The Paradox of Buddhist Wisdom

Author(s): Donald W. Mitchell

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), pp. 55-67
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1397907
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Donald W. Mitchell The paradox of Buddhist wisdom

For a number of centuries, beginning about 100 B.C., Indian Mahayana

Buddhists developed a literature which explicated what they considered to be
the nature of "Perfect Wisdom" (prajhnipdramiti). This concept of Wisdom
became of central importance in Mahayana Indian Buddhism and entered into
the Hindu tradition through its development by Gaudapada and Sarmkara-
carya.1 Outside the borders of India the concept had influence within the
diverse cultures of Tibet, Mongolia, China, and Japan. The concept itself was
originally developed in South India where there was most likely an influence
from the Greek Wisdom tradition.2 Indeed, one can find in the Mahayana
tradition the same concern for the relation of theory and knowledge, on the one
hand, to practice and virtue, on the other, that was emphasized in the Platonic
and Aristotelian traditions. Also one finds the Buddhist Wisdom Literature
stressing, much like the Stoics, the soteriological effect of Wisdom as it liberates
man from the futile emotional attachments and passions caused by ignorance
and leads him to a state of higher freedom.
However, this does not mean that the Indian Mahayana Buddhists were
adopting the particular positions developed by the Greeks concerning these
matters. In fact, their concept of Perfect Wisdom entails both a unique way of
relating knowledge to virtue and of conceiving liberation. It is the uniqueness
of this position that I would like to explore in the article. More specifically I
want to focus on what seems to be a paradox at the heart of their position: a
paradox that involves the status of the Mahayana Buddhist "Man of Wisdom,"
the Bodhisattva (one whose essence is Perfect Wisdom). On the one hand the
Bodhisattva vows to practice compassion by leading all beings to full nirvana
with nothing left behind. On the other hand, it is also said that there are ulti-
mately no beings to be led nor any Bodhisattva to lead nor any nirvana to be led
to: "That which is striven after does not exist, he who strives does not exist,
that wherewith he strives does not exist."3 Thus, it would seem that the Buddhist
affirms both A (the Bodhisattva with Wisdom strives to lead all beings to
nirviana) and not-A (there is no Bodhisattva, no Wisdom, no beings no nirvana).
This, of course, would be a blatant contradiction. How can bodhisattvas,
Wisdom, beings, and nirvana both exist and not exist at the same time? Indeed,
the Buddha commented upon this paradox with the question: "How should I
instruct and admonish a non-creation in a perfect wisdom which is also a non-
creation ?"4

With this paradox in mind I would like to go on to an examination of the

metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions behind this Mahayana
Buddhist concept of Wisdom as it was originally presented in the prajhd-
paramitd literature. My hope is to show thereby that there is a way of escaping
the dilemma and then to go on to show how such a position thus clarified has
specific soteriological implication. Since this concept of Wisdom is basic to

Donald W. Mitchell is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University.

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 56 Mitchell

Mahayana Buddhism and not part of the Theravada tradition of Buddhism,

my use of the term "Buddhist," unless otherwise indicated, will refer to the
Mahayana tradition only. Let us begin then with the metaphysical basis of this
concept of Perfect Wisdom.

