TC – 48

8TH JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020

[ONLINE]

25TH-27TH JUNE, 2020

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTEROS

[PETITIONS UNDER ARTICLE 139A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS, 1950]

TO BE HEARD THROUGH THE SUPREME COURT’S VIRTUAL PLATFORM

In the matter of

ORGANISATION FOR COMMON CAUSE FOR POOR (PETITIONER)

V.

UNION OF WESTEROS (RESPONDENT)

[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 123 of 2020]

Along-With

CATHERINE PEARSON (PETITIONER)

V.

UNION OF WESTEROS AND OTHERS (RESPONDENTS)

[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 234 of 2020]

Along-With

MICHAEL OLIVER (PETITIONER)

V.

UNION OF WESTEROS AND OTHERS (RESPONDENTS)

[Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 540 of 2020]

Written submissions on behalf of petitioners

Counsel for petitioners
 8TH JMI-NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
LIST OF CONTENTS

LIST OF AUTHORITIES ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------4-9

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ---------------------------------------------------------------------10

ARGUMENT ADVANCED ------------------------------------------------------------------------------11-30

1. WHETHER THE MHA ORDER DATED 27.03.2020 IS ARBITRARY, AND THE

DETENTION OF SUCH MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE PURSUANCE OF SUCH ORDER
AMOUNTS TO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS? --------------------------------11-15
1.1.THE FRS CANNOT BE WAIVED OFF DURING THE PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN. --------------------------11
1.2.THE IMPUGNED ACTION VIOLATES ART. 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS. ---------11-12
1.3.THE IMPUGNED ACTION VIOLATES THE RIGHTS CONCERNING FREEDOM UNDER ART. 19. ---12-13
1.4.THE IMPUGNED ORDER VIOLATES ART. 21 R/W DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICIES. -----
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13-15
i. There is a violation of the Right to Livelihood and Right to Shelter. -------------------13-14
ii. The Govt. has failed to implement the directives enshrined under the Constitution. –14-15
1.5. THE IMPUGNED ORDER VIOLATES ART. 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS. ------------15
2. WHETHER THE SUSPENSION OF SEVERAL LABOUR LAWS BY ALL THREE
STATES VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAWS? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15-20
2.1. THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF LABOURERS.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15-19
i. The blanket ban on labour laws violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. ----------------------16
ii. Ban on the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 is violative of Art. 21. -------------16-17
iii. The impugned Ordinance is violative of Art. 23 of the Constitution. ----------------------17
iv. Ban on Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 leads to the violation of right to freedom of speech
and expression. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------17-18
v. The ban on the Factories Act, 1945 except Section 5 is arbitrary in nature. ----------18-19
2.2. ALL THREE STATES HAVE FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE DIRECTIVES ENSHRINED UNDER PART-
IV OF THE CONSTITUTION. -----------------------------------------------------------------------19
2.3.THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS ALSO IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
WHICH HAVE BEEN RATIFIED BY UNION OF WESTEROS. -------------------------------------19-20

i. The Ordinance is in violation with ICCPR. ---------------------------------------------------20

ii. The Ordinance is in violation with ICESCR. ------------------------------------------------20

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3. WHETHER THE SHARING OF MEDICAL DATA OF COVID-19 TESTED PATIENTS
WITH DMPL VIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACY? -------------------------------------20-26
3.1. RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS A SACROSANCT RIGHT UNDER ART. 21. --------------------------------20-22
i. Right to privacy ensures dignity to human being. ---------------------------------------------21
ii. It is internationally recognized human right. -------------------------------------------------21
iii. Governmental interference is condemned. ------------------------------------------------21-22
3.2. ABSENCE OF PATIENTS’ CONSENT IN SHARING THEIR MEDICAL DATA. -----------------------22-24
i. Medical information carries high mandate of privacy. --------------------------------------22
ii. Medical data is highly sensitive. ---------------------------------------------------------------23
iii. Other Acts, regulations, guidelines and committee reports. ------------------------------23-24
3.3. DATA TRANSFER FAILS THE TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY AND LEGITIMACY. -----------------24-27
i. Govt. action is not sanctioned by law. ------------------------------------------------------24-25
ii. Govt. action does not serve a legitimate State aim. ------------------------------------------25
iii. Govt. action is not proportionate to the objective sought. -------------------------------26-27
4. WHETHER ALL THE 14 FIRS FILED AGAINST MR. OLIVER IS LIABLE TO BE
QUASHED AND HIS ARTICLE FALLS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXPRESSION OF THE PRESS? -------------------------------------------------26-30
4.1. MR. OLIVER’S ARTICLE FALLS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ART. 19(1)(A). -----------------------26-27
i. Art. 19(1)(a) includes freedom of press. ------------------------------------------------------26
ii. Citizens are free to exercise their democratic rights. -------------------------------------26-27
4.2. EXISTENCE OF MYRIAD FIRS AGAINST MR. MICHAEL OLIVER. -----------------------------------28
i. Two or more successive FIRs cannot be registered. ------------------------------------------28
ii. It is a violation of fundamental right under Art. 21. ------------------------------------------28
4.3. PRESENT MATTER FALLS UNDER THE OTHER PRINCIPLES OF QUASHING OF FIR. -------------29-30
i. Application of condition on section 124-A of I.P.C. --------------------------------------29-30
ii. Application of condition on section 54 of Disaster Management Act, 2005. ---------------31
PRAYER ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------31

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LIST OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES

1. Disaster Management Act, 2005

2. Medical Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 2002
3. Constitution of India, 1949
4. Employees’ State Insurance Act 1948
5. Factories Act 1945
6. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
7. Supplement of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971
8. Information Technology Act, 2002
CASES

1. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 …………….........………….…..6, 11

