Page 1 of 6
Page 1 of 6
Page 1 of 6
Page 2 of 6
Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and owner-type jeep owned by that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto,
respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.the two vehicles collided. The front the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.24 Hearsay
right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. The bus is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.25
veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same were offered in
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted
Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners by both petitioners.26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the
Manliclic and PRBLI. testimony of DonatoGaniban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the
testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
Counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)4of the testimonies of
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in
that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of the
evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be admitted and at the
ISSUE: same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor.
To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
WON the transcripts may be admitted in evidence.
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
HELD:
G.R. No. 135644. September 17, 2001
YES. Petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo
Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,, Petitioner,
comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. vs.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or
SPOUSES GONZALO and MATILDE LABUNG-DEANG, Respondents.
unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case Topic State
involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the
issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) Case No. G.R. No. 135644, September 17, 2001
the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22 Case Name GSIS vs SpsLabung-Deang
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a Ponente Pardo, J.
testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine RELEVANT FACTS
the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, Respondents obtained a housing loan from GSIS in the amount of P8,500, secured by a real estate
petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly mortgage over the property. As required by the mortgage deed, respondents deposited owners
declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their duplicate copy with GSIS.
employees.23
11 months before maturity of the loan, respondents settled their debt with GSIS, and requested the
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of release of the owner’s duplicate title, because they intended to secure a loan from private lender Runes
the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their and would use the lot as collateral. They would use the proceeds for renovation of their residential
admissibility. house.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is However, GSIS personnel were unable to release the said owner’s duplicate title, as it could not be
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is found despite diligent search. Satisfied that the copy was really lost, GSIS commenced reconstitution
merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does proceedings, and was later able to get a reconstituted copy, and it also issued a release of mortgage.
not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti
Page 3 of 6
Respondents then filed for complaint for damages, claiming that because of the delay in releasing the the obligation." The inability of the respondents to secure
duplicate copy, respondents were unable to secure the loan from lender Runes, the proceeds of which another loan and the damages they suffered thereby has its
could have defrayed the estimated cost of renovation of their house, and could have been used for roots in the failure of the GSIS to return the owners'
some profitable business undertaking. duplicate copy of the title
CFI: Ruled in favor of respondents. Ruling that loss without justifiable cause constitutes negligence of RULING
their employees, making GSIS liable for damages.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
CA: Affirmed. GSIS is a GOCC whose charter allows for it to sue and be sued. Hence, legal personality 51240 with the MODIFICATION that award of attorney's fees is DELETED
separate from the government, and thus, outside the scope of 2180, and is liable for damages caused
[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]
by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners,
ISSUE AND RATIO DECIDENDI
v.
Issue Ratio
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
W/N GSIS, as a GOCC Yes, liable, but for a different reason.
primarily performing 214 SCRA 16
1. GSIS cites 2180, and claims falls within the term “State”,
governmental functions, is
and thus cannot be held vicariously liable <- untenable. Facts:
liable for negligent acts of its
employee acting w/in the 2180 is not applicable to the case at bar, because the act Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong, 18 years old, and deceased Wendell Libi, between 18 to 19 years old, were
scope of assigned task. complained of does not partake of a quasi-delict. sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the
guy sadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they be together again
Definition of 2176 (quasi-delict) entails no pre-existing
this made the guy resort to threats. But, the girl hold steadfast to her decision. In order to avoid the
contractual relationship between the parties.
guy, the girl lived with her best friend. On the day of the incident, the two were found shot dead with a
Since in the case at bar, there was a pre-existing contractual Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the girl instituted this case against the parents of the guy for
relations between the parties, which was the loan with damages.
mortgage, the duty of returning the duplicate title arose as
Issue:
soon as payment of the loan was made.
Whether or not the parents of the Wendell Libi is still liable for the death of Julie Ann Gotiong.
Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those Ruling:
who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable
DENIED. The parents of the guy are held liable for not exercising due diligence, diligentissimi patris
for damages.
familias, (Art. 2180). The father of the guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box. The father
Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages and the mother each had a key. The guy knew of it. The key must have been negligently left lying
for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be around or he had free access to it, such as the bag of his mother. The said gun was missing. The parents
those that are the natural and probable consequences of the were also unable to explain the photograph of their son holding a gun. The said photograph was
breach of the obligation, and which the parties have dedicated to the girl.
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
Moreover, they were remiss in their duties as parents as not being able to know that their son was a
obligation was constituted
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite (CANU) agent involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug
Since good faith is presumed and bad faith is a matter of fact informer or drug user. The damages is based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesn’t
which should be proved, we shall treat GSIS as a party who apply since the guy is or above 18 years old already.
defaulted in its obligation to return the owners' duplicate
Nostradamus Villanueva
copy of the title. As an obligor in good faith, GSIS is liable for
all the "natural and probable consequences of the breach of vs.
Page 4 of 6
Priscilla R. Domingo, et al. The registered owner is the operator with respect to the public and third persons. The owner of record
is the employer of the driver, the actual owner being considered merely as his agent.
[G.R. No. 144274, 20 September 2004, 438 SCRA 485]
G.R. No. L-25172 May 24, 1974
Facts:
LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner,
A car driven by Renato Ocfemia hit a car driven by Leandro Domingo. The registered owner of Ocfemia’s
vehicle was Nostradamus Villanueva, although Villanueva has traded/swapped the vehicle for a Pajero vs.
owned by Albert Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange.
ANTONIO R. DE JOYA, respondent.
