Journal of International Business Policy (2020) 3, 280–286

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www.jibp.net

COMMENTARY

How globalization became a thing that goes

bump in the night

Stephen J. Kobrin Abstract

For almost 200 years, globalization has been seen as a positive development,
William Wurster Professor Emeritus of albeit with costs and benefits, and as progress and modernization, a
Multinational Management, The Wharton School, broadening of humanity’s scope from the local and parochial to the
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, cosmopolitan and international. That changed dramatically with the Great
PA 19104, USA Recession, the waves of migration of the last decade, and the global
Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic of 2020. For many, globalization now
Correspondence:
SJ Kobrin, William Wurster Professor connotes economic dislocation, increasing inequality, unwanted immigration,
Emeritus of Multinational Management, The and a vehicle for the transmission of disease. The pandemic reminds us that
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, most economic activity takes place within national borders. It has emphasized
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA the dangers rather than the benefits of efficient linkages between markets,
e-mail: [email protected] laying bare the dangers of complex global supply chains where any node can
become a ‘‘choke point’’, and the risks of overspecialization or the
concentration of technological knowledge and/or production capacity in a
single country or region. A more positive view of globalization will require
restoring the balance between independence and integration, mitigation of its
costs within and between countries, and dealing with redundancy and supply
risk.
Journal of International Business Policy (2020) 3, 280–286.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-020-00060-y

Keywords: globalization; COVID-19; anti-globalization; supply chains; international

economic integration

Everything is designed to become interconnected. Tourists and terrorists, arms and

drugs…algorithms, messages, diseases…travel across borders, make, enjoy, or suffer history
in the Global Age
(Schafer, 2003: 84).

INTRODUCTION
For almost 200 years, globalization has been seen as a positive
development – albeit with costs and benefits – if not an imperative,
and as progress and modernization, a broadening of humanity’s
scope from the local and parochial to the cosmopolitan and
Everything is designed to become intercon-
nected. Tourists and terrorists, arms and dr-
international. While that sentiment was certainly not universal, for
ugs…algorithms, messages, diseases…travel much of this period it was dominant.
across borders, make, enjoy, or suffer history That changed dramatically with the Great Recession of 2008, the
in the Global Age waves of migration characteristic of the last decade, and, finally,
(Schafer, 2003: 84).
the global Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic of 2020. For many,
Online publication date: 6 July 2020 globalization now connotes economic dislocation and increasing
 How globalization became a thing that goes bump in the night Stephen J. Kobrin
281

inequality, unwanted immigration, and, most In 1930, the U.S. Congress passed the Smoot–
recently, a vehicle for the transmission of disease. Hawley tariff which imposed levies on over 20,000
While Marx and Engels (1998 (1848): 39) goods and was met by almost immediate retaliation
bemoaned the destruction of ‘‘old-established by the other major trading nations.
national industries’’, they went on to say that, ‘‘to What is important here is that Smoot–Hawley
the great chagrin of reactionists,’’ bourgeois was seen by most observers as a mistake. The tariff
exploitation of the world market has given ‘‘a was opposed by over 1000 economists and was
cosmopolitan character to production and con- remedied after the election of Roosevelt with the
sumption in every country.’’ Trotsky (1928) argued passage of the Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934. When
that the most advanced productive forces, the Churchill and Roosevelt issued the Atlantic Charter
application of electricity and chemistry to the in 1941, summarizing post-War aims, one of the
processes of production, were incompatible with eight points called for the lowering of trade
national boundaries. barriers.
At the other end of the political spectrum, the In 1945, immediately after the second World
Geneva School of Neoliberals believed that com- War, negotiations began for an International Trade
mitments to national sovereignty and autonomy Organization. While an agreement proved prob-
were dangerous; that the ‘‘cardinal sin of the lematic, the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
twentieth century was the belief in unfettered and Trade) was established in 1947 and it provided
national independence.’’; and that ‘‘nations must a framework for trade negotiations until the World
remain embedded in an international institutional Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995.
order that safeguarded capital and its right to move Although there has been substantial opposition
throughout the world’’ (Slobodian, 2018: 9). to both globalization in general and its institutions,
Keynes waxed eloquently about the global age in particular, the International Monetary Fund and
that came to an end in 1914. ‘‘An inhabitant of the WTO, that opposition tended to focus on
London [of a certain class] could order by tele- welfare effects (the distribution of the gains from
phone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various trade), sectoral impacts, or effects on developing
products of the whole earth…and reasonably countries. Although it may be an over-generaliza-
expect their early delivery upon his doorstep…He tion, it is fair to say that, until the very late
could secure…cheap and comfortable means of twentieth century, globalization was seen as a net
transit to any country or climate without passport positive, that international trade, investment, and
or other formality’’ (1920: 11). economic integration (e.g., the European Union)
There was a sense of inevitability associated with allowed both the more efficient use of the world’s
globalization, a sense of progress, and of a broad- resources and the development of large-scale tech-
ening of narrow, parochial, and local interests; a nology. Economic nationalism was seen as prob-
sense of inevitability driven by developments in lematic, as a barrier to further international
transport and communication that linked markets economic integration: as Habermas (2001) argued,
and individuals and dramatically increased the there was a need for politics to catch up with
ease and efficiency of international trade and economics.
investment. In a famous article at the turn of the Late twentieth century globalization became
twentieth century, Mackinder (1904) argued that, synonymous with the idea of a hyper-efficient
with the end of the Columbian epoch of explo- networked world economy. The combination of
ration and thanks to improvements in transport, the digital revolution and dramatic improvements
there now was a single, closed political system, in transport allowed the value chain to be broken
worldwide in scope. A century later, with the into small units or tasks with every task located
digital revolution, container shipping, and jet wherever in the world it could be performed most
aircraft, a great many citizens of the advanced efficiently. Geography was seen as ambiguous in a
countries were able to ‘‘order the various products ‘‘post-modern’’ economy (Kobrin, 1997). Network
of the whole earth’’ and expect 2-day delivery to theory emphasized the direct connections between
their doorstep. nodes, as opposed to a hierarchical organization of
The late nineteenth century global economy lost local to national to global scales: plants or financial
much of its steam with the outbreak of World War institutions interacted directly with multiple sites
I, and ended precipitously with the depression in other countries without the need to go through
following the American stock market crash in 1929. the organizational structure of the multinational

