Paper - Chrishmal Warnasuriya
Paper - Chrishmal Warnasuriya
Paper - Chrishmal Warnasuriya
INTRODUCTION:
I must first express my sincere gratitude to your Chamber and its very energetic
CEO for inviting me to share a few thoughts on this subject with you. It is indeed a
privilege to finally meet many of you leading the industry today. Coming in last on
a list of such illustrious speakers is indeed a ‘hard act to follow’, especially when all
of you are just itching to get away; nevertheless I shall try to keep you stuck to your
seats at least for a few minutes longer.
Taking into account the fact that all of you are busy professionals operating in a
commercial environment which demands ‘instant magic’ and considering further
that I’ve been afforded a modest 30 minutes to place before you what usually
requires much longer even for a basic study, I have decided against a MS PP
presentation (by which you will only retain what you see) but prepared this paper
instead. You will note that this has much more detail and depth than what I shall
present ‘on my feet’. All I will do is guide you through the salient points on this,
but you will hopefully retain this paper and use it as your ‘first information’ if you
like, to come to terms with these concepts whenever you’re presented with a
situation in international construction.
1
The author passed out as an Attorney-at-Law of Sri Lanka in May 2000, having apprenticed under Mr. Faisz
Musthapha PC at whose Chambers he continued as a ‘junior counsel’ pursuing a primarily appellate practice in
Public & Administrative Law, Civil & Commercial Appeals, Constitutional Law & Fundamental Rights
jurisdiction appearing mainly before the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. He thereafter moved to UK and
read at King’s College, University of London and passed out in 2006 with a Master’s Degree in Laws (Hons)
Specialising in Commercial & Corporate Law, including the subject Int. Construction Contracts & Int.
Arbitration. He went on to complete a pupillage as a Barrister at 2 Paper Buildings in London (Chambers of
Sir Desmond De Silva, QC) and has just returned to active practice in Colombo in July 2007, where he has
added to his areas of practice Commercial Banking & Int. Finance, Corporate Law, Public & Private Int. Law,
Construction Law, Arbitration, Immigration and Int. Human Rights Law.
Chrishmal also holds a BA in Political Science, Int. Relations & Journalism from Colombo and a Postgraduate
Diploma (Hons) in Int. Relations & Conflict Resolution from the BCIS. He is a member of the Association of
Sri Lankan Lawyers in the UK (ASLLUK) and of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL). He regularly
contributes to publications both here and in the UK and can be contacted on [email protected] or
[email protected] for any clarifications on this presentation.
1
I must strongly advocate however, that although ‘law’ as it used to be practiced has
undergone many a change over the years (as for instance this seminar – where we
the practitioners bring the law to you, as opposed to a decade ago where you may
be visiting us in chambers for even a percentage of this information), it must be
borne in mind that this paper is an ‘overview’ only and should therefore be relied
on purely for your information and education, not as ultimate authority based on
which you should contract. You as contractors, engineers or employers would
naturally be expected to be aware of these concepts when you’re confronted with an
issue. It is always best to immediately seek sound professional advice from a
specialised legal practitioner when you are faced with an actual situation for only
they will know the intricate operating of these rules, how they’ve been interpreted
recently and any provisos (or exceptions) in their practical application. When faced
with any situation it is also unnecessary to entertain the age-old fears over
protracted litigation, since the 21st century practitioner also appreciates that time
itself is a valuable commodity with a severe opportunity cost and he/she has been
trained therefore, to think that their primary task is to do everything possible to
keep a client out of court rather than inside it!
For the very same practical reasons my presentation today shall be based on:
Some notable legal issues arising out of FIDIC standard form of Construction
Contracts (International Federation of Consulting Engineers), 2 specifically the
1999 publications; the Red Book (construction)3, Yellow Book (plant-design &
build)4, Silver Book (EPC-turnkey)5 and the Green Book (short contracts)6;
And the manner of resolving any disputes arising from the provisions of the
FIDIC modelled contracts.
I shall where appropriate (and time permitting) attempt to draw parallels with
other forms of contracts and the operation of ‘ordinary laws’ in relation to similar
disputes.
1. RESOURCE MATERIAL:
I give below some useful websites where you may seek immediate recourse to as a
‘first port of call’, which can be extremely helpful as ‘information only’.
2
Federation Internationale des Ingenieurs-Conseil
3
For building and engineering works primarily designed by the employer
4
For electrical and mechanical plant and & engineering works, design-build by the contractor
5
For projects where contractor engineers, procures and constructs
6
For projects typically 6 months or under, of relatively lesser value, ideally under US$ 5,00,000.
2
For publications – These are mainly ‘institutionalised’ publications.
FIDIC 7 - www.fidic.org
For general information plus papers (some from the ICLR) and speeches, for Multilateral
Development Bank (MDB) Harmonised Edition see home page
For Case Law – Most decided cases that I quote (and available for reference) are
based on ‘English Law’ and I will also refer (where
appropriate) to relevant Arbitration Rules (such as ICC).
3
This provides excellent coverage of all the decisions of the House of Lords and Court of
Appeal as well as the main High Court cases.