Before the prajiiparamitd tradition developed, Buddhists assumed that

reality could be analyzed into a number of fundamental elements called
dharmas. These factors of existence are the essential and ultimate facts of the
universe. There are both psychic and somatic dharmic factors or "events"
(for example, volition and color). The universe is a process of these momentary
events or dharmas as they interact in an interconnected causal nexus. An
analysis of the various types of dharmas has been given in a number of sources
and need not concern us here.5 What is relevant to our present consideration
is that the early Buddhists claimed that each dharma has an "own-being"
(svabhdva) which can be known through the attainment of wisdom (prajna).
By "own-being" the early Buddhists meant that each dharma has an essential
nature which in turn has its own mark (sva-laksana) or characteristic. Further
the doctrine entails that this essential nature is a kind of independent ultimate
fact in its own right: svabhiva entails a thing existing by virtue of its own-being.
It is against the svabhdva theory that the prajhnparamitd literature directed
their theory of emptiness (sunyata). True wisdom according to this view "sees"
that the dharmas, or elements of existence, are empty of any own-being
(svabhdvasuinya). It is important to note that the concept of emptiness qualifies
the elements of existence and does not entail the metaphysical claim that the
world is ultimately Void or Nothingness. Rather it posits that each element of
our experience is empty of any essential nature that is an ultimate and inde-
pendent fact. In arguing for this position the prajhdpdramitd points to the
Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada). Simply put,
this doctrine makes the empirical claim that all beings arise or originate only
in dependence on something else. The conclusion drawn from this is that all
things (ultimately all dharmas) are what they are only through a relation with
something else.6 A thing's existence is dependent upon a multiplicity of other
things. And since the existence of each entity is defined by its coarising with
other entities, it is thereby empty of any independent own-being.
So the Man of Wisdom, when surveying the world of dependent origination,
"does not see any dharma that is being produced without a cause...."7
Dharmas are not, as the svabhdva theory claims, independent but are dependent
upon other causal factors and conditions for their existence and are therefore
wholly contingent. Own-being is an empty concept insofar as it implies indepen-
dence, and dharmas are empty of any such own-being: "No dharma acting in
causal connection has a being of its own, because of conditional co-produc-
tion."8 A correlary to this position is the claim that the dharmas are not only

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57

empty of any independent essential nature but that the qualities, character-
istics, or attributes of each entity are determined by the entity's relation to
other entities. It is in this sense that the dharmas are said to be signless (animitta).
The Bodhisattva sees the absence of separate marks in all dharmas insofar as he
realizes in Perfect Wisdom that the qualities (marks, signs) of all entities are
not separate from the relation of that entity to other entities. So when the
prajhdppramitd speaks of a Perfect Wisdom that goes beyond all distinctions
to a state where "there is no discrimination at all,"9 this does not refer to a
merging with some primoridal One. Rather it simply means that given the empty
and signless nature of things, the Man of Wisdom does not distinguish entities
as independent and separate in terms of either essence or attributes.
The prajihdpramitd follows the implication of this postulate to the con-
clusion that all dharmas have "one single essential and original nature (which
is just the absence of a differentiated nature)."'0 That is, they claim that
all dharmas are the same. Indeed, if there is to be any independence between
two entities, it must be in terms of either their essence or their attributes. These
two possibilities are denied by the positing of the categories of emptiness and
signless, and these two categories are what is implied by the concept of Sameness
(samatva). This concept then does not imply, as some would have it, that all
dharmas ultimately merge in a monistic One; rather it means that all dharmas
are the same in that they are all empty of svabhdva. This interpretation must
also be applied to the famous Buddhist category of Nonduality: "Those who
course in duality cannot grow in merit. All the foolish common people are
supported by duality, and their merit cannot grow. But a Bodhisattva courses
in non-duality.""" Coursing in Nonduality means that the Bodhisattva
realizes that entities are not independent from each other but owe their existence
to an interdependent nexus of relations. That is, Nonduality refers to the
contention that entities cannot be divided or separated, dualistically, into self-
subsisting entities. But again this does not mean that they merge into a nondual
Oneness.

Once we understand the claim that all dharmas are ultimately empty of any
distinction, either essential or accidental, that would separate one dharma from
another, the question arises as to what this non-duality of things ultimately
is like. A number of symbols are popularly applied to this condition. There
are two basic symbols which are important to our present analysis; namely,
Suchness and Unborn. However, we must keep in mind that the true condition
of things is ultimately ineffable and these are only symbols.
Suchness (tathata) is a positive term used as a synonym for the empty, non-
dual nature of the dharmas. Suchness is the object of the Wisdom of the
Bodhisattva. When wisdom goes beyond the distinctions and discriminations
that seemingly separate the dharmas into independent entities it sees their
Suchness. The Bodhisattva is able "to look through to the Suchness of all
dharmas, to the Suchness of the Dharmadhatu."'2 This single Suchness is the

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58 Mitchell

true reality of all dharmas since, given non-duality, all things have the "same"
reality.13 The category of Suchness is used in the prajhdipramitd texts in such a
way that the underlying metaphysical nondual Sameness discussed above is
clearly shown:

