Mindanao State University

College of Law
General Santos City Extension
General Santos City

COMPILATION OF
CASE DIGESTS
IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Submitted to:

PROSECUTOR ANDRES B. MISSION, JR.

Professor

Submitted by:

DAN R. MILLADO
1577-17

Rule 72
1. Natcher vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001

Facts:

In an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages,

private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired
TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of
Sale dated 25 June 1987 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the
name of Patricia Natcher.

In her answer, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally
married to Graciano and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered
a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during
Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to
his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim
against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, RTC of Manila rendered a decision holding that the deed
of sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. Although the deed
of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC of

Manila ratiocinating that RTC trying an ordinary action for reconveyance /
annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts
proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC of Manila acting as a court of general

jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/annulment of title with
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person.

Ruling:

No, RTC acting as a court of general jurisdiction cannot adjudicate

matters relating to the settlement of estate.

In Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880 [1920], it was held that, “there
lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly
so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon
an application or motion.”

Here, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with

damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in
the Rules of Court. Clearly, matters which involve settlement and
distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province
of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
2. Montaner vs. Shariah District Court, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009

Facts:

Private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter,

Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the
judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court. It prayed
among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent;
and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss contending that

the Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late
Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic. Said court
dismissed the complaint and held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a
Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution
of the estate of deceased Muslims.

Upon the motion of the private respondents, the Shari’a District

Court reconsidered its order of dismissal and allowed them to adduce
further evidence. Subsequently, it ordered the continuation of trial, trial on
the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint for judicial partition filed by private

respondents is an ordinary civil action.

Ruling:

No, it is a special proceeding.

In Heirs of Celso Amarante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, May

21, 1990, the Supreme Court held that, “The designation given by parties to
their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it
according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or
defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments of the
pleadings.”

Here, although private respondents designated the pleading filed

before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of
properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim.
3. Tadeo-Matias vs Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

Facts:

After more than 3 decades of absence, petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-

Matias filed before the Regional Trial Court RTC of Tarlac City a petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N.
Matias as one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits. Said RTC
rendered a decision declaring Wilfredo absent or presumptively dead
under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

On appeal, CA reversed the said decision it ruled that Article 41 of

the Family Code (FC) does not apply to the instant petition as it was clear
that petitioner does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was
invoking the presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code, and not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
That Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of
evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is dead—
which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself
cannot be the subject of an independent action or proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct.

Ruling:

Yes, the CA is correct.

In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw, GR

No. L-1780, August 31, 1948, it was held that, “Independently of such an
action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked,
nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this
case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by
the petitioner against her absent husband.”

Here, Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express
rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a person
presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents no
actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be
no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to
be established. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively
dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary.
The presumption in the said articles is already established by law.
4. Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and

Reconveyance with Damages. However, the RTC issued the assailed Order
dismissing the complaint. It found that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs
therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous
special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not
mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory
heirs.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case is proper.

Ruling:

Yes, the RTC’s dismissal of the case is proper.

In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, G.R. No. 150206, March
13, 2009, the Supreme Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case.

Here, Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the

legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings
in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action
for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action
for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding.
5. Gabatan vs CA, G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009

Facts:

Assailed in this petition is the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s decision

in an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession,
thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against
petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
The lower court declared the respondent as the sole and surviving heir of
Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto. On appeal,
the CA declared that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was
sufficiently established during trial.

Issue:

Whether or not the status of the party as heirs can be made only in
special proceeding.

Ruling:

No, there are certain exceptions and can be determined in a civil

action.

In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 467 SCRA 184, 199 (2005), the

Supreme Court held that, “under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish
the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case –
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented
evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case
upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.”

Here, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by

the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be
more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan,
specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also, the RTC
assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment
thereon.
6. Sheker vs. Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a

probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment
of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of
the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to
special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is correct.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner is not correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2.

Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Here, stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules

of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary
civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform;

capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that
in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be
applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of
Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the
Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal
service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against
an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they
are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person as in the present case.
7. Hilado vs. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex

Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality
of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband.
Consequently, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested
parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being
the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC. The
same was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have the right to intervene in the special

proceeding based on their contingent claim.

Ruling:

No, petitioners have no right to intervene.

While Section 2, Rule 72 provides that “[i]n the absence of special

provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings,” however, this is not
applicable in this case.

Here, notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth

under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is
based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19
simply does not accommodate contingent claims. Yet, even as petitioners
now contend that they have the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before
the RTC, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even
if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance
with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs
they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of
those reliefs.
 Rule 73
1. Quiazon vs Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

Facts:

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of
the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.
The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was
a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas,
Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for improper venue.

Ruling:

No, it should not be dismissed.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of
the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.

Here, In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule

73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that
for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. Viewed in the light of the principles, it is
evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2. Cuenco vs CA, G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

Facts:

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of

Administration with the CFI of Cebu, alleging among other things, that the
late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964 and that he was a
resident of Cebu at the time of his death. A week later, herein petitioner
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal (Quezon City)
for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the
issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and
executrix in the said last will and testament.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court,

petitioner filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, as
well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special
Administrator. However, the Cebu court issued an order holding in
abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for
probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of
the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco.” On the other hand, respondents
filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss
opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said
Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for
appointment as executrix in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction
vested by her petition in the Cebu court. Said respondent prayed that Sp.
Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue. However, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss,
giving as a principal reason the “precedence of probate proceeding over an
intestate proceeding.” The said court further found in said order that the
residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. On appeal, CA rendered a
decision in favor of respondents holding that Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes
the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings of the Cebu CFI
having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first
invoked and which first attached.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct.

Ruling:

No, the CA is not correct.

 Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that, “Where estate
of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time
of his death, x x x x The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence, of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall
not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.

Here, it should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that
the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires
exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A
fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City
court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu
court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must
exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court
declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a
rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal
and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. Since the Quezon City court
took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu
court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of
venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
3. Tadeo-Matias, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018

Facts:

The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for
certiorari when said RTC rendered its decision granting the petition for
declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the
Family Code, when said petitioner’s purpose is to claim benefits and not to
remarry.

Issue:

Whether or not the remedy availed of by the Republic through OSG

is proper.

Ruling:

No, the remedy availed of by the Republic is not proper.

Section 4, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that, “For purposes

of settlement of his estate, a person shall be presumed dead if absent and
unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code. But if such person
proves to be alive, he shall be entitled to the balance of his estate after
payment of all his debts. The balance may be recovered by motion in the
same proceeding.”

Here, according to Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, the manner of

appeal in special proceedings is through a record on appeal. From these
provisions, it is apparent that in an action for the declaration of death of a
person under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code, whether it is to settle
his estate or for other reasons apart from remarriage, the appeal must be
made through record on appeal. No exception to the application of these
rules is present. The Republic therefore availed of the wrong remedy to
question the decision of the trial court.
 Rule 74
1. Butiong vs. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524, August 5, 2015

Facts:

Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs including herein

respondents, as well as several properties including a resort and a family
home, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. In their Amended Complaint
for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession,
respondents alleged that their co-heirs sold the subject properties to herein
petitioners without their knowledge and consent. Subsequently,
respondents discovered an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late
father was published in a tabloid called Balita, thus, they caused the
annotation of adverse claim of the subject properties.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint

on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring
the subject properties. However, the trial court decided in favor of herein
respondents and annulled the transfer of the subject properties to
petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of
conveyance offered by petitioners particularly, the notary public was not
commissioned to do so, the date of execution was not indicated, the
amount of consideration was superimposed, and it was not presented in
the ROD of Nasugbu, Batangas. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of

discretion in entertaining the special proceeding for the settlement of estate
of Pedro Rinoza and the Civil Action for annulment of title of heirs and
third persons in one proceeding.