2. SR Bommai v UOI AIR 1994 SC 1918………………………………………………….………6
3. UP State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd v Chandra Bhan Dubey (1999) 1 SCC 74 .6
4. P Ramchandra Rao v State of Karnataka (2012) 9 SCC 430……………………………..………6
5. Brahmajeetsing Sharma v State of Maharashtra AIR 2005 SC 2277………………………...…..6
6. EP Royappa v State of TN AIR 1974 SC 555; Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248…..…..6
7. Shrikishan Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR 1955 SC 795……………………………………..….6
8. TMA Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 ……………………….…………6
9. Govt of AP v Maharshi Publishers Pvt Ltd (2003) 1 SCC 95 ……………..…………………….6
10. Amita v UOI (2005) 13 SCC 721…………………………………………………………………6
11. State of UP v Maqbool Ahmed (2006) 7 SCC 521…………………………………………..……6
12. Soma Chakravarty v State (2007) 5 SCC 403………………………………………..…………..6
13. M Nagaraj v UOI (2006) 8 SCC 212 ………………………………………………………..…..6
14. John Vallamattom v UOI AIR 2003 SC 2902……………………………………………………7
15. Jagannath Prasad v State of UP AIR 1961 SC 1245…………………………………………….7
16. Mohd Shakeb Mahoon v Deputy Custodian AIR 1961 SC 1657…………………………………7
17. Virendra Krishna Mishra v UOI (2015) 2 SCC 712……………………………………………..7
18. EP Royappa v State of TN AIR 1974 SC 555 …………………………………………….……..7
19. Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248………………………………………………….……7
20. Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib (1981) 1 SCC 722……………………………………………..…….7
21. RD Shetty v IAA (1979) 3 SCC 498………………………………………………………………7
22. Kasturi Lal Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248………………………………………….7
23. DS Nakara v UOI (1983) 1 SCC 305…………………………………………………………….7
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24. Delhi Development Authority v Joint Action Committee (2008) 2 SCC 672………….…….…..7
25. In Re Special Reference No 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1 ………………………………….…….7
26. Dutta Associates Private Ltd v Indo Merchantiles Private Ltd (1997) 1 SCC 53 …………..….7
27. State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose AIR 1954 SC 92……………………………….…..7
28. Mohd Faruk v State of MP (1969) 1 SCC 853……………………………………………….…..7
29. Abdul Sattar Yusufbhai v State of Gujarat AIR 2009 Guj 179…………………………….……..7
30. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v Jan Mohammad Usmanbhai (1986) 3 SCC
20……………………………………………………………………..…………………………..7
31. State of Karnataka v Narasimhamurthy (1995) 5 SCC 524………….………………….……….7
32. Chameli Singh v State of UP (1996) 2 SCC 549 ………………………………………….……..7
33. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn v Nawab Khan Gulab Khan (1997) 11 SCC 121……….……….7
34. KA Abbas v UOI AIR 1973 SC 123; Nandlal v State of Punjab AIR 1981 SC 2041………..…..8
35. Khare v State of UP 1950 SCR 519……………………………………………………………….8
36. Kharak Singh v State of UP AIR 1963 SC 1295…………………………………………………..8
37. Gobind v State of MP (1975) 2 SCC 148…………………………………………………...……..8
38. NB Khare v State of Delhi (1950) SCR 519…………………...………………………………….8
39. AK Bindal v UOI (2003) 5 SCC 163………………………………………...………………...….8
40. Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545………………………….……..8
41. Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248………………………………………………………...8
42. Consumer Education & Research Centre v UOI (1995) 3 SCC 42……………………………….9
43. Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corp (1985) 3 SCC 545 ……………………………………….9
44. Centre for Environment and Food Security v UOI (2011) 5 SCC 676 …………………………..9
45. UP Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v Friends Cooperative 1995 Supp (3) SCC 456………………...9
46. State of Karnataka v Narasimhamurthy (1995) 5 SCC 524; ……………………………………..9
47. Chameli Singh v State of UP (1996) 2 SCC 549 ……………………………………………….9
48. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn v Nawab Khan (1997) 11 SCC 121……………………………….9
49. Chameli Singh v State of UP (1996) 2 SCC 549……………………………………………..…9
50. State of Karnataka v Narasimhamurthy (1995) 5 SCC 524…………………………………….…9
51. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn v Nawab Khan (1997) 11 SCC 121……………………………….9
52. Minerva Mills v UOI AIR 1980 SC 1789……………………………………………………….9
53. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v UOI (1984) 3 SCC 161………………………………………………..9
54. Vinal Kishor Mehrotra v State of UP AIR 1956 All 56 …………………………………………..9
55. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v State of Maharashtra (2018) 6 SCC 454………………………...9
56. Vinal Kishor Mehrotra v State of UP AIR 1956 All 56 …………………………………………10
57. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v State of Maharashtra (2018) 6 SCC 454……………………….10
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58. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225……………………………………...11
59. Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v UOI AIR 19511 SC 41 …………………………………………….11
60. Srinivasa Theatre v State of TN (1992) 2 SCC 643……………………………………………...11
61. Binoy Viswam v UOI (2017) 7 SCC 59…………………………………………………...……..11
62. Indra Sawhney v UOI AIR 1993 SC 477………………………………………………………...11
63. State (NCT of Delhi) v UOI (2018) 8 SCC 501…………………………………………..……..11
64. Bir Singh v Delhi Jal Board (2018) 10 SCC 312………………………………………………...11
65. Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608………….11
66. Olga Tellis v Bombay Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545……………………………………….....11
67. DTC v Mazdoor Congress Union DTC AIR 1991 SC 101 ……………………………………...11
68. Consumer Education & Research Centre v Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42…………………..11
69. Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v State of UP (1990) 4 SCC 449 ………………11
70. State of Karnataka v State of AP (2000) 9 SCC 572 …………………………………………….11
71. Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 664………………………………..11
72. New Reviera Cooperative Housing Society v Special Land Acquisition Officer (1996) 1 SCC
73………………………………………………………………………………………………11
73. State of TN v K Sabanayagam (1998) 1 SCC 318 …………………………………………….11
74. Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520 …………………………...11
75. Virender Gaur v State of Haryana (1995) 2 SCC 577 ………….............................................11
76. MC Mehta v Union of India (2004) 12 SCC 118………………………………………………...11
77. AP Pollution Control Board II v MV Naydu (2001) 2 SCC 62 ……………………………........11
78. Madhya Pradesh v Kedia Leather (2003) 7 SCC 389……………………………………………11
79. Board of Trustee of the Port of Bombay v Nadkarni Dilip Kumar Raghavendra (1983) 1 SCC
124………………………………………………………………………………………………..11
80. Consumer Education & Research Centre v UOI 1995 AIR 922…………………………..11 & 12
81. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration AIR 1978 SC 1675…………………………………..11 & 12
82. Consumer Education & Research Centre v UOI 1995 AIR 922 …………………………….….12
83. People’s Union for Democratic Rights v UOI 1982 AIR 1473……………………………….…12
84. Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v Vishwanath Pande Barde (1995) Supp 2 SCC 549 …………..12
85. LIC of India v Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995) SCC (5) 482 ………….……12
86. Regional Director ESI Corporation v Francis De Costa AIR 1995 SC 1811…………………...12
87. Sanjit Roy v State of Rajasthan 1983 AIR 328…………………………………………………..12
88. All India Bank Employees Association v IT (1961-62) 21 FJR 63………………………..…….12
89. Damyanti Naranga v UOI 1971 AIR SC 966……………………………………………………13
90. All India Bank Employees Association v IT (1961-62) 21 FJR 63……………………………...13
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91. Jacob M Puthuparambil v Kerala Water Authority 1990 AIR 2228……………………………14
92. People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India 1982 AIR 1473………………….…..15
93. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ……………………………………………..16
94. X v Z (1998) 8 SCC 296 ………………………………………………………………………..16
95. Sharda v Dharmpal 2003 4 SCC 493 …………………………………………….…………….16
96. PUCL v UOI (1997) 1 SCC 301…………………………………………………..…………….16
97. Kharak Singh v The State of UP 1963 AIR 1295……………………………….………………16
98. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ……………………………………………..16
99. R Rajagopal v State of TN 1995 AIR 264……………………………………………………….16
100. Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148………………………..…………….16
101. Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479………………………………………………………...16
102. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081……………………………..……………16
103. Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148 ………………………………….…..17
104. Kharak Singh v The State of UP 1963 AIR 1295 ……………………………………..…….17
105. BK Parthasarathi v Government of AP 2000 (1) ALD 199………………………...……….17
106. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ……………………………………….…17
107. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ……………………………………..…..17
108. In Her Majesty The Queen v Brandon Roy Dyment [1988] 2 SCR 417……………………..17
109. NM v Smith 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC)…………………………………...……………………..17
110. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ………………………………………….19
111. Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248 …………………………………………………..19
112. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI 2018 (8) MadLJ 115, 2018 (12) …………………….………20
113. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ………………………………………….20
114. In District Registrar and Collector Hyderabad v Canara Bank (2005) 1 SCC 496……..….20
115. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ………………………………………….20
116. Modern Dental College and Research Centre v State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC
353………………………………………………………………………………………………..20
117. Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 …………………………………………20
118. MH Devendrappa v Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation (1998) 3
SCC 73………………………………………………………………………………….………..21
119. Bennet Coleman v UOI AIR 1973 SC 106 ………………………………………………..21
120. DC Saxena v Hon’ble Chief Justice of India AIR 1996 SC 2481……………………………21
121. Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129…………………………………………....21
122. Arundhati Roy In re (2002) 3 SCC 343 ………………………………………………….….21
123. Indian Express Newspaper (P) Ltd v UOI AIR 1986 SC 515…………………………..….21
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124. Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 881…………………………….…22
125. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd v UOI AIR 1962 SC 305………………………………………….....22
126. Express Newspaper Ltd v UOI AIR 1958 SC 578……………………………………….…22
127. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd v UOI AIR 1962 SC 305……………………………………………..22
128. Rangarajan S v Jagjivan Ram P 1989 2 SCC 574…………………………….……………22
129. LIC v Manubhai D Shah (Prof) AIR 1956 SC 541…………………………………………22
130. Hector v AG 1991 LRC (Const) 237 (240-41) PC…………………………………………..22
131. Sanmay Banerjee v State of West Bengal MANU/WB/2830/2019………………………….22
132. Arnab Ranjan Goswami v Union of India (UOI) MANU/SC/0448/2020 …………………..23
133. Chirra Shivraj v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2011 SC 604…………………………….…23
134. Babubhai v State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254…………………………………………….23
135. Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v CBI AIR 2013 SC 3794……………………………………...23
136. Prashant Bharti v State of NCT of Delhi AIR 2013 SC 2753 ……………………………..24
137. State of UP v VRK Srivastava MANU/SC/0526/1989………………………………...…..24
138. State of West Bengal v Swapan Kumar Guha AIR 1982 SC 949………..…………………..24
139. Pratibha Rani v Suraj Kumar 1985 CriLJ 817…………………………………………..…..24
140. State of Haryana v Ch Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 …………………………………….…24
141. State of UP v VRK Srivastava 1989 (4) SCC 59……………………………………….….24
142. Sarju Pershad v Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain AIR 1950 SC 120……………..……….24
143. Niharendu v KE (1954) FCR 38………………………………………………………..…….24
144. A.L.V.R. Ct. Veerappa Chettiar v Arunachalam Chetti AIR 1936 Mad 758 (763)……….…25
145. Satyaranjan Bakshi v King-Emperor AIR 1927 Cal 698…………………………...……25
BOOKS & JOURNALS
1. Ruth Faden & Thomas Beau Champ, ‘A history of theory of informed consent’ 60(3) (OUP
1986)……………………………………………………………………………………………...17
2. A Allen, ‘Privacy and Medicine in EN Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
vol-2 (2011)………………………………………………………………………………..……..17
3. Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation (Cambridge
University Press 2012)………………………………………………………………………….20
4. Manoj Kumar Sadual, ‘Freedom of Press in Indian Constitution: A Brief Analysis’ [2015] 1(8)
INT’L JOU APP RES 194…………………….…………………………………………………….24
5. Vishnu S Warrier, ‘Right to Strike and Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution’ page
7…………………………………………………………………………………………….……13
6. DURGA DAS BASU VOLUME 1 EDITION 14th 2009 LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS
WADHWA NAGPUR…………………………………………………………………..……….24
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OTHER AUTHORITIES
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into
force 23 March 1976) 999…………………………………………………………………….…15
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966,
entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR)…………………………………...15
3. Data Protection Rules…………………………………………………………………………..17
4. Informed Consent in Medical Decision Making In India 1(1) JOU COUN & FAM 30………….17
5. Article 4(11) of General Data Protection Regulation (European Union)………………………17
6. White Paper of the Committee of Experts on a Data Protection Framework for India ……….18
7. Code of Ethics Regulations 2002, Section 7.17………………………………………………..18
1. The IRDA (Sharing Of Database for Distribution Of Insurance Products) Regulations
2010…………………………………………………………………………………………….18
2. Disha Bill 2019…………………………………………………………………………………18
3. Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi, ‘Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on
Human Subjects’ 2016…………………………………………………………………………..19
4. Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi, ‘Informed Consent Process, Ethical Guidelines
for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects’…………………………………………………..19
5. Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation Rules 1996…………………..19
6. National Policy for Persons with Disabilities 2003………………………………………………19
7. Constituent Assembly Debates 712-716, 780……………………………………………………21
8. Report of 1st Press Commission 1954 ………...………………………………….……………..22