The Suchness of the Tathagata [the Buddha] is the Suchness of all dharmas,
they are both one single Suchness, not two or divided. Unborn is that Suchness,
and there is nothing of which it is not the Suchness; that is why it is not two or
divided. It is in this sense that the Elder Subhuti is born after the image of the
Tathagata. 1 4

Suchness as "the Sublime That which really is,"15 is the true nondual nature
of all things. Further, all things in their Suchness are as pure as the Tathagata
in that they, like the Tathagata, are empty of own-being. Suchness then ulti-
mately refers to the famous Mahayana identity of nirviana and satimsra. Perfect
Wisdom that has gone altogether beyond transcends all distinctions including
even that of nirvana and sathsdra. The adept Bodhisattva sees "the identity
of defilement [samhsara] and purification [nirvana]."l6 Since the Bodhisattva
sees all dharmas as empty of independence, sarsaric becoming and nirvanic
quietude are not separate realms. They are both empty of own-being. This
identity of nirvana and sarhsdra will be discussed in detail later. However,
there is another term in an earlier passage that is of extreme interest. The
term "Unborn" is given as a synonym for Suchness. This concept brings us to
the heart of prajhdpiramitd ontology, and it is here that we can see the fuller
implication of Suchness. The term Unborn refers to the central category of
nonproduction (anutpdda).
The category of anutpdda is used to denote that the dharmas are unproduced
or unborn: "just as one speaks of a self, and yet, absolutely, a self is unproduced
so also all inner and outer dharmas are unproduced."17 The word "self"
for Buddhists is an empty concept-it does not refer to anything that is ulti-
mately real. So, too, the words "inner dharma" and "outer dharmas" refer to
nothing that is ultimately real. These dharmas have ultimately never been
produced into existence as independent and self-existing entities: "For all
dharmas have not come, and from that situation (in emptiness) they do not
depart. And why? Because absolutely form does not exist; how could its coming
and going take place?"18 If this is the case then the independent objects we
perceive are not ultimately real. They are like the objects in a dream or an
illusion: "Because a perverted view is a dream ... It is a perverted view on the
part of the foolish common people ... likewise there is no Arhat, no Pratyeka-
buddha, no Bodhisattva, no Tathagata. And why? Because all dharmas have
non-existence for own-being, they are non-produced, have not come about."'9
Indeed, it is this category of anutpdda that brings us to the culmination of our
analysis of the metaphysical presuppositions of the prajhdiparamitd concept of
Wisdom. We have seen that the Bodhisattva realizes that given dependent

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59

origination all elements of existence are empty of either an independent essential

nature (svabhdva) or any marks or qualities (laksana) that would distinguish
one as independent from another. Given that all things are in a causal nexus of
interdependence, the Bodhisattva speaks of the sameness of all dharmas and
their ultimate nondual nature. This nature is referred to as Suchness, which is
now finally described as unborn or unproduced. Given this latter concept,
referred to as the Single Principle, the produced world of independent multi-
plicity is in turn referred to with such similes as dream, illusion, mirage, and
magical creation.20 These similes are put forward to address the obvious
question that arises at this point: How is it that things appear to us as they do in
ordinary experience? How is the world of multiplicity "produced" from this
"unproduced" Suchness? To analyze the answer to these questions we must
turn to the epistemological presuppositions involved. To maintain their
position of metaphysical nondualism and account for the phenomenal world of
sense-perception, the prajhiipramitd must make an appearance-reality dis-
tinction which posits an epistemological dualism. And by an analysis of this
epistemic presupposition we can put the earlier metaphysical categories into
their proper context and reach a fuller understanding of the concept of Perfect
Wisdom.

