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Department of International Relations

University of Dhaka

Professional Masters in International Relations (PMIR) Program

6th Batch Third Semester Final Examinations 2021

[To be filled in by Student]

Course Number PMIR 109

Course Title South Asian Affairs

Student’s Name Madhusudan Howlader

Examination Roll Number 2019-06-065

Class Roll Number JN 65

Registration Number H-2120/2018-2019

Email [email protected]

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Student Name: Madhusudan Howlader

Examination Roll Number: 2019-06-065
 Answer to the Ques. No. 1

South Asia is a critical link to the rise of Asia and its position in the international system. With a
population of 1.8 billion people, it houses one fourth of the global humanity. The region of South
Asia consists of seven countries: India, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and
Maldives. Some researchers and international organisations define the region as including
Afghanistan as well. In April 2007, Afghanistan became the eighth member of SAARC. It is one
of the fastest growing economies in the world. The term “South Asia” is now applied to what, in
colonial days, was commonly known as the Indian subcontinent, a diverse mix of British India
and a range of kingdoms with varying degrees of subservience and fealty to the colonial power.
In some respects, the British followed earlier models of decentralized governance for this
populous and heterogeneous region, incorporating institutional structures that dated to Mughal
days or earlier. At the same time, they added Anglo-Saxon institutions of administration, politics
and law, creating superstructures that were novel for that part of the world. These superstructures
have been assimilated and preserved to varying degrees in different parts of South Asia, but,
nevertheless, have maintained some commonality across the independent political units that
emerged from 1947 onwards. Of course, there are older commonalities, beyond the simple facts
of geography, which define the region as a recognizable entity: language, religion, culture and
learning all contribute dimensions of South Asian identity. If one goes far enough back in
history, all of these dimensions evolved and flourished in South Asia, being exported well
beyond the region: language scripts, the concept of zero, Buddhism, Hinduism, dance and music
went from South Asia to all points of the compass. At the same time, the land continually
absorbed ideas and peoples from other places, especially from the North and West. What we now
think of as quintessentially “South Asian” is often an eclectic mix of such interactions.

The Conceptual and Political Issues Defining South Asia:

It is important to provide some background discussion of the meaning of the term “South Asia,”
because it will frame the subsequent analysis. The most basic conceptualization of “South Asia”
is as a geographic region, with the underlying motivation being geopolitics. One can, for
example, correlate the use of the term with the need for an academic label for departments of
study and for

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Student Name: Madhusudan Howlader
Examination Roll Number: 2019-06-065

region-focused research centers, which – in the United States in particular – have relied on
government funding tied to perceptions of strategic importance. The relative neutrality of the
term has given it preference over the colonialera “Indian subcontinent.” In practical terms, one
has to specify precisely which nationstates are encompassed within this label, and the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as the only significant region-level
organization, provides one current operational boundary, including seven countries: Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. One can argue that SAARC should not
define South Asia, excluding and perhaps thereby marginalizing Afghanistan and Myanmar, but
we do not propose to tackle such issues here. In fact, for many purposes, the five largest of the
SAARC countries (in order of population size, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Nepal) are the ones that matter. In particular, the colonial legacy of governance institutions
(legislative, bureaucratic and judicial) and social norms (kinship and status) applies particularly
to the four largest South Asian nations. Ultimately, it is this British imperial heritage, overlaid on
culture and history, which in many ways defines a core concept of South Asia. As we shall
illustrate in the next section, the economic progress of these countries has been quite similar, and
this is arguably the result of similar institutional characteristics and social norms, which
transcend national boundaries within the region, but, at the same time, distinguish the region
from other ex-British colonies. Governance and social institutions obviously have impacts for
how collective action is achieved, and therefore how levels of public goods and services are
decided and delivered. Furthermore, norms deriving from culture and tradition have implications
for consumption patterns of private goods, including food, clothing, and entertainment. These
patterns not only shape or reinforce self-identities, but also identities as perceived by outsiders.
Two implications follow from these broad observations. First, there is a regional identity, defined
and shaped significantly by economic and social factors, which puts this very picturesquely,
though obviously with some resulting simplification and distortion, “a South Asian identity has

