G.R. No. 166682. November 27, 2009.

*
NOEL B. BAGTAS, petitioner, vs. HON. RUTH C. SANTOS, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City, and ANTONIO and ROSITA GALLARDO, respondents.
Civil Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; The purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not
limited to the production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus
is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child.—Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court
states that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases where the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the persons entitled thereto. In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas
corpus is not limited to the production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition
for habeas corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering
that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is
insufficient to justify the decision; The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare
of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family
and the youth.—Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a
trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis,  inter alia,
of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence
of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding
custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to
promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.
Same; Same; Same; The Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving
minors: (1) the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor, (2) the respondent is withholding the
rightful custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she be in
custody of the petitioner.—In Sombong, 252 SCRA 663 (1996), the Court laid down three requisites in
petitions for habeas corpus involving minors: (1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor, (2)
the respondent is withholding the rightful custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor
demands that he or she be in the custody of the petitioner. In the present case, these requisites are not
clearly established because the RTC hastily dismissed the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to
the Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  William F. De Los Santos for petitioner.
  Public Attorney’s Office for private respondents.

The Case

This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition
challenges the 11 June 2004 Decision2 and 5 January 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 77751. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 9 December 20024 and 21 April 2003
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 4, Branch 72, Antipolo City, in
Special Proceeding Case No. 02-1128.