Some of the following articles have been written by highly respected authors on this
subject (most of them who sit as Int. Arbitrators and they shed invaluable light on
our subject matter. I shall try to refer to at least some of these articles during my short
presentation (depending on time availability) but I strongly recommend a
comprehensive reading to anyone with specific interest on any area. The reader
should ordinarily be able to find the article without much difficulty in the ICLR9 with
the reference supplied and where such a reference is not given, I can make it
available via email to anyone interested.
8
Point of interest – see case of Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic of
Sri Lanka (Case No. ARB/87/3), to do with a joint venture on Shrimp Farming which was referred to ICSID
and decided in 1987.
9
Publication - International Construction Law Review
4
The New standard form of int. construction contracts – Christopher Seppala
(International Business Lawyer, February 2002)
FIDIC Subcontract form – Christopher Seppala [1995] 12 ICLR 5
The pre-arbitral procedure for the settlement of claims under the FIDIC Contract –
Christopher Seppala [1986 3 ICLR 315]
On International Arbitrations:
Report on Construction Arbitrations – Prof.’s Nael Bunni & H.H. Humphrey Lloyd, QC
[2001] 18 ICLR 644
Multi-Party Arbitration under ICC Rules - Christopher Seppala [1990] 7 ICLR 358
Hong Kong Dispute Resolution – D. Lewis [1993] 10 ICLR 76; [1994] 11 ICLR 25, [1995]
ICLR 131
Arbitration in the Netherlands - A G J van Wassenauer [1993] ICLR 43
Resolution of disputes in Vietnam - RA Shadbolt [1995] 12 ICLR 267
Resolving Disputes in Singapore: Litigation, Arbitration and ADR – Chan [1998] 15
ICLR 259
2. AN ‘INTERNATIONAL’ CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT:
I will not undermine the intellectual capacity of this forum by launching a high-
school like lecture on ‘similarities & differences’ between domestic and
international construction contracts; suffice though I believe to set down the
following salient features of ‘playing on the international arena’ of construction.
5
Although it appears very obvious at first glance, I’m certain that those with
experience will readily agree that you encounter a completely novel set of everyday
issues when dealing in the international marketplace (as opposed to dealing with
‘your own people’ in the domestic arena); which, if not handled tactfully on first
occurrence will almost undoubtedly lead to ‘a dispute’.
Now this looks simple enough at first glance. However say you were tendering for
works in Singapore and encountered certain issues with subterranean conditions
subsequent to base date, which you will now claim as an ‘unforeseeable ground
condition’ based upon which you will naturally seek an extension.
It is quite possible that you will not be granted such an extension since if you claim
to be a contractor on the international marketplace, you will be deemed to have
known and expected to have provided for all such conditions as an ‘experienced
contractor’, Singapore being such a small land space without largely diverse or
complicated ground conditions; all of which must be known by now by experience.
This is an area where one would undoubtedly face adverse consequences, if not
provided for adequately at the stage of contracting. I will attempt to explain this
factor through the following example.
As many of you experienced persons would know, the prevalent legal systems of
the world can be liberally divided as ‘common law’ systems and ‘civil law systems’.
The concept of ‘frustration of contract’, for instance, which generally means that the
performance of the contract has become impossible and therefore demands
discharge automatically is viewed very differently within these two systems of law.
You will find that the civil law jurisdictions (such as Germany/France) will more
readily accept this phenomenon based upon their concept of impossibiliun nulla
obligatio est10 upon which a contractor’s obligations may be immediately considered
discharged. However even in 1863 common law systems (such as the UK)
demanded that one performs the contract or pays damages in lieu of failure, even
where performance had been rendered impossible. 11 Although the position is now
slightly improved, at first instance common law would still consider a person who
10
Latin legal maxim – meaning that “as to the impossible, there is no obligation”. This is manifested by their
principles of ‘force majeure‘ etc…
6
for a defined or ascertainable amount promises to carry out and complete a
construction project to have assumed all the risks inherent in it, and would discharge
the contract as ‘frustrated’ only if there has been ‘a radical change’ in the obligation,
so as to render it an entirely different obligation than that was originally contracted to
do12. In this regard I recommend a reading of Davis Contractors Ltd. Vs Fareham
UDC13 where even an acute shortage of skilled labour and material that extended
the time for completion by almost 16 months was still not considered ‘a radical
change of the obligation’ so as to merit ‘frustration of contract’.
A
Insurer
Insurer Architect Operator - User A User/Consumer
A
A
Other
11 Insurer
Contract – 27th Ed (Oxford-1998) at page 504 quoting the case of Taylor v Caldwell
See Anson’s Law of Consultants
(1863) 3 B&S 826 per Blackburn J
12
Ibid – at page 516
MAIN PRIME CONTRACTOR
13 Re Insurers Primary JOINT VENTURE OF Plant Purchases
[1956] AC 696
Insurers PARTNERS 1-A-2-A-3
A A A
A
A
A
A
A A A A A
A
Mechanical
A A and
Electrical
Materials Sub-contractor
A
Equipment
suppliers
I have inserted ‘A’ and used straight lines (_____) where I felt any issues
arising were more likely to be settled through arbitration
I have used dotted lines (----------) where I felt disputes were more likely to be
settled in courts of law based on domestic legislation.