Ruling:

No, the CA did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides in part: “If the

decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized
for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition…”
 Here, it must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person
dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish
the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be
judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court. An exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted
Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and
no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or
in an ordinary action for partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by
the court. The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending
obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator
to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled.
2. Benatiro vs. Cuyos, G.R. No. 161220, July 30, 2008

Facts:

Sometime in February 1998, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and

Enrique learned that all the tax declaration of the properties in the name of
their mother Agatona were cancelled and new tax declaration were issued
in the name of Columba. They filed a complaint against Gorgonio Benatiro
before the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP ) of the
DOJ but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Mediation before the
barangay level was likewise unsuccessful. Thus, a petition for annulment
of the order was filed by respondents assailing that the said Order was null
and void and has no effect. It being based on commissioner’s report which
was patently false and irregular and deprived them of due process in
claiming their share of their father’s estate. That no meeting ever took
place for the purpose of settlement of estate and that the report was done in
close confederacy with their co-heir Columba who benefited from it.

Issue:

Petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered

the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was
preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate
proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this
was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for
annulment within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have
been in possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the
same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate
proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed
order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having
received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents
were estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had
already attained the status of finality. However, the CA granted the
annulment of the CFI’s order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement,
there was a need for all the concerned parties to be present in the
conference.

Issue:

Whether or not the heirs were deemed constructively notified of and

bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless
of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and
partition has been duly published.
Ruling:

No, they were not deemed notified.

In Cua v. Vargas, G.R. No. 156536, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 374, it
was held that, “The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex
parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do
not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued
before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been
executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the
first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive

notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because
the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of
publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's
estate.”

Here, applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is

whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement
was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were
notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement
afterwards.
3. Cua vs Vargas, G.R. No. 156536, October 31, 2006

Facts:

According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas and one

of respondents herein, she came to know of the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs with Sale dated November 16, 1994 only when the original
house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995. She
likewise claimed she was unaware that an earlier Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs dated February 4, 1994 involving the same property had
been published in the Catanduanes Tribune.

After trial on the merits, the MTC rendered a decision in favor of

petitioner. This was affirmed by the RTC. On appeal, the CA reversed the
ruling of both lower courts declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale,
dated February 4, 1994 and November 15, 1994, respectively, were void
and without any legal effect. The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court, 16 the extrajudicial settlement made by the other
co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never
participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that the acquisition by petitioner of
the subject property subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was valid
because the partition was duly published. The publication of the same
constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their implied
acquiescence thereon.

Issue:

Whether or not herein respondents as heirs are deemed

constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to participate
therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the
extrajudicial settlement and partition has been duly published

Ruling:

No, they were not constructively notified.

Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides in part that, “The fact of
the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.”

Here, the procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte

proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound
thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before
any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been
executed19 as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the
first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive

notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because
the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of
publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended
to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this
connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never
signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their
existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following
Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the
partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as
they are concerned.
4. Domingo vs. Roces, G.R. No. 147468, April 9, 2003

Facts:

When respondents learned of the sale of the property to petitioners,

they filed a complaint against Montinola and petitioners with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig. They argued that the affidavit of self-adjudication was
fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the Roces spouses and it
was not true that Lilia Roces was dead. Therefore, the affidavit of self-
adjudication, as well as the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. 7299, and TCT
No. 7673, all covering the subject property, were null and void. In their
answer, petitioners alleged that they were buyers in good faith and that
their action was barred by estoppel and laches. After trial, the court a quo
rendered judgment in favor of respondents. On appeal, the CA rendered a
decision declaring the affidavit of self-adjudication, the deed of absolute
sale and TCTs as null and void. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the annotation in the

title regarding Sec. 4, Rule 74 is an encumbrance which disqualifies
petitioners from being innocent purchasers for value.

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err.

Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, provides: “SEC. 4. Liability of

distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the
provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or
other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the
estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the
estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of
satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2)
years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate
which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having
jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing,
settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how
much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment
thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the
bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging
to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain
charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full
period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any
transfers of real estate that may have been made.”

