A.C. No. 11754 JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas, Respondents Decision Tijam, J.

A.C. No.
11754
JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era) and Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador Villanueva
v. Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05- 05953-03.
Complainants therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era.2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and, consequently,
ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay. More specifically,
Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to pay a partially computed amount of ₱674,128 for the separation pay and
full backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month pay. 3 Bonifacio and the corporation brought their case up to the
Supreme Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and motions were decided against them.4
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution 5 was issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of
Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was likewise issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 20087 and April 16, 20138 were
later on issued, directing the sheriff to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the judgment award plus interest
and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand
A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664.9 In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty. Era
guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15,
and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years
effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered m [sic] his file in the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the business
establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public
auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the same day, a certificate of sale
was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and employees who were there at that time. Armed
with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties but eventually stopped to negotiate with
Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of pulling out the auctioned properties. Atty. Era
summoned Bonifacio's children to continue with the negotiation in his law office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-
offer for the satisfaction of the judgment award went from ₱6 Million to ₱9 Million.11
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's business
establishment together with their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out the auctioned
properties. This was evidenced by the videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant administrative complaint.12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing with the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its Resolution13 dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion.14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime in February
and April, 2014 with regard to the subject labor case.15
1
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint.16
In their Answer,17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal knowledge as to what transpired on
November 28, 2013 and December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present therein at that time. 18 Hence, his allegations of
force, threat, and intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis. 19 In his defense, Atty. Era further argued
that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-
in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attomey20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SP A, he
was not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He added that he
never signed any document or pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an
associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients.
Anent the Php 6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they made, Attys. Era and Bragas explained that the parties were
still on negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have their own computations, which they could respectively accept or
otherwise.21
In his Report and Recommendation22 dated March 17, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera
recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a pleading
considering that the same was not signed by the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was prepared by Atty.
Era. On the other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings. There was also no proof that
in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a pleading. Neither the presence of Atty. Era during
the public auction and the negotiations was an implication or proof that Atty. Era was engaging in the practice of law
during his suspension. According to the Investigating Commissioner, anybody, not exclusively lawyers, can be present at
an auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the implementation of the judgment by using force, threat,
and intimidation, the Investigating Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such imputations by filing the
following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate Case23 dated December 18, 2013, acknowledging the full
satisfaction of the judgment award and even prayed for Attys. Era and Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining
machines in his business establishment; (2) a Manifestation24 dated March 12, 2014, wherein complainant stated that he
has surrendered the vehicles listed in the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion with Entry of Appearance (Motion to
Withdraw and Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate Case and release of TRO Bond 25 dated February 4,
2014; (4) A Motion for Consignation with Motion to Lift Levy26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on the criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and Trespassing against
Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that in acknowledging the satisfaction of the
judgment in the labor case and withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era and Bragas with regard to the
implementation of the said judgment, complainant contradicted and demolished his own allegation that the satisfaction of
the judgment was improperly and unlawfully implemented.28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative charges against Attys. Era and Bragas be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI- 2015-270 30 dated April 18, 2015 reversed and set aside
the Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and considering
Atty. Era's continuedengagement in the practice of law during the period of his suspension by admittedly participating in
the negotiation for the payment of money judgment including pegging of interest he acted as his clients advocate instead
as an agent in view of the presence also of his client in the negotiation, for holding office and admittedly summoned the
complainant's children to determine the money judgment. Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane Karen
B. Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.
In its Extended Resolution31 dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Era's argument that he
merely acted pursuant to an SP A given to him untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SP A gave Atty. Era the
authority to appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction and did not include the November
28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive payment on behalf of his clients, the SP A specifically stated
that said payments should be made in the form of checks and not machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era had no authority
under the SP A to represent his clients during the November 28, 2013 auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's
machines as payment of the judgment award. At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal
knowledge in having the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated Section 28,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an unauthorized
practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the satisfaction of the
2
alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing.34
Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case were transmitted to this Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant administrative case, the issues being: (1) Did
Atty. Era engage in the practice of law during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another disciplinary action
against him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal
practice of law that would likewise warrant this Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et. al. 36 is on point.
Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions of the said Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of
law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts
either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp.
262, 263).
xxxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows
some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.1âwphi1 "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)37 (Emphasis supplied)
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante, 38We succinctly ruled that the term practice of law implies
customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
3
consideration of services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a
law office for the general practice of law.39
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning clients in
the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3) secured the certificate of
sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees present in the premises at that time; (4)
insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises;
(5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as regards the
payment of the judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the properties.40
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be exclusively for
lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the Board in its Resolution,
Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and consequences of each
course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award. 41 Precisely, this is why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent
them in the public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the labor case as stated in
the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era.42 Such trained legal mind is what his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for
their claims. This is evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement without the prior
written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their lawyer. 43 It could readily be seen that the said SPA was executed by
reason of Atty. Era being their legal counsel. Thus, We are one with the Board's submission that the said SPA cannot be
invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in the practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as
such SP A cunningly undermines the suspension ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's Decision dated
July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year, specifically November to December 2013.
Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27, 44 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to circumvent
the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his disrespect to this Court's lawful order
which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else, are called upon to obey court orders and
processes.45 Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to
show respect to their processes.46
This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who continue in their practice despite being
suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty. Ceferino R. Magat, 47this Court suspended Atty. Magat from the
practice of law for practicing his profession despite this Court's previous order of suspension. Likewise in another case,
We suspended a lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear language of this Court's suspension order.48
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution, finding Atty. Era guilty of willfully disobeying
the lawful order of this Court warranting the exercise of Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the Board's
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years suspension from the practice of law,
taking into account that this is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet, she
allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is
founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified
in education and character.49
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice could be
performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have
not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances
of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm's clients
during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the one actively performing all
acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the violation of the
CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's lawful
4
order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane Karen B.
Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also, both
Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a commission of another offense
will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as members of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5573