However it doesn’t necessarily have to be so always and it is quite possible
for this position to be reversed, depending on surrounding circumstances.
c. The FIDIC forms of Contract
What I intend on giving here is a brief introduction (in point-form) to the four new
FIDIC books published in 1999. For a more detailed study I suggest a reading of the
articles by Wade14 or Seppala.15
Red Book – recommended for building and engineering works where most of
the designing is done by the Employer. Some designing may of course be done by
the contractor.
8
Yellow Book – mostly used in projects for Electrical/Mechanical Plant or even
engineering works where most of the design is done by the contractor.
This new Yellow Book replaces both the old Yellow & Orange (turnkey) Books.
Whilst the old Yellow dealt only with electrical & mechanical construction works,
the new one is not necessarily limited by ‘nature of works’ but is suitable for all
types of projects where main responsibility for design lies with Contractor, though
some design may be carried out by Employer/Engineer. Some notable features are:
Silver Book – Since this is a completely new book to FIDIC an extra description
is warranted.
This book is recommended for EPC (turnkey) projects, intended at catering to the
void created in the international marketplace by the Red and Yellow Books for
constructions with ‘price/time certainty’. The traditional books with their balanced
risk-sharing brought with it a host of difficulties for some Employers:
However, certain Employers in the market are privately funded (as in many BOT
projects) who require more certainty in final price and time, to attain which, the
contractor needs to take on more risks, subject of course to the demand for a higher
price which some Employers in the international market do not mind spending.
This book is therefore meant to cater to such projects where Employers require
more certainty, less risk and where parties contract with full understanding and
acceptance of these risks.
This move to deviate from FIDIC’s standards of balanced risk sharing between the
employer and contractor has been widely criticised as placing a more onerous
liability on the contractor. Therefore effectively the silver book is intended at a strict
2 party contract without the intervention of the 3 rd intermediary (the engineer), such
as an EPC contract within a BOT (or similar type) structure. Some of its main
features are:
9
o Contractor carries out all engineering, procurement, construction providing
a fully-equipped facility, ready for operation at ‘the turn of a key’,
o No Engineer – instead the Employer may appoint a representative to look
after its interests
o Lump sum contract price, extended testing procedures after completion
o Contractor takes majority of risks which Employer pays more to cover
o Final price and time of completion is more certain
o Employer’s requirements are usually very brief (and performance type) and
Contractor assumes overall control of project
o Procurement procedures are different, with only a small number of tenderers
o Contractor is given freedom to carry out works in his chosen manner, BUT
has to prove reliability and performance of completed project
o Such privately-financed (BOT type) projects are subject to more negotiation
than public funded ones
Since the main forms of contract were rather long and unnecessarily unwieldy for
relatively simple projects, FIDIC also prepared a much simpler form, originally
intended for works of value up to US$ 500,000 and six months’ duration. However
as it progressed it was understood that the amount of the contract sum should not
be the governing factor, but rather the complexity of the work, since a simple yet
repetitive project (like sewer laying) may cost much more BUT may not need a
complicated form, whilst some other project with much less work (like a dredging
contract) may. The Green Book therefore –
o Has all the provisions necessary for such works in a total of 15 clauses, with a
total length of only 10 pages
o The sentences are short, language uncomplicated and simple to understand,
making it ideal for many contracts of a simple nature, particularly in
developing countries (such as ours) for projects such as roads, water and
sewage, electricity transmission, and the like
o The World Bank has found it so useful that it is now incorporated in their
Standard Bidding Documents for Simple Works
o The printed Book is some 35 pages long, BUT includes the Agreement with
its Appendix, Rules for Adjudication and Adjudicator’s Agreement, and 10
pages of Notes for Guidance,
10
o Risk sharing is basically on the same balanced principle as the Red & Yellow
Books. There is no ‘Engineer’, so it is a direct contract BUT the Employer
may appoint representative. Design can be carried out by either party and all
types of construction work may be covered. Payment may be on a lump sum
or on any other basis.
DAB - In the new books, the role of the Engineer to settle disputes has been
supplanted by a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB), thus negating the necessity
for the Engineer to be ‘impartial’ any longer
o There is also provision for this DAB to be set up at the time of contract (only
in the new red book) to remain on site throughout the contract
o In the case of yellow and silver books this is provided for each dispute
(clause 20). This is a marked departure from the old red and yellow books,
where any dispute needed to be referred to the engineer as a pre-condition to
arbitration
Similarities in the Red & Yellow books – both contain identical or similar
provisions on many matters:
o risk sharing is balanced between parties (as in the old books), e.g. employer
takes risk of ‘adverse physical conditions’ (4.12), unforeseeable ‘operation of
11
the forces of nature’ [17.3(h)] and design by Employer [17.3(g)], as well as
other phenomena such as war (anywhere), terrorism, riot, & similar (within
the country) (17.3)
o All claims must follow a strict procedure, employer’s claims (2.5) &
contractor’s claims (20.1), which are then determined by Engineer in terms of
3.5
o The earlier position was that the difference lay in the ‘nature of the work’
which was primarily ‘civil’ or mechanical’ engineering
o The previous Red Book was primarily intended for civil engineering
construction works such as roads, water & sewage facilities, bridges, dams,
hydropower stations, tunnels etc where most of the work was carried out on
site. The employer or his engineer provided the detailed design. Here
payments were on a monthly basis, where the work was available for
measurement and scrutiny
o As opposed to this the previous Yellow Book was for contracts where the
major part of the work was carried out ‘off-site’ at the manufacturer’s
workshops, which is the case in most electrical and mechanical plant. This
had more emphasis on testing & commissioning procedures, guarantees, etc
for manufactured plant such as turbines, generators, switchyard equipment.