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 123 of 2020]

The Organisation for Common Cause for Poor has approached High Courts of five different
States of Westeros by filling Public Interest Litigation under Article 226 of the Constitution of
Westeros, 1950 on behalf of indigenous and migrant workers who were detained in several States
including Santa Cruz Town and New Castle Town.
[Writ Petition (Civil) No. 234 of 2020]
Ms. Catherine Pearson has approached Hon’ble Supreme Court of Westeros by filling Public
Interest Litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution of Westeros, 1950 and has challenged the
constitutional validity of the Ordinance dated 26.04.2020.
[Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 540 of 2020]
Mr. Micheal Oliver has approached Hon’ble Supreme Court of Westeros under Article 32 of
Constitution of Westeros, 1950 seeking the remedy of quashing of all 14 FIRs which has been filed
against him.

Pursuant to all three petitions, Hon’ble Supreme Court of Westeros on its own motion has
withdrew Writ Petition (Civil) No. 123 of 2020 and clubbed it with Writ Petition (Civil) No. 234 of
2020 and Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 540 of 2020 by exercising its power enshrined under Article
139A of Constitution of Westeros, 1950.

Article 139A: Transfer of certain cases

1. Where cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before
the Supreme Court and one or more High Courts or before two or more High Courts and the
Supreme Court is satisfied on its own motion or an application made by the Attorney General of
India or by a party to any such case that such questions are substantial questions of general
importance, the Supreme Court may withdraw the case or cases pending before the High Court
or the High Courts and dispose of all the cases itself: Provided that the Supreme Court may after
determining the said questions of law return any case so withdrawn together with a copy of its
judgment on such questions to the High Court from which the case has been withdrawn, and the
High Court shall on receipt thereof, proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with such
judgment.
2. The Supreme Court may, if it deems it expedient so to do for the ends of justice, transfer any
case, appeal or other proceedings pending before any High Court to any other High Court.

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ARGUMENT ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE MHA ORDER DATED 27.03.2020 IS ARBITRARY, AND THE
DETENTION OF SUCH MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE PURSUANCE OF SUCH
ORDER AMOUNTS TO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Westeros that the restrictions
imposed vide order dated 27.03.2020 are unconstitutional as [1.1.] The said order is violating the
Fundamental Rights of the Migrant Workers [1.2.] The Impugned order violates Art. 14. [1.3.] The
Impugned order violates Art. 19. [1.4.] The Impugned order violates Art. 21 r/w Directive Principles
of State Policies (hereinafter DPSP) [1.5] The Impugned order violates Art. 22.
1.1. THE FRS CANNOT BE WAIVED OFF DURING THE PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN.
The Ministry of Home Affairs issued guidelines on 25.03.2020 considering the ‘corona virus
pandemic’ as a ‘disaster’ within the meaning of the Disaster Management Act, 20051. What the
Government has forgotten in this mix is the equally critical mandate of relief and rehabilitation
under the above stated Act. The poor and the marginalized are homeless, penny less and starving.
The Fundamental Rights forms the part of basic structure of the Constitution,2 and cannot be waived
off. The lockdown was declared to curb the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 under Disaster
Management Act, 2005 has major limitations when it comes to tackling the emergence and re-
emergence of communicable diseases in the country and do not have power to waive off
Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution.
It is well established that the Right to life and Personal Liberty,3 and Right in respect of
conviction of offence,4 cannot be suspended even during an emergency.5 As the sentinel on the qui
vive, this Court must be alert to the cries of the citizenry, alleging violation of their Constitutional
rights.6
1.2. THE IMPUGNED ACTION VIOLATES ART. 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.
The concept of equality is a dynamic concept with multiple dimensions.7 Art. 14 lays down the
principles of equality which grants equal treatment to all its citizens8 who are circumstanced

1
Disaster Management Act, 2005
2
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225
3
Constitution of India 1950, art 21
4
ibid art 20
5
ibid art 359
6
SR Bommai v UOI AIR 1994 SC 1918; UP State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd v Chandra Bhan Dubey
(1999) 1 SCC 741; P Ramchandra Rao v State of Karnataka (2012) 9 SCC 430; Brahmajeetsing Sharma v State of
Maharashtra AIR 2005 SC 2277
7
EP Royappa v State of TN AIR 1974 SC 555; Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248
8
Shrikishan Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR 1955 SC 795; TMA Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481;
Govt of AP v Maharshi Publishers Pvt Ltd (2003) 1 SCC 95; Amita v UOI (2005) 13 SCC 721; State of UP v Maqbool
Ahmed (2006) 7 SCC 521; Soma Chakravarty v State (2007) 5 SCC 403
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equally.9 Right to equality not only lies on treating equally, but also lies on grating privileges
equally.10 Equality before law ensures that all are equally subjected to the ordinary law of the land
regardless of the strata of society11 to which he belongs and such right cannot be denied arbitrarily,12
as Equality is antithesis of arbitrariness.13 Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures
fairness and equality of treatment’.14 The reasonableness and fairness are the heart and soul of Art.
14,15 as referred to in the Preamble of the Constitution.16
In casu, the Central Govt. has issued a premature order dated 27.03.2020 without providing any
effective mechanism for protecting the needs of the migrant workers after the complete lockdown
vide the order dated 25.03.2020. The premature imposition of lockdown severely affected all the
strata of society adversely.17 The factories and workplaces were closed, migrants were to deal with
shortage of income, food and other essentials,18 and they gathered near ISBT Terminal of the town to
go to their respective places.19 Although the Govt. has framed various guidelines and schemes to
ensure that the poor are not affected but no immediate relief was given.20 Subsequently, 429
Migrants Labourers were arrested in NCT and 313 were arrested in SCT.
Furthermore, the action taken should be fair and open otherwise it would be termed as arbitrary.21
In the instant case the Migrants were only demanding that they should be sent to their hometown
because there was lack of and hence such arrest is arbitrary.
1.3. THE IMPUGNED ACTION VIOLATES THE RIGHTS CONCERNING FREEDOM UNDER ART. 19.
The rights contained in Art. 19(1) are those great and basic rights, which are recognized as the
natural rights of every citizen.22 It is a settled principle of law that, when violation of Art. 19(1) is
challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the Court that the restriction is reasonable lies
upon the State.23 The Right to Shelter is a Fundamental Right under Art. 19(1) r/w 21 and is a basic

