Lacan's "Mirror Stage": Where to Begin

Author(s): Jane Gallop

Source: SubStance, Vol. 11/12, Vol. 11, no. 4 - Vol. 12, no. 1, Issue 37-38: A Special Issue from
the Center for Twentieth Century Studies (1982/1983), pp. 118-128
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
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 Lacan's"MirrorStage":Whereto Begin1

JANEGALLOP

The work of the French psychoanalystJacques Lacan has had a tremendous

and unsettlingeffecton the disciplinesknownin France as the"human sciences,"
that is, on bothwhat we call the humanitiesand what we call the social sciences.
Among the most far-reachingof Lacan's subversionsof our traditionsofknowl-
edge is the havoc he wreaks upon temporal succession. This essay concentrates
on the problem of chronologyas posed by Lacan's most famous work, "The
Mirror Stage." The problem is explored in its relation to two importantkinds
of history: the historyof the individual subject (that is, biography) and the
historyof a science. In a deceptivelysimplerform,the question here is "where
to begin."
The monumental collection of Lacan's work, Ecrits,2begins with the
"Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter'."Alan Sheridan's translation,Ecrits:A Selec-
tion,3which does not include the "Seminar," begins with an essay entitled"The
Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psycho-
analytic Experience." The jacket copy to Ecrits:A Selectiontells us that "The
Mirror Stage" is "theearliestin date" of the collection. Sheridan's selectionthus
appears to begin withthe earliesttextas partof a chronologicalorder. Yet closer
examination of the bibliographical informationreveals a slightchronological
irregularity.
The jacket copy, having named "The Mirror Stage" as "the earliest"essay,
amplifies this statement by the informationthat " 'The Mirror Stage' was
delivered in its originalformto the fourteenthInternational Psychoanalytical
Congress in 1937" (italics mine). But the text translated is not the "original
form,"but ratherwhat Sheridanhimselfcalls "a muchrevised laterversion"(p. xiii,
italics mine). In fact,the essay thatopens Sheridan's translationactually dates
from1949 when it was delivered at the sixteenthInternationalPsychoanalyti-
cal Congress. Since thistextis dated 1949, it cannot be consideredthe "earliest."
The essay followingit in this collection- "Aggressivityin Psychoanalysis"-
dates from 1948. But we cannot rectifychronology by simply reversingthe
order of these two essays, since the 1948 textmakes referenceto "The Mirror
Stage."