The Facts

Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are the parents of Maricel S. Gallardo
(Maricel). Two weeks after graduating from high school in April 2000, Maricel ran away to live
with her boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy S. Gallardo (Maryl
Joy). Maricel’s boyfriend left her.
In February 2002, Maricel returned to her parents. On the same day, Maricel ran away again
and lived with Noel B. Bagtas (Bagtas) and Lydia B. Sioson (Sioson) at Ma. Corazon,
Unirock, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. Maricel went to Negros Occidental and left Maryl
Joy in the custody of Bagtas and Sioson. In a letter5 dated 5 February 2001, Maricel relinquished
her rights over Maryl Joy to Bagtas and his wife. She stated:
“Ako po si Maricel S. Gallardo 18 taong gulang ay kusang ipinagkaloob ang aking anak sa
pagkadalaga sa mag-asawang Noel B. Bagtas at Neneth A. Bagtas sa kadahilanan pong itinakwil ako
ng sarili kong mga magulang at hindi ko po kayang buhayin at dahil po sa tinakbuhan ako ng
aking boyfriend kaya wala na pong ibang paraan para ako makabangon o makapagsimula ng
panibagong buhay kaya para mabigyan ng magandang buhay ang aking anak inisip ko po na ito na ang
pinaka madaling paraan para po sa pagbabago ng aking buhay.
Kaya mula sa araw na ito ay wala na akong karapatan sa aking anak. Sila ang tatayo bilang
magulang ng aking anak.”
In April 2002, the Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy from Bagtas and
Sioson. Bagtas and Sioson refused. Unable to settle the matter, the Spouses Gallardo filed with
the RTC a petition6 for habeas corpus.
In its Order7 dated 10 July 2002, the RTC issued a writ of habeas8 corpus directing the deputy
sheriff to produce Maryl Joy before it and to summon Bagtas and Sioson to explain why they
were withholding the custody of Maryl Joy.
The Spouses Gallardo, Bagtas and Sioson entered into a compromise agreement. In its
Order9 dated 13 September 2002, the RTC stated:
“In today’s hearing, both parties appeared with their respective counsels and have agreed on
the following:
1. that the child should be placed in custody of the petitioners on Friday, Saturday and
Sunday;
2. that the child should be returned to the respondents by the petitioners on Sunday at 8:00
o’clock in the evening subject to visitorial rights of the petitioners anytime of the day; and
3. that the child can be brought by the respondents to Valenzuela but should be returned to
the petitioners on Friday morning.
The above agreement shall take effect today and parties are ordered to comply strictly with
the said agreement under pain of contempt in case of violation thereof.”
On 29 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson learned that Rosita S. Gallardo brought Maryl Joy
to Samar. In their motion10 dated 30 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson prayed that the Spouses
Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl Joy before the RTC, that they be directed to explain why
they violated the RTC’s 13 September 2002 Order, and that they be cited in contempt. In their
motion11 to dismiss dated 11 October 2002, Bagtas and Sioson prayed that the Spouses Gallardo’s
action be dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. Section 3 states that
“If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails x x x to comply with x x x any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s
own motion.” Bagtas and Sioson claimed that the Spouses Gallardo failed to comply with the
RTC’s 13 September 2002 Order.
In its Order12 dated 15 October 2002, the RTC cited the Spouses Gallardo in contempt, fined
them P500, and ordered them to produce Maryl Joy before the trial court.
The RTC’s Ruling
 In its Order13 dated 9 December 2002, the RTC dismissed the action for having become moot.
The RTC stated:
“In this petition, the prayer of the petitioners is to produce the person of Meryl [sic] Joy S. Gallardo
before this court to be turned over to herein petitioners who are the maternal [grandparents] of said minor.
Since the person subject of the petition has already produced [sic] to this court and has been
turned over to the petitioners, the issue on the petition for habeas corpus is now moot and
academic without prejudice to the filing of the proper action to determine as to the rightful custody over
the minor child.
In view thereof, x x x the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted but without prejudice on the petitioners
to file proper action for custody of the minor.” (Emphasis supplied)
In their motion14 for reconsideration dated 27 December 2002, Bagtas and Sioson alleged that
the ground for the dismissal of the action was erroneous. The action should have been dismissed
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. They prayed that Maryl Joy be returned to
them to preserve the status quo ante. Bagtas and Sioson stated:
“5. Thus, the Honorable Court very clearly issued a conflicting Order because It has cited the
[Spouses Gallardo] in contempt of court for violating the previous September 13, 2002 Order that the
child should be returned to the respondents in the evening of September 29, 2002 (Sunday), and yet the
Honorable Court has dismissed the petition for being moot and academic.
This is in effect giving premium to the act of the petitioners of not turning over the child to
respondents on September 29, 2002. Likewise, this is tantamount to rewarding them for not producing the
child in court in violation of the aforesaid September 13, 2002 Order;
6. Moreover, the Honorable Court has issued an unreasonable Order by stating that the dismissal of
the instant case is without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for custody of the minor by the
petitioners. Why would the petitioners still file the proper action for custody if they now have the custody
of the minor?
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the December 9, 2002 Order
of the Honorable Court be partially reconsidered so that the dismissal of the case will not be based on the
ground of being moot and academic but based on failure to comply with the September 13, 2002 pursuant
[sic] to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and that petitioners be consequently
directed to return the person subject of the petition to the respondents to preserve the status quo ante.”
In its Order15 dated 21 April 2003, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. The RTC
held that the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus was the production of Maryl Joy and
that the Spouses Gallardo exercised substitute parental authority over Maryl Joy. The RTC stated
that:
“The allegations in the Petition show that the sole purpose for the filing of the Petition is to cause
the production before the Court of the person of minor Meryl [sic] Joy S. Gallardo, not a
determination of the legality or illegality of respondents’ custody of the child, petitioners being aware
of the fact that the child was left by their (petitioners’) daughter to [sic] the custody of the respondents, as
stated in par. no. 10 of the Petition.
The instant Petition is therefore, essentially not a petition for Habeas Corpus as contemplated in Rule
102, Revised Rules of Court which is resorted to in all cases of illegal confinement by which any person
is deprived of his liberty (Cruz vs. CA, 322 SCRA 518), but is resorted to also where the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto as contemplated in Rule 102, Revised Rules of
Court. In order that the special remedy of Habeas Corpus maybe [sic] invoked, it is necessary that there
should be an actual and effective restraint or deprivation of liberty. A nominal or moral restraint is not
sufficient (Gonzales vs. Viola, et al., 61 Phil. 824).
Since therefore, the purpose of the instant Petition has already been served, as the child has
been produced and delivered to the petitioners, the instant Petition logically has become moot and
academic. Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, the
entitlement to the legal custody of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible
and/or enable the petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute parents.
There is no inconsistency between the Order dated December 9, 2002 sought to be reconsidered, and
the Order dated October 15, 2002, as the latter was issued pursuant to an incident, an interlocutory matter,
that is, the failure of the petitioners to comply with the agreement reached between the parties in open
court on September 13, 2002. The said Order dated October 15, 2002 is not a resolution of the case in the
main, as it did not terminate the case. The Order dated December 9, 2002, on the other hand, terminated
the case, and considering that the dismissal of the case was unqualified, the same amounted to an
adjudication on the merits pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court Procedure, therefore,
the agreement earlier entered by and between the herein parties is deemed terminated.” (Emphasis
supplied)
Bagtas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition 16 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Bagtas alleged that (1) the RTC erred when it ruled that the sole purpose of the 1 August
2002 petition was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court, (2) the RTC erred when it
ruled that the petition was “essentially not a petition for Habeas Corpus as contemplated in Rule
102,” (3) the RTC erred when it ruled that there must be actual and effective deprivation of
liberty, (4) the RTC erred when it ruled that the action had become moot, (5) the RTC erred
when it ruled that the Spouses Gallardo had substitute parental authority over Maryl Joy, and (6)
the RTC erred when it ruled that there was no inconsistency between the 15 October and 9
December 2002 Orders.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