9
M Nagaraj v UOI (2006) 8 SCC 212
10
John Vallamattom v UOI AIR 2003 SC 2902
11
Jagannath Prasad v State of UP AIR 1961 SC 1245; Mohd Shakeb Mahoon v Deputy Custodian AIR 1961 SC 1657
12
Virendra Krishna Mishra v UOI (2015) 2 SCC 712
13
EP Royappa v State of TN AIR 1974 SC 555
14
Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248; Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib (1981) 1 SCC 722; RD Shetty v IAA (1979) 3
SCC 498; Kasturi Lal Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248v State of J&K (1980) 4 SCC 1; DS Nakara v UOI
(1983) 1 SCC 305
15
Delhi Development Authority v Joint Action Committee (2008) 2 SCC 672
16
In Re Special Reference No 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1
17
Moot Proposition ¶6
18
Moot Proposition ¶7
19
ibid
20
ibid
21
Dutta Associates Private Ltd v Indo Merchantiles Private Ltd (1997) 1 SCC 53
22
State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose AIR 1954 SC 92
23
Mohd Faruk v State of MP (1969) 1 SCC 853; Abdul Sattar Yusufbhai v State of Gujarat AIR 2009 Guj 179;
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v Jan Mohammad Usmanbhai (1986) 3 SCC 20
12
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 8TH JMI-NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
right such which is granted to each and every citizen.24 Furthermore, the Fundamental Right of a
citizen to move freely throughout the territory of Westeros25 has been practically suspended during
the lockdown.
The Right to reside and settle in any part of the territory of Westeros26, cannot be suspended for
an indefinite period forcing these migrant workers to stay away from their families and living in
unpredictable and arduous conditions, as the same is an unreasonable restriction beyond what is
envisaged under Art. 19(5) of the Constitution.27 There is a distinction between mass movement and
movement per se. The order of lockdown is excessively vague which allows the scope of
implementational overreach through which even the individual movement is being curtailed and the
law which affects the Fundamental Right may be held bad for sheer vagueness and uncertainty.28
The freedom of movement guaranteed under clause (d) of Art. 19(1) is in addition to the right to
personal liberty guaranteed under Art. 21.29 Orders of externment and internment violate this right.30
The right under the sub article is not mere freedom to move without physical obstruction and the
movement under the scrutinizing gaze of policeman cannot be termed to be free movement.31 The
right of free movement throughout the territory as enunciated in Art. 19(1)(d) of the Constitution
contemplates absence of inter-state restrictions, which prevents citizens of the country from moving
from one state to another.32
1.4. THE IMPUGNED ORDER VIOLATES ART. 21 R/W DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICIES.
The expression ‘life’ in Art. 21 mean something more than mere animal existence.33 It is multi-
faceted, including numerous strands such as the right to livelihood,34 public safety, development, and
a meaningful existence.35 The premature lockdown and its ineffective implementation [i.] is in
violation to the right to livelihood and right to shelter of migrant workers, and [ii.] the Govt. has
failed to implement the directives enshrined under Part-IV of the Constitution.

24
UP Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v Friends Cooperative Housing Society Ltd 1995 Supp (3) SCC 456; State of
Karnataka v Narasimhamurthy (1995) 5 SCC 524; Chameli Singh v State of UP (1996) 2 SCC 549; Ahmedabad
Municipal Corpn v Nawab Khan Gulab Khan (1997) 11 SCC 121
25
Constitution of India 1950, art 19(1)(d)
26
ibid 19(1)(e)
27
ibid 19(5)
28
KA Abbas v UOI AIR 1973 SC 123; Nandlal v State of Punjab AIR 1981 SC 2041
29
Khare v State of UP 1950 SCR 519
30
Kharak Singh v State of UP AIR 1963 SC 1295
31
Gobind v State of MP (1975) 2 SCC 148
32
NB Khare v State of Delhi (1950) SCR 519
33
AK Bindal v UOI (2003) 5 SCC 163
34
Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545
35
Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248
13
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i. There is a violation of the Right to Livelihood and Right to Shelter.
The right to life embraces within its fold, some of the finer facets of human civilization which
makes life worth living36 and that the expanded concept of life enlarges its sweep to encompass
human personality in its full blossom.37 The right to livelihood38 is an integral part of the right to life
and dignity of an individual.39
The Apex Court in the plethora of cases has held that without right to shelter, a dignified life
cannot be enjoyed with and thus, right to shelter is also a fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19
& Art. 21.40
Further, in the case of Chameli Singh v State of UP41 it was held that right to shelter includes
adequate living space, safe & decent structure, clean & decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air
& water, electricity, sanitation & other civic amenities. Therefore, the right to shelter does not mean
a mere right to a roof over one's head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to
live & develop as a human being.42 Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to
live should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right.43 The stranded laborers have
no shelter above their head & are starving therefore no option is left in their hands except for walking
back to their hometowns on their foot.44
In casu, although the Govt. has framed guidelines that food and shelter is to be provided to
migrant workers,45 however, the formulation of scheme is one thing and its implementation is other
and similarly the implementing system failed abruptly leaving behind the migrants with no other
option but to migrate back to their native places.
ii. The Govt. has failed to implement the directives enshrined under the Constitution.
The State is having a duty to apply the principles of Part IV while making any law46 and the
harmony between FRs and DPSP is the basic structure of the Constitution.47 The right to live with
human dignity enshrined in Art. 21 derive its life breath from the DPSP and particularly clauses (e)
and (f) of Art. 39.48 Art. 38 postulate that it is the duty of the state to secure a social order for the

36
Consumer Education & Research Centre v UOI (1995) 3 SCC 42
37
ibid; Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corp (1985) 3 SCC 545
38
Centre for Environment and Food Security v UOI (2011) 5 SCC 676
39
ibid
40
UP Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v Friends Cooperative Housing Society Ltd 1995 Supp (3) SCC 456; State of
Karnataka v Narasimhamurthy (1995) 5 SCC 524; Chameli Singh v State of UP (1996) 2 SCC 549; Ahmedabad
Municipal Corpn v Nawab Khan (1997) 11 SCC 121
41
Chameli Singh v State of UP (1996) 2 SCC 549
42
ibid
43
State of Karnataka v Narasimhamurthy (1995) 5 SCC 524; Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn v Nawab Khan (1997) 11
SCC 121
44
Moot Proposition ¶7
45
ibid
46
Constitution of India 1950, art 37
47
Minerva Mills v UOI AIR 1980 SC 1789
48
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v UOI (1984) 3 SCC 161
14
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 8TH JMI-NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
promotion of welfare of the people.49 Art. 39(a) provides that the citizens, men and women equally,
have the right to an adequate means to livelihood.50
In casu, the workers are starving for food. The Govt. is expected to provide the food supply in
order to ensure their existence otherwise these daily wage labourers and their families may not die
with disease but surely, they will die due to lack of food and essential supply, which is seen in the
present situation.
1.5. THE IMPUGNED ORDER VIOLATES ART. 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF WESTEROS.
The government has violated the FR under Art. 22 of the Constitution by arresting migrant
laborers. The word ‘ground for such arrest’ occurring in Art. 22(1) indicates that there should be a
reason known to the victim for his detention.51 All those workers demanded to have shelter and food
were detained on the basis of MHA order52 and arrest can’t be done on the basis of arbitrary
decision, no arrest can be made merely because it is lawful to do so. The exercise of power must be
for a valid purpose.53 Hence, the MHA Order was arbitrary and the arrest therefore was violative of
FR.
2. WHETHER THE SUSPENSION OF SEVERAL LABOUR LAWS BY ALL THREE
STATES VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAWS?
On 26.04.2020, the Governors of three States of Union of Westeros suspended six labour laws by
passing an Ordinance under Art. 213 of Constitution of Westeros for 735 days. The impugned
Ordinance is unconstitutional as [2.1.] It is in violation with fundamental rights of labourers. [2.2.]
All three states have failed to implement the directives enshrined under Part-IV of the Constitution.
[2.3.] The impugned Ordinance is also in conflict with the International Conventions which have
been ratified by Union of Westeros.
2.1. THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS IN VIOLATION WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

LABOURERS.

The blanket ban for 735 days on [i.] six labour laws is in violation with the right to equality.54
[ii.] Ban on the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 is in violation with right to life of the
labourers.55 [iii.] The impugned Ordinance is also in violation of Art. 23 of the Constitution. [iv.]

49
Constitution of India 1950, art 38
50
ibid 39(a)
51
Vinal Kishor Mehrotra v State of UP AIR 1956 All 56
52
Moot Problem ¶7
53
Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v State of Maharashtra (2018) 6 SCC 454
54
Constitution of India 1950, art 14
55
ibid 21
15
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Ban on the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 is in violation with the right to freedom of speech and
expression.56 [v.] The Factories Act, 1945 except Section 5 is unreasonable.
i. The blanket ban on labour laws violates Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The Right to Equality is a basic feature of the Constitution.57 Art. 14 commands two concepts,
‘equality before law’ and ‘equal protection of law’. The concept of ‘equal protection of the laws’
requires the State to give special treatment to persons in different situations in order to establish
equality amongst all.58 The necessary corollary to this would be that equals would be treated equally,
whilst un-equals would have to be treated unequally.59 Art. 14 guarantees equality to all the
‘persons’.60 The word ‘persons’ includes industries as well.61
In order to revive the economy of the State, the Governors have passed an Ordinance which puts
blanket ban for 735 days on all labour laws without classifying different types of industries.62 In
Westeros 55% of population are employed either in small scale industries or in unorganized
sectors.63 The State must understand that there is a huge difference between the workers of large
scale industries and small scale industries. This means that small scale industries cannot be treated
equally with large scale industries and putting ban on labour laws without classifying different
conditions leads to violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
ii. Ban on the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 is violative of Art. 21.
The right to life includes right to live with human dignity.64 It would include all those aspects
of life65 which go to make a person’s life precious,66 meaningful,67 worth-living68 and complete.69
The expression ‘life’ assured in Art. 21 of the Constitution does not connote mere animal existence
and it include right to health.70 Compelling economic necessity to work in an industry exposed to
health hazards due to indigence to bread-winning to labourers and their dependents should not be at

