SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 188146. February 1, 2017.]

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION , petitioner, vs. ROYAL

FERRY SERVICES, INC. , respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN , J : p

The venue for a petition for voluntary insolvency proceeding under the Insolvency
Law is the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the insolvent debtor
resides. A corporation is considered a resident of the place where its principal o ce is
located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation. However, when it is uncontroverted
that the insolvent corporation abandoned the old principal o ce, the corporation is
considered a resident of the city where its actual principal office is currently found.
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Court of Appeals'
January 30, 2009 Decision 2 and May 26, 2009 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 88320,
which reinstated the Order 4 that declared Royal Ferry Services, Inc. insolvent made by
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24 (Regional Trial Court).
Royal Ferry Services, Inc. (Royal Ferry) is a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine law. 5 According to its Articles of Incorporation, Royal Ferry's
principal place of business is located at 2521 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City.
6 However, it currently holds o ce at Room 203, BF Condominium Building, Andres
Soriano corner Solano Streets, Intramuros, Manila. 7
On August 28, 2005, Royal Ferry led a veri ed Petition for Voluntary Insolvency
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 8 It alleged that in 2000, it suffered serious
business losses that led to heavy debts. 9 Efforts to revive the company's nances
failed, and almost all assets were either foreclosed or sold to satisfy the liabilities
incurred. 1 0 Royal Ferry ceased its operations on February 28, 2002. 1 1 In a special
meeting on August 25, 2005, its Board of Directors approved and authorized the ling
of a petition for voluntary insolvency in court. 1 2
The Regional Trial Court declared Royal Ferry insolvent in its Order 13 dated
December 19, 2005, the relevant portion of which reads: ScHADI

Finding the petition su cient in form and substance and pursuant to the
provisions of Act No. 1956, petitioner Royal Ferry Services, Inc., is hereby
declared insolvent.
The Court hereby further directs and orders:
1. The Branch Sheriff to take possession of, and safely keep until the
appointment, of an Assignee all the deeds, vouchers, books of accounts, papers,
notes, bills and securities of the petitioner and all its real and personal
properties, estates and effects not exempt from execution;
2. All persons and entities owing money to petitioner are hereby forbidden
to make payment for its accounts or to deliver or transfer any property to
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 petitioner except to the duly elected Assignee;
3. All civil proceedings against petitioner are deemed stayed;
4. For purposes of electing an Assignee, a meeting of all creditors of the
petitioner is hereby set on February 24, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. before this Court, at
Room 435, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall Building.
Let this Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and copies thereof be
furnished all creditors listed in the schedule of creditors at the expense of
petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 1 4
On December 23, 2005, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell)
led before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Formal Notice of Claim 1 5 and a Motion
to Dismiss. 1 6 In the Notice of Claim, Pilipinas Shell asserted that Royal Ferry owed
them the amount of P2,769,387.67. 1 7 In its Motion to Dismiss, Pilipinas Shell alleged
that the Petition was led in the wrong venue. 1 8 It argued that the Insolvency Law