SubStanceNo 37/38,1983 118

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 Lacan's "Mirror Stage" 119

The firstentryin "Bibliographical Informationin Chronological Order" in

the French Ecritsis "The Mirror Stage," but the fifthentryis "The Mirror Stage
as Formative of the Function of the I." The latter entryfollows"Aggressivity
in Psychoanalysis."3Sheridan condenses the two different "mirrorstage"entries
in his bibliographicalnote witha slightalteration.He writes:"An English trans-
lation of [the 1936] version appeared in TheInternationalJournalofPsychoanalysis,
vol. 18, part I, January, 1937, under the title, 'The Looking-glass Phase"
(p. xiii). The French bibliographyreads "Cf. TheInternational JournalofPsycho-
analysis,vol. 18, part I, January, 1937, p. 78 wherethispaper is inscribedunder
the title 'The Looking-glass Phase'." Upon consulting the 1937 journal, one
realizes thatthe French bibliographyis notjust ambiguous, but actuallyironic.
One findsnothingat all underthe title"The Looking-glass Phase." Nothing but
the titleis given, simplythe words "J.Lacan (Paris), The Looking-glassPhase."
There is no version,not even a summaryofthe paper, althoughtheotherpapers
fromthe Congress are summarized. The ironyin the bibliographyis highlighted
by a footnotein the introductionto the section of Ecritswhich contains "The
Mirror Stage." In that note, Lacan informsus that he "had in fact neglected
to deliverthe textforthe reportofthe Congress" (Ecrits,p. 67n). To my knowl-
edge there is no published version of the original "Mirror Stage." Each entry
in the chronological bibliographyof the French Ecritscorresponds to a text in
Ecrits,except for the firstentry. The firstentryis a blind entry.
Now my point is not reallyor not simplyto be fastidiousabout chronologi-
cal order, but ratherto point to some difficultyaround the question of where
to begin, some slightconfusionabout the "beginning"oftheEcrits,some trouble
about where (and how) to begin reading Lacan. "The Mirror Stage" is un-
doubtedly Lacan's best known work. It is the "logical," the "natural" place to
begin. Yet, not only does Ecritsnot begin there, but it turns out that "there"
may be a difficultplace to locate exactly, a lost origin, one might say.
In an excellent book, the best book devoted to Lacan, Catherine Clement
writes: "Lacan, perhaps has never thought anything else besides the mirror
stage. . . . It is the germ containingeverything[ Toutyestcontenu engerme]....
When the war comes along, Lacan's thoughtis formed."4The war separates
the two versions of "The Mirror Stage." Somewhere between the 1936 and the
1949 versions,Lacan's thought,the thoughtwe identifyas "Lacan's," is "formed."
The titleof the 1949 version is "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function
of the I." The essay is about the "formation,"the "forming"of an "I," of an
identity.And the textitselfis formativeof an identitywe call Lacan. Clement
says that Lacan's thoughtis all found thereengerme.According to Lacan, what
is formedin the mirrorstage "will be the root stock"(la souche,which Sheridan
translatesas "source")oflater identifications.5 If"The Mirror Stage" poses tricky
of
bibliographical questions origin and chronology,it is only appropriate, for
the essay is precisely about the origin of a chronology. And if we are having
some difficultystabilizingchronologyat this origin, we will soon findthat the
temporality of "The Mirror Stage" is in some way alien to the logic of
chronology.

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120 Jane Gallop

Now a word of caution seems appropriate here. I have been so captivated

by the resemblance between what Clement says about"The Mirror Stage" and
what Lacan says in it, that, in my enthusiasm, I accepted, unquestioningly,
if only momentarily,her claim that all Lacan is there engerme.Lacan, I find,
has anticipated Cl6ment's assertion. In an introductionto the section of Ecrits
which contains "The Mirror Stage," he writes: "It happens that our students
delude themselvesin our writingsinto finding'already there'thatto which our
teaching has since broughtus" (p. 67). Clement's gestureof findingall Lacan
engermein the mirrorstage is preciselyfinding"already there"what has come
"since."
It is, however, difficultto read Lacan's statementabout his students'self-
delusions simplyas an admonitionagainst chronologicalinfidelity.Lacan's stu-
dents are reading earlierwritingsin view oflater Lacan teachings. This implies
reading what comes "after,""before,"and what comes "before,""after."Such
a violation of chronological order is encouraged by Ecritswhich presents the
1956 "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter' " before the earlier texts. But even
more to the point, here, is an analogy between the students'illusion and the
infant's"mirage"in the mirrorstage. According to Lacan, in the mirrorstage,
"the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power" (Ecrits,pp.
94-95; Sheridan, p. 2). The studentanticipates in the early textsthe matura-
tion of Lacan's teachings. Thus, somehow, the effectof Lacan's texton his stu-
dents is analogous to the effectof the mirroron the infant.Lacan's text func-
tions as an illusory mirrorimage.
I said above that Clement's claim that all Lacan is engermein "The Mirror
Stage" produced an enthusiasmin me whichimmediatelybecame embarrassing.
My embarrassmentcorrespondedto a realizationthatit was extremelypleasur-
able to findthe later Lacan "already there"in the earlywriting.An anticipation
of maturationproduced joy along witha willingnessto suspend disbelief.This
joy may resemble the "jubilation"which Lacan ascribes to the child assuming
his mirrorimage, being captivated by an analogy and suspendinghis disbelief.
Briefly:in the mirrorstage, the infantwho has not yetmasteredtheupright
posture and who is supported by either another person or some device will,
upon seeing herselfin the mirror,"jubilantlyassume" the uprightposition. She
thus finds"already there"in the mirrorimage a masterythat she will actually
learn only later. The jubilation, the enthusiasm, is tied to the temporal dia-
lectic by which she appears alreadyto be what she will onlylaterbecome.
The temporaldialecticin whichLacan's studentsare enmeshedis not exactly
one of anticipation, of seeing the futurein the present. Both the "present"and
the "future"here are actually "pasts." The students read the past in light of
a more recent past, read early Lacan writingsin light of more recent Lacan
teachings. Indeed one might be tempted to contrastthe infant'santicipation
with the students' retroaction. But it turns out that the mirrorstage itselfis
both an anticipation and a retroaction.
The mirrorstage is a turningpoint. Afterit the subject's relationto himself
is always mediated througha totalizing image which has come fromoutside.
For example, the mirrorimage becomes a totalizingideal which organizes and

