02 Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management, G.R. No. 185412, 16 November 2011

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 7

1 Torts and Damages | Atty.

Marianne Beltran-Angeles

G.R. No. 185412 November 16, 2011

GILBERT QUIZORA, Petitioner,


vs.
DENHOLM CREW MANAGEMENT (PHILIPPINES), INC., Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review challenging the September 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which set aside the Resolutions2 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dated September 20, 2004 and May 24, 2005, and reinstated the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter (LA) dated June 27, 2002.

The Facts

Records show that in 1992, Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc. (respondent company), a
domestic manning agency that supplied manpower to Denklav Maritime Services, Ltd. (Denklav), a
foreign maritime corporation, hired the services of Gilbert Quizora (petitioner) to work as a messman
on board the international vessels of Denklav. Based on Article 4.2 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement3 (CBA) entered into by and between the Association of Marine Officers and Seamen Union
of the Philippines (AMOSUP) and Denholm Ship Management (Singapore) Ltd., represented by
Denklav, his contractual work as messman was considered terminated upon the expiration of each
contract. Article 5.1 thereof provided that the duration of his sea service with respondent company
was nine (9) months depending on the requirements of the foreign principal. After the end of a contract
for a particular vessel, he would be given his next assignment on a different vessel. His last assignment
was from November 4, 1999 to July 16, 2000 on board the vessel "MV Leopard."

After the expiration of his contract with "MV Leopard," petitioner was lined up for another assignment
to a different vessel, but he was later disqualified for employment and declared unfit for sea duty after
he was medically diagnosed to be suffering from "venous duplex scan (lower extremities) deep venous
insufficiency, bilateral femoral and superficial femoral veins and the (L) popliteal vein." In layman’s
terms, he was medically found to have varicose veins.

Subsequently, petitioner demanded from respondent company the payment of disability benefits,
separation pay and reimbursement of medical expenses. His demands, however, were denied. He then
submitted his claim before the AMOSUP, but it was likewise denied. Thereafter, he filed with the LA
a complaint for payment of disability benefits, medical expenses, separation pay, damages, and
attorney’s fees.

On June 27, 2002, the LA, after due hearing, rendered a decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint for
lack of merit.

On appeal, the NLRC issued its Resolution dated September 20, 2004 reversing the LA’s decision and
ordering respondent company to pay petitioner his disability compensation in the amount of
US$60,000.00.

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration in the NLRC Resolution dated May 24, 2005,
respondent company elevated the case to the CA with the following arguments:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK


AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED
TO DISABILITY BENEFITS OF $60,000.00 CONSIDERING THAT:

1) PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT HIS


ACQUISITION OF VARICOSE VEINS WAS CAUSED BY HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT WITH
PETITIONER COMPANY.

2) VARICOSE VEINS IS A COMMON DISEASE FOR THOSE WHO ARE AT LEAST 30 YEARS OLD.
IT CAN BE ACQUIRED GENETICALLY OR CAN BE DUE TO LACK OF EXERCISE. HENCE, TO
BLAME THE PETITIONER COMPANY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S VARICOSE VEINS IS
MOST UNFAIR AND UNJUST.

Andrei Da Jose | Page 1|7


2 Torts and Damages | Atty. Marianne Beltran-Angeles

3) WHILE PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAY HAVE ACQUIRED A DISABILITY, HE NEVER LOST


HIS EARNING CAPACITY PERMANENTLY SO AS TO ENTITLE HIM TO DISABILITY BENEFITS
UNDER THE CBA.

Decision of the Court of Appeals

On September 8, 2010, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the NLRC Resolution and reinstating
the LA Decision. The CA explained that since having varicose veins was not among those listed as
occupational diseases under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, petitioner bore the burden of proving
that such ailment was brought about by his working conditions. His mere claim that his employment
with respondent company was the cause of his varicose veins hardly constituted substantial evidence
to convince a reasonable mind that his ailment was work-related or the risk of contracting it was
increased by his working conditions with respondent company. There was even no proof that the
disease progressed due to the circumstances of his work which did not fall under any of the factors
that contribute to varicose veins. The mere fact that he had no other employer except respondent
company did not necessarily impute to the latter the disease acquired by him. Since his claim was not
supported by substantial evidence, he was not entitled to disability benefits.

Unsatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner raised before this Court the following

ISSUES

WHETHER RESPONDENT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PETITIONER’S


ILLNESS IS NOT WORK RELATED

II

WHETHER PETITIONER’S ILLNESS IS WORK RELATED

III

WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS

In advocacy of his position, petitioner argues that the burden of proving that his illness is not work-
related rests on the respondent company. Citing the provisions of the Philippine Overseas and
Employment Authority Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), he claims that illnesses not
listed therein are disputably presumed work-related. It is only when the claim is under the provisions
of the Employees Compensation Act that the claimant has the burden of proving that the illness is
work-related. As it is not listed, he is relieved from the trouble of proving the work-relatedness of the
illness because it is already disputably presumed by law. Hence, respondent company should rebut
this presumption by proving otherwise but, unfortunately, it failed to do so.