GIZALE O. TUMBAGA, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL P. TEOXON, Respondent
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Gizale O. Tumbaga against respondent Atty. Manuel
P. Teox.on, charging him with gross immorality, deceitful and fraudulent conduct, and gross misconduct. The parties
hereto paint contrastive pictures not only of their respective versions of the events but also of their negative portrayals of
each other's character. They are, thus, separately outlined below.
The Complaint
In a verified complaint1 dated October 9, 2001 filed directly with the Court, complainant narrated that she met
respondent sometime in September 1999. He was then the City Legal Officer of Naga City from whom complainant
sought legal advice. After complainant consulted with him a few times, he visited her often at her residence and brought
gifts for her son, Al Greg Tumbaga. Respondent even volunteered to be the godfather of Al Greg. In one of his visits,
respondent assured complainant's mother that although he was already married to Luzviminda Balang, 2 his marriage was
a sham because their marriage contract was not registered. In view of respondent's persistence and generosity to her
son, complainant believed his representation that he was eligible to marry her.
Complainant averred that on December 19, 1999, she moved in with respondent at the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. In
April 2000, she became pregnant. Respondent allegedly wanted to have the baby aborted but complainant refused. After
the birth of their son, Billy John, respondent spent more time with them. He used their apartment as a temporary law office
and he lived there for two to three days at a time.
After Billy John was baptized, complainant secured a Certificate of Live Birth from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Naga
City and gave it to respondent to sign. He hesitantly signed it and volunteered to facilitate its filing. After respondent failed
to file the same, complainant secured another form and asked respondent to sign it twice. On February 15, 2001, the
Certificate of Live Birth was registered.
Thereafter, complainant related that respondent rarely visited them. To make ends meet, she decided to work in a law
office in Naga City. However, respondent compelled her to resign, assuring her that he would take care of her financial
needs. As respondent failed to fulfill his promise, complainant sought assistance from the Office of the City Fiscal in Naga
City on the second week of March 2001. In the early morning of the conference set by said office, respondent gave
complainant an affidavit of support and told her there was no need for him to appear in the conference. Complainant
showed the affidavit to Fiscal Elsa Mampo, but the latter advised her to have the respondent sign the affidavit again.
Fiscal Mampo was unsure of the signature in the affidavit as she was familiar with respondent's signature. Complainant
confronted respondent about the affidavit and he half-heartedly affixed his true signature therein.
In May 2001, complainant went to respondent's office as he again reneged on his promise of support. To appease her
anger, respondent executed a promissory note. However, he also failed to honor the same.
In June· 2001, complainant moved out of the Puncia Apartment as respondent did not pay the rentals therefor anymore.
In the evening of September 9, 2001, respondent raided complainant's new residence, accompanied by three SWAT
members and his wife. Visibly drunk, respondent threatened to hurt complainant with the bolo and the lead pipe that he
was carrying if she will not return the personal belongings that he left in their previous apartment unit. As respondent
barged into the apartment, complainant sought help from the SWAT members and one of them was able to pacify
respondent. Respondent's wife also tried to attack complainant, but she too was prevailed upon by the SWAT members.
The incident was recorded in the police blotter.
To corroborate her allegations, complainant attached the following documents to her complaint, among others: (a)
pictures showing respondent lying in a bed holding Billy John,3 respondent holding Billy John in a beach
5
setting,4 complainant holding Billy John in a beach setting,5 respondent holding Billy John in a house setting,6 and
respondent and complainant seated beside each other in a restaurant 7 ; (b) the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John with
an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity showing respondent's signature 8 ; (c) the affidavit of
support9 executed by respondent; (d) the promissory note10 executed by respondent; (e) the police blotter entry11 dated
September 9, 2001; and (f) copies of pleadings12 showing the signature of respondent.
Respondent's Answer
In his answer,13 respondent denied the allegations in the complaint. He asserted that complainant merely wanted to exact
money from him.
Respondent alleged that he became the godfather of complainant's son, Al Greg, but he was only one of four sponsors.
He began to visit complainant's residence to visit his godson. He also denied being the father of Billy John since
complainant supposedly had several live-in partners. He cited the affidavit of Antonio Orogo, complainant's uncle, to attest
to his allegations. According to the affidavit, Al Greg is the son of the complainant's live-in partner named Orac
Barrameda. Cpmplainant allegedly used Al Greg to extort money from Alfrancis Bichara, the former governor of Albay,
with whom complainant also had a sexual relationship.
Respondent denied that he lived together with complainant at the Puncia Apartment since he was already married. As
complainant was his kumadre, he would pass by her house whenever he visited the house of Representative Sulpicio S.
Roco, Jr. Respondent was then a member of Representative Roco's legislative staff. Sometimes, respondent would leave
a bag of clothing in complainant's house to save money for his fare in going to the office of Representative Roco in the
House of Representatives in Quezon City. In one instance, complainant and her mother refused to return one of his bags
such that he was forced to file a replevin case. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Naga City decided the case
in his favor.
Respondent also claimed that complainant falsified his signature in the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John so he filed a
complaint for the cancellation of his acknowledgment therein. Complainant allegedly made it look like he appeared before
Notary Public Vicente Estela on February 15, 2001, but he argued that it was physically impossible for him to have done
so as he attended a hearing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur that day. He also contended
that complainant forged his signature in the Affidavit of Support.
As to the pictures of respondent with Billy John, he argued that the same cannot prove paternity. He explained that in one
of his visits to Al Greg, complainant left Billy John in his care to keep the child from falling off the bed. However,
complainant secretly took his picture as he was lying in the bed holding Billy John. As to his picture with Billy John taken
at the beach, respondent alleged that at that time complainant gave Billy John to respondent as she wanted to go
swimming. While he was holding the child, complainant secretly took their picture. Respondent accused complainant of
taking the pictures in order to use the same to extort money from him. This is the same scheme allegedly used by
complainant against her previous victims, who paid money to buy peace with her.
Respondent further alleged that politics was also involved in the filing of the complaint as complainant was working in the
office of then Representative Luis Villafuerte, the political opponent of Representative Roco.
Respondent attached to his answer the following documents, among others: (a) the affidavit of Antonio Orogo14 ; (b) the
Decision15 dated May 8, 2006 of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546, which is the replevin case; (c) copies of
the Minutes of Proceedings16 and the Order17 of the RTC of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, both dated January 15, 2001,
showing that respondent attended a hearing therein on said date; and (d) a photocopy18 of respondent's credit card and
automated teller machine (ATM) card showing his signature.
The Proceedings before the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline
The parties appeared before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for a few hearings and the marking of their respective.
evidence. Complainant marked the following documents, among others, in addition to those already attached to the
complaint: (a) a picture19 showing respondent seated in a restaurant with complainant hugging him; (b) a receipt 20 issued
by the Clerk of Court of the MTCC of Naga City, enumerating the objects (consisting mostly of items of clothing) returned
by complainant to respondent in the replevin case; and (c) receipts21 purportedly showing respondent's payment of the
rentals for complainant's apartment unit.
On motion of complainant, the IBP issued an order22 directing respondent, complainant, and Billy John to undergo DNA
testing in the DNA laboratory of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to determine the child's paternity. Upon
motion23 from respondent, however, the IBP annulled its prior order in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case.24
On November 14, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report and Recommendation,25 finding that
respondent maintained an illicit affair with complainant and that he should be meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of two (2) years.
In the Resolution No. XVIII-2009-1526 dated February 19, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors approved the above
recommendation and increased the recommended period of suspension to three (3) years.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration27 of the above resolution. Attached thereto were: (a) the affidavits28 of
6
Representative Roco and respondent's wife, Minda B. Teoxon, which allegedly refuted complainant's contention that
respondent lived with complainant at the Puncia Apartment in Naga City; (b) the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN)
dated May 10, 200529 in Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin, wherein complainant supposedly admitted to her past
relationships; and (c) a letter30 from the University of Nueva Caceres that informed respondent that he was chosen to be
the recipient of its Diamond Achiever Award.
The IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XX-2012-539 31 dated December
14, 2012.
The IBP thereafter transmitted the record of the case to the Court for final action.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the IBP that the actuations of respondent in this case showed his failure to live up
to the good moral conduct required of the members of the legal profession.
We held in Advincula v. Advincula32 that:
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their application for admission to the
Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral
character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain
from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and
attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in
their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not
only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the common sense of decency. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment or suspension if a
member of the Bar is found guilty of committing grossly immoral conduct, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral .conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. x x x.
In order to justify the imposition of the above administrative penalties on a member of the Bar, his/her guilt must first be
established by substantial evidence.33 As explained in Re: Rafael Dimaano,34 substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, the Court upholds the findings of the IBP as there is indeed substantial
evidence that respondent committed gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant.
One of the key pieces of evidence that the IBP considered in ruling against respondent is the Decision dated May 8, 2006
of the MTCC of Naga City in Civil Case No. 11546 for replevin.
In said case, respondent made it appear that he was merely seeking to recover personal belongings that he left behind at
7
one time in complainant's house. The items included a traveling bag with various articles of clothing and file folders of
cases that he was handling. He also tried to recover the pieces of furniture that he allegedly bought for the complainant,
which the latter failed to reimburse as promised. These include a brass bed with foam mattress, a plastic dining table with
six plastic chairs, a brass sala set with a center table, and a plastic drawer. For her defense, complainant argued that the
respondent gradually left the items of clothing in their apartment unit during the period that they cohabited therein from
time to time. She also said that the furniture were gifts to her and Billy John.
In its decision, the MTCC did rule in favor of respondent.1âwphi1 However, the following elucidation by the MTCC is quite
telling:
To the Court, this is one case that should not have been brought to court because [respondent] could have resorted to a
more diplomatic or tactful way of retrieving his personal belongings rather than going on record with a lot of pretext and
evasion as if the presiding judge is too naive to appreciate human nature and the truth. [Respondent] would have done
well if he was gentleman, candid and responsible enough to admit his misadventure and accept responsibility for his
misdeeds rather than try to distort facts and avoid facing the truth. It is not manly.
Of course, the [MTCC] is fully convinced that the personal belongings listed in the complaint [are] owned by him and the
[furniture] that were eventually sold by [complainant] was bought by him, even without showing any receipts for it.
However, the [MTCC] is not persuaded by his allegation that he left his bag with [complainant] because he was in a hurry
in going to Manila. He boldly declared in [the trial court] that he has three residences in Naga City and of all places he had
to leave his shirt and underwear with a lady whom he had visited "only twice".
[Respondent] could deny all the way up to high heaven that he has no child with [complainant] but the [MTCC] will forever
wonder why the latter would refuse to part with the shirts and pants unless she is a bareface extortionist. But to the
[MTCC], she did not appear to be so. In fact, the [MTCC] had the occasion to observe [complainant] with two little
handsome boys who appeared to be her sons. Hence, this lends credence to the fact that she might have really
demanded money in exchange for the shirts and pants to support her children.
Be that as it may, the [MTCC] is duty bound to apply the law. There is no issue on the ownership of the personal
belongings contained in a bag allegedly left by the [respondent] in the house of [complainant].
xxxx
However, as far as the [furniture] is concerned, like the brass bed, sala set, dining table and plastic drawer, the [MTCC] is
not persuaded by [respondent's] claim that he meant to be paid by [complainant] for it. [Respondent] is a lawyer and
although he is not engage[d] in the buying and selling of [furniture] he should have known that if he really intended to be
paid back for it, he should have asked [complainant] to [sign] a promissory note or even a memorandum. As it is, he failed
to show any evidence of such an undertaking. That it was a gift of love is more like it.35
The IBP posited that the above ruling was more than sufficient to prove that respondent tried to distort the truth that he
and complainant did live together as husband and wife in one apartment unit. The Court agrees with the IBP on this
matter.
The MTCC plainly disbelieved respondent's claim that he merely left his bag of clothing in complainant's house before he
left for his place of work in Metro Manila - a claim which he likewise made in the present case. The trial court further
posited that the pieces of furniture sought to be recovered by respondent were indeed bought by him but the same were
intentionally given to complainant out of love. Clearly, the MTCC was convinced that respondent and complainant were
involved in an illicit relationship that eventually turned sour and led to the filing of the replevin case.
A perusal of the above decision reveals that the findings and conclusions therein were arrived at by the MTCC after a trial
on the merits of the case. In other words, the trial court first heard the parties and received their respective evidence
before it rendered a decision. As such, the trial court cannot be accused of arriving at the aforementioned findings lightly.
Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to mistrust the observations and findings of the MTCC. Respondent did not even
point out any reason for us to do so. While the issues in the replevin case and the instant administrative case are indeed
different, they share a common factual backdrop, i.e., the parties' contrasting account of the true nature of their
relationship. From the evidence of both parties, the MTCC chose the complainant's version of the events. Incidentally, it
was respondent himself who brought to light the existence of the MTCC decision in the replevin case when he attached
the same to his answer in the present case to substantiate his narration of facts. Thus, he cannot belatedly plead that the
decision be disregarded after the statements and findings therein were used against him .
Complainant further attached pictures of respondent with her and Billy John as proof of their romantic relations. A perusal
of these pictures convinces this Court that while the same cannot indeed prove Billy John's paternity, they are
nevertheless indicative of a relationship between complainant ~d respondent that is more than merely platonic.
One of the annexed pictures shows the couple in a restaurant setting, smiling at the camera while seated beside each
other very closely that their arms are visibly touching. Another picture shows the couple in the same setting, this time with
complainant smiling as she embraced respondent from behind and they were both looking at the camera. From the facial
expressions and the body language of respondent and complainant in these pictures, the same unfailingly demonstrate
their unmistakable closeness and their lack of qualms over publicly displaying their affection towards one another. Thus,
the attempts of respondent to downplay his relationship with complainant flop miserably. Curiously, respondent did not
8
bother to explain the aforesaid pictures.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent only managed to comment on the pictures of himself with Billy John. Even
then, respondent's accounts as to these pictures are too flimsy and incredible to be accepted by the Court. Respondent
previously admitted to the genuineness of the pictures but not to the alleged circumstances of the taking
thereof.36 However, respondent's allegation that the pictures were surreptitiously taken by complainant falls flat on its face.
The pictures clearly show that he and Billy John were looking directly at the camera when the pictures were taken.
Moreover, the angles from which the pictures were taken suggest that the person taking the same was directly in front of
respondent and Billy John.
In his motion for reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XVIII-2009-15, respondent further argued
that the pictures were not conclusive and the admission of the same was not in accordance with the Rules of Court as
nobody testified on the circumstances of the taking of the pictures and the accuracy thereof. 37 The IBP correctly
disregarded this argument given that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative
proceedings. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.38
With respect to the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John that contained an
Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity, respondent likewise failed to provide sufficient controverting
evidence therefor.
In the affidavit of support and the promissory note, respondent supposedly promised to provide monetary support to Billy
John, whom he acknowledged as his illegitimate son. Respondent verbally repudiated said documents, pointing out that
the same were typewritten while he used a computer in his office, not a typewriter. 39 Respondent further accused
complainant of falsifying his signatures therein and, to prove his charge, he submitted photocopies of his credit card and A
TM card that allegedly showed his customary signatures.
The Court, still, finds this refutation wanting. To the naked eye, the sample signatures in the credit card and A TM card do
appear to be different from the ones in the affidavit of support, the promissory note, and the Certificate of Live Birth.
However, we likewise compared the sample signatures to respondent's signatures in his pleadings before the IBP and
other documents submitted in evidence and we find that the signatures in the two sets appear to be likewise dissimilar,
which suggests respondent uses several different signatures. Thus, respondent's claim of forgery is unconvincing.
Moreover, as the IBP noted, the records of the case do not indicate if he filed criminal charges against complainant for her
alleged acts of falsification.
As to the Certificate of Live Birth of Billy John, respondent did file a complaint for the cancellation of his acknowledgment
therein. Thus, the Court will no longer discuss the parties' arguments regarding the validity of respondent's signature in
said certificate of birth as the issue should be threshed out in the proper proceeding.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent attached the affidavit of Antonio Orogo in order to belie complainant's
allegations and that she merely wanted to exact money from respondent. In the affidavit, Orogo claimed that respondent
did not live with complainant in the Puncia Apartment in Naga City. Orogo further accused complainant and her mother of
engaging in the practice of extorting money from various men since she was just 11 years old. The alleged instances of
extortion involved the complainant falsely accusing one man of rape and falsely claiming to another man that he was the
father of her first child.
The Court can hardly ascribe any credibility to the above affidavit. Given the materiality of Orogo's statements therein, not
to mention the gravity of his accusations against complainant and her mother, he should have been presented as a
witness before the IBP investigating commissioner in order to confirm his affidavit and give complainant the opportunity to
cross-examine him. For whatever reason, this was not done. As it is, Orogo's affidavit lacks evidentiary value.
In Boyboy v. Yabut,40 we cautioned that:
It is not difficult to manufacture charges in the affidavits, hence, it is imperative that their truthfulness and veracity be
tested in the crucible of thorough examination. The hornbook doctrine is that unless the affiants themselves take the
witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, those affidavits must be excluded from the proceedings for being
inadmissible and hearsay x x x. (Citation omitted.)
In like manner, the Court cannot give much weight to the affidavits of Representative Roco and Minda B. Teoxon, both of
whom attested to the statements of respondent regarding his places of residence during the time material to this case. It
should be stressed that said affidavits were executed only on June 15, 2009 or about four months after the IBP Board of
Governors issued its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-15 on February 19, 2009, which affirmed respondent's culpability for
grossly immoral conduct. This attenuates the credibility of the statements as the same were only given as corroborative
statements at so late a time given the relevancy thereof.
In the face of the accusations and the evidence offered against him, respondent was duty-bound to meet the same
decisively head-on. As the Court declared in Narag v. Narag41 :
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to
show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is
assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges
squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his
name in the Roll of Attorneys. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
9
Unfortunately, respondent failed to prove his defense when the burden of evidence shifted to him. He could neither
provide any concrete corroboration of his denials in this case nor satisfactorily prove his claim that complainant was
merely extorting money from him.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent should be held liable for having illicit relations with complainant.
As to whether respondent also sired complainant's second child, Billy John, the Court finds that the same was not
sufficiently established by the evidence presented in this case. The paternity and/or acknowledgement of Billy John, if
indeed he is respondent's illegitimate child, must be alleged and proved in separate proceedings before the proper
tribunal having jurisdiction to hear the same.
As to the penalty that should be imposed against respondent in this case, the Court had occasion to rule
in Samaniego v. Ferrer,42 that:
We have considered such illicit relation as a disgraceful and immoral conduct subject to disciplinary action. The penalty
for such immoral conduct is disbarment, or indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances of the case.
Recently, in Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., we ruled that suspension from the practice of law for two years was an adequate
penalty imposed on the lawyer who was found guilty of gross immorality. In said case, we considered the absence of
aggravating circumstances such as an adulterous relationship coupled with refusal to support his family; or maintaining
illicit relationships with at least two women during the subsistence of his marriage; or abandoning his legal wife and
cohabiting with other women. (Citations omitted.)
However, considering respondent's blatant attempts to deceive the courts and the IBP regarding his true relationship with
complainant, we agree with the IBP Board of Governors that the proper penalty in this instance is a three-year suspension
from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Manuel P. Teoxon GUILTY of gross immorality and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be punished with a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11494
HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS, namely, JENNIFER N. CARLOS, JOCELYN N. CARLOS, JACQUELINE
CARLOS-DOMINGUEZ, JO-ANN CARLOS-TABUTON, JIMMY N. CARLOS, LORNA A. CARLOS, JERUSHA ANN A.
CARLOS and JAN JOSHUA A. CARLOS, Complainants
vs.
ATTY. JAIME S. LINSANGAN, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E. Carlos (Juan) who presently seek to disbar respondent Atty. Jaime
S. Linsangan (Atty. Linsangan). Atty. Linsangan acted as counsel for their late father in several cases, one of which
involving the recovery of a parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Complainants alleged that Atty. Linsangan
forced them to sign pleadings and documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City in cahoots with
complainants' estranged mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he divided his share in the subject property
as his supposed attorney's fees to his wife and children, all in violation of his oath as lawyer.
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
The parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntilupa City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139061 with
an area of 12,331 square meters was previously owned by the Spouses Felix and Felipa Carlos. Their son, Teofilo Carlos
(Teofilo), convinced them to transfer said title to his name with a promise to distribute the same to his brothers and sisters.
Teofilo delivered the owner's duplicate copy of the title to his brother, Juan. However, Teofilo sold the entire property to
Pedro Balbanero (Pedro). Pedro, however, failed to pay the agreed installment payments.
For purposes of recovering the subject property from Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed wife, Felicidad), and from Pedro,
Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan. It appears that Atty. Linsangan, for Juan, filed the following cases: (a) a
case1 against Felicidad which was settled with the latter acknowledging Juan's one-half interest and ownership over the
property; (b) a case against Pedro which was concluded on September 12, 1997; and (c) another case 2 against Felicidad,
albeit filed by another lawyer who acted under the direct control and supervision of Atty. Linsangan. In this case against
Felicidad, it appears that the other half of the property was adjudicated to Juan, as Teofilo's sole heir. Said adjudication
10
was appealed to the CA.3
It further appears that Atty. Linsangan represented Juan in the following cases, likewise all involving the subject property:
(a) an action for partition4 filed by Bernard Rillo against Pedro; (b) an ejectment case5 filed by Juan against Pedro; and (c)
Juan's intervention in the case6 between Pedro and Teofilo.
It finally appears that Atty. Linsangan also represented Juan in the certiorari cases and petitions for review filed before the
CA7 and this Court,8 likewise involving the same property.
During the pendency of the above cases, or on September 22, 1997, Atty. Linsangan and Juan executed a Contract for
Professional Services9 enumerating the above cases being handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan. In said Contract, Atty.
Linsangan and Juan agreed, as follows:
xxxx
WHEREAS, the Parties have decided to consolidate their agreements in connection with ATTORNEY's engagement as
CLIENT's attorney to recover the subject property;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the parties hereto have mutually agreed and
bound themselves as follows:
1. That ATTORNEY shall continue to take all legal steps to recover the 10,000 square meters covered by TCT No.
139061, or any portion thereof acceptable to CLIENT, through any or all of the Court cases mentioned above, or such
other Court cases as may be necessary;
2. That ATTORNEY shall not enter into any compromise agreement without the written consent of CLIENT. CLIENT may
enter into any compromise agreement only upon consultation with ATTORNEY;
3. That ATTORNEY shall avail of all legal remedies in order to recover the property and shall continue the prosecution of
such remedies to the best of his knowledge, ability, and experience, all within legal and ethical bounds;
4. That CLIENT shall shoulder all necessary and incidental expenses in connection with the said cases;
5. That considering, among others, the extent of services rendered by ATTORNEY; the value of the property sought to be
recovered; the importance of the case to CLIENT; the difficulty of recovery (considering that the Balbanero spouses have
a favorable Court of Appeals['] Decision in C.V. No. 29379, while Felicidad Sandoval's name appears in the TCT
No.139061 as wife of the registered owner, Teofila Carlos), the professional ability and experience of ATTORNEY; as well
as other considerations, CLIENT hereby confirms and ratifies that he has agreed and bound himself to pay ATTORNEY a
contingent fee in an amount equivalent to FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of the market value of the property, or portion thereof,
which may be recovered, or the zonal value thereof, whichever is higher.
The said attorney's fees shall become due and payable upon recovery of the property, or any portion thereof, (a) upon
finality of a favorable Court decision, or (b) compromise settlement, whether judicially or extrajudicially, through the
execution of any document acknowledging or transferring CLIENT's rights over the property, or any portion thereof,
whether or not through A TTORNEY's, CLIENT's, or other person's efforts or mediation, or (c) or by any other mode by
which CLIENT's interest on the subject property, or a portion thereof, is recognized, or registered, or transferred to him; or
(d) should CLIENT violate this contract; or (e) should CLIENT terminate A TTORNEY's services without legal or just
cause.
6. That CLIENT undertakes and binds himself to pay the said attorney's fees to the following:
(a) To ATTORNEY himself;
(b) In case of ATTORNEY'S death or disability, to LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN;
(c) In case of death or disability of ATTORNEY and LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN, jointly and severally, to LAUREN
KYRA LINSANGAN, LORRAINE FREYJA LINSANGAN, and JAMES LORENZ LINSANGAN;
(d) In default of all the [foregoing], to the estate of ATTORNEY.
7. That this Contract shall be binding and enforceable upon CLIENT's heirs, successors-in-interest, administrators, and
assigns, if any.
8. That finally, CLIENT hereby authorizes, at ATTORNEY's option, the annotation of this contract on TCT No. 139061 or
any subsequent title which may be issued. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx10
However, it was not only Juan who went after the property, but also Bernard Rillo and Alicia Carlos, a sister-in-law. The
11
latter also filed an action11 for recovery of their share and by Compromise Agreement, an area of 2,331 square meters
was awarded in their favor, leaving a 10,000 square meter portion of the property.12
This remaining 10,000 square meter portion was eventually divided in the case filed by Juan against Felicidad (which Atty.
Linsangan admits13 to have filed albeit through another lawyer who acted under his control and supervision), through a
Compromise Agreement wherein 7,500 square meters of the subject property was given to the heirs of Juan while the
remaining 2,500 square meters thereof was given to Felicidad.14 In said Compromise Agreement, the parties likewise
agreed to waive as against each other any and all other claims which each may have against the other, including those
pending in the CA15 and this Court. This Compromise Agreement was approved by the trial court on December 11, 2009.16
Subsequently, a Supplemental Compromise Agreement17 dated December 16, 2009 was submitted by the heirs of Juan
and Atty. Linsangan, dividing among them the 7,500 square meter-portion of the property as follows: 3,750 square meters
to the heirs of Juan and 3,750 square meters to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the Contract for Professional
Services.1âwphi1 In said Supplemental Compromise Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor of his wife and children
his 3,750 square meter share, except as to the 250 square meters thereof, as follows:
(a) To Mrs. Lorna O. Linsangan - 2,000 square meters;
(b) To Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(c) To Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(d) To James Lorenz O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
(e) To Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan - 250 square meters.18
Said Supplemental Compromise Agreement was likewise approved by the trial court in its Decision19 dated December 18,
2009. There was no mention in the record, however, that the Compromise Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise
Agreement were likewise presented for approval before the several courts where the other cases were pending.
On December 10, 2015, Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale20 with a certain Helen S. Perez (Helen)
covering the entire 12,331 square meters of the subject property for a purchase price of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos
(PhP150,000,000). Atty. Linsangan sold the entire property using the following:
1. a Special Power of Attorney21 dated August 26, 2010, executed by his wife Lorna Linsangan, and children, Lauren Kyra
O. Linsangan, Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan and James Lorenz O. Linsangan to sell their shares in the subject property;
2. a Special Power of Attorney22 dated September 2009, executed by Juan's wife, Bella N. Vda. de Carlos, and their
children, Jo-Ann Carlos-Tabuton, Jacqueline Carlos-Dominguez and Jimmy N. Carlos to represent them in all cases
involving their interests and shares in the properties of Juan;
3. a Special Power of Attorney23 dated September 30, 2009 executed by Lorna A. Carlos, Jerusha Ann A. Carlos and Jan
Joshua A. Carlos to represent them in all cases involving their interests and shares in the properties of Juan;
4. a Special Power of Attorney24 dated May 2013 executed by Porfirio C. Rillo and Jose Rillo to sell their shares consisting
of 200 square meter portion and 199 square meter portion, respectively, of the subject property;
5. a Special Power of Attorney25 dated October 15, 2009 executed by Jocelyn N. Carlos and Jennifer N. Carlos to
represent them in all cases involving their interests and shares in the properties of Juan;
6. a Special Power of Attorney26 dated May 28, 2010 executed by Bernard Rillo in favor of Alicia D. Carlos to sell his share
in the subject property by virtue of a Compromise Agreement dated September 3, 1987 in the case of Bernard Rillo, et al.
vs. Teofilo Carlos, et al., Civil Case No. 11975, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch CXLIV.
On November 28, 2015, Helen issued several checks27 in varying amounts either made payable to Cash or to Jaime S.
Linsangan or Loma O. Linsangan and simultaneous thereto, Atty. Linsangan released the owner's duplicate original of
TCT No. 139061 to Helen.28 It further appears that in lieu of one check in the amount of PhP2,500,000, Atty. Linsangan
received, in cash, the amounts of PhP2,000,000 on December 4, 2015,29 and PhP500,000 on December 10, 2015,30 from
Helen.
Upon learning of the sale, complainants allegedly requested from Atty. Linsangan for their shares in the proceeds and for
the copies of the Special Power of Attorney as well as the case records, but that Atty. Linsangan refused.31 Complainants
also requested from Atty. Linsangan, this time through another lawyer, Atty. Victor D. Aguinaldo, that their shares in the
subject property be at least segregated from the portion sold.32
On August 20, 2016, complainants wrote a letter33 to Atty. Linsangan revoking the Special Power of Attorney which they
executed in the latter's favor. In said letter, complainants accused Atty. Linsangan of conniving with their mother, Bella N.
Vda. De Carlos, in submitting the Compromise Agreement and in selling the subject property. Complainants, however,
recognized Atty. Lisangan's services for which they proposed that the latter be paid on the basis of quantum
meruit instead of fifty percent (50%) of the subject property.34
12
Subsequently, or in September 2016, complainants filed the instant administrative complaint35 against Atty. Linsangan
accusing the latter of forcing them to sign pleadings filed in court, copies of which were not furnished them; of selling the
subject property in cahoots with their mother; of evading the payment of income taxes when he apportioned his share in
the subject property to his wife and children.36
By way of Comment,37 Atty. Linsangan avers that the Supplemental Compromise Agreement was never questioned by the
complainants until now38 and that they had never requested for a copy thereof from him. Atty. Linsangan admits that the
subject of the sale with Helen is the property in Alabang, Muntinlupa City and that complainants were not given a share
from the payments because such were specifically made applicable to his and his family's share in the subject property
only.39 Atty. Linsangan also contends that the proposal that he be paid on the basis of quantum meruit is only for the
purpose of reducing his 50% share as stated in the Contract for Professional Services he executed with Juan, so that the
balance thereof may accrue to complainants.40
The Issue
The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent is guilty of violating his lawyer's oath.
The Ruling of this Court
After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court finds that respondent committed acts in violation of his oath as
an attorney thereby warranting the Court's exercise of its disciplinary power.
We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.41 Whether or not a lawyer is still entitled to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar
him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.
The avowed purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is not to punish the lawyer, but to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice. 42 The
lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action.43
The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the cases involving the subject property were still
pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan entered into a Contract for Professional Services with Juan
wherein his attorney's fees shall be that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a portion thereof, that may be
recovered. It is likewise not denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon himself, and to his wife and children, half
of the property awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan, through a Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly,
such Supplemental Compromise Agreement was entered into by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan concurrently with
the pendency of several cases before the CA and this Court44 involving the very same property. What is more, Atty.
Linsangan, probably anticipating that he may be charged of having undue interest over his client's property in litigation,
caused another lawyer to appear but all the while making it absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's appearance was
nevertheless under Atty. Linsangan's "direct control and supervision."
Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5)45 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from acquiring, by
purchase or assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their
profession. While Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase
any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," is no longer reproduced in the new Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription still applies considering that Canon 1 of the CPR is clear in requiring
that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process " and
Rule 13 8, Sec. 3 which requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein."46 Here, the law transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, in
violation of his lawyer's oath.
While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above proscription, i.e., if the payment of contingent fee is not made
during the pendency of the litigation involving the client's property but only after the judgment has been rendered in the
case handled by the lawyer,47 such is not applicable to the instant case. To reiterate, the transfer to Atty. Linsangan was
made while the subject property was still under litigation, or at least concurrently with the pendency of
the certiorari proceedings in the CA and the petitions for review in this Court. 48 As mentioned, there was nothing in the
record which would show that these cases were likewise dismissed with finality either before the execution of, or by virtue
of, the Compromise Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise Agreement between complainants and Atty.
Linsangan.
What is more, Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely waiving portions of the subject property in favor of his wife and
children, actually divided his attorney's fee with persons who are not licensed to practice law in contravention of Rule
9.02,49 Canon 950 of the CPR.
Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his act of selling the entire 12,331 square meters property and
making it appear that he was specifically authorized to do so by complainants as well as by the other persons 51 to whom
portions of the property had been previously adjudicated. However, a perusal of the supposed Special Power of Attorney
attached to the Deed of Absolute Sale, save for that executed by his wife and children, only authorizes Atty. Linsangan to
represent complainants in the litigation of cases involving Juan's properties. Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney
13
authorizes Atty. Linsangan to sell the entire property including complainants' undivided share therein.
Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon himself to sell the property because complainants were unfamiliar
with real estate transactions does not exculpate him from liability. If indeed that were the case, then it is incumbent upon
Atty. Linsangan to make it clear to the complainants that he was acting in such capacity and not as their lawyer. 52 But
even this, Atty. Linsangan failed to do.
Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the downpayment for the property from Helen. Atty. Linsangan
does not also deny failing to give complainants' share for the reason that he applied said payment as his share in the
property. In so doing, Atty. Linsangan determined all by himself that the downpayment accrues to him and immediately
appropriated the same, without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. Such act constitutes a breach of his
client's trust and a violation of Canon 1653 of the CPR. Indeed, a lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's
money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorneys fees.54 The failure of an attorney to return the client's
money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and
violation of the general morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. In short, a lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case,
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.55
Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has consistently been treated as one of special trust and
confidence.1âwphi1 An attorney must therefore exercise utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationship with his
client. Measured against this standard, respondent's act clearly fell short and had, in fact, placed his personal interest
above that of his clients. Considering the foregoing violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, Rule
9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon respondent the penalty of six
(6) months suspension from the practice of law.56
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491(5) of the Civil
Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Decision. Let copies of this Decision be
circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty.
Linsangan.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8887
ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO* , Complainant