II

Perennial epistemological considerations concern the origin, nature, and

limits of our knowledge. Buddhist philosophy in general has treated these topics
in great detail, and the prajhdapramitd literature is no exception. In terms of
our question about the production of the world of independent multiplicity, the
prajhiapramita claims that our knowledge of the seemingly separate and distinct
objects of sense experience is a product of something called avidyd (usually
translated as ignorance) and are thereby ultimately an illusion. The Sanskrit
word avidyd derives from the root vid, to know, which also has the meaning to
find. Thus a-vidyd as not-knowing may also imply the belief in something
that is not-found or, by extension, does not-exist.21 Thus avidyd brings about a
belief in objects that are not found in reality; that is, that do not ultimately
exist. The dharmas are in fact these objects produced by avidyd: "[they] do not
exist except for ignorance, they are called (the result of) ignorance."22
The question arises here as to what one means when he says that the elements
of existence are the "result" of ignorance, or avidya. The kind of ignorance im-
plied by avidyd would seem to be more than just a lack of knowledge. It implies
a cognitive power that constructs things that ultimately do not exist. Given
the simile that the world is like a dream, it would seem that this power is akin
to the faculty of productive imagination which also produces things which are
not to be found in reality. Just as the imagination produces a world of dreams
and daydreams, so the world of sense perception is a kind of dream world-an
illusion-conjured up by a similar type of false discrimination (vikalpa):

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60 Mitchell

"The Prajiiaparamiti now claim that discrimination (vikalpa) is the co

ignorance and that the empirical world ... is a thought-construction de
from false discrimination."23 Ignorance (avidyd) implies false discrimin
(vikalpa). The world of independent multiplicity is a mental construc
based on ignorance as a discrimination of objects that ultimately do not
The world is like a "magical creation" constructed of dharmas "which fail to
produced."24 There is but one reality-the Suchness of existence. Howe
ignorant thought construction produces from it, or better, discriminates o
it the empirical world of independent self-subsisting entities. What is born
produced is so by false discrimination (vikalpa). Vikalpa superimposes,
were, phenomenal discriminations onto reality. The nature of an ord
empirical experience is then that of an illusion. We do not see things as
really are but as conditioned by false discrimination. Given this origin, ord
sense experience is limited in the sense that it can never know what is real
only what is constructed by the human mind.
It ought to be obvious by now that there is a certain similarity betw
Buddhist epistemology and that of Immanuel Kant. While the prajhipir
does not go into any great detail as to how the mind constructs the phenom
world, the general phenomena-noumena distinction is affirmed. It shou
noted that other Buddhist schools do devote much effort to an analysis of t
dynamics of the mental-construction process; however, those analyses need
concern us here.25 There is, however, a major difference between Budd
and Kant. Kant felt that there is no faculty by which one can intuit noume
and thus man is limited to the experience of phenomena. Buddhism, on
other hand, posits the existence of a type of intuition by which one can com
know reality. The coming to know reality is the achievement of Wisdom. T
type of awareness, which is the Wisdom of the Bodhisattva, is referred
prajha. While vikalpa gives us the empirical world of independent multiplici
prajiic gives us insight into nondual Suchness.
Prajhd is described in the prajhiiipramitd literature as "an act of consciou
ness which has none of the skandhas for an objective support...."26 Tha
prajhd is a form of conscious awareness which does not involve body se
feelings, perceptions, volitions, or thoughts. The ordinary modes of awaren
entailed by these five skandhas imply duality; that is, a discrimination (vik
of independence between perceiver and objects perceived. Prajnda on the oth
hand does not employ these faculties and is thereby said to "transcend"
dualities. Further, the empirical world which is constituted of these dua
fades from awareness. Perfect Wisdom comes "through a non-viewing o
world. Here the perfection of wisdom indicates that the world is empty
One's awareness is only of Suchness described negatively as emptiness, signl
wishless, uneffected, nonproduced, unborn, and nonexistent. Positively stat
it is said to be the essential nature of the universe which in the end is one's
own essential nature. Here again we must be careful, for this is not to say