provides that a petition for insolvency should be led before the court with territorial
jurisdiction over the corporation's residence. 1 9 Since Royal Ferry's Articles of
Incorporation stated that the corporation's principal o ce is located at 2521 A.
Bonifacio St., Bangkal, Makati City, the Petition should have been led before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati and not before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 2 0
On January 30, 2006, the Regional Trial Court of Manila issued the Order 2 1
denying Pilipinas Shell's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. It found Royal Ferry to have
su ciently shown full compliance with the requirements of the Insolvency Law on
venue and that it had abandoned its Makati o ce and moved to Manila. The Regional
Trial Court also noted that when the Branch Sherriff con scated Royal Ferry's books
and personal assets, the properties were taken from a Manila address, at Room 203, BF
Condominium Building, Andres Soriano corner Streets, Intramuros, Manila.
Pilipinas Shell moved for reconsideration on February 24, 2006. 2 2
In the Order 2 3 dated June 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court reconsidered the
denial of Pilipinas Shell's Motion to Dismiss. It held that a corporation cannot change
its place of business without amending its Articles of Incorporation. 2 4 Without the
amendment, Royal Ferry's transfer did not produce any legal effect on its residence. 2 5
The Regional Trial Court granted the dismissal of the Petition for Voluntary Insolvency.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
Accordingly, the Order of this court dated January 30, 2006 denying the
claimant-movant's motion to dismiss is hereby reconsidered. The Motion to
Dismiss is granted. The Petition for Voluntary Insolvency is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 2 6
Aggrieved, Royal Ferry led a Notice of Appeal 2 7 on October 26, 2006. On
November 7, 2006, the Regional Trial Court forwarded the records of the case to the
Court of Appeals. 2 8
In the Decision 2 9 dated January 30, 2009, the Court of Appeals reinstated the
insolvency proceedings. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED .
Accordingly, the following Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
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 24) in Civil Case No. 05-113384 are SET ASIDE : 1) Order dated 15 June 2006,
which granted Pilipinas Shell's "Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency;" and 2) Order dated 16 October 2006, which denied Royal Ferry's
Motion for Reconsideration. On the other hand, the Orders of the trial court
dated 5 September 2005 and 19 December 2005, granting an adjudication of
insolvency in favor of Royal Ferry are REINSTATED .
SO ORDERED. 30 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court of Appeals held that the Motion to Dismiss failed to comply with
Section 81 3 1 of the Insolvency Law, which required the written consent of all creditors
before a petition for insolvency can be dismissed. It overturned the grant of the Motion
to Dismiss since Pilipinas Shell failed to secure the written consent of all the creditors
of Royal Ferry.
On the alleged jurisdictional defects of Royal Ferry's Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency, the Court of Appeals found that "the [Manila Regional Trial Court] has
jurisdiction over the instant case, and therefore, has the authority to render a decision
on it." 3 2 It likewise found that Manila was the proper venue for the case because "the
cities of Makati and Manila are part of one region, or even a province, city or
municipality, if Section 51 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines is taken by
analogy." 3 3 The Court of Appeals stated that Section 82 3 4 of the Insolvency Law
dictates that an order granting an adjudication of insolvency is appealable only to the
Supreme Court. 3 5 aICcHA