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 Lacan's "Mirror Stage" 121

orientsthe self.But since the "self"is necessarilya totalized,unifiedconcept- a

division between an inside and an outside- thereis no "self"beforethe mirror
stage. The mirrorstage is thus a turningpoint, but between what and what?
It is a turningpoint in the chronologyof a self, but it is also the origin, the
moment of constitutionof that self. What thereforeprecedes it?
Jean Laplanche and Jean-Baptiste Pontalis, in their article "The Mirror
Stage" in TheLanguageofPsycho-analysis, come close to answering that anterior
to the mirrorstage is "lecorpsmorcelid"(thebody in bits and pieces), a Lacanian
term fora violentlynon-totalizedbody image. They explain "the body in bits
and pieces" and "the mirrorstage" in Freudian terms. "The body in bits and
pieces" would correspondto a primordial,polymorphousauto-eroticstatethat
is prior to the constitutionof the ego, whereas the mirrorstage marks the com-
ing of the ego and thereforeof narcissismproper(as opposed to auto-eroticism).
Narcissism is love of an image of self,and so demands the image of selfwhich
is achieved forthe firsttime in the mirrorstage. Laplanche and Pontalis thus
seem to answer that the body in bits and pieces precedes the mirrorstage. But
they then add: "Except forone importantnuance: forLacan, it would be the
mirrorstage which would retroactivelybring forththe phantasy of the body
in bits and pieces."6 The mirrorstage would seem to come after"the body in
bits and pieces" and to organize them into a unifiedimage. But actually, that
unorganized image only comes afterthe mirrorstage so as to representwhat
came before. What appears to precede the mirrorstage is simplya projection
or a reflection.There is nothing on the other side of the mirror.
The mirrorstage is a decisive moment. Not only does the self issue from
the mirrorstage, but so does "the body in bits and pieces." This moment is
the source not only for what followsbut also for what precedes. It produces
.the futurethrough anticipation and the past through retroaction.And yet it
is itselfa moment of self-delusion,of captivation by an illusory image. Both
futureand past are thus rooted in an illusion.
Lacan and others have emphasized the illusion in the mirror stage. It is
the foundingmoment of the imaginary mode, the belief in a projected image.
It representsthe firstinstance of what according to Lacan is the basic function
of the ego, the classic gestureof the self: miconnaissance, misprision,misrecog-
nition. According to Lacan, "the importantpoint is that [the ideal formedin
the mirrorstage] situates the agency of the ego . . . in a line of fiction"(Ecrits,
p. 94; Sheridan, p. 2). However, I would like to emphasize not the fictionality
so much as the temporal dialectic of a moment that is at once anticipatoryand
retroactive.
Both anticipationand retroactionare violationsofchronology,but separately
either can, ifnecessary, be sorted out, theirelements assigned to theirproper
chronological place. The specificdifficultyin thinkingthe temporalityof the
mirror stage is its intricacyof anticipation and retroaction. The retroaction
is based on the anticipation. In other words, the self is constitutedthrough
anticipatingwhat it will become, and then this anticipatorymodel is used for
gauging what was before. For example, the anticipatorytotalized body image
produces the retroactivephantasy of the body in bits and pieces.