Here the Contractor was responsible for most of the design. For such work
being carried out at the factory, monthly measurement is not practicable and
therefore payments were mostly on a ‘lump sum basis’ as for instance upon
stages of completion.
o Whilst the new Red & Yellow books have retained most of these features, the
deciding factor for selection has now evolved to be based on ‘who is
responsible for the design’ rather than naming it ‘civil’ or ‘mechanical’
engineering. Thus in modern composite projects the all-important allocation
of risks is mainly dependent upon who is responsible for the design and not
which particular type of work dominates
o Build, operate and transfer (BOT) conditions (as in the Silver book) would
usually include an agreement to provide infrastructure to be compensated
later through the operation of the project, such as a PPP initiative
12
o Clause 8.4 also enforces a strict limitation on time extensions, as opposed to
the other books, whilst Clause 20.1 requires the submission of a ‘fully detailed
claim’ with ‘full supporting particulars’ for the satisfaction of a claim by the
contractor; which would invariably mean all records (whether primary,
secondary or tertiary) unlike in the other books
o Since no two projects are identical, the books have a Part I, which contains
the standard conditions applicable, hopefully to the great majority of
projects, and a Part II containing the ‘Conditions of Particular Application’,
which must be drafted to suit the precise requirements of the actual project
in hand.
Having thus introduced you to FIDIC, I intend to very briefly discuss a few areas in
it which I feel require careful construction and interpretation to avoid many
possible disputes. Since these are ONLY brief observations I recommend a reading
of the referred articles (set out under ‘resource materials’ above or given as
‘footnotes’) for a more comprehensive grasp of these areas.
It would not be incorrect to say that the single-most encountered obstacle in all
international contracts (not necessarily only in constructions) if not provided for
specifically in the contract is the search for the ‘governing (or proper) law of the
contract and the principle known as ‘the conflict of laws’; the question as to which
system of law would govern the terms of the contract.
The membership of the EU has to a large extent ‘contained’ this problem following
the ratification of the ‘Rome Convention’16 and thereafter legislating for it through
domestic enabling statutes, similar to the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act of the UK17
to arrive at the ‘governing law’ (a similar concept is the UNCITRAL model law on
arbitration, which is discussed later in this paper). These however are only
applicable to those ratifying states to the Convention. What of the others? The
prevalent philosophy is that in respect of other countries the general law of
interpretation (common law) applies to search for the ‘proper law’ of the contract.
16
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 1980 (for short, the Rome Convention)
17
In the UK, S 2(1) of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 gave statutory force to the Rome Convention
on the law applicable to contractual obligations
13
One must be careful not to be confused by this whole phenomenon and remember
that any such ‘search for a law’ only arises in the absence of a selected law that has
already been chosen by the parties to interpret their contract (subject to certain very
limited exceptions such as ‘provisions contrary to the lex situs). This is why FIDIC
has made specific provision at clause 1.4 for the parties to select their law.
In the absence of such an express provision, the convention 18 or the common law
must kick in to figure out the applicable system of law. The search is generally
three-fold. It begins by seeing whether the parties have expressly chosen a
particular system of law. If not express, can their choice be implied? If even an
implied choice cannot be discerned, then with which system of law is the contract
most closely connected? What the convention refers to as ‘governing law’ and the
common law refers to as ‘proper law’ is more or less the same 19. I have set out some
salient features below in the form of a comparative table for ease of reference.
EU STATES GOVERNED BY THE COMMON LAW RULES FOR
‘ROME’ CONVENTION FINDING THE ‘PROPER LAW’
14
Article 1 (2) (d) - specifically decided that “it may be that the
excludes ‘arbitration agreements’ parties have in terms in their
or those contracts where the agreement expressed which law
parties have already selected a they intend to govern, and in that
law. case their intention will be
effectuated by the court”
Furthermore even the Roman-
Dutch common law which also
has roots in our legal system
evidences similar provisions as in
the South African case Improvair
(Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Establissements
Neu22 in which it is noted that an
express agreement of the parties
was deemed to be their choice on
whether South African or French
law governed their partnership
for joint tender.