The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila recommended the filing of an Information for reckless
FACTS:
imprudence resulting to damage to property and physical injuries.
The trial court found Villanueva liable and ordered him to pay damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court but deleted the award for attorney’s and appearance fees. Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of the Ace Advertising, proposed
to the board of directors that an employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up
Villanueva files a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
special studies in television but the board failed to act on the proposal. Still, respondent sent Taylor
Issue: abroad, on September 1953, and assured J. Antonio Araneta, company director, that the trip will be
funded by other parties, as respondent later confirmed in a memorandum. From September 1, 1953 to
Whether a registered owner of a vehicle may be held liable for damages arising from an accident
March 15, 1954, Taylor continued receiving his salaries while abroad. His salaries was ordered and
involving the said vehicle while it was being operated by the employee of the vehicle’s buyer without
approved by the respondent and were included in the semi-monthly payroll checks of the corporation
the latter’s consent and knowledge
employees. Three of the checks were signed by the company treasurer, who also put up part of the bill
Held/Ratio: connected with Taylor’s trip and handed him letters for delivery in the US. A total of P5,043.20 was
disbursed by Ace Advertising for Taylor’s travel and studies. The company filed a complaint for recovery
Yes, a registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily liable to the public and third persons
of sum, with the court of first instance in Manila, alleging they had no knowledge of the engagement
while it is being operated. The petition for review is denied and the Court of Appeals decision is
neither they authorized nor ratified it. The respondent denied all charges, also alleging that it was for
affirmed.
the company’s benefit. A 3rd-party complaint was filed against Vicente Araneta, company treasurer, for
The public has a right to assume that the registered owner is the actual owner, to make it easier for signing the checks, and Ricardo Taylor. Vicente Araneta and respondent claimed they signed the
them to enforce actions for injuries caused to them by vehicles negligently operated. However, the documents in good faith.
registered owner may recover from the person to whom he had sold, assigned, or conveyed the vehicle
The trial court ordered the respondent to pay the sum disbursed by Ace Advertising, P5,043.20, and
via a third-party complaint.
dismissed the third-party complaint. The respondent appealed and the CA affirmed the trial court’s
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should be primarily decision but reversed the judgment on the 3rd-party case stating that Vicente Araneta and Taylor were
responsible to the public or third persons while the vehicle is being driven on the streets. complicit in the unauthorized disbursement of corporate moneys jointly with the appellant.
The main aim of registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, responsibility can ISSUE:
be fixed on a definite individual–the registered owner. The primary purpose is to make certain that the
Whether or not respondent is guilty of a quasi-delict.
violator shall not escape because of lack of means to discover him.
RULING:
The law, with its aim in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law places upon
him as an incident or consequence of registration. If a registered owner is allowed to prove who the Yes. The Court upheld the decision of the CA. The Court agrees that the respondent neglected to
supposed transferee is, it would be easy for him to escape responsibility and transfer it to an indefinite perform his duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer and affirmed that the
person or to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the injury or damage. acts of the respondent, Vicente Araneta, and Ricardo Taylor affirm their guilt of unauthorized
disbursement of corporate moneys, without evidence to prove otherwise. And as it was an
Whether the driver is authorized by the actual owner is irrelevant in determining the liability of the
unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was these three without whose acts the
registered owner. To require so would defeat the purpose of the enactment of motor vehicle
same could not have happened, the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by them committed
registration.
upon the corporation, for which solidary liability should have been imposed upon all in the first place,
Page 5 of 6
Art. 2194, New Civil Code; and only De Joya having been sued and made liable by the corporation, it The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
was the right of the latter to ask that his two joint tortfeasors be made to shoulder their proportional follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the
responsibility. same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR. What would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
G.R. No. L-12219, 15 March 1918
Abstract speculation cannot be of much value; as reasonable men govern their conduct by the
STREET, J.: circumstances which are before them or known to them, and hence they can be expected to take care
only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Reasonable foresight of harm
FACTS:
is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. In fine, the proper criterion for determining
On 12 December 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, Amado Picart was riding on the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man
his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith Jr. approached from the in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. As Smith neared probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that
the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG,
coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or petitioners-appellants,
the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
vs.
bridge instead of going to the left. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman would CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.
move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the
Facts:
automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of
without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the Antipolo St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into
horse getting across to the other side, Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing; but in so doing the automobile inserted. The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the Africa and heirs of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo
bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the Boquiren, the agent in charge of its operation, for damages. The CFI and CA found that the petitioners
flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some failed to prove negligence of the respondents, and that there was due care in the premises and with
violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which caused temporary respect to the supervision of their employees.
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
Issue:
ISSUE:
Whether or not, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
Whether or not Smith is guilty of negligence. should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the respondents.
RULING: Held:
Yes. Smith, in maneuvering his car in the manner described, was guilty of negligence such as gives rise Yes. Res ipsa loquitur literally means “the thing or transaction speaks for itself.” For the doctrine of res
to a civil obligation to repair the damage done. In the nature of things the control of the situation had ipsa loquitur to apply, the following requisites should be present: (a) the accident is of a kind which
passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (b) it is caused by an instrumentality
there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and (c) the possibility of contributing
the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. In the case at bar, the gasoline
almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. A fire
eye of the law. occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could
Page 6 of 6
have known how the fire started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation
thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of
care. The negligence of the employees was the proximate cause of the fire, which in the ordinary course
of things does not happen. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to the award for damages.
Page 7 of 6