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122 Jane Gallop

Lacan writesthat what is formedin the mirrorstage "will be the root stock
of secondaryidentifications" (Ecrits,p. 94; Sheridan, p. 2). "Will be" is an antici-
patory gesture, but what is anticipated is that "this form"will have been the
"root stock,"that is, the necessary antecedent to the later identifications.Only
by an effectof retroactionfromthe anticipated identificationsdo we under-
stand that what happens in the mirrorstage is the formationof a "root stock."
What thus occurs in the mirrorstage is the formationof what in the future
will be an antecedent, what grammaticallycan be called a "futureanterior,"
the formationof what will havebeena rootstock.Later, in the famous Discours
de Rome, Lacan will have written:"What realizes itselfin my history,is not
the past definiteof what was since it is no longer, nor even the presentperfect
of what has been in what I am, but the futureanterior of what I will have
been forwhat I am in the process of becoming."7"My history,"subjective his-
tory,the historyof a subject,is a successionof futureanteriors,pasts of a future,
moments twice removed from"presentreality"by the combined action of an
anticipation and a retroaction.
In "The Mirror Stage" Lacan writes that "this development is lived like a
temporal dialectic that decisivelyprojects the formationof the individual into
history"(Ecrits,p. 97; Sheridan, p. 4). "Development," "lived," and "forma-
tion" imply a natural progression, a succession of present moments or past
moments. But the mirrorstage is "decisive." It is a turningpoint that"projects"
the individual into "history,"that is, into the futureanterior. The individual
is no longer living a natural development, a chronological maturation. She is
projected, thrown forward,in an anticipation which makes her progress no
longer a natural development but a "history,"a movement doubly twistedby
anticipation and retroaction.Yet the difficultyin thinkingthe temporalityof
the mirrorstage is thatit is nonethelessa momentinthenatural maturationprocess,
a moment whichprojectsthe individual out of thatprocess.It is the moment in
a chronologythat violates that very order. As Lacan writes:"It is the moment
that decisively . . makes of the I that apparatus forwhich every push of the
instinctswill be a danger, even should it correspond to a natural maturation"
(Ecrits,p. 98; Sheridan, p. 5).
Lacan says that the infant"anticipates the maturation of his power." Yet
now we see that the anticipation is much more complicated than a simple pro-
jection into a future.For the anticipated maturationwill never simplyarrive.
Not that the infantwill not grow up, learn to walk, become capable of inde-
pendent survival. But the veryprocess of "natural maturation"is now affected
by the anticipation. It at firstappears that the infantis inscribed in an inevi-
table developmental chronology and merely "anticipates" a later moment in
that development. The organism is inscribed in an instinctualdevelopment,
but the "I," the subject primordiallyformed in the mirrorstage, the subject
that can say "my history,"must defend against "natural maturation," must
defendagainst natural chronologyin favorof the futureanterior.Any "natural
maturation" simplyproves that the selfwas not mature before, and since the
selfwas founded upon an assumption of maturity,the discoverythat maturity
was prematurelyassumed is the discoverythatthe selfis builton hollow ground.