To petitioner, there is little difficulty in showing that acquiring varicose veins is work-related for a
seafarer. He avers that he was engaged by respondent company as a seafarer for nine (9) years covering
seven (7) contracts with their vessels; that he was medically screened in every contract; and that he
was found fit to work up to his last contract on board the vessel "MV Leopard."

Moreover, petitioner claims that he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because his
varicose veins have rendered him permanently incapacitated to return to work as a seafarer.

Position of respondent company

Respondent company counters that there is no evidence showing that petitioner’s varicose veins were
caused by his previous employment with respondent company, that this disease was work-related, and
that it caused him permanent disability.

Petitioner omitted to mention his health after his stint on the "MV Leopard." Also, his application for
a new contract with respondent company came long after the contract ended. He was discovered to
have varicose veins in March 2001, or months after his last employment contract with respondent
company ended in July 2000. So, it is difficult to conclude that his varicose veins can only be
attributable to his previous employment with the company.
Andrei Da Jose | Page 2|7
3 Torts and Damages | Atty. Marianne Beltran-Angeles

Besides, petitioner’s employment was not continuous but on a per-contract basis which usually lasted
for nine (9) months depending on the requirement of the foreign principal. He was considered "signed-
off" upon the expiration of each contract. It was possible that he acquired varicose veins while he was
"signed-off" from the vessels of respondent company. Except for his bare allegations, there is nothing
to support his theory that his intermittent contracts of employment with respondent company had
reasonable connection with his acquisition of varicose veins. He neither presented proof on this point
nor offered a medical expert opinion.

Respondent company further argues that the disputable presumption under Section 20(B) (4) of the
2000 POEA SEC is completely irrelevant to this case. First, the 2000 POEA-SEC initially took effect
sometime in July 2002. Petitioner’s last employment contract with respondent company was from
November 1999 to July 2000. Thus, at the time the parties entered into an overseas employment
contract in November 1999, the provisions of the POEA-SEC, which were deemed incorporated into
the contract, were those from the 1996 POEA-SEC. Hence, it is the 1996 POEA-SEC, not the 2000
POEA-SEC, which should govern his claim for disability benefits. The disputable presumption relied
upon by petitioner does not appear in the 1996 POEA-SEC but can only be found in the 2000 POEA-
SEC.

Second, even assuming that the 2000 POEA-SEC governed petitioner’s previous employment with
respondent company, he was still not entirely relieved of the burden to submit evidence to prove his
claim because Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC specifically pertains to work-related injury or
illness. Therefore, it is still incumbent upon him to present proof that his varicose veins were
reasonably connected to his work.

Respondent company opines that varicose veins is a common disease for those who are at least 30
years old and it can be acquired genetically or through lack of exercise.

Lastly, respondent company asserts that there is no showing that petitioner’s varicose veins caused
him permanent disability. While affliction with varicose veins may bring pain and discomfort to the
body of a person, the illness is not permanent as it can actually be treated, either through self-help or
medical care.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Before tackling the issue of what rule governs the case, there is a need to compare the provisions of
Section 20-B of the 1996 POEA-SEC and Section 20-B of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Section 20 (B) of the
1996 POEA-SEC reads as follows:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS:

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract
are as follows:

1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board
the vessel;

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the
employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital
treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be
repatriated.

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said
injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared
fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

Andrei Da Jose | Page 3|7


4 Torts and Damages | Atty. Marianne Beltran-Angeles

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination
by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when
he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the
same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory
reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear
the full cost of repatriation in the event that the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or
(2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his
former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.

5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment
caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the
schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits
arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

On the other hand, Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC reads:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term
of his contract are as follows:

1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board
the vessel;

2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the
employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital
treatment, as well as board and lodging, until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be
repatriated.

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said
injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared
fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness
allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work, or the degree of
permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination
by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return, except when
he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the
same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory
reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final
and binding on both parties.

4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work
related.

5. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear
the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2)
fit to work, but the employer is unable to find employment for the seafarer on board his former
vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.

6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or
illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits
Andrei Da Jose | Page 4|7
5 Torts and Damages | Atty. Marianne Beltran-Angeles

enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness
or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time
the illness or disease was contracted. [Emphasis supplied]

Considering that petitioner executed an overseas employment contract with respondent company in
November 1999, the 1996 POEA-SEC should govern. The 2000 POEA-SEC initially took effect on June
25, 2000. Thereafter, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) which was later lifted
on June 5, 2002. This point was discussed in the case of Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v.
Leonisa Delgado,4 where it was written:

The employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed by the contracts they
sign every time they are hired or rehired; and as long as the stipulations therein are not contrary to
law, morals, public order or public policy, they have the force of law between the parties. While the
seafarer and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement, the POEA rules and regulations
require that the POEA Standard Employment Contract be integrated in every seafarer’s contract.

