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G.R. No. 179155. April 2, 2014.*

NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, petitioner, vs. EULALIA
BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA
BRACEWELL, JAMES BRACEWELL, JOHN BRACEWELL,
EDWIN BRACEWELL, ERIC BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF
GEORGE BRACEWELL, respondents.

Civil Law; Property; Land Registration; Property Registration

Decree (P.D. No. 1529); The land registration laws were updated
and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979,
and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for
land registration is still vested on the Courts of First Instance CFIs
(now, Regional Trial Courts [RTCs]) of the province or city where
the land is situated.—Under Act No. 496 (Act 496), or the “Land
Registration Act,” as amended, — which was the law in force at the
time of the commencement by both parties of their respective
registration proceedings — jurisdiction over all applications for
registration of title was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance
(CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land
sought to be registered is situated. The land registration laws were
updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on January
23, 1979, and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an
application for land registration is still vested on the CFI (now,
RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated.
Remedial Law; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction;
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) now have the power to hear and
determine all questions, even contentious and substantial ones,
arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands
and petitions filed after such registration.—To be clear, the only
issue in Joson was which court should take cognizance of the
nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral court that had issued the
decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction. It should be pointed out, however, that with the
passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now
have the power to hear

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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and determine all questions, even contentious and substantial ones,

arising from applications for original registration of titles to lands
and petitions filed after such registration. Accordingly, and
considering further that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an
issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has
nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction, petitioner cannot now
rely on the Joson pronouncement to advance its theory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law instructs that for “as long
as a final decree has not been entered by the (Land Registration
Authority [LRA]) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed
from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.”—Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration
only proceeds from the land registration court’s directive, a petition
taken under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the
land registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for
“as long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the
period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such
decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.”
Same; Civil Procedure; Venue; Venue is only a matter of
procedure and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the
orderly administration of justice.—As the land subject of this case is
undeniably situated in Las Piñas City, the application for its original
registration should have been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC
were it not for the fact that the said court had yet to be created at the
time the application was filed. Be that as it may, and considering
further that the complication at hand is actually one of venue and
not of jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain jurisdiction over
review of registration decree cases pursuant to Section 32 of PD
1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the situation, holds
that the Las Piñas City-RTC has the authority over the petition
for the review of Decree No. N-217036 filed in this case. Indeed,
the filing of the petition for review before the Las Piñas City-RTC
was only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules of procedure
then-existing, which was temporarily set back only because of past
exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevail-

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ing, the Court perceives no compelling reason to deviate from

applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of
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procedure and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the

orderly administration of justice.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Stephen L. Monsanto for petitioner.
  Wenceslao V. Jarin for respondents.

 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the
Decision[2] dated May 23, 2007 and the Resolution[3] dated
August 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
81075, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated July 31, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 275 in Civil
Case No. LP 98-0025, directing the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) to set aside Decree of Registration No. N-217036 (Decree
No. N-217036) and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-78 in
the name of petitioner Nicomedes J. Lozada (petitioner), and
ordering the latter to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 as
well as segregate therefrom Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598.
The Facts
On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for
registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land

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[1] Rollo, pp. 8-43.
[2] Id., at pp. 179-191. Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman, with Associate
Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now, member of the Court) and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.,
concurring.
[3] Id., at pp. 202-203.
[4] Id., at pp. 102-107. Penned by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.

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covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted on February 23,

1989 by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, acting as a land
registration court.[5] Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA issued
Decree No. N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained
OCT No. 0-78 covering the said parcel of land.[6]
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the
aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a
petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,[7] otherwise known as the
“Property Registration Decree,” before the RTC of Las Piñas City,
Branch 275 (Las Piñas City-RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. LP
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98-0025,[8] claiming that a portion of Plan PSU-129514, consisting

of 3,097 square meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598
(subject lot) — of which he is the absolute owner and possessor —
is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036.[9] He allegedly
filed on September 19, 1963 an application for registration and
confirmation of the subject lot, as well as of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las Piñas City, which was granted by
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58, on May 3, 1989.[10] He
further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed the fact that he
(Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners, and left him totally
ignorant of the registration proceedings involving the lots covered
by Plan PSU-129514.[11] Instead of impleading him, petitioner listed
Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an adjoining owner,
although she had already died by that time.[12]

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 [5] Id., at p. 104.
 [6] Id.
 [7] Entitled “Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property
and for Other Purposes.”
 [8] Rollo, pp. 45-51.
 [9] Id., at p. 47.
[10] Id., at pp. 46-47.
[11] Id., at pp. 48-49.
[12] Id., at p. 48.

