Evidence Case Digest

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 19

PAGE 5 – EVIDENCE ASSIGNED – FULL TEXT court convicted Salveron of murder but did not explain how it was

of murder but did not explain how it was qualified by evident premeditation or
treachery as alleged in the information. The allegation was simply accepted without proof. This Court
1. People vs. Salveron, 228 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 102079 November 22, 1993 itself has gone over the records and finds that neither of these circumstances attended the commission
of the crime.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Where an eyewitness saw the accused with rifle seconds after gunshots rang out
and victim was dead on the ground, the conclusion is that the accused: killed the victim.—Gregorio saw Same; Same; Evident premeditation; Elements must be established.—The prosecution has not
Salveron with a rifle seconds after gunshots rang out Rosibal de Felipe was dead on the ground. There established the essential elements of evident premeditation, to wit: a) the time when the offender
was no other conclusion but that Salveron had killed Rosibal. determined to commit the crime; b) an overt act showing that the culprit had clung to his determination
to commit the crime; and c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of
Same; Same; Right against self-incrimination; Paraffin test was not violative of the accused-appellant’s the crime as to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In fact, no evidence whatsoever of
right against self-incrimination as it involved only an examination of a part of his body.—The nitrate any of these elements was presented by the People.
burns on Salveron’s hands only affirmed that conclusion. The claim that he had gone hunting was too pat
for the trial judge, who under- standably felt that the story had been concocted to explain the nitrate Same; Same; Same; Treachery; Treachery cannot be merely presumed but must be shown that accused
burns. The paraffin test did not violate the appellant’s right against self-incrimination as it involved only employed means, methods and forms calculated to insure execution of the killing without risk to himself
an examination of a part of his body. As Justice Holmes said in Holt v. United States: [T]he prohibition of arising from the defense the victim might have made.—Like evident premeditation, treachery cannot be
compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical merely presumed, and certainly not from the environmental facts of the particular case before us. While
or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be argued that Salveron ambushed Rosibal on his way home, there is also absolutely no positive
it may be material. evidence of this conjecture. On the other hand, it may also be supposed that, because he was riding on
his motorcycle, Rosibal could have used the vehicle to avert the attack upon him or even to ram his
Same; Same; Alibi; Alibi of accused-appellant though corroborated by witnesses was not convincing in attacker or at least deflect his fire. We resolve the doubt in favor of the accused. We hold that there was
the face of positive identification by an eyewitness.—The alibi itself, although corroborated by Romeo no treachery because it has not been shown that Salveron employed means, methods or forms
Salveron and Elvira Barredo, was not convincing enough in the face of the positive identification by calculated to insure the execution of the killing without risk to himself arising from the defense the
Gregorio of Salveron as the killer. That identification proved that Salveron went to Anilao not before but victim might have made.
after the killing of Rosibal. Besides, Salveron would have the court believe that he deliberately left his
wife and children, as well as his mother, simply to assist his ailing uncle. The record shows that the uncle Same; Same; In the absence of qualifying circumstances, the crime committed is merely homicide.—In
did not really need his nephew because he had from six to ten hired laborers who were then helping the absence of either of the alleged qualifying circumstances, we must find that the crime committed by
him. Salveron was merely homicide and not murder. Homicide is punishable with reclusion temporal; in this
case in its medium period, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Under the
Same; Same; Motive; Assumed motive of revenge strengthened the finding of accused-appellant’s guilt Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty is reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from prision
Proof of motive is not essential where the culprit has been positively identified.—The assumed motive of mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. People vs. Salveron, 228
Salveron to avenge the killing of his father merely strengthened the finding of the trial judge that the SCRA 92, G.R. No. 102079 November 22, 1993
appellant was guilty of killing Rosibal. We are not persuaded by the argument of the defense that
Salveron would have reacted earlier to his father’s murder if his purpose was revenge. Vengeance may G.R. No. 102079 November 22, 1993
take its time aborning; four years may not be long enough to appease the vengeful heart. In any event, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HENRY SALVERON, Accused-Appellant.
we have repeatedly held that proof of motive is not essential where the culprit has been positively The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.chanrobles virtual law library
identified, as in the case at bar. Leopoldo C. Nagera, Jr. for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Same; Same; Witnesses; Omission in the list of witnesses did not disqualify the eyewitness from
testifying as the prosecution is allowed to call witnesses other than those named in the complaint or To better understand the antecedents of this case, we go back to May 22, 1981, when Gloria de Felipe
information.—The fact that Gregorio was not in the list of witnesses that was attached to the was allegedly robbed and raped by Raul Salveron, Jesus Dalida, Mauricio Dumangas and several other
information was satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. The record shows that the criminal unidentified persons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
complaint filed with the municipal court on March 29, 1986 did not include Gregorio among the
witnesses because his sworn statement was taken only on April 1, 1986, and it was this list that was During their trial in 1982, Raul Salveron was shot to death inside a bus by a passenger who escaped and
merely copied when the information was prepared by the provincial prosecutor. At any rate, the has not been arrested to date. A few weeks later, Jesus Dalida was killed in his house under mysterious
omission did not disqualify Gregorio from testifying later because, as we said in People v. Pacabes: We circumstances that have yet to be unraveled. Mauricio Dumangas was luckier: he too was attacked with
have held in a long line of decisions that the prosecution is allowed to call witnesses other than those
apparent intent to kill but survived to accuse his attackers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
named in the complaint and information. While the accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to know
law library
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it does not mean that he is entitled to know in
advance the names of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of the prosecution might be
They were, according to him, Rosibal de Felipe, the husband of Gloria de Felipe, Marianito Billones, Jr.,
endangered if such right be granted to an accused for the known witnesses might be subjected to
and Jessie Vito, who were all eventually charged with frustrated
pressure or coerced not to testify. The time for the accused to know all the witnesses against him is
homicide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
when they take the witness stand.
It was during the pendency of this case that Rosibal de Felipe was himself gunned down, on March 26,
Same; Same; A conviction for murder must explain how it was qualified by evident premeditation or
1986, in Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Balasan, Iloilo. The killing was mounted to the herein
treachery as alleged in the information. Allegation cannot simply be accepted without proof.—The trial
appellant, Henry Slaveron, son of the late Raul Salveron, in an information for murder filed against him Salveron misses the point completely. The assumptions he protests are merely corroborative of the
and Federico Sadava. 1 This is the case now before the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual principal evidence of the prosecution, which is the testimony of
law library Gregorio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At the trial, the prosecution presented Victoriano Gregorio as its star witness. He declared that at about Gregorio saw Salveron with a rifle seconds after gunshots rang out. Rosibal de Felipe was dead on the
6:00 o'clock in the evening of said date, he went to see Rosibal at his house but was told by his wife that ground. There was no other conclusion but that Salveron had killed
he was not there. On his way back, Gregorio met Henry Salveron and Federico Sadava at the foot of the Rosibal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
bridge in Barangay Dolores and asked them what they were doing there. Salveron said they were waiting
for somebody. Gregorio proceeded on his way and, halfway through the bridge, met Rosibal, who was The nitrate burns on Salveron's hands only affirmed that conclusion. The claim that he had gone hunting
riding on a motorcycle. They talked about some cattle for sale and agreed to meet at the town of was too pat for the trial judge, who understandably felt that the story had been concocted to explain the
Estancia the following day. Gregorio reached the other end of the bridge when he heard gunshots. He nitrate burns. The paraffin test did not violate the appellant's right against self-incrimination as it
ran for fear of his life but after a while stopped and looked back, in time to see Henry Salveron standing involved only an examination of a part of his body. As Justice Holmes said in Holt v. United States:  9
at the bridge with a long firearm. Gregorio then sped back to Rosibal's house, but by another route, to
[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition
inform Gloria that her husband had been shot. 2chanrobles virtual law library
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
Rosibal was already dead when Gloria reached him. The autopsy revealed that he had died due to body as evidence when it may be material.
gunshot wounds in the head, body, arm and thigh caused by a high-powered firearm. 3chanrobles virtual
The alibi itself, although corroborated by Romeo Salveron and Elvira Barredo, was not convincing enough
law library
in the face of the positive identification by Gregorio of Salveron as the killer. That identification proved
Captain Nicanorito Gomez, station commander of the Integrated National Police branch at Balasan, that Salveron went to Anilao not before but after the killing of Rosibal. Besides, Salveron would have the
testified that after conducting an investigation of the killing, he and his men went out to look for court believe that he deliberately left his wife and children, as well as his mother, simply to assist his
Salveron and Sadava and were informed that they had gone to Camansi, Anilao, Iloilo, about 100 ailing uncle. The record shows that the uncle did not really need his nephew because he had from six to
kilometers away. The team proceeded to this place and there found the two, who willingly went with ten hired laborers who were then helping him. 10chanrobles virtual law library
them to the PC headquarters at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City. 4 There, the suspects were subjected to a
The assumed motive of Salveron to avenge the killing of his father merely strengthened the finding of the
paraffin test by Zenaida Sinfuego, a forensic chemist, who said she found them both positive for
trial judge that the appellant was guilty of killing Rosibal. We are not persuaded by the argument of the
gunpowder residue. 5chanrobles virtual law library
defense that Salveron would have reacted earlier to his father's murder if his purpose was revenge.
The defense pleaded alibi. According to Salveron his uncle Romeo Salveron fetched him on March 21, Vengeance may take its time aborning; four years may not be long enough to appease the vengeful
1986, so he could work at his farm in the town of Anilao as the latter was no longer able to do so because heart. In any event, we have repeatedly held that proof of motive is not essential where the culprit has
he was sick of tuberculosis. He started plowing the following morning at 6:00 o'clock and ended at 9:00, been positively identified, as in the case at bar. 11chanrobles virtual law library
after which he and his uncle went hunting with a licensed .22 caliber rifle. 6chanrobles virtual law library
The fact that Gregorio was not in the list of witnesses that was attached to the information was
Salveron added that on March 27, 1986, after asking his uncle's permission, he went to fetch Federico satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. The record shows that the criminal complaint filed with the
Sadava from Cabanatuan to help him with the farm. They returned to Anilao at half past 1:00 in the municipal court on March 29, 1986 did not include Gregorio among the witnesses because his sworn
afternoon and immediately started plowing the field. Afterwards, they went hunting with the same rifle statement was taken only on April 1, 1986, and it was this list that was merely copied when the
Salveron and his uncle had used earlier. 7chanrobles virtual law library information was prepared by the provincial prosecutor. At any rate, the omission did not disqualify
Gregorio from testifying later because, as we said in People v. Pacabes: 12
It was on March 28, 1986, while they were resting in his uncle's house, that they were picked up by
Captain Gomez and his men and taken to Camp Delgado.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual We have held in a long line of decisions that the prosecution is allowed to call witnesses other than those
law library named in the complaint and information. While the accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to know
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it does not mean that he entitled to know in advance
After assessing the evidence of the parties, Judge Ricardo P. Galvez of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the names of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of the prosecution might be endangered
City acquitted Federico Sadava for lack of evidence of conspiracy but found Henry Salveron guilty as if such right be granted to an accused for the known witnesses might be subjected to pressure or
charged. In a well-written decision, he sentenced Salveron to suffer the penalty of reclusion coerced not to testify. The time for the accused to know all the witnesses against him is when they take
perpetua and all accessory penalties, to indemnify the victim's heir in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the witness stand.
the costs. 8chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court convicted Salveron of murder but did not explain how it was qualified by evident
The appellant objects to this judgment. He argues in his brief that the trial court erred in assuming that premeditation or treachery as alleged in the information. The allegation was simply accepted without
he had a motive in killing Rosibal de Felipe; that he fled to Anilao after the killing; and that the nitrate proof. This Court itself has gone over the records and finds that neither of these circumstances attended