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61

that one sees his essence as absorbed into some monistic One. What is meant
is that one simply sees that his essential nature is empty of svabhava and so is
the essential nature of all other things.
The claim that there are two modes of awareness (vikalpa and prajhi) each
with its distinctive type of knowledge is later developed by the great Buddhist
philosopher Nagarjuna into the Madhyamika doctrine of the Two Truths.
Here in the prajhdpdramita, the basis of such a doctrine is being established.
The prajhnapramitd makes a distinction between truth from the standpoint of
ultimate reality and truth in a conventional sense.28 Vikalpa produces, in a
conventional sense, independent dharmas which in ultimate reality are not
produced. Wisdom (prajha) is the awareness that the empirical or phenomenal
world thus produced is from the highest point of view empty of the distinctions
and discriminations that ordinarily make it up. The Bodhisattva sees that the
true nature of all dharmas is without modification or discrimination and that
any empirical distinction has no existence (apart from ignorance.)29 The true
nature of all dharmas is Suchness. The dharmas are not distinct from Suchness
insofar as their true nature is Suchness. The difference here is again epistemic
and not ontological.
This kind of thinking leads to what is perhaps the most well-known identity
of the prajiiapramitd literature. As stated in the Heart Sitra it is claimed that:

Here [in Wisdom], O Sariputra, form is emptiness and the very emptiness is
form; emptiness does not differ from form, form does not differ from emptiness;
whatever is form that is emptiness, whatever is emptiness, that is form, the
same is true of feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness.30

By vikalpa one perceives the universe as the empirical world of sense perception.
This world of forms has inherent truths analyzed by logic and the sciences.
All claims made by these disciplines are judged to be true or false on the con-
ventional or phenomenal level. Conventional truths are concerned with these
phenomenal forms of the empirical world. By prajha the Bodhisattva sees that
the empirical world, made up of the five skandhas referred to in the preceding
quotation, is empty, that is, is ultimately identical with Suchness. The Suchness
of the phenomenal skandhas, elements, sensefields, dharmas, Tathagatas, and
all beings is "one single Suchness."31 The higher truth, then, refers to the
Bodhisattva's awareness that the empirical world of forms (saisiira) is a
phenomenal appearance which is ultimately empty of svabhava. Nirviina is
gained through this awareness of sarhsdra as being empty of svabhava. Nirvana
is not a separate realm from sarimsra, but is attained by seeing the Suchness
(or emptiness) of sarimsra. One then either knows the world by vikalpa as
sahmsara and is aware of things from the standpoint of a lower truth, or he
knows the world by prajha and is aware of the world from the standpoint of
a higher truth and attains nirviana. In either case it is the same reality that is
being considered. The difference is in the nature of one's awareness of it, and

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62 Mitchell

the state of being that awareness brings (either sarhsaric or nirvanic).

To exemplify this idea, the prajhdpdramita employs a famous simile.
number of passages the dharmas are said to be like "mere names:" "A m
name is all this that is conditioned."32 Or elsewhere, "The dharmas on w
beings seek a false support are mere names and signs; they are not real,
are imagined, artificial adventitious designations which are added to wh
really there."33
This simile can be interpreted in two main ways. First, it can be see
claiming that objects (forms, etc.), like names, do not exist as independ
separate, and discrete entities. In terms of our earlier discussion of vik
both names and dharmas are dependent on mental discrimination for th
existence. But more important than this rather straightforward understand
of the simile, is the interpretation that words are added onto or superimpos
onto what is real by the mind. For example, I (my person) can be referr
by many names: "Don," "son," "father," "teacher," etc. All these names
the same referent, and one would be mistaken if he felt that each referred
a separate individual. In a similar way, it would be wrong to say that all emp
rical entities refer to, or, better in this case, manifest, a separate and indepen
essence. Such is the error of essentialist superimposition. I should here
that for the prajhdpiramita, names function by "pointing out" or "manifest
an object. Names call objects to our attention and manifest them more cl
to us. In so doing, however, they often make us feel that what is pointed
is a separate and independent entity. So in terms of our above exampl
number of names might manifest the various roles my person may ass
(for example, son, father, teacher, etc.), but none of the names refers to an
thing which is independent from what is referred to by the others. In a
manner, the dharma objects that make up our phenomenal world (for examp
trees, houses, books, etc.) owe their seemingly independent subsistence t
conceptual construction of vikalpa. Vikalpa reinforces the belief that the ent
it discriminates are ultimately self-subsisting, and it is here that the illu
arises.
This is not to say that the forms referred to by words do not exist on
conventional or phenomenal level of appearance. Certainly they do. How
from the perspective of Wisdom that goes beyond such appearances th
Buddhists claim, to follow our simile, the Bodhisattva trains in a know
that all objects are like "mere names ... without a corresponding entity.
The Buddha himself warns: "From false discrimination has all arisen, it
mere designation. May you not get attached to a false discrimination!"
And finally the Bodhisattva is cautioned not to imagine "that the gift is
thing, the donor another, the fruit another, the recipient another, [etc.]...."
In this latter quotation we can finally see the basis of the paradoxes qu
at the beginning of this article. That is, the Bodhisattva with compassio
Wisdom strives to lead all sentient beings to nirvana while at the same