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In his answer[13] to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called

Bracewell a mere interloper with respect to the subject lot, which the
Bureau of Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of Plan
PSU-129514.[14] He argued that his Plan PSU-129514 was approved
way back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan PSU-180598 was
surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan, in fact,
contained a footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject
lot, is a portion of the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514.
[15]
The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M.
Cortez in his 2nd Supplementary Report dated August 5, 1996, which
was submitted to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.[16] The
report, which contains a recommendation that petitioner be ordered
to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514 in view of Bracewell’s
claims, reads as follows:
 

COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the

Honorable Court respectfully submits this report:

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1. LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the

Honorable Court on February 23, 1989, confirming the title of the
herein applicant [petitioner] over the parcel of land covered by plan
PSU-129514;
2. Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet, thru its
tie line, it was found to overlap with plan PSU-180598, Lot 5,
applied in LRC Record No. N-24916, which was referred to the
Lands Management Services, El Bldg., Quezon City, for verification
and/or correction in our letter dated January 12, 1996 x x x;
3. In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief, Surveys
Division, in his letter dated 20 June 1996, x  x  x, informed this
Authority that after [re-verification] and research of the plan, they
found out that Lot 5, PSU-180598 applied in

_______________
[13] Id., at pp. 71-73.
[14] Id., at p. 72.
[15] Id., at p. 71.
[16] Id., at p. 104.

376

LRC Record No. N-24916 is a portion of plan PSU-129514, applied

in the instant case;
4. Our records further show that the petition for registration of
title to real property pertaining to Lot 5, PSU-180598 filed by the
petitioner James Bracewell, Jr. under Land Reg. Case No. N-
4329, LRC Record No. N-24916 has been granted by the
Honorable Court per his decision dated May 3, 1989.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the
Honorable Court for its information with the recommendation that the
applicant [herein petitioner] in the instant case be ordered to cause for
the amendment of plan PSU-129514, subject of registration, by
segregating therefrom the portion of Lot 5, PSU-180598 also decided
in Land Reg. Case No. N-4328. The approved amended plan and the
corresponding certified technical descriptions shall forthwith be submitted
to the Honorable Court for its approval to enable us to comply with the
decision of the Court dated May 3, 1989 in the instant case.[17] (Emphases
supplied)

 
The Las Piñas City-RTC Ruling
Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT
No. 0-78 in bad faith, the Las Piñas City-RTC rendered a
Decision[18] on July 31, 2003 in favor of Bracewell, who had died
during the pendency of the case and was substituted by Eulalia
Bracewell and his heirs (respondents). Accordingly, it directed the
LRA to set aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and

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ordered petitioner (a) to cause the amendment of Plan PSU-129514

and to segregate therefrom the subject lot, and (b) to pay
respondents the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, as well as the
cost of suit.[19]
The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately
preventing respondents from participating and objecting to

_______________
[17] Id., at p. 105.
[18] Id., at pp. 102-107.
[19] Id., at p. 107.

377

his application for registration when the documentary evidence

showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes for
the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was recognized as the owner
thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as
well as in the City Assessor’s Office.[20]
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal[21] before the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, arguing mainly that the
Las Piñas City-RTC had no jurisdiction over a petition for review of
a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should
be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the decision
and ordered the issuance of the decree.[22] He likewise raised (a) the
failure of Bracewell to submit to conciliation proceedings,[23] as
well as (b) the commission of forum shopping, considering that the
decision granting Bracewell’s application for registration over Lots
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Plan PSU-180598 was still pending resolution
before the Court at the time he filed Civil Case No. LP 98-0025.[24]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[25] dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court
affirmed the assailed judgment of the RTC, finding that respondents
were able to substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the
procurement of Decree No. N-217036, which is the only ground that
may be invoked in a petition for review of a decree of registration
under Section 32 of PD 1529. It held that, since the petition for
review was filed within one (1) year from the issuance of the
questioned decree, and considering that the subject lot is located in
Las Piñas City, the RTC of

_______________
[20] Id., at p. 106.
[21] Id., at pp. 109-152. Appellant’s Brief dated August 15, 2004.
[22] Id., at pp. 121-122.
[23] Id., at pp. 137-139.
[24] Id., at pp. 139-140.