burns pointed to his guilt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library the commission of the crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The prosecution has not established the essential elements of evident premeditation, to wit: a) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; b) an overt act showing that the culprit had clung to
his determination to commit the crime; and c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and as controverting evidence to impeach Batin’s credibility as witness. Having failed to do so, appellant
the execution of the crime as to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 13 In fact, no cannot now pass the blame on the prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done.
evidence whatsoever of any of these elements was presented by the
People.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Same; Same; Witnesses; Judicial Notice; The non-disclosure by a witness to the police officers of the
accused’s identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human
Like evident premeditation, treachery cannot be merely presumed, and certainly not from the experience—the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against
environmental facts of the particular case before us. While it may be argued that Salveron ambushed immediate neighbors is of judicial notice.—Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the
Rosibal on his way home, there is absolutely no positive evidence of this conjecture. On the other hand, appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime,
it may also be supposed that, because he was riding on his motorcycle, Rosibal could have used the this fact alone does not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the
vehicle to avert the attack upon him or even ram his attacker or at least deflect his fire. We resolve the police officers of appellant’s identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against
doubt in favor of the accused. We hold that there was no treachery because it has not been shown that human experience. In fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions
Salveron employed means, methods or forms calculated to insure the execution of the killing without against immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial notice.
risk to himself arising from the defense the victim might have made. 14chanrobles virtual law library
Same; Same; Same; It is the established rule of evidence that the findings of the trial court with regard to
In the absence of either of the alleged qualifying circumstances, we must find that the crime committed the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court;
by Salveron was merely homicide and not murder. Homicide is punishable with reclusion temporal; 15 in Exceptions.—At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial
this case in its medium period, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Under the court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty is reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from prision the appellate court. This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the
mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal in its medium period as testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which can weigh said testimony in
maximum.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library the light of the witness’ demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial. And although the rule admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored
We hope that the bloody trail of vendetta that began with the alleged robbery and rape of Gloria de by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence, we
Felipe will end with the killing of her husband, Rosibal de Felipe in the case we here decide. Whatever found none in this case.
retribution is warranted upon the guilty in this tangled web of vengeance upon vengeance must be
decreed, not by those who feel they have been wronged, but by the law itself through the processes of Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Right Against Self-Incrimination; The right against self-incrimination is
the courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the accused’s own lips, against his will,
admission of his guilt and does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and the appellant is hereby declared guilty not of incriminating statement but an object evidence.—We are not persuaded. The right against self-
murder but of homicide, for which he is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He shall also by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, “x x x is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
indemnify the heirs of Rosibal de Felipe in the sum of P50,000.00 and pay the compulsion, to extort communications from him x x x.” It is simply a prohibition against legal process to
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library extract from the [accused]’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the
instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object
SO ORDERED.
evidence.
Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Same; Same; Same; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial Confessions; “Miranda Rights”; Infractions of
Bellosillo, J., is on leave. the so-called “Miranda rights” render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made
during custodial investigation—the admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the
issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.—These are the socalled “Miranda rights” so oftenly disregarded by our
2. People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996 men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are
Criminal Law; Evidence; Police Blotters; Where entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative
relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or
evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of a witness, the presentation of the police blotter as
taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to
evidence is not indispensable.—Next, appellant derided the nonpresentation by the prosecution of the
remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial
police blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime. We
investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the
do not believe, however, that it was necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the
constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility
aforementioned police blotter. Neither was its non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution’s case.
of Malaki’s wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other
Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin
facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet
that he identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its
taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys
presentation as evidence is not indispensable. Besides, if appellant believed that he was not identified
found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to
therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same
Malaki.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE WALLET AND ITS CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LEAD TO ITS PRODUCTION WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; There can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the crime; Requisites III
for Conviction.—Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we ruled that there THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion
of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient
to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the appellee in its Brief, and duly supported by the
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People vs. Malimit, evidence on record:
264 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store.
Same; Same; Alibi; As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the accused by Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the
the prosecution witnesses, it becomes weaker by reason of the unexplained failure of the defense to kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199 (sic), p. 14).
present any corroboration.—On the other hand, appellant’s version of the story does not inspire belief.
Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase
He maintains that on that fateful night he was in his house together with his wife. He claims that they
chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from his house, approximately one
had just arrived from a gambling spree allegedly in the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly,
hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from Malaki's store (Ibid., p. 24).
however, the defense did not bother to call appellant’s wife to the witness stand to corroborate
appellant’s alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui Petalcorin, or any other person who may have Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to
seen the appellant in the said place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this assertion. As the ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken
defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution aback when he saw appellant coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his
witnesses, it becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense to present any boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life" (hovering between life
corroboration. and death) (Ibid.).
Same; Same; Robbery with Homicide; Proof that the accused is in possession of a stolen property gives Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose
rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same.—Appellant’s insistence that he merely found Malaki’s Malimit (or "Manolo") rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo
wallet by chance while gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside
crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22).
as the trial court was, as to why appellant should fear being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely
found Malaki’s wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from appellant’s purported apprehension Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon (TSN, June
other than the logical conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of
appellant is in possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same. Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell
People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996 Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki
in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with 1 and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid., pp. 16-17). 6
with homicide, 2 was meted by the trial court 3 the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. 4
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio
In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court committed the following errors, Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the
to wit: incident. He posits that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on September 17, 1991
when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit.
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin
WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF implicated the appellant to this gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date
THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY REVEALED THEIR ALLEGED "KNOWLEDGE" OF TH6E CRIME however, was merely the date 7 when Rondon and Batin executed their respective affidavits, 8 narrating
MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT. that they saw the appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing
out of Malaki's store. As to appellant's claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are
II ample testimonial evidence negating appellant's protestation, to wit: (1) after having discovered the
commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-
law, and informed him that appellant was the only person they saw running away from the crime scene; If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal
9 (2) Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment in their barangay where Batin utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a
declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on that fateful night; 10 and (3) Batin again made a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the
similar statement later at the Silago Police Station.11 authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his
possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In
Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial
if appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime.12 We do not believe, however, that compulsion 28
it was necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police blotter.
Neither was its non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution's case. Entries in the police blotter are Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence pursuant to the
merely corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz
as the perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not
indispensable. 13 Besides, if appellant believed that he was not identified therein, then he should have (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
secured a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
impeach Batin's credibility as witness. 14 Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the blame on choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
the prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done. cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on September 15, 1991, or xxx xxx xxx
after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does not render their
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in
testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity
evidence against him. (Emphasis ours.)
immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. 15 In fact the
natural reticence of most people to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, xxx xxx xxx
as in this case, 16 is of judicial notice. 17 At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that
the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However,
degree of respect by the appellate court. 18 This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during
assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which can custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is
weigh said testimony in the light of the witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the not otherwise excluded by law or rules, 29 is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have
trial. 19 And although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute
the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these
clearly unsupported by the evidence, 20 we found none in this case. constitutional short-cuts do not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence
certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is
admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery.
In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of Malaki's The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are
wallet 21 together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; 22 (2) his identification admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that
card;23 and (3) bunch of keys, 24 violates his right against self-incrimination. 25 Likewise, appellant these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's culpability
sought for their exclusion because during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt
investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional as perpetrator of the crime charged.
rights.

