause of action involving possession.

FACTS: On Feb 1978, Eleuterio Cosme obtained a loan of P50,000 from Insular Bank of Asia and America.
To secure the loan, he mortgaged a parcel of land registered in his name “married to Asuncion Obando”.
The loan was not paid upon maturity, so it was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction with
the bank as highest bidder. Ownership was consolidated to the bank after the lapse of redemption
period.

During the pendency of the case, private respondent Baron bought the property from the bank and a
DOAS was executed in his favor. On the basis of the sale, Baron demanded from petitioner to pay the
rents and vacate the premises. Petitioner refused insisting that she is the owner and the same is subject
to pending litigation. Baroon filed an ejectment suit before the MTC of QC, but dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia. RTC affirmed the MTC decision.

CA reversed the MTC decision saying that litis pendentia was not present in the case.

ISSUE: WON there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for to constitute litis pendentia?

HELD: No. The fact that herein petitioner instituted a prior action for the annulment of the mortgage
contract, certificate of sale, deed of absolute sale, reconveyance and damages, is not a valid reason for
defeating the action for ejectment.

While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the two (2) actions, the issues involved
and the reliefs prayed for are not the same. In the annulment and reconveyance suit, the issue is the
validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale, whereas the issue in the ejectment case
is whether, assuming the mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, private respondent has the right
to take possession of the property. In the former case, the relief prayed for is recovery of ownership
of the subject land, while the latter, it is the restoration of possession thereof to private respondent.

Moreover, well-settled is the rule that the pendency of an action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for unlawful detainer or
forcible entry. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with
respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties
upon the different cause of action involving possession.
Cayabyab v. De Aquino= Forcible entry does not bar the filing of case on ownership

DOCTRINE: The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with
respect to the possession only and shall in no case bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building—such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties
upon a different cause of action involving possession; It is not even material if the other action was
filed earlier than or prior to the ejectment case

FACTS: De Aquino filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners before MTC of Pangasinan.
She alleged that she is the owner and was in prior possession of the land currently being occupied by the
petitioners as evidenced by a TCT. Further, that Cayabyab and Lazo were only allowed to occupy the
same in 1998 by mere tolerance and upon condition they will vacate the same upon demand.

The MTC ruled in favor of De Aquino. The RTC dismissed the case on appeal holding that based on
primary administrative jurisdiction, the case previously filed with COSLAP should be determinative of the
issues in the case. The CA, however, reinstated MTC ruling.

SSUE: WON the pending and previously filed COSLAP case barred the MTC from exercising jurisdiction
over unlawful detainer case.

HELD: No. In summary actions for ejectment such as Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer, the only issue
involved is that of physical possession or possession de facto, the purpose of which is only to protect the
owner from any physical encroachment from without. 9 Such cases are merely quieting processes, not
designed to determine actual title, being summary actions intended to provide an expeditious manner
for protecting possession or right to possession without involvement of title. 10 It is a settled rule that
the mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the municipal court
of its summary jurisdiction.

Further, if another case pending before another court of justice does not bar an independent summary
case for ejectment like forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the Court likewise takes the view that neither
should an ejectment case be barred by another case pending before an administrative body, such as the
COSLAP, where the question of ownership over the subject property is raised.

Spouses Apostol v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE: The fact that the respondents were never in prior physical possession of the subject land is
of no moment, as prior physical possession is necessary only in forcible entry cases. Under Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance
with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.
A person who has a torrens title over the property, such as the respondents, is entitled to the possession
thereof. The registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property covered by the said title
from the time such title was issued in their favor. Moreover, the fact that the respondents were never in
prior physical possession of the subject land is of no moment, as prior physical possession is necessary
only in forcible entry cases.

The petitioners claim that, as alleged in their answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer, the
respondents’ title over the property is a nullity; hence, the complaint for unlawful detainer against the
petitioners should be dismissed for lack of merit. Certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in
accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose.

Soriente v. Estate of Concepcion

DOCTRINE: Unlawful detainer under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Complaint must allege
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding from the plaintiff the possession of certain real property
after the expiration or termination of the former's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, and that the action is being brought within one year from the time the defendant's
possession became unlawful.

FACTS: Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she was the registered owner of the lot
occupied by petitioner Angelina Soriente at Mandaluyong City. The lot is covered by a Transfer
Certificate of Title.

During the lifetime of Arsenio E. Concepcion, who acquired the lot in 1978, he allowed and tolerated the
occupancy of the lot by petitioner, who was already staying on the property. Petitioner was allowed to
stay on the lot for free, but on a temporary basis until such time that Concepcion and/or his family
needed to develop the lot. After Arsenio E. Concepcion, his family initiated steps to develop the lot, but
petitioner's occupancy of the lot prevented them from pursuing their plan.

On April 27, 2001, respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for unlawful detainer has prescribed

HELD: No. The Complaint alleged that petitioner occupied the subject property by tolerance of the late
Arsenio Concepcion. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate
by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. Respondent sent
petitioner a demand letter dated September 22, 2000 to vacate the subject property, but petitioner did
not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within which a complaint for
unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse
of that period does the possession become unlawful. Respondent filed the ejectment case against
petitioner on April 27, 2001, which was less than a year from the date of formal demand. Clearly,
therefore, the action was filed within the one-year period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful
detainer case.

Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. v. Adao= CONTRACT TO SELL

DOCTRINE: The contract to sell does not by itself give respondent the right to possess the property.
Unlike in a contract of sale, here in a contract to sell, there is yet no actual sale nor any transfer of title,
until and unless, full payment is made. In cases of non-payment, the unpaid seller can avail of the
remedy of ejectment since he retains ownership of the property.

FACTS: The case stemmed from the court-approved Compromise Agreement between petitioner Keppel
Bank and Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation (PMRDC). By virtue of the agreement,
PMRDC transferred and conveyed to petitioner, by way of dacion en pago, 25 properties consisting of
townhouses, condominium units and vacant lots, as partial settlement of their P200,000,000
outstanding obligation. One of the units transferred was occupied by Philip Adao.