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63

realizing by that Wisdom that "that which is striven after does not exist, he
who strives does not exist, that wherewith he strives does not exist."37 In other
words, in terms of the lower truth of phenomenal appearance there is a Bod-
hisattva who strives to take all sentient beings to nirvana. But in terms of the
higher truth of Perfect Wisdom, the Bodhisattva, sentient beings, and nirvaina
are all empty of svabhava; they ultimately do not exist as independent, discrete,
separate entities. It is with this understanding of the paradox that the dilemma
stated at the beginning of this article can be resolved.
Indeed, given two truths as exclusive as has been outlined above, such
paradoxes are inevitable. For example, consider the Tathigata himself. It is
only in terms of referring to the lower truth that one can make empirical
statements about the birth, attainment, teaching, and death of the Tathdgata:
"If we take such statements as 'the tathagata continues to exist after death,'
'the tathagata does not continue to exist after death' ... then these statements
refer to the skandhas only."38 The categories discussed in this quotation and
the entities referred to are part of phenomenal experience. However, in terms
of what the universe is really like these statements are meaningless. They
derive their meaning only in the phenomenal context, one does not "look in
non-production [reality] for a Tathagata, nor for his turning of the wheel of
Dharma."39 This is the reason behind the silence of the Buddha when asked
metaphysical questions.
Given the above metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions ground-
ing the Buddhist concept of Wisdom, the dilemma it seemed to entail no longer
poses such a problem. Indeed, given this doctrine of two truths and the meta-
physical position it entails, many Buddhist paradoxes even down to those of
modern-day Zen Buddhism are more understandable. This, of course, does
not imply that the Buddhist position is a valid one. In fact, the whole position
stands or falls on the veracity of the prajhn awareness. The metaphysical position
established earlier and its epistemic correlate are derived from prajhd awareness.
From a critical point of view, the central question is whether there is a prajhn
awareness and, if so, whether the prajhdparamitd interpretation is a valid one.
The first question must be assumed in the Buddhists favor. Empirically one
cannot deny that Buddhists do have and have had for thousands of years an
experience they refer to as prajna. However, the second question is more pro-
blematic. Restated it asks whether the awareness achieved is one of reality or
of some mind-created illusion. If the former is the case, then, perhaps the
positions outlined are correct, if the latter, then it is Suchness that is an illusion
and not the empirical world. The prajhiipiramitd does not present arguments
for the veracity of prajhd awareness, but simply attempts to clarify the above
metaphysical and epistemological positions entailed by that awareness in an
understandable and internally coherent fashion. The Madhyamika school of
Buddhism established by Nagarjuna will later make such a philosophical
attempt to support this position, but an adequate investigation of that attempt

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64 Mitchell

would take us beyond the scope of this article. Let it suffice to say the thrus
of his arguments is reductio in nature; that is, he begins by assuming the ex
tence of the various factors necessary to explain the nature of phenome
experience (for example, time, space, causality, material objects, etc.). He then
shows that such assumptions lead to absurd results. Thus, he concludes t
it is the empirical world which is illusory. But let me stress again that this d
not entail a nihilism where nothing exists, rather only that it is logically im
possible for the world to exist as it is normally perceived by vikalpa. Of cour
the argument can always be made that just because vikalpa is invalidated
mode of knowledge does not logically entail that prajha is thereby validat
Prajhd could also be another type of illusory awareness. In other words, t
seems to be no logical necessity that there be only two truths. Perhaps th
is a third, in the light of which the other two might be relegated to illusion
and it would seem that this process could conceivably go on ad infinitum.
These problems are the perennial considerations that arise whenever th
are knowledge-claims made on the basis of direct experience. Wherever s
claims are made, the questions of verification and objectivity ultimately arise
However, rather than pursue these broader philosophical questions, I wo
like to continue the specific task at hand and go on to consider some of
soteriological implications of this Buddhist concept of Wisdom.
III

