Appellant's Brief

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
Case Nos. 20-1933, 20-2005, 20-2091 and 21-1317

(consolidated)
_________________________________________
SENSA VEROGNA,
PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT,
- v. -
TWITTER, INC.,
DEFENDANT - APPELLEE.
Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of New Hampshire
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Appellant Plaintiff, PRO SE

Anonymously as Sensa Verogna
[email protected]

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
----
TABLE OF CONTENTS…. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . i
GLOSSARY…………………………………………………….………………...ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ADDENDUM- ORDERS OF THE DISTRICT COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..iv
APPENDIX- EXHIBITS OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . .v
I. INTRODUCTION……………..…………………………………………1
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE……...…………………………………….2
III. GENERAL ARGUMENTS…………..………...…….………………..…..7
IV. ARGUMENTS.........................................................................................................10
A. 4th Appeal- No. 20-2091- Clear Absence of Jurisdiction
1. JURISDICTON…………………………………………………….….10
2. QUESTIONS PRESENTED…………………………………...……..11
3. TIMELINESS………………………………………………...………..11
4. REVIEW STANDARD…………………………………….………….11
5. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION….…………………...……12
6. DIVERSITY UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1332……………………………..…14
7. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION…….……………………………15
8. THRESHOLD MATTER…………………...…………………………16

i.
9. FIRST CIRCUIT’S RATIONAL…………………….…………………19
10. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT CASES UNDERMINE
HYPOTHETICAL STATUTORY JURISDICTION………………… …20
11. CLAIMS AND DEFENSES……………………...……… ………… .22
12. ARGUMENT………………………………………...………………23
13. CONCLUSION……………………………………...……………….25
B. 5th Appeal- No. 21-1317- Void Judgment/Fraud on Court
1. JURISDICTON………………………………...…………………...…29
2. QUESTIONS PRESENTED………………………….………………31
3. TIMELINESS………………………………………………...………..32
4. REVIEW STANDARD…………………………...………………….. 33
(1) Generally Under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)……………………….33
(2) Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(4).………………………………..…….36
(3) Under Rule 60(b)(6)…………………………………………….38
(4) Under Rule 60(d)(3)…………………………………………….39
(5) Review for Plain or Basic or Fundamental Error…………..……40
5. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS……………………….……… 41
6. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS OF PROOF……………….……….. 42
(1) Void Judgments and Rule 60(b)(4)………………………………42
(2) Fraud Upon the Court and Rules
60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3)…………………………………………….…43
i.

7. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS…………………………….…..………48
8. LOCAL DISTRICT COURT RULES………..…………….………….49
9. PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS………………………………………50
10. UNOFFICIAL PRO HAC VICE RULES AND POLICIES……...…..53
11. APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS……………………….…..54
12. DISQUALIFICATION………………………………….…...……….58
13. ARGUMENT………………………………………………..…..……59
(1) Fraud Upon the Court………………………………….………59
(2) Bias Orders of the Court…………………………….……….….60
(3) Aberrational Behavior…………………………………….….…63
(4) Ex-Parte Communication………………………………...……..64
(5) Defendant, Appellee, Twitter………………………..……...…..65
14. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………...….66
C. 2nd Appeal- No. 20-2005- Stripped Jurisdiction
1. JURISDICTON…………………………………………………...…...69
2. QUESTIONS PRESENTED…………………………………………70
3. TIMELINESS…………………………………………………..…..…70
4. REVIEW STANDARD………………………………………….….....70
5. BACKGROUND……………………………………………………...71
6. CONTENT AND RULE 3 NOTICE……………………………...…..71
7. ARGUMENT………………………………………………………….73

i.

8. CONCLUSION……………………………………………….……….75
D. 1st Appeal- No. 20-1933- Megless Doctrine
1. JURISDICTON…………………………......……………….…………77
2. QUESTIONS PRESENTED………………………………….………78
3. TIMELINESS……………………………………..………….………..78
4. REVIEW STANDARD………………..……………………….…….. 78
5. BACKGROUND……………………………..……………………… 83
6. ARGUMENT………………………………..………………….…….. 84
7. CONCLUSION………………………………..………………...…… 89
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................................................ 91
VI. CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................ 92
VII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVCE…………………..………………………….97
ATTACHED APPENDIX- EHIBITS TABS A, B, C AND D……………..…...vi.

i.
GLOSSARY
“Appellant” Plaintiff, proceeding anonymously as Sensa Verogna
“Appellee” Defendant, Twitter, Inc.
“Appeals Court” United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
“Court” United States District Court District of New Hampshire
“Case” Court Case No. 1:20-cv-00536-SM
“ ROA” Appeals Case: 20-1933 Doc. 00117746599 Filed: 05/28/2021
“[Motion, at]” Docket number from Court Case, refers to ROA
“[Order, at]” Order of the Court.
“No. 4 Appeal” Case No. 20-2091, Appeals Court- Clear Absence of Jurisdiction
“No. 5 Appeal” Case No. 21-1317, Appeals Court- Fraud Upon Court/Void
“No. 2 Appeal” Case No. 20-2005, Appeals Court- Stripped Jurisdiction
“No. 1 Appeal” Case No. 20-1933, Appeals Court- Megless Doctrine
“Section § 230” 42 U.S.C. § 230 of the Communications Act of 1934
“Local Rule” Local Rules of the First Federal District Court of New Hampshire
“Schwartz” Julie E. Schwartz, Partner Attorney of Perkins Coie and Counsel

for Twitter in Appellant’s Case.
“Eck” Jonathan M. Eck, Director Attorney of Orr & Reno and Counsel
for Twitter in Appellant’s Case
“Mrazik” Ryan Mrazik, Partner Attorney of Perkins Coie and Counsel

for Twitter.
“Johnstone” Andrea K. Johnstone, Federal Magistrate Judge for the United

States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.
“ McAuliffe” Steven J. McAuliffe, Senior United States Judge for the United
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.
“COIE” Perkins Coie LLP. and Counsel for Twitter.

ii.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Supreme Court
Accord Rowe v. Coal Corp., 197 Va.

136, 143, 87 S.E.2d 763, 767-
68 (1955) 32
Accord: Matter of Leggat, 162 N. Y.
437, 56 N. E. 1009 (1900) 25
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S.

193, 71 S. Ct. 209, 95 L. Ed. 207
(1950) 39
Am. Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781,
810 (1946) 94
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 506 (2006) 10, 13,26
Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 26 U.S.
567 (1828) 30, 42
Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757
(2001) 73
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97

S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72
(1977) 56
Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 126 (1804) 23, 26
Chambers v. Baltimore Ohio R.R, 207
U.S. 142, 28 S. Ct. 35 (1907) 56, 57
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
32 (1991) 43, 56
Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 77
S.Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253 (1957) 58
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.
Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) 18

iii.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949) 29, 42
Continental Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U.S.
237 (1886) 14
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U.S.
463 (1978) 29
Devlin v. Cooper, 84 N. Y.
410,413,415 (1881) 25
Easlry v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242
(2001) 80
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938) 14
Evans v. Corporate Services, 207

Ill.App.3d 297, 301, 152 Ill.Dec.
191, 194, 565 N.E.2d 724, 727
(1990) 29
Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) 13

Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506, 630 (1869) 13
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348
(1879) 43
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) 17
Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178 (1962) 74

Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2211
(2011) 81
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640
(1980) 22
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co.,
459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) 73, 75

iii.
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515
U.S. 417, 434-35, 115 S. Ct. 2227,
132 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1995). 7, 16
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475
(1965) 14
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) 33, 48, 65
Ins. Corp. of Ir. Ltd. v. Compagnie des

Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701
(1982) 17
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89
S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969) 57
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,
466-67 (1997) 40
Johnson v. Zerbst - 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.
Ct. 1019 (1938) 38
Klaprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,

614-615, 69 S. Ct. 384, 390, 93 L.
Ed. 266 (1949); 39
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) 17
Kontrickv. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,455
(2004) 10, 17
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1377 (2014) 21, 28
Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162
(1994) 58
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149 (1908) 14
Mansfield, C. & L. M R. Co. v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) 13, 26
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 170 (1803). 12

iii.
Marine Insurance Company v. Hodgson, 7
Cranch 332 (1813) 33
Marrese v. American Academy of

Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
378-79 (1985) 75
McClung v. Folks, 126 Va. 259, 268-
74, 101 S.E. 345, 347-49 (1919) 32
McNally v United States 483 U.S.
350 (1987). 48
McNutt v. GM Acceptance Corp., 298
U.S. 178, 189 (1936) 14
Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441
F.3d at 542. (2006) 14
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) 29
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
(1950) 57
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136--137, 75

S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942, 946
(1955) 58
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.

National Assn. of Railroad Passengers,
414 U. S. 453, 465, n. 13 (1974) 26
Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co.
368 U.S. 317 (1967) 1
Ojeda-Toro v. Rivera-Mendez, 853 F.2d
25, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1988) 36
O'Neill v. Cole, 194 Va. 50, 56-57, 72
S.E.2d 382, 385-86 (1952) 32
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905
(2018) 23
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 481-83 (1986) 54

iii.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) 55
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
557, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994, 95
L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) 57
People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410
N.E.2d 626 (1980) 43
Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 32 S.
Ct. 687 (1912) 33
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
142 (2009) 40, 41
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S.
657, (1838). 12
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503
U.S. 429, 438 (1992) 23
Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574, 583 (1999). 12, 13, 20, 21, 24, 26-28, 93
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976). 12
Sinochem Int 'I Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'!

Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31
(2007) 16, 20, 21, 24, 28
Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248
(1992). 71, 73, 76
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). 12, 13, 16-21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 93
Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers
Union, 446 U.S. 719, 722 (1980) 43
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487
U.S. 312, 316 (1988) 73
Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 8, 11 (1799) 17

iii.
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107
S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64
(1987) 57
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S.
157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555
(1936) 1, 40
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38,
47 (1998) 42
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625
(2002) 13, 40
United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct.
2159, 2164 (2010) 40
United States v. Mine Workers of Am.,
330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947) 24
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
731-37 (1993) 40
United States v. River Rouge Improvement
Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926) 30, 42
United States v. Walker, 109 U.S. 258,
265-67 (1883) 37
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Ref.
Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946) 40
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) 12
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440
(2000) 1
Whitaker v. McLean, 73 App. D.C.
259, 118 F.2d 596 (1941) 58
Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632,
658 (1896) 40
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579,

94 S.Ct. 2963, 2986, 41 L.Ed.2d 935
(1974) 56

iii.
First Circuit
Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886,

890 (1st Cir.1997) 1
American Cyanamid v. Capuano, 381
F.3d 6, 21 (1st Cir. 2004) 77
Aoude v Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F2d,
1118 (1st Cir 1989) 46
Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10,
15 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1997) 8
Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304
F.3d at 3-4 (1st Cir. 2002) 8
Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v.

Caribbean Petroleum Corp.,79 F.3d 182,
189 (1st Cir.) 40
Correa v. Cruisers, 298 F.3d 13, 21 n. 3
(1st Cir.2002) 8
Davila-Alvarez v. Escue/a de Medicina

Universidad Central de! Caribe, 257
F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2001) 81
Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock 46 F.3d
138 (1st Cir. 1995) 80
Gaydar v. Sociedad Instituto Gineco-

Quirurgico, 345 F.3d 15, 22-23 (1st
Cir. 2003) 41
Geo. P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker
Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.1995) 45
Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404, 407
(1st Cir. 1971) 27
Hooper-Haas v. Ziegler Holdings, LLC,
690 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2012) 81
Irizarry v. Quiros, 722 F.2d 869, 872
(1st Cir. 1983) 95

iii.
Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192,
197 (1st Cir. 1999) 19
Key Bank of Maine v. Tab1ec1oth

Texti1e Co. Corp. , 7 4 F. 3d 349, 353
(1st Cir. 1996) 61, 63, 65
Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402
F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2005) 9
Parella v. Retirement Board, R.I.

Employeees, 173 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir.
1999) 18, 19
Putnam Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d
448,471 (1st Cir.1992) 34, 35, 79
Seale v. Immigration & Naturalization

Serv., 323 F.3d 150, 154–56 (1st Cir.
2003) 19, 22
Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F. 2d 163,
166 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980) 22
Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19,
26 (1st Cir. 1999) 6
Soto v. United States, 11 F.3d 15, 17
(1st Cir.1993) 80
Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,320
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002). 40
United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc.,
909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990) 56
Circuits
Ark. Bar Assoc. v. Union Nat’l Bank,

224 Ark. 48, 53-54, 273 S.W.2d 408,
411-412 (1954) 51
&chard S. v. Dep't of Dev. Seros., 317
F.3d 1080, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2003) 81

iii.
“Glen E. Keller, Jr., De” Behagen v.
Amateur Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A,
744 F.2d 731, 732 (10th Cir. 1984) 22
A!!Jeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 876
(9th Cir. 2002) 35, 80
Achtman v. Kirby, McInerny & Squire,
LLP, 464 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2006) 26
Addington v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Co.,
650 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1981) 44
Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d
105, 108 (6th Cir. 1995) 37
Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343
(D.C. Cir. 1962) 32
Barrientos v. We/Lr Fargo Bank, NA.,
633 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011) 80
Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d
205 (5th Cir. 1949) 58
Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966,
971 (3d Cir. 1996) 54
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d
1205, 1261 (7th Cir.1984) 56
Belton v. United States, 104 U. S. App.

D. C. 81, 259 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.
1958) 75
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
409 F.2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1969) 27
Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
346 F.3d 402, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2003) 21
Bryant, Inc. v. Walters, 493 So. 2d 933,
938 (Miss. 1986) 37
Bulloch v. United States, 721 F.2d 713,
718 (10th Cir.1983) 48
Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260,1263
(11th Cir. 2001) 36

iii.
Casry v. Albertson's Inc., 362 F.3d
1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004) 81
Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d
1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993) 33
Chang v. United States, 327 F.3d 911,
925 (9th Cir. 2003) 81
Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205, 216--
217 (9th Cir. 1956) 58
Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap
Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 986 (4th Cir.
1986) 44
Computer Leasco, Inc. v. NTP, Inc., 194
Redcaps. 328, 334 (6th Cir. 2006) 32
Computer Prof’ls for Soc. Responsibility v.

United States Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897,
903 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 36
Corus Staal BV v. United States, 502
F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 33
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338,
348 (6th Cir. 1993) 45, 47
Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc.,
527 F.3d 358, 371 n. 2 (3d Cir.2008) 82
Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi

Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th
Cir.2010)) 84, 88
Doe v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Gov't, 407 F.3d 755, 761 (6th Cir.
2005) 37
Doe v. Vill. of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372,
377 (7th Cir. 2016) 77
Elliott v. Archdiocese of New York, 682
F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) 78

iii.
Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co.,
Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1257
(N.D. Ala. 2003) 90
Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 657
(7th Cir. 2008) 26
Fisher v. Tucson United Sch. Dist., 652
F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011) 80
Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d
1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006) 12, 36, 71, 79
Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, 699
F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2012) 19
Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 775 n.
4 (9th Cir. 1991) 11
Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 646 F.
Supp. 2d 79, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2009) 34
Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556,
559 (2d Cir. 1998) 44, 45
Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic

Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 959 (6th
Cir.1986). 55
Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd.

Of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1357
(4th Cir. 1982) 44, 45
Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d
677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984) 38
Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala,
989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.1993) 82
Hawxhurst v. Pettibone Corp., 40 F.3d
175, 179 (7th Cir. 1994) 10
Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 117 Ill.

App. 3d 512, 452 N.E.2d 1383 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) 37

iii.
Herring v. United States 424 F.3d 384,
389-90 (3d Cir. 2005) 39
Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 312 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) 33, 34
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in

Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d
180, 195 (8th Cir.1976) 44, 46
In re Four Seasons Securities Laws

Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th
Cir.1974) 37
In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist.

Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 730 n.2
(2d Cir. 1993) 16
In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1118–
19 (9th Cir.1999) 43
In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d 1092,
1099 (2d Cir. 1979) 37
In Re: Apple Inc., No. 14-143 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) 8
Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 f.3d 278 (9th Cir.
2011) 81
Kerwit Med. Prods., Inc. v. N. & H.

Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833, 837
(11th Cir.1980) 45
Kilcullen v. New York Dep't of Transp.,

33 F. Supp.2d 133, 136 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) 18
Klugh v. United States, 620 F. Supp.
892 (D.S.C. 1985) 37
Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) 1, 14

iii.
Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192,
195 (7th Cir. 1995) 73
Ladner v. Logan, 857 So. 2d 764, 770
(Miss. 2003) 32
LaRouche v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 112
F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2000) 34
Lawrence v. Dep’t of Interior, 525 F.3d
916, 920 (9th Cir. 2008) 12, 36, 70, 79
Levin v. ARDC, 74 F.3d 763, 766
(7th Cir. 1996) 10, 11
Lewis v. United States, 641 F.3d 1174,
1176 (9th Cir. 2011) 12, 71, 79
Linear Technology Corp. v. Compala

Linear Corp., Case Nos. 02-1569,-
1576 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 17, 2004) 30
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d at
195 (3rd Cir. 2010) 85
Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820
(6th Cir. 1970) 43
Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th
Cir. 1981) 37
Marshall v. Board of Educ., Bergenfield,
N.J., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3d Cir.
1978) 37
Martina Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc., 278 F.2d 798, 801 (2d
Cir. 1960); 48
Mathews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d
1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) 35
Matter of Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644
(7th Cir. 1992) 37
McMunn, 191 F Supp 2d at 445,
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) 46, 65

iii.
Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817
F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987) 32
Miller v. Thane Int'!, Inc., 519 F.3d
879, 888 (9th Cir. 2008) 80
Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d
257, 260 (10th Cir. 1971) 32
Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School,
543 F.2d 1189, 1191 (7th Cir. 1976) 94
Murray v. District of Columbia, at 52.
F.3d 353 (D.C.Cir.1995) 5
Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Gray,
1 F.3d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 1993) 34
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension

Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir.
1996) 15
O’Handley Case 2:21-cv-04954,
Central District of California 4
Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136,
146 (3d Cir.2000) 82
Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum

Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916,
920 (11th Cir. 2003) 36
Pumphrey v. Thompson Tool Co., 62
F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir.1995) 45
Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d
339, 342(9th Cir.1996) 26
Reyes Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001,
1006 (9th Cir. 2003) 55
Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 306 &
n.16 (5th Cir. 1980) 43
Riffle v. United States, 299 F.2d 802
(5th Cir. 1962) 75

iii.
Riordan v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins.,
589 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009) 80
Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d
1332, 1338 (5th Cir.1978) 45
Seaborn v. Florida Dep't of Corrections,
143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) 18
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) 82
Shangold v. Walt Disney Co., 275 F.
App'x 72 (2d Cir. 2008) 65
Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d
364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993) 14
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th
Cir.1981) 37
Smith v. Commissioner, 300 F.3d 1023,
1028 (9th Cir. 2002) 35
Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482
F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) 35, 80
Suzy’s Zoo v. Commissioner, 273 F.3d
875, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) 35
Thomas v. Holder, 750 F.3d 899, 902
(D.C. Cir. 2014) 4, 5
Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 188,
189-90 (5th Cir. 1984) 43
United States v. Beltran Gutierre:v 19
F.3d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1994) 81
United States v. Comprehensive Drug

Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 117 5
(9th Cir. 2010) 80
United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163,
168 (7th Cir.1985) 48
United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660
F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011) 33, 39, 43, 44, 65

iii.
United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d
1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992) 87
United States v. Leon, 203 F.3d 162,
164 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) 10
United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842,
845 (7th Cir. 1996) 58
United States v. Urena, 659 F.3d 903,
908 (9th Cir. 2011) 80
United States v. Waites, 198 F.3d 1123,
1126 (9th Cir. 2000) 80
Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 553
(10th Cir.1996) 45
Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204, 207
(4th Cir. 1984) 34
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
873 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1989) 44
Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 906
F.2d 645, 649 (11th Cir. 1990) 73
Other Courts
"&,def v. "&,def, 111 So. 3d 285, 291

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) 35
(1876 57 N.H. 245 at 288 [Supreme
Court, N.H.]) 88
Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565

F.2d 1364, 1371 (CA6 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978) 74
Amer. Household Products, Inc. v. Evans

Manufacturing, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d
1235, 1239 (N.D. Al. 2001), 64
Brainerd v. Beal 498 F.2d 901 (C.A.
7th, 1974) 72

iii.
Carpenter v. Berry, 58 So. 3d 1158,
1162 (Miss. 2011) 39
Cobb v. Lewis 488 F.2d 41 (C.A. 5th,
1974) 72
Commonwealth v. Greineder, 936 N.E.
2d 372, 393-94 (2010) 58
Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla.
5th DCA 1998) 57
DAG Jewish Directories, 2010 WL
3219292, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), 65
Doe v . Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995
(E.D. La. 2012) 85
Doe v. Megless, 2010 WL 3076246, at
*2 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 5, 2010) 2, 9, 77-79, 81-85, 89, 90, 93
Dougherty v. Harper's Magazine
Co., 537 F.2d 758, 762 (CA3 1976) 74
Ducanson v. Serv. First, Inc., 157 So. 2d
696, 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) 80
Edmond v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, 253 F.2d 143 (CA2 1958) 74
Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co.,