On February 18, 2000, petitioner demanded Adao to vacate the unit within 30 days from receipt of the
notice. Respondent refused. On October 19, 2000, petitioner sent respondent a final demand to vacate.
Since the demand was not heeded, an ejectment case was filed. In his defense, Adao alleged that he has
long been occupying the contested unit by virtue of a Contract to Sell between him and PMRDC. He
stated that to avoid litigation, he offered to purchase the unit for 2.5 million pesos, in addition to the 3
million pesos he already paid to PMRDC. Respondent contended that petitioner's remedy is to demand
from PMRDC the immediate replacement of the property as provided in their Compromise Agreement
and Dacion en Pago.

Petitioner contends he is not bound by the contract to sell as it was not annotated in the certificate of
title; that not having fully paid the price, respondent is not the owner; and that PMRDC merely tolerated
the possession by the respondent but such possession became illegal when, as the new owner, it
demanded that respondent immediately vacate the property.

Respondent counters that an ejectment suit is merely concerned with possession de facto and the issue
of ownership need not be resolved; that he has a better right of possession having fully paid the
purchase price; that ejectment cases are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure which relies
merely on affidavits and position papers submitted; and that his affidavit was sufficient to prove full
payment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of ejectment is legally available to the petitioner.

HELD: YES. The only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Ejectment cases
are designed to summarily restore physical possession to one who has been illegally deprived of such
possession, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties’ opposing claims of juridical possession in
appropriate proceedings.

It is true that persons dealing with registered property can rely solely on the certificate of title and need
not go beyond it. However, as correctly held by the CA, this rule does not apply to banks as their
business is affected with public interest. As master of its business, petitioner should have sent its
representatives to check the assigned properties before signing the compromise agreement and it
would have discovered that respondent was already occupying one of the condominium units and that a
contract to sell existed between Adao and PMRDC. In our view, petitioner was not a purchaser in good
faith.

Ramos v. Court of Appeals= Injunction in this case is by MTC. For accion publiciana = RTC

DOCTRINE: The function of injunction, generally is to preserve the status quo ante. The exception is
provided in Section 3 of Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, governing forcible entries, in which the court may
issue preliminary mandatory injunction, and by Section 9 thereof, involving leases, in which the court
may, on appeal, grant similar mandatory injunctive relief. The exception, it should be noted, applies to
ejectment cases alone, cases exclusively cognizable by the Municipal Court. It does not apply to the
proceeding below, and accion publiciana, jurisdiction over which is vested in the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the KASUNDUANs stands to defeat Bernal’s claim

HELD: No. The restoration assailed, as the lower court has declared, is the simple consequence of the
dissolution of the writ of injunction decreed by the Court of Appeals. In other words, Bernal is being
replaced in possession not because the lower court has finally ruled that she is entitled thereto, but in
order simply to maintain the status quo.

Rural Bank of Malalag v. Maniwang

DOCTRINE: Sec. 6 of the Rules on Summary procedure states that should the defendants fail to answer
the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for. Whereas Sec 10 of the same rules provides that a court cannot resort to "clarificatory
procedure," when the parties fail to submit their affidavits and position paper.

FACTS: Civil cases 226-228 were filed by petitioner, however, no action was taken by respondent
regarding this except for a pretrial conference. According to Judge Maniwang, (2) of the cases were not
triable under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Petitioner thereafter, filed (3) other civil cases
(229-231) but the defendants gave no answer to the summons sent upon them. Due to this, the former
filed a motion for the resolution of cases. After almost five months, the defendants finally filed their
answers which was admitted by respondent, consequently denying the motion of petitioner for
resolution of the case. Thereafter petitioner filed another motion to declare defendants in default but
was again denied by Judge Maniwang.

ISSUE: 1) WON Judge Maniwang was correct in admitting the answer filed by the defendant

2) WON Judge Maniwang was correct in conducting a clarificatory hearing on the case

1) Failure of submitting an answer: Respondent has not explained why after the defendants failed to file
their answer, he did not follow Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides:
"Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendants fail to answer the complaint within the period
above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided,
however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed
for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. He has not explained the justification for allowing the
admission of the answers, which were filed more than five months after their due date.

Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware

DOCTRINE: An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a summary proceeding and is an
expeditious means to recover possession. If the parties raise the issue of ownership, courts may only
pass upon that issue for the purpose of ascertaining who has the better right of possession. Any ruling
involving ownership is not final and binding. It is merely provisional and does not bar an action between
the same parties regarding the title of the property.

FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City under Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22. On September 28, 1966, through then Provincial Governor Apolonio G.
Maleniza, petitioner donated around 600 square meters of this parcel of land to the Camarines Sur
Teachers’ Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation), which
included an automatic revocation clause, to wit: That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE
shall use the above-described portion of land subject of the present donation for no other purpose
except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the abovenamed DONEE to
house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers’ Association, Inc., in connection with its
functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers’ Association as well as the Camarines
Sur High School Alumni Association

CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the donated property for a period of 20 years
commencing on September 1, 1995 and ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega took actual possession
of the property on September 1, 1995.

Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega undisturbed and merely
tolerated its possession of the property.
On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega saying that Bodega’s occupation of the
property was by mere tolerance of the petitioner As it now intended to use the property for its
developmental projects, petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its
peaceful possession. Subsequently, petitioner revoked its donation through a Deed of Revocation of
Donation pursuant to the revocation clause. CASTEA never challenged said revocation.

CA ruling: affirmed the RTC ruling, saying that while petitioner alleges that CASTEA violated the
conditions of the donation and thus, the automatic revocation clause applies, it should have first filed an
action for reconveyance of the property against CASTEA. The CA also found that petitioner’s action has
already prescribed. Applying Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code, the petitioner had 10 years to file an
action for reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation was violated. As the Contract of Lease was
entered into on September 1, 1995, petitioner, thus, had 10 years from this date to file the action.
Unfortunately, the action for unlawful detainer was filed more than 12 years later.

ISSUE: Whether the judgment in an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is final and binding.