Here, the foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to

any person, as long as the deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights
within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of estate.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision are not
limited to the heirs or original distributees of the estate properties, but shall
affect any transferee of the properties.

In David v. Malay, G.R. No. 132644, 19 November 1999, it was held

that the buyer of real property the title of which contain an annotation
pursuant to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court cannot be considered
innocent purchasers for value. In the same vein, the annotation at the back
of TCT No. 7299 in this case referring to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court was sufficient notice to petitioners of the limitation on Montinola's
right to dispose of the property. The presence of an irregularity which
excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee to look beyond the
certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face
thereof. Purchasers of registered land are bound by the annotations found
at the back of the certificate of title.

Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and

cannot now avoid the consequences brought about by the application of
Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
 Rule 75
1. Manahan vs. Manahan, G.R. No. 38050, September 22, 1933

Facts:

The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix
in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice
required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of
the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was
presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as
prayed for. The will was probated and the trial court appointed the herein
petitioner executrix. One year and seven months later, the appellant herein
filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order
admitting the will to probate be vacated and the “authenticated will” be
declared null and void ab initio.

Issue:

Whether or not the Order admitting the probate of the will can be
questioned on appeal.

Ruling:

No, said Order cannot be questioned on appeal.

In Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, the Supreme Court held that,
“The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law,
except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceedings.”

Here, this question can no more be raised in this case on appeal. After
due hearing, the court found that the will in question was valid and
effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should
be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the will in question now
constitutes res judicata.
2. Garcia vs. Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020

Facts:

Upon the death of Consuelo Garcia, one of his children Catalino filed
a petition to settle the intestate estate. This was opposed by Natividad, the
daughter of Consuelo contending that she already filed a petition for the
probate of the will of Consuelo. Eventually, the two cases were
consolidated and hearing ensued. However, RTC ruled that the will is
dubious and should not be allowed probate, giving credence to Rolando’s
testimony that Consuelo declared that she had no will and that her
properties would be equally divided between her two children. The RTC
deemed it irregular when the purported will was suddenly produced only
after Consuelo’s death and not years earlier especially since it was
allegedly executed 10 years before her death. Moreover, the will
unconscionably favored Natividad as she was named as the executrix of
the will and most of the properties were disposed in her favor. This was
reversed by the CA holding that the witnesses established the due
execution and authenticity of the will and that the authority of the court is
limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC sitting as a probate court may pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will.

Ruling:

No, the probate court may not pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
will.

In Baltazar v. Laxa, 685 Phil. 484, 497, 498 (2012), it was held that,
“The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is
the due execution or the extrinsic validity of the will. The probate court
cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the
estate by the testator. Thus, due execution is “whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.”

Here, inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will or the manner in
which the properties were apportioned is not within the purview of the
probate court. “The court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of,
and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will.
3. Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

Facts:

Rosario Nuguid died single, without descendants, legitimate or

illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid and six brothers and sisters. Herein petitioner
Remedios Nuguid (sister of Rosario) filed in the CFI of Rizal a holographic
will allegedly executed by Rosario some 11 years before her demise.
Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her. The legitimate
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by
the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the
direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence
the institution is void.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate court’s limitation not to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will is absolute.

Ruling:

No, said limitation is not absolute.

In Case, et al. vs. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522, it was held that, “If the
case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained.
On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.”

Here, these are the practical considerations that induce the Court to a
belief that it might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question.
4. Balanay vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975

Facts:

Atty. Montaña, claiming to be the lawyer of Felix Balanay, Jr and Sr.,

in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the
conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He
prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding
be converted into an intestate proceeding. Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B.
Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments manifested their
conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They
prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an
intestacy be declared. The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty.
Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditors was in order
since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys.
Montaña and Guyo that the will was void.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate court is correct in passing upon the

intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal
validity.

Ruling:

Yes, the probate court is correct.

In Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 (1966), it was held that, “Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.”