Article 3.3 – Freedom for parties to select Vita Food Products Inc v Unus
‘any system of law’ to govern their Shipping Co Ltd23 this same
contract, notwithstanding the fact that it principle applied and recognized.
may have no connection at all to the The HOL endorsed this PC
contract. decision in Compagnie Tunisienne
de Navigation SA v Compagnie
d’Armement Maritime SA24
22
1983 2 SA 138 (C) 145A-F (South African case)
23
[1939] AC 277 (PC)
24
[1971] AC 572 (HOL)
25
Christie R.H., QC – ‘the law governing an international engineering contract’ at page 4
15
In the absence of such an express choice, Christie in his article gives an invaluable
the ‘Convention’ allows for the implied ‘mirror image’ on how even the common
choice of the parties to be construed, law interprets the parties intentions,
done by recourse to the Giuliano & precisely in the same manner as the
Lagarde report26: convention:
(a) From their use of a standard form of (a) In the case of Amin Rasheed
contract which is known to be Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance
governed by the law of that country; Co27 the preferred choice of a
or standard Lloyd’s marine policy
by a Kuwaiti insurance company
was held to be ‘an implied
choice’. Another close upon this
interpretation is Whitworth Street
Estates (Manchester) Ltd v James
Miller and Partners Ltd28 where a
standard English building
contract was held to mean a
choice of English Law as the
‘proper law’ impliedly chosen.
(b) from their express choice of that (b) In The Njegos case29 the fact that
country in previous or related the previous charterparty for the
transactions between them; or same voyage was governed by
English Law was deemed to be an
implied choice once again for the
subsequent dispute on the bills of
lading
(c) from the choice of the courts of that (c) The Compagnie Tunisienne de
country to settle their disputes, or Navigation SA v Compagnie
‘the choice of a place’ (lex situs) d’Armement Maritime SA30 case
where disputes are to be settled by may be cited as authority for the
arbitration; or contention that an arbitration
clause specifying a venue for the
arbitration was an indication of
the party’s choice of law. The
same line of decision is reflected
26
OJ 1980 C282/1 AND in Plender & Wilderspin – European Contracts Convention (2nd Ed-2001) at Annex
IV, made applicable in the UK under S 3 (3) (a) of the Act of 1990 (see FN 17 above)
27
[1984] AC 50
28
[1970] AC 583
29
[1936] AC 90
30
See FN 24 above
16
in The Mariannina31 case English
Law was held to be the ‘implied
choice’ since the bills of lading
specified arbitration in London by
a maritime arbitrator.
31
[1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 12 (CA) 14-15
32
[1950] 3 DLR 26 37 (Can)
33
[2001] EWCA Civ2019, [2002] CLC 533 CA
34
[2002] FSR 45, CA
35
[2002]EWCA Civ916, [2002]1WLR 3059CA
36
[1969] Qd R 378 (Aus)
37
[1938] 1 AC 565
17
Perhaps it is also the appropriate time for those of us in ‘this region’ to seriously
consider formulating our own set of rules (not only on interpreting questions on the
‘choice of law’ but maybe even extending to other broader issues in ‘regional
construction) in the form of a ‘regional treaty’; similar to the style and concept
adopted by the EU with regard to the Rome Convention, for minimising
construction related disputes in this region and/or involving
Contractors/Employers of the region.
Clause 1.1.2.4 defines the appointment of the ‘Engineer’ and Clause 3.2 allows for
replacement by affording notice to the Contractor. It may be of interest to note the
following provisions in the FIDIC contract and possible interpretations that may be
drawn.
o Note – Employer may delegate his authority for ‘specified works’ in the
contract and such actions are then deemed to be with approval
o If so the applicable laws of agency should apply for such delegation (such as
instances where the agent can bind the principle for certain actions) in
contract and in common law
Clause 3.2 – it is also possible for the Engineer to delegate works to assistants
38
As for instance the principle of delegatus non potest delegare in Public Law (that powers of discretion etc,
conferred specifically upon a person can ONLY be exercised by such person and no other)
18
o If you read Clause 3.2 (b) you will note that this asserts the Engineer’s
authority (even under such delegation), allowing the Contractor to refer any
decision of such a delegated assistant to the engineer for his final decision
Clause 3.3 – allows the Engineer to vary his instructions to the contractor and
specifies that it must be in writing, unless the Contractor confirms such an oral
instruction.
Especially in view of the fact that the new FIDIC books have replaced the
Engineer’s ‘on site adjudicatory role’ by providing for a ‘Dispute Adjudication
Board (DAB at Clause 20.2) I feel it worthwhile to review the Engineer’s new role to
ascertain how impartial he is required to be in his present context.
I am personally of the view (with which quite a few commentators agree) that the
Engineer’s impartiality has diminished to a great extent in the present FIDIC
editions in view of the following provisions (Clauses):
3.5 – the express duty to exercise discretion impartially on any situation (as
previously) has been replaced by making a fair determination only in respect of
matters arising under 3.5
3.4 – The Employer can replace him (having given notice to the Contractor and
subject to objections) but this ‘fear’ in my view would not allow for impartiality
Extensions of time –
o One can see that this argument holds some merit since the contractor’s duty
of ‘general indemnity’ (17.1) covering Employer’s personnel, in terms of the
interpretation clause (1.1.2.6) includes the Engineer
39
Bateson, David in his paper titled ‘Impartiality of the Engineer’ (FIDIC – August 2000)
19
c. Ground Conditions & Risk Allocation
This is another area in which I feel there is potential for many disputes to arise,
which would ultimately of course depend on the circumstances of each case. I
should like to explore specifically the following FIDIC provisions in this regard:
See 1.2 (interpretation clause) which stipulates that the ‘marginal note’
cannot be relied on for interpreting the contract. Therefore although
4.10 refers to ‘site data’ on the margin, all relevant data does not
necessarily have to be limited to site data in terms of this interpretation
Also note the qualifying words when referring to the Contractor’s
obligation to ascertain facts
The words ‘practicable’ & ‘cost & time’ are also important
considerations when interpreting this since the search for ‘site data’
must also therefore be within these qualified limits for the Contractor,
which may therefore not allow him to take into account all relevant
matters on certain occasions
o Also note that 4.11 ties down the contractor to a price, which is deemed to
be after having considered all such ‘site data’ (and therefore calculated for
any contingencies) and forms his acceptance of the above site information
and whatever risks as necessary
20
This is another ‘twister’ for any interpreter of a FIDIC contract.