HELD: NO, the judgment in an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is not final and binding. Any
ruling in an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is merely provisional and does not bar an
action between the same parties regarding the title of the property. An action for unlawful detainer, as
in this case, pertains to specific circumstances of dispossession. It refers to a situation where the current
occupant of the property initially obtained possession lawfully. This possession only became unlawful
due to the expiration of the right to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere
tolerance.

An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key jurisdictional facts:

1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter's right of possession;

3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and

4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.

D.O. Plaza Management Corporation v. Co-Owners Heirs of Andrei Atega

FACTS: Parties entered into a contract of lease over two adjoining parcels of land situated at Baan,
Butuan City, one having an area of 1.70 hectares and the other with an area of 2,312 square meters. The
Lease Contract was for a term of five (5) years, commencing on December 16, 1986 up to December 15,
1991, renewable upon mutual agreement of the parties. It provided for a monthly rental of P3,000 for
the first year, P3,500 for the second year, P4,000 for the third year, P4,500 for the fourth year, and
P5,000 for the fifth year, After the expiration of the contract, petitioner allegedly proposed to extend
the lease. In a letter dated March 11, 1992, respondents agreed to reduce the area leased from 19,213
sq. m. to 9,205 sq. m. but increased the rent to P3.50 per square meter or P32,217.50 per month.
Respondents sent their last letter to petitioner on June 7, 1994, reiterating their demand for it to pay
unpaid rentals amounting to P934,307.50 and to vacate the leased premises, together with the
occupants therein, within ten (10) days. Petitioner refused to heed their demands.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reasonable monthly rental value is P32,217.50, as found by the CA and the
MTCC, or P14,000.00, as found by the RTC.

In the case at bar, CA correctly considered the enumerated factors. First, the old rate did not reflect the
fair value of the subject premises. It was kept artificially low as a concession to respondent which
undertook to introduce improvements into the property, ownership of which would automatically
accrue to petitioners at the end of the term of the lease. Second, while the new lease shall cover a
reduced area of 9,205 square meters only, a higher rate is still justified because the new lease will affect
not only the land but also 35 units of buildings and houses, ownership of which, as provided in the lease
contract, automatically accrued to them at the end of the term of the lease. These structures include
buildings used for commercial and industrial purposes and residential houses. Based on the tax
declarations covering the land and improvements, the total market value thereof is over six million
pesos. Third, the new rate is equivalent to PhP3.50 per square meter. This is the prevailing rental rate in
the nearby Municipality of Cabadbaran. On the other hand, the subject premises are located in Butuan
City where rental rates are definitely higher. The rate in Cabadbaran is being applied to the subject
premises only as a concession to respondents

Dumo v. Espinas= rental value, compensation for the use of property

DOCTRINE: The settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair
rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.

FACTS: Spouses Dumo are the owners-possessors of a parcel of sandy beach resort in Bauang, La Union.
Severa J. Espinas filed a "Quieting of Title and/or Ownership and Possession against spouses Sandy and
Presnida Saldana, subject matter of the case being the same resort.

HELD: No. The CA is correct. There is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral and exemplary
damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is
the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.
Felisilda v. Villanueva= OTHER DAMAGES MUST BE CLAIMED IN AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION

DOCTRINE: The only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property, Other damages must be
claimed in an ordinary action.

The city court of Butuan City in its decision of February 17, 1979 ordered the Felisilda spouses to vacate
Lot No. 662-C covered by OCT No. P-1877 in the name of Dr. Vicente C. Galeon, to pay him P300 a
month as compensation for the use of the land from January, 1971 until the said land is vacated, P7,000
as moral and exemplary damages and P3,000 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses (Civil Case No.
846).

CGR Corporation v. Treyes= FILING OF SEPARATE CASE FOR RECOVERY OF DAMAGAES IS NOT SPLITTING
CAUSE OF ACTION

DOCTRINE: The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the
property" and attorney's fees and costs. Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.

On August 26, 2005, the Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground of prematurity,
holding that a complaint for damages may only be maintained "after a final determination on the
forcible entry cases has been made." Hence, the present Petition for Review

ISSUE: Whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for damages
arising after the act of dispossession had occurred

HELD: Yes. The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC.
17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent
or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If
it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs.
If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either
party and award costs as justice requires.

Lastly, we agree with the CA and the RTC that there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and
exemplary damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages
which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or
those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. Other damages must
thus be claimed in an ordinary action.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Corpuz= LOSING PARTY MUST FIRST RECEIVED NOTICE

As held in Felongco v. Dictado, reiterating the earlier case of Dy v. Court of Appeals, the losing party
must first receive notice of the judgment before the court or its personnel can execute the judgment.
The reason is that if such judgment is immediately executed without prior notice to the losing party,
then such a party has no remedy if the evidence or law does not support the judgment. The court
cannot direct the issuance of a writ of execution motu proprio. x x x Section 8, Rule 70 explicitly provides
that although execution is immediately executory, judgment may be stayed by perfecting an appeal,
filing a supersedeas bond approved by the court and periodically paying the rents during the pendency
of the appeal. As explained in Kaw v. Judge Anunciacion, Jr., a party is not in a position to stay execution
unless he receives notice of the filing of a motion for execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Corpuz abused her authority as clerk of court when she issued a writ
of execution prior to receipt of the court’s decision by the losing party in the case (Defendant Lu)

YES. Clearly, this is an improper procedure because the clerk of court issued the writ of execution before
the losing party received the decision. As held in Felongco v. Dictado, reiterating the earlier case of Dy v.
Court of Appeals, the losing party must first receive notice of the judgment before the court or its
personnel can execute the judgment. The reason is that if such judgment is immediately executed
without prior notice to the losing party, then such a party has no remedy if the evidence or law does not
support the judgment.

Air Transportation Office v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE: Failure of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case to comply with any of the
requirements under Sec 19, Rule 70, ROC which provides for wa stay the execution of a judgment in an
unlawful detainer case is a ground for the outright execution of judgment despite appeal. The duty of
the court in this respect being mandatory and ministerial.