Inc., 498 F.2d 901 256 F.Supp.2d
1250, 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2003) 91
Hargrove v Riley, 2007 WL 389003,
*11 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 65
Hattersley v. Bollt, 512 F.2d 209 (CA3
1975) 74
In re Estate of Pearson, 25 So. 3d 392,
395 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) 39
In re Roussos, 541 B.R. 721, 729
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015) 32, 39
Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384-85
(Del. 1991) 58

iii.
Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245
(C.A. 5th 1968) 39
Perrine v. Henderson, 85 So.3d 1210,
1211-22 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) 57
Ruby v. Secretary of United States

Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 389 (CA9 1966)
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011 (1967) 73
Rudel v. "Rudel, 111 So. 3d 285, 291
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) 80, 81
Skywark v Isaacson, 1999 WL

1489038, *14 (SDNY 1999), No. 96
CIV. 2815 (JFK)] affd 2000 WL
145465, *1 [SD NY Feb. 9, 2000) 46
Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg, 437 F.2d
1098 (CA9 1971) 74
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Remley, 270 Va. 209, 218 (Va. 2005) 32
Stokes v. Peyton's Inc., 508 F.2d 1287
(CA5 1975) 74
United States v. Hitchmon, 587 F.2d
1357 (CA5 1979) 73
White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525,
529-30 (Tenn. 1998) 80
Williams v. Town of Okoboji, 599 F.2d
238 (CA8 1979) 74
Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F.2d 65, 66

(CA2 1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
925 (1981) 74

iii.
U.S. Constitution
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 17, 18, 19
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 12, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24
Federal Statutes
Title 18 U.S. C. §878 (1994) 87
Title 18 U.S.C. §871 ( 1994) 87
Title 18 U.S.C. §876 (1994) 87
Title 18 U.S.C. §879 ( 1994) 87
Title 28 U.S. §2071 49, 50, 59
Title 28 U.S. §2072 49
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 10, 68, 69, 71, 77, 79, 91
Title 28 U.S.C. §1251 10, 12
Title 28 U.S.C. §1253 10, 12
Title 28 U.S.C. §1291 10
Title 28 U.S.C. §1292 29
Title 28 U.S.C. §1331 10, 12
Title 28 U.S.C. §1332 10, 12, 14, 15
Title 28 U.S.C. §1367 15, 16, 25
Title 28 U.S.C. §1441 25
Title 28 U.S.C. §2106 1
Title 42 U.S.C. §1981 3
Title 42 U.S.C. §2000a. 4, 7
Title 47 U.S.C. §230 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 22, 27, 64, 90, 91
Gun Lake Act 22
New Hampshire Laws

N. H. RSA 311:7 3, 4, 15, 53, 54
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 4 3
Rule 8(c) 22
Rule 11 73
Rule 12 3, 61, 62, 63, 64, 95

iii.
Rule 50 1
Ru1e 55(b)(2) 62, 64, 65,
Rule 60(b)(4) 8, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 95
Rule 60(b)(6) 8, 31, 38, 43, 47, 95
Rule 60(d)(3) 8, 39, 41, 43, 47, 95
Local Rules
Rule 12 62, 65
Rule 4 62, 65
Rule 83.1 54
Rule 83.2(b), 50, 53, 54, 59
Rule 83.3. 50
Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure
Rule 3 71, 72, 73, 75, 91
Rule 4(a)(1) 70, 78
Rule 12 72, 95
Other Sources
84 Wright and Miller §1283 40
11 Wright & Miller §2862 37
13 Wright & Miller §3522 10, 11
15 C.J. 851, 852, secs. 170, 171; 14
Am. Jur. 368, sec. 168 24
14 Am. Jur. 363, sec. 160. 25

Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.:
"Hypothetical Jurisdiction" in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 855,857 (2001) 13

iii.
Alan M. Trammell, “Jurisdictional
Sequencing,” 47 Ga. L. Rev. 1099,
1126–27 (2013). 18, 21
Kimberly N. Brown, What's Left
Standing? ECA Citizen Suits and the
Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U.
KAN. L. REv. 677, 679-94 (2007) 18
Joshua Schwartz, Note,

“Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a
Broader ‘Arising Under’
Jurisdictional Question,”
104 Colum. L. Rev. 2255, 2270
(2004). 21
Hershkoff, Helen (2006). "Personal
Jurisdiction Question". NYU Law.
New York University. Retrieved
February 3, 2017. 25
Williams, Ryan (2010). "The One
and Only Substantive Due Process
Clause". Yale Law Journal. 120:
408–512. SSRN 1577342; 56
Robert J. Martineau, Considering
New Issues on Appeal: The General
Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 V and.
L. Rev. 1023 (1987), 40
Tory A. Weigand, Raise or Lose:
Appellate Discretion and Principled
Decision-Making, 17 Suffolk J. Trial
& App. Adv. 179 (2012); 40, 41
Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte

Appellate Rulings: When Courts
Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity
to Be Heard, 39 San Diego L. Rev.
1253 (2002); 40
ABA Model Rule 5.5(c)(2) 51

iii.
ABA Model Rules Comment(s) at
[9] 51
ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct 2.2; 58, 59
Federal Court of Appeals Manual,
supra note 15, §§ 8.1–8.17; 72
Federal Appeals: Jurisdiction and
Practice, supra note 15, §§ 6.01–
6.17. 72
H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52,

at 6357. supra note 6. 43
iii.
ADDENDUM- ORDERS OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Case: 21-1317, Document 001177738271, Filed 05/07/2021- (ROA)
No. 4 Appeal 20- 2091
11/09/2020 Dkt. 69 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL No. 4
11/10/2020 Dkt. 71 Clerk's Certificate transmitting Record
04/26/2021 Dkt. 81 Amended NOTICE OF APPEAL No. 4
04/29/2021 Dkt. 83 Clerk’s Certificate transmitting Record
05/27/2021 Dkt. 84 Clerk's Supplemental Certificate, Fees Paid
7/8/2020 [“Default Order”] ENDORSED ORDER denying 7 Motion for Entry
of Default. Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw)
(Entered: 07/08/2020) Case: 20-2091 Document: 00117673256 Page: 17 Date Filed:
11/25/2020
7/8/2020 ENDORSED ORDER denying 8 Motion for Entry of Default
Judgment. Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw)
11/25/2020
8/13/2020 [“MFR Order”] ENDORSED ORDER denying 39 Motion for
Reconsideration. Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw)
11/25/2020
iv.
8/27/2020 [“Anon Order”] ORDER Dkt. 54 denying 15 Motion to Proceed
Anonymously; denying 5 Motion to Declare Twitter a Public Accommodation Under
Law and Brief and Memorandum in Support; denying 6 Motion to Declare Twitter a
"State Actor" Under Law and Brief and Memorandum in Support; denying 16 Motion
to Declare Twitter's Computer Network a Public Forum Under Law; denying 42
Motion for Judicial Notice; granting 24 Motion to Stay Proceedings. On or before
September 17, 2020, plaintiff shall file a sworn affidavit in this court revealing his true
identity, whereupon the case caption will be amended accordingly. Until the court: (a)
issues its order on defendant's pending motion to dismiss, or (b) solicits briefing from
the parties, or (c) authorizes additional filings, neither party shall file any additional
papers, pleadings, notices, or motions with the court, except as necessary on an
emergency basis and only with prior leave of the court (that is, by way of first seeking,
and obtaining, leave to file). Failure to comply with this order may expose the violator
to an order imposing costs and legal fees. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw)
(Entered: 08/27/2020) Case: 20-2091 Document: 00117673256 Pages: 20-30 Date
Filed: 11/25/2020
9/14/2020 [“Permission Order”] ENDORSED ORDER denying 55
Emergency Motion for Permission to File Objections and a Hearing on the Motions.
Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered:
09/14/2020) Case: 20-1933 Document: 00117648101 Page: 26 Date Filed: 09/25/2020
iv.
9/21/2020 [“Compulsion Order”] ENDORSED ORDER denying 56 Motion to
Delay Compulsion of True Name Pending Appeal. Text of Order: Plaintiff's motion to
proceed anonymously was considered and ruled upon - he was required to notify the
clerk of his true identity by September 17, 2020. He failed to do so, but instead filed
this motion to delay or modify the disclosure order. Plaintiff acknowledges in this
motion that the disclosure order was clear and neither tentative, informal, or
incomplete, and he offers no explanation for his failure to comply other than that he
intends to appeal the order. This motion to delay or modify is denied. Plaintiff shall file
the required disclosure on or before the close of business on Friday, September 25,
2020, or the case will be dismissed for want of prosecution. So Ordered by Judge Steven
J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered: 09/21/2020) Case: 20-2005 Document: 00117663011 Page:
16 Date Filed: 10/30/2020
9/28/2020 [“Stayed Order”] ENDORSED ORDER - Text of Order: Plaintiff did
not comply with the court's extended disclosure order but instead filed an
"interlocutory" appeal on the final day allowed. As an appeal has been filed, and
dismissal was inevitable for failure to comply - thus essentially a final order - this court
will stay further action pending resolution of plaintiff's appeal. So Ordered by Judge
Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered: 09/28/2020) Case: 20-2005 Document:
00117663011 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/30/2020
10/06/2020 ENDORSED ORDER denying 61 Emergency Request for
Permission to File Motion to Reconsider Endorsed Orders Calling for Dismissal of
iv.
Claims. Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered:
03/08/2021 ENDORSED ORDER denying without prejudice 3 Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying without prejudice 14 Motion to Strike;
denying without prejudice 45 Motion Rule 5.1 Motion and MOL Challenging the
Constitutionality of Title 47 USC Code § 230; denying without prejudice 46 Motion for
Default of Default By Clerk. Text of Order: The pending motions (docket numbers 3,
14, 45, and 46) are denied without prejudice to renewing them following resolution of
plaintiff's interlocutory appeal, if appropriate. So Ordered by Judge Steven J.
McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered: 03/08/2021)
03/19/2021 “Rule 60 Order” ENDORSED ORDER denying 74 Emergency
Motion to Set Aside Orders Under Rule (60)(b). Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by
Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered: 03/19/2021
04/02/2021 ENDORSED ORDER re: 73 Motion to Clarify, Parameters of the
Current Stay, and to Toll Response Time; 75 Motion for Specific Findings to Clarify
Order and Toll Response Time. Text of Order: Motions for Clarification and Specific
Findings (doc. nos. 73 and 75) are granted to the following extent. The referenced
motions have been denied without prejudice - they are no longer pending. Should
plaintiff prevail on his interlocutory appeal in a way that permits this case to go forward,
plaintiff may refile those motions for consideration. (Plaintiff need not physically refile
iv.
the motions but may simply file a pleading asking the court to revive the motions, which
will be granted.) So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered: 04/05/2021)
04/21/2021 ENDORSED ORDER denying 76 Motion for Reconsideration.
04/22/2021)
8/28/2020 ENDORSED ORDER denying as moot 48 Motion for Leave to
File Reply and MOL to Defendant's Objection to Motion for Reconsideration. Text of
Order: Plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 48) for leave to reply to the defendant's objection
(Doc. No. 43) to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Doc. No. 39) of the court's
July 8, 2020, Order denying the plaintiff's motion for default (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED
as moot, as the court has denied the motion for reconsideration. See Aug. 13, 2020,
Order. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Andrea K. Johnstone.(lw) (Entered:
File Reply and MOL to Objection to Motion for Judicial Notice. Text of Order:
Plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 52) for leave to file a reply to the defendant's objection
(Doc. No. 50) to the plaintiff's motion for judicial notice (Doc. No. 42) is DENIED as
moot, as the court has denied the plaintiff's motion for judicial notice. See Aug. 27,
2020, Order (Doc. No. 54). So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Andrea K. Johnstone.(lw)
11/25/2020
iv.
No. 5 Appeal- 21-1317
7/8/2020 “Default Order” ENDORSED ORDER denying 7 Motion for Entry
of Default. Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw)
11/25/2020
7/8/2020 ENDORSED ORDER denying 8 Motion for Entry of Default
Judgment. Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw)
11/25/2020
8/13/2020 “MFR Order” ENDORSED ORDER denying 39 Motion for
Reconsideration. Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw)
11/25/2020
8/27/2020 [“Anon Order”] ORDER Dkt. 54 denying 15 Motion to Proceed
iv.
Filed: 11/25/2020
9/14/2020 [“Permission Order”] ENDORSED ORDER denying 55
iv.
16 Date Filed: 10/30/2020
00117663011 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/30/2020
10/06/2020 ENDORSED ORDER denying 61 Emergency Request for
Permission to File Motion to Reconsider Endorsed Orders Calling for Dismissal of
Claims. Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered:
03/08/2021 ENDORSED ORDER denying without prejudice 3 Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying without prejudice 14 Motion to Strike;
denying without prejudice 45 Motion Rule 5.1 Motion and MOL Challenging the
iv.
Constitutionality of Title 47 USC Code § 230; denying without prejudice 46 Motion for
Default of Default By Clerk. Text of Order: The pending motions (docket numbers 3,
14, 45, and 46) are denied without prejudice to renewing them following resolution of
plaintiff's interlocutory appeal, if appropriate. So Ordered by Judge Steven J.
McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered: 03/08/2021)
03/19/2021 “Rule 60 Order” ENDORSED ORDER denying 74 Emergency
Motion to Set Aside Orders Under Rule (60)(b). Text of Order: Denied. So Ordered by
Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered: 03/19/2021
04/02/2021 ENDORSED ORDER re: 73 Motion to Clarify, Parameters of the
Current Stay, and to Toll Response Time; 75 Motion for Specific Findings to Clarify
Order and Toll Response Time. Text of Order: Motions for Clarification and Specific
Findings (doc. nos. 73 and 75) are granted to the following extent. The referenced
motions have been denied without prejudice - they are no longer pending. Should
plaintiff prevail on his interlocutory appeal in a way that permits this case to go forward,
plaintiff may refile those motions for consideration. (Plaintiff need not physically refile
the motions but may simply file a pleading asking the court to revive the motions, which
will be granted.) So Ordered by Judge Steven J. McAuliffe.(lw) (Entered: 04/05/2021)
04/21/2021 ENDORSED ORDER denying 76 Motion for Reconsideration.
04/22/2021)
iv.
File Reply and MOL to Defendant's Objection to Motion for Reconsideration. Text of
Order: Plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 48) for leave to reply to the defendant's objection
(Doc. No. 43) to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Doc. No. 39) of the court's
July 8, 2020, Order denying the plaintiff's motion for default (Doc. No. 7) is DENIED
as moot, as the court has denied the motion for reconsideration. See Aug. 13, 2020,
Order. So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Andrea K. Johnstone.(lw) (Entered:
File Reply and MOL to Objection to Motion for Judicial Notice. Text of Order:
Plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 52) for leave to file a reply to the defendant's objection
(Doc. No. 50) to the plaintiff's motion for judicial notice (Doc. No. 42) is DENIED as
moot, as the court has denied the plaintiff's motion for judicial notice. See Aug. 27,
2020, Order (Doc. No. 54). So Ordered by Magistrate Judge Andrea K. Johnstone.(lw)
11/25/2020
No. 2 Appeal- 20- 2005
iv.
16 Date Filed: 10/30/2020
00117663011 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/30/2020
iv.
No. 1 Appeal- 20- 1933
09/25/2020 Dkt. 59 Clerk's Certificate transmitting Record on Appeal
8/27/2020 “Anon Order” ORDER Dkt. 54 denying 15 Motion to Proceed
Filed: 09/25/2020
iv.
9/14/2020 “Permission Order” ENDORSED ORDER denying 55
iv.
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a consolidated appeal from interlocutory and final orders of the District
“Court” dismissing one case arising from the same factual circumstances and involving
the same Appellant and Twitter.
Circuit Courts have authority to raise issues on their own when "the errors are
obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56
S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)); Kramer v. Gates, 481 F.3d 788 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See
(Liberal interpretation of imperfectly pled cause of action.) Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118
F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir.1997). [See TAB C- 2].
In Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co. 368 U.S. 317 (1967), the Supreme Court
held that a federal appellate court possesses the power to direct entry of judgment as a
matter of law. Id. at 321,330. The Court held that exercise of this power is consistent
with: (a) the Seventh Amendment; (b) the scope of appellate review contained in 28
U.S.C. § 2106; and (c) Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 322-30.
See also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
Appellant brings forward all arguments, facts, evidence and legal conclusions
submitted in Appellant’s: Appeal Motion and MOL to Join or Consolidate, [TAB A-1];
Appeal Reply to Twitter’s Response, [TAB A-2]; Appeal Motion to Consolidate, etc.
[TAB B-7]; Appeal Reply Response to Consolidate. [TAB C-1], [TAB D-3]; and Appeal
Motion to Stay Compulsion, [TAB D-2].
Page 1 of 97

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant challenges through Appeal No. 4, ALL the Courts Orders for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; through Appeal No. 5, the 03/19/2021 “[Rule 60 Order]”,
07/8/2020 “[Default Order]” and the 08/13/2020 [Motion for Reconsideration,
“MFR” Order], and collective remaining Orders for fraud upon the Court and void
judgments, and that McAuliffe failed to recuse himself; through Appeal No. 2, the
09/21/2020 “[Compulsion Order]” and 09/28/2020 “[Stayed Order]” for stripped
jurisdiction, and lastly; in the No. 1 Appeal, the 07/08/2021 “[Anon Order]” and
09/14/2020 “[Permission Order]” in misapplying the Megless test. See Doe v. Megless,
2010 WL 3076246, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 5, 2010). See [Attached Addendum- Orders of
the District Court].
In his [“Complaint, at 1” or 1.6 Electronic Version], [TAB A-3] Plaintiff,
“Appellant” alleged that Defendant, Appellee “Twitter” promulgated its policies for the
specific reason of removing whites’ tweets and accounts and severed services within its
ongoing User Agreement with Appellant and suspended for life most, if not all, of
Appellant’s @BastaLies account services and access to services in its public
accommodation for life because Appellant is white and tweeted, posted, communicated,
acted, displayed, behaved and portrayed himself to be a white person. [TAB A-3]
Additionally, in a role traditionally left exclusively to local governments and under the
color and authority of 47 U.S.C. §230, “Section §230”, Twitter violated Appellants’ free
speech rights by censoring and regulating Appellants’ tweets and behaviors and then in
Page 2 of 97

retaliation for the tweet, violated Appellant’s Rights of Assembly when it banned him
from a Public Forum and other Designated Public Forums. All in violation of
Appellant’s rights under the US Constitution and the New Hampshire “N.H.”
Constitution.
Twitter retorted, inter alia, that Appellant’s “claims are barred by Section §230
of the Communications Decency Act, and by [Twitter’s] own First Amendment
rights.” [MTD, at 3]. The Appellant retorted with a [Default Motion, at 7] [See TAB
B- 1] under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “Rule” 12 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, claiming
that as the Attorney for Twitter, Attorney “Schwartz”, was not authorized to practice
law in N.H., and averred that her submittal of Twitter’s [MTD, at 3]. amounted to illegal
engagement of the unauthorized and prohibited practice of law, “UPL” and that it
would be “tantamount to affixing an ex post facto imprimatur of approval of the
unauthorized and prohibited practice of law in violation of N.H. Revised Statutes
Annotated “RSA” 311:7, and therefore “as [Twitter] has failed to properly plead
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and otherwise defend Appellant’s Complaint and
Summons by June 1, 2020, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. [MTD, at 3], and
“within the time prescribed by the Court.” [Default Motion, at 7] Irregardless of her
illegal submittal to the Court, Magistrate Judge “Johnstone”, the administrational judge
of this case, granted Schwartz’s [Pro Hac Vice Motion, at 9] to appear before the court.
Section §230 safe harbors will not save the Twitter from Appellant’s claim I
alleging a Federal Question violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981, [See TAB A-5], and claim II
Page 3 of 97

alleging a Federal Question violation of a Public Accommodation 42 U.S. Code §2000a.
[See TAB A-6] and a supplemental N.H.RSA 354-A:17 claim, [1] as Twitters race
discrimination is not contemplated within Section §230, nor could discriminatory acts
be described as “Good Faith” and certainly were not intended to be covered by
Congress through Section §230. Additionally, Twitter’s Contract Venue Forum Clause,
among other reasons, is useless in this case as it does not include acts of racial
discrimination, nor could it legally be inserted into any contract in law. Appellant’s
Claim III alleges violations of Constitutional Rights of free speech and assembly
[Complaint., ¶ 164-175] in which he submits, inter alia, that Section §230 is
unconstitutional because it, sensors speech through Section §230, which is overbroad
and promotes, eliminates or excludes due process rights for Federal and State free
speech and has Twitter acting as a State Actor, [Dkt. 6 and 6.1], usurping State speech
laws, in policing its self-admitted Public Forum [Dkt. 16 and 16.1] See also, O’Handley
Case 2:21-cv-04954, Central District of California, Document 1-4 Filed 06/17/21 Page
1, State Actions), and utilizing the executive powers of Section §230 and violating
Appellant’s right to assembly. The Appellant has shown that his claims have “at least
some merit.” See Thomas v. Holder, 750 F.3d 899, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2014), which is not “a
particularly high bar,” Thomas, 750 F.3d at 902, because the claim “need not be ironclad”
_________________________
[1] [See TAB A-4] Twitter’s principal place of business at 1355 Market Street, Suite 900,
San Francisco, CA 94103 operates as a establishment described in ¶ (4) of subsection
(b), as Bon Appetite is physically located within the premises of an establishment the
operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection.
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in order for the movant to “establish that it possesses a potentially meritorious claim,
which, if proven, will bring success in its wake.” Murray v. District of Columbia, at 52. F.3d
353 (D.C.Cir.1995). The movant may satisfy this prerequisite by “provid[ing] at least a
hint of a suggestion that [it] might prevail.” Thomas, 750 F.3d at 902. In Appellant’s case
the Court has not denied the Appellants claims on the merits and, after 11 months, has
failed to do so because the claims are solid, and the Court is protecting Twitter from
any negative order.
The [Complaint, at 1], states enough facts and evidence to pass the motion to
dismiss threshold on all three claims and thus, la resistance against the Appellant is born.
The first exhibit illustrating this la resistance would be that the Court left unanswered the
Appellant’s [Complaint, at 1], a second [Default Motion, at 46], his [Strike Motion, at
14], Twitter’s [MTD, at 3], See [TAB B-2], and Twitter’s actual [MTD, at 3]. This alone
certainly doesn’t prove anything. But understanding the Court’s pre-disposition in favor
of Twitter prior to the Appellant making his claims, and the gravity of the situation,
helps.
The Court, having used an illegal, unwritten policy that allowed Twitter’s
attorneys the privilege of practicing before the Court 67 times prior when they were not
authorized by the rules to do so and in violation of State Laws, set out to dismiss the
Appellant’s case, or at minimum to wash [See 04/02/2021 Order] the illegally submitted
[MTD at 3], or any resulting Default, all in favor of the Twitter, and for reasons outside
the four corners of Appellant’s [Complaint, at 1] or his [Default Motion, at 7] and at
Page 5 of 97