vs.
ATTY. LUIS FERNAN DIORES, JR., Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint 1 filed with the Court on February 2, 2011 by complainant
Roman Dela Rosa Verano (Verano) against respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. (Atty. Diores) for deceit, malpractice,
gross ignorance of the law and violation of the Lawyer's Oath for surreptitiously using Verano's parcel of land to secure
bail bonds in connection with at least 61 cases of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) that had
been filed against Atty. Diores.2
The salient facts, as borne by the records, are the following:
On April 11, 2006, Verano executed a Special Power of Attomey 3 (SP A) in favor of Atty. Diores authorizing the latter to
use Verano's parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-77901 (subject property) as guaranty to obtain a bail bond for particular
criminal cases4 that had been filed against Atty. Diores.
Verano was surprised when he subsequently discovered that Atty. Diores executed a Memorandum of Agreement5 (MOA)
dated August 31, 2006 with Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety) in order to use the subject
property as guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases of Estafa and Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 that had been filed
against him, which included, among others, Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706, which were filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City (RTC). Verano alleged that he did not authorize Atty. Diores to enter into such
MOA, much less to use the subject property as collateral for bail bonds of the more than 61 Estafa cases filed against the
latter which were other than those he authorized under the SPA, causing great loss and damage to Verano.
Thereafter, the aforementioned RTC branch, through Presiding Judge Ester M. Veloso, promulgated a Joint
Judgment6 dated November 16, 2009 in the said Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706 together with Criminal
Case Nos. CBU-50599, CBU-50279, CBU-50335 and CBU-51277, finding Atty. Diores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and fraudulent means under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code
by engaging in a Ponzi scheme,7 as follows:
14
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Luis F. Diores, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
six (6) counts of the crime of Estafa and sentences him as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50599, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and
to pay the off ended party Irene Lumapas the sum of [₱]3,050,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed
from June 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full;
to pay the offended party Calixto Ventic the sum of [₱]500,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
December 7, 1998 until such time that the amount is paid in full;
to pay the offended party Lilia Amy Ursal the sum of [₱]416,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed
from March 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full;
to pay the offended party Rolando Chiu the sum of [₱]660,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
May 4, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full;
(5) In Criminal [Case] No. CBU-50335, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
to pay the offended party Philholina Villamor the sum of [₱]200,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed
from May 8, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full; and
to pay the offended party John Michael Velez the sum of [₱]2,100,000.00 plus legal interest to be
computed from August 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in full.
SO ORDERED.8
Thus, Verano filed this letter-complaint against Atty. Diores. In its Resolutions dated March 9, 2011 9 and November 28,
2011,10 the Court directed Atty. Diores to file his comment on the letter-complaint. However, Atty. Diores failed to file any
comment despite notice. Consequently, in its Resolution 11 dated July 25, 2012, the Court considered as waived the filing
of Atty. Diores' comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
At the scheduled mandatory conference before the IBP on April 1, 2013,12 only Verano appeared together with his
counsel, Atty. Manuel F. Ong. Atty. Diores, on the other hand, failed to appear despite notice. 13 Thereafter, Verano filed
his position paper,14 adding that subsequent to the filing of the letter-complaint before the Court, Atty. Diores had jumped
bail in some of his criminal cases and had failed to serve his sentence on some of the decided cases against him which
had already become final and executory.15 Atty. Diores, on the other hand, failed to file his position paper.
After due proceedings, Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera) rendered a Report and
Recommendation16 on June 18, 2013, finding Atty. Diores guilty of deceit in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.0117 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR), holding that Atty. Diores: (1) took undue advantage of the trust reposed on him by
Verano by secretly entering into the subject MOA; (2) jumped bail on some of the criminal cases and failed to serve
sentence in those where he was duly convicted by final judgment; and (3) refused to comply with the orders of the Court
and the IBP to submit his comment and position paper, and to attend the mandatory conference. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from

the practice of law for a period of TWO (2) YEARS with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.18
In its Resolution19 dated October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the said Report
and Recommendation, but recommended that Atty. Diores be disbarred, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", and considering that Respondent is liable for deceit in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility aggravated by his recalcitrance to legal
orders in his refusal to comply with the resolution of the Supreme Court for him to file Comment and his
deliberate failure to file his Position Paper with the IBP and attend the Mandatory Conference before the
Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Luis Fernan Diores[, Jr.] is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.20
15
After a judicious examination of the records and submissions of the parties, the Court has no compelling reason to diverge
from the factual findings of Commissioner Antiquiera and the recommended penalty of the IBP Board of Governors.
In dealing with clients or other people, lawyers are expected to observe the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor, both in their private and professional capacities. Thus, any form of deception or fraudulent act committed by a
lawyer in either capacity is not only disgraceful and dishonorable, but also severely undermines the trust and confidence
of people in the legal profession, violates Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and puts the lawyer's moral character into
serious doubt as a member of the Bar, rendering him unfit to continue his practice of law. 21 Moreover, a lawyer has the
duty to obey lawful orders of a superior court and the IBP. Willful disobedience to such orders, especially to those issued
by this Court, is a sufficient ground to disbar a lawyer or suspend him from the practice of law under Section 27, 22 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.23
In this case, Commissioner Antiquiera observed that while there was an SPA executed by Verano in favor of Atty. Di ores
for the latter to use Verano's land as guarantee for the bail bonds, it only authorized Atty. Diores to use the same for
specific criminal cases, and not for the other criminal cases filed against him. In addition, Atty. Diores failed to file his
comment to Verano's letter-complaint filed against him despite two (2) notices from the Court ordering him to do so, failed
to attend the mandatory conference and file his position paper despite orders from the IBP, and jumped bail in the criminal
cases filed against him.
The Court agrees with Commissioner Antiquiera's observation. While the SPA executed by Verano empowered Atty.
Diores, in his private capacity, to use the subject property as guaranty for his bail bond in some of his criminal cases, this
did not grant him carte blanche to use the said property to secure bail bonds in his other criminal cases which were not
included in the SP A, much less enter into a MOA with Visayan Surety for the said purpose. Such act not only violates the
trust granted to him by Verano, but also shows doubt as to his moral character.
Moreover, the fact that Atty. Diores jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against him, failed to file a comment in the
instant case despite notice from the Court, and also failed to attend the mandatory conference and file his position paper
when he was directed to do so by the IBP, shows his propensity to willfully disobey the orders - of the Court, no less - and
other judicial authorities, including the IBP, which is a grave affront to the legal profession, and which should be penalized
to the greatest extent.
As for the recommended penalty, the Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the IBP's recommendation that Atty. Diores
should be disbarred, in view of the totality of infractions he had committed, compounded by his conviction for six (6)
counts of Estafa by the RTC.
It is also well-settled that Estafa, which is an act of defrauding another person, whether committed through abuse of
confidence, false pretenses or other fraudulent acts,24 is a crime involving moral turpitude25 which is also a violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or suspend a lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
Here, Atty. Diores was convicted of not only one, but six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and fraudulent
means under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Such conviction simply shows his criminal tendency to defraud
and deceive other people into remitting to him their hard-earned money, which the legal profession condemns in the
strongest terms. This, together with his willful disobedience of court orders and his act of using Verano's subject property
as guaranty for his bail bond outside the criminal cases wherein he was authorized, cements his utter unfitness to
continue exercising his duties as a lawyer. Thus, the Court will not hesitate to adopt the penalty of the IBP and hereby
disbar Atty. Diores to protect the trust and confidence of the people in this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. is found GUILTY of Deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Willful Disobedience to a Lawful Order of the Court and Conviction for Estafa, both in
violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1âwphi1 He is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN FROM the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately upon the date of his receipt of this Decision.
Atty. Diores is hereby DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his disbarment has commenced,
copy furnished to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Di ores' personal record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10564
MANUEL L. VALIN AND HONORIO L. VALIN, Complainants

vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO T. RUIZ, Respondent
DECISION
16
GESMUNDO, J.:
Before the Court is an Administrative Complaint1 filed by complainants Manuel L. Valin (Manuel) and Honorio L.

Valin (Honoria) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) committing forgery and
falsification of a deed of absolute sale, in breach of his lawyer's oath and in violation of the laws.
The complainants averred that they are two of the surviving children of their deceased parents, spouses Pedro F.
Valin (Pedro) and Cecilia Lagadon (Cecilia). Pedro was the original registered owner of a parcel of land (subject
land) located in San Andres, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, with an area of 833 square meters and covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P- 3275(S ).2
Pedro died on December 7, 1992 while he was in Oahu, Honolulu, Hawaii.3
Several years later, Honorio discovered that the subject land has been transferred to respondent, the godson of Pedro,
resulting in the cancellation of OCT No. P-3275(S), and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
11655(s)4 in the name of respondent. He learned from the Register of Deeds of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (RD) that the
subject land was conveyed to respondent in consideration of ₱10,000.00 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale (subject
deed),5 dated July 15, 1996, and executed in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of
his spouse, Cecilia.
The complainants alleged that the subject deed was obviously falsified and the signatures therein of Pedro and Cecilia
were forgeries because Pedro was already dead and Cecilia was in Hawaii at that time. They also asserted that Pedro's
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 2259388, which was used to identify Pedro in the deed, was also falsified as it was
issued only on January 2, 1996 long after Pedro's death. The complainants pointed to respondent as the author of the
falsifications and forgeries because the latter caused the registration of the subject land unto his name and because he
was the one who benefited from the same.
In his Answer,6 respondent claimed that Rogelio L. Valin (Rogelio), one of the children of Pedro and Cecilia, sold the
subject land to him sometime in 1989 allegedly in representation of Pedro. He recalled that Rogelio approached him for
financial assistance to defray the expenses of the surgical operation of his son. Rogelio offered to sell the subject land
and claimed that it was his share in their family's properties. Respondent agreed to buy the subject land out of
compassion. He asked Rogelio for his authority to sell the subject land but the latter claimed that he could not locate his
authority from his parents in their house.7 Respondent claimed that he knew that it was hard to transfer the title because
the title owner, Pedro, was out of the country at the time of the sale and without a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) for the
purpose; thus, Rogelio undertook to transfer the title.8
Respondent also denied having knowledge regarding the execution of the subject deed in 1996. He insisted that he
neither falsified the said deed and Pedro's CTC No. 2259388 nor forged the signatures of Pedro and Cecilia as it was
Rogelio who processed the transfer of the title of the subject land in his name. He explained that when the subject land
was sold in 1989, Rogelio, as the vendor, undertook to process the transfer of the title of the subject land. Respondent
further clarified that in 1996, he instructed his house helper, Judelyn Baligad (Baligad), to sign the release of the title in his
name because at that time he was busy to go to the RD to sign the release for himself as per instruction of Rogelio's
messenger.9
In their Reply,10 the complainants stressed that the document, which was a falsified deed, was executed in 1996. They
also pointed out that records from the RD revealed that on August 19, 1996, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-
11655(s) was released to Baligad, the housemaid of respondent. In fact, respondent admitted in his answer that he
instructed Baligad to pick up the said copy from the RD as he was busy at that time. Thus, respondent's sweeping denial
of any knowledge with respect to the subject deed is unmeritorious and his claim of good faith must be denied.
In his Rejoinder,11 respondent imputed the falsification of the deed to Rogelio arguing that he must have forged the
signatures of his parents in his attempt to have the title of the subject land transferred to respondent.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was submitted for the IBP-CBD's resolution.
Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation,12 dated April 26, 2011, the IBP-CBD found respondent to be unfit to be entrusted with
the powers of an attorney. It reasoned that as the beneficiary of the falsified deed, respondent was presumed to be the
author thereof. The IBP-CBD opined that he failed to overcome this presumption despite his attempt to deflect the blame
to Rogelio for his failure to adduce evidence in support of his claim.
The IBP-CBD also dismissed respondent's claim that the transaction was a private one and not in connection with his
profession. It emphasized that good moral character and moral fitness transcends the professional personality of a lawyer.
Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-207,13 dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) resolved to adopt
and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD for the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years.
17
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the IBP Board denied it in the assailed Resolution No. XXI-2014-
98,14 dated March 21, 2014.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a petition before the Court arguing that:
I.
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - BOARD OF GOVERNORS COMMITTED