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[25] Id., at pp. 179-191.

378

said city had jurisdiction over the case.[26] It further declared that:
(a) there was no need to submit the case a quo for conciliation
proceedings because the LRA, which is an instrumentality of the
government, had been impleaded; (b) no forum shopping was
committed because the petition for review of the decree of
registration before the Las Piñas City-RTC and the application for
land registration then pending before the Court involved different
parties and issues; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees was well
within the sound discretion of the RTC.[27]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[28] having been denied,
[29] he now comes before the Court via the instant petition for
review, challenging primarily the jurisdiction of the Las Piñas City-
RTC which set aside and nullified the judgment rendered by the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 134 that had not yet become final and
was still within its exclusive control and discretion because the one
(1) year period within which the decree of registration issued by the
LRA could be reviewed has not yet elapsed.[30]
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not
the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for review
of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the
judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition must fail.

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[26] Id., at pp. 185-186.
[27] Id., at pp. 186-187 and p. 190.
[28] Dated June 7, 2007; id., at pp. 192-201.
[29] Id., at p. 202.
[30] Id., at p. 9.

379

Under Act No. 496[31] (Act 496), or the “Land Registration Act,”
as amended,[32] — which was the law in force at the time of the
commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings — jurisdiction over all applications for registration of
title was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now
RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be
registered is situated.[33]
The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD
1529, which took effect on January 23, 1979,[34] and under Section

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17[35] thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration is

still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where
the land is situated.[36]
Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their
comment to the instant petition that when petitioner filed his land
registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over applications
for registration of property situated in Las Piñas City was vested in
the RTC of Makati City in view of the fact that there were no RTC
branches yet in the Las Piñas

_______________
[31] Entitled “An Act to Provide for the Adjudication and Registration of Titles to
Lands in the Philippine Islands.”
[32] As amended by Act No. 2347, entitled “An Act to Provide for the Reorganization
of the Courts of First Instance and of the Court of Land Registration.”
[33] See City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24,
2011, 656 SCRA 102, 120.
[34] Esconde v. Hon. Barlongay, 236 Phil. 644, 651; 152 SCRA 603, 608 (1987).
[35] Section 17. What and where to file.—The application for land registration
shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is
situated. The applicant shall file together with the application all original muniments
of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of
Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the applicant has
furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.
[36] See City of Dumaguete v. Philippine Ports Authority, supra note 33 at pp. 120-121.

380

City at that time.[37] Bracewell’s own application over Lots 1, 2, 3,

4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all situated in Las Piñas City, was thus
granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58.[38]
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,[39] otherwise
known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” was enacted
and took effect on August 14, 1981,[40] authorizing the creation of
RTCs in different judicial regions, including the RTC of Las Piñas
City as part of the National Capital Judicial Region.[41] As pointed
out by the court a quo in its Decision dated July 31, 2003, the RTC
of Las Piñas City was established “in or about 1994.”[42]
Understandably, in February 1998, Bracewell sought the review of
Decree No. N-217036 before the Las Piñas City-RTC, considering
that the lot subject of this case is situated in Las Piñas City.
Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been
filed with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, which rendered the
assailed decision and ordered the issuance of Decree No. N-217036,
citing the 1964 case of Amando Joson, et al. v. Busuego[43] (Joson)
among others. In said case, Spouses Amando Joson and Victoria
Balmeo (Sps. Joson) filed a petition to set aside the decree of
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registration issued in favor of Teodora Busuego (Busuego) on the

ground that the latter misrepresented herself to be the sole owner of
the lot when in truth, the Sps. Joson were owners of one-half
thereof, having purchased the same from Busuego’s mother.[44] The
court a quo therein dismissed the petition for the reason that since its
jurisdiction as a cadastral court was special and

_______________
[37] Rollo, p. 242.
[38] Id., at pp. 46-47.
[39] Entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes.”
[40] Tomawis v. Balindong, G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354, 364.
[41] BP 129, Chater II, Sec. 13.
[42] Rollo, p. 105.
[43] 120 Phil. 1473; 12 SCRA 678 (1964).
[44] Id., at p. 1474; p. 679.