56
ibid 19(1)(c)
57
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225
58
Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v UOI AIR 19511 SC 41; Srinivasa Theatre v State of TN (1992) 2 SCC 643; Binoy Viswam
v UOI (2017) 7 SCC 59
59
Indra Sawhney v UOI AIR 1993 SC 477; State (NCT of Delhi) v UOI (2018) 8 SCC 501; Bir Singh v Delhi Jal Board
(2018) 10 SCC 312
60
Constitution of India 1950, art 14
61
Ujjam Bai v State of UP 1962 AIR 1622
62
Moot Proposition ¶8
63
ibid ¶3
64
Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608; Olga Tellis v Bombay
Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545; DTC v Mazdoor Congress Union DTC AIR 1991 SC 101; Consumer Education &
Research Centre v Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 42
65
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v State of UP (1990) 4 SCC 449
66
State of Karnataka v State of AP (2000) 9 SCC 572; Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 664
67
New Reviera Cooperative Housing Society v Special Land Acquisition Officer (1996) 1 SCC 731; State of TN v K
Sabanayagam (1998) 1 SCC 318; Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520; Virender Gaur v
State of Haryana (1995) 2 SCC 577; MC Mehta v Union of India (2004) 12 SCC 118
68
AP Pollution Control Board II v MV Naydu (2001) 2 SCC 62; Madhya Pradesh v Kedia Leather (2003) 7 SCC 389
69
Board of Trustee of the Port of Bombay v Nadkarni Dilip Kumar Raghavendra (1983) 1 SCC 124
70
Consumer Education & Research Centre v UOI 1995 AIR 922; Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration AIR 1978 SC
1675
16
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 8TH JMI-NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
the cost of the health and vigour of the workman.71 The health and strength of the worker is an
integral facet of right to life.72 Denial thereof denudes the workman the finer facets of life violating
Art. 21.73
The Preambular reading of Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 makes it crystal clear that this
Act is enacted to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and
employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto.74 Further,
Section 38 of Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 states that, “subject to the provisions of this Act,
all employees in factories or establishments to which this Act applies shall be insured in the manner
provided by this Act.” Once this Act is suspended for 735 days, this will amount to violation of right
to health and right to have meaning and dignified life of the labourers.75
iii. The impugned Ordinance is violative of Art. 23 of the Constitution.
The impugned Ordinance passed by Governors of three States vide order dated 26.04.2020 is in
violation of Art. 23 of the Constitution. Art. 23 guarantees the right against exploitation.76 Hon’ble
SC has held that if a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less than
the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of
the words ‘forced labour’ under Art. 23.77
No work of utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on the blood and sweat of persons
who are reduced to a state of helplessness on account of scarcity conditions.78 The Apex Court has
observed that the payment of wages lower than the minimum wage to a person employed even in
scarcity situations violates Art. 23.79 Thus, exemption of all the industries from the Minimum Wages
Act, 1948 will leave a scope for exploitation and will lead to a situation of forced labor that the
Constitution specifically seeks to avoid.
iv. Ban on Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 leads to the violation of right to freedom of speech
and expression.
Right to protest is a fundamental right under Art. 19 of the Constitution and right to strike is a
legal right.80 The right to strike in the Constitution set up is not absolute right but it flow from the
fundamental right to form associations81 and it includes the right to its continued function.82 As every

71
ibid
72
ibid
73
ibid
74
Employees’ State Insurance Act 1948, Preamble
75
Consumer Education & Research Centre v UOI 1995 AIR 922 ¶27
76
Constitution of India 1950, art 23
77
People’s Union For Democratic Rights v UOI 1982 AIR 1473; Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v Vishwanath Pande
Barde (1995) Supp 2 SCC 549; LIC of India v Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995) SCC (5) 482; Regional
Director ESI Corporation v Francis De Costa AIR 1995 SC 1811
78
Sanjit Roy v State of Rajasthan 1983 AIR 328
79
ibid
80
All India Bank Employees Association v IT (1961-62) 21 FJR 63
81
Constitution of India 1950, art 19(1)(c)
17
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 8TH JMI-NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
other fundamental right is subject to reasonable restrictions, the same is also the case to form trade
unions to give a call to the workers to go on strike and the state can impose reasonable restrictions.83
The Hon’ble SC has held that the right to strike or right to declare lock out may be controlled or
restricted by appropriate industrial legislation and the validity of such legislation would have to be
tested not with reference to the criteria laid down in clause (4) of Art. 19 but by totally different
considerations.84 The provisions of ID Act enumerate different restrictions for legal strike given
under Sections 22, 23 & 24 of the Act.85
Thus the trade unions cannot raise any dispute during the period of ban and the Act makes this
clear that all the disputes related to industries shall be heard by the labour tribunal.86 Once this Act is
banned then laborers will not have any legal remedy in case of any dispute and whole grievance
redressal mechanism will be suspended.
v. The ban on the Factories Act, 1945 except Section 5 is arbitrary in nature.
The Governor of three States have arbitrarily put ban on all the provisions of Factories Act, 1945
except Section 5 as the ban is in conflict with the mandate of Section 5 of the Act.87 According to
Section 5 of this Act, three elements need to be satisfied. [a.] There must be a presence of public
emergency. [b.] The classification of factories is important. [c.] The exemption shall not be more
than 3 months.
a. There is no presence of a public emergency as defined under Section 5.
The explanation of Section 5 defines ‘public emergency’ as “a grave emergency whereby the
security of India88 or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external
aggression of internal disturbance.” In casu there is no such threat to the security of Westeros due to
war or external aggression.
b. There is no classification of factories in the Order dated 26.04.2020.
Section 5 states that, “in any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the
provisions of this Act, for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit.”89
It is clear that the State can exempt a particular factory or class of factories. In the present matter
the three States have suspended this Act in its territory without classifying different types of factories
and different conditions applicable on them.

82
Damyanti Naranga v UOI 1971 AIR SC 966
83
Vishnu S Warrier, ‘Right to Strike and Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution’ page 7.
84
All India Bank Employees Association v IT (1961-62) 21 FJR 63
85
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
86
ibid s 7A
87
Factories Act 1945, s 5
88
Moot Problem page 11
89
Factories Act 1945, s 5
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 8TH JMI-NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2020
c. Ban for 735 days is unreasonable in nature.
Section 5 of the Act puts an obligation on state that the notification shall not be more than 3
months. In casu, the ban is for 735 days from 26.04.2020 onwards. Thus it is unreasonable in
nature.90
2.2. ALL THREE STATES HAVE FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE DIRECTIVES ENSHRINED UNDER PART-
IV OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Art. 37 clarify that, though Part-IV of the Constitution is not enforceable by any court.91
However, it also points out that Part-IV is fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall
be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.92 The Governors of three States
have failed to recognise Articles 3893, 39(a)94, 39A95, 4196, 4297, 4398 and 43A99 of the Constitution
of Westeros.
The Apex Court has held that whenever the State is required to make laws it must do so
consistently with these principles with a view to securing social and economic freedom so essential
for the establishment of an egalitarian society.100 Thus putting blanket ban on all six legislation
amounts to violation of Part-IV of the Constitution.
2.3. THE IMPUGNED ORDINANCE IS ALSO IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
WHICH HAVE BEEN RATIFIED BY UNION OF WESTEROS.

The impugned Ordinance is in conflict with Art. 51(c) r/w Art. 253 of the Constitution. It states
that the State shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the
dealings of organised peoples with one another.101 Art. 253 enunciate that, only Parliament has
power to make laws in relation to international treaties and conventions.102 Putting complete ban for
735 days on labour legislation will amount to breach in duty to foster respect for international treaties
and obligations.
Union of Westeros has signed and ratified ICCPR and ICESCR.103 It has also ratified six out of
eight fundamental conventions on labour rights and their standards.104 The Ordinance dated
26.04.2020 [i.] is in violation with ICCPR [ii.] It is also in violation with ICESCR.