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 How globalization became a thing that goes bump in the night Stephen J. Kobrin
282

corporation. The emphasis was on the linkages 2003; Krugman, 2008). In what seemed at the time
rather than the nodes, an assumption that the as a rapid reversal of opinion, globalization became
nodes or sites where specific tasks are performed a negative rather than a positive, a threat to social,
were dependent for their value on the network as a cultural, and political as well as economic well-
whole. being (see Kobrin, 2017, for a more complete
discussion of this point.)
This was clear in a recent New York Times article
THE RISKS OF GLOBALIZATION BECOME describing globalization (of recent decades) as ‘‘an
OBVIOUS underregulated, complacent form of interconnec-
The combination of the rise of populist nationalism tion that has left communities vulnerable to a
with the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pan- potent array of threats’’ (Goodman, 2020: B4).
demic has stood these arguments on their head, COVID-19 dramatically exposed one of the most
and emphasized the dangers rather than the ben- potent threats: the rapid transmission of the infec-
efits of the efficient linkages between markets tion globally through the complex web of interna-
(Rodrik, 2018a). Most obviously, the extensive tional air travel (and cruises). The World Health
and rapid international travel associated with Organization (WHO) first announced the new virus
globalization served as an ideal medium for the in China on January 11, 2020, by early February it
very rapid spread of the Coronavirus: it became had spread to seven Asian countries, five in Europe,
global in just a few months after first being isolated and to the U.S. and Canada. The WHO declared it a
in China. pandemic on March 10, and by May 7 there were
The global pandemic reminds us that, at the end 3.8 million cases worldwide and 260,000 deaths
of the day, most economic activity does take place (World Health Organization, 2020).
within national borders. It has again focused The response was almost as immediate and very
attention on the nodes, laying bare the dangers of physical: one nation after another closed their
complex global supply chains where any node can borders and banned non-essential travel – the very
become a ‘‘choke point’’ that threatens to close antitheses of globalization. As of April 15, at least
down the entire network. It has also revealed the 93 percent of the global population lived in coun-
very real risks of letting efficiency drive the con- tries with coronavirus-related travel restrictions,
centration of supply of critical goods and materials and about 3 billion people were living in countries
into a single market; the ‘‘destruction of old- enforcing complete border closures to foreigners
established national industries’’ is no longer taken (Salcedo & Cherelus, 2020). The U.S. State Depart-
as an indicator of progress. ment has issued a level 4 ‘‘do not travel’’ advisory
My objective in this essay is to focus on the and the U.S.–Canadian and U.S.–Mexican borders
impacts of the Coronavirus pandemic on how were closed. On April 11, President Macron of
globalization is perceived. That said, it is clear that France announced that the Schengen member
the Great Recession of 2008 was a turning point countries were considering extending the closing
and that the economic dislocation and inequalities of their borders until September.
that it revealed, combined with the reaction against For much of the twentieth century and the first
large-scale migration into the developed countries, decade of the twenty-first, globalization was an
resulted in a populist reaction against international abstraction to much of the world’s population.
integration – social and political as well as eco- Especially when economies were strong, economic
nomic. That was exploited by economic national- dislocations attributable to globalization – while
ists such as Donald Trump in the U.S. and Viktor very real to those suffering the consequences – were
Orban in Hungary and the ‘‘leavers’’ in Britain who limited in scope. That changed dramatically during
promoted Brexit. the last decade. With the Great Recession, the
While it has always been acknowledged that negative economic impacts of globalization became
globalization entails both benefits and costs, it was much more widespread, directly affecting the mid-
generally assumed that the former far outweighed dle classes of many industrial countries.
the latter, and that the welfare or distributional That said, it took large-scale migration and the
effects could be dealt with nationally. However, by COVID pandemic to firmly establish globalization
the late twentieth century, the consensus that trade as a widely seen threat. The waves of migrants
has only modest effects on income distribution fleeing conflict zones such as Syria, and abject
became increasingly dated (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, poverty and violence in Africa and Latin America,