REVERSIBLE ERROR TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED MARCH 20, 2013 AND MARCH 21, 2014 BY
CONCLUDING [RESPONDENT] HAS COMMITTED A MISCONDUCT IN HIS PRACTICE OF LAW AND
AS A CONSEQUENCE RECOMMENDED HIS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW;
II.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - BOARD OF GOVERNORS

HAS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS IN THE CHARGES AGAINST THE
[RESPONDENT] FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, MUCH MORE AS A BASIS FOR HIS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS THE EXTANT OF THE RECORDS IS DEVOID OF ANY SUPPORT
AND FOR BEING GLARINGLY ERRONEOUS.15
Respondent avers that in 1989, he initially declined to buy the subject property from Rogelio because he could not
produce his authority to sell the land; that he sympathized with Rogelio, thus, he was convinced to buy the subject
property with the understanding that the latter would take the necessary steps to transfer the title in respondent's name;
that he acted in good faith in dealing with Rogelio in his private capacity and he paid ₱26,000.00 for the consideration of
the sale; that the subject deed executed in 1996 does not show any participation on the part of respondent; and that the
written authority to sell of Rogelio actually existed and is attached in his petition, but it was not presented before the IBP.
In a Resolution,16 dated October 14, 2014, the Court required the complainants to file their comment within ten (10) days
from notice thereof. The complainants, however, failed to file the required comment within the stated period.17 On March 1,
2016, the case was submitted for resolution.18
The Court's Ruling
The Court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP-CBD and the recommendation of the IBP Board.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing
with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.19
Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the
law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated
by the CPR. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."20
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right
to practice law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment
of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and
attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering
him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.21 In disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.22
In this case, the complainants allege that respondent breached his lawyer's oath and violated the law because he falsified
the subject deed of sale in 1996 to acquire the land of Pedro even though the latter died in 1992. On the other hand,
respondent claims that he had nothing to do with the sale in 1996; rather, he imputes the execution of the subject deed
and its registration to Rogelio, brother of the complainants.
The Court finds that respondent violated the lawyer's oath, Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR.
Respondent's disclaimer as to his

participation in the forged deed of
absolute sale is incredible as he
benefited from it
18
As pointed out in the IBP-CBD Report and Recommendation:
The respondent would like the Commission to believe that Rogelio Valin authored the falsification of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996, present the same to the Register of Deeds so that a new title
can be issued in his name. Such allegations are specious at best. No evidence had been adduced by the
respondent to substantiate such allegation. "Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not
equivalent to proof' (Real vs. Belo, 513 [SCRA] 111). Moreover the Commission finds it unbelievable that
after seven (7) years, Rogelio Valin will be bothered by his conscience for not fulfilling his commitment to
transfer OCT No. P-3275(s) in the name of his father, Pedro Valin, to the name of the respondent by
falsifying a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996 and making it appear that his deceased father,
Pedro Valin, sold OCT No. P-3275 to herein respondent and in the process risk being sued for
falsification of public documents. Moreover, records will show that Rogelio Valin was one of the
complainants who filed cases against the respondent in connection with the subject property. Such
posturing runs counter to respondent's insinuation that Rogelio Valin was the culprit in the falsification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996.23
From the time that the sale of the subject land was negotiated in 1989 until it was executed and registered through the
subject deed in 1996, there were patent irregularities, which respondent cannot ignore.
First, in 1989, respondent admitted that he entered into with Rogelio a contract of deed of sale over the subject property
owned and registered to Pedro without any SPA. As a lawyer, he knows that "[w]hen a sale of a piece of land or any
interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be
void."24 Respondent even admitted that it would be difficult to transfer the title of the subject land because the title owner
Pedro is out of the country at the time of the sale and without a SPA for that purpose.25 As early as 1989, respondent was
aware that the sale of the subject land without proper authorization was null and void.
Second, in spite of the deficient SPA from Rogelio's father, respondent allowed many years to pass without probing him
regarding the sale of the land. He did not exert any effort to communicate with Rogelio. In all those times, respondent did
not demand from Rogelio his written authority to sell the subject land to ensure that the sale would have a mark of
regularity considering that he had paid the purchase price. He continued to ignore the reality that Rogelio was precluded
to sell the subject land without the SPA of his parents. This is obviously contrary to human experience.
Third, it is a difficult pill to swallow that respondent was oblivious of Pedro's death in 1992. He admitted in his petition
that he is a close family friend and godson of Pedro. 26 Certainly, he could not claim such strong ties to the family of
Pedro if he never heard about the latter's demise. Even after the lapse of four (4) years or in 1996, it would be arduous to
believe that respondent was still ignorant of the demise of his close family friend and godfather.
Fourth, in 1996, respondent directed his house helper Baligad to sign the release of the title in his name. He admitted in
his answer that he instructed Baligad to go to the RD and sign for him the release of the title because he was busy at that
time.27 Conchita P. Baustita, a former employee of the RD, also attested that Baligad indeed came to the RD to sign the
release of the title in behalf of respondent on August 19, 1996.28 Evidently, respondent was knowledgeable that the title
was issued in his name because he instructed his house helper to finalize the release of the title.
Respondent was neither surprised nor doubtful of the title's release in his name in 1996. He never attempted to contact
Rogelio to verify if he was the one who transferred the property to his name. He also did not immediately request the
production of his authority to sell the subject land. Respondent had the opportunity and resources to verify the veracity of
the subject deed in 1996, which caused the transfer of Pedro's land to him. Regrettably, he continued to feign ignorance
of the irregularities that attended the transaction.
Fifth, the subject deed executed in 1996 was readily available at the RD. Respondent could have effortlessly and briefly
verified the said deed, which was the basis of the transfer of the title to him. It is to be noted that the subject deed was not
signed by Rogelio on behalf of Pedro; rather, it was purportedly signed by Pedro personally and confirmed by Cecilia.
Evidently, the sale contemplated by the said deed was not anymore a sale through an agent, which was the original
agreement of respondent and Rogelio back in 1989. The consideration stated in the subject deed, in the amount of ₱l
0,000.00, did not reflect the alleged purchase price of ₱26,000.00 given by respondent in 1989.
Further, the subject deed was executed in Tugegarao, Cagayan when respondent knows fully well that Pedro and Cecilia
are residing in Hawaii as early as 1989.1âwphi1 In the same light, it would be impossible to notarize the subject deed in
1996 before a notary public considering that Pedro was already dead. Also, the subject deed mentioned CTC No.
2259388, dated January 2, 1996, issued to Pedro, which is patently falsified because Pedro has passed away at that time.
Again, respondent did not bother to even read the subject deed of sale which contains obvious and palpable irregularities;
rather, he continued to disregard them for his own convenience.
Sixth, as a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the legality of deed of sale and its registration. He knows
how important it is to ensure that the registered instrument is complete and regular on its face. He is also duty-bound to
denounce illegally acquired deeds of sale, which deceive and betray the general public. Instead of assailing its validity,
respondent continuously and completely utilized to his benefits the subject land obtained through the falsified deed. As
reflected in TCT No. T-11655(s), he even mortgaged the subject land to Philippine National Bank, Sanchez Mira Branch
as a security for a loan.29
19
In fine, the Court is convinced that respondent is the author or, at the very least, has connived with the author of the
subject deed and Pedro's CTC for his personal benefits. Respondent incessantly closed his eyes until he became blind to
the anomalies surrounding the sale of the subject land. Whether through deliberate intent or gross negligence, he
participated in the successful registration and release of the title that originated from an absolutely falsified deed of sale.
As discussed above, there have been numerous occasions that respondent could have stopped and noted the red flags
apparent throughout the transaction. Disappointingly, he chose to profit from the falsified deed, devoid of any empathy
that his actions would damage innocent third persons. Respondent's acts are inconsistent with the sacred oath to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any.
Respondent cannot finger

point culpability to Rogelio
Respondent attempts to impute the falsification of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC to Rogelio because it was the latter
who allegedly promised to transfer the title of the subject land.
The Court is not convinced.
It is highly unbelievable that, after seven (7) years and without any communication or notice whatsoever, 30 Rogelio will
suddenly process the transfer of Pedro's property to respondent out of sheer goodwill and that he was willing to move to
great lengths to fulfill his promise by falsifying the signature of his dead father in disposing his parents' land. Curiously,
respondent failed to show proof that he demanded from Rogelio to effect the transfer the subject land; respondent did not
even see him anymore after 1989.31 Rogelio has left for Hawaii and have been residing there up to the present.32
Further, the subject deed of sale does not even reflect the name of Rogelio, but it was signed by Pedro and Cecilia. The
sale manifested by the said deed was not anymore a sale through an agent, which was the agreement between
respondent and Rogelio back in 1989. Rogelio does not have any more participation in the subject deed. Indubitably,
since respondent is the ultimate beneficiary of the falsified deed of sale, he is presumed to be the author of the subject
deed.
The purported written authority

of Pedro is immaterial
In his last ditch attempt to evade responsibility, respondent presented for the first time on appeal a purported written
authority, dated September 13, 1989, signed by Pedro permitting Rogelio to sell the subject land. 33 The said authority is
originally captioned as a special power of attorney; however, it bore an erasure and it reads as an authorization of
attorney.
The written authority, however, is irrelevant and incredible in light of the circumstances in the present case.
Respondent plainly admitted that the title owner Pedro is out of the country at the time of the sale and Rogelio was without
a SPA for that purpose.34 Thus, the Court wonders how the said written authority suspiciously conjured itself out of thin air
when respondent had confessed that it was not existing at the time of the alleged sale in 1989.
Further, the purported written authority deserves scant consideration. The said authority was allegedly executed by Pedro
at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan on September 13, 1989. However, respondent earlier admitted that in 1989, Pedro was out of
the country,35 thus, he could not have signed the same.
The written authority is immaterial because Pedro died in 1992 and it had lost its force and effect then. It cannot be used
for any purpose whatsoever. Moreover, the subject deed in 1996 was not anymore a sale through an agent as it was
purportedly signed by Pedro and Cecilia personally. Thus, the written authority is irrelevant in the subject deed.
In any case, respondent must face the music in view of his questionable actions regarding the registration and release of
the subject title through the falsified deed.
That the transaction is private in

nature, not in relation to the
practice of law, is not an excuse;
proper penalties
Respondent violated the lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR when he participated and benefited from the
falsified deed. Even though he acted in his personal capacity in the improper sale and registration of the subject, he is not
excused from liability.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the
legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression
is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.36
Jurisprudence provides different ranges of penalties in cases where the lawyer participates in the execution of a falsified
deed involving a dead party. In Magaway v. Avecilla,37 the erring lawyer notarized a deed of sale even though the party
20
was already dead for 27 years and he was suspended from the practice of law for one year. In Serzo v. Flores,38 the erring
lawyer notarized a deed of absolute sale when one of the parties had long been dead and he was suspended from the
practice of law for two years.
On the other hand, in Sicat v. Ariola, Jr.,39 the Court imposed the ultimate penalty of disbarment against a lawyer who
falsified a special power of attorney, which led to the wrongful encashment of a check worth ₱3,700,000.00 to the
prejudice of the government. In Velasco v. Doroin,40 two erring lawyers forged a deed of sale and they forced complainant
to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement to deprive her of her share. One of the lawyers was suspended indefinitely;
while the other was disbarred for absconding the criminal case against him.
In this case, respondent participated in the registration and release of subject title in his favor with the use of the falsified
deed of sale. Pedro has long been dead when the subject deed was executed. Respondent did not do anything to verify
the validity of the subject deed and its registration in spite of the numerous badges of fraud. He is presumed the author as
he was the only beneficiary thereof. Because of his actions, the complainants were deprived with their share as
compulsory heirs. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP-CBD and the resolution of the IBP
Board that respondent should be meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years effective
immediately, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He
is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall
take effect.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent Atty. Rolando T.
Ruiz's records. Copies shall likewise be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018
MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARISTEDES A. MARAMOT, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer is a disciple of truth because he swore upon his admission to the Bar that he would do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, and that he would conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
clients. His violation of the Lawyer's Oath through the commission of falsehood can be condignly
sanctioned.
Antecedents
In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo (Marjorie) alleges that the respondent

consented to, abetted and participated in the illegal act of falsifying a public document in violation of
Article 171(4) in relation to Article 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code; and that he thereby violated the
Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The public document in question was the deed of donation2 executed in favor of Princess Anne Apolinar-
Petilo (Princess Anne) and Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar (Mommayda) who were only 12 years old and 16
1/2 years old, respectively, at the time of its execution.3 Asserting that the respondent had known of the
minority of the donees, Marjorie insists that he was thereby guilty of falsification first in his capacity as a
lawyer by preparing the deed of donation and indicating therein that both donees were then "of legal
age"; and as a notary public by notarizing the document. She claims that he, being Mommayda's counsel
in the latter's adoption case, was aware of the untruthful statements he made in the deed of donation
because he thereafter submitted the deed of donation as evidence therein.4
In his answer, the respondent states that Margarita Apolinar (Margarita) and her sister-in-law Justina
Villanueva-Apolinar (Justina) went to his law office sometime in 2000; that Margarita was a grandaunt
who owned a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro that she wanted to donate to Princess Anne,
Marjorie's own daughter, and Mommayda, the adopted daughter of Justina; that upon learning of Princess
Anne's minority, he advised that she had to be represented by either parent;5 that not one to be easily
turned down, Margarita persisted, and prevailed over him; that he thereupon prepared the deed of
donation but left the date, the document number and page number blank; that he reserved the
notarization for later after the parties had signed the document; that he allowed Margarita to bring the
deed of donation to Manila where she was supposedly proceeding in order to procure the signature of
21
Princess Anne thereon and as a way of avoiding additional travel expenses; and that Justina had
mentioned to him at the time that Margarita was then suffering from colon cancer and had only a little
time to live.
The respondent recalled that a month afterwards Margarita and Justina returned to him with the signed
deed of donation; that he then noticed that the document did not bear the signatures of Princess Anne's
parents; that Margarita again offered to procure the signatures on the document; and that Margarita and
Justina did not anymore return with the document until the time when he had to enter the instrument in
his notarial book for his monthly report.
Margarita eventually died on April 13, 2003. Later on, with issues about her properties left unresolved, the
relationship among her relatives quickly turned sour, and the deed of donation again came to the fore. In
2004, Justina and her husband Tomas went to see the respondent and confided to him that they were
entangled in a court battle with Marjorie, their niece, over Margarita's properties, including the apartment
in Manila where they had been occupying since 1980. They then learned from the respondent that
because Mommayda's birth certificate had been simulated, they needed to legally adopt her in order to
enable her to inherit from them. Hence, they filed a petition for the adoption of Mommayda, which did not
sit well with Marjorie.
Claiming that her successional rights as a niece or heir to Tomas vis-a-vis would be adversely affected by
the adoption of Mommayda, Marjorie vigorously opposed the petition for adoption, and argued for its
dismissal on the basis that Tomas and Justina were not morally capable of adoption as shown by their
simulation of the birth of Mommayda. Marjorie also brought several criminal cases in the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor on the ground of the simulation of the birth and falsification of the birth certificate of
Mommayda in violation of Articles 347, 359, 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code.
Marjorie's opposition to the petition for adoption and her criminal charges were dismissed. Also dismissed
were her opposition to the petition of Tomas and Justina for the correction of entry in Mommayda's birth
certificate, as well as Marjorie's motion to recall the social worker for cross examination in the adoption
case. The respondent claims that Marjorie -exasperated and dissatisfied with the outcome - then turned
against him and instituted the complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.6
The respondent submits that there was nothing illegal in the deed of donation; that as the sole owner of
the donated land, Margarita had an absolute right to dispose of her property by donation; that no law
prohibited donations to minors; and that the filing of the petition for judicial partition was an express if not
implied ratification of the defect in the donation; and that in regard to the submission of the simulated
birth certificate in evidence, the purpose of filing the petition for adoption was to rectify the simulation and
to convert the relationship between Mommayda and her adopting parents into a legal one.7
During the mandatory conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, Marjorie admitted that a petition for judicial partition involving the donated land was meanwhile
filed; that a compromise agreement8 was reached; and that Princess Anne sold her share to Mommayda.9
In his position paper,10 the respondent asserts that the complaint was pure harassment calculated only to
besmirch and malign his reputation; and that the complaint was also a premeditated tactic to prolong or
pre-empt the adoption case considering that a favorable ruling thereat would adversely affect Marjorie's
rights as an heir of Mommayda's parents.
In his resolution dated May 22, 2008,11 the IBP Commissioner recommended that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned Commissioner finds