90
ibid
91
Constitution of India 1950, Part-IV
92
ibid art 37
93
ibid art 38
94
ibid art 39(a)
95
ibid art 39A
96
ibid art 41
97
ibid art 42
98
ibid art 43
99
ibid art 43A
100
Jacob M Puthuparambil v Kerala Water Authority 1990 AIR 2228
101
Constitution of India 1950, art 51(c)
102
ibid art 253
103
ibid
19
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i. The Ordinance is in violation with ICCPR.
The impugned Ordinance is in violation to Art. 8(3)(a).105 Art. 8(3)(a) states that, “no one shall
be required to perform forced or compulsory labour”.106 Hon’ble SC has held that Art. 8 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibit forced or compulsory labour and Art.
23107 is in the same strain.108 It enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may be
found.109 Banning Minimum Wages Act, 1948 will definitely amount to violation of Art. 8 of
ICCPR.
Art. 22 of ICCPR states that, “everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests”.110
Putting ban on Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for 735 days will bar labourers to fight for their interest
through trade unions and there will be no mechanism to seek remedy in such matters. Thus
impugned order is in violation with Art. 22 of ICCPR.
ii. The Ordinance is in violation with ICESCR.
The impugned Ordinance is in violation with Art. 7, Art. 8 and Art. 12 of ICESCR.111 Art. 7
entrusts the right to minimum and fair wage to everyone.112 Putting ban of Minimum Wages Act,
1948 is in conflict with Art. 7 of this Convention. Further it is in violation with Art. 8 as it ensures
the right to be part of trade unions. Putting ban on Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will amount to
violation of Art. 8 of the Convention.113 Moreover, Art. 12 of ICESCR guarantees right of everyone
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.114 Putting ban on
the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 is in violation with Art. 12 of the Convention.
3. WHETHER THE SHARING OF MEDICAL DATA OF COVID-19 TESTED PATIENTS
WITH DMPL VIOLATES THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
Sharing of medical data of COVID-19 tested patients with DMPL amounts to violation of right to
privacy [3.1] as it is a sacrosanct. [3.2] There is an absence of patients’ consent. [3.3] The test of
proportionality and legitimacy is not satisfied.

104
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102691 accessed
on 16 June 2020; Moot Proposition page 11
105
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)
106
ibid
107
Constitution of India 1950, art 23
108
People’s Union For Democratic Rights v Union of India 1982 AIR 1473
109
ibid
110
ICCPR, art 12
111
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted on 16 December 1966, entered into force 3
January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR)
112
ibid art 7
113
ibid art 8
114
ibid art 12
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3.1. RIGHT TO PRIVACY IS A SACROSANCT RIGHT UNDER ART. 21.
Privacy is a constitutionally protected right115 which is defined as the state of being free from
intrusion or disturbance in one’s private life or affairs.116 The security of one’s privacy against
arbitrary instructions is basic to a free society117 and an essential ingredient of personal liberty.118
Right to Privacy is a sacrosanct as [i.] it ensures dignity. [ii.] It is an internationally recognized
human right and [iii.] governmental interference is condemned.
i. Right to privacy ensures dignity to human being.
Right to life and personal liberty is a FR guaranteed under Art. 21 and privacy is an integral part
of it.119 The presence of word ‘fraternity’ in Preamble itself recognizes this right.120 Privacy is the
constitutional core of human dignity121 and it is so fundamental that it permeates FRs guaranteed to
an individual.122 It seeks to achieve the dignity of human existence.123 Privacy with its attendant
values assures dignity only then liberty can be of true substance.124 Privacy ensures the fulfillment of
dignity and is a core value, which the protection of life and liberty intend to achieve.125 Undoubtedly,
privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be denied only when an important
countervailing interest is shown to be superior.126
ii. It is internationally recognized human right.
The recognition of privacy as a fundamental constitutional value is part of India’s commitment to
a global HRs regime127. Significantly, India is not alone, but the world also recognizes the right of
privacy as a basic human right.128 Even in the USA privacy is a fundamental personal right,
emanating from the totality of the Constitutional scheme.129 Additionally, various international
organizations like Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Union, ICCPR etc. also
provide due recognition to the privacy rights.
iii. Governmental interference is condemned.
The intervention in privacy of a person is highly condemned as it enables an individual to stand
up against a programme of forced sterilization.130 There is nothing to prevent one from using the

115
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶307; Mr. X v Hospital Z (1998) 8 SCC 296 ¶27
116
Sharda v Dharmpal 2003 4 SCC 493 ¶76
117
PUCL v UOI (1997) 1 SCC 301
118
Kharak Singh v The State of UP 1963 AIR 1295
119
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶266
120
ibid ¶411
121
ibid ¶188
122
ibid ¶107
123
ibid
124
ibid
125
R Rajagopal v State of TN 1995 AIR 264
126
Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148
127
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶129
128
ibid ¶424
129
Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479
130
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081
21
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word ‘privacy’ to mean the freedom to live one’s life without governmental interference.131 Murphy,
J. considered that any kind of privacy invasion is against the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty.132 Indeed, nothing is more deleterious to a man’s physical happiness and health than a
calculated interference with his privacy.133
In casu the Govt. of Westeros has shared the critical medical information of patients to DMPL
which amounts to infringement of right to privacy of patients.134
3.2. ABSENCE OF PATIENTS’ CONSENT IN SHARING THEIR MEDICAL DATA.
Consent is defined as “the agreement to what other person has proposed”.135 It is one of the
major requirements under the Data Protection Rules.136 The notice and choice framework to secure
an individual’s consent is the bulwark on which data processing practices are found.137 It provides
lawful basis for processing personal data.138 Importantly, with regards to medical data, special
concern must be given to disclose the genetic information of any person. Hence, consent becomes
imperative in medical discipline139 because [i.] Medical information carries high mandate of Privacy.
[ii.] Medical data is highly sensitive and [ii.] obtaining consent is recognised in various Acts, bills,
regulations etc.
i. Medical information carries high mandate of privacy.
Privacy with respect to medical data is a category with reasonable expectation140 and promotes
individual’s medical autonomy.141 An unauthorised parting of the medical records by a hospital will
amount to an invasion of privacy.142 Such unauthorised invasion is due to the absence of consent143
as it is the key elements for protection of welfare of patients or research participants.144 Before
processing patient’s data, it is required by law to obtain the recipient’s consent in writing.145 J. Forest
held that the use of a person’s body without his consent to obtain information about him, invades an
area of personal privacy essential to the maintenance of his human dignity146 Moreover, consent has
to be expressed by a clear affirmative statement or action.147

131
Govind v State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148 ¶26
132
Kharak Singh v The State of UP 1963 AIR 1295 ¶17
133
BK Parthasarathi v Government of AP 2000 (1) ALD 199
134
Moot Preposition ¶8
135
Ruth Faden & Thomas Beau Champ, ‘A history of theory of informed consent’ 60(3) (OUP 1986)
136
Data Protection Rules, rule 5(1)
137
Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna, page 32
138
ibid Section 12 of the Bill
139
Code of Ethics Regulations 2002, Chapter 1, Section 1(3)(2)
140
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶177
141
A Allen, ‘Privacy and Medicine in EN Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol-2 (2011)
142
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶182
143
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-healthcare.pdf
144
Informed Consent in Medical Decision Making In India 1(1) JOU COUN & FAM 30
145
Data Protection Rules, rule 5(1)
146
In Her Majesty The Queen v Brandon Roy Dyment [1988] 2 SCR 417
147
General Data Protection Regulation (European Union) art 4(11), Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of
Justice B.N. Srikrishna, page 32
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ii. Medical data is highly sensitive.
Sensitive Personal data is defined as information relating to password, biometric information
which in turn includes medical records.148 In NM v Smith149 the Court decided that private medical
information is highly sensitive for individuals. Even the White Paper150 considers health information
as sensitive personal data. Similarly, J. B.N Shri Krishna report on data protection also considers
such information as sensitive personal data.151 Moreover, he recommends that while processing such
data, higher standard of consent must be applied.152 In some jurisdictions this has taken the form of
requiring explicit consent in the law.153 Furthermore, even if the sensitive data has to be disclosed to
a third party, it is permitted only with a prior consent.154 Transfer of sensitive data outside India for
processing is even conditioned with an explicit consent by the individual.155
iii. Other Acts, regulations, guidelines and committee reports.
Consent as a prerequisite for data sharing can be clearly witnessed in several [a.] acts,
regulations, [b.] guidelines, policy [c.] and committee reports.
a. Acts & regulations favouring consent in data sharing.
The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971156 and 2003157 emphasizes upon relevant
restrictions within every day practices of data collection and transfer in order to protect the privacy
of patients. Further, Information Technology Act, 2002 provides for punishment and penalty for
breach and violation of privacy of an individual without consent.158
The Medical Council of India (MCI) Code of Ethics Regulations, 2002 prohibits publication of
photographs or case studies without consent by patients.159 In addition to this, the IRDA notified in
its regulations to restrict referral companies from providing details of their customers without the
prior consent.160 Moreover, an upcoming bill, namely Digital Information Security in Healthcare Act
(DISHA Act) also grants various rights to patients for consensual data protection.161