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become a reality in most other parts of the world. Whether one is dismissed as a ‘Paki’ or
ridiculed as Indian, people from all over South Asia have come to be identified with curry,
qawaali, cricket, Hindi films, and a distinct variety of imperial English.” transcends national
boundaries within the region. Second, this identity is largely circumscribed by this region,
extending outside only through migration. Interestingly, the shared goals of economic progress
and human development are at the core of the stated aims of SAARC. The principal goal of
SAARC is “to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia, to improve their quality of life,
to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development and to provide all
individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential.”This statement
goes much deeper than objectives such as strategic cooperation or regional trade agreements, and
represents an embodiment of the potential idea of South Asia.

Importance of South Asia in International Poltics:

South Asia is important by virtue of containing 1.8 billion people—or 30% of the global
population. Such a concentration of population will always be important, whatever its
circumstances. However, South Asia is also important in international politics for a number of
other reasons. It contains more of the world’s poor—about 500 million people—than any other
region, even Sub-Saharan Africa. The 2010 United Nations Millennium Development Goals
Report notes that the proportion of undernourished people in South Asia is again growing and is
now on a par with that of 1990. Pakistan is especially at risk. It has a population of 170 million
that is projected to grow by 85 million over the next 20 years. It is also struggling with violent
jihadi terrorism, chronic environmental problems, poor literacy rates, and a stagnant
demographic transformation. In its latest report on failed states, The Fund for Peace ranks
Pakistan as the eleventh last in terms of fragility and failing states in the world. The degree of
poverty and instability in South Asia has multiple global effects.

First, it consumes substantial global resources for refugee assistance, food programs, peace
keeping and making, and stabilisation—such as in Afghanistan now, previously in Bangladesh,
and more recently in Sri Lanka—and development assistance provided by the World Bank.

Second—partly because of the problems of poverty and also directly contributing to them—is
the fact that South Asia is one of the least stable sub-regions of the globe. Dissonance washes

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back and forward across borders, feeding from internal instability and in turn contributing to
international tension. This is in part due to the unstable borders created by the British colonial
enterprise in South Asia and in part due to the failure of governance in many regional countries.
For example, the long-standing competition between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has
contributed to sustained regional tension and the failure of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to provide a platform for cooperatiion. This regional dissonance
has, in turn, attracted outside influence and interference, and acted to leverage sub-regional
tensions into global ones.

For example:

• China’s ability, as India sees it, to ‘interfere’ in India’s troubled ‘backyard’

• the several invasions of Afghanistan, first by the Soviets and more recently by the United States
and NATO

• the incursion of more ‘puritanical’ Gulf-based versions of Islam into a region noted for its
syncretic values and pervasive Sufi versions of Islam.

• the use of South Asia as a proving and ‘breeding’ ground for global terrorism directed against
the West and Hindumajority India, and

• the nuclearisation of the India-Pakistan rivalry, with the assistance of outside powers like China
and North Korea. In a more positive context, South Asia promises to play a very important role
in the global economy if it can sort out its problems. In particular, it provides an important
reservoir of labour-intensive manufacturing potential, which could be enhanced by its proximity
to massive energy sources: the hydropower of the Himalayas and the relatively ‘clean’ gas of the
Persian Gulf. Finally, South Asia is important because it hosts India, with all that country’s
potential. India will be the most populous country in the world by 2025, and its economy is
growing. India also sits in a box seat in terms of the massive energy flows across the Indian
Ocean, which is in turn essential to fuel the growth of the tigers of Asia and of China.