respondent Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot to have violated the Notarial Law, his act having
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents; and, respectfully recommends
his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one (1) year while the other complaints
against him are recommended dismissed for lack of merit.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent submitted that he did not employ any falsity because it
was only Margarita - the donor - who had in fact attested to the execution of the deed of donation in the
notarial acknowledgement of the deed of donation; that it was inconsequential even if Princess Anne had
signed the deed of donation not in his presence; that in conveyances, only the person encumbering or
conveying needed to personally appear, sign and acknowledge the deed before the notary public; and that
Princess Anne and Mommayda's names were placed in the document merely for them to accept the
donation.
The respondent pleads for the mitigation of his liability considering that he has exhibited candor in
admitting his offense. He represents that his act was not gross enough as to justify suspension; that the
complainant had thereby suffered no damage, but had actually benefitted from the act; that he had
notarized in good faith; and that with this offense being his first in his 12 years as a law practitioner and
22
as notary public, humanitarian considerations should be considered in his favor because he had children to
support and had been his family's sole bread winner.
In her comment on the respondent's motion for reconsideration, 14 Majorie avers that Princess Anne could
not have signed the instrument in Manila because her daughter was then studying in Victoria, Oriental
Mindoro.
In Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline, but modified the penalty by
recommending the immediate revocation of the respondent's notarial commission and his disqualification
from reappointment as a notary for two years, thus:15
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for Respondent's violation of the Notarial Law, Atty. Aristedes Maramot is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, immediate Revocation of his
Notarial Commission if presently Commissioned and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary
Public for Two (2) years.16
The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration through Resolution No.
XIX-2011-424 dated June 26, 2011,17 thus:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of
substantial ground or reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-337 dated July 17, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
On September 6, 2011, the respondent filed in this Court his Comment on the IBP Board of Governor's
Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 and No. XIX-2011-424 dated August 16, 2011.19
In its Report dated June 27, 2012,20 the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended to treat the comment as
a petition for review.
On February 15, 2012, the respondent filed an amended comment dated December 5, 2011.21
On July 23, 2012, the Court resolved: (1) to direct the respondent to furnish the IBP a copy of his
amended comment and submit proof of its service within ten (10) days; and (2) to require the
complainant to file her comment thereon within 15 days from receipt.22
Accordingly, the complaint submitted her comment on November 9, 2012, opposing the respondent's
prayer for reconsideration and asking the Court to uphold the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.
A.
As a Lawyer
Every lawyer before entering his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Bar and an officer of the
Court, professes as a natural course the promises contained in the Lawyer's Oath, to wit:
I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I
will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients, and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis
supplied)
The letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath are oftentimes forgotten or taken for granted in the course of
the lawyer's practice of law. To give teeth thereto, the Court has adopted and instituted the Code of
Professional Responsibility to govern every lawyer's relationship with his profession, the courts, the
society, and his clients.
23
Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and Rule 10.1 of Canon 10, which provide:
CANON 1 - x x x
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - x x x
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the document, he actually
knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having then advised that her parents should
represent her in the execution of the document. Mommayda was likewise a minor. His awareness of the
latter's minority at the time was not disputed because he was also representing Mommayda in the latter's
adoption proceedings aside from being Mommayda's neighbor. Nonetheless, he still indicated in the deed
of donation that the donees were of legal age. His doing so, being undeniably dishonest, was contrary to
his oath as a lawyer not to utter a falsehood. He thereby consciously engaged in an unlawful and
dishonest conduct, defying the law and contributing to the erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.
The respondent's explanation that it was only Margarita who actually acknowledged that the deed of
donation was her own free act and deed does not extricate him from responsibility. The deed of donation,
whether or not acknowledged by the donees, should not bear any false statement upon a material fact.
The ages of the donees were material because they bore on their capacities to render the donation
efficacious. That neither Princess Anne nor Mommayda acknowledged the deed of donation did not cure
the defect.
The respondent justifies himself by stating that the persistence of the donor Margarita prevailed upon him
to prepare the deed of donation as he had done; and adverts to the donor's assurance that she would
herself procure the signatures of the parents of Princess Anne on the document. He also submits that the
execution of the deed had redounded to the advantage of the minors; and that there was no law that
prohibited the donation in favor of minors.
The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a lawyer, he should not invoke
good faith and good intentions as sufficient to excuse him from discharging his obligation to be truthful
and honest in his professional actions. His duty and responsibility in that regard were clear and
unambiguous. In Young v. Batuegas,23 this Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the highest
value for attorneys, thus:
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his
high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to
aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand,
are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display
the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of
truth.24
The respondent posits that a donation could be made in favor of a minor. Such position was not a factor,
however, because whether or not a minor could benefit from the donation did not determine the merits of
the complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Neither was his claim that the
filing of the petition for judicial partition amounted to the ratification of the deed of donation a factor to be
considered in his favor. The decisive consideration is whether or not he committed a falsehood in his
preparation of the deed of donation. Sadly for him, the answer is in the affirmative.
Relative to the respondent's submission of the false birth certificate of Mommayda in the proceedings for
her adoption, we adopt with approval the following findings and recommendation made by the IBP
Commissioner absolving the respondent, viz.:
The Certificate of Live Birth of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar is certainly a simulated
one where it was made to appear that she was the biological child of Spouses Tomas V.
Apolinar and Justina P. Villanueva when she was not. It was not shown, however, that
respondent has a hand when its contents were given to the employee of the Local Civil
24
Registrar of Victoria, Mindoro Oriental. From the face of the document, it appears that Tomas
Apolinar himself gave the details and he signed the Certificate of Live concerned.
When the respondent used the document in the adoption case of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva
Apolinar by the Spouses Tomas and Justina Apolinar (docketed as Spec. Proc. No. R-04-5396,
RTC, Branch 40, Calapan City, Mindoro Oriental), the respondent did not misrepresent that Ma.
Mommayda V. Apolinar is the biological daughter of the petitioners. In fact, there was
nothing that was misrepresented in the allegations in the petition. This led to the filing of
another case for the correction of entry in the birth certificate of the same Ma. Mommayda V.
Apolinar docketed as Spec. proc. CV-05-5445. It was alleged therein that Leini Villanueva
Guerrero and Johnny Ortega are the biological parents of Ma. Mommayda Apolinar.25
B.
As a Notary Public
The respondent is also being hereby charged with having executed the notarial acknowledgment for the
deed of donation despite Princess Anne not having actually appeared before him.
The respondent explains that he did not employ any falsity or dishonesty, and that he did not make
untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment.
In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:
It cannot be denied that the respondent violated the Notarial Law when he, by his own
admission, notarized the Deed of Donation which was signed by at least one of the parties,
namely: the donee, Princess Anne Petilo, who signed not in the presence of the Notary Public
but somewhere in Metro Manila. This fact the respondent has admitted in his Answer (records,
P. 22 Statement of Facts, par. 3). For this reason, notaries public are once again reminded
to observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence a notary public should not notarized a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein (Serzo vs. Flores, A.C. No. 6040
[formerly CBD 02-972, July 30, 2004] citing Fulgencio v. Martin, 403, 403 SCRA 216,
2200221).26
The IBP Commissioner obviously rendered his foregoing observations on the assumption that Princess
Anne had herself acknowledged the instrument not in the presence of the respondent as the Notary Public.
But, as borne out by the acknowledgment, only Margarita's name was indicated as the person appearing
before the respondent during the notarization of the instrument, to wit:
BEFORE ME, on the date and at the place afore-cited personally appeared Margarita V.
Apolinar with her CTC indicated below her name and signature, issued at Victoria, Oriental
Mindoro, all known to me the same person who executed the foregoing instrument and she
acknowledged to me that the same is her own free act and deed (Emphasis supplied)27
Nonetheless, the respondent's denial of having employed any falsity or dishonesty, or of making untruthful
statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment does not necessarily save the day for him. There is
no question that a donation can be accepted in a separate instrument. However, the deed of donation in
question was also the same instrument that apparently contained the acceptance.28 The names of Princess
Anne and Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should have been included in the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of their minority, the names of their respective parents
(or legal guardians) assisting them should have also been indicated thereon. This requirement was not
complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne and Mommayda should have also signed the deed of donation
themselves along with their assisting parents or legal guardians.
The omission indicated that the deed of donation was not complete. Hence, the notarial acknowledgment
of the deed of donation was improper. Rule II Section 1 of the Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a