We, now come to appellant's third assignment of error where he demurs on the prosecution's evidence,
We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds contending that they are insufficient to sustain his conviction.
no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is
conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will,
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others,
admission of his guilt. 27 It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded
as the perpetrator of the crime. 30 In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the
is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before
same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 31 In this case, there were at least five (5)
circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events which by their "concordant combination and
cumulative effect", satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the appellant, 32 specifically: (1)
appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in his right presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant
hand and rushing out of Malaki's store seconds prior to their discovery of the crime; 33 (2) Malaki had not reappeared or remained at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not
sustained multiple stab wounds 34 and he died of "cardiac arrest, secondary to severe external waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the fugitive’s advantage, and in mockery of
hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds", 35 (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been recaptured.
1991, accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a stone at the seashore in
Barangay Hingatungan; 36 (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony that on August 6, 1991, he Same; Same; Doctrine in People vs. Avanceña, modified by Section 19 of the Constitution which now
accompanied several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; 37 and (5) appellant's flight allows trial in absentia; Requirements for trial in absentia.—The doctrine laid down in that case has been
and his subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident. 38 modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia. Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping
thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been
arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.

On the other hand, appellant's version of the story does not inspire belief. He maintains that on that Same; Same; Right to be present at one’s trial waivable, except only at that stage where the accused has
fateful night he was in his house together with his wife. He claims that they had just arrived from a to be identified by prosecution witnesses; Defendant’s escape constitutes a waiver of the right to be
gambling spree allegedly in the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the defense did present and to be notified of the trial.—The right to be present at one’s trial may now be waived except
not bother to call appellant's wife to the witness stand to corroborate appellant's alibi. Neither did it only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.
present as witness Maui Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the appellant in the said Under Section 19, the defendant’s escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the
place, if only to provide a semblance of truth to this assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak in view of court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will
the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses, 39 it becomes weaker because of be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear
the unexplained failure of the defense to present any corroboration. 40 Furthermore, proof that appellant unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law,
was in his house when the crime was committed is not enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate that
he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its vicinity, at the time of its Same; Same; When all the requisites for a trial in absentia are present, the trial judge erred in refusing to
commission. 41 In this case, appellant himself admitted that his house was just about eighty (80) meters try the accused who had already been arraigned when he escaped.—Trial in absentia was not allowed in
away from the house of Borja v. Mendoza because it was held notwithstanding that the accused had not been previously
arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the
Malaki. 42 It was, therefore, not impossible for him to have been physically present at the place of the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the
commission of the crime, as in fact, no evidence to negate this possibility was ever adduced by him at the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong
trial. should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be
notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the
evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction.

Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance while gathering shells along the Same; Same; Interpretation, Too literal reading of the law, not advisable; Judges, not bound by the
seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath language of the law but must discover the reason and rhyme for its enactment.—We admonish against a
a stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to why appellant should fear too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference can be intention of its authors Same; Same; Doctrine in People vs. Avanceña, modified by Section 19 of the
drawn from appellant's purported apprehension other than the logical conclusion that appellant had Constitution which now allows trial in absentia; Requirements for trial in absentia.—The doctrine laid
knowledge of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of a stolen property gives rise to a down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia. Now, the prisoner
valid presumption that he stole the same. 43 cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided
only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is
In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of robbery, appellant was correctly convicted
unjustified.
by the trial court of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Same; Same; Right to be present at one’s trial waivable, except only at that stage where the accused has
to be identified by prosecution witnesses; Defendant’s escape constitutes a waiver of the right to be
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
present and to be notified of the trial.—The right to be present at one’s trial may now be waived except
SO ORDERED. only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.
Under Section 19, the defendant’s escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the
court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will
be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear
3. People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, No. L-66469 July 29, 1986 unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law,

Constitutional Law; Trial in absentia; Purpose of the rule that trial of the accused may proceed Same; Same; When all the requisites for a trial in absentia are present, the trial judge erred in refusing to
notwithstanding the absence of the accused.—The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of try the accused who had already been arraigned when he escaped.—Trial in absentia was not allowed in
criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely Borja v. Mendoza because it was held notwithstanding that the accused had not been previously
abandoned, because of the defendant’s escape. The old case of People v. Avanceña required his
arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be
requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The
accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong old case of People v. Avanceña  8 required his presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had
should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not re-appeared or remained at large. As his right to be
notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the
evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction. fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as
he had not been recaptured.
Same; Same; Interpretation, Too literal reading of the law, not advisable; Judges, not bound by the
language of the law but must discover the reason and rhyme for its enactment.—We admonish against a The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia,
too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual
intention of its authors conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c)
his failure to appear is unjustified.
People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial  in
G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986 absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners, forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped,
vs. and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG, legal justification. In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against
ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape
MABUHAY, respondents. will, legally speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will
continue even in his absence and most likely result in his conviction.
Basilio E. Duaban for accused.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution
RUZ, J.: intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under Section 19, the defendant's escape
will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice.
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he
The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping,
could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. 1 As a result of the
placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not
guilty.2 Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first
information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the
ordering his release; and so he escaped. 3 The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the
the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution instant case, since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge
moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial  in should refuse to try the accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he was released on the
absentia under certain circumstances.5 The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture
suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. 6 The order of the trial court is now before us of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his
on certiorari and mandamus.7 behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable
conviction.
The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by
the literal reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its
intendment. purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that
killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must
look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as
reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need
follows:
and must use not only learning but also vision.

Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent
The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the
until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
city court of Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result
counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
of his investigation within sixty days.
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been absentia of the accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
4. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 86 SCRA 27, L-26136 October 30, MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
1978
In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and/or the "Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc.", now petitioner in
Labor Law; Due process; Evidence; A party, even in a labor suit, who was deprived of his right to cross- this case, was in the transportation business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit".
examine a witness who left for abroad, is entitled to have the latter’s testimony stricken off the record.— In that year the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and the dispute between the
Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations for compulsory arbitration. The
failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that case was docketed as Case No. 22- IPA entitled: Rural Transit Employees Association vs. Bachrach Motor
he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, Co., and Bachrach
respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record.
Transportation Co. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR for short) immediately issued an order on
Same; Same; Same; Admission by adverse counsel during direct testimony of signatures on certain August 7, 1958 by which the strikers were ordered to return to work and the management to take them
documents is an admission only of said signature thereon not the truth of the documents as regards back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. 1
which the adverse party is still entitled to cross-examine the witness.—Petitioner contends however that
it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Ursula Silva, to identify the documents, Exhibits “1” to “8- While this labor dispute was pending with the CIR Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge
F”, but it did not proceed to call the witness for the reason that during the hearing of January 16, 1965, driver Maximo Jacob from the service", dated July 24, 1961. The reasons given for the petition were
respondent’s counsel, Atty. Santiago, manifested that he was admitting the signatures of Joseph Kaplin alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law by Maximo Jacob resulting in damage to property and
on the aforesaid documents. However true that may be, what Atty. Santiago admitted merely was the injuries to third parties, the latest of which occurred on June 9, 1961 resulting in the "total destruction of
signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth of the contents of the documents. The opposing part was still bus 170" of the company.
entitled to cross-examine the witness on the matters written on Exhibits “1” to “8-F” especially if they
adversely affected the substantial rights of the party against whom they were being presented, namely,
driver Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted that the signature appearing in Exhibits “1” to “8-F” An "Answer and Counter-Petition" was filed in behalf of Maximo Jacob by the Rural Transit Employees
was that of witness Kaplin, the counsel of petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if the Association whereby it denied the charges and alleged that the June 9, 1961 accident was due to a
party was admitting likewise the veracity of the contents of the documents; not having done so, mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob, hence, the latter's
petitioner must now suffer the consequences. suspension from the service was not justified.

Same; Same; Same; The labor court need not receive evidence for the purpose of finding out the validity The petition of Bachrach docketed as Case No. 22-IPA (11) was heard on January 23, 1963, during which
of the suspension order issued against the worker which it ordered reinstated where the company’s petitioner presented its one and only witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, and
petition to discharge the latter was already dismissed.—Considering the dismissal of Bachrach’s petition various documents marked as Exhibits "1" to "8-F" inclusive. After Mr. Kaplin, concluded his direct
to discharge Maximo Jacob, the lifting of the latter’s suspension and his reinstatement in the service testimony, with agreement of the parties, the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of
were but a necessary consequence thereof. For obvious reasons, the relief could be granted without cross-examination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear
need of evidence. The onus probandi was on the company, now petitioner, to justify the suspension of because he had left for abroad.
Jacob and his eventual separation from the service. Having failed to discharge that burden, there were
no valid grounds for it to keep its employee away from his work. Sometime on March 8 1965, the employee's association filed a motion praying that:

Same; Same; Same; Payment of backwages for a period equivalent to 3 years is reasonable to avoid (a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records
protracted delay.—On the matter of backwages, We agree with petitioner’s counsel that the judicial
trend is to fix a reasonable period for the payment of backwages, the philosophy being to avoid
(b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the
protracted delay in post-judgment hearings to prove or disprove earnings of the worker elsewhere
service be denied: and
during the period he had not been reinstated to his employment. Following this principle, We hold that
payment of backwages for a period of three (3) years is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of
the case. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 86 SCRA 27, L-26136 October 30, (c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with
1978 backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement. 2

----------------- In an order dated March 1, 1966, the CIR through then Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez dismissed the
company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages
from the date of his suspension up to his actual reinstatement. 3
G.R. No. L-26136 October 30, 1978

Bachrach's motion for reconsideration 4 having been denied 5, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari on
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. and/or "BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION CO., INC", as operator of the
June 15, 1966 which in the Court's Resolution of July 18,1966 was given due course. 6
RURAL TRANSIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents.. The following errors are now assigned by petitioner, viz: 7
I The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial
litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is fundamental right which is part of due
The respondent court erred in dismissing the petition of the herein petitioner,
process. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62
after ordering the testimony of Joseph Kaplin to be stricken off the record,
SCRA 258)
notwithstanding the fact that the service records of Maximo Jacob, upon the basis
of which his dismissal could be justified were admitted by it.
In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, defendant's witness failed to appear at the continuation
of hearing during which the witness was to be cross-examined by plaintiff's counsel. The trial court
II
denied defendant's motion for postponement and ordered the unfinished testimony of the witness
Lazzari stricken off the record. In sustaining said order, this Court held inter alia:
The respondent court erred in not admitting the petitioner's exhibits unqualifiedly
and in admitting them "for whatever worth they may have" only to disregard them
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the
entirely thereafter on the alleged ground that "the contents of the same were not
witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-
proven.
examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when
cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes
III attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is
thereby rendered incompetent.
The respondent court erred in not ordering the dismissal of Maximo Jacob.
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it
IV is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases.
The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not
render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is
The respondent court erred in granting the respondent union's counter-petition an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ...
without reception of evidence, especially after it earlier dismissed the petitioner's Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness
petition on the technical ground that Joseph Kaplin was not cross-examined by the cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part
respondent union. of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. (64 SCRA 610,
636- 637; emphasis supplied)
V
Parenthetically, the situation in Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra,
The respondent court erred in granting backwages to Maximo Jacob from the date was different. There, the witness, Atty. Morabe, had finished his direct testimony and he was ready and
of his suspension up to actual reinstatement without evidence to prove that he has available for cross-examination. Motions for postponement of the cross-examination were made
exercised reasonable diligence to secure other employment during the time of his however by the adverse counsel from time to time until one day Atty. Morabe succumbed to a fatal
alleged suspension. heart attack without the cross-examination having been accomplished. On motion of the respondents
the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the testimony of Atty. Morabe deleted from the record. On a
petition for certiorari by Savory Luncheonette, this Court set aside the order and held that by their own
VI actuations, respondents were considered to have impliedly waived and thereupon lost their right to
cross-examine the witness, for such a right may be forfeited by a party litigant through his own conduct.
The respondent court erred in not holding that the union has the burden to prove Petitioner contends however that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Ursula Silva, to Identify
that Maximo Jacob is entitled to backwages. the documents, Exhibits "1" to "8-F", but it did not proceed to call the witness for the reason that during
the hearing of January 16, 1965, respondent's counsel, Atty. Santiago, manifested that he was admitting
the signatures of Joseph Kaplin on the aforesaid documents. 8 However true that may be, what Atty.
VII
Santiago admitted merely was the signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth of the contents of the
documents. 9 The opposing party was still entitled to cross-examine the witness on the matters written
The respondent court erred in not holding that, if at all, Maximo Jacob is only entitled to three months on Exhibits "1" to "8-F" especially if they adversely affected the substantial rights of the party against
backwages according to the Sta. Cecilia Sawmill case. whom they were being presented, namely, driver Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted that the
signature appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was that of witness Kaplin, the counsel of petitioner then,
1. Respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if the party was admitting likewise the veracity of the contents of
Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to prove its case against driver Jacob. The the documents; not having done so, petitioner must now suffer the consequences. Exhibits "1" to "8-F"
witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple were admitted by respondent court only for "whatever they may be worth." Evaluating them, however,
reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to cross- it did not consider said documents, and rightly so, as competent proof of the truthfulness of their
examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken contents without the supporting testimony of witness Kaplin. As stated in the order under review "(N)o
off the record. other witness was presented by respondent company (now petitioner) to testify on the intrinsic value of
those exhibits"; consequently, they are hearsay. Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken
off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which the opponent in his case in reply” and is “necessary only because, on a plea in denial, new subordinate
substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge evidential facts have been offered, or because, on an affirmative plea, its substantive facts have been put
Jacob from its service is in order. forward, or because, on any issue whatever, facts discrediting the proponent’s witnesses have been
offered.” While the presentation of rebuttal evidence is discretionary with the prosecution in a criminal
2. No error was committed when the CIR, without receiving evidence, granted relief to private action, in the instant case, the overwhelming import of the new facts disclosed by the accused which have
respondent herein on its counter-petition. a damaging effect on the complainant’s version made it imperative for the prosecution to present rebuttal
evidence. Relegating the complainant to the background and presenting other witnesses to rebut minor or
At the time Bachrach filed its petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, there was a pending labor dispute in trivial matters brought out in the evidence in chief for the defense engender serious doubts on the
the CIR between the company and the employee's union. The CIR ordered the strikers to return to work. integrity of her story. People vs. Padero, 226 SCRA 810, G.R. No. 106274 September 28, 1993
The company in the meantime suspended its driver Maximo Jacob after the alleged June 9, 1961
accident. 10 ---------------