India is clearly the regional giant in terms of population, economy and conventional military
strength. Surrounded by far smaller countries—all of which share a border with it except the
Maldives—India suffers from the ‘Kautilian dictum’, according to which smaller surrounding

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countries naturally seek to balance their giant neighbour with closer relations with more distant,
larger powers. China has been a prominent feature in this balancing exercise, particularly with
Pakistan, but also to a lesser extent with all other South Asian powers except Bhutan. Recently,
with the comparative decline of the West and rise of Asian powers like China, the external
dynamic has been changing. We may be seeing the emergence of a ‘quadrilateral’ consisting of
China and Pakistan ranged against the United States and India. But just how this may evolve
after the impending Afghanistan ‘end game’ remains to be seen. It is possible, even likely, that
with the end of substantial US and NATO involvement in Afghanistan, the already troubled
Pakistan-US relations will deteriorate further and the main US interest in South Asia will
devolve onto Washington’s predilection to use India to ‘balance’ the rise of China. For the
United States, India is especially relevant because it occupies a box seat in the Indian Ocean.
Although strategically relatively weak in East Asia, India is potentially far stronger in the Indian
Ocean because of its location. For the United States, the Indian Ocean is important because of its
role as the ‘west about’ route into the oil-rich and strategically important Persian Gulf. China too
is concerned about the Indian Ocean as it becomes ever more dependent on oil from the Persian
Gulf. In that regard it is concerned that India, perhaps in conjunction with the United States,
might one day during times of tension or even war use its vital strategic location to interdict oil
supplies. This concern is fuelling at least some of China’s growing involvement in the Indian
Ocean region.

The Sino-Indian rivalry is one of the more troubling features of the geopolitical structure of
South Asia. At least in the Indian Ocean, it is assuming all the hallmarks of a classic security
dilemma. On the one hand, China fears that India might seek to interdict vital energy flows,
possibly in collusion with the United States. On the other hand, India is concerned that China, in
building up its potential influence throughout the Indian Ocean region (including South Asia), is
seeking to ‘fish in the troubled waters’ of what New Delhi regards as its backyard. Much of this
results from misinterpretation; for example, many of China’s activities in South Asia can be seen
as essentially commercial (but also with a strategically hedging element). However, India has
some grounds for concern about the longstanding friendship, even strategic relationship, between
China and Pakistan. China has hardened its position on its disputed border with India since 2007,
and intensified its claim to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. This is by no means certain
and would depend on how Sino-Indian relations develop. In terms of current and future effects,

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the Sino-Indian competition offers other South Asian powers scope to play off China and India
against each other. This is a potentially dangerous game because it sharpens the security
dilemma and is ultimately bad for the region. To truly flourish, South Asia needs to set aside its
differences so it can turn itself into the next great labour-intensive manufacturing hub after China
graduates, leveraging from its massive number of cheap labourers and location near the oil and
gas-rich Persian Gulf. For this to happen, India-Pakistan relations must improve by allowing
SAARC to play its proper role in breaking down economic and security barriers across the
region.

Except in relation to India, the position of the United States in South Asia is somewhat declining
—a situation that could accelerate once the United States and NATO leave Afghanistan. The
United States is no longer as influential in the region’s multilateral economic institutions as it
once was. It no longer has massive capital reserves to invest in the region. That mantle is
progressively being taken up by China and other cashed-up Asian powers. The United States no
longer holds the degree of sway over the conduct of human rights as it once did—again for
financial reasons—as illustrated by the denouement of the civil war in Sri Lanka, when Colombo
was able to shrug off Western concerns about human rights because it was funded by China and
other Asian powers. As for China, it is not fundamentally concerned about trading off human
rights for its financial resources. But the United States remains important in relation to India and
maintaining energy flows out of the Persian Gulf. Should the hedge in relations with India
sharpen, an interesting trade-off would emerge. The United States is losing comparative
advantage to China in the production of research, technology and potentially weapons systems
due to China’s far cheaper cost structures. The United States could undertake a trade-off with
India where production—or parts of it—could be exchanged for technology.

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