A perusal of Jerry’s employment contract reveals that what was expressly integrated therein by the
parties was DOLE Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 or the POEA Amended Standard Terms
and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, and
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, series of 2000. However, POEA had issued Memorandum Circular
No. 11, series of 2000 stating that:

In view of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated 11
September 2000 on the implementation of certain amendments of the Revised Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels as contained in DOLE
Department Order No. 04 and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, both Series of 2000, please be
advised of the following:

Section 20, Paragraphs (A), (B) and (D) of the former Standard Terms and Conditions Governing
the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, as provided in DOLE
Department Order No. 33, and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, both Series of 1996 shall apply
in lieu of Section 20 (A), (B) and (D) of the Revised Version;

xxxx

In effect, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11-00 thereby paved the way for the application of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract based on POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055, series of 1996.
Worth noting, Jerry boarded the ship [in] August 2001 before the said temporary restraining order
was lifted on June 5, 2002 by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of 2002. Consequently,
Jerry’s employment contract with Coastal must conform to Section 20(A) of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract based on POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055, series of 1996, in determining
compensability of Jerry’s death. [Emphases supplied]

Thus, petitioner cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Section 20
(B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. As he did so without solid proof of work-relation and work-causation or
work-aggravation of his illness, the Court cannot provide him relief.

At any rate, granting that the provisions of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption
provision in Section 20 (B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to
present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary
to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation.
He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have existed during the
term of his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to
respondent company.

For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must
concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must
have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to
compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s
illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that
there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had
been contracted.

Andrei Da Jose | Page 5|7


6 Torts and Damages | Atty. Marianne Beltran-Angeles

The 2000 POEA-SEC defines "work-related injury" as "injury[ies] resulting in disability or death
arising out of and in the course of employment" and "work-related illness" as "any sickness resulting
to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract
with the conditions set therein satisfied.5

Unfortunately for petitioner, he failed to prove that his varicose veins arose out of his employment
with respondent company. Except for his bare allegation that it was work-related, he did not narrate
in detail the nature of his work as a messman aboard Denklav’s vessels. He likewise failed to
particularly describe his working conditions while on sea duty. He also failed to specifically state how
he contracted or developed varicose veins while on sea duty and how and why his working conditions
aggravated it. Neither did he present any expert medical opinion regarding the cause of his varicose
veins. No written document whatsoever was presented that would clearly validate his claim or visibly
demonstrate that the working conditions on board the vessels he served increased the risk of acquiring
varicose veins.

Moreover, although petitioner was rehired by respondent company several times, his eight-year
service as a seaman was not actually without a "sign-off" period. His contract with respondent company
was considered automatically terminated after the expiration of each overseas employment contract.
Upon the termination of each contract, he was considered "signed-off" and he would have to go back
and re-apply by informing respondent company as to his availability. Thereafter, he would have to
sign an Availability Advise Form. Meanwhile, he would have to wait for a certain period of time,
probably months, before he would be called again for sea service.

Thus, respondent company can argue that petitioner’s eight (8) years of service with it did not
automatically mean that he acquired his varicose veins by reason of such employment. His sea service
was not an unbroken service. The fact that he never applied for a job with any other employer is of no
moment. He enjoyed month-long "sign-off" vacations when his contract expired. It is possible that he
acquired his condition during one of his "sign-off" periods.

As discussed in the decision of the CA, varicose veins may be caused by trauma, thrombosis,
inflammation or heredity. Although the exact cause of varicose veins is still unknown, a number of
factors contribute to it which include heredity, advance aging, prolonged standing, being overweight,
hormonal influences during pregnancy, use of birth control pills, post-menopausal hormonal
replacement therapy, prolonged sitting with legs crossed, wearing tight undergarments or clothes,
history of blood clots, injury to the veins, conditions that cause increased pressure in the abdomen
including liver disease, fluid in the abdomen, previous groin injury, heart failure, topical steroids,
trauma or injury to the skin, previous venous surgery and exposure to ultra-violet rays.

Lastly, there is also no proof that petitioner’s varicose veins caused him to suffer total and permanent
disability.1âwphi1 The Pre-Employment Medical Examination6 (PEME) he underwent cannot serve
as enough basis to justify a finding of a total and permanent disability because of its non-exploratory
nature.

The fact that respondent passed the company’s PEME is of no moment. We have ruled that in the past
the PEME is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough
examination of an applicant’s medical condition. The PEME merely determines whether one is "fit to
work" at sea or "fit for sea service," it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. In short,
the "fit to work" declaration in the respondent’s PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he
was free from any ailment prior to his deployment. Thus we held in NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc.
v. NLRC:

While a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a seafarer is fit for
overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer’s true state of
health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent’s illness considering that the examinations
were not exploratory.7

Besides, it was not expressly stated in his medical diagnosis that his illness was equivalent to a total
and permanent disability. Absent any indication, the Court cannot accommodate him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Andrei Da Jose | Page 6|7


7 Torts and Damages | Atty. Marianne Beltran-Angeles

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice

Andrei Da Jose | Page 7|7

You might also like