[Reconsideration Motion, at 39]. Is any reasonable person to believe that a Court who
demonstrated bias towards a party or litigant 67 times isn’t going to be biased in favor
of them the 68th time? And against a Pro Se party? Appellant’s [Default Motion, at 7]
was not decided utilizing the official rules, Cannons, precedent or within State laws as
it must, and as suggested by the Appellant. The same could be said of Appellant’s
[Reconsideration Motion, at 39], [TAB B-4], and the denial of [Surreply at 42] and
numerous other motions by the Appellant. [See this Brief No. 1, No. 2, No. 4 and No.
5 appeals]. The Court denied Appellant’s Motions, 7 and 39, the Mooted Surreply, at
48, and the subsequent Orders because it did not want Twitter to be in default or suffer
any damages.
Appellant minimally demonstrates a plain error was committed in denying
Appellant’s [Rule 60 Motion, at 74], which is obvious and clear under current laws, was
prejudicial which affected Appellant’s substantial rights, misaligned the judicial
machinery of the Court and review is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Smith
v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1999). Appellant also submits that because the
Court favored Twitter, and was in fact biased in favor of Twitter, it also errored in
denying Appellant’s [Default Motion, at 7] and his [Reconsideration, at 39], and the
[Mooted Surreply, at 48], and denied Appellant his due process rights to a non-
prejudicial or non-bias forum in altering the judicial machinery of the Court in using
unbridled power, unofficial, unwritten, unlawful and unpublished policies and set new
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precedents, and therefore exceeded its statutory powers, without jurisdiction and acted
ultra vires and thus, voiding these and subsequent orders of the Court is just.
III. GENERAL ARGUMENTS
In the No. 4 Appeal, Appellant argues that because the Court cannot gain
jurisdiction until it has answered the jurisdiction for itself, it is left with a case without
a federal question to support the court's personal jurisdiction or subject-matter
jurisdiction over the parties. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434-35, 115
S. Ct. 2227, 132 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1995). Twitter’s [MTD, at 3] seeks dismissal on the
grounds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Communications Decency Act, 47
U.S.C. §230 and by Twitter’s own First Amendment rights, and on the grounds that
Twitter is neither a “place of public accommodation” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a and N.H.
RSA 354-A:17, nor a “state actor.” [See Doc. 3.], [Doc. 50]. Obviously, the Appellant
is not advocating that the Court dismiss the claims, because he truly believes he has
claims, but the Court cannot claim diversity jurisdiction over Appellant’s claims until
the Jurisdictional minimum of $75,000 has been met under 1331 and cannot answer the
remaining federal question until it decides whether immunity under Section §230 bars
any discrimination claims against Twitter, and asserted by the Appellant. [See V.
Appendix I, (Hypothetical Jurisdiction, lacks power, unconstitutional), page 1]
In the No. 5 Appeal, Appellant challenges the Court's analytical method of
applying the appropriate standards to the doctrine of fraud upon the court and void
judgments and its application of such standards, and whether certain undisputed facts,
Page 7 of 97

as a matter of law, are sufficient to constitute a bias court by a preponderance of the
evidence or fraud upon the Court with clear and convincing evidence which voids all
Court Orders under either Rule(s) 60(b)(4), 60(b)(6) or 60(d)(3). Appellant also avers
that the Court's verdict in its [Default Order], [MFR Order] and [Rule 60 Order] are
inconsistent with the law applicable in this case and utilized unofficial rules which
altered the judicial machinery of the Court and that this court should grant a judgements
in his favor as a matter of law.[2] [See V. Appendix I, (Orders Contrary to Acts of
Congress, page 4], an error(s) of law; plainly abused his discretion; failed to consider
adequately the evidence, and; failed to give proper weight to the relevant legal factors.
In Re: Apple Inc., No. 14-143 (Fed. Cir. 2014), when he pronounced upon the law’s
meaning or constitutionality when he had no jurisdiction to do so, and by very
definition, and were ultra vires and unconstitutional acts. [See V. Appendix I, (Biased
Court unconstitutional), page 2]
In the No. 2 Appeal, Appellant argues that his [Delay Compulsion Motion, at
56] may be read to include denial of underlying motion, and not simply denial of motion
for reconsideration, and “can be fairly inferred from the notice" that Appellant
intended to appeal the underlying motion. Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 15 n. 5
(1st Cir. 1997); Correa v. Cruisers, 298 F.3d 13, 21 n. 3 (1st Cir.2002). (briefs as well as
notice of appeal can be consulted during this process); Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc.,
_______________________
[2] or demonstrated an intent to do so.
Page 8 of 97

304 F.3d at 3-4 (1st Cir. 2002). Here, based on a review of Appellant’s [Delay
Compulsion Motion, at 56] brief, Appellant manifested an intent to appeal the
underlying order denying the [Anonymous Motion, at 15]. Marie v. Allied Home Mortg.
Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2005). [See V. Appendix I, (ignore notice, lacks power,
unconstitutional), page 7].
In the No. 1 Appeal, Appellant argues that the Court misconstrues the meaning
of “exceptional” in a Megless claim, failed to consider any of the evidence submitted
by the Appellant and that the Court itself fails to step in the shoes of a reasonable
person and generalizes the Appellant’ reasoning by not inquiring as to the second part
needed to prove an exceptional circumstance in that his established fears of severe harm
were reasonable and failed to review the remaining factors of the Megless test which
also favor the Appellant. Stating that the Appellant “has not plausibly described any
legitimate safety concerns”, is to turn a blind eye to the facts in record and the reasons
for the Appellant’s fear. [See V. Appendix I, (unofficial evidentiary rules), page 8]
Page 9 of 97

IV. ARGUMENTS
A. No. 4 Appeal- No. 20-2091- Clear Absence of Jurisdiction
1. JURISDICTION
"The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised
by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after
trial and the entry of judgment." Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006),
(Jurisdiction upheld); Kontrickv. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,455 (2004). The Court here lacked
personal and subject matter jurisdiction to make any orders regarding the merits, as it
had not answered the jurisdiction question first. See “Wright & Miller”, Federal Practice
& Procedure Civ. § 3522, pp. 122-23 (“may later challenge it as a means of avoiding an
adverse result on the merits."); United States v. Leon, 203 F.3d 162, 164 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000))
("well settled that lack of federal jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal,
even by a party who originally asserted that jurisdiction existed "'). See Levin v. ARDC,
74 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may
be contested by a party or raised sua sponte at any point in the proceedings."), quoting
Hawxhurst v. Pettibone Corp., 40 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1994).
This Court has jurisdiction of final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as the [Anon
Order] was a final order determining Appellant’s anonymity and the [Stayed Order] is a
final order as the case was dismissed as stated by McAuliffe. [See 10/06/2020 Order].
“[T]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1251, §1253, §1331, §1332.
Page 10 of 97

2. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1). Did the Court establish an entirely new and erroneous legal principle in
deciding the merits which included analysis and adjudication of State and Federal laws
without first obtaining subject-matter or personal jurisdiction?
(2). Did the Court lack jurisdiction to make determinations upon the merits
of the case prior to determining immunity under Section §230?
(3). Did the Court give a judgment on the merits without first ascertaining that
it had jurisdiction?
(4). Does Section §230 strip the Court of subject matter and personal
jurisdiction over contract and public accommodation discrimination claims?
(5). Was Hypothetical Statutory Jurisdiction utilized to bypass a jurisdiction-
stripping, Section §230 statute?
3. TIMELINESS
Because challenges to lack of subject matter jurisdiction many be taken at any
time, this No. 4 Appeal is timely. Defects in subject matter jurisdiction are nonwaivable
and may be raised at any time, including on appeal. Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 775 n.
4 (9th Cir. 1991). See also, 13 Wright & Miller § 3522, pp. 122–26. Levin, 74 F.3d 763,
766. See arguments [TAB A-1 ¶¶ 3-4], [Amended Notice, at 81], [TAB A-7]
4. REVIEW STANDARD
When legal error is at issue the standard of review is de novo review. Under this
standard, the Federal Circuit gives the trial tribunal little, if any, deference; the opinion
Page 11 of 97

appealed receives little or no presumption of correctness, and views the case from the
same position as the district court. See Lawrence v. Dep’t of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 920 (9th
Cir. 2008); Lewis v. United States, 641 F.3d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011). The appellate
court must consider the matter anew, as if no decision previously had been
rendered. See Freeman v. DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006).
5. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
Article III of the Constitution limits the scope of the Federal judicial power to
the adjudication of "cases" or "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This "bedrock
requirement," Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982),
protects the system of separated powers and respect for the coequal branches by
restricting the province of the judiciary to "decid[ing] on the rights of individuals."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). Indeed, "'[n]o principle is more
fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.'"
See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).
The rules governing subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts are derived from
two sources. First Article III, § 2 lists the types of cases that federal courts may hear.
The categories allowed to federal courts under this provision are broad and
encompassing.[3] The Steel Co.- Ruhrgas rule generally requires a federal court to
________________________
[3] Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, (1838).
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decide Article III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction before ruling on the
merits.[4][ 5] Our law's foremost sequencing rule says that a federal court's decision on
a challenge to its jurisdiction must come before decision on the merits.[6]
All courts have an "independent obligation to determine whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Arbaugh, 546 U.S.
500, 514. (citing Ruhrgas, 574, 583).
"[T]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, the question of jurisdiction
asks whether the court has the power to proceed to these other questions. Steel Co., 523
U.S. at 94. 9. The Court said this the first of many times in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506, 630 (1869); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), overruling Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
Steel Co. reiterated: "The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a
threshold matter ... is 'inflexible and without exception,' " id., at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield,
C. & L. M R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)); for "[j]urisdiction is power to
declare the law," and " ' [w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any
cause,' " 523 U.S ., at 94 (quoting McCardle, 506, 514). The D.C. Circuit has
_________________________
[4] Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
[5]Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-85 (1999)
[6] See Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.: "Hypothetical Jurisdiction" in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 855,857 (2001).
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provided a test to determine when a court can decide an issue before adjudicating
jurisdiction: a court can decide an issue before jurisdiction if the issue does not involve
"an exercise of a court's law-declaring power .... " See Kramer, 481 F.3d 788. A court
exercises its law-declaring power when a ruling has an effect on "primary conduct." Id
(citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (classifying
rules affecting "primary decisions respecting human conduct" as substantive for
purposes of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
6. DIVERSITY UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1332
Appellant asserted in good faith that the Court had jurisdiction over the claims
28 U.S.C. § 1332 because it was an action in “the amount in controversy in excess of
$75,000.” [Complaint at, 1 ¶ 9]. He asserts he had approx.. 3,800 followers who Twitter
estimates [id. ¶ 15], to be worth between $9,500 to $13,300. [id. ¶ 16], identifies both
party's citizenship of different States, but failed to establish “competent proof” of
diversity. McNutt v. GM Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936), which is to say, by
submitting admissible evidence. See Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d at 542.
(2006), or by a preponderance of the evidence. Id, at 536, 543. (Some cases equate
“preponderance of the evidence” with “reasonable probability”), Shaw v. Dow Brands,
Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993); Meridian, Id. (defect in jurisdiction is apparent
on the face of the record). See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934). In either case a tardy attack is permitted.
Continental Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U.S. 237 (1886).
Page 14 of 97

Twitter then raised the forum selection clause in its [MTD, at 3], as an alternative
argument, and introduced the following facts into the case. [See MTD, Attached
Affidavit, at 3.3].“We cannot and will not be liable for any loss or damage arising from
your failure to comply with the above.” [MTD, at 3, Id. pg. 6 and pge. 12].
“TWITTER ENTITIES SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY

INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES”.[Id. pg. 7].
“IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AGGREGATE LIABILITY OF

THE TWITTER ENTITIES EXCEED THE GREATER OF
ONE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS (U.S. $100.00)” [Id. Pg. 7].
Because the amount in controversy was contested, and the Appellant failed to
allege in his pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction, the Court could not have
obtained jurisdiction suitably premised upon diversity of citizenship under § 1332(a)
because the amount in controversy, on its face, does not in fact exceed the sum or value
of $75,000. (See Arguments [TAB A-1] and [TAB A-2]).
7. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Appellant claims violations in Public Accom. N.H.RSA 354-A:17 via 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367. Twitter rebutted that it is not a public accommodation under any law and that
Appellant has not exhausted all his administrative remedies. See [MTD, at 3].
But, because the court may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims
unless the court has original jurisdiction' over at least one of the Appellant’s federal
claims, Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996),
quoting In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 730 n.2 (2d Cir.
Page 15 of 97

1993). The court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these claims would be
inappropriate and cannot attach until the District Court determines that Appellant has
at least one federal claim. "`[L]eft with a case without a federal question to support the
court's subject-matter jurisdiction.'" Gutierrez, 515 U.S. 417, 434-35.
It would be inappropriate and impossible for the Court to claim supplemental
jurisdiction over Appellant’s claim under N.H. via 28 U.S.C. § 1367 until it first has
Federal subject matter jurisdiction elsewhere.
8. THRESHOLD MATTER
A court "generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining
that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in the suit (subject-matter jurisdiction).
Sinochem Int 'I Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'! Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007)
(declining to address jurisdiction and holding that the district court had authority to
dismiss action on forum non conveniens grounds before considering the merits) (citing Steel
Co., 523 U.S. 83, 93-102, (rejecting doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction" that would
allow a court to rule on issues of law before adjudicating jurisdiction).
Furthermore, subsequent Supreme Court cases elaborating on Steel Co. have
tacitly assumed that hypothetical statutory jurisdiction is unconstitutional, and have
emphasized that subject-matter jurisdiction—without qualification—is necessary for a
federal court to reach the merits of a case. Prior to 1998 every circuit had endorsed the
practice. Things changed when the Supreme Court declared at least some, and perhaps
Page 16 of 97

all, instances of hypothetical jurisdiction unconstitutional in Steel Co.. [7] The Court
forcefully rejected the practice “because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of
authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of
powers.”[8] Showing that the case falls within one of the enumerated Article III
categories of cases and that a plaintiff possesses Article III standing, however, is
insufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. A federal statute must also grant
jurisdiction to hear the case.[9]
Under the constitutional scheme, the lower courts are creatures of statute.[10]
The Constitution grants Congress the power to create them and abolish them, and
expand and constrict their jurisdiction within the constitutional boundaries. [11] A
federal statute must therefore grant the lower federal court jurisdiction over a case, and
jurisdiction is lacking if a constitutionally valid federal statute bars the federal courts
from entertaining the case.[12] Subject-matter jurisdiction serves to protect and
___________________
[7] 523 U.S. 83. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
[8] Id. at 94.
[9] See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (lower federal
courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis); Ins. Corp. of Ir. Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (same).
[10] Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see infra-Part II. A.
[11] See, e.g., Kontrick, 443, 452 (2004) (“Only Congress may determine a lower federal
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
[12] Continued. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by
judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); See
Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799).
Page 17 of 97

promote the separation-of-powers and federalism values at the core of Article III.[13]
It confines the federal courts to a traditional judicial role, preventing them from
interfering with the prerogative of the political branches to resolve political issues.[14]
Because Eleventh Amendment issues are clearly linked to the question of Article
III jurisdiction, some courts have held that Steel Co. requires them to address Eleventh
Amendment questions before reaching the merits of a plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Seaborn
v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[A]n assertion of
Eleventh Amendment immunity must be resolved before a court may address the
merits of the underlying claim(s).") (citing Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1012-16); Kilcullen v. New
York Dep't of Transp., 33 F. Supp.2d 133, 136 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (same). “These two
aspects of Eleventh Amendment doctrine suggest that the Eleventh Amendment is just
as much a grant of immunity (i.e., a type of defense) as it is a limitation on courts'
jurisdiction. Steel. at 2055 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Parella v. Retirement Board, R.I.
Employeees', 173 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 1999).
_______________________
[13] See, e.g., Trammell, supra note 13, at 1141 (“Subject matter jurisdiction primarily
serves separation of powers interests.”).
[14] See, e.g., See generally Kimberly N. Brown, What's Left Standing? }ECA Citizen Suits and
the Battle for Judicial Review, 55 U. KAN. L. REv. 677, 679-94 (2007), supra note 24, at
100 (constitutional standing requirements, those disputes which are appropriately
resolved through the judicial process.’” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct.
1138, 1146 (2013).
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9. FIRST CIRCUIT’S RATIONAL
The First Circuit reads “Steel Co.’s underlying rationale” to be that “a court
without Article III jurisdiction has no power to declare the law—it would only be in a
position to render an advisory opinion, which ‘offends fundamental principles of
separation of powers.’”. Parella, 173 F.3d 46, 55, (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94).
Therefore, it recognized that Steel Co. “reaffirmed” the principle “that an inferior court
must have both statutory and constitutional jurisdiction before it may decide a case on
the merits.” Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, 699 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2012).
And while the First Circuit has not retreated from its endorsement of
hypothetical statutory jurisdiction, it has expressed doubts that the doctrine should be
used to bypass jurisdiction-stripping statutes. Seale v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
323 F.3d 150, 154–56 (1st Cir. 2003). In declining to use the doctrine in those
circumstances, it reasoned that “[a] federal court acts ‘ultra vires’ regardless of whether
its jurisdiction is lacking because [the plaintiff lacks Article III standing or] because
Congress has repealed its jurisdiction to hear a particular matter.” Id. (quoting Steel Co.,
523 U.S. 83, 101. "[h]ypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical
judgment. Seale, 323 F.3d 101.
This Appeals Court has recognized, the decision in Steel Co. "distinguishes
between Article III jurisdiction and statutory jurisdiction questions, holding that the
former should ordinarily be decided before the merits, but the latter need not be."
Parella, 46, 54; Kelly v. Marcantonio, 187 F.3d 192, 197 (1st Cir. 1999).
Page 19 of 97

10. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT CASES UNDERMINE
HYPOTHETICAL STATUTORY JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court elaborated on Steel Co. in Ruhrgas, and in Sinochem, 549 U.S.
422, clarifying that federal courts may dismiss on certain “threshold” grounds such as
lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens prior to reaching issues of
subject matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584–85; Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 432–33. In
doing so, the Court drew a line between “threshold” issues such as personal jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens—which may be decided before subject matter jurisdiction
issues—and merits issues, which may not. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431. The Court
emphasized that courts are powerless to reach the merits in the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction, without giving any hint that statutory jurisdictional restrictions are
an exception: “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction necessarily precedes a ruling on the
merits,” Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584, and “[j]urisdiction is vital only if the court proposes
to issue a judgment on the merits,” Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431.
Moreover, Ruhrgas and Sinochem involved statutory issues of subject matter
jurisdiction. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584; Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 427–28. If Steel Co.'s rule
banning hypothetical jurisdiction did not apply to statutory jurisdictional issues, the
Court would have had no occasion to address whether the rule prevents courts from
reaching threshold issues prior to those statutory jurisdictional issues. Rather, it would
have been much simpler and more in keeping with values of judicial minimalism for the
Court to announce that Steel Co. did not apply to statutory jurisdictional
Page 20 of 97

questions. See Alan M. Trammell, “Jurisdictional Sequencing,” 47 Ga. L. Rev. 1099,
1126–27 (2013). Thus, Ruhrgas and Sinochem strongly suggest that hypothetical statutory
jurisdiction falls within the ambit of Steel Co. and is impermissible.
In addition, the primary doctrinal argument for hypothetical statutory
jurisdiction has been undermined by the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). This argument
reasoned that (1) Steel Co. had approved of a prior Supreme Court case in which the
Court bypassed an issue of statutory standing—whether the plaintiff may bring suit
under the statute in question—to dismiss on the merits; (2) issues of statutory standing
are jurisdictional; so (3) Steel Co. approved of hypothetical statutory jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 346 F.3d 402, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2003); Joshua
Schwartz, Note, “Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader ‘Arising Under’
Jurisdictional Question,” 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2255, 2270 (2004). But in Lexmark, the
Court explained that statutory standing is simply an issue of “whether a legislatively
conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim” and therefore goes
to the merits rather than jurisdiction. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 & n.3. In light
of Lexmark, the prior Supreme Court case was simply a case in which two merits issues
were reordered, and Steel Co.’s endorsement of the case provides no support for
hypothetical statutory jurisdiction. In sum, in light of fundamental constitutional
principles and subsequent Supreme Court cases, hypothetical statutory jurisdiction is
unconstitutional.
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11. CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
In ascertaining the facts necessary to establish jurisdiction, the district court must
accept as true the allegations set forth in the complaint to the extent they are
uncontroverted by defendant's affidavits. “Glen E. Keller, Jr., De” Behagen v. Amateur
Basketball Ass'n of U.S.A, 744 F.2d 731, 732 (10th Cir. 1984); Seale, 150, 152.
The Communications Decency Act provides an absolute immunity for an owner
of an interactive website “so long as … [its] actions were within the scope of the
immunity.” Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F. 2d 163, 166 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980). But Appellant
has no burden of production or proof as to the absence of immunity. See Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Rule 8(c) requires Twitter to “plead ‘any matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” Id. Hence it is Twitter’s burden to
prove that its actions of which Appellant claims deserves absolute immunity under
Section §230 and defeats a suit at the outset. Slotnick, supra (distinguishing between the
affirmative defenses of qualified and absolute immunity)
In passing Section § 230, Congress removed the jurisdiction of federal courts to
hear cases involving most questions regarding the treatment of interactive computer
service(s) and their liability under federal law for acts of removing free speech from
their platforms, including cases that raise questions under the Federal Constitution
namely free speech and public forums. Just as the Gun Lake Act removed jurisdiction
altogether for an entire class of cases,[15] so does Section § 230.
Page 22 of 97

12. ARGUMENT
Drawing on a long line of precedent, [16] the Steel Co. Court held that a lower
federal court could not dismiss for failure to state a claim without first deciding a
challenge to Article I standing, [17] which the Supreme Court determined was lacking
in the case, but which posed a harder question to resolve. Even though the result was
the same-judgment for the defendant-a federal court could not give a judgment on the
merits without first ascertaining that it had jurisdiction. The Court rested its decision
on separation of powers and Article III requirement of a "Case" or "Controversy. [18]
In order for a court to stay within its proper limits, it cannot go about rendering a
decision on the merits without making sure that the case falls within the court's
jurisdictional bounds. [19] Based on the Court's reasoning and wording, by
"jurisdiction," the Court meant Article III justiciability[20] as well as ordinary subject-
matter jurisdiction. [21] The Court has never added to that short list of nonbypassable
defenses.
___________________
[15] Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Gun
Lake Act did not violate Article III because it merely “change[d] the law” to “strip[ ]
federal courts of jurisdiction” and did not dictate a decision “under old law” (quoting
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 438 (1992)). The Act… strips the courts
of jurisdiction over a particular lawsuit.
[16] Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 93-100, (citing historical cases, including Capron v. Van
Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
[17] See Wright and Miller § 3531. at 9-16 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing requirements for
Article III standing and a court's powers when requirements are not met).
[18] U.S. CONST. art. ill,§ 2; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102.
[19] Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
Page 23 of 97

For example, although a court cannot bypass subject-matter jurisdiction in favor
of a disposition on the merits, it can skip over subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss
under forum non conveniens, (Sinochem, 549 U.S. 422,432, (dictum)) which is irrelevant
here as the Court has not decided Twitter's [MTD, at 3].
A tribunal has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. This is a truism, and,
subject to certain implicit limitations, is ordinarily a correct statement of law. It has its
origin mainly in the cases holding that a court has inherent power to inquire into
jurisdiction of its own motion, regardless of whether the question is raised by the
litigants. See 15 C.J. 851, 852, secs. 170, 171; 14 Am. Jur. 368, sec. 168; United States v.
Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947)). Although courts must generally decide
a jurisdictional issue before deciding the merits of a case, "a federal court has leeway 'to
choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits."'
Sinochem, 549 U.S. 422, 431. (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 574, 585).
"There are three things needed to give jurisdiction: First, power by law to act
upon the general subject-matter .... Second, jurisdiction of the person .... Third,
jurisdiction of the particular case."' Clearly, a court, acting without any of these three
____________________
[20] See generally 13 Wright and Miller., supra note 25, § 3529 (discussing the concept
of justiciability and the limits on judicial power created by Article Ill).
[21] Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101-02 (referring to the "statutory and (especially)
constitutional elements of jurisdiction," the Court ruled, "For a court to pronounce
upon the [merits] when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court
to act ultra vires. ")
Page 24 of 97

jurisdictions, could, as between the parties, arrive at no valid conclusion. Devlin v. Cooper,
84 N. Y. 410,413,415 (1881). Accord: Matter of Leggat, 162 N. Y. 437, 56 N. E. 1009
(1900). Obviously, as between the parties to a litigation, judicial proceedings are void,
if lacking in jurisdiction of subject-matter, or of persons (where such jurisdiction is
necessary).
In the United States, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a court must both
comply with Constitutional limitations, and be authorized by a statute. See Hershkoff,
Helen (2006). "Personal Jurisdiction Question". NYU Law. New York University.
Retrieved February 3, 2017.
13. CONCLUSION
Every legal issue is either jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. A legal issue either
speaks to the power and competence of the tribunal, making it jurisdictional, or it does
not, making it "the merits" Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense
means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority
over the subject matter or the parties. (See generally, 14 Am. Jur. 363, sec. 160.)
Prior to any Order or Dismissal, the Court had not established federal question
jurisdiction under any of the Appellant’s claims in his [Complaint., at 1] regarding
Diversity Jurisdiction or Federal Question Jurisdiction, making the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction under §§ 1367 or 1441, impossible. Until subject matter
jurisdiction is determined by the Court, any prior or any other order made on the merits
of the case, should be nullified as the Court was acting in the clear absence of any
Page 25 of 97

jurisdiction. (whether the Court had jurisdiction at the time it issued any of its
judgments, orders or dismissals). See Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 342(9th
Cir.1996).
McAuliffe exercised the Courts jurisdiction not specifically authorized by any
federal statute. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2008), and lacked the statutory
grant of jurisdiction. Achtman v. Kirby, McInerny & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328 (2d Cir.
2006), failed in his owed duty to the Appellant in not answering the question of
jurisdiction prior to answering upon the merits of the case, Mansfield, 379, 382, failed
his independent obligation to determine and ensure whether subject-matter jurisdiction
existed, Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500, 514, citing Ruhrgas 526 U.S. 574, 583. (jurisdiction
upheld); Steel, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102. (rejecting doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction” that
would allow a court to rule on issues of law before adjudicating jurisdiction), stating
“this Court has held that, without proper jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all, but
can only note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit. E. g., Capron, at 43, 73;
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 465,
n. 13. (1974). See also [TAB A-8, Hypothetical Statutory Jurisdiction by Joshua S.
Stillman].
Authority to hear a case under the Constitution is insufficient to allow federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, since Congress sets up and establishes the
rules for federal courts, there must also be statutory grounds for jurisdiction, and that,
because statutory authority is a prerequisite for a federal cause of action for damages,
Page 26 of 97

jurisdiction cannot be founded solely on the violation of a constitutional right and
federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 409 F.2d 718, 720 (2d Cir. 1969); Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404, 407 (1st
Cir. 1971). The Steel Co.-Ruhrgas rule generally requires a federal court to decide Article
III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction before ruling on the merits The
sequence of jurisdictional defenses can result in dismissing a claim when the court
lacked authority to hear the case.
Here, the Appellant supplied everything the Court needed to resolve the
jurisdictional issues. In fact, he begged the Court to decide these issues. [It] chose to
disregard threshold matters and Steel doctrine principles and instead embrace
hypothetical jurisdiction and order on the merits of the case prior to answering the
jurisdictional issues at hand because it would not be in the best interest of the Twitter.,
or it’s Counsel.
The Court exercised law-declaring power when ruling which had an effect on
primary conduct and primary decisions respecting human conduct. Jurisdiction is
lacking if a constitutionally valid federal statute Section §230 bars the federal courts
from entertaining the case. ("[A]n assertion of Section §230 immunity must be resolved
before the court may address the merits of the underlying claim(s).") Article III
jurisdiction depends on the quasi-factual question whether Section §230 provides
immunity, is unconstitutional and whether Twitter is a public accommodation or public
forum under the law.
Page 27 of 97

And although the First Circuit has not retreated from its endorsement of
hypothetical statutory jurisdiction, is it now willing to set aside it’s unconstitutional
practices of hypothetical jurisdiction in light of Ruhrgas, Sinochem and Lexmark? Or at
least dis-allow the Court below to bypass personal and subject-matter jurisdiction in
favor of a disposition on the merits prior to obtaining valid jurisdiction.
Page 28 of 97

B. No. 5 Appeal- No. 21-1317- Void Judgment/Fraud on Court
1. JURISDICTION
The [Rule 60 Order] denying Appellant’s [Rule 60 Motion, at 74] is a final order
and "[t]he courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. §1251, §1253, §1331, § 1332.
Title 28 U.S.C.. § 1292 also allows appeals from certain interlocutory orders, decrees
and judgments from orders other than final judgments when they have, as stated here
within, a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties as Appellant would lose
his rights to due process without an immediate appeal. Void judgments may be attacked
at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally. (E.g., Evans v. Corporate Services
(1990), 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 301, 152 Ill.Dec. 191, 194, 565 N.E.2d 724, 727.)
Although the [Rule 60 Order] does not end this case, it is "practically" or
"effectively" final as it is (1) completely separate from the merits of the case; (2) is not
tentative, informal or incomplete, but conclusively determine the disputed question of
whether fraud upon the court was committed; and (3) would cause irreparable harm to
the Appellant if review is delayed as this is in “Real Time” and happening right now
and "involves 'an asserted due process right the legal and practical value of which would
be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial."" See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799
(1989)); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U.S. 463 (1978). The [Rule 60 Order] is also
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the Appellant’s Case, and are too
Page 29 of 97

important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
Appellant’s consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Appellant’s
constitutional rights to due process and an unbiased court will be further eroded if not
vindicated before trial. The U.S. Supreme Court has long given this provision of the
statute this practical, rather than a technical, construction. Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 26
U.S. 567 (1828); United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926).
The fact that the Rule 60 Order may now be construed to be “without
prejudice”[22] does not change the fact that it was, in fact, denied and no longer pending
and is therefore final. Just as any plaintiff’s complaint may be denied without prejudice,
they still must re-introduce it to [a] Court through another case. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, following vintage case U.S. Supreme Court precedent,
held that dismissal of a case without prejudice is a final judgment under the final
judgment rule and is therefore appealable. Linear Technology Corp. v. Compala Linear Corp.,
Case Nos. 02-1569,-1576 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 17, 2004) (Linn, J.).
___________________________
[22] 04/02/2021 ENDORSED ORDER re: 73 Motion to Clarify, Parameters of the

Current Stay, and to Toll Response Time.
Page 30 of 97

(1). Whether the district judge applied the proper legal standard of “clear and
convincing” or applied an incorrect rule of law in not finding fraud upon the Court
entitling the Appellant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) or Rule 60(d), or in the least, indicate
that if would do so if it had jurisdiction, and thus, setting too high a bar for fraud upon
the court and establishing an entirely new and erroneous legal principle?
(2). Whether the district judge applied the proper legal standard of
“preponderance of the evidence” or applied an incorrect rule of law and thus, setting
too high a bar for proving constitutional violations and establishing an entirely new and
erroneous legal principle;
A. in not finding that any of the judgments were not void under Rule 60(b)(4)
or in the least, indicate that if would do so if it had jurisdiction?;
B. in not finding that the judge usurped his judicial power when deciding [DM,
at 7] and [Reconsideration Motion, at 39], and as they were based on unofficial policies,
or in the least, indicate that if would do so if it had jurisdiction?;
(3). Given the facts of the evidence introduced, was there a “sound and
substantial” legal basis which would support the district judge’s decision to deny the
Appellant relief under Rule 60(d) and Rule 60(b)(4), or (6), or is the error obvious and
a clear abuse of the district judge’s discretion.
Page 31 of 97

(4). Whether the district judge committed plain error in deciding Appellant’s
[Rule 60 Motion, at 74] because he did not sua sponte retroactively recuse himself based
on his allegedly having been implicated in the fraud upon the court?
3. TIMELINESS
A party may move to set aside a void judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) more
than six months after entry of the judgment if the delay in moving for relief was
reasonable. Ladner v. Logan, 857 So. 2d 764, 770 (Miss. 2003); Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d
337, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (explaining that Rule 60(b) “places no time limit on an attack
upon a void judgment”); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“no time limit on a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a judgment as void.”); Misco
Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir. 1971); Rule 60(b)(4) may be made
at any time.” Id. See also 11 Wright & Miller § 2862 (3d ed.); Rule 60(d) provides a
"savings clause, preserving the law before its enactment in 1946, that allows judgments
to be attacked without regard to the passage of time[.]" Computer Leasco, Inc. v. NTP, Inc.,
194 Redcaps. 328, 334 (6th Cir. 2006); The judgment of a court, procured
by extrinsic fraud, i.e., by conduct which prevents a fair submission of the controversy
to the court, is void and subject to attack, direct or collateral, at any time." [23]
________________________
[23] Accord Rowe v. Coal Corp., 197 Va. 136, 143, 87 S.E.2d 763, 767-68 (1955); O'Neill v.
Cole, 194 Va. 50, 56-57, 72 S.E.2d 382, 385-86 (1952); McClung v. Folks, 126 Va. 259,
268-74, 101 S.E. 345, 347-49 (1919). State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Remley, 270 Va.
209, 218 (Va. 2005); No statute of limitations. In re Roussos, 541 B.R. 721, 729 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 2015); relief will be granted against judgments regardless of the term of their
Page 32 of 97

Appellant’s [Rule 60 Motion, at 74] was brought as soon as possible after
discovering and understanding the complexities of the fraud upon the court and had
no earlier opportunity to raise the specific argument of fraud upon the court. E.g., Corus
Staal BV v. United States, 502 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and appealed the Rule
60 Order on 4/19/2021 and is timely pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) because the
Notice of Appeal in this civil case was filed within 30 days of the Court's decision and
within the time prescribed in Appellate Rule 26(a)(1)(C). Notice was mailed on
4/15/2021, First Class Mail. See Amended NOTICE OF APPEAL No. 4, [TAB A-7].
4. REVIEW STANDARD
(1) Generally Under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b).
Rule 60(b) allows a party to request relief from a final judgment. The appellant
must “demonstrate a justification so compelling that the court was required to vacate
its order.” Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). In relevant
part, Rule 60(b) provides the following grounds for relief: (4) the judgment is void; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
As an initial matter, where, as here, “a Rule 60(b) motion and an appeal are
pending simultaneously, appellate review may continue uninterrupted.” Hoai v. Vo, 935
_______________________
[23] Continued: entry. Marine Insurance Company v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332 (1813);
W]here the occasion has demanded, where enforcement of the judgment is
"manifestly unconscionable," Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 32 S. Ct. 687, 689
(1912); they have wielded the power without hesitation. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415,
444 (9th Cir. 2011).
Page 33 of 97

F.2d 308, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1991). But whereas the district court “ha[s] authority to deny”
a Rule 60(b) motion while the appeal is pending,” it “does not have jurisdiction to grant
a Rule 60(b) motion . .. .” LaRouche v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 112 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C.
2000). Instead, if the district court would grant the Rule 60(b) motion, it must indicate
that it would do so “if it had jurisdiction,” Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 646 F. Supp. 2d
79, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2009) (Collyer, J.), and the movant may then “move the appellate
court for a remand in order that relief may be granted.” Hoai, 935 F.2d at 312.
A party seeking redress under Rule 60(b) must persuade the trial court, at a bare
minimum, that [their] motion is timely; that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring
extraordinary relief; that if the judgment is set aside, [t]hey had the right stuff to mount
a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no unfair prejudice will accrue to
the opposing parties should the motion be granted. Id., Werner v. Carbo, 731 F.2d 204,
207 (4th Cir. 1984)). “two stages.” See Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Gray, 1 F.3d 262,
264 (4th Cir. 1993). “Once the movant has met the threshold showings, he must satisfy
one of the six enumerated grounds for relief under Rule 60(b).” Nat’l Credit Union
Admin. Bd., 1 F.3d at 266.
Additionally, the Court's determinations as to the legal rules that govern
Appellant's proof, including those that dictate what quantum of proof the law requires,
are subject to plena1y review. E.g., Putnam Resources v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448,471 (1st
Cir.1992). Here, the record on the pivotal issues of fact (an Unofficial Policy) is not
contradicted or impeached in any respect, and no conflicting evidence is introduced,
Page 34 of 97

these statements of fact cannot be wholly disregarded or arbitrarily rejected. Rather, the
Appellant's evidence of such an unofficial policy should be accepted as proof of the
issue for which it is tendered, even though given by an interested party, so long as it
consists of fact, as distinguished from opinion, and is not essentially illegal, inherently
improbable or unreasonable, contrary to natural laws, opposed to common knowledge,
or contradictory within itself.) Id. at 699 (footnotes omitted). See "&,def v. "&,def, 111
So. 3d 285, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) Review is "independent," A!!Jeman v. INS,
296 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2002), or "plena1y," Stilwell v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d
1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007); Even mixed questions of law and fact that generally require
the consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment about the values that
animate legal principles, the review should be de novo. See Smith v. Commissioner, 300
F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002); Mathews v. Chevron Corp., 362 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir.
2004). A mixed question of law and fact arises when the historical facts are established,
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the legal rule. See
Suzy’s Zoo v. Commissioner, 273 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a mixed
question “exists when primary facts are undisputed and ultimate inferences and legal
consequences are in dispute”). Mixed questions of law and fact generally require the
consideration of legal concepts and the exercise of judgment about the values that
animate legal principles. Smith v. Commissioner, at 1023, 1028. Mixed questions of law and
fact are generally reviewed de novo. Mathews, 1172, 1180.
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(2) Under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(4)
The issues on appeal are the propriety of the district court's decision to deny the
Rule 60(b)(4) motion under the preponderance of evidence standard and whether the
appropriate standards of proof were utilized and the underlying [Default Motion, at 7]
and [Reconsideration Motion, at 39] which denied Appellant his due process rights to
a non-prejudicial or non-bias forum vitiating the Court’s Orders in that the Court was
biased in favor of Twitter. And although the Court generally reviews a district court’s
denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of discretion standard, Ojeda-Toro v. Rivera-
Mendez, 853 F.2d 25, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1988), a de novo review of Rule 60(b)(4) challenge
is warranted because the Court’s failure to vacate a void judgment is per se an abuse of
discretion; Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916, 920
(11th Cir. 2003). When legal error is at issue the standard of review is de novo review.
This “large measure of discretion” “may be reversed only for abuse of [that] discretion”
“unless the decision was, AS WAS HERE, rooted in an error of law.” Computer Prof’ls
for Soc. Responsibility v. United States Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and
unconstitutional. Rule 60(b)(4) motion on grounds that judgment is void, reviewed de
novo. Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260,1263 (11th Cir. 2001). Lawrence, at 916, 920; Freeman,
at 1001, 1004.
A void judgment is to be distinguished from an erroneous one, in that the latter
is subject only to direct attack. A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a
complete nullity and without legal effect. The Court's [Default Order] and [MFR
Page 36 of 97

Order](s), are "void" within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(4), because the trial court acted
in a manner inconsistent with due process of law and judgment was entered in violation
of Appellant's right to due process. [24]
A judgment may be void and subject to relief under Rule 60(b)(4) in three
circumstances: (1) the Court rendering the judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction,
(2) the Court rendering the judgment lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties, or(3)
it entered “a decree which is not within the powers granted to it by law.” Marshall v.
Board of Educ., Bergenfield, N.J., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting United States
v. Walker, 109 U.S. 258, 265-67 (1883)). The third circumstance subjecting a judgment
to attack under Rule 60(b)(4) has been described as one in which the rendering court
“acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” 11 Wright & Miller § 2862
(3d ed.).
__________________________
[24] Bryant, Inc. v. Walters, 493 So. 2d 933, 938 (Miss. 1986). In re Texlon Corp., 596 F.2d
1092, 1099 (2d Cir. 1979); Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 117 Ill. App. 3d 512, 452 N.E.2d
1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Klugh v. U.S., D.C.S.C., 610 F.Supp. 892, 901. See Doe v.
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 407 F.3d 755, 761 (6th Cir. 2005) (due process
violation) “Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 108 (6th Cir. 1995) ”acted in a
manner inconsistent with due process of law," 11 Wright and Miller § 2862, at pp. 198-
200 (1973); Margoles v. Johns, 660 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909,
102 S. Ct. 1256, 71 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1982); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502
F.2d 834 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034, 95 S. Ct. 516, 42 L. Ed. 2d 309
(1975). Judgment void if error is of constitutional dimension. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655
(7th Cir.1981); “ A denial of due process is for the most part treated like any other legal
error” Matter of Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1992).
Page 37 of 97