Pilipinas Shell moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied on May 26,
2009. 3 6 Hence, this Petition was filed on July 20, 2009.
Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals should not have taken cognizance
of respondent Royal Ferry's appeal because it "failed to comply with Section 13,
paragraphs (a), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h), Rule 44 of the Rules of Court." 3 7 Petitioner
claimed that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the "petition for voluntary
insolvency [was led] in the proper venue since the cities of Makati and Manila are part
of one region[.]" 3 8 According to petitioner, there was no reason to consider Makati and
Manila as part of one region or province for the purpose of determining venue. 3 9
Moreover, petitioner argued that since respondent's Articles of Incorporation
stated that its principal o ce was located at 2521 A. Bonifacio St., Bangkal, Makati
City, 4 0 the Petition for Voluntary Insolvency should have been led in Makati, not in
Manila. Petitioner cited Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corporation v. Goldstar
Elevators Phils., Inc., 4 1 where this Court held that a corporation's residence was the
place where its principal o ce was located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation. 4 2
Thus, the address in respondent's Articles of Incorporation should control the venue.
Finally, petitioner claimed that Section 81 of the Insolvency Law is inapplicable to
this case as it contemplated a situation where the trial court had jurisdiction over the
case. 4 3 Petitioner reiterated that because the venue was improperly laid, the trial court
could not issue a final order declaring respondent insolvent.
In its Comment, 4 4 respondent averred that jurisdiction over the subject was
determined by the allegations in the pleading. 4 5 Respondent argued that because it
stated in its Petition that it held o ce in Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila had
jurisdiction over the case. 4 6 It further asserted that the ction of a corporation's
residence must give way to fact.
On April 29, 2016, respondent moved to dismiss the case. 4 7 Respondent stated
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 that it entered into a Compromise Agreement 4 8 with petitioner, which resulted in the
Court of Appeals' judgment based on the compromise agreement. 4 9 It argued that the
Judgment, promulgated in a related case docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 102522, 5 0 made
the present Petition moot and academic. 5 1 In CA-G.R. CV No. 102522, the Court of
Appeals deemed the stipulations of the Compromise Agreement valid and not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 5 2 The dispositive portion
of the Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE , the foregoing premises considered, the Compromise
Agreement is hereby APPROVED and judgment is hereby rendered in
accordance therewith. The parties are hereby enjoined to comply with and abide
by the said terms and conditions thereof. By virtue of such approval, this case is
now deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED. 53 (Emphasis in the original)
On September 23, 2016, petitioner led a Comment 5 4 to respondent's Motion to
Dismiss. It claimed that the Compromise Agreement was only between Pilipinas Shell,
and Antonino R. Gascon, Jr., and Jonathan D. Gascon (the Gascons). 5 5 Respondent
was not a party to the agreement. 5 6 Petitioner argued that it had agreed to waive any
action against respondent's o cers, directors, employees, stockholders, and
successors-in-interest, but that it did not agree to waive its claim against respondent.
57