o Also note that there is a limitation even on this, that what is referred to is
ONLY what he sees at the time of tender
Having received this notice the engineer is required to make his own
evaluation
Before proceeding for payment [under sub-paragraph (b)] the engineer
is also entitled to make an overall evaluation of other conditions
encountered, whether they had been more favourable than estimated by
the Contractor
Note – that since the emergence of such a condition invariably leads to a
request for an extension of time and/or additional payment and/or
both, the Engineer is allowed to ‘net such times/payments’ as against
other favourable conditions
It is therefore my view that ‘Clause 12 (4.12)’ needs to be viewed more
as an insurance policy rather than a means to recover all costs over such
time/expenditure, ONLY to recover those parts which were actually
unforeseeable and impossible to overcome
o Also note - although this clause in both ‘red & yellow books’ is more or less
the same, the ‘silver book’ categorically disentitles the contractor from
recompense for such risks, and expects him to have estimated for all of
that, which (as I have argued before) is the whole idea of the Silver Book
21
4. DISPUTES & MECHANISMS FOR RESOLUTION UNDER FIDIC:
“Legal” claims - which the Contractor may be entitled to assert under the law
governing the contract, the most obvious one being breach of contract. It is
important to bare in mind that FIDIC contracts are not exclusive of remedies
that may be available to a party under the governing law and for instance, the
Contractor may consider:
o That the Employer has wrongfully terminated the contract, upon the basis
of breach of contract, rather than upon the basis of the termination clause
(15),
22
or otherwise, the Contractor must give notice to the Engineer (or to the
Employer – in the Silver Book) as soon as practicable and not later than 28
days.
o Mere notice of claim is sufficient at this stage (28 days) and does not need
to state the amount or time claimed nor the contractual basis of the claim
nor provide any supporting documents40
Her Majesty’s Attorney General for the Falkland Islands v. Gordon Forbes
Construction (Falklands) Limited42
40
Equally, the Engineer is not required to respond to this, the Contractor’s notice of claim, only to the fully
detailed claim with supporting particulars
41
Seppala, Christopher R – Contractor’s Claims under FIDIC Contracts for Major Works, [2000] 17 ICLR 235
42
[2003] BLR 208, 285
23
Within 42 days after receiving a claim the Engineer must respond “with
approval, or with disapproval and detailed comments”. He may also
request any necessary further particulars “but shall nevertheless give
his response within such time”
If the Contractor fails to comply with this or another Sub-Clause, any
extension of time and/or additional payment shall take account of the
extent (if any) to which the failure has prevented or prejudiced proper
investigation of the claim
Interestingly this is the first time a FIDIC contract has required the Engineer or the
Employer to respond to the claim of a Contractor within a given time period or in a
given manner.
In terms of both standard claims (2.1) and general procedure (20.1), having received
‘a notice of claim’ the Engineer must ‘proceed in accordance with Sub- Clause 3.5
(Determinations)’
o 3.5 – specifies that such a ‘determination’ is binding on the parties unless later
revised by the DAB or international arbitration pursuant to Clause 20
24
b. Dispute Adjudication Boards
Prior to having a closer look at the actual process of how a dispute escalates into an
international arbitration, it may be worthwhile to understand the working of the
DAB within the FIDIC structure; especially since it is a new addition.
Is it a ‘mini-arbitration’?
The history of DAB’s lies in the US, where the Engineer at most times tended to be
an agent of the employer and therefore there were questions with regard to his
impartiality in arriving at decisions (as in the present case of FIDIC). Interestingly
the World Bank picked up this US idea first and thereafter FIDIC (as indeed many
others) has now incorporated the concept into these new editions.
(i) DAB (as in 20.2) – which is an adjudication board that produce decisions
(as in FIDIC) which are at most times binding until reviewed, AND
(ii) Dispute Review Board - the review board is much more common to
favour the US model that issues recommendations,
Interestingly under the ICC rules of DAB even ‘recommendations’ are deemed
‘decisions’! In so far as FIDIC is concerned however the DAB procedure is
‘annexed’ at pages 67 & 68 to the Red Book and if a party is dissatisfied of a
decision, if it has been communicated under 20.4 OR if there is non-compliance
under 20.7, then they can move to Int. Arbitration under clause 20.6.
25
I rely with gratitude on the diagrams of Prof. Bunni43 to explain the provisions of
FIDIC for the resolution of disputes ultimately leading to an Int. Arbitration.