Journal of International Business Policy

 How globalization became a thing that goes bump in the night Stephen J. Kobrin
283

were very visible and immediate and leveraged by knowledge and/or production capacity in a single
xenophobic groups to turn significant numbers of country or region and the reliance on complex
citizens of many countries against both immigrants global supply chains proved problematic.
specifically and globalization more generally. Glob- Ironically, some of the earliest indications of the
alization was no longer abstract: it was waves of dangers of overspecialization came from shortages
immigrants washing up on beaches in Greece or of materials and drugs needed to treat the virus
President Trump warning of ‘‘armies of migrants’’ itself. Chinese manufacturers produced half of the
marching to invade America’s southern border. world’s medical masks, and the production of
The COVID pandemic was the next nail in the reagents, a component of test kits, is dominated
coffin. Globalization and international travel by just two companies (Farrell & Newman, 2020).
became associated with an immediate and very As plants were shut down in China and other
visible threat – serious illness and death. Globaliza- countries, the flow of these very necessary supplies
tion is no longer an abstraction to most of the was significantly restricted and the ability to shift
world’s population. It carries negative connotations the location of production was limited.
as a vehicle for the transmission of a serious and Similarly, India has become the world’s main
potentially fatal disease, and the economic chaos supplier of generic drugs, and they, in turn, rely on
associated with it, in virtually every country. China for 70 percent of the active pharmaceutical
ingredients (APIs) for their medicines. In March
2020, India restricted export of 26 of these APIs and
OVERSPECIALIZATION AND CONCENTRATION the medicines made from them in order to insure
OF PRODUCTION an adequate supply for the domestic market in the
Digital communications provide for simultaneity face of the COVID pandemic. Europe was described
in time without regard for space, and facilitate the in the press as ‘‘panicking’’ over the possible
creation of relational networks of flows for the impacts on supplies of necessary medications, and
coordination of complex processes without regard the U.S. Food and Drug Administration noted that
for place or geographic distance (Amin, 2002). Indian imports accounted for almost a quarter of
That, in turn, has allowed for the extension of medicines in 2018 (Dasgupta & Burger, 2020).
specialization – in every phase of the production In another of the COVID ironies, at a time when
process – with scant regard for national borders. a good portion of humanity is confined to their
This drive for efficiency combined with technolog- home, the lockdown in Malaysia has resulted in
ical path dependence has resulted in the concen- concern about a ‘‘devastating condom shortage’’, as
tration of knowledge – in both research and a single plant in that country produces 20 percent
development and production processes – in specific of the world’s condoms (France 24, 2020).
and often limited geographic areas. As the pandemic spread, countries went into
Benefits of the application of the digital revolu- ‘‘lockdown’’ mode, production was disrupted, the
tion to research and production include a dramatic trade-off between efficiency (lower prices and
increase in the rate of innovation and the flow of a technological specialization) and security of supply
very wide range of affordable products to con- became obvious as shortages, or threats of short-
sumers worldwide. A broad spectrum of inhabitants ages, became evident. As with many issues related
of most of the countries of the developed world had to international trade, the benefits in terms of a
access to ‘‘the various products of the whole earth’’ lower cost of goods, while widespread, are not
in remarkably short order and at an affordable cost. always obvious while the costs – job losses or in this
That came with a price in terms of the loss of case, shortages of critical goods – bear more directly
jobs, especially in developed countries’ manufac- on specific industries and consumers.
turing sector, a price which became very obvious
with the Great Recession and certainly played a role
in the surge of populist nationalism in many RISKS OF COMPLEX GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
countries. (Advances in manufacturing technology Both the rise of economic nationalism (e.g., Amer-
are also relevant.) The COVID-19 pandemic, how- ica First) and the COVID pandemic revealed the
ever, revealed that, regardless of the simultaneity of serious risks of reliance on very complex networks
time, the disregard of space – of geography – of global supply chains in many industries. Both
entailed very significant risks. Both overspecializa- have reemphasized the importance of places as
tion or the concentration of technological opposed to flows, of the possibility that any given