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 Lacan's "Mirror Stage" 123

Since the entire past and present is dependent upon an already anticipated
maturity- that is, a projected ideal one - any "natural maturation"(however
closely it mightresemble the anticipated ideal one) must be defended against
forit threatensto expose the factthat the selfis an illusion done with mirrors.
Just as the subject cannot simply mature, cannot advance into the future
which he anticipated as his birthright,neithercan he inalienably possess his
past. He can never simply fall back on some accomplishment, rest on some
laurels already won, since the"past"itselfis based upon a future,whichis neces-
sarily an uncertainty.Not that he will have done nothing,or simplyforgotten
what happened, but the significanceof his past is dependent upon revelation
in the future,and it is only as significantexperience that any past can be "his
past," his experience, the accomplishment of a subject.
Lacan finallydid get a paper published in TheInternationalJournal ofPsycho-
analysis- not in 1937, but in 1953. In that article, he writes: "This illusion of
unity,in which a human being is always lookingforwardto self-mastery, entails
a constant danger of sliding back again into the chaos fromwhich he started;
it hangs over the abyss of a dizzy Ascent in which one can perhaps see the
very essence of Anxiety."8The "maturationof power" which the infantantici-
pated now has a new name: "self-mastery." Yet the"self"whichmustbe mastered
is the product of an anticipatoryillusion. To "master"the self, to understand
it, would be to realize its falsity,and thereforethe impossibilityof coinciding
withone's self.The momentof"self-mastery" cannot but be infinitelydeferred.
But that moment would also be the revelationof the meaning of the past (the
futureanterior), and so the acquisition and comprehension of the past is also
infinitely deferred.No ground is ever definitively covered, and one always risks
sliding all the way back. Hence the effectof anticipation is anxiety. But how
can we correlate this anxiety with the infant'sjubilation, equally an effectof
anticipation?
In TheProblemofAnxiety, Freud writesthat "the id cannot be afraid, as the
ego can; it is not an organization."9Anxietymightthenbe connectedto organi-
zation. That which is not organized or totalized or unifiedcannot be violated.
The anxietywhich Lacan representsas the riskof"slidingback again intochaos"
can only be experienced by the ego with its "illusion of unity."But the mirror
stage is only the firststep in the "dizzy Ascent." At this point the subject can
"look forward"without the fear of "slipping back," since she is just beginning
her climb. The ego is onlyjust being formedand as yethas no ongoing organi-
zation to be endangered. The mirrorstage is a fleetingmoment ofjubilation
before an inevitable anxiety sets in.
The mirrorstage is thus high tragedy: a briefmoment of doomed glory,
a paradise lost. The infantis "decisivelyprojected"out ofthisjoy intothe anxious
defensivenessof "history;"much as Adam and Eve are expelled fromparadise
into the world. Just as man and woman are already created but do not enter
the human condition until expelled fromEden, so the child although already
born does not become a self until the mirrorstage. Both cases are two-part
birthprocesses: once born into "nature,"the second time into "history."When
Adam and Eve eat fromthe tree of knowledge, they anticipate mastery. But

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124 Jane Gallop

what they actually gain is a horrifiedrecognition of their nakedness. This

resembles the movement by which the infant,having assumed by anticipation
a totalized, mastered body, then retroactivelyperceives his inadequacy (his
"nakedness"). Lacan has writtenanother version of the tragedyof Adam and
Eve.
If the mirrorstage is a lost paradise, then it is appropriate to recall that
the text"The Mirror Stage" is likewise a lost, originarymoment. And perhaps
the bibliographicalthinkingdone earliercan help us workthroughthistragedy.
There are, you will recall, two "MirrorStages"-one not in print,an oral event
lost to recordedhistory;the otherreadilyavailable, frequentlyreprinted,trans-
lated, collected. This doubling, however, undermines the uniqueness of the
original, lost version. For example, in Sheridan's translation,the loss is for-
gotten,covered over in various ways. If the paradise that is lost is not unique,
thenit is not exactlylost. In just such a way, perhaps, thejubilation oforiginary
anticipation need not be lost.
Lacan does not termthemirrorstage a tragedy,but he does call it a "drama."
"The mirrorstage is a drama whose internalimpetuslunges forward[sepricipiter,
precipitatesitself]frominsufficiency to anticipation- and which,forthe subject
captivated by the lure of spatial identification,machinates the succession of
phantasies which go froman image of the body in bits and pieces to a form
which we will call orthopedicof its totality- and to the armor finallyassumed
of an alienating identity,which will mark with its rigid structurehis entire
mental development"(Ecrits,p. 97; Sheridan, p. 4). This precipitous internal
impetus is the ineluctable unfoldingof a drama. The child's destinyis sealed:
insufficiency(body in bits and pieces) to anticipation (orthopedic form) and
"finally"to a rigid armor. But let us carefullyexamine the chronologyimplicit
here. The infantis thrownforwardfrom"insufficiency" to "anticipation."How-
ever, that "insufficiency" can only be understood fromthe perspective of the
"anticipation." The image of the body in bits and pieces is fabricatedretroac-
tivelyfromthe mirrorstage. It is only the anticipated "orthopedicformof its
totality"that can define-retroactively - the body as insufficient.Thus the
impetus of the drama turns out to be so radically accelerated that the second
term precedes the first- a precipitousness comparable to the speed of light.
In this light, we must question the "finally"of the "alienating identity."In a
temporal succession where the second term can precede the first,what is the
status of a "finally"?By separating anticipation fromretroaction,Lacan pre-
sents a tragedy. But having found that anticipation is always entangled with
retroaction,we must question this tragic view. Is the "rigid armor" an inevi-
table conclusion?
The problem of rigidityseems to be linked to a certain sort of temporal
succession, an irreversiblechronologythat one mightcall "tragic." It appears
that the internal linear progression of the drama leads to rigidity.But given
the effectof retroaction,one might also say that it is rigiditythat produces
irreversiblechronology.
In Lacanian tragedy, the ego finallybecomes rigid, becomes a painful,
encumbering armor that constrictsthe psyche. The notion of rigidityalso