single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally

complete instrument or document; x x x x
We cannot approve of the recommended penalty of suspension for one year. The circumstances peculiar
to the complaint call for lenity in favor of the respondent, but who must nonetheless be sternly warned
against a repetition of the offense at the risk of suffering a more stringent penalty. We hold that the
penalties commensurate to the offense is suspension from the practice of law for six months.
25
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ARISTEDES MARAMOT guilty of
violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial Practice; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for six months effective from notice of this decision, with revocation of his notarial commission and
disqualification from being re-appointed as Notary Public for two years effective upon receipt; and warns
him of a more stringent penalty upon repetition of the offense.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10547
FREDDIE A. GUILLEN, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. AUDIE ARNADO, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant case is brought about by an administrative complaint which Freddie Guillen filed against his former business
partner, Atty. Audie Arnado, for alleged violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Complainant Freddie Guillen is the registered owner of the City Grill Restaurant. He then invited respondent Atty. Audie
Amado and a certain Cedric Ebo to join the restaurant business. Each of them had to shell out ₱200,000.00 to make up a
total capital of ₱600,000.00. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was therefore executed and the business was formally
launched in May 2003. At first, everything went smoothly, until Amado's sister-in-law and Ebo's son participated in the
management, causing complications in the business operations, which later forced Guillen and his wife to step down as
general manager and operations manager, respectively. Because of the disagreements among the parties, Guillen offered
that he would waive his claims for profits, provided that Arnado would return the ₱200,000.00 that he paid as capital.
Arnado allegedly claimed that said refund would still be subject to the billings of the Amado and Associate Law Firm.
Thereafter, Guillen was surprised to find out that Arnado had already caused the incorporation of the restaurant with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which was approved on February 16, 2004. Guillen was likewise excluded
from the business without the aforementioned refund of his capital. He was further charged with Estafa before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. Thus, Guillen initiated the present administrative case.
For his part, Arnado admitted the existence and the contents of the MOA. He also admitted that he caused the
incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation. However, he insisted that the same was done in accordance with the
requirements under the law. Guillen could not validly claim for a refund, and if he was really entitled, he should simply file
an action to that effect. Arnado likewise contended that Guillen's refund would still be subject to the legal compensation
claim of his law firm.
On November 2, 2011, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended the
censure of Arnado, thus:1
WHEREFORE, Taking into consideration the foregoing premises, it is with deep regret to recommend to
the Board of Governors that ATTY. AUDIE ARNADO [oi] Cebu City be CENSURED for his deceitful and
dishonest act in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that- A
lawyer shall not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
So Ordered.
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED.
On January 3, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-47,2 which adopted and approved the
aforementioned recommendation, hence:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of' the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rule’s and considering Respondent's violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Audie Arnado is hereby CENSURED.
Thereafter, Arnado moved for reconsideration of said Resolution. On March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed
another resolution, Resolution No. XXI-2014-180,3 which denied said motion for reconsideration and approved its 2013
Resolution, with modification, to wit:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
26
threshed out and taken into consideration. Further, for taking advantage of his knowledge of the law and
for his deceitful conduct of easing out Complainant from their restaurant business partnership without his
knowledge by registering a corporation under a different name and style but doing the same line of
business and using the same complements and trade secrets, Resolution No. XX-2013-47 dated January
3, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification, and accordingly the penalty imposed on Atty. Audie
Arnado [is] increased from Censure to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for three (3) months.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
that Amado should be suspended from the practice of law.
At the onset, it must be pointed out that the business name City Grill Restaurant registered under Guillen's name was
never dissolved in accordance with the law. Even Arnado failed to prove that the City Grill Restaurant business had
already been terminated. Although said business name was only used for a short period of time, the same had already
acquired goodwill among the residents and customers in the locality.
On February 26, 2004, City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation was registered with the SEC. Although Arnado and Ebo were
not included as incorporators, those persons reflected in the articles of incorporation as the company's incorporators were
their relatives. It is clear that when Arnado caused the incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation, he was fully
aware that City Grill Restaurant was still registered in Guillen's name. Obviously, he did the same to take advantage of the
goodwill earned by the name of City Grill Restaurant. Amado was likewise the one who actually notarized some of City
Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation's legal documents such as the Treasurer's Affidavit and a letter addressed to the SEC.
The IBP Board thus aptly concluded that Arnado is guilty of taking advantage of his knowledge of the law and of
surreptitiously easing out Guillen from their restaurant business partnership by registering a corporation under a different
but similar name and style, in the same line of business, and using the same trade secrets. Arnado, although not reflected
as one of the incorporators of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation, has deceived the public into believing that City Grill
Restaurant and City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation are one and the same, clearly violating Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that a lawyer owes
substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the public, and
takes part in the administration of justice, one of the most important functions of the State, as an officer of the court.
Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing.4
Here, Arnado has certainly fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of
him.1âwphi1 On the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of Guillen to
secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Audie Arnado from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Audie Arnado and entered in his file in the Office of
the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8968, September 26, 2017
MA. VILMA F. MANIQUIZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANILO C. EMELO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Ma. Vilma Maniquiz against Atty. Danilo C. Emelo, for
notarizing a fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale and in the absence of the required notarial commission.
The procedural and factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Maniquiz alleged that Emelo violated his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
when he willfully notarized a fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale containing a falsified signature of her sister-
in-law, Mergelita Sindanom Maniquiz, as vendor of a parcel of land in favor of spouses Leonardo and
27
Lucena Torres, as the vendees. Even worse, Emelo notarized said document without being authorized to
act as a notary public for Cavite.
On January 11, 2011, a person connected with the Spouses Torres gave Maniquiz a copy of said deed of
sale. When she showed it to Mergelita, the latter was surprised and denied that she ever signed the same.
Also, they noticed that the document did not show the names of the witnesses but only their signatures
and the purported vendees failed to present any government-issued identification documents. Emelo's
notarial commission and roll of attorneys number were likewise not indicated in the document. Thus,
Maniquiz went to Emelo's residence to confirm if he indeed notarized said deed of sale. Emelo told them
that he did notarize said document based on a photocopy of Mergelita's passport which was shown to him
by his kumpare, Leonardo Torres, who personally appeared before him at that time.
Emelo, for his part, denied the accusations against him. In his belatedly filed Comment on July 26, 2012,
he argued that he was not remiss in his obligations as a notary public when he notarized the subject deed
of absolute sale since the parties actually appeared before him. He likewise attested that a woman
introduced herself to him as Mergelita Maniquiz, as evidenced by her passport. As regards the issue of
absence of notarial commission, he explained that for the year 2007, he could not retrieve orders of his
commission as they may have been destroyed when his residential house was inundated by the typhoon
Milenyo on September 28, 2006. He admitted the notarization of said document without notarial
commission and begged for clemency, kind consideration, and forgiveness for the same.
On June 18, 2013, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended Samson's suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. 1 On October 10, 2014, the
IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-729,2 which adopted and approved, with
modification, the aforementioned recommendation, hence:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", and considering that Respondent is liable
for deceit, gross misconduct and dishonesty, Atty. Danilo C. Emelo is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for two (2) years and his notarial commission, if presently commissioned,
is REVOKED. Further, he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for two
(2) years.
The Court's Ruling
The Court upholds the findings and recommendations of the IBP that Emelo should be held liable for the
questioned act.
Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true
agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of
notarized documents. The notary public is the one who assures that the parties appearing in the document
are indeed the same parties who executed it. This obviously cannot be achieved if the parties are not
physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document since it is highly possible that the
terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be included in the document submitted by the
vendee for notarization. Worse, the possibility of forgery becomes real.3 It should be noted that a notary
public's function should not be trivialized; a notary public must always discharge his powers and duties,
which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity, and with carefulness and faithfulness.
Notaries must, at all times, inform themselves of the facts they certify to. And most importantly, they
should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.4
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's oath to obey the laws,
more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he
is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath
similarly proscribes. It cannot be overemphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a
commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual.5
These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR. Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
28
xxx
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. A lawyer, to the best
of his ability, is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is
contrary to the same. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also
inspires the public to likewise respect and obey the law. Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of
conduct to be observed by all lawyers. Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct does
not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such
element. To be dishonest means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; be unworthy;
lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness, and straightforwardness, while
conduct that is deceitful means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or
device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the
party imposed upon.6
The Court must reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege that is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers
should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the public's faith in the legal profession. To declare that lawyers must at all times uphold and
respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Since of all
classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is then imperative that
they live by the law.7
When Emelo was admitted to the Bar, he took an oath to obey the laws, do no falsehood, and conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. After a review of the records of
the case, however, the Court finds him guilty of deceit, gross misconduct, and dishonesty in notarizing the
deed of sale without all the parties personally appearing before him and in the absence of a notarial
commission.
The public is led to expect that lawyers would always be mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. The lawyer is expected to maintain, at all times,
a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to his work. To
this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives.8
Emelo's failure to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to observe fairness and
honesty in all his dealings and transactions. Indubitably, he fell short of the demands required of him as a
faithful member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge said duty makes him answerable, not just to
the private complainant, but also to the Court, to the legal profession, and to the general public.
Considering the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct certainly
diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.9
In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,10 the respondent-lawyer notarized twenty-two (22)
public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those documents. The Court suspended
the lawyer from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary
public. In Anudon v. Atty. Arturo B. Cefra,11 wherein the lawyer notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale without
requiring the presence of the affiants, the Court suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law
for two (2) years and likewise perpetually disqualified him from being commissioned as a notary public.
Therefore, pursuant to the aforecited principles, the Court finds Emelo guilty of violating the pertinent
Canons of the CPR, for which he must necessarily be held administratively liable.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Danilo C. Emelo from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, REVOKES his notarial commission, if presently
commissioned, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. The
Court further WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Danilo C. Emelo and entered in his
file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this Decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as
well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11483
29
LUZVIMINDA S. CERILLA, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. SAMUEL SM. LEZAMA, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
On November 22, 2010, complainant Luzviminda S. Cerilla filed an administrative complaint1 for gross misconduct against
respondent Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In her Complaint, complainant stated that she is one of the co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, with an area of 730 square meters. The said property is covered by TCT No. 1-
20416 and registered in the name of Fulquerio Gringio. It was later sold by his sole heir, Pancracio A. Gringio, to the heirs
of Fabio2 Solmayor, including the herein complainant. Being a co-owner of the subject property, complainant engaged the
services of respondent to file an unlawful detainer case against Carmelita S. Garlito with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental. At that time, the complainant was working at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, and
for this reason, she executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of the respondent to perform the following acts,
to wit:
(1) To represent and act on my behalf in filing a case of ejectment against Lita Garlito of Sibulan, Negros
Oriental;
(2) To appear on my behalf during the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 497-04 and to make
stipulations of facts, admissions and other matters for the early resolution of the same including amicable
settlement of the case if necessary.3
Complainant said that on the basis of the SPA, respondent entered into a compromise agreement with the defendant in
the unlawful detainer case to sell the subject property of the complainant for ₱350,000.00 without her consent or a special
authority from her. Paragraph 2 of the Compromise Agreement dated January 31, 2005 states:
2. The plaintiff is willing to sell [the] property in question to the defendant in the amount of ₱350,000.00
within a period of three months beginning February 1, 2005 up to April 30, 2005, the payment of which
shall be paid in one setting.4
The Compromise Agreement was approved by the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in an Order5 dated January 31, 2005.
Subsequently, a Motion for Execution6 dated June 2, 2005 was filed due to complainant's failure to comply with the terms
and conditions set forth in the compromise agreement, as complainant refused to execute a Deed of Sale. The MTC
issued a Writ of Execution7 on June 10, 2005.
Complainant contended that respondent misrepresented in paragraph 2 of the Compromise Agreement that she was
willing to sell the subject property for ₱350,000.00. Complainant averred that she did not authorize the respondent to sell
the property and she is not willing to sell the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00, considering that there are other co-
owners of the property.
Complainant contended that by entering into the compromise agreement to sell the subject property without any special
power to do so, respondent committed gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties to his client. She asserted that
respondent's misconduct was the proximate cause of the loss of the subject property in the ejectment case, which
prejudiced her and the other co-owners, as respondent knew that the ejectment case was filed by her for the benefit of all
the co-owners of the property.
According to complainant, the subject property is located near the Municipal Hall and town plaza of the Municipality of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental and the property's market value is not less than ₱l,500,000.00. Since respondent sold the
property for only ₱350,000.00, she (complainant) and the other co-owners suffer actual loss.
Complainant contended that respondent's act of entering into the compromise agreement with the misrepresentation that
she was willing to sell the property in the unlawful detainer case without her consent or conformity, which caused her
material damage, warrants respondent's suspension or disbarment.
In his Answer,8 respondent denied complainant's allegation that he misrepresented that complainant was willing to sell the
property in the amount of ₱350,000.00, since he was duly armed with an SPA to enter into a compromise agreement, and
the price of ₱350,000.00 was the actual price paid by the complainant to the owner of the property.
Respondent contended that complainant has no cause of action against him for the following reasons:
(a) The SPA dated December 27, 2004 was executed by the complainant in favor of the respondent due
to her inability to attend every hearing of the unlawful detainer case;
(b) The SPA contains the sentence under number 2: "including amicable settlement of the case if
necessary";
30
(c) During the preliminary conference of the unlawful detainer case, the respondent requested Presiding
Judge Rafael Cresencio C. Tan, Jr. to allow him to contact the complainant by mobile phone before any
compromise agreement could be executed. Respondent tried several times to contact complainant to no
avail during the recess. When the case was called again, he requested a resetting, but the Presiding
Judge insisted on a compromise agreement to be submitted because respondent was armed with the
necessary SPA anyway, and the result was the Compromise Agreement of January 31, 2005;
(d) Upon the signing of the Compromise Agreement, respondent was able to contact complainant, who
objected to the agreement because the amount of ₱350,000.00 was small;
(e) After writing a letter of repudiation to the counsel of the defendant in the unlawful detainer case,
respondent filed a Manifestation dated February 24, 2005 with the MTC of Sibulan, attaching therewith
the letter of repudiation, and he also filed a Motion to Set Aside Order and to Annul Compromise
Agreement9(on the ground of mistake). However, the MTC denied the said motion in an Order 10 dated
May 30, 2005. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the MTC;
(f) In 2006, the heirs of Favio Solmayor filed another unlawful detainer case over the same property with
the same MTC against the same defendant, which was dismissed by the court on the ground of res
judicata; 11 and
(g) In 2008, complainant filed a civil case 12 for annulment of judgment/quieting of title, recovery of
possession and damages against Carmelita S. Garlito, respondent Atty. Lezama and the MTC of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental, and the case is still pending before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch
35, Negros Oriental.13
Further, respondent stated that the payment for the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00 is under the custody of the
MTC of Sibulan, although the money was deposited with the Philippine Veterans Bank by defendant Carmelita S. Garlito,
who opened an account in respondent's name. Respondent stated that he has never touched the said deposit.
Respondent contended that the SP A given to him by the complainant was sufficient authority to enter into the said
compromise agreement.1âwphi1 The amount of ₱350,000.00 was the price of the subject property, because the
complainant paid the same amount for the purchase of the property from the Gringio family.
According to the respondent, he entered into the compromise agreement under the honest and sincere belief that it was
the fairest and most equitable arrangement. Under the present policy of the Court, parties should endeavor to settle their
differences (in civil cases, at least) amicably. To penalize lawyers for their judgment calls in cases where they are armed
with authority to settle would wreck havoc on our system of litigation, making them hesitant, apprehensive and wary that
their clients might file disciplinary cases against them for the slightest reasons. While the filing of such complaint is part of
the professional hazards of lawyering, the same should only be anchored on the most serious misconduct of lawyers,
which respondent does not believe is present in this case. Hence, respondent prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
On June 10, 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline held a mandatory conference with the parties, who were
required to submit their respective Position Papers thereafter.
The Commissioner's Report
On June 28, 2013, Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. submitted his Report,14 finding respondent guilty
of violating Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
The Investigating Commissioner stated that during the mandatory conference, it was agreed upon that the SPA dated
December 27, 2004 was the same SP A granted by complainant in favor of respondent. It was also agreed upon that by
virtue of the said SP A, respondent entered into a compromise agreement with the defendant in the unlawful detainer
case. According to the complainant, while it is true that she executed an SPA in favor of the respondent, there was no
specific authority granted to him to sell the subject property for ₱350,000.00, and that was the reason why she refused to
sign the Deed of Sale.
Moreover, respondent admitted during the mandatory conference that complainant did not give him any instruction to sell
the property, thus:
Comm. De La Rama: Prior to the execution of the compromise agreement on January 31, 2005, were you
under instruction by Ms. Cerilla to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama: No, Your Honor.
Comm. De La Rama: You were not?
Atty. Lezama There was none.
31
Comm. De La Rama: So what prompted you to [have] that idea that Ms. Cerilla is willing to sell this
property in the amount of Php350,000.00?
Atty. Lezama : Because that is the same amount that she paid [for] the property. It is an amicable
settlement in meeting halfway.
Comm. De La Rama: But you at that time, prior to the signing of the Compromise Agreement, you do not
have any instruction from Ms. Cerilla to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama No, Your Honor.
Comm. De La Rama : So it was your own volition?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, my own belief.15
The Investigating Commissioner stated that respondent must have overlooked the fact that the subject property was co-
owned by complainant's siblings. Respondent knew about the co-ownership because of the existence of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate,16 but he did not assert that his authority to compromise binds only the complainant. Respondent
merely made a flimsy excuse as shown in the transcript of stenographic notes, to wit:
Comm. De La Rama: Are you aware, Atty. Lezama, that the property does not belong exclusively to Ms.
Cerilla?
Atty. Lezama I was of the impression that it was owned by complainant that's why the ejectment
complaint filed speaks only of Luzviminda Cerilla but that was her claim because she said she paid for it.17
The Investigating Commissioner stated that the transcript of stenographic notes shows that respondent admitted that
complainant did not grant him the authority to sell the property in the amount of ₱350,000.00. Thus, knowing that he did
not possess such authority, respondent cannot validly claim that his client, complainant herein, was willing to sell the
property in the amount of ₱350,000.00.
In order to save himself, respondent allegedly filed a Manifestation, but he failed to submit a copy of the same before the
Commission.
Further, the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary conference of the unlawful detainer case shows
that it was the respondent who stated that the plaintiff (complainant herein) was willing to sell the property, and it was also
the respondent who fixed the selling price of the property at ₱350,000.00, thus:
Court : The plaintiff is willing to sell the property?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, if the defendant is willing to pay the amount of sale.
Court : How much?
Atty. Lezama : ₱l00,000.00, although the record is more than that, your Honor.
Court : They will also want to buy the property. You will sell it for ₱l00,000.00?
Atty. Lezama : I don't think, your Honor. Maybe it's ₱300,000.00.
Court : ₱300,000.00. How much?
Atty. Lezama : ₱350,000.00.
x x x.18
The MTC Judge also inquired about respondent's authority, and respondent replied, thus:
Court Are you authorize[d] to make some suggestions to other matter, dismissal or other settlement? Do
you have an authority?
Atty. Lezama : Yes, your Honor, but I have some limitations. I think, your Honor, we need one more
setting because I cannot agree on the proposal of the amount of the property your Honor.19
The Investigating Commissioner stated that based on the foregoing, respondent acted beyond the scope of his authority.
Respondent knew beforehand that no instruction was given by his client to sell the property, yet he bound his client to sell
the property without her knowledge. Thus, he betrayed the trust of his client, complainant herein.
32
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 1520 and 1721 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
The Ruling of the IBP Board of Governors
On August 8, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-386, 22 which adopted and approved the
Report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Finding that the recommendation was fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and for violation of Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Board suspended respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XXII-2016-
17923 dated February 25, 2016.
In a letter24 dated August 18, 2016, Director for Bar Discipline Ramon S. Esguerra notified the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the transmittal of the documents of the case to the Court for final action, pursuant to Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the finding and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondent entered into the Compromise Agreement25 on the basis of the SP A granted to him by complainant. The SPA
authorized respondent to represent complainant in filing the ejectment case and "[t]o appear on [complainant's] behalf
during the preliminary conference in said ejectment case and to make stipulations of fact, admissions and other matters
for the early resolution of the case, including amicable settlement of the case if necessary." Nowhere is it expressly stated
in the SPA that respondent is authorized to compromise on the sale of the property or to sell the property of complainant.
The records show that respondent admitted that he entered into the compromise agreement with the defendant in the
unlawful detainer case and stated that the plaintiff, who is the complainant herein, was willing to sell the property to the
defendant in the amount of ₱350,000.00 even if the complainant did not instruct or authorize him to sell the property, and
he merely acted upon his own belief.26 As the SPA granted to him by the complainant did not contain the power to sell the
property, respondent clearly acted beyond the scope of his authority in entering into the compromise agreement wherein
the property was sold to the defendant Carmelita S. Garlito.
Respondent, in his Answer and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. XXI-2014-386, stated that his action was
based on an honest belief that he was serving both the interest of his client and the policy of the law to settle cases
amicably. However, his justification does not persuade, because his alleged honest belief prejudiced his client, since the
property she was not willing to sell was sold at a price decided upon by respondent on his own, which caused his client
and her co-owners to file further cases to recover their property that was sold due to respondent's mistake. He overlooked
the fact that he was not authorized by his client to sell the property.
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 5 - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of
law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their Canon 5 duty have been reiterated in Hernandez v. Atty.
Padilla,27thus:
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may
not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they
may become susceptible to committing mistakes.28
As found by the IBP Board of Governors, respondent also violated Canons 15 and 17 of the Code of Responsibility:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his client.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
The Court sustains the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be penalized with suspension
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
33
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama is found guilty of violating Canons 5, 15 and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal file of
respondent. Likewise, copies shall be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141], August 23, 2017
LITO V. BUENVIAJE, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is an Administrative Complaint dated December 28, 2007 filed by Lito Buenviaje1 (Buenviaje)
against respondent Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo (Atty. Magdamo), docketed as A.C. No. 11616 for violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In the instant Complaint dated December 28, 2007, Buenviaje alleged that he was married to the late Fe
Gonzalo-Buenviaje as evidenced by NSO issued Marriage Contract Register No. 87-13503-A. 2 Fe died on
September 17, 2007.
Meanwhile, Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo, who filed a
criminal case for bigamy against Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was married to a certain Amalia
Ventura in 1978, thus, making him guilty of bigamy.
In an attempt to protect the rights and interests of his clients in securing the monies of their sibling,
deceased Fe Gonzalo, Atty. Magdamo sent a Notice of Death of Depositor3 dated October 11, 2007 to the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)-Dagupan Branch where Buenviaje and Fe appeared to have a joint
account. The pertinent portion of said Notice reads as follows:
"x x x x
FE SOLIS GONZALO was formerly an Overseas Filipina Worker (OFW) Nurse in Switzerland whose
lifetime savings is now in an account in BPI-Dagupan. She came back to the Philippines to
spend the last days of her life with her family in San Fabian, Pangasinan.
Unfortunately, while she was terminally ill and while residing in Manila so as to be near
Saint Luke's Hospital, a clever swindler by the name of LITO BUENVIAJE made it appear on
spurious documents that he is the husband of Fe Gonzalo when in truth and in fact LITO
BUENVIAJE is married to AMALIA VALERA.
x x x x
Moreover, ever since 24 August 2007, LITO V. BUENVIAJE has been a fugitive from justice as
he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the Philippines versus Lito
Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in the City of Manila.
x x x x
Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life. x x x" (Emphasis ours)
Aggrieved, Buenviaje filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Magdamo for violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 , Rule 7.03 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Buenviaje averred
that in Atty. Magdamo's Notice of Death of Depositor dated October 11, 2007 sent to the BPI-Dagupan
Branch, he untruthfully and maliciously quoted the following statements: (1) "a clever swindler by the
name of Lito Buenviaje made it appear on spurious document that he is the husband of Fe Gonzalo when
in truth and in fact Lito Buenviaje is married to Amalia Valero", (2) "since August 24, 2007, Lito V.
Buenviaje has been a fugitive from justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People of the
Philippines versus Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-103365 pending in the City of Manila", and
(3) "Fe never had a husband or child in her entire life" to his prejudice.
Buenviaje alleged that he discovered the Notice's existence sometime in December 2007 when he inquired
34
about the remaining balance of his joint account with Fe. He lamented that he was shocked upon reading
the letter and felt humiliated at the words written against him as the bank manager and the other bank
personnel might have really thought that he was a swindler and a fugitive from justice.4
Buenviaje denied Atty. Magdamo's allegation that Fe was never married as they were in fact married in a
public civil rites in the presence of many relatives of Fe. As to his alleged marriage with a certain Amalia
Valera, Buenviaje admitted that he had extramarital relationship with her and that they had two (2) sons.
When they separated and he subsequently worked overseas, it did not stop him from fulfilling his
responsibilities as a father to his sons. He was then advised to remit money to Amalia but he was told that
he needed a marriage contract to be able to do so, thus, he asked someone to make a marriage contract
for remittance purposes and that he was told that there would be no record of it. Buenviaje claimed that
at that time, he really believed that no valid marriage took place between him and Amalia and that he was
single up to the time he married Fe.
Buenviaje lamented that Atty. Magdamo employed dirty and dishonest means and tactics to ensure that
BPI will prevent him from withdrawing money from the joint account that he has with his late wife. He
averred that in referring to him as a "swindler", Atty. Magdamo succeeded in intimidating BPI-Dagupan
into extrajudicially "freezing" the joint account and in not transacting with him.
Buenviaje also pointed out that Atty. Magdamo, in referring to him as a fugitive from justice, in effect,
made BPI-Dagupan believe that a criminal complaint was already pending against him when in truth and
in fact, the August 24, 2007 complaint for bigamy filed by Lydia and Florenia was still pending before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila at the time that they wrote and served the Notice to BPI-Dagupan.
Buenviaje further added that Atty. Magdamo even made threats to him as evidenced by his text messages
to him, to wit: "Sometime in the morning of 1 October 2007, I sent text messages to Lito's last known
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) number (+639062097612) requesting him to stop his merciless plunder
and to voluntarily surrender to the rule of law."
Finally, Buenviaje questioned Atty. Magdamo's fitness to continue in the practice of law as he has
displayed lack of ability to distinguish a fugitive from justice and a respondent in a criminal investigation;
employed of dirty and unprofessional tactics of calling him a "swindler"; and by referring to his marriage
contract with his wife as "spurious document". He, thus, prayed that considering Atty. Magdamo's
actuations, he should be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
On January 9, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed Atty. Magdamo to submit
his answer on the complaint against him.5
In its Report and Recommendation 6 dated October 23, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty.
Magdamo be reprimanded for his unethical actuations.
However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-717 dated October 10,
2014, resolved to adopt and approve with modification the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD,
and instead suspend Atty. Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3) months.7
Aggrieved, Atty. Magdamo moved for reconsideration. However, in Resolution No. XXII-2016-326 8 dated
May 28, 2016, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to deny Atty. Magdamo's motion for reconsideration
and affirm the latter's suspension.
We concur with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against the opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In the instant case, Atty. Magdamo's actuations do not measure up to this Canon. The records show that
he referred to Buenviaje as a "swindler". He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence
that Buenviaje is committing swindling activities. Even if he was suspicious of Buenviaje, he should have
refrained from making such malicious reference or name-calling for he should know as a lawyer that the
mere filing of a complaint against a person does not guarantee a finding of guilt, and that an accused is
35
presumed innocent until proven guilty. Here, other than the criminal complaint for bigamy which Fe's
siblings filed before the prosecutor's office, there were no other cases decided against Buenviaje.
Atty. Magdamo's malicious imputation against Buenviaje is further aggravated by the fact that said
imputation was made in a forum which is not a party to the legal dispute between Fe's siblings and
Buenviaje. He could have just informed BPI-Dagupan of the death of its client and that there is a pending
litigation regarding their client's estate, and he did not have to resort to name-calling and make
unnecessary commentaries in order to support his cause. Undoubtedly, his malicious imputation against
Buenviaje is unfair as the latter was unnecessarily exposed to humiliation and shame even as there was
no actual case yet to be filed in the courts.
Moreover, Atty. Magdamo is likewise out of line when he made inference to the marriage documents of
Buenviaje and Fe as "spurious" as well as his conclusion that "Fe never had a husband or child in her
entire life". He should know better that without the courts' pronouncement to this effect, he is in no
position to draw conclusions and pass judgment as to the existence, and validity or nullity of the marriage
of Buenviaje and Fe. That is not his job to do. While his statements in the Notice given to BPI-Dagupan
might be prompted by a good cause, it were nevertheless careless, premature and without basis. At the
very least, Atty. Magdamo's actuations are blatant violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment,
or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. (Emphasis ours)
Equally incredulous is Atty. Magdamo's statement in the Notice that "Lito V. Buenviaje has been a fugitive
from justice as he has been hiding from the criminal charge in People vs. Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case
number 7H-103365, pending in the City of Manila". Upon review, it appears that case number 7H-103365
is the same bigamy case which Fe's siblings filed against Buenviaje before the Prosecutor's Office of
Manila. At the time Atty. Magdamo made the subjects statement in the Notice to BPI-Dagupan, he knew
that there was no final resolution yet from the prosecutor's office, no case has yet to be filed in the courts,
there was no warrant of arrest against Buenviaje, and more importantly, there was no evidence that
Buenviaje had any intent to flee prosecution as he even filed the instant case and participated in the
proceedings hereto. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge.9 As to why Atty.
Magdamo made such malicious statements is beyond this Court's comprehension.
We had an occasion to say that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements by an attorney in his pleadings or motions is a violation of the lawyer's oath and a
transgression of the canons of professional ethics.10 The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use
dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. 11 Though a
lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Magdamo ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only
bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.12
In this case, Atty. Magdamo's statements against Buenviaje were not only improper but it also
undoubtedly tended to mislead BPI-Dagupan into thinking that the latter is a swindler and a fugitive as it
was made without hesitation notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary support. The Court cannot
condone this irresponsible and unprofessional behavior.
As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 &
145822:13
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their
cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct
or even wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members
of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause
with which they are charged. (emphasis ours)
Finally, it must be emphasized anew that, in support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. However, a client's cause does not
permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.14 The lawyer's duty to its clients must
never be at the expense of truth and justice. As explained in Choa v. Chiongson:15
36
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law.
He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his client's
case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel
or maintain such actions or proceedings only as it appears to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind
himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same;
and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to
state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense.
A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant
a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
Based on the foregoing, We cannot countenance Atty. Magdamo's use of offensive and disrespectful
language in his Notice addressed to BPI-Dagupan. He clearly violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for his actions erode the public's perception of the legal profession. We, thus,
sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the October 10, 2014 and May 28, 2016 Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 08-2141 and ORDERS the
suspension of Atty. Melchor G. Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon his
receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Magdamo's personal record as an attorney with the Office of
the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10758

ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, ET AL, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent
x-----------------------x
GLENDA ALVARO, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Respondent
x-----------------------x
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES AND ATTY. AVE.LINO ANDRES, Respondent
x-----------------------x
ATTY. BAYANI P. DALANGIN, Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. ROSITA L. DELA FUENTE TORRES, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, JR, J.:
These are four administrative complaints that were separately filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by and against substantially the same parties, particularly:
(l) CBD Case No. 11-3215 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed by Atty.
Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres (Atty. Torres). et al., against Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin (Atty. Dalangin)
and docketed before the Court as A.C. No. l 0758:
(2) CBD Case No. 12-3292 for gross misconduct filed by Glenda Alvaro (Alvaro) against Atty.
Dalangin and docketed before the Court as A.C. No. 10759;
(3) CBD Case No. 12-3369 for gross misconduct, violation of the lawyer’s oath and violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres
and Atty. Avelino Andres (Atty. Andres), docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10760 ; and
(4) CBD Case No. 12-3458 for grave misconduct, dishonesty and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR
filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10761.
The Antecedents
A.C. No. 10758
CBD Case No. 11-3215 is a complaint for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed against Atty.
1
Dalangin by the following complainants: (1) Atty. Torres; (2) Felicidad O. Samatra (Samatra); (3) Alvaro; (4) Mary
DF. Noveras (Noveras); and (5) Generosa S. Camacho (Camacho). 2
37
The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches of his duties as a lawyer. First, it was alleged that Atty.
Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer groundless suits, which were merely prompted
by his loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence as counsel. By his acts, Atty. Dalangin committed
gross misconduct, and breached Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Rules 1.02 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Canon 11 of the CPR. 3
It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-3215, a complaint for disbannent was filed against Atty.
Torres by Apolonia Marzan (Marzan) and 1V1elody Valdez (Valdez), who were clients of Atty. Dalangin and the
losing parties in an unlawful detainer case decided by Presiding Judge Efren B. Mallare (Judge Mallare) of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Marzan and Valdez later disclosed to Atty. Torres that
the filing of the disbarment case was orchestrated by Atty. Dalangin, who prepared the affidavit and instructed them
to sign it even without explaining the contents and tenor of the document.
When Marzan and Valdez eventually realized that their affidavit was used to file a disbarment complaint with the IBP
against Atty. Torres, they decided to terminate the services of Atty. Dalangin. By their new counsel's advice, Marzan
and Valdez stopped attending the disbarment hearings, and the case was eventually dismissed by the IBP. Atty.
Dalangin also caused Marzan and Valdez's filing of administrative cases against Judge Mallare and Noveras, as the
Clerk of Court of the MTC, which complaints were nonetheless likewise dismissed by the Supreme Court upon the
IBP’s recommendation. 4
Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual (Pascual), a
clerk at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin previously worked as
district public attorney. After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he retained Pascual as his private secretary, who still
remained to be employed with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a daughter whom they named Julienne, even
when each of them had existing marriages with some other persons. The affair between Atty. Dalangin and
5
Pascual, and the paternity of Julienne, were known to the community, especially the courts. Julienne was 6
nonetheless entered in the civil registry as Pascual and her legal husband's own child so as to conceal the fact that
Atty. Dalangin was the real father. The foregoing acts allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03,
7
Canon 7 of the CPR.

Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts that dated back to his prior employment with PAO. He
allegedly collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants who sought his assistance, like complainant Camacho from
whom he demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When Camacho explained that he could only produce
₱3,000.00, Atty. Dalangin threw the case records on a table and retorted, "Mabubuhay ba naman ang abogado
[ditto]." Without prior authority from his superiors, Atty. Dalangin also willfully appeared in areas outside his
8
jurisdiction as a district public attorney. 9
Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases. It was claimed
that Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court, which act constituted a breach of Rule
10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR. In a case for robbery filed by Samatra against Pascual, Atty. Dalangin also wielded
10
his influence and prepared perjured statements from supposed witnesses, a clear violation of Rule 10.02, Canon 10
of the CPR. Finally, Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR when he submitted in a civil case
11
fraudulent and misleading evidence, particularly a certificate of title without the page reflecting the annotations
pertinent to the case.12
Atty. Dalangin filed his Answer and refuted all charges. He denied having a hand in the preparation of the
13
disbarment complaint against Atty. Torres, as he argued that neither his name nor his signature appeared in the
records thereof. His relationship with Pascual, on the other hand, was only maliciously misinterpreted. He was only
a close friend of the Pascuals, and some of Pascual’s children, including Julienne, were his godchildren. 14
Atty. Dalangin likewise denied the claim that he collected attorney's fees while he worked as a PAO lawyer.
Although he admitted appearing as a public attorney in an area that was beyond his jurisdiction, the appearance 1
was with the Regional Public Attorney's verbal authority, claimed by Atty. Dalangin to be sufficient under office
practice. Finally, the alleged mistakes that he committed as counsel in specific cases' presentation of evidence had
15
been rectified in court. 16
A.C. No. 10759

CBD Case No. 12-3292, a complaint for gross misconduct, was filed by Alvaro against Atty. Dalangin for an
17
incident that happened on the morning of November 14, 2011, while Alvaro was waiting for the start of a hearing at
the lobby of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Upon seeing Alvaro, Atty.
Dalangin allegedly hurled slanderous and defamatory remarks against her, as he spoke at the top of his voice and
referred to her as a "certified swindler." He also confronted and threatened Alvaro for her participation in the filing of
CBD Case No. 11-3215, and then precluded her from visiting the PAO in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Atty. Dalangin’s
tirade was heard and witnessed by several persons, and some of them executed their respective affidavits to 18
narrate the incident. The foregoing impelled Alvaro to seek Atty. Dalangin’s disbarment for a violation of Rules 1.01
and 1.02, Canon 1, Rule 7.03, Canon 7, and Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the CPR.
While Atty. Dalangin admitted in his Answer the alleged confrontation, he denied shouting invectives at Alvaro.
19
When he talked to Alvaro, he merely confronted her for what he claimed were lies declared in her affidavit in CBD
Case No. 11-3215. Atty. Dalangin also warned to seek legal remedies should Alvaro fail to substantiate the truth of
her testimonies.
Atty. Dalangin also admitted that he precluded Alvaro from visiting PAO, but explained that this was prompted by his
knowledge that Alvaro was a fixer, who used the name of the office and demanded money from indigent clients. For
Atty. Dalangin, Alvaro filed this complaint to get back at Atty. Dalangin for banning her at the PAO and depriving her
of earning from her illegal activities. 20
A.C. No. 10760

The two other complaints, CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, were instituted by Atty. Dalangin.
In CBD Case No. 12-3369, Atty. Dalangin sought the disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for gross
21
misconduct, violation of the lawyer's oath, and breach of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR. He claimed that
38
both lawyers conspired with their clients in filing CBD Case No. 11-3215, even as they violated Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Submitted to support CBD Case No. 11-3215 was Nonilo Alejo’s (Alejo) affidavit, which contained a transcript of a
recorded telephone conversation between Alejo and one Wilma Pineda (Pineda). The recording was without the
22
prior knowledge and consent of Pineda. 23
As a backgrounder, Atty. Dalangin was accused in CBD Case No. 11- 3215 of fabricating testimonies against
Noveras, who was claimed to be a vital witness in a criminal case against Pascual. In an affidavit drafted by Atty.
Dalangin for Pineda, the latter complained of Noveras and Alejo’s failure to return in full the cash bond that she
posted in a case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, even after the case had been dismissed by the trial
court. This allegation was negated in the disputed transcript, as Pineda allegedly confirmed receiving the full
₱8,000.00, but decided to give half thereof to Alejo for a "blow-out" after her case’s dismissal. 24
Both Atty. Andres and Atty. Torres disputed the complaint. Atty. Andres asserted that CBD Case No. 12-3369 was
filed only to harass and intimidate him, being the counsel of the complainants in CBD Case No. 11- 3215. By way
25
of defense, he adopted a counter-affidavit which he submitted in a separate complaint for violation of R.A. No. 4200
26
that was filed by Atty. Dalangin with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City. Atty. Andres therein argued that on the basis
of Atty. Dalangin’s allegations, the case should have been filed by Pineda against Alejo, being the purported victim
and the one who recorded the conversation, respectively.
Atty. Torres, on the other hand, pointed out that Atty. Dalangin’s reference to R.A. No. 4200 was tantamount to an
admission that the conversation actually transpired. This only confirmed a fault committed by Atty. Dalangin for the
fabrications in Pineda's earlier affidavit, which was executed purposely to destroy the credibility of Noveras. The
submission of the transcript was necessary because Atty. Dalangin’s malpractice was one of the main causes of
action in CBD Case No. 11-3215. Moreover, the record of the conversation between Alejo and Pineda could not be
27
considered a violation of R.A. No. 4200 because no wire or cable was used to tap their cellular phones. Neither
party in the conversation also complained of a supposed wiretapping. 28
A.C. No. 10761

The complaint docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3458 was filed solely against Atty. Torres for grave misconduct,
29
dishonesty for violation of Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and breach of Canon 1 of the CPR.
30
Atty. Dalangin faulted Atty. Torres for submitting in CBD Case No. 11-3215 Marzan and Valdez’s affidavit, which 31
allegedly contained untruthful statements. Marzan and Valdez knew from the beginning that they were complainants
in a disbarment case against Atty. Torres. Atty. Torres, however, later made them issue the perjured statements by
using as a leverage her own complaint for perjury against Marzan and Valdez, who were then pressured to sign the
32
affidavits in exchange for the perjury case’s dismissal. 33
In her Answer to the complaint, Atty. Torres insisted on the truth of the statements made by Marzan and Valdez in
34
their affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
The four administrative complaints were eventually consolidated and jointly resolved by the IBP.
After the parties ’ filing of their respective position papers and the conduct of a series of hearings, Investigating
Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Investigating Commissioner) issued a Consolidated Report and
Recommendation dated February 11, 2013, which found sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from the
35
practice of law for three years. Atty. Dalangin’s charges against Atty. Dela Torres and Atty. Andres, on the other
hand, were recommended for dismissal.
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation ended as follows:
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing, finding that Respondent Bayani P. Dalangin violated the
provisions of the [CPR] and his Lawyer's Oath specifically on Gross Immorality, and Gross
Misconduct in CBD Case No. 11-3215 and CBD Case No. 12-3292, it is recommended that said
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the period of three (3) years from receipt of
the order with a warning that similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
It is further recommended that the charges against Respondent Rosita L. dela Fuente Torres and Respondent
Avelino Andres in CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, for lack of merit be ordered dismissed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 36
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-768, which adopted and approved
37
the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation. The resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supprted by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent Dalangin
is guilty of gross immorality and gross misconduct, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is
hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for three (3) years with Warning that repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The case against Atty. Rosita L. dela
[Fuente] Torres and Atty. Manuel Andres is hereby DISMISSED. 38
Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a
Resolution dated August 8, 2014, which reads:
39
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent/Complainant Dalangin’s Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the Resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No.
XX-2013-768 dated June 1, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED. 40
On February 26, 2015, Atty. Dominic C. M. Solis, Director for Bar Discipline, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
transmitted the case records to the Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 41
39
On even date and before the Court could have rendered its final action on the disbarment complaints against Atty.
Dalangin vis-a-vis the records forwarded by the IBP, Atty. Dalangin forthwith filed with the Court a Petition for
Review, which questioned the IBP resolutions that, first, declared him administratively liable in CBD Case Nos. 11-
42
3215 and 12- 3292, and second, dismissed his complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres in CBD Case Nos.
12-3369 and 12-3458.
In a Resolution dated June 16, 2015, the Court consolidated these cases and, without giving due course to the
43
petition for review, required the filing of Comments on the petition. Accordingly, a Consolidated Comment on the
Petition dated August 5, 2015 was filed by Andres & Associates Law Office, as counsel for Atty. Torres, et al.,
44
being the complainants in CBD Case Nos. 11-3215 and 12-3292, and respondents in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and
12-3458. Thereafter, Atty. Dalangin filed his Reply to the consolidated comment.
45
The Court’s Ruling