Journal of International Business Policy

 How globalization became a thing that goes bump in the night Stephen J. Kobrin
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node in the network could serve as a ‘‘choke point,’’ necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the
disrupting or shutting down the entire supply system. As Kindleberger (1986) observed, the inabil-
chain (Farrell & Newman, 2020). The U.S. auto ity of U.K. and the unwillingness of the United
industry, for example, relies heavily on parts States to continue or assume that leadership role
sourced from China and their suppliers rely on was one of the primary causes of the collapse of the
Chinese tool and die makers. first global economy and the Great Depression.
For example, there is concern that the COVID It is reasonable to argue that the U.S. is now
pandemic could result in a global food crisis in no neither willing nor able to assume leadership of the
small part due to supply chain disruption. As a global economy, and that it will be difficult for
recent Atlantic Council report (Terp & Jahn, 2020) either China or Europe to take its place in the near
noted, ‘‘(L)arge amounts of seeds, fertilizer, and future, resulting in what Bremmer (2011) has called
agro-chemicals are shipped between ports. As a a ‘‘G-0 World.’’ The instability that is likely to result
result, ports can form a single point of failure in a will certainly add to the negative views of global-
complicated system, particularly where a country ization held by many.
or region is heavily reliant on freight through a More generally, the repudiation of international
specific port.’’ Needless to say, any disruption of the economic integration and of the international
food supply, in advanced or developing countries, system established after WWII to facilitate flows
will affect a broad swath of the population and of trade and investment by the two countries most
certainly be seen as a risk of globalization. responsible for its birth – ‘‘America First’’ and Brexit
Consumer electronics have complex supply – has unquestionably contributed to a more nega-
chains that could certainly be affected by the virus. tive view of globalization. The leaders of both
For example, virtually all of Apple’s iPhones are countries have demonized internationalism in gen-
assembled in China. The lockdown in Malaysia eral and opposed international economic, cultural,
impacted chip and circuit board suppliers, while and social exchanges more specifically.
the engineers who work on cellular modems are in
Germany and the plants that produce power man-
agement chips are located in Italy, Germany, and THE FUTURE
the UK, all suffering shut downs due to COVID-19 While my purpose here is analysis rather than
(Eadicicco, 2020). forecasting, it is reasonable to ask whether global-
A consumer who may use an iPhone daily ization will continue to be seen as ‘‘the thing that
without thinking about the marvels of the complex goes bump in the night.’’ Over the last century and
global supply chain that brought it to them, will a half, globalization has been a cyclical phe-
certainly become aware of the risks of globalization nomenon, and there is reason to believe that we
when a part needed for a repair or even a replace- have reached a plateau if not the peak of the
ment phone is not available. As noted above, unlike second, late twentieth century wave. At the same
Lord Keynes, the majority of the population most time, we face an increasing flow of anti-globaliza-
likely does not spend time marveling at the fact tion rhetoric and perceptions, fanned by populists
that global economic integration provides a vast taking full advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic.
cornucopia of goods at an affordable price. It is The emergence of a more positive view of glob-
taken as the norm. However, the disruption of that alization will require at least three major interre-
flow of goods is inherently obvious to most lated changes to minimize its costs while still
observers and is certainly not taken as a normal taking advantage of its benefits: first, restoring the
state of affairs. balance between economic independence and inte-
gration; second, mitigation of the costs of global-
ization both within and between countries; and
A LACK OF LEADERSHIP last, insuring some degree of redundancy and
While America’s leadership of the global economy supply risk mitigation.
since 1945 has been viewed ambivalently, it has Ever since Adam Smith’s argument for specializa-
also been seen by many as necessary. A stable, open tion in the manufacture of pins, the quest for
international economy requires a hegemon, a economic efficiency has driven larger and larger-
dominant power who can provide some of the scale integration of production, both in terms of