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 Lacan's "Mirror Stage" 125

appears when Freud is discussing the ego. But with Freud it is not the ego
that is rigid, but our concept of the ego. The third chapter of The Problemof
Anxiety begins thus: "To returnto the problem of the ego. The apparent con-
tradictionis due to our having taken abstractionstoo rigidly"(p. 24). Freud
findshe has contradictedhimselffromone moment to the next in his descrip-
tion ofthe ego. Rather than considerthe contradictiona shortcoming,he decides
that it is the overly sharp delimitationof the boundaries of the concept of the
ego which causes the contradiction.A more flexibledefinitionwould avoid the
problem.
When Freud writes"the problem of the ego" we read it as our problem in
conceptualizing the ego, but perhaps we mightalso read it as "the ego's prob-
lem." The "abstraction"that is too rigid here is our conception of the ego. But,
according to Lacan's notion of the formationof the ego in "The Mirror Stage,"
the "self itself"is an idealized form, abstracted fromthe "real." So we could
say that not only the psychoanalyticconcept of the ego, but the ego itselfis
too rigid an abstraction. Rigid abstraction is intrinsically"the problem of the
ego."
Psychoanalytic science is engaged in the same dilemma as its object, the
psyche. Rigidity is the tragedythat awaits both. Yet Freud seems to glimpse
a happy ending. Not forthe psyche- his outlook thereis as bleak as Lacan's -
but forthe science. Freud is optimisticabout the possibilityof a science that
would not be irreparablyhampered by the rigidityof its concepts. If we take
the libertyof seeing an analogy between the rigid concept and the rigid ego,
then perhaps Freud's descriptionof a healthyscience can be helpfulin finding
a way for the self to sidestep its inevitable progress to rigidity.
Freud addresses the question of "where to begin"- the very question with
whichI began thispaper. Where does Lacan's Ecritsbegin?Where does a science
begin? Freud's discussion of this question begins the article called "Instincts
and their Vicissitudes": "The view is often defended that sciences should be
built up on clear and sharplydefinedbasal concepts. In actual factno science,
not even the most exact, begins with such definitions.The true beginning of
scientificactivityconsists in describingphenomena and then in proceeding to
group, classifyand correlatethem."'0 It is interestingthat the defense("is often
defended") is associated with the priorityof "clear and sharply defined"con-
cepts. The clear and sharp definitionrecalls the orthopedic, organized, ideal
form of the self, anticipated in the mirror stage. As we have seen, it is pre-
cisely this clearly defined formthat leads to defensiveness,to "armor." Freud
contraststhe defendedview (the defensiveideal) with"actual fact."Freud asserts
thatscience actuallybegins withdescriptionand not definition.He thusappears
to have answered the chronological question "Where does science begin?"
But he goes on: "Even at the stage of descriptionit is not possible to avoid
applying certain abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from
various sources and certainlynot the fruitof new experience only. Still more
indispensable are such ideas-which will later become the basal concepts of
the science- as the material is furtherelaborated. They must at firstneces-
sarily possess some measure of uncertainty;there can be no question of any