On October 25, 2016, respondent led a Reply 5 8 stating that petitioner was held
solidarily liable with the Gascons in CA-G.R. CV No. 102522. Thus, when petitioner
"released the Gascons, two (2) of the solidary debtors, of all their obligations," 5 9
petitioner effectively extinguished the entire obligation under Article 1215 6 0 of the Civil
Code.
The issues for resolution are:
First, whether this Petition is moot and academic in light of the Compromise
Agreement dated August 4, 2015;
Second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of Royal Ferry's
appeal despite its violation of Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court; and
Lastly, whether the Petition for Insolvency was properly filed. EHaASD

I
Respondent argues that the Petition is moot and academic in light of the
Compromise Agreement. It alleges that petitioner has abandoned its claim against
respondent and, consequently, lost its status as respondent's creditor. Thus, petitioner
has no more interest in the case and can no longer question the insolvency proceeding.
61

For its part, petitioner contends that it has waived only its claims against "
[respondent's] Antonino R. Gascon, Jr. and Jonathan D. Gascon and its other o cers,
directors, employees, stockholders, successors-in-interest and did not waive or
abandon any of its claims against [respondent]." 6 2 (Emphasis in the original).
Petitioner has not abandoned its claim against respondent. Paragraphs 4 and 5
of the Compromise Agreement provide:
4. The FIRST PARTY waives any further action of whatsoever nature,
whether past, present or contingent, in connection with the causes of action
against the SECOND PARTY and THIRD PARTY alleged in its complaint in Civil
Case No. 05-773, entitled "Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Royal Ferry
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 Services, Inc., Antonino R. Gascon, Jr. and Jonathan D. Gascon," already
partially resolved by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141 in its Partial
Decision dated 20 May 2013 and Order dated 3 December 2013;
5. Should the Supreme Court of the Philippines rule in favor of the FIRST
PARTY in "Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Royal Ferry Services, Inc."
(G.R. No. 188146), or otherwise reinstate the Orders dated 15 June 2006 and 16
October 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, dismissing the
Petition for Voluntary Insolvency led by Royal Ferry Services, Inc., the FIRST
PARTY agrees not to hold the o cers, directors, employees, stockholders,
successors-in-interest of Royal Ferry Services, Inc., the SECOND PARTY, the
THIRD PARTY, and the heirs and assigns of the foregoing personally liable for
the obligations of Royal Ferry Services, Inc. to the FIRST PARTY, and, instead,
abandon completely all causes of action against said o cers, directors,
employees, stockholders, successors-in-interest of Royal Ferry Services, Inc., the
SECOND PARTY, the THIRD PARTY, and their heirs and assigns. 6 3
The Compromise Agreement was between petitioner and the Gascons. Contrary
to its claim, respondent was not a party to the agreement. Nowhere in the Compromise
Agreement did petitioner agree to waive its claim against respondent.
In CA-G.R. CV No. 102522, petitioner held the Gascons solidarily liable with
respondent for the same debt that petitioner was claiming in these proceedings. It is
on this basis that respondent now asserts that it is a solidary debtor with the Gascons
and can, thus, acquire the benefit stipulated in Article 1215 6 4 of the Civil Code.
Respondent did not present any other proof of this alleged solidary liability. In
CA-G.R. CV No. 102522, one of petitioner's contentions was whether the corporate veil
should be pierced to make the Gascons liable for respondent's liabilities. Before the
Court of Appeals could rule on the matter, however, the Compromise Agreement had
been executed and the case was closed.
A case is moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
because of supervening events so that a declaration would be of no practical use or
value. 6 5 As respondent has failed to establish that petitioner has abandoned its claim
against it, petitioner continues to have an interest in the insolvency proceeding.
II
On the issue of the formal defects of respondent's appeal, we uphold the Court
of Appeals Decision to rule on the merits of the case.
Petitioner alleges that respondent's Appellant's Brief has failed to comply with
Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (h) of the Rules of Court:
(a) First, the Appellant's Brief is bereft of page references to the
record in its "Statements of Facts and of the Case" and its discussion
supporting its assignment of errors, in violation of Section 13 (c), (d) and (f) of
Rule 44.
(b) Second, the Appellant's Brief failed to include a statement of the
issues of fact or law to be submitted to [the Court of Appeals] for judgment, in
violation of Section 13(e), Rule 44.
(c) Third, the Appellant's Brief does not contain the page of the report
on which the citation of authorities is found, in violation of Section 13(f), Rule
44.
(d) Fourth, the table of cases is not alphabetically arranged, in
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 violation of Section 13(a), Rule 44.
(e) Fifth, the Appellants Brief does not contain, as an appendix, a
copy of the judgment or nal order appealed from, in violation of Section 13(h),
Rule 44. 6 6
On the other hand, respondent argues that it has substantially complied with the
requirements under the law. 6 7 It claims that the absence of page references to the
record in its "Statements of Facts and of the Case" has not automatically resulted in the
dismissal of the appeal. 6 8 Further, as the records of this case are not voluminous, the
Court of Appeals was not inconvenienced by the lapse. 6 9
Respondent likewise claims that although the Appellant's Brief did not
speci cally contain the phrase "statement of issues," the three errors in issue were
identi able through a reading of the Brief. 7 0 It claims that its failure to append a copy
of the trial court Order has been mooted because the Court of Appeals has issued the
Resolution requiring them to submit copies of the assailed Order. 7 1 Lastly, respondent
argues that it only cited ve (5) cases in the Brief. Hence, a citation of authorities was
unnecessary. 7 2 DaIAcC