The question arises as to what the Buddhist Man of Wisdom is like. Given
Wisdom how does he live in the phenomenal world that he knows is empty
of ultimate reality? There are two sides to the answer to this question. First is
that the awareness of emptiness leads to an attitude of nonattachment. Empti-
ness is referred to as an antidote. It cures one of a grasping attachment to
worldly concerns by showing that they are ultimately based on empty or false
distinctions. To see the essential nature of phenomenal things "as a no-nature
which has not been brought about" leads to a state where "all points of attach-
ment will then be abandoned."40 The nonapprehension of all dharmas, the
realization that they are like a mirage or a dream leads the Bodhisattva to not
settle down in sarimsra. He does not attempt to appropriate any dharma but
remains unattached and free from them. Wisdom allows him no support in
the phenomenal world. This mode of existence is referred to as nonattachment
or nonappropriation.41
This first side of the character of the Bodhisattva often leads those outside
the tradition to view Buddhist Wisdom as leading to world-denial. However,
there is another side which puts nonattachment in a more positive perspective.
While the Bodhisattva does not appropriate the dharmas, so too, he does not
abandon them either. Perfect Wisdom then entails both "the non-appropriation
and the non-abandonment of all dharmas."42 The reason for this is, again,
twofold. First, abandonment is seen as a negative form of attachment. It implies

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65

that one is attached to the negation of that which is being abandoned. However,
as we discussed earlier, Perfect Wisdom entails the nonduality or sameness of
samsdra and nirvana. (Form is emptiness, enlptiness is form.) There is no other
world for which we could abandon this world. Perfect Wisdom is the awareness
of this world-the only world there is-as it really is in its Suchness and not
as it ordinarily appears to be.
The second reason for the nonabandonment of the phenomenal world is
that Perfect Wisdom gives rise to a deep sense of compassion (karuna). Perfect
Wisdom is Compassionate Wisdom for, while it is aware of the emptiness of
all dharmas, it also is aware that emptiness is not separate from those dharmas
and so continues to distinguish the dharmas in an unattached manner and goes
forth into the world as an agent who effects nirvina for the benefit of all sentient
beings. Manjusri Bodhisattva states that Perfect Wisdom entails that:

One neither approaches the faults of birth-and-death nor longs for the virtues
of Nirvana. For one does not review birth-and death, how much less its faults.
And I do not apprehend Nirvana, how much less will I see its virtues.43

Thus, the Bodhisattva neither attaches himself to things in the world nor
seeks to escape the world. He is in the world but not of the world and seeks
selflessly to help his fellow sentient beings with bliss bestowing hands. All this
must be seen as a rejection of the earlier Buddhist ideal of the Saint (Arhat)
who forsakes the world (saimsdra) for the bliss of some transcendent nirvana.
Given the prajhdpdramitd identity of nirvana and sarhmsra, and their stress on
Compassionate Wisdom, this type of world-denial is considered a lesser religious
goal. Indeed, the Bodhisattva as the Buddhist "man-for-others" presents us
with the high point of the Buddhist religious ideal. I would like to conclude
with a short investigation of the religious implications of this Bodhisattva
ideal. For in terms of soteriology the Bodhisattva's relation to the universe is
uniquely religious.
Perfect Wisdom (prajhnapramitd) is idealized and personified as the "Mother"
of the Tathagata in that it is Wisdom which begets enlightenment (bodhi).44
Like the Greek Sophia, Wisdom is viewed as the great Mother Goddess. She
is the genetrix of enlightenment and truth. And through the aid of the Bod-
hisattvas, she nourishes goodness and beauty in the world. The Bodhisattva
practices perfection (pdramita), with the aim of ridding all sentient beings of
the evils such as depression, fear, hate, and greed. When sentient beings are
happy the Bodhisattva is friendly and joyful. When they are sad, the Bodhisattva
is compassionate. Thus one is called on to seek a mode-of-existence that is
energetic, zestful, and vigorous, full of joy, love, and compassion, and stressing
courage, strength, patience, and charity. All of these virtues are extolled at
length in the sutras. One should create a pleasant and joyful environment for
himself and for others, for pleasant things can be enjoyed without attachment.
It is said that the Buddhist householder should seek "enjoyment of sense