G.R. No. 106274 September 28, 1993


Considering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, the lifting of the latter's PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HENRY PADERO, Accused-Appellant.
suspension and his reinstatement in the service were but a necessary consequence thereof. For obvious The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.chanrobles virtual law library
reasons, the relief could be granted without need of evidence. The onus probandi was on the company, Herbert P. Timtim for accused-appellant.
now petitioner, to justify the suspension of Jacob and his eventual separation from the service. Having
failed to discharge that burden, there were no valid grounds for it to keep its employee away from his
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
work.

In a complaint 1 filed on 21 January 1992 with Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros
3. On the matter of backwages, We agree with petitioner's counsel that the judicial trend is to fix a
Oriental and docketed therein Criminal Case No. 741-B, Jocelyn Cadeliña, a sixteen-year-old lass and a
reasonable period for the payment of backwages, the philosophy being to avoid protracted delay in post-
resident of sitio Amalao, barangay Tagpo of Bais City, charged Henry Padero, her uncle-in-law, with the
judgment hearings to prove or disprove earnings of the worker elsewhere during the period he had not
crime of rape committed as follows:
been reinstated to his employment." 11 Following this principle, We hold that payment of backwages for
a period of three (3) years is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
That on or about, August 31, 1991, at Bais City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused, armed with a knife, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
WHEREFORE, We hereby render judgment affirming the order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her
dated March 1, 1966, now under review, with the sole modification that petitioner shall pay its driver
will.
Maximo Jacob three (3) years backwages at the rate of the last salary received before he was suspended,
without qualification and deduction. With costs against petitioner. Order modified.
The warrant for the arrest of the accused, issued on 21 January 1992,  2 was served upon him on 4 March
1992. 3 No bail was recommended for his temporary liberty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
SO ORDERED.
law library

A plea of not guilty having been entered by the accused at his arraignment on 13 March 1992,  4 the case
was set for continuous trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
5. People vs. Padero, 226 SCRA 810, G.R. No. 106274 September 28, 1993

Criminal Law; Rape; Remedial Law; Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; Rule that when the issue of The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jocelyn Cadeliña and Cherryl Palacios for its
evidence in chief, and Clara Cadeliña, Rev. Lemuel Felecio, and Damiana Cadeliña on rebuttal. The
credibility is involved, appellate courts generally will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless
accused took the witness stand in his defense and presented Loreta Samane, Elsa Garcia, Macrina
certain facts of value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.—The
Padero, and Marietta Padero as his witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
credibility then of the complainant is under scrutiny here. The trial court gave her testimony full faith and
credit. The general rule is that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is involved, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to In a decision promulgated on 2 June 1992,  5 the trial court convicted the accused of the crime charged.
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner The dispositive portion thereof as follows:
of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused, HENRY PADERO, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged, and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
thereby sentences him to RECLUSION PERPETUA and indemnity offended party, Jocelyn Cadeliña the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000) PESOS, and to pay costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rebuttal Evidence; The function of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, virtual law library
counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adversary.—The function of rebuttal evidence is to explain,
repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adversary. Its office is “to meet the new facts put in by SO ORDERED.
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the complainant who it said testified "with the market at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, told him to bring his mosquito net and folding bed to the
sincerity, honesty and candidness and with answers direct to the point, in a logical and straightforward house she was renting. At that time, he was drinking beer with his brother in front of his mother's store.
manner, and free from inconsistencies."chanrobles virtual law library After having brought the mosquito net and the folding bed to the rented house, he went back to
continue drinking with his brother. Later, past midnight, he went back to the rented house, and saw
complainant already lying on his folding bed. He asked her what she was doing in his folding bed, but she
On the other hand, it characterized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as "laden with
cautioned him to be silent, and she pulled him down, and thereupon they have their first sexual
inconsistencies" and described their manner of testifying as "clearly wanting of candor, honesty, and
intercourse. After that, they had sexual intercourse for about fifteen (15) times in that very house,
elements of straightforward manner of delivery" and "fraught with hesitations."  6chanrobles virtual law
usually at the time when the other occupants in the rented house were not around. They likewise
library
engaged in sexual activities short of intercourse in the house of Jocelyn, and in his father-in-law's house
in sitio Amalao. His relationship with Jocelyn ended in October, 1991, when he avoided her due to the
The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the trial court, is as follows: latter's wish that they go away but which wish he did not agree as he has a wife and children. During
their intimate moments, Jocelyn revealed to him that she had relationship with a certain Pedring, Ali
Complainant, JOCELYN CADELIÑA, 16 years old, jobless, single and a resident of sitio Amalao, barangay Labeste and a certain Amay. Jocelyn was motivated into filing this case against him for his having avoided
Tagpo Bais City, testified that:chanrobles virtual law library her, and the condition imposed by her mother that they should see first the appearance of the child to
be given birth before they will give expenses for delivery.  8chanrobles virtual law library