381

limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues raised.

Disagreeing, the Court held that, as long as the final decree has not
been issued and the period of one (1) year within which it may be
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after
hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate
the land to another.[45]
To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take
cognizance of the nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral court
that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction.[46] It should be pointed out, however, that
with the passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now
have the power to hear and determine all questions, even contentious
and substantial ones, arising from applications for original
registration of titles to lands and petitions filed after such
registration.[47] Accordingly, and considering further that the matter
of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a
matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction,[48] petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson
pronouncement to advance its theory.
Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of
registration falls within the jurisdiction of and, hence, should be
filed in the “proper Court of First Instance,” viz.:

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[45] Id., at p. 1476; p. 681.

[46] Id., at p. 1475; Id.
[47] See Philippine National Bank v. International Corporate Bank, 276 Phil. 551, 558-559;
199 SCRA 508, 514 (1991).
[48] See Manalo v. Hon. Mariano, 161 Phil. 108, 120; 69 SCRA 80, 89 (1976), citations
omitted. See also Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 218,
227, citing Coca v. Borromeo, 171 Phil. 246; 81 SCRA 278 (1978).

382

Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for

value.—The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one
year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration,
but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser
for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed
to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and
the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible
for the fraud. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

 
Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration only
proceeds from the land registration court’s directive, a petition taken
under Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the land
registration court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for “as
long as a final decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the
period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such
decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.”[49]
While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134 which rendered the decision direct-

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[49] Atty. Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 250 Phil. 504, 510; 168 SCRA 503, 509 (1988).

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383

ing the LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and should, applying
the general rule as above-stated, be the same court before which a
petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the Court
must consider the circumstantial milieu in this case that, in the
interest of orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition
before the Las Piñas City-RTC.
Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for
original registration in this case was only filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e., December
1976, Las Piñas City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the
aforesaid application should not have been filed before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134 pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing at
that time. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, the proper venue for
real actions, such as an application for original registration, lies with
the CFI of the province where the property is situated, viz.:

Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.—(a) Real actions.—Actions

affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof
lies.

As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las

Piñas City, the application for its original registration should have
been filed before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for the fact that
the said court had yet to be created at the time the application was
filed. Be that as it may, and considering further that the complication
at hand is actually one of venue and not of jurisdiction (given that
RTCs do retain jurisdiction over review of registration decree cases
pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the
peculiarity of the situation, holds that the Las Piñas City- RTC has
the authority over the petition for the review of Decree No. N-
217036 filed in this case. Indeed, the filing of the petition for
review before the Las Piñas City-RTC was only but a rectificatory
implementation of the rules of

384

procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set back only

because of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances now
prevailing, the Court perceives no compelling reason to deviate from
applying the rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of
procedure[50] and, hence, should succumb to the greater interests of
the orderly administration of justice.[51]

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Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum

shopping, submission to conciliation proceedings, and award of
attorney’s fees, suffice it to say that the same have been adequately
discussed by the appellate court and, hence, need no further
elucidation.
Finally, on the matter of petitioner’s objections against the trial
judge’s “unusual interest” in the case, the Court concurs with the CA
in saying that such tirades are not helpful to his cause. Besides, as
pointed out in the Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the RTC of Las
Piñas City, Branch 275, petitioner already had his chance to
disqualify the trial judge from further hearing the case, but the
appellate court dismissed his petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 74187
for lack of merit.[52]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
May 23, 2007 and the Resolution dated August 14, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 81075 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ.,

concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed. 

_______________
[50] See Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro, 381 Phil. 591, 610; 324 SCRA 591, 609 (2000).
[51] See Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Yap, 211 Phil. 641, 643; 126 SCRA 500, 503 (1983).
[52] Rollo, p. 103.

385

Note.—Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments,

an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived. (Salas vs.
Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560 [2013])

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