In its Decision dated 11 June 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed
the 9 December 2002 and 23 April 2003 Orders of the RTC. The Court of Appeals held that:
“In the second part of [Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court], x x x habeas corpus may be resorted
to in cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Accordingly, the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable herein private respondents to
regain the custody of their minor grand daughter Maryl Joy who was admittedly left by her natural mother
in the care of petitioner and Lydia Sioson.
Significantly, in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal or involuntary restraint is not
the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy; rather, the writ is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody of a child. By dismissing the petition
a quo, the trial court in effect upheld private respondents’ right of custody over the minor involved
as against that of petitioner.
While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial custody of the minor in violation
of a valid court order, we nonetheless sustain the judgment a quo dismissing the petition and validating
such rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private respondents are the grandparents of Maryl
Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise substitute parental authority over her in the absence of her
parents. What is more, in awarding custody to private respondents, the best welfare of the child was taken
into consideration inasmuch as, per report of the Court Social Worker, the implementation of the parties’
agreement would cause more psychological damage and traumatic experience to Maryl Joy. To our
mind, therefore, the violation of a court order pales in significance when considered alongside the best
interest of the minor whose welfare requires that she be in the custody of her grandparents rather than
petitioner’s. x x x
Under the factual and legal milieux of the case, there is no question that as grandparents of the minor,
Maryl Joy, private respondents have a far superior right of custody over her than petitioner.”17
 The Issues

In his petition dated 1 February 2005, Bagtas raised as issues that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
FINDING THAT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGATION IN THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS SHOW THAT THE SOLE PURPOSE FOR THE FILING THEREOF IS TO
CAUSE THE PRODUCTION BEFORE THE COURT OF THE PERSON IN WHOSE FAVOR IT WAS
FILED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT WITH THE DELIVERY OF THE CHILD FOR
WHOM THE PETITION WAS FILED, THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS HAS BECOME
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTC’s 9 December 2002 and 21 April 2003
Orders. In its Orders, the RTC ruled that, since the sole purpose of the petition for habeas
corpus was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court, the action became moot when
Maryl Joy was produced. The Court disagrees.
Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to
all cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled thereto.
In cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the
production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas
corpus is to determine who has the rightful custody over the child. In Tijing v. Court of
Appeals,18 the Court held that:
“The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said
that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose
of determining the right of custody over a child.” (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy
was produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had
the rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the
petition for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo
without sufficient basis. In Laxamana v. Laxamana,19 the Court held that:
“Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a
trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia,
of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence
of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding
custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to
promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.” (Emphasis supplied)
Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Article 216 states
that in default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child. Accordingly, in its 21 April 2003 Order, the
RTC held that:
Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the
legal custody of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible and/or enable the
petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute parents.”
20

In its 11 June 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that:

“While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial custody of the minor in violation
of a valid court order, we nonetheless sustain the judgment a quo dismissing the petition and validating
such rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private respondents are the grandparents of Maryl
Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise substitute parental authority over her in the absence of her
parents.”21

In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the child’s welfare is the most
important consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child.
In Sombong v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court held that:
“The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is presumed to
be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing on the writ in a child custody case,
the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or
guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim founded
on human nature and considered generally equitable and just. Therefore, these cases are decided, not
on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case
of adults, but on the court’s view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in
custody of one person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of
any claimant or of any person, but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody
as its welfare at the time appears to require. In short, the child’s welfare is the supreme
consideration.
Considering that the child’s welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child and Youth
Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the same vein, the Family
Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned
of parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper under the
circumstances.” (Emphasis supplied)
In Sombong,23 the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving
minors: (1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor, (2) the respondent is
withholding the rightful custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands
that he or she be in the custody of the petitioner. In the present case, these requisites are not
clearly established because the RTC hastily dismissed the action and awarded the custody
of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial
The proceedings before the RTC leave so much to be desired. While a remand of the case
would mean further delay, Maryl Joy’s best interest demands that proper proceedings be
conducted to determine the fitness of the Spouses Gallardo to take care of her.
WHEREFORE, the Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region
4, Branch 72, Antipolo City, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of the
Spouses Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo to have custody of Maryl Joy Gallardo.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro,** Brion, Del Castillo and Abad, JJ., concur.
 Case remanded to Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Br. 72.
Note.—RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of the minors—the provisions of RA
8369 must be read in harmony with RA No. 7029 and BP 129, i.e., family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas
corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. (Madriñan vs. Madriñan, 527 SCRA 487 [2007])