She knows the accused as the latter is the husband of Marietta Indiao who is her mother's sister, by
affinity, accused is her uncle-in-law, At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 31, 1991, she He sought to buttress his defense with the testimonies of Loreta Samane, Elsa Garcia, Macrina Padero,
attended the services of the Youth Services Organization in Bais City, and after the service, she helped in and his wife, Marietta Padero. Loreta Samane, the accused's maid, declared that one early morning in
the cleaning of their church, which ended at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Afterwards, they had choir March 1991 when she was in the house of Clara Cadeliña, she was requested by Clara to get a plate and
practice, and having finished practice, ate supper in the house of the pastor upon invitation of the latter. spoon from the house of Damiana Cadeliña (mother of the complainant); that when the door of the
Later at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, together with a co-member of the choir, Cherryl Palacios, they latter's house was opened for her by Wengweng, a 14 year old sister of the complainant, Loreta saw the
proceeded home riding on a pedicab, their houses being near to each other. Together with her sister and accused and the complainant covered by a blanket underneath a table. Suddenly a gust of wind blew
friends, they were renting a house situated at Aglipay St., Bais City which was owned by one Macrina away the blanket and she saw the complainant fondling the sex organ of the accused. On another
Padero, mother of the accused. At that time, she stayed at the second floor of the rented house as the occasion, also in March 1991 at about noon, she saw the latter and the complainant lying down in the
school is far from their home at barangay Tagpo. Upon arrival at said rented house at past 10:00 o'clock middle of the house with the complainant's legs wrapped around those of the accused.  9 Elsa Garcia, who
in the evening of August 31, 1991, and before she went up to the second floor, she noticed accused has been occupying the unit adjacent to that rented by the complainant and one Marilou since
sleeping inside a mosquito net at the ground floor. She was not surprised on seeing the accused sleeping 16 September 1991, declared that in the evening of that date she heard noises from the unit occupied by
at the ground floor that night as she had been used to seeing the accused slept [ sic] there. She the complainant, so she peeped through a hole in the wall and saw the complainant, who was not fully
immediately went upstairs to the second floor, and went to sleep alone that night as her sister, dressed, on top of the accused on a folding bed while caressing him. At another time, she also saw the
Darwinda, and her friends, Melissa Adalid and one Marilou were not there. At about 11:00 o'clock that complainant approach the accused, who was sitting at the doorway of Elsa's unit, and tell him that she
same night, she woke up to find accused on top of her with his right arm holding a knife, and his left was "two months pregnant." 10chanrobles virtual law library
hand holding her right arm. Accused told her "don't shout because if you shout I will kill you". (TSN, p. 12,
March 18, 1992) For fear, she did not shout. After having removed her blouse and panty with his left Macrina Padero, the mother of the accused, testified that sometime in October 1991, she met Damiana
hand, accused successfully raped her. She tried to resist but was pinned down by the accused, who was Cadeliña at the house of Elsa Garcia. Damiana told her that the complainant and the accused "had a
aiming the knife at her. After warning her not to report the incident otherwise he will kill her, accused relationship" and that "in case of delivery of the baby," she (Macrina) is obligated to spend on the
went back to sleep on the ground floor, but she was not able to sleep the rest of the night. With the delivery." Macrina stated that she was willing to spend for the child on condition that she "should see
threat to kill her by the accused, she did not report the incident to anybody, until after several months, first the appearance of the child." Elsa, the accused, and his wife were present at the time.  11chanrobles
she was forced to tell her mother as she was conceiving. Her mother, Damiana Cadeliña, immediately virtual law library
filed a complaint. She suffered sadness and mental anguish caused by the sexual abuse on her by the
accused, and leaves to the court damages that may be awarded to
Marietta Padero testified that she frequently quarreled with her husband, the accused herein, because
her. 7chanrobles virtual law library
she "was jealous with their [sic] relationship with the woman, Jocelyn, her niece." During the instances
when Jocelyn came to her house, she observed that when she turned her back, Jocelyn and her husband
On the other hand, the accused, who was 21 years old at the time he testified on 1 April 1992, admitted talked to each other, but when she was near them they would stop conversing. At one time, Jocelyn
having sexual intercourse on several occasions with the complainant, the niece of his wife, but alleged accompanied her husband in fetching water. She was present during the meeting between her mother-
that these were all with her consent. His testimony is condensed by the trial court in this wise: in-law (Macrina) and Damiana wherein the former told the latter, "Day, if Jocelyn gave birth, we will just
help in the expenses." 12chanrobles virtual law library
His relationship with Jocelyn started sometime in March, 1991, at the house of her mother, where
Jocelyn was renting. It started when he noticed that she usually sat on his lap, and paid special attention On rebuttal, Clara Cadeliña denied the testimony of Loreta Samane that sometime in March 1991 she
to him. He reminded her that how could they maintain such relationship considering that she is his niece, ordered her to get a plate and spoon from Damiana's house which is only two meters from her
but Jocelyn countered that she was in love with him and her aunt (accused's wife) was not around. From house 13 and the testimony of Macrina Padero that she had a conference with Macrina in the house of
the commencement of their relationship, and whenever he was in Bais City, he usually slept in the house Elsa Garcia and that she requested Macrina to support the child of the complainant. Clara further
rented by Jocelyn. In furtherance of said illicit relationship, they started kissing each other. It was in the declared it is not possible, as testified to by Loreta, that the complainant and the accused were covered
month of August, 1991 that they had their first sexual intercourse. On that day, Jocelyn who arrived from
with a blanket under the table, and that the complainant was fondling the sex organ of the A painstaking review of the evidence discloses vital facts of immense importance in the determination of
accused. 14 chanrobles virtual law library this issue - facts which would necessarily affect the result of this case but which the trial court apparently
overlooked or glossed over. This case then falls under the exception to the general
rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The accused seasonably appealed from the judgment 15 and in his Appellant's Brief filed on 2 March 1993
assigns the following errors:
For one, despite the positive testimony of the accused which squarely traversed the complainant's
version of force or intimidation by stating that he and the complainant had an intimate relationship, with
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT JOCELYN "JOY"
the latter as the more aggressive partner, and that their first sexual encounter in August of 1991 was
CADELIÑA CONSIDERING THAT IT IS CONTRARY TO COMMON HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE
followed by fifteen more encounters at the same place during week-ends when the complainant was
AND THIS IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
alone, all of which were new facts, the complainant was never recalled to the witness stand to rebut
these obviously damaging revelations of the accused. The prosecution was simply contented with the
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE presentation of Clara Cadeliña, Rev. Lemuel Felecio, and Damiana Cadeliña to rebut some less important,
DEFENSE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library if minor or trivial, matters brought out in the testimonies of Loreta Samane and Macrina Padero. Why
the complainant herself was not made to rebut the damaging evidence against her is beyond us. After
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT the second rebuttal witness, Rev. Felecio, had finished his testimony, the prosecutor simply announced
OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 16chanrobles virtual law library to the court that the last rebuttal witness would be Damiana Cadeliña. 24chanrobles virtual law library

The accused admits having carnal knowledge of the complainant not only on the date alleged in the The function of the rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the
information but for fifteen (15) more times thereafter but maintains that he and the complainant are adversary. 25 Its office is "to meet the new facts put in by the opponent in his case in reply" and is
lovers and that the complainant voluntarily had sex with him. His testimony pictured the complainant as "necessary only because, on a plea in denial, new subordinate evidential facts have been offered, or
a woman passionately in love with him, who not only initiated the first sexual encounter but longed for because, on an affirmative plea, its substantive facts have been put forward, or because, on any issue
and welcomed the others. Accused further maintains that an analysis of the complainant's testimony whatever, facts discrediting the proponent's witnesses have been offered." 26 While the presentation of
discloses other signs of the absence of force or intimidation: she manifested no form of resistance; she rebuttal evidence is discretionary with the prosecution in a criminal action, 27 in the instant case, the
made no outcry at the start of the sexual assault nor did she plead with the accused; she shed not a overwhelming import of the new facts disclosed by the accused which have a damaging effect on the
single drop of tear at her defloration; 17 and after the sexual act, instead of crying or cursing the accused complainant's version made it imperative for the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence. Relegating
for his dastardly act, she nonchalantly sat down with the accused. 18 Finally, the accused points out that the complainant to the background and presenting other witnesses to rebut minor or trivial matters
although the alleged rape took place on 31 August 1991, it was only about three months later, upon brought out in the evidence in chief for the defense engender serious doubts on the integrity of her
learning that she was pregnant, that the complainant revealed the alleged rape to her mother; her story.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
explanation for the delay - that the accused threatened to kill her if she reported the incident - is
unacceptable because the threat, if any, was not continuing. 19chanrobles virtual law library For another, we find enough evidence of the intimate relationship between the complainant and the
accused. On cross-examination, she admitted that the accused used to sleep in the unit of the house
In rape cases, the following guidelines have been laid down by this Court: (1) an accusation for rape can which she rented from his mother. Thus:
be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the Q You will agree with me that it was not the only occasion [referring to 31 August 1991 when she was
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the allegedly raped] that Henry Padero slept on that unit of the house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the virtual law library
weakness of the evidence for the defense. 20 Accordingly, the complainant's testimony should not be
received with precipitate credulity, especially when the conviction depends at any vital point upon her
A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
uncorroborated testimony; it should not be accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from
suspicion. Such testimony must be impeccable and ring true throughout, or credible and
positive. 21chanrobles virtual law library Q Because there were several occasions in the past that he slept on that unit?chanrobles virtual law
library
The credibility then of the complainant is under scrutiny here. The trial court gave her testimony full faith
and credit. The general rule is that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is involved, appellate courts A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner
Q And in those times Henry Padero occupied the ground floor?chanrobles virtual law library
of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 22chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes. 28
The core issue here is whether the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant through the use of
force or intimidation, 23 or whether the complainant consented to the sexual She further revealed that the door to her room at the upper story of the unit has no lock:
intercourse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q According to you, you were occupying the upper storey, that room you were occupying has a door is Also, her concut during and after coitus unmistakably discloses absence of even token resistance and
that correct?chanrobles virtual law library betrays her consent to the sexual congress.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A Yes, but there's no lock.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library In one salient portion of the cross-examination, we find her totally submissive in the face of the assault
against her most prized possession and unusually observant of the preparatory acts of the accused and
his eventual physiological and emotional transformation in fulfilled libido. Thus:
Q And that was the place which according to you that Henry raped you [sic]?chanrobles virtual law
library
Q Did you notice Henry Padero when you were lying down?chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes. 29
A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
And, as further testified to by her on cross-examination, she declared that the accused usually came to
her rented unit every weekend since June 1991 and slept there despite the fact that the house of his Q He was on top of you when he held your right hand?chanrobles virtual law library
mother is only nearby:
A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q How many times did Henry sleep in that house before this alleged incident?chanrobles virtual law
library
Q He was on top of you when he threatened you with a knife?chanrobles virtual law library