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126 Jane Gallop

clear delimitation of their content. So long as they remain in this condition,

we come to an understanding about theirmeaning by repeated referencesto
the material of observation, fromwhich we seem to have deduced our abstract
ideas, but which is in point of fact subject to them."
The "true beginning" is description. However, the "true beginning,"
untainted by abstraction, turns out to be itselfonly an abstraction. In actual
fact, abstraction is unavoidable, even at the stage of description,even though
these abstractionsdo not derive from"the new experience." Yet these abstrac-
tions are not yet concepts; they "will later become the basal concepts." The
base, the foundationis not laid first;it will be built later, retroactively.These
abstractions are anticipations of retroactivebasal concepts very much as the
image of the self formed in the mirrorstage "will be the rootstock."
Then Freud comes to a slightirregularity.The abstractions"seem"to follow
the"materialofobservation";but in factthatmaterialfollowsthe"abstractideas."
Again a comparison withthe mirrorstage is enlightening.Lacan says that the
"total form of the body . . . is more constitutivethan constituted"(Ecrits,
pp. 94-95; Sheridan, p. 2). By this I understand that although it seems that
the image of one's own body as total form is deduced from"the material of
observation," fromwhat one observes in the mirror,in point of factthe total
formis an abstract idea which shapes the observation. The question of which
comes first- abstract idea or observation, image of one's body as total form
or perception of one's body as total form-remains trickyto answer.
It is perhaps the uncertaintyof the answer to this question which is most
progressive. So long as the concepts remain to some degree uncertain, that
is, flexible,not sharplydefined, not rigidlyarmored, then the question need
not be answered. We can "come to an understanding"- thingsgo well, we can
get along. There is an exchange, "repeated references"between the abstrac-
tions and the observations. Since thereis a repeated back and forthmovement,
priorityis not particularlyimportant.
Freud continues: "Thus, strictlyspeaking, they are in the nature of con-
ventions; although everythingdepends on theirbeing chosen in no arbitrary
manner, but determinedby the importantrelationstheyhave to the empirical
material- relationsthatwe seem to divine beforewe can clearlyrecognize and
demonstrate them." The concepts are conventions; which is to say, they are
fictions. Not only that, but they are "divined": they are anticipatoryprojec-
tions. The analogy to the mirrorstage dynamic is evident. For Lacan and the
infantsubject this building upon a fictionis tragic, whereas forFreud and the
infantscience, likewise constructedupon fictionalfoundations,there is hope.
Somehow the avoidance of tragedydepends upon a retroactiveeffectrevers-
ing the internalimpetuswhichlunges forward,a retroactiveacceptance ofone's
foundations (whether concepts or self) as fiction. Such an acceptance might
mean an openness to revision, ratherthan a rigid defense against the realiza-
tion of fictionality.
Freud concludes his developmental historyof an infantscience: "It it only
aftermore searching investigationof the field in question that we are able to
formulatewith increased claritythe scientificconcepts underlyingit, and pro-

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 Lacan's "Mirror Stage" 127

gressivelyso to modifythese concepts that theybecome widely applicable and

at the same time consistentlogically. Then, indeed, it may be time to immure
them in definitions.The progressof science, however, demands a certainelas-
ticityeven in these definitions."
Freud seems finallyto go beyond the strangeyet now familiartemporality
of the"divined"basal conceptsintoa one-wayirreversibleprogressionthatfinally
"immures"the definitions.The immurementof the concepts like the armoring
of the ego would definitively(definitionally?)end the more fluid interplayof
anticipation and retroaction("repeated references")that precedes it. Science
would then proceed to containment,imprisonment,what I have earlier called
tragedy.
If tragedydemands an irreversiblechronology,then the tragicloss of elas-
ticityin a science would be based upon a simple chronological progressionin
which past discoverieshave become givensand presentobservationsand theori-
zations are founded upon that immutable past, eitheraccepting it or rejecting
it, but never questioningthatit is already known. Such a doomed sciencewould
have an objective historyof pasts and presentperfectsratherthan a subjective
history of future anteriors. Lacan has frequentlycalled his contributionto
psychoanalyticscience a "returnto Freud." This "return"is not a simple regres-
sion back to a stable point along a set line of development. It is a retroactive
effectof Lacan's teaching. Reading Freud afterhaving read Lacan is unlike
reading Freud beforeLacan. AlthoughLacanian theoryis foundedupon Freud,
followsFreud, the Freud thatit followsis shaped, "constituted"by Lacan's read-
ing. The question of which comes first,Freud or Lacan, although chronologi-
cally absurd, becomes a valid question.
In 1958, in "The Significationofthe Phallus," Lacan will claim that"Freud's
discoverytakes on its value preciselyin thatit musthaveanticipated the formulas
[of modern linguisticanalysis]."" Mature Lacanian psychoanalysiswill draw
upon modern linguistic analysis (Ferdinand de Saussure, Roman Jakobson)
which postdates Freud. But Lacan retroactivelysees Freud as having "antici-
pated" this. Freud's text, in a sense, constitutes,for Lacan, the mirrorstage
of psychoanalyticscience. In the case of the ego, the infantmay be jubilant,
but Lacan, the tragic chorus, lucidly foretellsthe coming doom. But in the
drama of psychoanalysis,it is not Freud but Lacan himselfwho is retroactively
jubilant at Freud's "anticipation" of "mature" psychoanalytictheory.Just as
Lacan's studentswill retroactivelyenjoy reading an anticipation into his early
texts.
Lacan may be tragic about the prognosis for the ego, but the ego might
look to his historyof psychoanalysisforhope. Afterall, it is most likelythere
that his ego is to be found. It is there that Lacan is at work tryingto undo
irreversiblerigidification.In the drama of psychoanalytichistory,Lacan is not
a passive, wise, ironic chorus, but a protagoniststrugglingagainst the tragic
fateofimmurement.This struggleagainst the ineluctableprogressofchronology
must stake its hopes upon the combined effectsof anticipationand retroaction.
The question of which text comes first,Freud or Lacan, this question of
a chronologyofreading (ratherthan ofwriting)returnsus to the question which