FACTS: Air Transportation Office (ATO) leased certain parcels of land,referred to in this case as
“concession area,” to private respondent Miaque. On January 18, 1989, ATO Area Manager Gerochi
issued to private respondent MIaque a concession permit to operate a paid parking space and taxicab
and limousine service in the Iloilo City Airport for a period of 15 years. However, despite the expiration
of the concession permit, private respondent Miaque resumed business in June of 2004 over the
concession area despite petitioner's protest. Petitioner ATO filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer
against private respondent Miaque before the MTCC. MTCC ordered private respondent to
immediately vacate and deliver to petitioner the concession area.
Petitioner moved for the execution of said decision while private respondent filed a notice of appeal.
MTCC ordered the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. Because of the failure of private
respondent to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the accruing rentals pending appeal, a Writ of
Execution was issued.

Private respondent filed a Motion for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the implementation of the writ of execution to the RTC. RTC denied said motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance by the CA of the TRO to restrain the enforcement and
implementation of the MTCC’s writ of execution is proper

HELD: NO, it was issued improvidently

Conformably to Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, concurrence of all the following requisites
must be present to stay the immediate execution of judgment pending appeal in ejectment cases, to
wit:

a) defendant perfects his appeal,

b) he files a supersedeas bond, and

c) he periodically deposits the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.

Tolentino v. Roces

DOCTRINE: "To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the
foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his
appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due
during the pendency of the appeal." However, this rule is not without any exception. In the case of
Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,this Court categorically stated that "[a]n exception is
where the trial court did not make any findings with respect to any amount in arrears, damages or
costs against the defendant, in which case no bond is necessary to stay the execution of the
judgment."

Tolentino v. Roces

ISSUE: Whether or not a respondent's non-filing of a supersedeas bond stays the execution pending
appeal in the absence of any award of rent for the reasonable use of the subject property's premises.

that "[a]n exception is where the trial court did not make any findings with respect to any amount in
arrears, damages or costs against the defendant, in which case no bond is necessary to stay the
execution of the judgment."

In this case, it must be noted that there was no award of rental payment for the reasonable use and
occupation of the subject property. The only monetary award given by the MeTC is the award of
attorney's fees and costs, which, following the aforementioned pronouncement of this Court, is not
within the contemplation of the law under Section 19 of Rule 70. Thus, respondent's filing of a
supersedeas bond is not necessary to stay the execution of judgment as the perfection of her appeal is
enough for the same.

Aznar Brotheras Realty Company v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE: Under the former Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, if the judgment of the municipal
trial court in an ejectment case is adverse to the defendant, execution shall issue immediately. To stay
the immediate execution of the judgment, the defendant must (1) perfect his appeal; (2) file a
supersedeas bond to answer for the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the
appeal.

CONTEMPT:

Webb v. Gatdula

DOCTRINE: Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its
authority, justice, and dignity. Contempt of court "signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience
of the court's order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice."
There are two (2) types of contempt under the Rules of Court, namely: (1) direct contempt; and (2)
indirect contempt. There is direct contempt when there is a "misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before [it.]" It includes disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, refusal to be sworn in or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe
an affidavit or deposition. It may be meted out "summarily without a hearing." The grounds for indirect
contempt are provided for under Rule 71, Section 3

Criminal contempt is a "conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge
acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is one's failure to fulfill a court order in a civil
action that would benefit the opposing party. It is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose
behalf the violated order was made

FACTS: In the case of Lejano v. People, Jeffrey Webb was among those charged with the crime of rape
with homicide on the infamous case Vizconde Massacre. Webb filed a motion before the trial court to
direct the NBI to submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis, claiming that this would prove innocence
since the result would show that the semen found in Carmela did not belong to him.
Due to the missing semen specimen, Webb filed this petition for indirect contempt against the
following: 1. Current NBI Director Gatdula, Former NBI Director Caabay and Former NBI Director
Mantaring for failing to exercise direct supervision and due diligence in safekeeping the semen specimen
which was entrusted to the custody of the NBI 2. Dr. Bautista — Medico-Legal Officer III for issuing his
Certification that the slides were still in the custody of the NBI and later denying that they are 3. Dr.
Cabanayan — former Chief, Medico-Legal Division for failing to bring the slides containing the semen
specimen during the hearing held on 6 February 1996 as required by the Court, and for falsely claiming
that he had already surrendered the slides to the trial court despite all evidence to the contrary

Webb was acquitted over the crime charge. The OSG filed its comment to this petition (representing
Gatdula, Esmeralda, Bausta and Arizala) arguing that it is already moot as Webb was acquitted and the
DNA analysis was only to afford petition him his right to due process and was not indispensable in
determining his guilt. The others all deny responsibility for the loss of the specimen

ISSUE: Whether or not the following persons should be cited in indirect contempt?

YES. HELD: Respondents were charged with indirect contempt on two (2) grounds under the Rules of
Court: (1) "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court"; and (2)
"improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice" The facts here sufficiently prove that, indeed, there was willful disobedience.

On the second ground, petitioner prays that respondents Atty. Rivera and Herra be held in contempt for
coaching Alfaro in executing her dubious affidavit and in the coached identification of petitioner. A
contempt case on this ground is in the nature of a criminal contempt. Being a criminal contempt, it must
be shown that respondents acted willfully or for an illegitimate purpose. This implies willfulness, bad
faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice. Here, respondents were not shown to have planned a
deliberate scheme to inculpate petitioner. There was no other evidence presented supporting this but
by mere allegation of Webb.

Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE: In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the
principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the
summary nature of contempt proceedings. Strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a
prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in
regular criminal cases; and proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.
However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial
rights of the accused are preserved.

Civil contempt proceedings, on the other hand, are generally held to be remedial and civil in nature; that
is, for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy resorted to, to preserve and enforce the
rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to
benefit such a party litigant. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or
criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.

Requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt: (1) the filing of a written charge
and (2) an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner may be held liable for indirect contempt after a single hearing and on the basis
of an ocular inspection report which was not furnished to the parties nor set for hearing.