STEP 3 DAB provides its decision within DAB fails to give decision
or within 84 days under 20.4
84 days under Sub-Clause 20.4 **
Does that Party give its STEP 4b STEP 4a Dispute is settled and
notice of dissatisfaction the decision is final and
under 20.4 in the time
No
binding, Sub-Clause 20.4
allowed (28 days)?
Yes
No
STEP 5
Dispute finally settled by ICC - International Arbitration - 20.6
** The decision shall be binding on both Parties, who shall promptly give effect to it unless and until it shall
be revised in an amicable settlement or an arbitral award, see 4th paragraph of Sub-Clause 20.4.
43
Prof. Bunni, Nael G - The Gap in Sub-Clause 20.7 of The 1999 FIDIC Contracts for Major Works
26
Dr. Bunni further highlights what he terms as ‘a gap’44 in the FIDIC procedure ,
where a party does NOT comply with the DAB’s decision:
No Yes
STEP 4a STEP
4b
The Decision is
final & binding Yes
Yes
Do the Parties comply
No with the DAB’s decision?
End
Proceed to 20.7 &
refer the failure
itself to arbitration No Yes
** The decision shall be binding on both Parties, who shall promptly give effect to it unless and until it shall
be revised in an amicable settlement or an arbitral award, see 4th paragraph of Sub-Clause 20.4.
44
Ibid – at page 4
27
As noted above, at the end of the FIDIC procedure for dispute resolution lays the
beginning of an Int. Arbitration in terms of the ICC rules of arbitration (20.6).
Article II
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake
to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, at the request of one of the
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed
These provisions have been given ‘domestic legal effect’ in Sri Lanka by the
enactment of the Arbitration Act, No. 11 of 1995.46
45
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10
June 1958)
46
See (in particular) – Ss 3, 4 & 5 of the 1995 Act
47
See (generally) Beatson J – Anson’s Law of Contract, 27th Ed. Pp 4-7
28
o A fair tribunal must relate their decisions to, and always be mindful of public
policy and not give decisions in oblivion to it, for if not; that itself will open
the matter for scrutiny by courts again and courts will not hesitate to strike
down such decisions given contrary to public policy48
o The procedure governing the arbitration itself (such as the applicable rules of
evidence) must be seen to be fair
o There may be instances where an ad hoc arbitration needs to be held, as for
instance:
where the formation of the contract itself (which includes the arbitration
clause) is challenged by a party,
where the contract itself stands terminated with a breach, and thus there
are questions as to how further provisions leading to arbitration (as
agreed by parties) can be held to apply
UNCITRAL – one cannot discuss the gamut of Int. Arbitrations without at least
a mention of this ‘model law’49, specifically where Sri Lanka is a signatory to this
UN Commission.
This set of rules was designed to assist States in reforming and modernizing their
laws on arbitral procedure so as to take into account the particular features and
needs of international commercial arbitration. It covers the entire spectrum of the
arbitral process from the arbitration agreement, the composition and jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal and the extent of court intervention through to the recognition
and enforcement of the arbitral award. Since the adoption of this ‘model law’, the
practical difference is that the variety of rules of procedure in many countries has
been harmonized subjecting all international commercial arbitrations (governed by
this model law) to the same law of arbitration ( lex arbitri); notwithstanding the fact
that the law of the seat of arbitration (lex situs) maybe quite different.
This model has now been adopted almost universally but in the event of a country
that has not adopted it, it is always safe to select a ‘law to govern the arbitration’
which is in conformity with the public policy of that land, and also consonant to the
law of the contract.
48
See – S 4 of Arbitration Act No. 11 of 1995
49
Adopted by UNCITRAL on 21 June 1985 (for further explanation see page 3 above)
29
e. Reference to ICC Arbitration under 20.6 of FIDIC
Clause 20.6 – stipulates that unless settled amicably, any dispute where the
DAB’s decision has not become final and binding shall be finally settled by Int.
Arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, it shall be:
It appears therefore that the preference of FIDIC is for the ICC rules but there is
nothing precluding the parties from preferring any other (such as the UNCITRAL)
rules to govern their arbitration.
As soon as the arbitral tribunal has received the file from the ICC secretariat
referring the matter for arbitration, it is required to draw up its ‘terms of reference’:
I believe that this provides the ideal first opportunity to allow the tribunal to ‘get
into grips’ with the case at hand and what they need to decide on. Therefore it is in
the best interests of the parties to ensure that the terms are as comprehensive and
thorough as possible. The parties must then signify their agreement to these terms
by signing it, and since such endorsement is in each other’s presence, it also opens
up an ideal forum for discussion and resolution of as many ancillary issues as
possible (raising objections etc), thus crystallising the issues for determination.
Furthermore since the award is scrutinized by the ICC Court (under A27) before
being finalised, the ‘terms’ also constitute a basis upon which the court could
evaluate whether the final award is consonant with what the tribunal has ventured
to decide on, or whether they have exceeded their mandate etc.
Bias:
I also feel it may be of interest for you to at least have a basic knowledge of what
constitutes ‘bias’ by an arbitral tribunal and how one would go about challenging it.