A He usually went there every weekend in my rented house.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual


A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
law library

Q How was he able to remove your pantie when he was on top of you?chanrobles virtual law library
Q And his parents' house is very near to the house where you were renting?chanrobles virtual law library

A When he was on top of me he released my right hand and with his left hand he removed my
A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
pantie.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q About what month was that Henry started sleeping in your house where you were occupying?
Q When [he] removed your pantie your right hand therefore was already free?chanrobles virtual law
chanrobles virtual law library
library

A June 1991. 30
A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Why the accused chose weekends can easily be explained by the fact that the complainant's companions
Q Did he remove his pants?chanrobles virtual law library
in the rented unit, including her own sister, usually went home on Fridays. He testified thus:

A At the time he was on top of me he was only wearing shorts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles


Q In those times that you have these activities together 31 in the morning, where were the other
virtual law library
occupants in that dwelling occupied by Jocelyn?chanrobles virtual law library

Q Had his t-shirt on?chanrobles virtual law library


A They usually go home during Fridays. 32

A None.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library


If indeed there was no liaison between the complainant and the accused, we find it rather unusual that
the accused would spend his weekends in her rented unit and not at his parents' residence which was
just nearby, and that instead of going home to her parent's home in Amalao, Tagpo, Bais City, just as her Q What was the color of his short pants?chanrobles virtual law library
companions were wont to, the complainant preferred to welcome the accused in her rented unit and
allow him to spend his weekend nights alone with her. She offered no satisfactory explanation therefore. A I can not remember anymore.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
These facts do not appear to us to be innocuous coincidences. Rather, they eloquently manifest a mutual
understanding or a predetermined plan. She could not just have accommodated an uncle-in-law even if
he were in need of a place to sleep after a hard day's work and reposed in him complete trust and Q Did he remove his short pants?chanrobles virtual law library
confidence during the tempting hours of the night without any lock on the door of her room to keep her
safe just in without any look on the door of her room to keep her safe just in case he was overpowered A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
by the beast in him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q What arm did he use to remove his short?chanrobles virtual law library Q After that there was fluid which you felt came out from the penis of Henry Padero before he pulled out
his penis?chanrobles virtual law library
A With his left.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A It took long time. 33
Q When [he] removed his short pants did you see his penis?chanrobles virtual law library
After the sexual intercourse, both parties merely sat down. The accused then went down to the ground
floor to sleep:
A No.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q So after he had sex intercourse [sic] with you he did not stand up right away?chanrobles virtual law
Q Was he wearing underwear?chanrobles virtual law library
library

A I can not remember anymore.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library


A No.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q Did he insert his penis into your vagina?chanrobles virtual law library
Q He had sexual intercourse with you only once?chanrobles virtual law library

A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library


A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Q Did he separate your legs?chanrobles virtual law library


Q He did not stand up right away but after that he sat down while you were lying down still?chanrobles
virtual law library
A Yes, because he parted my legs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A I also sat down.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q When he inserted his penis were you hurt?chanrobles virtual law library
Q After that Henry Padero went back to the ground floor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library law library

Q How long did he stay [sic] that penis in our vagina?chanrobles virtual law library A He went back to sleep to the ground floor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A I can not remember anymore.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Q You went back to sleep also?chanrobles virtual law library

Q When he inserted that he was making a push and pull movement?chanrobles virtual law library A I was not able to sleep already. 34

A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The claim of threat or intimidation through the use of a knife merits scant consideration. As shown
above, and even from the complainant's direct testimony, 35 the alleged "more than a finger stretch
Q And you noticed that there was something [that] come out from his penis?chanrobles virtual law length" knife was never accounted for during and after coitus. As admitted by the complainant during
library the cross-examination, she allegedly saw it for the first time when she was roused from her sleep and
she notice the accused on top of her, holding the knife in his right hand. 36 In this position, the accused
could only be facing down at her. However, on direct examination, she declared that when she saw him
A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library wielding a knife and holding her arm, [he] was lying down, faced [sic] up":

Q There was that push and pull movement by Henry Padero for several times?chanrobles virtual law Q Will you please tell the court what was [the] unusual incident that happened?chanrobles virtual law
library library

A Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library A I woke up and noticed Henry Padero was holding my arm and on his right arm he was holding a
knife.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q Maybe about in your reasonable estimate 20 to 30 times?chanrobles virtual law library
Q What was the position of Henry Padero when he held your right arm and a knife with his right hand?
A I can not recall anymore.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
A He was lying down faced [sic] up. 37 Same; Same; Death Penalty; Qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin requirements
that should be both alleged in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt during trial in
From then on she was silent about the knife. Although she distinctly remembered that the accused did order to sustain an imposition of the death penalty; Judicial notice of the issue of age without the
not stand up immediately after the sexual act, that thereafter both of them sat down for a while, and requisite hearing conducted under Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered
that later the accused went down to the ground floor to sleep, she did not mention anything more about sufficient compliance with the law.—These qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin
the knife. requirements that should be both alleged in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt
during trial in order to sustain an imposition of the death penalty. Neither an obvious minority of the
We therefore have serious doubts on the guilt of the accused for the crime charged. Although rape is victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real age always excuse the prosecution from the
universally condemned as a most detestable crime, conviction therefor can, in light of the presumption desired proof required by law. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing conducted
of innocence which is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, only lie upon proof beyond reasonable under Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered sufficient compliance with the
doubt or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not law. The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a
only the right of the accused to be freed, it is the constitutional duty of the court to acquit him.  38 This is baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence,
not, of course, to say that we approve of the conduct of the accused. Indisputably, he took undue that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented. While the declaration of a victim as to
advantage of the complainant's feelings for him and breached his vow of fidelity to his wife who happens her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree,
to be the complainant's aunt. He should have acted as a father or adviser to the complainant who is his the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is a totally different matter.
own niece-in-law and helped her develop in manners and virtue instead of corrupting
her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Same; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against
whom the witness is called; The trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.—The cross-
Oriental, in Criminal Case No. 741-B is REVERSED, and the accused HENRY PADERO is hereby ACQUITTED examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of
on the ground of reasonable doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct
examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination
Costs de oficio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or
on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound
to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-
SO ORDERED.
examined by the other party. People vs. Fabre, 385 SCRA 185, G.R. No. 146697 July 23, 2002

Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court, Br. VI, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, of
raping his own daughter Marilou Fabre, and he was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of
Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave. death.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Fabre was indicted in an Information that read: 1


