2 Ortiz vs. Kayanan, 92 SCRA 146, July 30, 1979

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 092 8/25/21, 7:32 AM
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
11
BARTOLOME ORTIZ, petitioner, vs. HON. UNION C.

KAYANAN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, Branch IV; ELEUTERIO ZAMORA,
QUIRINO COMINTAN, VICENTE FERRO, AND
GREGORIO PAMISARAN, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Possessor in Good Faith; Rights of a

possessor in good faith; When does possession in good faith legally
interrupted.·There is no question that a possessor in good faith is
entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted. Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted
from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extreneous evidence or by the filing of an action in
court by the true owner for the recovery of the property. Hence, all
the fruits that the possessor may receive from the time he is
summoned in court, or when he answers the complaint, must be
delivered and paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right of retention of a possessor in
good faith until reimbursement of his expenses on the land; Nature
of the right.·However, even after his good faith ceases, the
possessor in fact can still retain the property, pursuant to Article
546 of the New Civil Code, until he has been fully reimbursed for all
the necessary and useful expenses made by him on the property.
This right of retention has been considered as one of the
conglomerate of measures devised by the law for the protection of
the possessor in good faith. Its object is to guarantee the
reimbursement of the expenses, such as those for the preservation
of the property, or for the enhancement of its utility or productivity.
It permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has
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not been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the

possession for those necessary expenses and useful improvements
made by him on the thing possessed. The principal characteristic of
the right of retention is its accessory character. It is accessory to a
principal obligation. Considering that the right of the possessor to
receive the fruits terminates when his good faith ceases, it is
necessary in order that this right to retain may be useful, to
concede to the creditor the right to
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION
147
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 147
Ortiz vs. Kayanan
secure reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing its

proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the principal of
the debt while he remains in possession. This right of retention of
the property by the creditor, according to Scaevola, in the light of
the provisions of Article 502 of the Spanish Civil Code, is considered
not a coercive measure to oblige the debtor to pay, depriving him
temporarily of the enjoyment of the fruits of his property, but as a
means of obtaining compensation for the debt.
good faith analogous to a contract of antichresis.·The right of
retention in this case is analogous to a contract of antichresis and it
can be considered as a means of extinguishing the obligation,
inasmuch as the right to retain the thing lasts only for the period
necessary to enable the creditor to be reimbursed from the fruits for
the necessary and useful expenses.
good faith analogous to pledge as to movable property and
antichresis as to immovable property.·According to Manresa, the
right of retention is, therefore, analogous to that of a pledge, if the
property retained is a movable, and to that of antichresis, if
property held is immovable. This construction appears to be in

harmony with similar provisions of the civil law which employs the
right of retention as a means or device by which a creditor is able to
obtain the payment of a debt. Thus, under Article 1731 of the New
Civil Code, any person who has performed work upon a movable has
a right to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid.
good faith is used by means of extinguishing the obligation.·In all
of these cases, the right of retention is used as a means of
extinguishing the obligation. As amply observed by Manresa: „El
derecho de reten-cion, lo hemos dicho, es el derecho de prenda o el
de anticresis constitutido por la ley con independencia de la
voluntad de las partes.‰ In a pledge, if the thing pledged earns or
produces fruits, income, dividends or interests, the creditor shall
compensate what he receives with those which are owing him. In
the same manner, in a contract of antichresis, the creditor acquires
the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor with the
obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing,
and thereafter to the principal of his credit. The debtor can not
reacquire enjoyment of the immovable until he has actually paid
what he owes the creditor.
148
Ortiz vs. Kayanan
Same; Same; Appropriation by possessor of property of the fruits

for his exclusive benefit after confirmation of award of property to
another in a judgment not allowed; Duty of claimant of property of
accounting of the tolls collected.·Applying the afore-cited principles
to the case at bar, petitioner cannot appropriate for his own
exclusive benefit the tolls which he collected from the property
retained by him. It was his duty under the law, after deducting the
necessary expenses for his administration, to apply such amount
collected to the payment of the interest, and the balance to the
payment of the principal of the obligation. We hold, therefore, that
the disputed tolls, after deducting petitionerÊs expenses for
administration, belong to Quirino Comintan, owner of the land
through which the toll road passed, further considering that the
same was on portions of the property on which petitioner had not

introduced any improvement. The trial court itself clarified this
matter when it placed the toll road under receivership. The
omission of any mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be
attributed to the fact that the tolls appear to have been collected
after the rendition of the judgment of the trial court.
Same; Same; Obligations; Joint Liability; Presumption when
two persons are liable under a contract or judgment and no mention
of the specific liability of each for the entire obligation.·With
respect to the amount of reimbursement to be paid by Comintan, it
appears that the dispositive portion of the decision was lacking in
specificity, as it merely provided that Comintan and Zamora are
jointly liable therefor. When two persons are liable under a contract
or under a judgment, and no words appear in the contract or
judgment to make each liable for the entire obligation, the
presumption is that their obligation is joint or mancomunada, and
each debtor is liable only for a proportionate part of the obligation.
The judgment debt of P13,632.00 should, therefore, be pro-rated in
equal shares to Comintan and Zamora.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

prohibition with preliminary injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat & Associates and
Salvador, Ulgado & Carbon for petitioner.
Jose A. Cusi for private respondents.
149
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 149