Here, Appellant can prevail under Rule 60(b)(4) if he demonstrates the Court
deprived him of due process which would not be within the powers granted to it by
law. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357.
Applying the principles stated above, the court should have applied the
preponderance of evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing standard and
that the Appellant should be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4) as he provided
sufficient evidence that the court was in fact biased in favor of Twitter and therefore all
Orders are void.
(3) Under Rule 60(b)(6)
A party may move to set aside the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) if there
are "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances justifying relief. Griffin v. Swim-Tech
Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Moore's Federal Practice,
Vol. 1, § 60.27. When ruling on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the trial court may consider the
following factors: "(1) [t]hat final judgments should not lightly be disturbed; (2) that the
Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal; (3) that the rule should
be liberally construed in order to achieve substantial justice; (4) whether the motion was
made within a reasonable time; (5) [omitted factor relevant only to default judgments];
(6) whether if the judgment was rendered after a trial on the merits-the movant had a
fair opportunity to present his claim or defense; (7) whether there are intervening
equities that would make it inequitable to grant relief; and (8) any other factors relevant
Page 38 of 97

to the justice of the judgment under attack." Carpenter v. Berry, 58 So. 3d 1158, 1162
(Miss. 2011). [Rule 60 Motion, at 74 ¶ 49].
It must be based on some other reason than the first five clauses, and it must be
some ground which will justify relief from the final judgment. Moore terms it a "grand
reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case when relief is not
warranted by the preceding clauses, or when it is uncertain that one or more of the
preceding clauses afford relief." Klaprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-615, 69 S. Ct.
384, 390, 93 L. Ed. 266 (1949); Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 71 S. Ct. 209,
95 L. Ed. 207 (1950); Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245 (C.A. 5th 1968). Relief from
a final judgment based upon fraud upon the court may also be sought pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6). In re Estate of Pearson, 25 So. 3d 392, 395 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Herring v. United
States 424 F.3d 384, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2005), which reviewed de novo a district court's
12(b)(6) dismissal of an independent fraud-on-the-court action instituted under Rule
60's savings clause. [Rule 60 Motion, at 74 ¶ 48].
(4) Under Rule 60(d)(3)
Courts have not explicitly defined the concept of “fraud on the court.” Estate of
Stonehill, at 415, 444. Rule 60(d), a savings clause, provides that Rule 60 does not limit
the court’s power to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3).
But Rule 60(d)(3) states Rule 60 does not limit a court’s power to set aside a judgment
for fraud on the court. In re Roussos, at 721, 728-29. Rule 60(d)(3) is the codification of
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a court’s inherent power to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by fraudulent
conduct. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
(5) Review for Plain or Basic or Fundamental Error
In accordance with the “plain error” exception, a court will consider issues not
passed on by the trial court “if a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely
vital” to a party that the court “feels [itself] at liberty to correct it.”[25] This exception
derives originally from criminal procedure [26] but courts have applied the exception
to civil cases as well, [27] though considerably less often.[28] The Supreme Court has
cautioned that this exception is to be used “exceptional circumstances,” when “(1) there
is an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute’;
(3) the error ‘affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case
means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings’; and (4) ‘the error
_________________________
[25] Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896).
[26] Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and
the Gorilla Rule, 40 V and. L. Rev. 1023 (1987), supra note 1, at 1052 (discussing United
States v. Atkinson, at 297. 84 Miller*, supra note 1, at 1283; Weigand*, supra note 1, at
194 (discussing Atkinson, 297). In fact, Professor Martineau appears to consider the
“plain error” exception inapplicable to civil cases. Martineau, supra note 1, at 1052-53,
1055-56. *See Table of Authorities for full description.
[27] Weigand, supra note 1, at 217 (collecting cases).
[28] United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010) (citing Puckett v. United States,
556 U.S. 129, 142 (2009); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993); Johnson v.
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.. See also
Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160 (plain error exists when “the errors were obvious, or if the
otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.”). Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp.,79 F.3d 182,
189 (1st Cir.); apply the plain error doctrine "stringently" in civil cases. Trull v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,320 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002).
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seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”
This is a case-specific, fact-based inquiry.[29]
5. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
On March 18, 2020, Appellant sought relief from all of the “Court(s)” “Orders”,
in their entirety, [TAB B-6], and challenged through his [Rule 60 Motion, at 74], [TAB
B-5] under Rule 60(d) and Rule 60(b)(4), or (6). Rule 60(b) and stated in part: (b)
Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On a motion and just
terms, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (4) the judgment is void . . . (6) any other reason that justifies relief,
and under Rule 60(d) which allows the Court to set aside judgements for fraud on the
court. [Rule 60 Motion, 74 ¶ 1], and stating inter alia, that the Court was biased in favor
of Twitter and therefore the judgements are void and, that there was fraud upon the
Court which vitiates any Orders.
On March 19, 2021, one day later, with one word, the Court “denied”
Appellant’s [Rule 60 Motion, at 74]. See [Rule 60 Order]. On March 24, 2021, Appellant
filed a Motion for Specific Findings to Clarify Order and Toll Response Time of the
Order dated March 19, 2021. [Clarify Motion, at 75]. On April 5, the Court confirmed
the denial of [Rule 60 Motion, at 74], and that it is no longer pending. On this same
_________________________
[29] Weigand, supra note 1, at 196 (quoting Puckett , at 129, 142. Demonstrates there was
an error made; Gaydar v. Sociedad Instituto Gineco-Quirurgico, 345 F.3d 15, 22-23 (1st Cir.
2003)
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day, Appellant filed Motion to Disqualify District Judge Steven J. McAuliffe. [Recuse
Motion, at 77]
The [Rule 60 Order] is separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
Appellant’s action, and are too important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case
is adjudicated. Appellant’s constitutional rights to due process rights to a non-prejudicial
or non-bias forum will be further eroded if not vindicated before trial. The Supreme
Court has long given this provision of the statute this practical, rather than a technical,
construction. Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 26 U.S. 567 (1828); United States v. River Rouge
Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926); See also Cohen, 337 U.S. 541. Judgment based on
fraud on the court is warranted in this case to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.”
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998).
6. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS OF PROOF
(1) Void Judgments and Rule 60(b)(4)
Preponderance of evidence Standard has more evidence in its favor than the
other, even by the smallest degree. In order to successfully establish a prima facie case
for a due process violation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) there has been a deprivation
of the plaintiff’s liberty or property, and (2) the procedures used by the government to
remedy the deprivation were constitutionally inadequate. It is well established that the
Fifth Amendment applies only to actions taken by the federal government. [TAB B-
16].
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The Constitution requires that "neutral and detached judge[s]" preside over
cases. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 52, at 6357. supra note 6.
The District Court is a Federal agency as defined by 28 U.S. Code § 2671.
Johnstone and McAuliffe are federal judicial officers of the court, U.S. Government
employees. And are paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully. A
judge is also, not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
Johnstone and McAuliffe, acting individually and in their ministerial [30],
administrative,[31], executive,[32], legislative,[33] or purely judicial capacity, was at all
times material herein, a Federal Judges by the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) serving in the United States District Court for the District of N.H..
(2) Fraud upon the Court and Rules 60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3)
“Courts have inherent equity power to vacate judgments obtained by fraud”.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); In re Levander, 180 F.3d 1114, 1118–19
(9th Cir.1999). ” “ the power to vacate for fraud on the court “is so great, and so free
from procedural limitations,” Estate of Stonehill, at 415, 443, 444. See 11 Wright & Miller
____________________________
[30] See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 306
& n.16 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
[31] See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 722 (1980); see also
Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1970) ("administrative" powers delegated
to Kentucky County Fiscal Court).
[32] See Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 188, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W.
3882 (U.S. June 4, 1985).
[33] See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980)
("[P]ropounding the [State Bar] Code was not an act of adjudication but one of
rulemaking.").
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§ 2870. The Court is an unbiased, but methodical "creature" which is governed by the
Rule of Law... that is, the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the Rules of Evidence, all which is overseen by Constitutional law. The Court can
ONLY be effective, fair and "just" if it is allowed to function as the laws proscribe. The
doctrine involves “corruption of the judicial process itself,” Cleveland Demolition Co. v.
Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 986 (4th Cir. 1986), and “should be invoked only when
parties attempt ‘the more egregious forms of subversion of the legal process.’” Great
Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1357 (4th Cir. 1982). "[R]elief
based on a showing of 'an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to
improperly influence the court in its decision.'" Id. (citing Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1989)).
The evidentiary standard applied by the federal courts is sufficient to protect the
integrity of our judicial system, and discourage the type of egregious and purposeful
conduct designed to undermine the truth-seeking function of the courts, and impede a
party's efforts to pursue a claim or defense. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d at 444; Gleason v.
Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1998). In order to adequately plead a fraud on the
court claim, a plaintiff must allege “a scheme by which the integrity of the judicial
process had been fraudulently subverted”. Addington v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Co., 650
F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1981); “ a scheme to interfere with the judicial machinery
performing the task of impartial adjudication, as by preventing the opposing party from
fairly presenting his case or defense.” In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic
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Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir.1976); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d
1332, 1338 (5th Cir.1978). Additionally, fraud upon the court differs from fraud on an
adverse party in that it “is limited to fraud which seriously affects the integrity of the
normal process of adjudication.” Gleason, 860 F.2d 556, 559. Other United States Courts
of Appeals expressly require that fraud upon the court must involve an officer of the
court. Geo. P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.1995); Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit noted that “one species
of fraud upon the court occurs when an ‘officer of the court’ perpetrates fraud affecting
the ability of the court or jury to impartially judge a case.” Pumphrey v. Thompson
Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir.1995); see also Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542,
553 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that “fraud on the court should embrace only that species
of fraud which does or attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud
perpetrated by officers of the court”); Kerwit Med. Prods., Inc. v. N. & H. Instruments,
Inc., 616 F.2d 833, 837 (11th Cir.1980) (same). The Doctrine is generally “limited to
situations, in which the integrity of the court and its ability to function impartially is
directly impinged.” Id. (quoting Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1356), or a scheme to
interfere with the judicial machinery performing the task of impartial adjudication, and
preventing the Appellant from fairly presenting his case involving 2 officers of the
court, Geo. P., at 44, 48; Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 348, which affected the ability of the
court to impartially judge a case.” Pumphrey, 1128, 1130.
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In order to demonstrate fraud on the court, the non-offending party must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the offending "party has acted
knowingly in an attempt to hinder the fact finder's fair adjudication of the case and his
adversary's defense of the action" (McMunn, 191 F Supp 2d at 445, (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
citing Skywark v Isaacson, 1999 WL 1489038, *14 [SD NY Oct. 14, 1999, No. 96 CIV.
2815 (JFK)] affd 2000 WL 145465, *1 [SD NY Feb. 9, 2000). A court must be persuaded
that the fraudulent conduct, which may include proof of fabrication of evidence,
perjury, and falsification of documents concerns "issues that are central to the truth-
finding process" (McMunn, 191 F Supp [*10]2d at 445). Essentially, fraud upon the court
requires a showing that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable
scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate
a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of
the opposing party's claim or defense (McMunn, 191 F Supp 2d at 445, quoting Aoude
v Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F2d, 1118 (1st Cir 1989).
The concept of fraud upon the court challenges the very principle upon which
our judicial system is based: the finality of a judgment. In order to meet the necessarily
demanding standard for proof of fraud upon the court we conclude that there must be:
(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court
itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court. [A] determination of fraud on the court may
be justified only by “the most egregious misconduct directed to the court itself,” and
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that it “must be supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” In re
Coordinated 180, 195.
Appellant has established Fraud on the court by clear and convincing standard
required as he has alleged and proven the five elements of fraud upon the court which
consist of conduct: 1. On the part of an officer of the court; 2. That is directed to the
‘judicial machinery’ itself; 3. That is intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or is
in reckless disregard for the truth; 4. That is a positive averment or is concealment when
one is under a duty to disclose; 5. That deceived the court.” Demjanjuk, at 338, 348.
Applying the principles stated above, the court should have applied the clear and
convincing standard versus the beyond a reasonable doubt standard and that the
Appellant should be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) or Rule 60(d)(3), as he
proffered sufficient evidence to support his claims of fraud on the Court and that an
unwritten and illegal policy was used to decide the Doc. 7 and Doc. 39. motions, and
the remaining orders [iv. ADDENDUM- ORDERS] which no doubt violated his due
process rights and an unbiased or fair proceeding therefore make judgements void.
Johnstone and McAuliffe engaged in fraud and concealment to cover up previous use
of the unofficial polices knew of this unofficial policy but knowingly failed to disclose
it and are accused of hiding facts that indicate a prejudice of juror. McAuliffe made an
erroneous finding that the Court as a whole was not defrauded in issuing its [Rule 60
Order]. McAuliffe acted prematurely and unfairly in dismissing or in the least, indicate
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that if would do so if it had jurisdiction, the Appellant’s [Rule 60 Motion, at 74] and
knowingly disregarded clear and controlling law and deliberately omitted critical facts.
7. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
"Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit -- and this is one of the
meanings that fraud bears in the statute”. United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th
Cir.1985). Both Judges deliberately concealed material information in a setting of
fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the
case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him, and if he deliberately conceals
material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. When a judge promulgates
unofficial policies that favors one party, and does not inform the opposing party, he is
concealing material information in violation of his fiduciary obligations." McNally v
United States 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
The Courts fraudulent scheme defrauds the “judicial machinery” and was
perpetrated by an officers of the court such that the court could not perform its
function as a neutral arbiter of justice. See Martina Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres,
Inc., 278 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1960); The Judges actions influenced the court itself or
a member of the court such that the impartial nature of the Court was compromised.
Bulloch v. United States, 721 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Cir.1983).(any action directly attacking
the judicial machinery. Hazel-Atlas, at 245-246.
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8. LOCAL DISTRICT COURT RULES
Rules of the Court shall be established by an Act of Congress and consistent
with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under 28 U.S.
Code § 2072. See 28 U.S. Code § 2071(a). [TAB B- 8] Any rule prescribed by a court,
other than the Supreme Court, under subsection (a) shall be prescribed only after giving
appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment. See 28 U.S. Code § 2071(b).
A rule of a district court prescribed under subsection (a) shall remain in effect unless
modified or abrogated by the judicial council of the relevant circuit. See 28 U.S. Code
§ 2071(c)(1). (See also, immediate need for a rule under 28 U.S. Code § 2071(e).
A federal court has the power to control admission to its bar and its decision
whether to grant pro hac vice status is committed to the sound discretion of the Court
and its Clerks if such motion is presented and unopposed. The practice of law generally
has been left exclusively to the States and regulated by the judiciary. Justices,
Magistrates and Clerks possess the power to grant pro hac vice, the authority is not
unlimited, but they do not possess the power to individually or unofficially
promulgate and exercise rules of the court and in violation of N.H. law. [See V.
Appendix I, (Unofficial pro hac vice rules unconstitutional), page 3]The official rules
of the court regulate the extent of which a judge may exercise their powers in the
course of legal proceedings and must be used according to those rules and principles
which have been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights. [TAB B-9, A Primer on the Jurisdiction of the U.S.
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Courts of Appeals Second Edition, which describes the federal rule-making apparatus].
To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its
constitution -- that is, by the law of its creation -- to pass upon the subject matter of
the suit. Johnstone’s unofficial policies were not prescribed by the district court under
section 28 U.S. Code § 2071(f).
9. PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS
The Court did so prescribe pro hac vice rules under LR 83.2(b), which
were in effect at all times relevant to this Case. Pro hac vice admissions in the Court are
governed by LR 83.2(b). To obtain the privilege of appearing in a particular case in the
District Court, an applicant must; be a member in good standing of the bar of any court
of the United States or the highest court of any state; have a member of the district's
bar who is actively associated with the attorney file a motion for pro hac vice admission;
attach to the motion an affidavit in compliance with LR 83.2(b)(1); and submit with the
motion a $100 fee (per person) via credit card or ACH debit. A federal court has the
power to discipline attorneys who appear before it, but only if the attorney has been
accepted to the bar of the court. See LR 83.3.
In all these cases, to which [TAB B- 6 Exhibits] were introduced to the Court,
both Mrazik and Schwartz invoked the processes of the Court in a matter pending
before it, exercising their legal training and judgment concerning the impact of the
Appellant’s pleadings upon Twitter. [TAB B-6 Exhibits] These actions constituted
UPL. When Mrazik and Schwartz appeared before the Court of record for the purpose
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of transacting business with the court in connection with Twitter’s pending litigation or
when Mrazik and Schwartz sought to invoke the processes of the Court in a matter
pending before it, both were engaging in the practice of law. It is uniformly held that
many of activities which Mrazik and Schwartz participated in and advised Twitter, such
as writing and interpreting contracts, agreements and the giving of legal advice in
general, constitute practicing law in N.H.. See Ark. Bar Assoc. v. Union Nat’l Bank, 224
Ark. 48, 53-54, 273 S.W.2d 408, 411-412 (1954). Additionally, neither Mrazik or
Schwartz obtained permission to appear pro hac vice and therefore had engaged in the
UPL when appearing before the Court and acted as officers of the court and were
rendering a service to the Court.
At rock bottom, Twitter concludes that N.H. Rule 5.5(c)(2) allows a submittal to
the court by simply noting [Schwartz] “would seek pro hac vice admission on the
pleading”, according to ABA Model Rule 5.5 cmt. [ Twitter Reply, at 25, to Strike
Motion, at 14]. What it neglects to mention are the ABA Model Rules Comment(s) at
[9] would require the pro hac vice attorney to obtain that authority before appearing
before the Court, [TAB B-13, ¶ 9], which states “To the extent that a court rule or
other rule or other law of this jurisdiction requires a lawyer who is not admitted
to practice in this jurisdiction to obtain admission pro hac vice before appearing
before a tribunal or administrative agency, this Rule requires the lawyer to
obtain that authority.” N.H. Rule 5.5(c)(2) required Mrazik and Schwartz to obtain
that authority prior to appearing before the Court.
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Twitter’s next contention is that Schwartz neither signed nor filed the [MTD, at
3], which is meaningless as pro hac vice attorneys are not required to sign any pleading
to the Court and shall be signed by the member of the bar of the court who shall sign
all filings submitted to the court. Fed. Ct. Rule 83.2(b). Regardless who signed the
[MTD, at 3], the fact that [it] was still submitted by Schwartz on behalf of Twitter is
clear as the nose on your face.
Twitter hired COIE, Mrazik and Schwartz to represent its interests in N.H.
Federal Court cases and constitute the UPL, including within the interpretation of N.H.
laws and Schwartz's act of submitting a pleading before the District Court certainly
constitutes "the practice of law." Twitter concedes their 6/1/2020 [MTD, at 3], was a
submittal. [Twitter Reply, at 25]. Concedes a pro hac vice motion was not submitted
prior to June 1, 2021. [Id.] Concedes that Schwartz is not allowed to appear and practice
before the [Court]. [TAB B- 3], but fails to concede that Schwartz “Submitted” [it] to
the Court, which is in black and white. See [TAB B- 6, Pge. 239].
Attorney Mrazik did not apply to the Court, on the record, in any of these cases.
It is undisputed that Attorney Schwartz did not apply to the Court until June 8, 2020,
one week after her [MTD, at 3] was filed and after the Appellant filed his [DM, at 7].
Applying to the Court is only the preliminary step to being granted pro hac vice status.
The court did not actually grant Schwartz's motion for pro hac vice until August 19,
2021. "Clearly, Attorney Schwartz was not admitted to practice law in N.H. when she
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filed Twitters’ [MTD, at 3], on June 1, 2020. Therefore, the [MTD, at 3], in this Case
was, and still is, void ab initio.
The act of giving favors or privilege(s) to appear and plead before the Court to
Twitter and their attorneys when they are not entitled too, is non-judicial because it does
not require an exercise of judicial discretion or a determination of the parties' rights and
are therefore ministerial, administrative, or legislative acts. Acts typically, a layperson
could perform. Acts not to be confused with the act of adjudicating a pro hac vice
motion entitling them to a judgement, after an objection.
10. UNOFFICIAL PRO HAC VICE RULES AND POLICIES
Starting on April 26, 2018, Magistrate Judge “Johnstone” was, on a continuous
basis, intentionally ignoring N.H. law and established official court pro hac vice rules,
and instead promulgated, implemented, managed and adopted her own non-public
alternative admission procedures, within her administrative case management duties,
that make pro hac vice laws and rule provisions unnecessary and for the specific reason
of, allowing partner attorneys from the law firm of Perkins Coie, LLP. “COIE”,
“Mrazik” and “Schwartz”, the privilege of practicing before the Court although they
lacked the requirements of eligibility set forth in Local Rule “LR” 83.2, and in violation
of N.H.RSA 311:7, [TAB B- 10], all to the benefit of the defendant, Twitter.
Johnstone’s unwritten, illegal pro hac vice “unofficial policies”, allowed COIE
and partner attorneys of COIE, on 68 separate occasions, [TAB B-6], the privilege of
practicing before the Court, even though these attorneys lacked any of the requirements
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of eligibility demanded under LR 83.1 and 83.2, [TAB B- 11], to practice before the
Court and in violation of N.H.RSA 311:7. See also, [TAB B- 12].
Johnstone, in her official capacity and within her administrative duties;
implemented and executed an illegal policy that was officially and informally adopted
as custom by the District Court. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996);
was the final policymaking authority when it came to implementing or deciding Pro
Hac Vice policies. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-83 (1986), and; as
a federal official, in her individual, legislative and administrative capacities intentionally
caused constitutional torts under color of her authority. Johnstone, who was given the
task of preliminary case review and pre-trial adjudication authorization by the court,
was active in Appellant’s case to which Schwartz was a participant, as well as all cases
in which Mrazik practiced unauthorized practice of law “UPL”, in the District Court.
Johnstone was duty-bound to at the very least disclose her unofficial policies and
failed in those duties owed to Appellant. Johnstone who, through bias, unofficial
policies or outright corruption, prevented Appellant from getting a fair proceeding in
the Court.
11. APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
“Equal justice under law is not merely a caption on the facade of the Supreme
Court building, it is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society. It is one of the ends
for which our entire legal system exists…[I]t is fundamental that justice should be the
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same, in substance and availability, without regard to economic status.” Graham v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 959 (6th Cir.1986).
Due process of law is, at its core, a concept of fundamental fairness. Basic to
fundamental fairness is the right to be given a meaningful opportunity to present all the
evidence and arguments in support of one’s case; and the right to have the factual issues
decided by a judge or a jury who will decide the case fairly, impartially and in accordance
with the rule of law. The term "due process of law," when applied to judicial
proceedings, means a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles
which have been established by our jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement
of private rights. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
The right to an impartial judge is based on the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution and is expressly set forth in many state constitutions.[34] In
addition, state codes of judicial conduct require that judges be impartial. “A neutral
judge is one of the most basic due process protections.” Reyes Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d
1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003)
The Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to a jury
trial in suits “at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars.” Despite the reference to suits “at common law,” it is settled that the “right to
_______________________________
[34] See U.S. Constitution, Amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”). The federal Constitution
guarantees the right to jury trial in civil actions in federal courts. See U.S. Const. amend
VII.
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a jury trial includes more than common law forms of action recognized in 1791” when
the Seventh Amendment was adopted, and “extends to causes of civil actions.
Procedural due process is a legal doctrine in the United States that requires
government officials to follow fair procedures before depriving a person of life, liberty,
or property and is required by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Williams, Ryan (2010). "The One and Only
Substantive Due Process Clause". Yale Law Journal. 120: 408–512. SSRN 1577342; United
States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)).
The right of access in its most formal manifestation protects a person's right to
physically access the court system. Without more, however, such an important right
would ring hollow in the halls of justice. e.g., Chambers v. Baltimore Ohio R.R, 207
U.S. 142, 28 S. Ct. 35 (1907). Access to courts does not only protect one's right to
physically enter the courthouse halls, but also insures that the access to courts will be
"adequate, effective and meaningful." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491,
1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Therefore, if a party engages in actions that effectively
cover-up evidence and this action renders a plaintiff's state court remedy ineffective,
they have violated his right of access to the courts. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d
1205, 1261 (7th Cir.1984) ("To deny such access defendants need not literally bar the
courthouse door or attack plaintiffs' witnesses."). In fact, the right of access to the
courts finds support in several provisions of the Constitution including the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S.Ct.
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2963, 2986, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Equal Protection Clause, Pennsylvania v. Finley,
481 U.S. 551, 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); the First Amendment,
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987)(citing Johnson
v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969)); Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, see, e.g., Chambers, at 34, 35, 52.
Appellant was denied Due Process by both judges under the Fifth Amendment,
which at a minimum requires an impartial tribunal. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
(1950). [TAB B-16]
Johnstone set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere
with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly
influencing the trier of fact, or attempted to, by unfairly hampering the presentation of
Appellant’s claims. Perrine v. Henderson, 85 So.3d 1210, 1211-22 (Fla. 5th DCA
2012) quoting Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
The Court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law, as Appellant
had no notice of the unofficial rules being employed and therefore it’s judgments are
void. 11 Wright and Miller § 2862, pp. 199-200.
The established facts demonstrate a violation Appellant’s constitutional rights to
due process and a fair and non-partisan judge. The rendering of these judgments,
preconceived in Twitters favor, were reached without due process of law, are without
jurisdiction and are void as the United States is forbidden by the fundamental law to
Page 57 of 97