Procedure from Resolutions
of the IBP Board of Governors
The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of Atty. Dalangin’s immediate recourse to the Court via a
petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors' resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action
on the complaints.
When the administrative complaints were resolved by the IBP and the instant petition for review was filed in Court,
the procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases was as provided in the former
Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, prior to the amendments introduced by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. The old rule read:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of' Governors.
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons
on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the
next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case,
shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is
less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a
decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed
terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the
Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Co mi
orders otherwise.
d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel.
A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied)
In B.M. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the Court
applied this provision to address the issue therein involved, and explained its proper application in a Resolution
dated June 17, 2008. The Court set the following guidelines:
In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors (BOG)] that exonerates the respondent
or imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a
motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said
party can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is
filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished
this Court.
If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a
motion for reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from
notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate the assailed
resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses
without any motion for reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this
Court the resolution with the entire case records for appropriate action. (Emphases supplied)
Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify his immediate filing of the petition for review questioning
the IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension. It could nonetheless be inferred from the circumstances that
Atty. Dalangin's chosen course of action was to preclude the forfeiture of his right to question the dismissal of the
administrative cases where he served as complainant, given that Section 12(c) provides that where the respondent
is exonerated, (t)he case shall be deemed terminated unless upon a petition of the complainant or other interested
party filed with Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court
orders otherwise. For this reason, the Court refused to make an outright denial of Atty. Dalangin’s petition for review
notwithstanding the fact that it questioned the resolve to suspend him from the practice of law. Considering that the
petition likewise covered the IBP's dismissal of the disbarment cases against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, the
Court, in a Resolution dated June 16, 2015, directed the filing of comments on the petition.
In any case, it must still be stressed that the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s
suspension from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering that the Court still had to
release its final action on the matter. It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated
46
duty to discipline lawyers. The factual findings of the IBP can only be recommendatory. Its recommended penalties
47
40
are also, by their nature, recommendatory. In light of these precepts, the Court will then not refuse a review of the
48
IBP's recommendation for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition. In fact, an
examination of the IBP resolutions for his suspension is warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence of a
petition, because it is the Court that has the duty to take a final action on any determination of the IBP for a lawyer's
suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court had in fact been later amended by B.M. No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. Section
12 thereof now reads:
Sec. 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to
the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the
respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be
issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.
c) The Board’s resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted,
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the
resolution.
d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.
In Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis, the Court emphasized that the amendments reiterated the principle that only the
49
Court has the power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. Factual findings and recommendations of
the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the IBP are recommendatory, subject to review by
the Court.50
As the Court now reviews the IBP’s resolve to dismiss the complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, it then
also enters its final action on the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the
practice of law for three years, as the IBP cited gross misconduct, violations of the CPR and breach of the lawyer's
oath as grounds.
A.C. No. 10758
<p" style="color: rgb(0, 0, 128); font-family: arial, verdana; font-size: 14px; font-
style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight:
400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-
transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-
width: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-thickness: initial;
text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color: initial;">Gross Immorality
Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for
three years was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even
when their marriages with their respective spouses subsisted.
Allegedly, the affair further resulted in the birth of the child Julienne, who was believed to be Atty. Dalangin’s
daughter even when he turned down a challenge for a DNA test that could prove the child's true filiation. 51
In his report, the Investigative Commissioner specifically referred to the following evidence to support his finding of
an immoral relationship between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual:
2. That Complainant Alvaro who executed an affidavit regarding the illicit and immoral relation of
[Atty. Dalangin] with [Pascual] for the reason that she was formerly [close] to [Pascual] and the latter
confided to her that she (Pascual) [did] not love her husband anymore and the child called [Atty.
Dalangin] "Papa attorney" (Affidavit of Alvaro as Exh. "F").
3. That Ligaya Agrave[,] a neighbor of [Pascual,] likewise executed an affidavit that the child
["Julienne"] is the daughter of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual], that she used to see [Atty. Dalangin]
taking care of [Julienne] when she was still a baby and when she grew up already, [Atty. Dalangin]
used to accompany the child in their school tour and also her graduation. That the child as she grew
older is a look[-]alike of [Atty. Dalangin]. (Affidavit of Ligaya Agrave marked as Exh. "G").
4. That the illicit affair of [Atty. Dalangin] with his former Clerk in the PAO, Talavera, Nueva Ecija was
well known in Talavera, in the entire judiciary in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and even in the community of
Sto. Domingo, Nueva [E]cija[.] [(L]etter to the Ombudsman dated Aug. 18, 2011 of Felicidad
Sumatra is marked as Exh. "H").
5. That [Atty. Dalangin] refused when challenged for a DNA test.
6. Complainants submitted xxx pictures of [Atty. Dalangin and Pascual] together with their daughter
[Julienne] taken in far away Puerto Prinsesa marked as Exh. I and I-1.
7. That [Atty. Dalangin] continued to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal
wife shows his lack of good moral character. 52
Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the
family, and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State." When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and
53
morality, the usual recourse is for the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds no sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair
with Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not adequately proved.
The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence. The Court explained in Saladaga v. Astorga: 54
41
Section 5, in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative
cases, such as the ones at bar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.55
In Reyes v. Nieva, the Court reiterated this rule on the quantum of proof in administrative proceedings, as it held:
56
Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, which was
promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, i.e., that 'amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. x x x.
Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further
confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.
The rule is taken in light of other settled principles that apply for a proper disposition of administrative cases.
In Advincula v. Macabata, the Court emphasized:
57
The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the
respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to
compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. Thus, the adage that he who asserts not
he who denies, must prove. xxx. 58
Further, the Court emphasized in Cabas v. Sususco the oft-repeated rule that "mere allegation is not evidence and
59
is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence." 60
With careful consideration of the foregoing tenets, the Court's perusal of the records reveals an insufficiency of
evidence that could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of law.
To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality
harped only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship
between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual. The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant
and unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's
birth certificate, a public document, expressly indicated the girl’s father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty.
Dalangin. Julienne’s baptismal certificate also provided such fact, along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s
61 62
defense on his closeness to Julienne for being her godfather.

It would be unfair to Atty. Dalangin, more so for the child whose filiation is in a way needlessly dragged into this
case, for the Court to affirm the assertions in the complaint and the IBP's findings and conclusions on the basis of
the available evidence. The alleged similarities in the physical appearances of Atty. Dalangin and Julienne were but
lame and dismal validations of the complainants’ vehement claim of paternity. Even the photographs of Atty. 63
Dalangin, Pascual and Julienne in what appeared to be a trip to Pue1io Princesa, Palawan were insufficient to
support a conclusion on the unlawful relations. The lone photo where Atty. Dalangin appeared with Pascual and
Julienne, who were apparently merely waiting for boarding in an airport terminal, utterly failed to manifest any
romantic or filial bond among them. It was also explained through an affidavit executed by spouses Dante
64
Capindian and Timotea Jamito that Atty. Dalangin was a principal sponsor, while Pascual’s family were guests, in
their wedding which was held on August 6, 2011 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Apparently, the photos were taken
during the said trip. Pascual’s husband, Edgardo, was also present for the occasion.
The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault. While he vehemently denied any
romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the latter's family, including her
children. It was such display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful
relationship and belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent
and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public, particularly because he and Pascual
were both married. "As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community." As keepers of public faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and,
65
hence, must handle their personal affairs with great caution." 66
The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should
suffice under the circumstances. The following pronouncement in Advincula v. Macabata is pertinent:
67
While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper
against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard
the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties
to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
x x x Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension,
while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a
lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's
unfitness to continue in the practice of law. x x x
68
Gross Misconduct and

Malpractice
Atty. Dalangin was also charged, and recommended for suspension from the practice of law, for several other acts
involving use of misleading evidence in court and preparation of affidavits with pe1jured statements to support
cases and complaints for disbarment. When he still served as a public attorney, he likewise allegedly demanded
acceptance fees from indigent clients, and appeared in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction. Even these charges,
however, were not supported by evidence that could warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension. And while there were
several other charges included in the complaint against Atty. Dalangin, the accusations were actually for actions that
should be attributed not to him, but to other individuals like Pascual.
42
Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the affidavit
that supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the Court takes note of the fact that the alleged failure to
explain did not necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein made. It refers to the joint affidavit executed by
Marzan and Valdez, and which was attached to the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215, whereby affiants merely
alleged that they signed the affidavit even when they were not fully apprised of its contents. It was not alleged that
69
they were fraudulently lured or tricked by Atty. Dalangin into signing the complaint, and that the charges therein
hurled against Atty. Torres were absolutely false. Thus, the claim that Atty. Dalangin knowingly brought a
groundless suit against a fellow lawyer had no leg to stand on.
The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed demand for attorney's fees while he still worked as a PAO
lawyer also remained unsubstantiated by evidence. Such serious imputation could not have been adequately
1âwphi1
established by an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a lone person, Camacho, from whom the demand for
₱8,000.00 was allegedly made in 2001. Similarly, while Atty. Dalangin admitted to have appeared in courts beyond
70
his area of jurisdiction as public attorney, he claimed to have obtained permission therefor from the Regional Public
Attorney, a defense which the complainants failed to refute. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption
that the respondent regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath shall prevail, especially as the Court
71
considers it highly improbable for the courts where appearances were made to fail to notice such patent irregularity,
if Atty. Dalangin was indeed not authorized to perform his acts before their courts as a public attorney.
Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336-SD(04)AF pending
with the RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National Bank, it has been
explained that the error had been corrected at once during the pre-trial conference. 72
Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his
misquote of jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC, Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No. 1564-05
entitled Bangko Luzon v. Diaz. It was narrated in the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215 that:
14. x x x [T]he cited jurisprudence is hereto quoted:
"If a court of competent jurisdiction annulled the foreclosure sale of the property in question, the
issuance of a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial."
15. In the said case of BPI vs. Tampipi, there is nothing mentioned about the cessation of the
ministerial function of the court but instead what is clearly stated in the decision are the following:
"Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction,
the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court."
73
Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling. As counsel and officer of the court,
74
however, with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was
remiss in the discharge of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10.02 thereof provides:
"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the
argument of the opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has
not been proved."
The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court
detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited
jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate.
A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty.
Dalangin’s own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the statement was
intended to mislead the court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine
that was embodied in the jurisprudence's original text.
A.C. No. 10759
In relation to A.C. No. 10759 on Atty. Dalangin’s altercation on November 14, 2011 with Alvaro as the latter was
waiting for the start of a court hearing in the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the records include affidavits
executed by witnesses who did not appear to have any reason to falsely testify against Atty. Dalangin on the
incident.
Affiant Josephine Rivera, in particular, who claimed to be also then waiting for a scheduled hearing, allegedly saw
Atty. Dalangin shout and point at Alvaro, as he threatened to file a case against the latter. Two security guards
75
stationed at the trial court, evidently disinterested persons who would not have wrongly testified against Atty.
Dalangin, likewise confirmed that such heated confrontation actually transpired. Pertinent portions of the guards’
affidavit read:
76
1. Na noong ika-14 ng Nobyembre, 2011, ganap na ika-8:45 ng umaga humigit kumulang, ha bang
nakaupo si [Alvaro] sa "bench", upuang mahaba malapit sa aming kinauupuan dito sa pintuan ng
Hall of Justice, Regional Trial Court, Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija at kausap niya ang isa
niyang kasama, dumating si Atty. Bayani Dalangin at pagkakita kay [Alvaro] ay pinagsisigawan ito at
maraming sinabi laban kay [Alvaro];
2. Na maraming nakarinig, nakakita at nagulat sa pangyayaring ito;
xxxx 77
For the Court, Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of the complaint, especially since his outburst was carried
out within the court premises and in the presence of several persons who readily witnessed his fit of anger. Part of
Atty. Dalangin’s duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that is due the profession. Members of the legal
profession should commit to the mandates of Canon 7, particularly Rule 7 .03 thereof, to wit:
CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD TI-IE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION XX X.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
43
Although Atty. Dalangin, at that instant, could have been stirred by his frustration or resentment for the disbarment
case filed against him by Alvaro, such circumstance could not have absolved him from any responsibility for his
conduct. At most, this only serves to mitigate the penalty that the Court deems appropriate to impose, as it likewise
considers its finding that Alvaro’s allegations in CBD Case No. 11-3215 on the supposed extra-marital affair of Atty.
Dalangin with Pascual were indeed not backed by sufficient evidence. The Court finds it appropriate to impose upon
Atty. Dalangin a fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stem warning that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
Although the Court has admonished Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, it finds the imposition of this fine still suitable
under the circumstances, given that A.C. No. 10759, although resolved jointly with A.C. No. 10758, is a distinct
administrative case that covers a separate complaint that was instituted solely by Alvaro. The severity of this offense
likewise varies from the other breaches for which the Court has determined the admonition to be appropriate.
A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761
The Court affirms the decision of the IBP to dismiss the administrative complaints filed by Atty. Dalangin against
Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.
In A.C. No. 10760, Atty. Dalangin sought to support his complaint by referring to the supposed participation of Atty.
Torres and Atty. Andres in a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He asserted that the act also violated the lawyer's
oath, and breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR which reads:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
The alleged violation of the statute is a serious charge that the Court cannot take lightly, in view of the breach of the
basic and constitutional right to privacy of communication that inevitably results from the act. In brief, the law
prohibits any person "to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder x x x." It likewise forbids any person from possessing,
79
replaying or furnishing transcriptions of communications that are obtained in violation of the law.
In this case, Atty. Dalangin claimed that Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres conspired with Alejo on the wrongful recording
of a private communication with Pineda, along with the use of the transcript thereof to support Alejo’s affidavit in
CBD Case No. 11-3215. However, Pineda's own denial of the truth of the statements in the transcription lends doubt
as to the allegation of a purported secret recording of an actual conversation. While Pineda denied knowledge that
her telephone conversation with Alejo was recorded by the latter, she still refused to acknowledge the veracity of the
assertions that she allegedly made as contained in the transcript, which then appears to be a rejection of the
80
supposed conversation. Given the circumstances, the IBP correctly ruled that Atty. Dalangin failed to substantiate
the charges in his complaint against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.
The same conclusion equally applies in A.C. No. 10761. The commission of perjury was imputed upon Atty. Torres,
as the person who prepared the affidavits of Marzan and Valdez. As witnesses in CBD Case No. 11-3215, Marzan
and Valdez claimed that Atty. Dalangin prepared an affidavit for Atty. Torres' disbarment without fully explaining to
them the contents thereof. The fact that Atty. Torres induced the affiants to make perjured statements, however,
was not established by clear and convincing proof. Even granting that statements of affiants were eventually
determined to be inaccurate and untruthful, it would be wrong to at once ascribe error or fault upon the lawyers who
drafted the affidavits, in the absence of clear and sufficient proof that they actively participated in the intentional
commission of a fraud or declaration of fabricated statements.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:
(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in
handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely;
(2) In A.C. No. 10759, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his breach of Rule
7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will
be imposed upon him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future; and
(3) In A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin’s petition for review is DENIED. The
Court AFFIRMS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated
June 21, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2014, insofar as the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the following
complaints: (1) CBD Case No. 12-3369 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres; and (2)
CBD Case No. 12-3458 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres.
SO ORDERED.
44

A.C. No. 11754 JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant Atty. Edgardo O. Era and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas, Respondents Decision Tijam, J.

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A.C. No.

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.

Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".

Black defines "practice of law" as:

A.C. No. 5573

The Proceedings before the IBP

The Ruling of the Court

We held in Advincula v. Advincula32 that:

A.C. No. 11494

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

(a) To ATTORNEY himself;

(b) In case of ATTORNEY'S death or disability, to LORNA OBSUNA LINSANGAN;

(d) In default of all the [foregoing], to the estate of ATTORNEY.

(a) To Mrs. Lorna O. Linsangan - 2,000 square meters;

(b) To Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;

(c) To Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;

(d) To James Lorenz O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;

(e) To Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan - 250 square meters.18

The Ruling of this Court

A.C. No. 8887

ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO* , Complainant

The salient facts, as borne by the records, are the following:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from

A.C. No. 10564

MANUEL L. VALIN AND HONORIO L. VALIN, Complainants

Before the Court is an Administrative Complaint1 filed by complainants Manuel L. Valin (Manuel) and Honorio L.

Pedro died on December 7, 1992 while he was in Oahu, Honolulu, Hawaii.3

Report and Recommendation

Dissatisfied, respondent filed a petition before the Court arguing that:

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - BOARD OF GOVERNORS COMMITTED

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - BOARD OF GOVERNORS

The Court's Ruling

Respondent's disclaimer as to his

Respondent cannot finger

The Court is not convinced.

The purported written authority

That the transaction is private in

A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018

MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARISTEDES A. MARAMOT, Respondent.

In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo (Marjorie) alleges that the respondent

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned Commissioner finds

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.

In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally

A.C. No. 10547

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

The Court's Ruling

A.C. No. 8968, September 26, 2017

MA. VILMA F. MANIQUIZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANILO C. EMELO, Respondent.

The procedural and factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

The Court's Ruling

A.C. No. 11483

The Commissioner's Report

Atty. Lezama: No, Your Honor.

Comm. De La Rama: You were not?

Atty. Lezama There was none.