Here, in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of

dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon
the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void.
5. Nepomuceno vs CA, G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985

Facts:

The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters
testamentary should not be issued to her. Subsequently, the lower court
denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted
in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his
death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle
exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court is correct in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will.

Ruling:

Yes, the lower court is correct.

In Balanay, Jr v. Martinez, 64 SCRA 452, the Supreme Court ruled

that, “the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate
of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue.”

Here, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the
making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the
Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing
the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
6. Nufable vs. Nufable, G.R. No. 126950, July 2, 1999

Facts:

The records show that upon petition for probate filed by the heirs of
the late Esdras Nufable, an Order was issued by then CFI of Negros
Oriental, Branch II, admitting to probate the last will and testament
executed by the decedent. Thereafter, the same court approved the
Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable
wherein they agreed "(T)hat the parcel land situated in Poblacion
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental remains undivided for community ownership
but respecting conditions imposed in the will." In paragraph 3 thereof, they
stated that "they have no objection as to the manner of disposition of their
share made by the testator, the expenses of the proceeding and that they
have already taken possession of their respective shares in accordance with
the will."

Issue:

Whether or not the probate of the Last Will Testament and of Esdras
Nufable determines the ownership of the land in question as against third
parties.

Ruling:

No, it did not affect the ownership of the land in question.

In , it was held that, “As a general rule, courts in probate

proceedings are limited only to passing upon the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribes by law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is
not called to rule on the rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will.”

Here, the question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes

only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, it was the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable who agreed among
themselves on the disposition of their shares. The probate court simply
approved the agreement among the heirs which approval was necessary
for the validity of any disposition of the decedent's estate.
 Rule 76
1. Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, G.R. No. L-23135, December 26, 1967

Facts:

The petition for probate was opposed by Saturnino and Santiago

Ramagosa who filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Herein petitioner
moved for denial of said motion on the ground that the Romagosas have
no legal standing in court and they are bereft of personality to oppose the
probate of the last will and testament of the testators. Probate court held
that that oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth
degree as provided by law and therefore the oppositors are totally
strangers to the deceased whose will is under probate.

Issue:

Whether or not the oppositors have personality to intervene with the

probate proceeding.

Ruling:

No, they have no personality.

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to

intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or
in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor. (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R. No. L-
18753, March 26, 1965.)

Here, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's finding that
they "have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree as provided
by law and therefore are strangers to the deceased whose will is under
probate." They do not attempt to show that they have some interest in the
estate which must be protected.
2. Acain vs. IAC, G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987

Facts:

Constatino, brother of the deceased and the alleged instituted heir,

filed a petition for probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain. It was
then set for hearing in the lower court, the oppositors (respondents herein
Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased and the
latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on
the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute
these proceedings; that he is merely a universal heir; and that the widow
and the adopted daughter have been pretirited.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has a personality to institute the probate

proceeding.

Ruling:

No, he has no personality to institute the probate proceeding.

In Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967, it was held that, “In

order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an
heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.”

Here, petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a

legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift
of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to
receive.
3. Frianela vs. Banayad Jr, G.R. No. 169700, July 30, 2009

Facts:

The Supreme Court notes that the trial court focused all of its
attention on the merits of the case without first determining whether it
could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and decide Sp. Proc. No.
3664-P. On appeal, the appellate court also overlooked the issue on the
jurisdictional competence of the trial court over the said case.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC sitting as a probate court has jurisdiction

over the proceeding.

Ruling:

No, the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the proceeding.

In Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000, it was
held that, “The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or
the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the
estate.”

Here, nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value

of Moises’s estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it
cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the proceedings. The RTC therefore committed gross error when it
had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory
pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
4. Palaganas vs. Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

Facts:

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by

foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its
execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior
compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They
insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent
proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign
country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c)
the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on
probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the
same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.

Issue:

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be

probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated
and allowed in the country where it was executed.

Ruling:

Yes, it may be probated in the Philippines.

In Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, 153 Phil. 115, 133 (1973), it was held
that, “Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will
must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b)
the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of
the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if
the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent,
his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he
left in such province.

Here, our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by

foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given
legal effects in our jurisdiction. The rules do not require proof that the
foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
5. Rodriguez vs. De Borja, G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966

Facts:

On March 12, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a

petition in CFI Bulacan for the probation of the will delivered by them on
March 4, 1963. The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963
while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction
to entertain the petition for probate.

Issue:

Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the probate
proceeding.

Ruling:

Yes, CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction.

Section 3, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that, “When a will is

delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court
having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the
will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and
shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks
successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.”

Here, the use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered
to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that
the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament,
even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for
probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to
relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of
Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on
March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
6. Vda de Perez vs Tolete, G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

Facts:

Petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn
Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the heirs of Cunanan should be notified.

Ruling:

Yes, the heirs of Cunanan should be notified.

Compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require

publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor,
if he is not the petitioner, are required.

Here, the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to

petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving
the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
"court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . .
7. Ajero vs. CA, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994

Facts:

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither

the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly
signed by decedent. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court
admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. On appeal, The Court
of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements
for its validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813
and 814 of the New Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct.

Ruling:

No, the CA is not correct.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be

disallowed in any of the following cases: (a) If not executed and attested as
required by law; (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution; (c) If it was executed
under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (d) If it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary,
or of some other person for his benefit; (e) If the signature of the testator
was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

Here, the list is exclusive and no other grounds can serve to disallow
a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only
issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed,
the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were
the voluntary acts of the decedent. In the case of holographic wills, what
assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself. Thus, unless the unauthenticated
alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not
invalidate the will itself.

Rule 78
1. Republic vs Marcos, G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855, August 4, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary

to respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity,
and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner
contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of cases and,
hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with
questionable integrity.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents are unfit to serve as executors of the

estate.

Ruling:

No, they are not unfit.

Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides in part, “No

person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who: (c) Is in the
opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by
reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.”

Here, two cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have already been
reversed by the Supreme Court. Hence, the so-called "convictions" against
respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her
disqualification to serve as an executor. Also, The CA acquitted
respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of
Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the four charges for violation
of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered
respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his income tax
return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner, said decision is still
pending appeal. Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has
appealed his conviction relating to four violations of Section 45 of the
NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be
appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even
assuming arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still
insufficient to disqualify him as the "failure to file an income tax return" is
not a crime involving moral turpitude.
2. Quiazon vs Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

Facts:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the

Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are
Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by
herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico. However,
petitioners contend that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for
Letters of Administration.

Issue:

Whether or not Elise is an interested party in the estate proceeding.

Ruling:

Yes, Elise is an interested party in the estate proceeding.

In Solinap v. Locsin, Jr., 423 Phil. 192, 199 (2001), the Supreme Court
held that, “An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would
be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next
of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.”

Here, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the

distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the
right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.
3. Butiong vs. Plazo, G.R. No. 187524, August 5, 2015

Facts:

Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was

captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action is actually
one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement
of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited
jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general
jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the
latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is correct.

Ruling:

No, the petitioner is not correct.

In Avelino v. Court of Appeals, et. al., 385 Phil. 1014, 1020 (2000), “It
must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate,
or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named
is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by
the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court. an exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted
Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and
no debts due from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or
in an ordinary action for partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by
the court.”

In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not
disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any
pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondents
were under no legal obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate
to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are, in fact,
encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
4. Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012

Facts:

Supreme Court decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of

Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. Thus,
Isabel, the other co-administrator moved to reconsider such decision and
contends that (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not
an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of
kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment
as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations since his appointment as
administrator by the RTC emphatically demonstrate the validity and
wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no
"opposing parties or factions to be represented."

Issue:

Whether or not the order of preference under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the

Rules of Court is absolute.

Ruling:

No, it is not absolute.

In Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-59935, 30 September 1982,

it was held that, “The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate.”