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66 Mitchell

pleasures without settling down in them."45 Further, in such a cultiv

environment one should seek peace and be a "dweller in peace" (arand-vihirin
The religious task then is to manifest Wisdom in the world by a courag
energetic, joyful, loving, and compassionate affirmation of the life and
being of one's fellow sentient beings. Disgust with life and world negation a
seen as cowardly and low-spirited. These attitudes are relegated to the lo
level where one works through his fears in order to gain clarity of understan
but once that clarity has been gained such attitudes dissipate with the conqu
fears: "Near Nirvana even in this life, the saved do not isolate themse
from the world, but become its saviors."46
Thus, through his Wisdom the Bodhisattva sees that all this is Suchness an
that "This perfection is undefiled."47 It is only defiled by false imagin
(vikalpa) that covers it with phenomenal distinctions (skandha-coverings). W
these coverings are stripped away from the transparent luminosity (p
bhasvara) of prajna, one sees that "absolutely defilement does not exist.
Thus, the Bodhisattva compassionately and courageously strives to unco
this Highest Wisdom to all sentient beings. It is in the light of this relig
goal or summum bonum that the above metaphysical and epistemolog
doctrines must be viewed. Indeed, it is my feeling that when this is done, o
can come to appreciate this Buddhist concept of Wisdom as an extrem
unique and profound contribution to the history of philosophical and
ligious thought.

NOTES

1. Edward Conze, "The Ontology of the Prajfiaparamita," Philosophy East and West
(Jul. 1953): 117; hereafter cited as OP.
2. Edward Conze, The Prajahdpramitd Literature (London: Mouton & Co., 1960), p.
3. Edward Conze, trans., Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom 2d ed. (L
The Buddhist Society, 1968), p. 84; hereafter cited as SS.
4. Edward Conze, trans., The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (London: Luzac and Co
p. 182; hereafter cited as LS.
5. See: Theodore H. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism (Calcutta, 19
6. SS, p. 19.
7. LS, p. 492.
8. SS, p. 95.
9. Edward Conze, trans., Abhisamayilahkdra (Rome: 1954) p. 95; hereafter cited as A
see LS, p. 372.
10. A, p. 45.
11. OP,p. 126.
12. LS, p. 15.
13. A, p. 66.
14. LS, p. 381.
15. LS, p. 373.
16. A, pp. 74-75.
17. LS, p. 191.

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67

18. LS, p. 374.

19. LS, p. 569.
20. OP, p. 124.
21. LS, p. xxviii.
22. LS, p. 84.
23. OP, p. 126.
24. SS, p. 81.
25. This whole distinction is analyzed in depth by T.R.V. Murti in The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), chap. 12.
26. LS, p. 357.
27. LS, p. 357.
28. A, p. 71.
29. LS, pp. 71, 75.
30. E. Conze, trans., Buddhist Wisdom Books (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958), p. 81.
31. LS, p. 352.
32. LS, p. 598.
33. OP,p. 112.
34. LS, p. 642.
35. LS, p. 598.
36. LS, pp. 604-605.
37. SS, p. 84.
38. LS,p.351.
39. LS, p. 191.
40. LS, p. 303.
41. LS, p. 42.
42. LS, p. 77.
43. SS, p. 84.
44. LS, p. 348.
45. LS, p. 401.
46. OP, p. 129.
47. LS, p. 317.
48. SS, p. 75. Transparent luminosity is referred to by Conze as "Spirit."

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