HELD: Yes. Section 3, Rule 71, of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the procedural requisites before
the accused may be punished for indirect contempt: (1) the filing of a written charge and (2) an
opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel. All that the law requires is that
there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity given to the person charged to be
heard by himself or counsel. In the instant case, a written charge of indirect contempt was duly filed by
the spouses Ochoa. This is not contested by the petitioner. Acting on the complaint, the trial issued an
order requiring to "show cause/explain why a judgment of contempt should not be rendered against it."
On a hearing date, as petitioner admits in its petition, it "vehemently denied the accusations in the
motion for contempt". We can draw no other conclusion than that a hearing was conducted and
petitioner was heard in its defenses in court. Moreover, its vice-president and counsel were likewise
present during the ocular inspection where they actively participated, as reported by the clerk of the
trial court. Further, after the trial court promulgated its final order, petitioner did not raise the question
of not having been furnished a copy of the commissioner's report. No mention thereof was made in its
opposition to the omnibus motion. Neither did it do so in its rejoinder to movants' reply. It is only an
afterthought of petitioner to raise on appeal the alleged, though unsubstantiated, procedural defect.

People v. Godoy= contemt of court even though the case was terminated exemption

DOCTRINE: 1. Philippine rule is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of
the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court,
even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two
circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the
court; or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be
impeded 2. Where the entire case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests
with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there
is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court.

The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the
administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous,
insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of
complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an
imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub
judice because it is still pending automatic review.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Post-Litigation Publications can be the Subject of Contempt Proceedings 2.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Contempt Proceedings

HELD: 1. No. The Philippine rule is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of
the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court,
even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two
circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize
the court; or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be
impeded. On the first ground, it has been said that the right of free speech is guaranteed by the
Constitution and must be sacredly guarded, but that an abuse thereof is expressly prohibited by that
instrument and must not be permitted to destroy or impair the efficiency of the courts or the public
respect therefor and the confidence therein. Anent the second ground, the rule in American
jurisprudence is that false and libelous utterances present a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice. To constitute contempt, criticism of a past action of the court must pose a
clear and present danger to a fair administration of justice, that is, the publication must have an
inherent tendency to influence, intimidate, impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court's administration of
justice. It is not merely a private wrong against the rights of litigants and judges, but a public wrong, a
crime against the State, to undertake by libel or slander to impair confidence in the judicial functions.

Santiago v. Anunciacion

DOCTRINE: Where from the nature of the offense (indirect contempt), or where the law defining and
punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene
in the prosecution of the offense. As contempt is inherently criminal in character, no indemnity can be
had, the alleged "obstruction" committed was an offense against the State, the respondent court in
particular, which involves no private party

The petitioner moved for investigation as Amylie had

come forward to claim that "she was not kidnapped and that she went voluntarily with RENE PERALTA, her
boyfriend and father of the child she is carrying. Consequently, Amylie was scheduled to submit a sworn statement
before the court. The petitioner requested the peace
officers aforesaid to defer service of the warrant until after Amylie had testified in court. (which the officers agreed
to) Thereafter, an accusation of indirect contempt was brought against the petitioner before the
respondent judge, for obstructing the implementation of the warrant of arrest against Amylie.

When the contempt case was called for hearing, the petitioner appeared on his behalf while Atty.
Eleazar Ferry, with the conformity of Fiscal Luis Tuason, Jr., entered his appearance as private
prosecutor. The petitioner interposed his objection to Atty. Ferry’s appearance, "in the absence of any
damage claim for which the intervention of the offended party is warranted." The respondent judge
overruled petitioner’s objection, the latter filed an MR which was denied.
In the case at bar, there is no justification for the prosecution of the case by a private prosecutor. In this
instance, the kind of contempt (indirect) for which the petitioner is sought to be held liable provides for
no indemnity because the alleged "obstruction" committed was an offense against the State, the
respondent court in particular, which involves no private party. Thus, the appearance of Atty. Eleazar
Ferry, on behalf of Mrs. Carolina Orozco, was unwarranted.

In the case at bar, there is no justification for the prosecution of the case by a private prosecutor. In this
instance, the kind of contempt (indirect) for which the petitioner is sought to be held liable provides for
no indemnity because the alleged "obstruction" committed was an offense against the State, the
respondent court in particular, which involves no private party. Thus, the appearance of Atty. Eleazar
Ferry, on behalf of Mrs. Carolina Orozco, was unwarranted.

Leonidas v. Supnet= FORM SHOPPING= direct contempt

FACTS: Union Bank, with petitioner Atty. Tomas R. Leonidas as counsel, filed a complaint against the
spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza Tamondong to collect the latter's unpaid loan secured from Union
Bank to buy a motor vehicle. Union Bank prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin.

(4) to cite Union Bank and its counsel for contempt of court for forum shopping and for misleading the
court.

The Pasay MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 342-00, recalled the order of the writ of replevin, and ordered
Union Bank to return immediately the motor vehicle to the Tamondong Spouses. Moreover, for violating
the rule against forum shopping and for making a false certification against forum shopping, the Pasay
MTC cited Union Bank, its collection officer Desi Tomas and petitioner in contempt of court.

Hence, petitioner filed the present administrative case for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. Petitioner states
that respondent judge cited him in contempt for refusing to return the replevied motor vehicle to the
Tamondong Spouses. Petitioner, however, claims that it was erroneous for respondent judge to have
done so since the Order of May 9, 2000 was addressed to Union Bank alone. The May 9, 2000 Order did
not direct petitioner, but rather Union Bank alone, to return the replevied vehicle.