take either life, liberty or property without due process of law, and its courts are
included in this prohibition. Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949).
12. DISQUALIFICATION
Federal Law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under
certain circumstances. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required
if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's
impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude
that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified. Liteky v. U.S.,
114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section
144, but on the Due Process Clause."). It has long been recognized that freedom of the
tribunal from bias or prejudice is an essential element of due process. E.g., In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136--137, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942, 946 (1955); Whitaker
v. McLean, 73 App. D.C. 259, 118 F.2d 596 (1941); Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205, 216-
-217 (9th Cir. 1956), vacated on other grounds, 354 U.S. 156, 77 S.Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d
1253 (1957). McAuliffe fails the ABA objective test[35] in that a disinterested person
might reasonably question his bias, prejudice or impartiality. In failing to disqualify
____________________________
[35] ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2.2; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Greineder,
936 N.E. 2d 372, 393-94 (2010); Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384-85 (Del. 1991).
Page 58 of 97

himself, he violated the Appellant’s due process rights to a tribunal free from bias or
prejudice, and lacked constitutional power to make the [Rule 60 Order].[36]
13. ARGUMENT
(1) Fraud Upon the Court
Johnstone’s self-promulgated unofficial pro hac vice policies, intentionally
circumvented the Courts prescribed LR governing practice and procedure which are
governed by both statute and the Fed. R. Civ. P. to benefit Twitter in Appellant’s case.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(a)-(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 83.2. [See Chart Next Page]
____________________________
[36] ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2.2.
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(2) Bias Orders of the Court
A reasonable person could conclude that submitting a pleading to the Court
when you are self admittedly, [TAB B-3] not so authorized to do so, is illegal in the
State of N.H., even in a federal court. The document submitted becomes a nullity.
Twitter therefore has not answered the [Complaint, at 1] in the time subscribed and
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therefore shall be in default. The facts demonstrate that the Court utilized policies that
were not promulgated through the Constitution, down to the Courts, through notice
and rebuttal of the public, and then decided by member Justices of the Court. The Court
demonstrated bias in Twitters favor 68 times. The Court knows or should know that
Twitter’s [MTD, at 3], was submitted illegally and can’t be used or relied upon by any
party or the Court. Appellant’s [Default Motion, at 7] was not decided utilizing the
official rules, Cannons, precedent or within State laws as suggested by the Appellant.
The same could be said of Appellant’s [Reconsideration Motion, at 39],
The Court’s Mooting of Appellant’s [Surreply, at 48] may appear innocuous, but
provides key facts and bolsters the Appellant’s case that the Court was, in fact, biased
in favor of Twitter. In its [Objection, at 44], Twitter misconstrued and mischaracterized
the holdings held in Key Bank of Maine v. Tab1ec1oth Texti1e Co. Corp. , 7 4 F. 3d 349, 353
(1st Cir. 1996) Stating that the “plaintiff knew from the correspondence that the
defendant had a clear purpose to defend the suit”, so [MTD, at 3], is within the
time and manner provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.”. [Twitter 17.1 Reply, Pge 2], The
Key Court held that notice as contemplated under Rule 55(b)(2), [TAB B- 14] and [TAB
B-15], lack of personal jurisdiction, was sufficient to reverse a default judgement award,
but remanded the default order back to the District Court to determine whether, in the
circumstances, there exists a basis for setting aside the entry of default to Rule 55(c),
judgment on the pleadings, and whether Appellants should accordingly be permitted to
file a late responsive pleading. Although a stricken or rejected motion to dismiss
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demonstrates such an intent regarding notice in a default judgement order, notice is not
the only or minimum bar required to satisfy an appearance in response to a Summons.
[Surreply, MOL, at 48.1, ¶ 4], [Twitter Reply at 53 to [DM, at 46]]. [37]
So with its [MFR Order], and the subsequent mooting of the [Surreply, at 48],
the Court rested and based its decision on 62, . Now the “new” jurisprudence moving
forward, and advanced by these two Court’s opinions, is that notice to defend an action
is the on1y or minimum bar required to satisfy a response to a Summons in order to
fulfill Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Which BTW is incorrect, as Rule 12 does not contemplate
Notice as a defense.
The Court’s [Anon Order] which denied several of the Appellant’s motions, and
subsequent [Permission Order] were “clearly wrong in view of reliable, probative and
substantial undisputed evidence on the whole record. [TAB D-1], and lack any legal
precedent. [See Appeal No. 1].
When discussing Appellants, [Judicial Notice, at 42], McAuliffe surmises
(although [the Motion, at 42] seem[s] more directly related to his efforts to
disqualify Twitter’s counsel”. [Anon Order, pge. 8]. Which is utterly false.
Appellant brought the [Judicial Notice, at 42], seeking judicial notice “surrounding
Defendant, Twitter, Inc. ("Twitter('s)"), pleading or Motion to Dismiss
Complaint or Alternatively Transfer”, and mentions nothing in his [Judicial Notice,
_______________
[37] LR’s 12 and 4 come with a higher burden than Ru1e 55(b)(2) than just notice when
submitting a response to a Summons. [Surreply, MOL at 48-1, ¶ 2]
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at 42] related to disqualifying Twitter’s counsel, Schwartz. So, in this particular Order,
the Court mischaracterizes and misstates the Appellant’s arguments regarding the
motion, decides and creates new law that notice is a valid defense under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12, and then a day later moots and denies the Appellants, [Surreply, at 52], which alerts
the Court that Twitters Key Bank arguments were incorrect.
The [Compulsion Order] the [Stayed Order] and the [10/06/2020] were acts
taken in complete absence of any jurisdiction or stripped jurisdiction and a clear
violation of Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights to Due Process as McAuliffe was in
fact notified that Appellant intended to file his Appeal and Notice to the Court by Sept.
28, 2020, [Delay Compulsion Motion, at 56], and therefore the Court lacked any subject
matter jurisdiction as no mandate had returned from the Appeals Court for this very
issue. [Permission to File Reconsideration, at 61].
The [Stayed Order] dismissing Appellant’s [Complaint, at 1] was an act taken in
complete absence of any jurisdiction and a clear violation of Appellant’s Seventh
Amendment guaranteeing the right to a jury trial in suits at common law, where the
value in controversy exceeded twenty-dollars.
(3) Aberrational Behavior
The Courts aberrational behavior towards basic rules and laws, leans towards
favoritism towards Twitter. The Court declared Appellant’s Motions to [Declare
Twitter a Public Accommodation Motion, at 5], [Declare Twitter a State Actor Motion,
at 6], [Declare Twitters Platform a Public Forum Motion, at 16] and, [Rule 5.1 Motion,
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at 45] Challenging the Constitutionality of Section § 230, “is neither proper nor
necessary. Accordingly, those motions must be denied”. [Anon Order, pge. 8]
The Court denied Declaratory relief, in its discretion, that would have resolved legal
uncertainty and given direction, Amer. Household Products, Inc. v. Evans Manufacturing, Inc.,
139 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1239 (N.D. Al. 2001), to the litigants. Additionally, the Motion at
5 to declare Twitter a Public Accommodation would have given Appellant subject
matter jurisdiction in the case. Each of these denials favors Twitter.
Appellant’s [Complaint, at 1], [Motion for Default II Motion at 46], (because
Twitter knew its [MTD, at 3] was illegal and failed to answer properly under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12 after many months]; his [Strike Motion, at 14] Twitters [MTD, at 3] were
never substantially answered by the Court, which all work in Twitter’s favor.
(4) Ex-Parte Communication
We also know that Twitter was directed by the Court to file a Response, in the
Appeals Court, by 12 p.m. on Monday, September 28. [38] This admittance by Twitter
indicates ex-parte communications and collaboration between the Court and Twitter,
where, here, the Court is now advising, giving legal advice and directing Twitter to file
a response to the Appeals Court in replying to Appellant’s Motion to Stay, [39] which
was filed in the Appeals Court and not in the District Court. The Appellant has received
no legal advice, thus far, from the Court.
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(5) Defendant, Appellee, Twitter
Twitter, through its attorneys, intentionally misrepresented or omitted facts
through written statements that were critical to the outcome of the case, and this Court
should take notice of the “deference to the deep-rooted policy in favor of the repose
of judgments.” Hazel–Atlas, at 244–45, 64 S.Ct. 997. Estate of Stonehill, at 415, 452.
Twitter misconstrued or mischaracterizes Rule 55(b) requirements and the
holdings held in Key Bank, and knew or should have known that LR’s 12 and Rule 4
come with a higher burden than Ru1e 55(b)(2) than just notice when submitting a
response to a Summons.
A finding of fraud on the court may warrant termination of the proceedings in
the non-offending party's favor (McMunn, 191 F Supp 2d at 462 ["[defendant] deserves
harsh sanction of dismissal"]; Shangold v. Walt Disney Co., 275 F. App'x 72, 2006 WL
71672, at *5 (2d Cir. 2008), (plaintiff's fabrication of evidence warrants dismissal);
Hargrove v Riley, 2007 WL 389003, *11 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), (same); DAG Jewish Directories,
2010 WL 3219292, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), (same). For "when a party lies to the court
and [its] adversary intentionally, repeatedly, and about issues central to the truth-finding
process, it can fairly be said that [the party] has forfeited [the] right to have [the] claim
decided on the merits" (McMunn, 191 F Supp 2d at 445). Therefore, once a court
concludes that clear and convincing evidence establishes fraud on the court, it may
_______________________
[38] Twitter was directed to file this Response by 12 p.m. on Monday, September 28.
[39] Case: 20-1933 Document: 00117648436, Filed: 09/28/2020.
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strike a pleading and enter a default judgment.
Twitter played along with the Court and deliberately mischaracterized the laws
and rules and concealed the facts of the unofficial policy which were central to the [DM,
at 7] dispute, materially cheating, and prevented Appellant from ascertaining those
central facts and fully evaluating and analyzing the issues in dispute. Nothing less than
outright default and judgment would deter similar misconduct. See also [TAB B-17].
Attorney Eck's signature on the [MTD, at 3] does not change the fact that the
motion was presented by and on behalf of the Defendant Corporation by an Attorney
was not authorized to practice law before this Court. Attorney Schwartz's absence of
her signature is moot, as she still "presented" [MTD, at 3], to the Court by including
her name onto the document while advocating and representing Twitter the Defendant
in a responsive pleading before the Court.[Surreply, at 34] to [Twitter Reply, at 5]
14. CONCLUSION
What occurred in this case exposes a failing in our civil justice system. When the
rules work together, they turn the gears of the judicial machinery towards justice.
Instead, Johnstone’s illegal and unofficial policies disrupted the entire mechanism,
forcing the rules and laws into conflict.
Johnstone set in motion an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with
the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing
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and compromising the trier (McAuliffe), unfairly hampering the presentation of the
Appellant's claims.
Appellant submits that he has shown by clear and convincing evidence that
Johnstone’s illegal and unofficial policies influenced McAuliffe into making such
[Default Order], under those policies, and perpetrated fraud upon the Court. But
because the Court had a predisposed bias, based in fact, in favor of Twitter, McAuliffe
had a predisposed bias to use Johnstone’s unofficial policy and failed to apply the
statutes and official rules when deciding [Default Motion, at 7] and [Reconsideration
Motion, at 39], and he usurped and passed judgement contrary to the power of the
governing state authority, failed to apply State law or acknowledge the framework
governing unauthorized practice of law, wrongly declared that Twitter had not violated
N.H. law, that Johnstone was making her own law and legislating from the bench and
usurped her judicial power in promulgating and utilizing unofficial policies to decide
these motions, which is clear and indisputable. McAuliffe’s denial of these [Motions,
id.], for reasons other than the current laws or rules, tampered with the judicial
machinery and subverted the integrity of the court itself. His false grounds for
dismissing denying these Orders, [Id.], and then dismissing Appellant’s [Complaint at,
1], while it had no jurisdiction [Appeal No. 4] or stripped jurisdiction [Appeal No. 5],
demonstrate an overall bias in favor of Twitter and contravened a key aspect of the
federal Constitution, from which all federal court justices derive their power and
legitimacy. Both justices actions betrayed the public’s trust in its institutions and the
Page 67 of 97

court. The unofficial policies used here, provided unyielding, unbridled and
unconstitutional power and Appellant could plainly see bias in the Orders, but had no
actual proof of bias at that time.
The acts by the Judge in [Anon Order] and the [MFR Order] and the [Mooted
08/28/2020 Order] could be seen as a deliberate action to interfere with the disposition
of Appellant’s claims, extend the entire course of the litigation, and prejudices Appellant
severely and undeservingly, as the Court's finding are not supported whatsoever by the
substantial undisputed evidence in the record and the Court applied too stringent a
burden of proof when deciding the [Rule 60 Motion, at 74] and the Appellant was not
notified of the unofficial policies being utilized. Both judges fail the subjective test for
disqualification or recusal as a reasonable person would question the judge’s
impartiality, and therefore the [Rule 60 Order] is void.
Page 68 of 97

C. #2 Appeal- No. 20-2005- Stripped Jurisdiction
1. JURISDICTION
Should this Appeals Court not be persuaded by the arguments and conclusions
set forth in Appellant’s 4th and 5th appeals, the Appeals Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for final judgments and under the collateral doctrine as parties may
appeal interlocutory rulings before a final judgment to prevent a manifest injustice and
the Appellant would lose his rights to due process without an immediate appeal. Intent
of the Court is clear that these two Orders are essentially final judgements regarding
Appellant’s alleged want of prosecution. [Stayed Order] and 10/6/2020 Order(s)].
Appellant appeals the;
9-21-2020 Order denying his Motion, at 56 to delay compulsion of

his true name as the Court had adequate notice on 9-17-2020 through
[Motion, at 56], that Appellant was to appeal this issue and therefore the
Court lacked any jurisdiction over those aspects of the case and to
compel the Appellant’s true identity when the Court knew full well the
Appellant's intentions to Appeal.
9-28-2020 Order as the Court lacked jurisdiction to compel Appellant's

true identity and to dismiss the case for want of prosecution for not
doing so when the Court, after notice, knew full well the Appellant's
intentions to Appeal the Orders of Compulsion and that the Court
lacked jurisdiction to decide further on the issue of Appellant’s true
identity.
The [Compulsion Order] was a duel order in that it contains Compulsion and
Dismissal. [Compulsion Order], on 9-21-2020 and the [Stayed Order] on 9-28-2020
lacked any jurisdiction after the informal notice of appeal on 9-17-2020, at minimum
Page 69 of 97

the [Stayed Order] lacked any jurisdiction after the formal notice of appeal on 9-25-
2020.
(1) Did the Court lack jurisdiction to compel Appellant to disclose his name
publicly after informing the Court he was appealing the original Order denying
anonymity?
(2) Did the Court declare the law in the absence of jurisdiction when it dismissed
and stayed the case after the Court was noticed?
(3) Whether the District Court lacked jurisdiction to decide a matter the Court
had notice of and had effectively been transferred to Circuit Court?
3. TIMELINESS
Appellant appealed the [Compulsion Order] and the [Stayed Order] on
10/12/2020 and these appeals are timely pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure because the Notice of Appeal in this civil case was filed within
30 days of the Court’s decisions. [See Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, at 63].
4. REVIEW STANDARD
When legal error is at issue the standard of review is de novo. Under this
standard, the Federal Circuit gives the trial tribunal little, if any, deference; the opinion
appealed receives little or no presumption of correctness. De novo review means that
this court views the case from the same position as the district court. See Lawrence; (see
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also Lewis). The appellate court must consider the matter anew, as if no decision
previously had been rendered. See Freeman.
5. BACKGROUND
The Appellant Motioned the Court to Delay Compulsion of Appellant’s true
identity regarding Appellant’s Motion to Proceed Anonymously. [Delay Motion, at 56
¶ 1].
“as he intends to file a 28 U.S.C. § 1291 appeal of the Courts