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128 Jane Gallop

began this paper: "where (and how) to begin reading Lacan?" On one level
that will always have been the implicit question of this essay. This essay is
written... (this essay will have been written- as I writeof the "present"paper
I find the futureanterior to be the most correcttense for my anticipation of
your reading). This essay will have been writtenforpeople who have not read
Lacan's texts,and is meant to be a presentation,an enticement,and an orien-
tation forthatprojectedreading. At the same time the "present"essay can most
fullybe understood as a response to Lacan, and thus takes on another dimen-
sion ifread after,ratherthan before, Lacan. If I were asked to suggest to my
reader which should be read first,I would want to reply: both.
And so thisessay which is presently(that is, in the futureanterior)attempt-
ing to formitself,to create a cohesive image out of chaos, findsitselfpartici-
pating in the same temporal dialectic it is describing. As I thus recognize my
essay as a mirror image of itself,I am jubilant.

NOTES

1. This paper is dedicatedto JamesCreech,whoseworkon prolepsisand whosecomments

on "The MirrorStage"in "ChasingafterAdvances,"YaleFrench Studies,63 (1982), pp. 183-197,
inspiredthe presentreadingof "The MirrorStage."
2. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits(Paris: Seuil, 1966).
3. Jacques Lacan, Ecrits:A Selection, trans.Alan Sheridan(New York: Norton,1977).
4. CatherineClement,Viesetligendes dejacquesLacan(Paris: Grasset,1981), p. 119. Transla-
tionmine.
5. "Le stade du miroircommeformateur de la fonctiondu Je tellequ'elle est revlleedans
l'experiencepsychanalytique," Ecrits,p. 94. The Englishtranslation is in Ecrits:A Selection,
p. 2.
All further references willbe in thetextwithpage numbersforboththeoriginaland Sheridan's
translation;thetranslationin the text,however,willbe myown.
6. JeanLaplancheandJean-Baptiste delapsychanalyse
Pontalis,Vocabulaire (Paris: PUF, 1967),
p. 453. Italicsmine.
7. "TheFunctionand FieldofSpeechand LanguageinPsychoanalysis," Ecrits,
p. 300; Sheridan,
p. 86. This major statement by Lacan is also translatedwithlengthycommentary in Anthony
Wilden, TheLanguageoftheSelf(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniv. Press, 1958).
8. JacquesLacan, "SomeReflections on theEgo,"International
Journal 34 (1953),
ofPsycho-analysis,
p. 15.
9. SigmundFreud, TheProblem ofAnxiety (New York: Norton,1963), p. 80.
10. SigmundFreud,"Instincts and TheirVicissitudes" in General
PsychologicalTheory (New York:
Collier, 1963), p. 83.
11. Lacan, "The Signification of the Phallus,"Ecrits,p. 688; Sheridan,p. 284. Italicsmine.

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