148
Information Technology Rules 2011, rule 3
149
2007 (5) SA 250 (CC)
150
White Paper of the Committee of Experts on a Data Protection Framework for India by AP Shah, page 43; Committee
of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna.
151
Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna, page ¶86
152
ibid page 37
153
ibid
154
Information Technology Rules 2011, rule 6
155
Personal Data Protection Bill 2019
156
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act 2002
157
Supplement of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 1971
158
Information Technology Act 2002, s 66E & 72A
159
Code of Ethics Regulations 2002, s 7(17)
160
The IRDA (Sharing Of Database for Distribution Of Insurance Products) Regulations 2010
161
Disha Bill 2019
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b. Guidelines & policy favouring consent.
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects,162 includes the aspects of
consent as a limitation on the information that may be collected and used. The Privacy related
information included in the patient information sheet includes the choice to prevent the use of their
biological sample, the extent to which confidentiality of records could be maintained.163
Further, National Policy for Persons with Disabilities, 2006164 also provides that in order to
conduct research on persons with disabilities consent is required from the individual or their family
members or caregivers.165
c. Committee reports favouring consent.
J. B.N Shri Krishna Committee Report on data protection recommends that consent, should be
explicit in case of sensitive medical data.166 It is a lawful basis for processing personal data.167 Along
with this, consent has found its due place among the nine principles of data protection laid down by
J. A.P. Shah.168 In casu, there is no fact which suggests that the patients have consented to share the
genetic information, including blood sample and DNA.169
3.3. DATA TRANSFER FAILS THE TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY AND LEGITIMACY.
In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v UOI the Hon’ble SC laid the test of proportionality and
legitimacy.170 Any invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the three-fold requirement171 of just,
fair and reasonable law.172 The Govt. has failed to follow [i.] due process of law [ii.] with legitimate
aim173 and [iii.] the test of proportionality is not satisfied.
i. Govt. action is not sanctioned by law.
Existence of law to justify an encroachment on privacy is an express requirement of Art. 21.174
This right cannot be infringed without procedure established by law.175 In casu, there is no law which
substantiates the governmental action of transferring the medical information.176 On the contrary,
laws related to data protection and transfer provides for due consent which is also absent in the
present case.

162
Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi, ‘Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects’
2016
163
Indian Council of Medical Research New Delhi, ‘Informed Consent Process, Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical
Research on Human Subjects’
164
Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation Rules 1996
165
National Policy for Persons with Disabilities 2003
166
Section 12 of the Bill, Committee of Experts under the Chairmanship of Justice B.N. Srikrishna
167
ibid Sections 3(35) & 22
168
White Paper of the Committee of Experts on a Data Protection Framework for India by AP Shah
169
Moot Proposition ¶8
170
AIR 2015 SC 3081
171
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶188
172
Maneka Gandhi v UOI (1978) 1 SCC 248 ¶48
173
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶490
174
ibid ¶180
175
ibid
176
Moot Proposition ¶8
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ii. Govt. action does not serve a legitimate State aim.
The legitimate state aim ensures that the nature and content of the law should fall within the zone
of reasonableness.177 Legitimacy, as a postulate, involves a value judgment and helps in deciding
whether the aim which is sought to be pursued suffers from palpable or manifest arbitrariness.178
This requires a careful balance between individual interests and legitimate concerns of the state.179
Importantly for health data, the state may assert a legitimate interest in analyzing data borne from
hospital records to understand and deal with a public health epidemic such as malaria or dengue to
obviate a serious impact on the population.180 But the State must preserve the anonymity of the
individual to legitimately assert a valid state interest in the preservation of public health.181 Further,
the state must ensure that information is not accessed by a private entity while serving the legitimate
aim.182 However, every State intrusion into privacy interests which deals with the physical body or
the dissemination of information personal to an individual, like health data, will be subjected to the
balancing test.183
In casu, neither anonymity nor balance with patients’ privacy is maintained. In fact, the
information is transferred to private foreign company.184 Moreover, the Govt. has exceeded the limit
of consent because it was only for collection of data and not for sharing with any other
organization.185 Hence, the Govt. has surpassed the scope of serving legitimate state aim.
iii. Govt. action is not proportionate to the objective sought.
Doctrine of proportionality is the exercise that is required to be undertaken for balancing FRs and
the restrictions imposed to carry on an occupation.186 It is an essential facet of guarantee against
arbitrary state action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is
not disproportionate to the purpose of the law187 and the means are proportional to the object sought
to be achieved by the law.188 This doctrine establishes that a limitation of a constitutional right will
be constitutionally permissible only if the measures undertaken are necessary with no alternative
measures that may similarly achieve the same purpose with a lesser degree of limitation.189
In casu, if the procedure of transferring health data was backed by consent, in that scenario both,
transfer of data and protection of privacy, could be ensured. But since no such step was undertaken

177
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI 2018 (8) MadLJ 115, 2018 (12) ¶636
178
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶180
179
ibid ¶190
180
ibid ¶182
181
ibid
182
In District Registrar and Collector Hyderabad v Canara Bank (2005) 1 SCC 496
183
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶337
184
Moot Proposition ¶8
185
Clarification point 8
186
Modern Dental College and Research Centre v State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353
187
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI AIR 2015 SC 3081 ¶180
188
Justice KS Puttaswamy v UOI 2018 (8) MadLJ 115, 2018 (12) ¶636
189
Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation (Cambridge University Press 2012)
25
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no proportionality exits which may ensure a rational nexus between the objects and the means
adopted to achieve them. Hence, the government is liable for sharing medical data of patients to
DMPL
4. WHETHER ALL THE 14 FIRS FILED AGAINST MR. OLIVER IS LIABLE TO BE
QUASHED AND HIS ARTICLE FALLS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXPRESSION OF THE PRESS?
It is humbly submitted that all the 14 FIRs filed against Mr. Michael Oliver are liable to be
quashed because [4.1] his article falls within the ambit of Art. 19(1)(a). [4.2] There is an existence of
myriad FIRs and [4.3] The case falls among the principles of quashing of FIR.
4.1. MR. OLIVER’S ARTICLE FALLS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ART. 19(1)(A).
Freedoms enumerated under Art. 19 are harmoniously construed190 to weave the fabric of a free
and equal democratic society191. Such rights are indispensable for the operation of a democratic
system192 and setting up a homogeneous egalitarian society.193 In the light of this, it is advocated that
the article of Mr. Michael Oliver, published on April 18, 2020194 falls within the ambit of freedom of
speech and expression enshrined under Art. 19(1)(a) because [i.] it includes freedom of press and [ii.]
citizens are free to exercise their democratic rights.
iii. Art. 19(1)(a) includes freedom of press.
It was made clear by Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman of the drafting committee, that no special mention
of the freedom of the press was necessary as the press and a citizen were the same so far as their
right of expression was concerned.195 It is distinct that the freedom of the press is an essential part of
the right to freedom of speech and expression.196 It is an implicit197 and comprehended198 freedom
within Art. 19(1)(a).
Thus, in casu, the article “The Ground Report”, published on April 18, 2020 in the newspaper
“The First Point”199 is within the umbrella of the freedom of press.
iv. Citizens are free to exercise their democratic rights.
In a democratic state like Union of Westeros200, freedom of speech and expression is the most
important medium of public opinion which pulsates and invigorates the democratic system of

190
ibid ¶16
191
MH Devendrappa v Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation (1998) 3 SCC 732
192
Bennet Coleman v UOI AIR 1973 SC 106
193
DC Saxena v Hon’ble Chief Justice of India AIR 1996 SC 2481
194
Moot Proposition ¶11
195
Constituent Assembly Debates 712-716, 780
196
Brij Bhushan v State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129
197
Arundhati Roy In re (2002) 3 SCC 343
198
Indian Express Newspaper (P) Ltd v UOI AIR 1986 SC 515
199
Moot Proposition ¶11
200
ibid ¶2
26
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Govt.201 J. Hidayatullah also opined that freedom of speech and expression is that cherished right on
which the democracy rests and is mean for the expression of free opinion.202 Thus Mr. Oliver has [a.]
democratic right to hold opinion and views and [b.] right to criticise the Govt. administration.
a. Mr. Oliver has democratic right to hold opinion and views.
Democratic right includes the right hold opinion, to receive and impart information without any
interference from any public authority”203 Even, Art. 19 says that everyone has their democratic right
of opinion and expression204 It is a guaranteed right to propagate ideas, views and to publish them so
as to reach any class and number of readers.205 Hence, an individual, being a citizen of India, is free
to circulate one’s views freely without any previous license or censorship.206 Moreover, this freedom
is not limited only to views but also its correspondents.207
In casu, after witnessing the pathetic condition of the migrants amid the outbreak of COVID-19,
Mr. Michael Oliver has held his opinion in his article that Govt. has failed the people of Westeros.208
This is a clear exercise of his right to hold opinion and views.
b. Mr. Oliver has democratic right to criticise
By the virtue of the freedom of speech and expression, state cannot prevent open discussion and
open expression however hateful to its policies209 or criticism of the incapacity of Govt.210 In a
democratic society, those who hold office in Govt. must always be open to criticism.211 Therefore,
any attempt to stifle or fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the most objectionable
kind.212 Hence, the people always have a right to criticize the dispensation running the administration
of the country.213
In casu, by writing about the incapacity of the Govt.214 after performing a fact check,215 Mr.
Oliver being a journalist,216 has exercised merely his democratic right to criticise.