August 27, 2020, final "Order" with the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit by September 28, 2020”
The Court denied that motion and ordered Appellant to reveal his true identity
by September 25 in order to avoid dismissal of his case for want of prosecution. Had
the Appellant complied with the “[Compulsion Order]”, he would have lost his right to
Appeal the Court's final decisions as his true identity would have been revealed. Smith
v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992).
6. CONTENT AND RULE 3 NOTICE
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3. specifies that a “proper notice” of
an appeal must contain;
(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal;
(B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed; and
(C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.
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Rule 3(4) also provides that [An] appeal must not be dismissed for informality of
form or title of the notice of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to
appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.
Rule 3 NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1979
AMENDMENT Subdivision (c) states, in part;
Because of the fact that the timely filing of the notice of appeal has been
characterized as jurisdictional (See, e.g., Brainerd v. Beal (C.A. 7th, 1974)
498 F.2d 901, in which the filing of a notice of appeal one day late was
fatal), it is important that the right to appeal not be lost by mistakes of
mere form. In a number of decided cases it has been held that so long as
the function of notice is met by the filing of a paper indicating an
intention to appeal, the substance of the rule has been complied with.
E.g., Cobb v. Lewis (C.A. 5th, 1974) 488 F.2d 41.
The requirements for the form of the notice of appeal are simple and
straightforward.[40] Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 requires a notice to be filed
with the clerk of the court that rendered the judgment, and the notice must “specify the
party or parties taking the appeal”; “designate the judgment, order or part thereof
appealed”; and “name the court to which the appeal is taken.”[41] Even such minimal
content requirements are excused as long as the true intent of the appellant is
ascertainable, the courts have not been misled, and there has been no prejudice to the
other parties.[42]
____________________________
[40] See generally 16A Federal Practice & Procedure, supra note 12, § 3949; 20 Moore’s
Federal Practice, supra note 12, §§ 303.30–303.51.
[41] Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). See also Fed. R. App. P. 12(a) (docketing the appeal); Federal
Court of Appeals Manual, supra note 15, §§ 8.1–8.17; Federal Appeals: Jurisdiction and
Practice, supra note 15, §§ 6.01–6.17.
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While the requirements of Rule 3 serve important purposes and are mandatory
and "jurisdictional in nature," Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988),
"functional" rather than formalistic compliance is all that is required, Smith v. Barry, 502
U.S. at 248. As another subsection of Rule 3 warns, an appeal "must not be dismissed
for informality of form or title . .. , or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal
is otherwise clear from the notice." And as the Supreme Court has instructed,
"imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists
about who is appealing, from what judgment to which appellate court." See E.g., Becker
v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001).
7. ARGUMENT
Ordinarily, “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional
significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court
of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). That divestiture lasts until the appellate court
issues the mandate. See, e.g., Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1995);
Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 906 F.2d 645, 649 (11th Cir. 1990). See, e.g., United States
v. Hitchmon, 587 F.2d 1357 (CA5 1979). Cf. Ruby v. Secretary of United States Navy, 365 F.2d
385, 389 (CA9 1966) (en banc) (notice of appeal from unappealable order does not
_______________________
[42] “An appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of
appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the
notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4). E.g., Becker, at 757 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 requirement that
notice of appeal be signed was not jurisdictional); Smith, at 02 244, (informal pro se
brief can serve as notice of appeal).
Page 73 of 97

divest district court of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1011 (1967). Under pre-1979
procedures, a district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a motion to vacate, alter, or
amend a judgment after a notice of appeal was filed. See Hattersley v. Bollt, 512 F.2d 209
(CA3 1975); Edmond v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 253 F.2d 143 (CA2 1958). However, if
the timing was reversed -- if the notice of appeal was filed after the motion to vacate,
alter, or amend the judgment -- two seemingly inconsistent conclusions were generally
held to follow: the district court retained jurisdiction to decide the motion, but the
notice of appeal was nonetheless considered adequate for purposes of beginning the
appeals process. E.g., Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F.2d 65, 66 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
925 (1981); Williams v. Town of Okoboji, 599 F.2d 238 (CA8 1979); Alexander v. Aero Lodge
No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1371 (CA6 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Dougherty v.
Harper's Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758, 762 (CA3 1976); Stokes v. Peyton's Inc., 508 F.2d 1287
(CA5 1975); Song Jook Suh v. Rosenberg, 437 F.2d 1098 (CA9 1971). Cf. Foman v. Davis, 371
U. S. 178 (1962). The Appellant argues that from the time he noticed the Court on
September 17, 2020, the Court was stripped of its jurisdiction to compel the Appellant’s
true identity or to enter a dismissal order concerning matters regarding Appellant’s true
identity.
As a general rule, an appeal divests the district court of power to modify its
judgment or take other action affecting the cause without permission from the court of
appeals, except insofar as a statute or rule expressly reserves the district court's
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jurisdiction in aid of appeal. See Griggs, at 56, 58. If, however, the appeal is from an
interlocutory order, the district court retains jurisdiction to act on matters not involved
in the appeal unless an order is entered staying the remainder of the proceedings. See
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1985). The
district court also retains jurisdiction to act in aid of or facilitate the appeal. (Rule 3
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1979 Amendment Fed. Rules of Appellant
Procedure Subdivision (c)). Belton v. United States, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 81, 259 F.2d 811
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (letter written to District Court constituted a notice which vested
jurisdiction of the appeal in this court.”) Riffle v. United States, 299 F.2d 802 (5th Cir.
1962) (letter of prisoner to judge of court of appeals held sufficient).
8. CONCLUSION
Appellant’s [Delay Motion, at 56] was adequate notice to the Court which
effectively divested the Court any jurisdiction pertaining to the issue of Appellant’s true
identity.
The “[Compulsion Order]” regarding Appellant’s [Anon Motion, at 15] and its
9/28/2020 dismissal Orders, are clearly erroneous as the Court lacked jurisdiction, or
the judge abused its discretion as jurisdiction was divested to the Appeals Court and
there is no evidence to support his conclusions. The 9/21/2020 Order compelling the
Appellant to submit his true identity cannot be construed to be and act to facilitate the
appeal. And although the 9/28/2020 Order stayed the case, this in no way facilitates or
aids the appeal as a motion had already been filed with the Appeals Court.
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The Court’s [Compulsion Order] and [Stayed Order] should be reversed on
appeal as the Court had been given Notice and therefore the Court lacked any
jurisdiction to make either of those Orders regarding the Appellant’s true identity and
set a new standard in that any Doe or Anonymous in cases like this, the litigant would
lose his appeal rights as the judge would be able to force disclosure, as attempted here,
before a review from the Appeals Court. Had the Appellant complied with the
Compulsion Orders, he would have lost his right to Appeal the Court's final decisions
as his true identity would have been revealed. See Smith v. Barry, at 244, 248.
Additionally, the Appellant's disobedience bears directly upon his right to appeal
and was unintentional and because the court lacked jurisdiction to take any further
action after notice. [See Motion, at 71, Attached Exhibit A]. And any "imperfections in
noticing an appeal should not be fatal to the Appellant’s case as there was no genuine
doubt existing about who is appealing, from what judgment and to which appellate
court.
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D. Appeal #1- No. 20-1933- Megless Doctrine
1. JURISDICTON
Should this Appeals Court not be persuaded by the arguments and conclusions
set forth in Appellant’s 4th and 5th appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals For The First
Circuit would have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 for a final order of the
Court or under the collateral order doctrine and to prevent a manifest injustice. It will
be impossible to rectify or repair as "the cat will be let out of the bag", and thus any
meaningful appeal would be fruitless as the damage would be done. Motion, at 15 ¶ 18,
(anonymously does fall within the collateral order doctrine and is immediately
appealable. Doe v. Vill. of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2016) Alternatively,
Appellant challenges the district court’s factual findings, which should be reversed upon
a finding of clear error. American Cyanamid v. Capuano, 381 F.3d 6, 21 (1st Cir. 2004).
Appellant appeals the [Anon Order] denying Appellant’s [Anon Motion, at 15],
to proceed anonymously as the Court applied the improper standard of proof in
analyzing an exceptional case under Megless and mis-applied or misinterpret the
meaning of an exceptional case requirements under Megless. Or abused its discretion
considering the weight of the evidence. The subsequent [Permission Order] is for the
same reasons appealed as the Court re-affirmed the [Anon Order].
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(1). Did the Court;
A. misconstrue the meaning of “Exceptional Case” under the Megless Doctrine?
B. apply an improper standard of proof in analyzing “exceptional” under
Megless?
C. apply an improper standard of proof when determining “reasonable” fear?
D. weigh the facts in record improperly causing improper judgment?
(2). Was compulsion after notice constitutional a statutory violation under the law?
3. TIMELINESS
Appellant appealed the 8/27/2020 [Anon Order] and the 9/14/2020
[Permission Order] [See iv., pge 7] on 9/17/2020 and on 9/25/2020, and these appeals
are timely pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure because
the Notice of Appeal in this civil case was filed within 30 days of the Court’s decisions.
See Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, at 57.
4. REVIEW STANDARD
In this case the Judge’s intent of the [Anon Order] and the [Permission Order]
with regards to anonymity, are conclusively, a final judgment. See [Stayed Order] and
[See [Stayed Order] and 10/06/2020 Order affirming essentially a final order] See Elliott
v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012).
When legal error is at issue the standard of review is de novo. Under this
standard, the Federal Circuit gives the trial tribunal little, if any, deference, the opinion
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appealed receives little or no presumption of correctness. De novo review means that
this court views the case from the same position as the district court. See Lawrence, 525
F.3d 916, 920; see also Lewis, 1174, 1176. The appellate court must consider the matter
anew, as if no decision previously had been rendered. See Freeman, 1001, 1004.
Appellant appeals the [Anon Order] compelling compulsion of his true identity
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, a final order which should be reviewed, De Novo or
plenary as the Appellant challenges the Court's analytic method of applying or balancing
the appropriate Megless test, and it's application of such method, and regarding whether
certain undisputed facts, as a matter of law, are sufficient to constitute that the
Appellant's interest and fear outweigh the public's strong interest in an open litigation
process. This Court of Appeals is reviewing the Court's choice of an analytic method
or its application of such a method. As for the court's initial choice from among three
standards--prima facie, likelihood, or preponderance--appellate review is de novo. This
accords with the general principle that a trial court's determinations as to the legal rules
that govern a party's proof, including those that dictate what quantum of proof the law
requires, are subject to plenary review. See, e.g., Putnam Resources, 448,471. Here, the
record on the pivotal issues of fact (Appellant’s reasons for fear) is not contradicted or
impeached in any respect, and no conflicting evidence is introduced, these statements
of fact cannot be wholly disregarded or arbitrarily rejected. Rather, the Appellant’s
“reasons” for his reasonable fear should be accepted as proof of the issue for which it
is tendered, even though given by an interested party, so long as it consists of fact, as
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distinguished from opinion, and is not essentially illegal, inherently improbable or
unreasonable, contrary to natural laws, opposed to common knowledge, or
contradictory within itself.) Id. at 699 (footnotes omitted). See "Rudel v. "Rudel, 111 So.
3d 285, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Ducanson v. Serv. First, Inc., 157 So. 2d 696,
699 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)). See also Soto v. United States, 11 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1993).
(holding that "if a district court applie[ s] an erroneous legal standard to the facts," de
novo review obtains). Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock 46 F.3d 138 (1st Cir. 1995) Review is
"independent," See A!!Jeman, 871, 876, or "plenary," See Stilwell, 1187, 1193; United States
v. Waites, 198 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). No deference is given to the district court.
See Barrientos v. We/Lr Fargo Bank, NA., 633 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011); Rabkin v.
Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2003) ("When de novo review is
compelled, no form of appellate deference is acceptable."). See Also; Interpretation of
federal rules. See United States v. Urena, 659 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2011) (evidence);
Riordan v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins., 589 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009) (civil procedure),
See Easlry v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001); Fisher v. Tucson United Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d
1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162,
117 5 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Miller v. Thane Int'!, Inc., 519 F.3d 879, 888 (9th Cir. 2008)
(concluding the district court clearly erred). Here there are no two permissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder's choice must coincide with its ruling. (if the uncontroverted
facts and inferences to be drawn from the facts make it so clear that a reasonable person
can reach only one conclusion. White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525, 529-30 (Tenn. 1998).
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Lastly, the Court abused its discretion when it did not apply the correct standard of law
or rested its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of the Appellants, uncontroverted,
material facts. See Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 f.3d 278 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Casry v. Albertson's
Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004)). District court rules in an irrational manner.
See Chang v. United States, 327 F.3d 911, 925 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Rudel v. Rudel above.
Thus, the court abused its discretion by erroneously interpreting Megless, United States
v. Beltran Gutierre:v 19 F.3d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1994), or by resting its decision on an
inaccurate view of the law, &chard S. v. Dep't of Dev. Seros., 317 F.3d 1080, 1085-86 (9th
Cir. 2003). See also Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (2011) (recognizing trial court has
wide discretion ''but only when, it calls the game by the right rules"). An abuse of
discretion occurs "when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when
an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are
assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them." Hooper-Haas v. Ziegler
Holdings, LLC, 690 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2012). In this case, there were no uncontroverted
facts or issues of facts to be determined, all that was required was for the Court to apply
the law.
Appellant's loosely framed Rule 60(b ), [Reconsideration Motion, at 55] for relief
from that order, dated 9/14/2020, can, for the same reasons as the Anon Order] be
reviewed de novo or at a minimum, be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Davila-Alvarez
v. Escue/a de Medicina Universidad Central de! Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2001). At
bare minimum, this ruling conclusively decides an issue separate from the merits of the
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case and would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment under the Collateral
Doctrine.
Appellant also requests this Appeals Court, if de novo review in not granted, to
review the Court's decision which denies the Appellant permission to proceed
anonymously for abuse of discretion. The Judge abused his discretion as his decision is
clearly erroneous in fact and law, 'rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, is an
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to the facts in record. Doe v.
C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371 n. 2 (3d Cir.2008). Oddi v. Ford Motor Co.,
234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d
123, 127 (3d Cir.1993)) The [Anon Order] was contrary to this Circuit's precedents and
without support of the laws of The State of N.H., a legal error or application of law to
facts on the part of the judge in excluding relevant evidence and by employing a
hypothesis that simply does not bear objective scrutiny that a “reasonable person would
adopt”. An abuse of discretion can also occur, as did here, when no reasonable person
would adopt the Court's view. Megless, at *2. [TAB D-1 ¶¶ 4-5].
The merits of Appellant’s [Anon Motion, at 15], to proceed anonymously should
be reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. See Sealed Plaintiff v.
Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that review of decision to
grant or deny application to proceed anonymously is for abuse of discretion and
collecting cases holding same).
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5. BACKGROUND
Appellant filed [Complaint, at 1] anonymously, using the pseudonym “Sensa
Verogna.” [Complaint, at 1 ¶ 15]. He has argued both before the Court, and this Court,
that he seeks to proceed anonymously based on reasonable fear that harm may befall
him and his family as a consequence of his support for the current administration. [Id.
¶ 21]. Appellant’s request for anonymity not only focuses on his reasonable fears of
severe harm or retaliation, but also submitted other arguments required by Megless and
also averred that the public identification of the himself would likely identify his young
children, who are not parties in the case and weighs heavily against disclosure.
[Declaration, at 15.2 ¶ 8], [Anon Motion, at 15 ¶ 18], [TAB D-1]
Twitter did not take a position before the Court as to whether Appellant should
be permitted to proceed anonymously. [Obj., at 27]. Appellant only asked that the Court
apply the test set forth in Megless in making its determination. Id. (citing Megless, 654 F.3d
404). Here, the parties agree[d] that Megless was to be used. [See Appellant’s Addendum
to Brief, vi Advocacy v. Deception]
3. The [Anon Order] concludes: [Appellant] has young children and worries
that disclosure of his real name may cause them harm, given their ages and
vulnerability and inability to protect themselves and believes harm will befall his
children should he be forced to reveal his true identity. [Appellant’s] Memorandum, at
15-1, ¶ ¶ 6, 14]; [Appellant] has not plausibly described any legitimate safety concerns,
nor has he shown that his desire to remain anonymous outweighs the strong
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presumption of openness in federal civil litigation. On balance, the relevant factors
identified above weigh heavily in favor of plaintiff proceeding under his true identity”;
Based upon the assertions made in plaintiff’s various filings, the court cannot conclude
that this is an “exceptional” case. Indeed, it appears to be a fairly typical one.[Order 54,
pge 9]. [A] plaintiff must show both (1) a fear of severe harm and (2) that the fear of
severe harm is reasonable. Megless, 654 F.3d at 408 (quoting Doe v. Kamehameha
Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir.2010)).
On September 10, Appellant filed, [Reconsideration Motion, at 55], Emergency
Request for Permission to File Objections and a Hearing on the Motions. On
September 14, the Court denied that motion. ROA at 9. Appellant prayed that the Court
either amend its findings and/or make additional findings to prevent a manifest
injustice and amend the judgment accordingly and allow Appellant to leave and file
briefs or objections related to the above. [Reconsideration Motion, at 55 ¶ 11].
6. ARGUMENT
“Exceptional” under Megless in the context of fear for retaliation simply requires
a litigant to allege a fear of severe harm, and that the fear of severe harm is reasonable.
[Anon Order] indicates that “Based upon the assertions made in plaintiff’s various
filings, the court cannot conclude that this is an “exceptional” case. Indeed, it appears
to be a fairly typical one.” [Anon Order, ¶ 9]. Surely it conveys that discrimination
cases are typical and does not mean that “fairly typical cases” include litigants seeking
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Doe status for fear severe harm in retaliation using guns, arson, bombs, ricin, threats
etc.
The Courts interpretation of “exceptional case” is in error in that the meaning
of exceptional in a Megless case is the nature of the harm alleged which would make it
exceptional and not that the entire case must be exceptional. Under this reading, the
whole case would be required to be exceptional, when the doctrine clearly states that
the fear and harm alleged is what makes it exceptional. This inherently would prejudice
Doe litigants in that the test is now shortened and becomes a one question test versus
and overall test which states numerous reasons when Megless would apply. The Court
rested its decisions on an inaccurate view of the law.
Because Appellant is a white, non-white, conservative Trump supporter that has
been discriminated against by Twitter, (and possibly the U.S. Government), [43] further
discrimination is precisely the consequence that he seeks to avoid in bringing his suit.
Doe v . Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995 (E.D. La. 2012). Where participation in a lawsuit for
racial discrimination would result in an "exponentially greater risk of racial
discrimination,", Appellant should be permitted to proceed under pseudonyms. Lozano
v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d at 195 (3rd Cir. 2010).
Here the Appellant alleged that he fears severe harm and that the reasons for
these harms are that because he is white, non-white, a conservative Trump supporter,
____________________________
[43] Motion, at 6.2, Plaintiffs Motion to Declare Twitter, Inc. a State Actor, ¶ 34
through ¶ 46, challenging government activity including Delegation, Compulsion and
Encouragement. [Motion, at 15 ¶ 18].
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suing Twitter for discrimination, who has a policy of discriminating against whites and
conservative people, and fans the flames of white hate on its platform, and that vicious
attacks are happening at an alarming rate with even members of Congress doxing and
thereby sending mobs to every-day citizens homes simply because they disagree with
their opinions.
Violent attacks such as Bomb Threats, Violence Against 11-Y ear-O Id, Shots
fired, Left-wing activist arrested for trying to buy radioactive material, N.J. GOP
Congressional Candidate Receives Letter Threatening His Children, battery on Trump
supporter, ricin was in letter sent to Senator Collins home, Republican State Rep. Sarah
Anderson assaulted in Minnesota, A truck with 'Trump 2020' bumper stickers set it on
fire, Ricin and threatening letter sent to Trump, threat to commit mass shooting at a
MAGA event, Threats of Rape and Strangling, 76- year-old man assaulted by anti-
Trump thugs in San Diego, Anti-Trump protester lights Trump supporter's hair on fire,
Denver, CO, Arsonist Sets Trump Campaign Sign On Fire, Endangers Entire
Neighborhood. Texarkana AR, Woman's Trump signs burned in arson attack. Threats
to the Trump's family left on Twitter for days without being removed, Twitter allows
179 death threats against Trump, Leftist Teacher Tweets: "So Who's Gonna Take One
For the Team and Kill Kavanaugh", Sen. Collins Flooded with Abusive Tweets
Threatening Death, Violence, FBI announce arrest for contract killing threat of ICE
agent via Twitter. (639 examples of what this Court interprets to be "generalized
threats"], [Complaint, at 1 ¶ 183] [Anon Motion, at 15, 15.1 MOL ¶ 11].
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Appellant has both stated in his pleading that he fears severe harm to either
himself or to his young family, and has also submitted that fear of severe harm is
reasonable either because he is white, a Trump supporter or a Conservative. The
Plaintiff need not show or demonstrate substantial "irreparable harm", only that he
fears severe harm, and that "that fear of severe harm is reasonable." What the Court
analogizes as "generalized threats" are acts of violence and violate either Federal or State
criminal laws Even the threats themselves violate Federal or State Criminal Codes that
could be prosecuted under any number of Federal Statutes. [44] and [45]. There are
plenty of facts proffered by the Appellant that would make any reasonable person
fearful of acts of violence for bringing and continuing to bring a lawsuit against the
Defendant, Twitter. [46] [Anon Motion, at 15 ¶ 18], [TAB D-1 ¶ ¶ 9,10] and
threatened conduct that is a prerequisite to the exceptional rule which is serious,
"harassing, stalking, threatening".
_________________________
[44] Chapter 41 of 18 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. § 871 et seq. ( 1994), contains a number of
statutes criminalizing various types of threats. See, e.g. , 18 U.S.C. § 871 ( 1994)
(making it a crime to convey through the mail a threat to kill, injure, or kidnap the
President); 18 U.S.C. § 876 (1994) (prohibiting the transmission of threats by mail); 18
U.S. C. § 878 (1994) (prohibiting threats against foreign officials); 18 U.S.C. § 879 (
1994) (prohibiting threats against former presidents). Com1s considering cases
brought under one of these statutes usually feel free to apply precedent from any of
the other statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir.
1992) (looking to 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982) for guidance even though the instant case
was brought under § 879).
[45] A threat is "[a] communicated intent to inflict physical or other harm on any
person or property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (6th ed. 1990). [Anon
Motion 15 at ¶18], [20-1933- Doc. 00117648115 Pages 9-10].
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The Court then proceeds to ignore material factors deserving significant weight
to any of the Appellant's justifications for these fears and the possibility that these fears
are reasonable. Doe v. Kamehameha, 1036, 1043. 639 example of violence against whites,
conservatives and Trump supporters. [Complaint, at 1 ¶ 183], [Anon Motion, at 15,
MOL ¶ l l] [Reconsideration Motion, at 55 ¶ 2].
[T]here are many instances in which the evidence of particular facts as bearing
on particular issues has been so often the subject of discussion in courts of law, and so
often ruled upon, that the united logic of a great many judges and lawyers may be said
to furnish…the best evidence of what may be properly called common-sense, and thus
to acquire the authority of law. (1876 57 N.H. 245 at 288 [Supreme Court, N.H.])
Would any reasonable person fear the mob being sent to their house? Do
reasonable people fear harassing phone calls, bomb threats, firebombs, arson, ricin
letters, or being shot or knifed? I think not! Appellant has a reasonable fear of severe
harm to his children and himself because he is white, non-white, a conservative Trump
supporter (who are at this time under vicious attacks) and who, in continuing with this
case, could be the next target.
___________________________
[46] Included in his [Complaint., at 1] and his [Anon Motion, at 15], Appellant
incorporated by reference each and every paragraph, tweet, article, exhibit or
attachment included within the complaint. The Appellant also alleged and demonstrates
in his [Complaint, at 1] and elsewhere that Twitter Blue Checkers will either directly
attack Appellant or fan others to do their dirty work for them. (Complaint Exhibits., at
1.6, ¶ 15, Twitter Blue Checkers fan the flames.)
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The unchallenged intrinsic evidence submitted through submittals and
declarations provided clear and convincing proof of extreme conduct against people
exactly like the Appellant and serve to prove the fact in question. That getting stabbed,
punched, kicked, shot, lit on fire, or to have your house set on fire while you and the
children are in it…. instills reasonable, realistic and well-founded fear” in the Appellant
and most certainly describes legitimate safety concerns of real danger or physical harm
or other conduct that would cause "reasonable fear of bodily injury", either because he
is white, a Trump supporter or a Conservative, and that his young children more than
likely will pay the price if he is to continue his claims using his true identity.
7. CONCLUSION
The Court erred when it misconstrued the meaning of “Exceptional Case” under
the Megless Doctrine when it refers to the entire case as needing to be exceptional,
applied an improper standard of proof in analyzing “exceptional” under Megless,
applied an improper standard of proof when determining “reasonable” fear and
weighed the facts in record improperly causing improper judgment and then compelled
the Appellant to review his true identity after notice which violated Appellant’s statutory
or constitutional rights to an appeal and not within the Courts own evidentiary rules.
The Court used a higher standard of proof than the preponderance of evidence
standard required. Under the preponderance standard, the burden of proof is met when
the party with the burden convinces the fact finder that there is a greater than 50%
chance that the claim is true.
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The [Anon Order] establishes an entirely new and erroneous legal principle and
precedent that would require litigants to demonstrate a nearly impossible bar of "near
death" or "actual harm" in order to proceed anonymously out of fear from retaliation.
The [Compulsion Order] set a new standard and precedent in that any Doe or
Anonymous in cases like this, the litigant would lose his appeal rights as the judge would
be able to force disclosure, like it has here, before any review from the Appeals Court.
On all the evidence adduced in this case and on the basis that the logic in
“drawing inferences from evidence to test hypotheses and justify conclusions”,
Appellant has established beyond the “preponderance of evidence” standard, that if his
name is revealed, the probability of him or his family suffering severe harm is
reasonable. Appellant has shown "both ( 1) a fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear
of severe harm is reasonable and that there are exceptional circumstances justifying
anonymity. The Appellant has met the relevant standards of the Megless test, and the
Court applied too stringent a burden of proof.
The Court failed to apply the Megless test correctly and/or completely and to
fully review and weigh the “record of facts in this case”, of which the truth or validity
is not disputed or denied, stands unrebutted, uncontroverted and unchallenged and it’s
decisions should be remanded.
The need to protect Appellant and his young family’s privacy and safety during
this lawsuit easily outweighs the presumption of judicial openness codified in Rule 10(a).
Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2003).
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Record of this case demonstrates bias against the Appellant and in favor of
Twitter. For the past year, the Court has danced around the Twitter’s self-admitted
Default [See TAB B- 3], and the fact that Section §230 does not provide a safe harbor
from race discrimination claims which are not “Good Faith”. This bias by the Court
dogs and bullies the Appellant for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) violation, but at the same time
on behalf of the Billion Dollar Twitter, ignores evidence in record, ignored and
disregarded N.H. Law, State and Federal precedents, official pro hac vice rules of the
Court and instituted and applied illegal rulemaking policies, implored delay tactics and,
failed to address subject matter jurisdiction ignoring Appellant’s numerous pleas for
standing and then knowingly dismissed the case without jurisdiction or stripped
jurisdiction. The Court has also relied upon the illegal document [MTD, at 3], in the
[Anon Order].
If these Orders are allowed to stand, it will stain this Court and further stain the
Court below. These Orders set new precedent and make new laws. Under these new
“Laws”, if your name is Twitter, or if you are an attorney for COIE, you don’t need to
bother with any pro hac vice rules, and can ignore State laws and other legal precedents
and official rules of the Court and practice and plead however you deem fit. Litigants
can still motion a Court for anonymity, but the judge is now free to ignore their
reasoning behind their fears of retaliation, and if you don’t like it, well the statutory
right to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is gone too. Rule 3 of Notice and the years of
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precedent behind general pleading will be lost. Cannons will be meaningless. The Steel
Co.-Ruhrgas rule is obliterated, and federal judges can now make orders without subject
matter jurisdiction and, regardless of any Appeals Court jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Appellant here has met the standard of clear and convincing evidence that an
unwritten pro hac vice policy existed and that fraud upon the Court was committed by
Johnstone, McAuliffe and Twitter. Appellant has met the preponderance of evidence
standard that the Court was in fact bias in favor of Twitter and granted Twitter and
Twitter’s counsel special privileges, and has also met the preponderance standard of
Megless.
Both judges failed to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed prior
to adjudicating upon the merits of the case.
Johnstone’s legislative act of promulgating the unofficial rule(s) or policy, or
executive acts of administrating alternative admission procedures and McAuliffe’s
unconstitutional predisposed orders were taken under mere color of law and not by
virtue of office.
McAuliffe’s act(s) of dismissing the entire case, were oppressive, violated the
rights of the Appellant, and reeks of unnecessary harshness and severity, especially after
notice of appeal. McAuliffe was predisposed to deny Appellant’s [Default Motion, at 7],
as the unofficial policies may be exposed.
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At a minimum, the evidence and facts demonstrate a “unity of purpose or a
common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement.”
between the Court, Twitter and Twitter’s Counsel, Am. Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781,
810 (1946), and that Appellant was deprived of Constitutional and federally protected
rights, to a predisposed, non-prejudicial or non-bias forum. Murphy v. Mount Carmel High
School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1191 (7th Cir. 1976). McAuliffe, Johnstone, Twitter and Twitter’s
counsel positively or tacitly came to a “mutual understanding” to try to accomplish a
common and unlawful plan which influenced, obstructed, and impeded the due
administration of justice of the Appellant’s Case. This mutual understanding was
designed for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating Appellant’s
case in any manner possible, with the intent to deny and deprive Appellant the equal
protection, or equal privileges of the law, or to knowingly injure him or his property for
lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce federal and state racial discrimination laws
of contract and public accommodation against Twitter. [V. Appendix I, Acts by Judges),
page 6].
Twitters material false statements were designed to mislead, as Eck, through his
e-mail, [TAB B-3], admitted from the start that Schwarz was not authorized to be before
the Court on June 1, 2020. Lawyers have a positive duty to refrain from intentional
tortious acts. Twitters court actions deliberately inflicted severe emotional distress upon
the Appellant by interfering with his civil rights, conspiring against him and blatantly
abusing the legal process thereby causing him physical injuries on top of the original
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racial discrimination suffered. Twitters' conduct can be characterized as deliberate,
intentional, wrongful, unlawful, willful, extreme, outrageous, distressful and
demonstrates a determination to inflict punishment, loss, or pain onto the Appellant
which were motivated by evil motive or intent. See Irizarry v. Quiros, 722 F.2d 869, 872
(1st Cir. 1983).
Appellant was forced to bring his Case under extremely prejudicial circumstances
and was injured directly as a result of independent acts of misconduct inspired by this
mutual agreement. Appellant is a reasonable person who has been forced to expend
countless hours, spend thousands of dollars, in his honest efforts and attempts to
rectify the entire matter, to protect and defend his liberty and due process rights and
privileges- and should not be treated as a second-class citizen. The Appellant has
suffered emotional distress, loss of self-esteem, mental anguish, and other intangible
harms such as loss of bargaining power to negotiate any settlement, and through no
fault of his own.
The Court should have never looked at Twitter’s [MTD, at 3] because it was void
from its conception. Twitter gained considerable leverage in secretly knowing and
concealing that most of the Court justices were and still are biased in [its] favor.
Appellant’s chances of returning to the lower Court and receiving a Constitutional
unbiased tribunal would seem nil, unlikely, and fruitless, as the Court, and most of its
judges, will now be further biased against the Appellant and still in favor of Twitter.
Without severe sanctions, the Court will not be able to deter future similar criminality
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such as taking over a U.S. Federal Court. See [V. Appendix I, (Twitter major benefactor
of scheme), page 5]. Twitter’s bogus Key Bank and Notice arguments demonstrate that
they only way Twitter won any argument was with the Courts biased help. In all its
submittals to the Court, Twitter never mentioned the 67 times prior that the Court
allowed this type of illegal behavior, because it enjoyed the benefits and was complicit
in the court fraud.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Appellant, prays that this Appeals Court:
Reverse ALL of the Courts’ Orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
Reverse the [Rule 60 Order], as Appellant’s [Rule 60 Motion] was sufficient to
demonstrate a bias and prejudiced court by a preponderance of the evidence standard
or for fraud upon the Court with clear and convincing evidence which voids all Court
Orders under either Rule(s) 60(b)(4), 60(b)(6) or 60(d)(3);
Reverse the [Default Order], and the [MFR Order], and ALL remaining Orders as void
for lack of an unbiased tribunal under Rule 60(b)(4);
Reverse the [Default Order], and the [MFR Order], and ALL remaining Orders the
product of fraud , and void for fraud upon the Court under Rule 60(b)(6) or Rule 60(d);
Reverse the [Rule 60 Order] as McAuliffe neglected to recuse himself;
Render and grant [Strike Motion, at 14];
Render Twitters [MTD, at 3], void ab initio;
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Render and grant [Default Motion, at 7] as [MTD, at 3] was illegally submitted, void ab
initio and therefore not answered within the time prescribed is a non-conforming
defense under Rule 12;
Reverse the [Compulsion Order], the [Stayed Order], and the 10/6/202 Order as the
Court was stripped of Jurisdiction;
Reverse the [Anon Order];
Render and grant [Anon Motion, at 15], and allow Appellant to proceed anonymously;
Render default judgment against Twitter in the punitive amount of $305,453,400.00[5]
which is equivalent to 30 days income to punish Twitter and to deter others from similar
conduct in compromising and corrupting the Court and destroying the judicial
machinery of the Federal Courts of the United States.
Respectfully,
/s/ Sensa Verogna
Appellant Plaintiff, Anonymously as Sensa Verogna
[email protected]
_______________________
[50] Twitter 2020 revenue was $3,716,350,000* or $10,181,780 per day x 30 days =
$305,453,400. *https://www.statista.com/statistics/274568/quarterly-revenue-of-
twitter/
Page 96 of 97