What I intend to do is therefore to refer to some decided cases on this point, to see
how courts of law have dealt with this somewhat ‘delicate matter’ and see whether
we can discern a form of ‘a test’ on which we could evaluate whether in fact there
has been such a biased decision.
Please note that emphasis (and comments) where added are all mine and do not
form part of the official judgment.
Chrishmal Warnasuriya Page xxx Colombo, SL – 22/08/2007
Paper - CCISL - Int. Const. Law
o The Gough test50 –
This is what we usually adopt as a ‘first test’. Note how the test has been employed
in the following celebrated case of former Chilean dictator Pinochet:
Following the House of Lords' decision that PU, as former head of state of Chile, did not have
immunity from arrest and extradition [2000] 1 A.C. 61, [1998] C.L.Y. 2354), PU discovered that one
of the judges who heard the appeal, H, had been an unpaid director and chairman of Amnesty
International Charity Ltd (AIC) since 1990. AIC was wholly controlled by Amnesty International
(AI), which had been allowed to intervene in the appeal, and PU sought to have the decision set
aside on the ground that H's connection with AI was such as to give the appearance that he might
have been biased against PU.
Held - allowing the application and directing … the Divisional Court's decision be reheard by a
differently constituted committee, that the fundamental principle was that a person could not be a
judge in his own cause. Although AI had effectively become a party to the appeal, H could not be
treated as its alter ego and automatically disqualified on the ground that he was personally a party
to the appeal. The question was whether a non pecuniary interest in non financial litigation was
sufficient automatically to disqualify a person from sitting as a judge in the cause. One of AIC's
objects was "to procure the abolition of torture, extra judicial execution and disappearance", and it
was clear that AIC had an interest in the proceedings, which was to establish that PU was not
entitled to immunity. The fact that H was not a member of AI but a director of its wholly owned
company, which carried on much of its work, was irrelevant if the absolute impartiality of the
judiciary was to be maintained. The fundamental principle that justice should not only be done but
be seen to be done had to be applied to a judge involved, either personally or as a company director,
in promoting the same causes in the same organisation as a party to the action.
A sought to appeal … for the removal of the chairman of an arbitration tribunal and the setting
aside of three partial awards in favour of S. A had become aware of the arbitrator's position as a
non executive director of a rival telecommunications company and sought his removal because of
the appearance of bias. A contended that the application of the bias test in R. v Gough was not
binding on an arbitrator and that a lesser test of reasonable suspicion of bias should be applied
owing to the consensual nature of arbitration …
Held - … the relevant test applicable in all cases was the existence of a real danger of bias … given
that the arbitrator was not disqualified under the common law test of bias, it was unreasonable to
consider that he lacked the requisite independence to which the ICC Rules referred.
50
R. v Gough (Robert) [1993] A.C. 646
51
[2000] 1 AC 119
52
[2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 625, [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127
It would appear then that suspected bias of an arbitrator can be further divided into
‘actual bias’ and ‘apparent bias’, the latter being decided using the age-old test of
the ‘fair minded observer’. This is further manifest in the following case study:
P, a trade association … appealed against (a decision) on the ground of apparent bias. P contended
that (1) R, one of the members of the court, had applied, albeit unsuccessfully, for a position in a
company in which DG's principal expert witness was a director, and (2) the court … (should
consider not only) … actual bias (but also) … whether the facts were such as to give rise to a
reasonable apprehension of the possibility of bias.
Held - … that it was a long established rule of English common law that a tribunal should be
independent and impartial, and latterly the Human Rights Act 1998 Sch. 1 Part I Art. 6 had given
effect to the right to a fair trial. When presented with a complaint of bias, the court had to identify
all factors relevant to the allegation and then determine whether a fair-minded observer would
apprehend a real danger of bias. On the facts of the instant case that process would have led a fair-
minded observer to deduce that R was at risk of partiality; hence she ought to have recused herself.
Having failed to do so, she should be disqualified, with the result that the other court members
would have to stand down.
I must, at least in passing for the sake of completeness, make reference and let you
know that there is provision available for more than two parties to be involved in
arbitrations in certain situations. Some such examples are:
o Where there are ‘cross claims’ against the same persons, but these claims
arise out of separate arbitration agreements (or contracts)
o Where the ‘cause of action’ is the same (or identical) but is alleged against
more than one person, as for instance an agent and an undisclosed
principal or some partners against the same debtor
53
[2002] 1 W.L.R. 269, [2002] 1 All E.R. 853
The procedure adopted in such multi partite arbitrations may differ from one to
another but can generally be categorised into one of the following heads:
o A single hearing, one panel of arbitrators with all the disputes and all the
parties
o It could also be a single hearing only between the parties that ultimately
stand to gain or lose (such as in the aforementioned ‘string sales’ where
you invite the first seller and the last buyer and the others agree to be
bound by such decision
There are obvious benefits in such multi partite arbitrations, the main being of
course a considerable saving on the cost factor of arbitrating, but it is essential that
all connected parties expressly agree to such a course of action, since any failure to
hear a party with an ‘interest’ would undoubtedly cause a miscarriage of justice and
thus possibly open the entire arbitration up to review by courts.
Chrishmal Warnasuriya
20/08/2007 – Colombo, Sri Lanka.