CRIMINAL LAW 1 ARTICLE 8

Republic of the Philippines

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 192180               March 21, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We decide the appeal, filed by Alfredo Delabajan (appellant), from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 25, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00228. The CA decision affirmed with modification the November 26, 2001 decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of
rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

The RTC Decision

In its November 26, 2001 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape. It gave
credence to the testimony of AAA3 that alias Kino Lascano and the appellant took turns in raping her. According to the trial court, the
victim recognized her assailants through their respective voices. The trial court held that a public accusation by a blind Filipina whose
virtue has been unblemished is worthy of belief. It also disregarded the appellant’s alibi, as he failed to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. The RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count, and to pay the victim the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, also for each
count.4

The CA Decision

On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with the modification that the appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of qualified rape. It held that the appellant actively participated with Kino in raping AAA; he tied
the victim’s hands, and then held her feet when Kino was raping her. In addition, AAA’s testimony was corroborated by the medical
findings of Dr. Ethel Simeon. The appellate court also rejected the appellant’s alibi in light of the victim’s positive declaration, and for
the appellant’s failure to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. 5

Our Ruling

We dismiss the appeal, but modify the counts of rape committed and the awarded indemnities.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accompanied such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented.6

In her September 20, 2000 testimony, AAA narrated in detail how the appellant and Kino threatened to kill her, and then took turns in
raping her. AAA explained that she recognized her assailants through their respective voices. We emphasize that the victim, although
blind, knew the identities of her two assailants because they were her neighbors. AAA explained that Kino and the appellant often
went to her residence in Sitio Maraga-as because they were the friends of her brother. Notably, the appellant admitted that he talked to
AAA on many occasions.

We view AAA’s testimony to be clear, convincing and credible considering especially the corroboration it received from the medical
certificate and testimony of Dr. Simeon. Our examination of the records shows no indication that we should view the victim’s
testimony in a suspicious light. It bears stressing that identification of an accused by his voice has been accepted, particularly in cases
where, as in this case, the victim has known the perpetrator for a long time;7 for the blind voice recognition must be a special sense that
has been developed to a very high degree. Besides, it is inconceivable that a blind woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Thus, to us, the prosecution positively established the elements of rape required
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First, the appellant and Kino succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim.
AAA was steadfast in her assertion that both the appellant and Kino had raped her, as a result of which, she felt pain. She also felt that
something "sticky" came out of the appellant’s and Kino’ private parts. Second, the assailants employed force, threat and intimidation
in satisfying their bestial desires. According to AAA, the appellant and Kino threatened to kill her if she refused to obey them.
The Presence of Conspiracy

We agree with the CA that the appellant and Kino conspired in sexually assaulting AAA. "Conspiracy exists when the acts of the
accused demonstrate a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose."8 In the present case, the acts of
Kino and of the appellant clearly indicate a unity of action: (1) Kino and the appellant entered the victim’s house at around 9:00 p.m.;
(2) Kino and the appellant ordered the victim to lie down, and threatened to kill her if she refused to do so; (3) Kino undressed AAA,
while the appellant tied her hands; (4) the appellant held AAA’s feet, while Kino inserted his penis into the victim’s private parts; and
(5) the appellant raped AAA afterwards.

Clearly, the appellant and Kino performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common
purpose or design to commit the felony. Thus, they are liable for two (2) counts of rape on account of a clear conspiracy between
them, shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the rapes. Each of them is responsible not only for
the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape committed by the other as well.

The Appellant’s Defenses

We reject the appellant’s claim that he was gathering coconuts in Sitio Pasakayon on the date and time of the rapes. It is settled that
the defense of alibi is inherently weak and easily fabricated, particularly when it is corroborated only by the wife of the appellant, as in
this case. In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the appellant was somewhere else when the offense
was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 9

In the present case, the appellant admitted that Sitio Pasakayon is just a 30-minute walk from Sitio Maraga-as. Considering how near
he was to the place where the crime was committed, the appellant’s alibi cannot be given any value. Clearly, the defense failed to
prove that it was physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the rapes.

The Court also finds unmeritorious the appellant’s contention that AAA had been instigated by WawingLascano to falsely testify
against him. The appellant alleged that Wawing was mad at him because he struck the latter’s pigs. Aside from being uncorroborated,
we find this claim implausible as the victim has no relation at all to Wawing. It is inconceivable that a young girl would be willing to
drag her honor to a merciless public scrutiny, and expose herself and her family to scandal upon the mere command and instigation of
a complete stranger.

The Other Rapes Not Proven With Moral Certainty

As earlier stated, the CA convicted the appellant of six (6) counts of qualified rape. After a meticulous reading of the records, we
sustain the appellant’s conviction for only two (2) counts of rape. It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and
distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt.10 The prosecution’s evidence must pass the exacting test of
moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant’s presumption of innocence. 11

AAA’s testimonies on two of the sexual abuses were explicit, detailing the participations of the appellant and Kino, and clearly
illustrating all the elements of the crime. However, AAA’s statements that the appellant and Kino each raped her three times were too
general and clearly inadequate to establish beyond reasonable doubt that each accused committed two other succeeding rapes. Her
testimonies were overly generalized and lacked specific details on how the other rapes were committed. We stress that a witness is not
permitted to make her own conclusion of law; whether the victim had been raped is a conclusion for this Court to make based on the
evidence presented.12

The Proper Penalty

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed whenever the rape is
committed by two or more persons. Since reclusion perpetua and death are two indivisible penalties, Article 63 13 of the Revised Penal
Code applies; when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, as in this case, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. The lower courts were, therefore, correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the
appellant.

It bears noting that under Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty shall be imposed when the
offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime. However, the information in the present case merely stated that the victim was blind; it did not specifically
allege that the appellant knew of her blindness at the time of the commission of the rape. Hence, we cannot impose the death penalty
on the appellant.

The Civil Indemnities

The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.1âwphi1 Moral damages, on the
other hand, are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape, under the assumption that the victim suffered
moral injuries from the experience she underwent. Therefore, this Court affirms the award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, based on prevailing jurisprudence. 14

In addition, we likewise award exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 for each count of rape. 15 The award of exemplary
damages is justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public example or correction for the public good.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 25, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00228 is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) Alfredo Delabajan is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape; and (b) he
is further ordered to pay the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 
Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Apolinario
D. Bruselas, Jr.; rollo, pp. 4-12.

2 
CA rollo, pp. 23-32.

3 
Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.

4 
CA rollo, p. 32.

5 
Supra note 1.

6 
People v. Cañada, G.R. No. 175317, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 388.

7 
See People v. Bandin, G.R. No. 176531, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 633, 639; People v. Reynaldo, 353 Phil. 883, 893
(1998); and People v. Calixtro, 271 Phil. 317, 328 (1991).

8 
People v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 176637, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 651, 657.

9 
People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301, 329 (2004).

10 
See People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Mercado, G.R. No. 189847, May 30, 2011.

11 
See People of the Philippines v. Henry Arpon y Juntilla, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011.

12 
People v. Matunhay, G.R. No. 178274, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 307, 319.
13 
Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.

14 
See People of the Philippines v. Bernabe Pangilinan y Crisostomo, G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011; People of the
Philippines v. Marcelo Perez, G.R. No. 191265, September 14, 2011; and People of the Philippines v. Alex Condes y
Guanzon, G.R. No. 187077, February 23, 2011.

15 
See People of the Philippines v. Vicente Publico y Amodia, G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011.