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed this 8th
day of July 2021 in the State of New Hampshire.
/s/ Sensa Verogna
[email protected]
VII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 8th day of July 2021, the foregoing document was made
upon the Appellee, through its attorneys of record to Jonathan M. Eck of Orr & Reno
P.A., 45 S. Main Street, Concord, New Hampshire, 03301, via First Class Mail.
Page 97 of 97

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH
TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE
REQUIREMENTS AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMENTS
This brief complies with type-volume limits because, excluding the parts of the
document exempted by Fed. R. App. R. 32(f) (cover page, disclosure statement, table
of contents, table of citations, statement regarding oral argument, signature block,
certificates of counsel, addendum, attachments), as it contains 24,983 words. See Fed.
R. App. P. 28.1(e),29(a)(5), 32(a)(7)(B) & 32(f). (See ORDER entered. Upon
consideration, plaintiff-appellant Sensa Verogna's motion seeking leave to file an
oversized consolidated brief is allowed. Appellant may file an oversized brief containing
up to 25,000 words. [20-1933, 20-2005, 20-2091, 21-1317].
This brief complies with the typeface and type style requirements because this
brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word font
size 14 ant type style Garamond and in compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5),
32(a)(6).
Appellant’s brief and appendix are timely. See ORDER granting motion to
extend time to file brief and appendix filed by Appellant Sensa Verogna. Brief and
appendix due 07/14/2021 for Appellant Sensa Verogna. [20-1933, 20-2005, 20-2091,
21-1317].
vi.
Respectfully,
Dated: July 8th, 2021
/s/ Sensa Verogna
[email protected]

vi.
ATTACHED APPENDIX II-
EXHIBITS TABS A, B, C AND D
No. 4 Appeal- Case No. 20-2091, Lack of Jurisdiction TAB A
1. [Appellant’s] Motion and MOL to Join or

Consolidate Related Appeals, Case No. 20-2005.
Document: 00117671219 Filed: 11/19/2020………………………………..….Pge. 1
2. [Appellant’s] Reply to Twitters Response to

Appellant’s Second Motion to Consolidate Related
Appeals, Case No. 20-1933 Document: 00117675773
Filed: 12/02/2020………………………………………………….……...…. Pge. 13
3. Plaintiff’s Complaint, at 1.3……………………………………...……...….. Pge. 22
4. PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT, AT 1.7,

Bon Appetit Management Co…….……………………………………….….. Pge. 79
5. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981- Equal Rights…………………………...………..…. Pge. 80
6. Title 42 Section 2000a- Public Accommodation………………………….... Pge. 82
7. Appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal…………………………….…..…. Pge. 84
8. Hypothetical Statutory Jurisdiction

by Joshua S. Stillman………………………………………………………..... Pge. 88
vii
No. 5 Appeal- Case No. 20-2091, Lack of Jurisdiction TAB B
1. Plaintiff’s Dkt 7 Request for Twitter

Default by Clerk and Dkt. 7.1
Declaration…..………………………………………………..…………….. Pge. 95
2. Plaintiff’s Dkt 14. Motion to Strike

Answer Motion to Dismiss and Dkt. 14.2
MOL and Dkt. 14.3 Declaration……………………………..…………….... Pge. 100
3. Plaintiff’s Dkt. 7.2 Exhibit

Jonathan Eck E-Mail…………………………………………….………..… Pge. 117
4. Appellant’s Dkt 39 and Dkt. 39.1 Motion

to Reconsider Default and MOL…………………………………………… Pge. 118
5. Plaintiff’s Dkt. 74. Rule 60b Motion to

Set Aside Orders……………………………………………………………. Pge. 145
6. Plaintiff’s Dkt 74.1 Rule 60b

Attached Exhibits………………………………………………………...… Pge. 164
7. Appellant’s Motion to Consolidate #5 Appeal,

Void and Fraud Upon the Court……………………………………….…… Pge. 240
8. 28 USC 2072- Rule Powers………………………………………………. Pge. 261
9. § 1.07 Rule Making………………………………………………………. Pge. 262
10. N.H. RSA 311:7 Prohibition……………………………………………. Pge. 264
11. Local Rule 83.1- 83.2 Bar of District Court…………………………….. Pge. 265

vii
No. 5 Appeal- Continued TAB B
12. Local Rule 83.7 Limited Representation

by Counsel……………………………………………………………….…. Pge. 268
13. Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.5…………………………..…….. Pge. 269
14. Fed. R. of Civ. P., Rule 55…………………………………………….… Pge. 273
15. Local Rule 55.1 Default…………………………………………………. Pge. 275
16. Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution-

Due Process………………………………………………………….……... Pge. 276
17. Advocacy v. Deception…………………………………………………..Pge. 279
CONTINUED BELOW

vii
No. 2 Appeal- Case No. 20-2005, Stripped Jurisdiction TAB C
1. Appellant’s Reply to Twitters Response
To Twitters Response to Appellant’s Motion to
Join or Consolidate Related Appeals, Case No.
20-1933 Document: 00117663779, Filed:
10/30/2020………………………………………………………………..... Pge. 283
2. NOTES OF RULES—1979 AMENDMENT-

Notice of Appeal…………………………………………………………… Pge. 291
No. 1 Appeal- Case No. 20-1933, Megless Doctrine TAB D
1. Plaintiff’s Emergency Request for

Permission to File Objections and a
Hearing on the Motions. Dkt.. 55
and Dkt. 55.1………………………………………………..……………… Pge. 293
2. Appellant’s Appeal Motion to Stay

Compulsion, Case No. 20-1933
Document: 00117648115 Filed 9/25/2020…………………………………. Pge. 329
3. Appellant’s Reply to Twitters Response

To Twitters Response to Appellant’s Motion to
Join or Consolidate Related Appeals, Case No.
20-1933 Document: 00117663779, Filed:
10/30/2020………………………………………………………………..... Pge. 343

vii

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Case Nos. 20-1933, 20-2005, 20-2091 and 21-1317

Appeal from the United States District Court

Appellant Plaintiff, PRO SE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

ADDENDUM- ORDERS OF THE DISTRICT COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..iv

APPENDIX- EXHIBITS OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . .v

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE……...…………………………………….2

III. GENERAL ARGUMENTS…………..………...…….………………..…..7

A. 4th Appeal- No. 20-2091- Clear Absence of Jurisdiction

5. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION….…………………...……12

6. DIVERSITY UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1332……………………………..…14

10. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT CASES UNDERMINE

HYPOTHETICAL STATUTORY JURISDICTION………………… …20

11. CLAIMS AND DEFENSES……………………...……… ………… .22

B. 5th Appeal- No. 21-1317- Void Judgment/Fraud on Court

(1) Generally Under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)……………………….33

(2) Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 60(b)(4).………………………………..…….36

(3) Under Rule 60(b)(6)…………………………………………….38

(4) Under Rule 60(d)(3)…………………………………………….39

(5) Review for Plain or Basic or Fundamental Error…………..……40

5. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS……………………….……… 41

6. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS OF PROOF……………….……….. 42

(1) Void Judgments and Rule 60(b)(4)………………………………42

(2) Fraud Upon the Court and Rules

60(b)(6) and 60(d)(3)…………………………………………….…43

8. LOCAL DISTRICT COURT RULES………..…………….………….49

9. PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS………………………………………50

10. UNOFFICIAL PRO HAC VICE RULES AND POLICIES……...…..53

11. APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS……………………….…..54

(1) Fraud Upon the Court………………………………….………59

(2) Bias Orders of the Court…………………………….……….….60

(3) Aberrational Behavior…………………………………….….…63

(4) Ex-Parte Communication………………………………...……..64

(5) Defendant, Appellee, Twitter………………………..……...…..65

C. 2nd Appeal- No. 20-2005- Stripped Jurisdiction

6. CONTENT AND RULE 3 NOTICE……………………………...…..71

D. 1st Appeal- No. 20-1933- Megless Doctrine

VII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVCE…………………..………………………….97

ATTACHED APPENDIX- EHIBITS TABS A, B, C AND D……………..…...vi.

“Schwartz” Julie E. Schwartz, Partner Attorney of Perkins Coie and Counsel

“Mrazik” Ryan Mrazik, Partner Attorney of Perkins Coie and Counsel

“Johnstone” Andrea K. Johnstone, Federal Magistrate Judge for the United

“COIE” Perkins Coie LLP. and Counsel for Twitter.

Accord Rowe v. Coal Corp., 197 Va.

Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S.

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97

Evans v. Corporate Services, 207

Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) 13

Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178 (1962) 74

Ins. Corp. of Ir. Ltd. v. Compagnie des

Klaprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601,

Marrese v. American Academy of

Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136--137, 75

National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.

Sinochem Int 'I Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'!

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579,

Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886,

Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v.

Davila-Alvarez v. Escue/a de Medicina