In this case, it is to this requirement of observation of the order of

preference in the appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that
the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an
exception. Supreme Court again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be
issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin.
 Rule 79
1. Maloles vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000

Facts:

Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a

petition for probate of his will. In his petition, he alleged that he had no
compulsory heirs and that he had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. Petitioner Octavio S.
Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only child of
Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the
sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise
alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is an interested party.

Ruling:

No, petitioner is not an interested party.

Section 1, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that, “Any person

interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why letters
testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein as executors,
or any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon
the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same time, be filed
for letters of administration with the will annexed.”

Here, under this provision, it has been held that an "interested

person" is one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is
material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent. The private
respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent
Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only
and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter
only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has
already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private
respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the
decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
 Rule 80
1. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010

Facts:

Petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings and alleged

that upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother
Leonardo jointly controlled the estate of their parents. However, when
Leonardo died, Respondents took possession, control and management of
properties to the exclusion of Petitioners. Respondents filed their
opposition but was denied by the RTC. Respondents reiterated their prayer
for appointment as joint special administrators of the estate. Petitioners
argued that they had been deprived of their fair share of income of the
estate and the appointment of respondents as special joint administrator
would further cause injustice to them. RTC appointed Respondents as
special joint administrators, which was also revoked by the RTC upon
motion of Petitioners.

Issue:

Whether or not the Order of revocation by the RTC is proper.

Ruling:

Yes, said Order was proper.

In Tan v. Gedorio, Jr., G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008, it was held
that, “The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator
is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully
authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant
to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.”

Here, while the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of
kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special
administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It
has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators
is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular
administrators.
2. Co vs Rosario, G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008

Facts:

RTC appointed petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special

administrators of the estate of the petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun.
However, on motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioner’s
appointment as special co-administrator. Petitioner consequently,
nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co, for appointment as co-administrator
of the estate. Then, the RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.
Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion filed by one of
the heirs, issued its Order revoking and setting aside the appointment of
Alvin. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to
discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his
capacity, ability or competence to perform the functions of co-
administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases
against him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided the
heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with
utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in

revoking and setting aside the appointment of Alvin.

Ruling:

No, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking
Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator

In Cobarrubias v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 209 (1946), it was held that, “even if

a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds
the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in
withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.”

Here, the exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity,

justice and legal principles. Supreme Court finds that the trial court’s
judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal as special co-administrator is
grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not
characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse,
arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the writ of certiorari.
3. Manugas vs. Loreto, G.R. No. 193161, August 22, 2011

Facts:

The RTC appointed Florencio Parreño, the niece of Engracia as the

Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt.
Thereafter, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of Engracia in his favor before the RTC with
the allegation that he, being an illegitimate son of Florentino, is an heir of
Engracia. Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencio opposed the petition
alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the Estate
of Manungas. However, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and
ordering the revocation of its earlier appointment of Florencio as the
administrator of the Estate of Manungas while appointing Diosdado as the
Special Administrator. Upon appeal, The CA issued its assailed Decision
finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking its
earlier appointment of Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of
Manungas and appointing Diosdado instead. The CA further reinstated
Parreño as the special administrator of the estate.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA is correct in reversing the RTC’s Order.

Ruling:

Yes, the CA is correct in reversing the RTC’s Order.

Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides that, “Such special

administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such
perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so
ordered by the court.”

Here, given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it

would, therefore, be prudent and reasonable to appoint someone interested
in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the heirs. In this
case, the evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late
Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate. On the
other hand, Florencia, who is a former judicial guardian of Engracia, is
interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt Engracia,
as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the
decedent’s estate.
 Rule 81
1. Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010

Facts:

The RTC revoked respondents’ appointment as special

administrators for failing to post their administrators’ bond and to submit
an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to
comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of
respondents’ plea to assume their office sans a bond.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC’s Order revoking respondent’s appointment

as special administrator is proper.

Ruling:

Yes, said RTC’s Order is proper.

Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of

the duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the
estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account
within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate
court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More
specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the
faithful execution of the administration of the decedent’s estate requiring
the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his
possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him
when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person
appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as
may be authorized to receive them.

Here, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and
the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to
perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent
upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the
decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the
necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included
among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a
qualification for the office of administration.

Rule 82
1. Mendiola vs. CA, G.R. No. 92999, October 11, 1990

Facts:

Private respondents moved for the removal of the executor and

subsequently moved for the appointment of Redentor. The motion was
granted and Petitioner was removed. Redentor was declared as excecutor.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Petitioner but it was denied by
the court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
trial court. Hence, this petition alleging that his removal was not
supported by evidence and he was not given his day in court.

Issue:

Whether or not the removal of petitioner as executor is proper.

Ruling:

Yes, his removal is proper.

Sec. 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides in part that, “If an

executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or
a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane,
or otherwise incapable or insuitable to discharge the trust, the court may
remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign…”

Here, sufficient evidence was adduced in the proceedings in the RTC,

that petitioner failed to pay the estate tax. Petitioner also failed to render
an accounting of the estate and settle the same according to law.
Furthermore, he involved the heirs in a transaction with Villarica
Pawnshop which, because of petitioner's failure to honor his part of the
bargain, resulted in the filing of a suit by Villarica against the heirs. Thus,
his removal was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court.
 Rule 83
1. Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA, G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996

Facts:

The probate court ordered for the release of the allowances for
support to Hilario’s grandchildren and the release of the titles of the
bequeathed properties to Private Respondents and to only cause notice to
the creditors.

Issue:

Whether or not the testator's grandchildren are entitled to receive

allowance for support from the funds of the estate.

Ruling:

No, they are not entitled to receive allowance for support.

Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court provides, “The widow and

minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement
of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such
allowance as provided by law.”

Here, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the

funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to
"widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
 Rule 84
1. Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA, G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996

Facts:

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited

with the clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate
court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the
properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But
petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the same
reasons he previously cited, but this time it was denied and require him to
submit first the accounting of the previous expenses. Thus, petitioner
claims that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession
of all the real and personal properties of the estate.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC’s Order is proper.

Ruling:

Yes, the RTC’s Order is proper.

Section 3, Rule 84 of the Rules of Court provides that, “An executor

or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of
the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for administration.”

Here, the right of an executor or administrator to the possession and

management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not
absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and expenses of administration." Thus, it was
correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the
necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money
in his favor.
 Rule 85
1. Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna vs. IAC,
G.R. No. 72424, February 13, 1989

Facts:

The appointed administrator of the intestate estate of Carmen De

Luna died and was replaced by the administrator’s wife, as the new
administratrix. She then filed a motion for administrator’s compensation
asking the court the amount of P500,000.00 based on the value of the
inventory of the property of the deceased. Respondents opposed the
motion but they failed to object as to the value of the property of the
deceased as listed in the inventory filed by the administratrix. However,
the CA arrived only at the amount of P4,313.50 by applying the schedule
provided in computing for commissions under Rule 85 of the Rules of
Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the wife of the late administrator Gonzales, as the

new administratrix, is entitled to compensation in the amount of
P500,000.00 as administrator of the estate of Carmen de Luna.

Ruling:

Yes, she is entitled.

Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court provides in part that, “But in

any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been
attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity
on the part of the executor or administrator, a greater sum may be allowed.
If objection to the fees allowed be taken, the allowance may be re-examined
on appeal.”

Here, the applicable provision is the proviso is the above-stated

provision. A wide latitude, leeway or discretion is therefore given to the
trial court to grant a greater sum. And the determination of whether the
administration and liquidation of an estate have been attended with greater
difficulty and have required a high degree of capacity on the part of the
executor or administrator rests on the sound discretion of the court which
took cognizance of the estate. The trial court, in applying this proviso
awarded the sum of P500,000.00 as administrator's compensation is much
proper.
 Rule 86
1. Sheker vs. Sheker, G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007

Facts: