PATRICIA FIGUEROA vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.

SBC CASE NO.519, JULY 31, 1997

FACTS:

In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to
the legal profession.

Figeuroa and Barranco were townmates in Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens,
they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at
the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in
1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. It was after the
child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more
than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays.
Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married
another woman.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of the respondent in engaging premarital relations with Patricia and making
promises to marry her constitute gross immoral conduct?

RULING:

The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting a permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant
and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case
citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from
the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment required and
that she remains interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court
denied respondent's motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.  Respondent's third motion to dismiss
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was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982.  In 1988, respondent repeated his
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request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-
1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the community as well as
the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer. 4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the
lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees. 5

Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant
and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree."  It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
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indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 7

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang  quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and
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a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was
born out of wedlock. 9

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible.
She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964
and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was
forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively
pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that
his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no
other indiscretion attributed to him.  Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be
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allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.