Journal of International Business Policy

 How globalization became a thing that goes bump in the night Stephen J. Kobrin
285

plant size and geographic scope. By the late twen- unpopular given current conditions is an
tieth century, specialization – of both production understatement.
and technology – was truly global in scope, and Last, some degree of redundancy and supply risk
borders were no longer significant barriers to the mitigation will have to be built into the system.
flow of goods and ideas. Regardless of efficiencies, the pandemic has shown
Hyper-globalization (Rodrik, 2018b) entailed that severe problems can result from depending on
both great benefits and great risks. The unprece- single sources of supply for critical products or
dented access to a wide range of more affordable technologies. Similarly, complex global supply
goods and rapid technological development came chains have proven vulnerable to problems at
with an unprecedented degree of economic (and ‘‘choke points’’ that can bring the entire production
political) interdependence and economic disloca- process to a halt.
tion in advanced countries. Resolving problems resulting from single-sourced
It is reasonable to argue that what the U.S. Trade products or technologies and complex supply
Representative has called a ‘‘lemming-like desire for chains will involve a large number of private firms,
efficiency’’ (Lighthizer, 2020) and lower costs may both global and national. Coordination problems
have gone too far and that some balance between both within and across countries will be immense
integration and national independence needs to be and conflicts between a firm’s objectives and
restored. Restoring that balance, however, is a national interest will prove difficult to resolve.
politically fraught, and an overreaction is likely. None of this bodes well for a dramatic change in
That overreaction will be compounded by populist attitudes about globalization in the short run. The
demagogues exploiting the fear of the ‘‘other’’ who COVID-19 pandemic has raised some very real
exacerbate concerns about socio-cultural problems arising from global integration – social
integration. and political as well as economic – and reinforced
Second, the costs in terms of dislocation and national feeling and fears of ‘‘the other’’ that are all
inequality will have to be dealt by each country on too easy to exploit.
its own terms. Within countries, more efforts will That said, the pandemic itself demonstrates that
have to be made to offset the costs of globalization disintegration or de-globalization has its limits; it is
through retraining and social welfare programs, one of a number of critical problems of a scale that
and to more fairly distribute the benefits. That will require international cooperation. A successful
certainly require income transfers to both support search for a vaccine will require a global effort.
welfare efforts and effect redistribution. To say that While political borders may be closed, scientists
is politically fraught, given ideological differences have been ‘‘creating a global collaboration unlike
among countries and the political influence of any in history. Never before, researchers say, have
wealth in many, is an understatement. so many experts in so many countries focused
Restoration of a positive attitude towards global- simultaneously on a single topic [development of a
ization will also require transfers between coun- vaccine] and with such urgency’’ (Apuzzo & Kirk-
tries. The very negative reaction to the wave of patrick, 2020).
migrants reaching Europe is certainly a significant Climate change is another existential problem
factor in the rise of anti-globalization sentiment. that cannot be dealt with on a country by country
National and multi-national efforts to stem the basis. No single country can prevent rising sea
flow through interdiction have very obvious limits. levels from ‘‘invading’’ its territory and mitigation
In the long run, the only solution, in both Europe demands global cooperation. Unfortunately, that
and the U.S., is to try to remedy the problem at its conclusion is not yet shared by all.
source: to increase standards of living in the It will be difficult to achieve that cooperation in
countries that are the sources of migrants. That the face of the economic nationalism characteristic
will also require income and wealth transfers of of the world at this point. In particular, the ‘‘mutual
various forms from wealthy to poor countries. vilification’’ between the United States and China,
Again, to say that an effort of that sort would be the two major powers, is limiting cooperation
between them, and the current geopolitical

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 How globalization became a thing that goes bump in the night Stephen J. Kobrin
286

environment creates a climate more conducive to 2020). We are in great danger of throwing the baby
national competition than international coopera- out with the bathwater.
tion (Sanger, Kirkpatrick, Zimmer, Thomas, & Wee,

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Accepted by Sarianna Lundan, Editor-in-Chief, 26 May 2020. This paper is part of a series of contributions dealing with the implications of the
Covid-19 pandemic on international business policy, and it was single-blind reviewed.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional
affiliations.

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