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in deciding to rule on the

merits. The term "may" in Rule 50, Section 1 7 3 of the Rules of Court means that the
Court of Appeals has discretion to dismiss an appeal based on the enumerated
grounds. The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion when it decided that the interest
of justice would be better served by overlooking the pleading's technical defects. Time
and again, this Court has declared that dismissal on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon. 7 4 It is judicial policy to determine a case based on the merits so that
the parties have full opportunity to ventilate their cause and defenses. 7 5 The Court of
Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the appeal.
III
The Petition for Insolvency was properly led before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
The rst insolvency law, Act No. 1956 n , was entitled "An Act Providing for the
Suspension of Payments, the Relief of Insolvent Debtors, the Protection of Creditors,
and the Punishment of Fraudulent Debtors (Insolvency Law)." It was derived from the
Insolvency Act of California (1895), with few provisions taken from the United States
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 7 6 With the enactment of Republic Act No. 10142, otherwise
known as the Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA), the Insolvency
Law was expressly repealed on July 18, 2010. The FRIA is currently the special law that
governs insolvency. However, because the relevant proceedings in this case took place
before the enactment of the FRIA, the case needs to be resolved under the provisions
of the Insolvency Law.
Insolvency proceedings are de ned as the statutory procedures by which a
debtor obtains nancial relief and undergoes judicially supervised reorganization or
liquidation of its assets for the benefit of its creditors. 7 7
Respondent argues that the Regional Trial Court of Manila obtained jurisdiction
because in its Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, respondent alleged that its principal
o ce was then found in Manila. On the other hand, petitioner argues that ling the
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Manila was a patent jurisdictional defect as
the Regional Trial Court of Manila did not have territorial jurisdiction over respondent's
residence. 7 8
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 Petitioner confuses the concepts of jurisdiction and venue. In City of Lapu-Lapu
v. Phil. Economic Zone Authority: 7 9
On the one hand, jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases
of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." Jurisdiction is
a matter of substantive law. Thus, an action may be led only with the court or
tribunal where the Constitution or a statute says it can be brought. Objections to
jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be brought at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is led with a court which has no
jurisdiction over the action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case.
On the other hand, venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in
which an action or proceeding should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a
matter of procedural law. A party's objections to venue must be brought at the
earliest opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the
objection shall be deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is
improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case. 8 0 (Citations
omitted)
Wrong venue is merely a procedural in rmity, not a jurisdictional impediment. 8 1
Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a matter of procedural law. 8 2
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the Insolvency Law vests jurisdiction in the Court
of First Instance — now the Regional Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is acquired based on the allegations in the complaint. 8 3 The relevant
portion of respondent's Petition for Voluntary Insolvency reads:
Petitioner was incorporated on 18 October 1996 with principal place of
business in 2521 A. Bonifacio Street, Bangkal, Makati City. At present and
during the past six months, [Royal Ferry] has held o ce in Rm. 203 BF Condo
Building, Andres Soriano cor. Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, where its books of accounts and most of its
remaining assets are kept. 8 4
Section 14 of the Insolvency Law speci es that the proper venue for a petition
for voluntary insolvency is the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the
insolvent debtor has resided in for six (6) months before the ling of the petition. 8 5 In
this case, the issue of which court is the proper venue for respondent's Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency comes from the confusion on an insolvent corporation's
residence.
Petitioner contends that the residence of a corporation depends on what is
stated in its articles of incorporation, regardless of whether the corporation physically
moved to a different location. On the other hand, respondent posits that the ction of a
corporation's residence must give way to uncontroverted facts.
In Young Auto Supply Co. v. Court of Appeals: 8 6
A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is
applied to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a
metaphysical sense a resident of the place where its principal o ce is located
as stated in the articles of incorporation. . . The Corporation Code precisely
requires each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation the "place
where the principal o ce of the corporation is to be located which must be
within the Philippines". . . The purpose of this requirement is to x the residence
of a corporation in a de nite place, instead of allowing it to be ambulatory. 8 7
TAacHE

Young Auto Supply dealt with the venue of a corporation's personal action by
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 applying the provisions of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, the Rules of Court also
provides for when its provisions on venue do not apply. Rule 4, Section 4 provides:
RULE 4
Venue of Actions
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not apply.
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the ling of
the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
As there is a speci c law that covers the rules on venue, the Rules of Court do not
apply.
The old Insolvency Law provides that in determining the venue for insolvency
proceedings, the insolvent corporation should be considered a resident of the place
where its actual place of business is located six (6) months before the ling of the
petition:
Sec. 14. Application. — An insolvent debtor, owing debts exceeding in
amount the sum of one thousand pesos, may apply to be discharged from his
debts and liabilities by petition to the Court of First Instance of province or city
in which he has resided for six months next preceding the ling of such petition .
In his petition he shall set forth his place of residence, the period of his
residence therein immediately prior to ling said petition, his inability to pay all
his debts in full, his willingness to surrender all his property, estate, and effects
not exempt from execution for the bene t of his creditors, and an application to
be adjudged an insolvent. He shall annex to his petition a schedule and
inventory in the form herein-after provided. The ling of such petition shall be
an act of insolvency. (Emphasis supplied) 8 8
The law places a premium on the place of residence before a petition is led
since venue is a matter of procedure that looks at the convenience of litigants. 8 9 In
insolvency proceedings, this Court needs to control the property of the insolvent
corporation. In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. S.F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. :
90