The Office of the Court Administrator opined that respondent judge was correct in stating that the
petitioner should have appealed the Pasay RTC's orders of dismissal instead of filing the case before the
Pasay MTC. The OCA's primary concern is the procedure adopted by respondent judge in issuing the
contested orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the two contempt orders issued by respondent judge are proper
HELD: The first contempt order issued by the respondent judge suffers no legal defect contrary to the
stance taken by petitioner. The Court found that neither the Union Bank nor petitioner as its counsel
bothered to inform the Pasay MTC that the Pasay RTC had previously dismissed a case of the same
nature and involving the same parties. It held that the courts are vested with the power to penalize a
party for filing an action raising the same basic issues as one still pending or already disposed of which
the same party has filed in another court. Such an act is deemed an abuse of the processes of the court.
A counsel who participates in such abuse of court processes can be held in contempt. Section 5, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court provides that "if the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions." Thus, even if the petitioner
did not sign the certification, if from the circumstances one can infer a willful and deliberate attempt to
mislead the courts, he can still be held in direct contempt.

Anent the second contempt order, the Court found the respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of
the law. It ruled that a party cannot be held in indirect contempt for disobeying a court order, which is
not addressed to him. Respondent judge never ordered petitioner to return the replevied vehicle. There
was also no evidence that petitioner was ever in possession of the replevied vehicle. Petitioner should,
therefore, not be punished for disregarding an order that he was never meant to comply with in the first
place.

Delgra v. Gonzales

DOCTRINE: Contempt proceedings are criminal in nature; "the power to punish for contempt should be
exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle"; that "a judge should always bear in mind that
the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal,
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that
they exercise" and that such "power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its
nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice",

Tabao v. Gacott

A judge may not hold a party in contempt for expressing concern on his impartiality even if the judge
may have been insulted therein. petitioner Atty. Ernesto P. Tabao, filed a Motion seeking the inhibition
of respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of the case on the ground that the non-partiality of
this Honorable Court which has been believed to be true

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding that the motion to inhibit filed by the
undersigned counsel is contemptuous

At first glance, the motion to inhibit would seem to contain disdainful and unfounded accusations
against the respondent. However, a closer look thereof would reveal that petitioner was not actually
imputing upon the respondent the acts which were mentioned therein. He was merely stating the
reasons why his clients were losing hope of getting a fair trial in respondent Judge's court, which was
precisely the ground for the motion for inhibition filed by petitioner. This is evident from his statement
in the motion that he is "constrained to ask for this inhibition so as not to destroy the image and
integrity of this tribunal, which in the minds of herein defendants has been put to question by the
foregoing circumstances." Hence, applying the parameter set in the Patricio case, it cannot be said that
petitioner Tabao is guilty of contempt since there was clearly no intention to debase the dignity of the
court.

Austria v. Masaquel

DOCTRINE: While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact
that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him,
may constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a
retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule
137

Atty. Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner, saw respondent Judge in his chamber and verbally transmitted to
him the request of the petitioner to inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon the ground that
the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former associate. The respondent
judge rejected the request because, according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not
one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court.

Respondent judge found the petitioner guilty of contempt of court for doubting his integrity. Austria
paid the fine of P 50 under protest. Having been punished summarily for direct contempt of court, and
the remedy of appeal not being available to him, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari before
this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of direct contempt.

HELD: No. We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the
circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that
Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is not one of the grounds enumerated in the
first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true
that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly
his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid
reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant
to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137.
Galangi v. Abad

DOCTRINE: A judge may summarily declare a person in direct contempt only when the person
committed the act or acts constituting the said offense, in the presence of or near a court or judge, who
may have actually witnessed or perceived the commission of the punishable act or acts, such that there
is indeed no need for another court proceeding to prove that the acts were actually committed.

Hence, the Board gave him enough time to submit his written explanation to the charges but he failed to
appear or submit the same. declaring Galangi in direct contempt of the Provincial Board in session and
imposed upon him the penalty of imprisonment for not more than 10 days as well as the Order for his
arrest.

SSUE: WON the respondent judge erred in declaring complainant liable for direct contempt instead of
indirect contempt, hence, administratively liable?

. Assuming arguendo that he had committed a contumacious act, the same, however, was not
committed "in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings
before the same " Hence, the charge against complainant was an indirect contempt and not direct
contempt as found by respondent judge. The correct proceeding should have been for indirect
contempt and the petitioner’s right to be informed of the charges against him as well as his right to be
heard should have been observed in consonance with Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Bugaring v. Español

DOCTRINE: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct contempt is
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, and can be punished summarily without
hearing.

Issue: direct CONTEMPT?

YES. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court,
and consequently, to the due administration of justice.

Oclarit v. Paderanga

DOCTRINE: The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The
courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that
power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.;
In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the Court introduced a new provision granting a
remedy to a person adjudged in direct contempt by any court. Such person may not appeal therefrom,
but may avail himself of certiorari or prohibition. In such case, the execution of the judgment shall be
suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemner files a bond fixed by the court
which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should
the petition be decided against him.

Dantes v. Caguioa

DOCTRINE: Where the law violated is so elementary, like Rule 71 which provides the scope of a
judge’s authority to punish for contempt and the procedure to be followed, for a judge not to know it
or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.

iSSUE: Whether or not Judge Caguioa is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and liable for contempt?

Judge Caguioa’s denial of Atty. Dantes’ request to post a bond for his provisional liberty violated Atty.
Dantes’ right to due process — his right to avail of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition pending
resolution of which the execution of the judgment should have been suspended. His denial of the
request betrayed his ignorance.

Cruz v. Gingoyon

DOCTRINE: A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court
or judge wherein proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt.

Leonidas v. Supnet

DOCTRINE: The Courts should be informed of the pendency of a similar proceeding a party has filed

In Re Calimlim

DOCTRINE: In this case, Judge Cruz-Avisado failed to observe the proper procedure in the exercise of the
power to punish for indirect contempt. First, there can be no indirect contempt absent any prior written
charge. In the 19 November 1999 Order, Judge Cruz-Avisado only ordered petitioners to explain their
failure to bring Pitao before the RTC for his scheduled arraignment. The 19 November 1999 Order did
not yet amount to a show-cause order directing petitioners to explain why they should not be cited for
indirect contempt. Absent an order specifically requiring petitioners to show cause why they should not
be punished for contempt, Judge Cruz-Avisado had no authority to punish petitioners
Felizmeña v. Galano

DOCTRINE: The fault imputed to petitioner is disobedience of a court order — an indirect contempt
which must be the subject of a written charge, with the accused afforded an opportunity to be heard by
himself or counsel.