6. People vs. Fabre, 385 SCRA 185, G.R. No. 146697 July 23, 2002
"That on or about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of April 26, 1995 in the house of the accused located at
Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Alibi; In order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to named accused by force, threats and intimidation, with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
demonstrate likewise that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with his own daughter MARILOU FABRE,
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.—In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it a girl thirteen (13) years of age, of good reputation, against her will and consent to the damage and
would not be enough for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was prejudice of the said victim consisting of moral, actual and compensatory damages."cralaw virtua1aw
committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have been physically present at the library
place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Clearly, in the instant case, it
was not at all impossible nor even improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene. Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of
Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon,
Same; Same; Same; The testimony of a rape victim, who is young and still immature, deserves faith and the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the
credence.—It has been stressed quite often enough that the testimony of a rape victim, who is young sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense,
and still immature, deserves faith and credence for it simply would be unnatural for a young and during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself. It
innocent girl to invent a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter also called Adela Fabre back to the witness stand.
subject herself and her family to the trauma of a public trial unless she indeed has spoken the truth.
Most especially, a daughter would not accuse her own father of such a serious offense or allow herself to The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of
be perverted if she were not truly motivated by a desire to seek a just retribution for a violation brazenly the young complainant, expressing a quote from an observation once made by this Tribunal in one of its
committed against her. decision that "even when consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which (could) put her own father for the rest of his
remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame." 2 Convinced that Upon the other hand, the evidently candid and straightforward testimony of Marilou should be more
the accused committed the crime of rape on his own daughter, the trial judge disposed of the case than enough to rebut the claim of innocence made by appellant. 8
thusly:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE alias Nardo, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the On 26 April 1995, around four o’clock in the afternoon, Marilou Fabre was alone in their house in
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 Section 11 thereof and hereby imposes upon the Barangay Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Adela Fabre, her mother, had gone to Purok 4 to buy fish while
accused Leonardo Fabre y Vicente alias Nardo the penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim Marilou Fabre civil her siblings were out strolling. After cleaning their yard, Marilou went to the adjacent palm plantation,
indemnity in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and the costs." 3 about fourteen to fifteen meters away from their house, to gather palm oil. Marilou had been gathering
palm oil for about a minute when her father, appellant Leonardo Fabre, arrived. He suddenly gripped
In this automatic review, the convicted accused assigned the following alleged errors committed by the Marilou’s hands and forcibly dragged her towards the house. He closed the door and removed his
court a quo. daughter’s underwear. He took off his pants and asked Marilou to hold his sex organ. In tears, Marilou
obeyed her father. He then began touching the girl’s breasts and vagina. He forced her to lie down,
"I mounted her and sought to insert his penis into her organ. Marilou cried in pain. When after some time
he still could not insert his penis into Marilou’s vagina, he applied coconut oil to lubricate his and his
"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF
daughter’s sexual organs. He was finally able to penetrate her. Once inside her, appellant made push and
ALIBI AND DENIAL.
pull movements until he was through with her. Appellant threatened to kill her if she would tell anybody
about the sexual encounter. The young girl’s mother, Adela Fabre, arrived home about five o’clock that
afternoon but, remembering her father’s threats, she kept mum about her ordeal.
"II

"ASSUMING IN ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
IMPOSING THE DEATH SENTENCE UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE The credibility of Marilou would not be all that difficult to discern from her narration that, as so
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL AGE OF MARILOU FABRE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION described by the prosecution, "was full of graphic details which a young provincial girl could not possibly
OF THE ALLEGED RAPE." 4 have concocted and which could only have come from someone who must have personally experienced
a brutal rape assault." She testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength
for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal "PROS. ENRIQUEZ:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
evidence. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is
called. 5 The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination. 6 The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further "Q Now, Miss Marilou, can you recall where were you on April 26, 1995 at about 4:00 o’clock in the
examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to afternoon?
be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial
court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because "A Yes, sir.
he is not cross-examined by the other party.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Q Where were you that time?

"A In our house, sir.


The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His account that
at the time of the alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just about one kilometer away "Q What were you doing in your house?
from the place of the crime, hardly would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his
"A I was cleaning our yard, sir.
wife, merit any better regard. At first, she testified that on the day of the rape incident, she had left their
house at four o’clock in the afternoon. Later, however, she changed her story by saying that she had left "Q How far is your yard where you were doing some works from your house?
the house in the morning and returned only at ten o’clock that same morning, staying home the whole
day thereafter. In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to "A (Witness pointing a distance of around 2 to 3 meters.)
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate
likewise that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate "Q Now, while you were doing your work in your yard, can you recall if there was an incident that
vicinity at the time of its commission. 7 Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even occurred?
improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene.
"A Yes, sir.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Q What was that incident that occurred? "Q And did he use anything to facilitate the insertion of his penis to your vagina?

"A While I was gathering a palm oil my father arrived and suddenly dragged me to our house, sir. "A Yes, sir.

"COURT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "Q What was that?

"Q Where is your house located? "A He used coconut oil in his penis and also in my vagina so that his penis can easily insert my vagina, sir.

"A At Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Your Honor. "Q Now, while his penis was in your vagina, can you tell this Honorable Court if he did anything also on
top of you and while his penis was inside your vagina?
"PROS. ENRIQUEZ:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A None, sir.
"Q What did you do when your father dragged you to your house?
"Q Did he make any movement?
"A Because I was dragged by my father to our house I just went with him, sir.
"A Yes, sir.
"Q While you were in your house after having been dragged by your father, what happened if any?
"Q What was that movement?
"A He closed our house and he removed my panty, sir.
"A He made a push and pull movement on my body, sir.
"Q And after removing your panty, what did your father do next?
"Q Now, while your father was doing it to you where was your mother that time?
"A He removed his pants and he let me hold his penis, sir.
"A She was in Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, sir.
"Q And what did you do next after holding his penis?
"Q And did you report this incident to your mother?
"A I was crying, sir.
"A Not yet sir because he told me not to tell anybody.
"Q While you were crying what did your father do?
"Q So when did you had a chance to tell your mother about this incident?
"A He was touching my breast and my vagina, sir.
"A On May 1, 1995, sir.

"Q After that what did he do next?


"Q And what did your mother do after you reported to her this incident?
"A He let me lie down, sir.
"A She reported [the matter] to the Kagawad, sir." 9
"Q And while lying down, what did your father do?
It has been stressed quite often enough that the testimony of a rape victim, who is young and still
"A He mounted me and he inserted his penis, to my vagina, sir. immature, deserves faith and credence 10 for it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl
to invent a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself
"Q And what did you feel while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?
and her family to the trauma of a public trial unless she indeed has spoken the truth. 11 Most especially,
"A Very painful, sir. a daughter would not accuse her own father of such a serious offense or allow herself to be perverted if
she were not truly motivated by a desire to seek a just retribution for a violation brazenly committed
"Q And what did you do while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina? against her. 12

"A I was crying, sir. Confirming Marilou’s story was the medical report and testimony of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the government
physician stationed at the Bunawan District Hospital in Agusan del Sur, who examined Marilou. Dr.
"Q And while you were crying what did your father do if any? Jalalon made these findings; viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A He told me not to tell anybody because if I will do it he will kill me, sir. "Abrasion at (L) labia minora at 3:00 o’clock position.

"Q Now, did your father find it easy to insert his penis to your vagina? "Vaginal smear (-) negative for spermatozoa." 13

"A It [took] a long time, sir.


The doctor concluded that it was possible that genital penetration on the victim did occur and that a Bellosillo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
penis could have caused the abrasion on the victim’s labia minora. Carpio, Austria-Martinez and Corona, JJ., concur.

There is merit, however, in the plea of the defense, seconded by the prosecution, that the penalty of
death imposed by the trial court should be reduced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, Davide, Jr., C.J., is on leave.
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law-spouse of the parent of the victim." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

While the father-daughter relationship between appellant and private complainant has been sufficiently
established, the fact of minority of the victim, although specifically averred in the information, has not
been equally shown in evidence. These qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin
requirements that should be both alleged in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt
during trial in order to sustain an imposition of the death penalty. 14 Neither an obvious minority of the
victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real age always excuse the prosecution from the
desired proof required by law. 15 Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing
conducted under Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered sufficient
compliance with the law. The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary
evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or credible
testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented. 16 While the
declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible
under the rule on pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is a totally
different matter. 17

In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident. 18 Her
mother stated, however, that she was 14. 19 The birth certificate of the victim, at least already in her
teens, was not presented to ascertain her true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost
when their house burned down. 20 No other document that could somehow help establish the real age
of the victim was submitted.

The Court, in sum, upholds the decision of the trial court convicting Leonardo Fabre of the crime of rape
but must reduce, on account of insufficiency of proof on the qualifying circumstance of minority of the
victim, the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the civil liability, the Court sustains
the award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity but, in keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, must additionally
order the payment of P50,000.00 moral damages 21 and P20,000.00 exemplary damages. 22

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding LEONARDO FABRE guilty of rape is AFFIRMED but
the sentence of death therein imposed should be, as it is hereby so, reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
award of P50,000.00 civil liability in favor of victim, Marilou Fabre, is sustained; however, appellant is
further ordered to pay to the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 moral damages and P20,000.00
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

You might also like