Conformably, it is the policy of Act No. 1956 to place all the assets and
liabilities of the insolvent debtor completely within the jurisdiction and control of
the insolvency court without the intervention of any other court in the insolvent
debtor's concerns or in the administration of the estate. It was considered to be
of prime importance that the insolvency proceedings follow their course as
speedily as possible in order that a discharge, if the insolvent debtor is entitled
to it, should be decreed without unreasonable delay. "Proceedings of [this]
nature cannot proceed properly or with due dispatch unless they are controlled
absolutely by the court having charge thereof." 9 1 (Citations omitted)
To determine the venue of an insolvency proceeding, the residence of a
corporation should be the actual place where its principal o ce has been located for
six (6) months before the ling of the petition. If there is a con ict between the place
stated in the articles of incorporation and the physical location of the corporation's
main office, the actual place of business should control.
Requiring a corporation to go back to a place it has abandoned just to le a case
is the very de nition of inconvenience. There is no reason why an insolvent corporation
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 should be forced to exert whatever meager resources it has to litigate in a city it has
already left.
In any case, the creditors deal with the corporation's agents, o cers, and
employees in the actual place of business. To compel a corporation to litigate in a city
it has already abandoned would create more confusion.
Moreover, the six (6)-month quali cation of the law's requirement of residence
shows intent to nd the most accurate location of the debtor's activities. If the address
in a corporation's articles of incorporation is proven to be no longer accurate, then legal
fiction should give way to fact.
Petitioner cites Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Goldstar Elevators Phils.
Inc., where this Court ruled that a corporation's articles of incorporation is the
92
controlling document that determines the venue of a corporation's action. 9 3 Thus,
abandoning the principal o ce does not affect the venue of the corporation's personal
action if the corporation's articles of incorporation were not previously amended to
reflect this change.
Two glaring differences between this case and Hyatt make the latter
inapplicable. First, Hyatt found inconclusive the allegation that the petitioner
corporation relocated to a different city. 9 4 Here, the Regional Trial Court found that
respondent had su ciently shown that it had been a resident of Manila for six (6)
months before it led its Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. 9 5 Second, and more
importantly, Hyatt involves a complaint for unfair trade practices and damages — a
personal action governed by the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. 9 6 This case,
however, involves insolvency, a special proceeding governed by a special law that
specifically qualifies the residence of the petitioner. HDICSa

IV
We cannot sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the "petition for
voluntary insolvency [was led] in the proper venue since the cities of Makati and
Manila are part of one region[.]" 9 7 This is untenable. Section 14 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 provides several judges to preside over the different branches assigned to
Manila and Makati. Thus, the two venues are distinct:
(d) One hundred seventy-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned
for the National Capital Judicial Region. There shall be:
Eighty-two branches (Branches I to LXXXII) for the city of Manila,
with seats thereat;
Twenty- ve branches (Branches LXXXIII to CVII) for Quezon City,
with seats thereat;
Twelve branches (Branches CVIII to CXIX) for Pasay City, with
seats thereat;
Twelve branches (Branches CXX to CXXXI) for Caloocan City, with
seats thereat;
Thirty-nine branches (Branches CXXXII to CLXX) for the
municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Mandaluyong,
Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas,
and Muntinlupa, Branches CXXXII to CL with seats at Makati,
Branches CLI to CLXVIII at Pasig, and Branches CLXIX and CLXX
at Malabon; and

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 Two branches (Branches CLXXI and CLXXII) for the municipality
of Valenzuela, with seats thereat. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite being in the same region, Makati and Manila are treated as two distinct
venues. To deem them as interchangeable venues for being in the same region has no
basis in law.
Respondent is a resident of Manila. The law should be read to lay the venue of the
insolvency proceeding in the actual location of the debtor's activities. If it is
uncontroverted that respondent's address in its Articles of Incorporation is no longer
accurate, legal ction should give way to fact. Thus, the Petition was correctly led
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
WHEREFORE , the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED . The assailed
Decision dated January 30, 2009 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88320 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Mendoza and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. n
2. Rollo, pp. 78-92. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and
concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga (Chair) and Isaias P.
Dicdican of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3. Id. at 94-95. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and
concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga (Chair) and Isaias P.
Dicdican of the Ninth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4. Id. at 209-210. The Order was issued by Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of Branch 24,
Regional Trial Court, Manila.
5. Id. at 16.
6. Id. at 112.
7. Id. at 79.
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 104.
12. Id. at 79.
13. Id. at 140-141. The Order was issued by Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of Branch 24,
Regional Trial Court, Manila.
14. Id. at 140-141.

15. Id. at 142-150.

16. Id. at 183-190.

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