Balasbas v. Aquilizan

DOCTRINE: Under the provisions of Section 6 Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which prescribe in categorical
language the punishment for contempt, suspension from the practice of law is not indicated. Suspension
from the practice of law requires an entirely separate procedure under the Rules with all the attendant
constitutional and statutory safeguards of procedural due process. Respondent should have applied
Section 6, Rule 71 on punishment for indirect contempt not Section 27 Rule 138 on suspension and
removal of lawyers from the practice of law.

Racines v. Morallos

DOCTRINE: Article 218of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party
in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The
penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amount depends on
whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however,
requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Action Interdictal vs Publiciana

Common element of 2 action= Both recovery possession of real property

Distinction

Interdictal= possession defacto or physical material recovery, jurisdiction exclusively MTC

Publiciana- De jure possession, jus posedindi, availed one year period to file has already elapsed.
Jurisdiction defend on assessed value

Reinvindicatoria= recovery of ownership, Jurisdiction defend on assessed value

ACTION INTERDICTAL:

What must be alleged

What are key jurisdictional facts which can be determinative or fall under 1 st level court. If it is not
alleged, first level court has no jurisdiction, unless assessed value falls under MTC.

Forcible Entry proper:

Forcible Unlawful Detainer

CAUSE: Physical possession is deprived thru FISTS. Physical possession unlawful withholding afer
termination of contract, LEASE, USUFRUCTUARY,
MERE TOLERANCE
As TO END: In forcible entry claims that he has prior The defendant has lawful possession at beginning
physical possession, can be based on title, ownership but his possession becomes unlawful,
or contracts
AS TO PERIOD: must be instituted within 1 year from One year period jurisdiction must be within 1 year
time of discovery thru FITS, and no need of demand. It from the demand. Deman must state both to pay
is Jurisdictional, if not alleged MTC has no jurisdiction. AND VACATE. What if there has been several
demands? From receipt (not the date of demand)
WHAT IF in FORCIBLE GIFT DEMAND? Is it possible? of last demand to vacate= DOCTRINE OF LAST
YES, but one year period still commenced the time of DEMAND.
FISTS.
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS: JURISDICTIONAL FACTS:
1. Plaintiff has prior physical possession; Plaintiff ‘1. Defendant, initially has lawful right to possess
may not be the owner, his also the lessee or property through contract or mere tolerance.
sublessee. Plaintiff must not occupy the
possession.
2. That the defendant or all of the defendant ‘2. Defendant has failed to pay rentals and despite
 have occupied, or intrude thru FISTS and demand and refuses to vacate. Or defendant
unlawfully deprived violated the term of the lease or contract, despite
demand to comply. Or by mere tolerance failed to
vacate the property.
3. Complaint must be filed within 1 year from 3. The complaint was filed within 1 year from
FISTS demand to comply
- In any manner it is alleged, complaint
sufficiently complaints and that MTC has
jurisdiction. Assessed value is not material
- Pray for damages? YES for use and
occupation, irrespective of damages prayed
for it is MTC

P vs D
1. If lack Jurisdictiona FACTS: not insufficiency but lack of jurisdiction.
2. If it cannot be determined within 1 year period, it can be treated as PUBLICIANA if the
complaint also alleges the assessed value. There are complaints where assessed value was
appended. MTC can convert it in PUBLICIANA.
3. For unlawful detainer, the court has to look in jurisdictional facts, if lackin of 1nyear period
or never alleges but there is assessed value, MTC will convert to PUBLICIANA, additional
payment of docket fees.
4. Interdictal-based on nature of action.
5. Publiciana- fees based on assessed value of property.

Why is it summary in nature?

This is also an ordinary civil action, where one seek to protection of rights and grievance of wrong.
Subject to summary procedure.

Because unlawful withholding is disturbance of possession.

What are the instances 1st level court has special jurisdiction?

1. The first is when the first level court can accept bail
2. Absence of RTC, 1st level court habeas corpus
3. Action interdictal, if physical ownership is so intertwined with issue of physical possession.

Substantive aspects of interdictal:

1. What if defendant raises ownership. The action for ejectment will not be dismissed, because the
issue who has better right to possesess or de facto possession. Who has right to physical
possession.
2. May a complaint be initiate by representative: Apply rule 7, when filed by representative, there
must be SPA.
 3. Initiatory Pleading: Payment of Fees, verification, Pleadings, complaint, answer, complusary
counterclaim, crossclaim.
4. Duty of the court or judge, MTC judge has jurisdiction but there are gorunds to dimissed like
prescription, lack of jurisdiction= dismissed outright. If litis pendentia, raised in affirmative
defenses
5. Assuming no grounds: The judge will instruct COC issue summons, personal, substitution,
electronic. Once served defendant has 10 days non extendible. If defendant fail to file, no
default, judgment rendered. If 3 defendant, 1 filed case will proceed as against the answering
and judgement against non answering.
6. Court will set the preliminary conference, same matters in rule 18. But more expeditious, 1. MTC
judge exert to reach settlement, immediately executor depend on period to comply. If there is
settlement, 2. CAM, 3. Based on stipulation of facts the court will state that in judgment, if no
settlement the judge will indicate the specific material facts that remain uncontroverted and
such other matters. Can this be refered to mediation? YES for 30 days, the court in ,multi sala
will refer the case to JDR. If no settlement rfer back to MTC judge, if there it is possible for
settlement. If no settlement, parties will submit position paper and other supporting document
those material facts remain uncontroverted. What if there is still facts need to be clarified?
Judge will ask clarificatory. 10 days to submit position paper. Then judgment 30 days will be
issued.
7. What happens if plaintiff fails to appear. Defendant may move to dismiss or moto propio.
Dismissal is with prejudice because it is equivalent to adjudication. If defendat does not appeal.
Plaintiff may move judgment be rendered. If both did not appear= the judge moto propio for
failure to prosecute. Dismissal with Prejudice.
8. What are the prohibited pleadings (12), because case is summry in nature.
1. Motion to dismiss (lack of juris, failure to conciliation)- lack of juris over person, not. Upon
examination of during precon- there is no referral to lupon, can the judge dismiss moto
propio?? YES without prejudice
2. Bill of particualrs
3. MR. NT, Reopening= if there is MR to Motion to Dismiss, it is allowed since it is interlocutory
and not judgment
4. Motion to Posponed, Extend, Intervention
5. Certiorari, Mandamus
6. Relief from judgment
7. Reply
8. Extension
9. Complaint in intervention

JUDGMENT:

1. Remedy against judgment, RULE 40 with 15 days MTC to RTC

2. Immediately Executory (if in favor plaintiff) defendant file appeal and Supersedeas bond include
damages awarded, rentals, compensation and cost, when will be posted? Within 15 days to file
 appeal. Defendant can file even without supersedeas if no judgment rendered, filemotion to fix
supersedeas bond. Once appeal is perfected, to stay exectution, pay monthly rentals regularly. If
fail to pay, appellee can file motion for execution.
3. If there was appeal by defendant, and plaintiff did not file motion for execution, can plaintiff
apply writ of mandatory injuction? Yes

RULE 71 CONTEMPT

Ruling of Justice Versamin

Lorenzo Shipping Lines vs DMAP

Hidalgo- it is not a criminal contempt in this case. It was a letter against the Judge address
to President. It is not a ground for contempt but maybe a Defamation

NATURE:

It is broader sense. Contempt is remedy in any act which demean, disrespect or disobey
the processes. In indirect contempt (7 acts)

It is inherent power of court. To protect and preserve the dignity of the court.

2 Kinds of Contempt

1. Direct Contempt- directly degrade or demean or obstruct the proceedings before the
court. In court act. Contempt in Facie Curiea.
a. Disrespect towards the court- includes offensive language toward the court,
- Lorenzon- it is made in goodfaith through legitimate channels
b. Offensive behavior towards other- the mother of public complainant is the mother
of accuse, a complainant was physical injury by boyfriend. During arraingnment,
the mother spoke and shouted by accuse in presence of judge. The Judge told to
stop. Cited for contempt. 1 day imprisonment.
- Pleadings filed by bar flunker 3 times and convicted for theft. Offesive towards other,
it is bait towards the judge.
c. Refusal to subscribe to an oath or affirmation, or failure to answer
d. Failure to subscribe to affidavit or deposition( before action,Pending appeal,
during pendency)
- It is summary in nature. The summary in the sense of procedure which does not
require hearing. Facie Curae on the presence of so near the court. The court will
summarly adjudge.
- Shariah, Munipal circuit, MTC, METC- they are conferred by law
- Penalty: first level: P200 or imprisonment of 1 day
- If RTC, quasi judicial: P P2,000 or imprisonment of 10 days or both
- Remedies: GR Immediately executor and not appealable. Certiorari or Prohibition
following principle of hierarchy
- HOW TO STAY OR SUSPEND:
- 1. There must be a petition for Certiorari Prohibition,
- 2. He must post a bond fixed by the court,
- 3. The Bond is conditioned upon undertaking that he will abide the judgment of court

COMENCED: Moto Propio, summarily adjudge him in direct contempt

2. Indirect- not commited in the presence of so near the court.- Constructive contempt
- There must be hearing
- COMMENCED:
- 1. Moto Propio by the court to show coause: SHOW CAUSE ORDER on why he
misbehave or did not complyor why he assumed as a lawyer or disobey subpoena. On
its own, when there is MOTION TO THE COURT TO ORDER MOTION TO SHOW CAUSE
- 2. Upon VERIFIED PETITION, payment of fees, forum shopping
- 7 ACTS constituting indirect:
- 1. Misbehevior of court officer, sheriff, or private individual appointed by the court.
He could be receiver, executor, administrator, commissioner, referral to assessor or a
lawyer because he is an officer of the court.
- 2. Disobedience to the lawful order of court or resistance- writ of execution, TRO,
preliminary injuction, and all lawful writs of the court. In case of St Francis School of
Cavite: There was an order issued to turnover all the moneys and that they did not
comply- it is an INDIRECT CONTEMPT
- 3. Any abuse or unlawful interference which not constituting direct contempt
- 4. Any improper conduct which impede, obstruct the administrator of justice
- 5. Assume to be a lawyer, or officer of the court: RULE ON WARRANT- should there be
a violation of cyber crime warrants there can be cited in contempts;
- A. If cyber crime officer failed to submit the return, failed to file affidavit,
simultataneously turn over, when the prosecutor move for the transfer of document
or cease item, RCW: procedure will be rule 71.
- 6. Refusal to obey subpoena
 - 7. Acts to rescue or attempt to get from sheriff when there is a law. Writ of Replevin
instituted by Sheriff.

PROCEEDINGS:

As to types: Direct or Indirect

As to Proceedings: Criminal or Punitive or Remedial or Civil in Nature

It is nature sui generis. As to nature it is criminal, may direct or indirect sanctions imposed
is imprisonment. But it can be resulted either CIVIL and CRIMINAL case and proceed
independently of CIVIL and CRIMINAL.

HOW TO DETERMINE IF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL:

- Look at the dominant purpose to impose the punishment for acts tending to degrade
or demean, it is criminal. It is civil in nature if dominant purpose is for the remedial or
compensatory in nature.

QUASI JUDICIAL AGENCIES:

1. They have contempt power if granted by law

2. How done if direct or indirect contempt: as a rule immediately executory. If there is
disobedience, file in RTC where the quasi body sits. In RCW- if law enforecement
officer if he did not file the return, may be held in another branch. In case of Bayot as
a rule that brach was raffled to may proceed independently or in the court which
hears the principal. Remedy os to file in RTC where the quasi is holding office.

WHAT IS CONTEMPT IN FACIE CURIAE.

WHAT IS CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT.

ACTS COMMITTED. Take note offensive language to court and other (lawyers).

HIDALGO: Contempt and defamation difference. Distinguish between offensive which

constitutes contempt or libel or defamation.