201
Ruheela Hasan, ‘Freedom of Media in India-(A Legal Perspective)’ [2014] 3(2) IJHSS 191
202
Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 881
203
Report of 1st Press Commission 1954, page 358
204
Manoj Kumar Sadual, ‘Freedom of Press in Indian Constitution: A Brief Analysis’ [2015] 1(8) INT’L JOU APP RES
194
205
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd v UOI AIR 1962 SC 305
206
Express Newspaper Ltd v UOI AIR 1958 SC 578
207
Sakal Papers (P) Ltd v UOI AIR 1962 SC 305
208
Moot Proposition ¶11
209
Rangarajan S v Jagjivan Ram P 1989 2 SCC 574
210
LIC v Manubhai D Shah (Prof) AIR 1956 SC 541
211
Hector v AG 1991 LRC (Const) 237 (240-41) PC
212
ibid
213
Sanmay Banerjee v State of West Bengal MANU/WB/2830/2019
214
Moot Proposition ¶11
215
ibid ¶9
216
ibid
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4.2. EXISTENCE OF MYRIAD FIRS AGAINST MR. MICHAEL OLIVER.
It is contended that since multiple FIRs has been filed against Mr. Michael Oliver217, the
successive FIRs are liable to be quashed. It is so peddled because [i.] two or more successive FIRs
cannot be filed and [b.] it is a violation of fundamental right engrafted under Art. 21.
iii. Two or more successive FIRs cannot be registered.
The law concerning multiple criminal proceedings on the same cause of action has been analysed
in TT Antony v State of Kerala.218 It is a settled principle that the earliest or the first information is
enough to satisfy the requirements of Section 154 of Cr.P.C.219 Thus, no separate FIR is needed
when one FIR is already registered regarding the same offence and against the same person.220
Consequently, if a situation of successive FIRs exists the test of sameness is applied and if the
answer is in affirmative221 then no fresh FIR can be filed even on receipt of subsequent information
in respect of the same cognizable offence.222
In casu, since 14 FIRs are filed against Mr. Michael Oliver,223 the intervention of the court
becomes necessary. Further, all the FIRs are connected to the same cause of action i.e. article “The
Ground report” and even registered under same penal sections i.e. section 124-A and section 54 of
the Disaster Management Act.224
iv. It is a violation of fundamental right under Art. 21.
Administering criminal justice is a two-end process, where guarding the ensured rights of the
accused is as imperative as ensuring justice to the victim.225 Thus, a just balance between the
fundamental rights of the accused under Articles 19 and 21 and the expansive power of the police to
investigate a cognizable offence has to be maintained.226 This is also the fundamental basis on which
the jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked.227 In its furtherance, it is consistently laid down that a
second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same
transaction is not only impermissible but also violates Art. 21 of the Constitution.228
In casu, Mr. Michael Oliver’s fundamental right under Art. 19 and 21 are infringed since 14 FIRs
are registered against him, that too for the same cause and under identical penal sections.229

217
Moot Proposition ¶13
218
2001(6) SCC 181
219
ibid
220
Chirra Shivraj v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2011 SC 604
221
Babubhai v State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254
222
Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v CBI AIR 2013 SC 3794
223
Moot Proposition ¶13
224
ibid
225
Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v CBI AIR 2013 SC 3794 ¶53(i)
226
ibid ¶27
227
Arnab Ranjan Goswami v UOI MANU/SC/0448/2020 ¶28
228
Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v CBI AIR 2013 SC 3794
229
Moot Proposition ¶13
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4.3. PRESENT MATTER FALLS AMONG THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASHING OF FIR.
The judicial conscience of the Court would persuade it to exercise its power to quash any
criminal proceedings if a situation arises to prevent the abuse of process of the court and secure the
ends of justice.230 In order to achieve this objective, Hon’ble Supreme Court State of Haryana v Ch
Bhajan Lal,231 in conformity with several other precedents, laid down an inexhaustive list of several
principles which govern the basis of quashing of FIRs.
Among these principles, it has been ruled that even if the allegations made in the FIR, taken on
the face value and accepted in toto, do not constitute an offence, the criminal proceedings instituted
on the basis of such FIR should be quashed.232 The test to be applied by the court is as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence.233 If the test concurs that an
ultimate conviction is bleak the Court may quash the proceedings even though it may be at a
preliminary stage.234 Further, it has also been ruled that where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, the FIR is
liable to be quashed.235
Since both the rules depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case,236 it is
contended that the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable and no prima facie case is made
out, [i.] neither under section 124-A of I.P.C [ii.] nor under section 54 of the Disaster Management
Act, 2005.
i. Application of condition on section 124-A of I.P.C.
Section 124-A pre-requisites that the words expressed must bring into hatred or contempt or
excite disaffection against the Govt. established by law.237 The ambit of hatred and disaffection is
interpreted as the tendency to cause disorder.238 On that account, the acts and words complained of
must cause disorder or satisfy reasonable men that it has a negative intention.239 Further, an utterance
will be punishable under this section only when it is intended to disturb public peace by resort to
violence. In addition, words are not punishable under this section which are criticism of the Govt. in
power, however strong it may be, but utterances which either intended or have a tendency to subvert
the existing Govt. by means of violence.240 Moreover, the essence of the crime of sedition consists of

230
Prashant Bharti v State of NCT of Delhi AIR 2013 SC 2753
231
AIR 1992 SC 604
232
State of UP v VRK Srivastava MANU/SC/0526/1989
233
State of West Bengal v Swapan Kumar Guha AIR 1982 SC 949
234
Pratibha Rani v Suraj Kumar 1985 CriLJ 817
235
State of Haryana v Ch Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 ¶105(5)
236
State of UP v VRK Srivastava 1989 (4) SCC 59
237
Indian Penal Code 1860, Section 124-A
238
AIR 1950 SC 120
239
Niharendu v KE (1954) FCR 38
240
DD Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India, vol-1 (14th ed. 2009 Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur)
29
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intention with which the language is used.241 In judging the intention of the writer, the meaning of
the content written and language must be taken into consideration.242
In casu, on application of the prima facie principle, even if the allegations in the FIR are
accepted in toto there is a clear absence of intention because it was not an attempt to cause disorder
but rather an attempt to dive deeper into the reality by performing a fact check.243 Moreover, his
intention was also to report the true affairs of the state244 and not to overthrow the Govt. by violence.
Further, on the application of the second principle, the allegation of being seditious is inherently
improbable because no prudent person can reach to the conclusion that proceeding should be
continued. It is proved by the overwhelming support for Mr. Michael Oliver by the lawyers,
academicians, artists and journalist fraternity.245
ii. Application of condition on section 54 of Disaster Management Act, 2005.
Section 54 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 states that, “whoever makes or circulates a
false alarm or warning as to disaster or its severity or magnitude, leading to panic, shall on
conviction, be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year or with fine.”In casu, on
the application of the prima facie principle, even if it is assumed that the article of Mr. Michael
Oliver is false, he is not liable under this section because all the information in the article is related to
policies and measures of the Govt.246 and not to the disaster or its severity or magnitude. Moreover, it
is neither a circulation of warning nor any situation of panic is witnessed because of the article.
Further, on the application of second principle, charging Mr. Michael Oliver under section 54 is
absurd and inherently improbable because his article “The Ground Report” is not false since other
reports are also present which disclose the pathetic condition of migrant workers due to Govt.
incapacity.247 The “Organization for Common Cause of Poor” (OCCP) has also relied upon the
article. Along with this, the Centre for Monitoring Westeros’ Economy (CMWE) has also published
a research paper in which it has disclosed that the lockdown (i.e. the Govt. measure) has caused more
suffering to people than COVID-19 itself.248
To conclude, by filing FIRs against Mr. Oliver, the Govt. is trying to arm-twist, harass and
humiliate the petitioner and his family and to diminish his right to free speech and expression.
Hence, the FIRs must be quashed.

241
AIR 1936 Mad 758 (763)
242
AIR 1927 Cal 698
243
Moot Proposition ¶9
244
ibid
245
ibid ¶13
246
ibid ¶11
247
ibid ¶¶ 9 & 11
248
ibid ¶17
30
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PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the issue presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Petitioners request this Hon’ble Court to adjudge and declare the following:

1. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 123 of 2020, the order passed by Ministry of Home Affairs dated
27.03.2020 is arbitrary, and the detention of such migrant workers in the pursuance of such
order amounts to violation of their fundamental rights. Thus, all the detainees shall be
released immediately by issuing the writ of habeas corpus.
2. The sharing of medical data of Covid-19 tested patients with DMPL violates right to privacy
of all patients.
3. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 234 of 2020, the Ordinance passed by the Governors of all three
States vide order dated 26.04.2020 is unconstitutional as it is in violation with the
fundamental rights of workers and international laws.
4. In Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 540 of 2020 all the 14 FIRs filed against Mr. Oliver is liable
to be quashed as his article falls within the ambit of freedom of speech and expression of the
press.
And

Pass any such order that this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the interests of justice, equity and good
conscience.

In respectful submission before the Supreme Court of Westeros.

All of which is respectfully affirmed and submitted

X ___________________________

Counsels on behalf of petitioners.

31
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