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
ANTONIO, J.:
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary

Injunction to nullify the Order of respondent Judge
directing the execution of the final judgment in Civil Case
No. C-90, entitled „Bartolome Ortiz vs. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al.,‰ and the Writ of
Execution issued to implement said Order, allegedly for
being inconsistent with the judgment sought to be enforced.
Civil Case No. C-90 was filed by Bartolome Ortiz who

sought the review and/or annulment of the decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, giving
preference to the sales applications of private respondents
Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora over Lot No. 5785,
PLS-45, located at Barrio Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon.
The factual background of the case, as found by respondent

Court, is as follows:
„* * * The lot in controversy was formerly the subject of Homestead

Application No. 122417 of Martin Dolorico II,‰ plaintiff Ês ward who
died on August 20, 1931; that since then it was plaintiff who
continued the cultivation and possession of the property, without
however filing any application to acquire title thereon; that in the
Homestead Application No. 122417, Martin Dolorico II named his
uncle, Martin Dolorico I as his heir and successor in interest, so
that in 1951 Martin Dolorico I executed an affidavit relinquishing
his rights over the property in favor of defendants Quirino
Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora, his grandson and son-in-law,
respectively, and requested the Director of Lands to cancel the
homestead application; that on the strength of the affidavit,
Homestead Application No. 122417 was cancelled and thereafter,
defendants Comintan and Zamora filed their respective sales
applications Nos. 8433 and 9258; that plaintiff filed his protest on
November 26, 1951 alleging that he should be given preference to
purchase the lot inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has
been in continuous possession of the same since 1931; and inspite of
plaintiff Ês opposition, ÂPortion AÊ of the property was sold at public
auction wherein defendant Comintan was the only bidder; that on
June 8, 1957, investigation was conducted on plaintiff Ês protest by
Assistant Public Lands Inspector Serapion
150

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
Bauzon who submitted his report to the Regional Land Officer, and
who in turn rendered a decision on April 9, 1958, dismissing
plaintiff Ês claim and giving due course to defendantsÊ sales
applications on the ground that the relinquishment of the

homestead rights of Martin Dolorico I in favor of Comintan and
Zamora is proper, the former having been designated as successor
in interest of the original homestead applicant and that because
plaintiff failed to participate in the public auction, he is forever
barred to claim the property; that plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration of this decision which was denied by the Director of
Lands in his oreder dated June 10, 1959; that finally, on appeal to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the decision
1
rendered by the Regional Land Officer was affirmed in toto.‰
On March 22, 1966, respondent Court rendered judgment

in the afore-mentioned civil case, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
„IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is

hereby rendered awarding Lot No. 5785-A of PLS-45, (Calauag
Public Land Subdivision) one-half portion of the property in
litigation located at Bo. Cabuluan, Calauag, Quezon, in favor of
defendant QUIRINO COMINTAN, being the successful bidder in
the public auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands on April 18,
1955, and hereby giving due course to the Sales Application No.
9258 of defendant Eleuterio Zamora over the other half, Lot No.
5785-B of PLS-45, Calauag, without prejudice to the right of
plaintiff BARTOLOME ORTIZ to participate in the public bidding
of the same to be announced by the Bureau of Lands, Manila.
However, should plaintiff Bartolome Ortiz be not declared the
successful bidder thereof, defendants Quirino Comintan and
Eleuterio Zamora are odered to reimburse jointly said plaintiff the
improvements he has introduced on the whole property in the
amount of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-
TWO (P13,632.00) PESOS, the latter having the right to retain the
property until after he has been fully paid therefor, without interest
since he enjoys the fruits of the property in question, with prejudice
2
and with costs against the plaintiff.‰
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.

Two (2) years after the rendition of the judgment by the
________________
1 Annex „B‰, Petition, pp. 26-27, Rollo.

2 Ibid., pp. 35-36, Rollo. Italics supplied.
151
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 151

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
court a quo, while the case was pending appeal and upon
petition of private respondents Quirino Comintan and
Eleuterio Zamora, respondent Court appointed respondent
Vicente Ferro, Clerk of Court, as Receiver to collect tolls on
a portion of the property used as a diversion road. On
August 19, 1969, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
annulling the Order appointing the Receiver. Subsequently,
on February 19, 1970, the Appellate Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court. A petition for review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals was denied by this
Court on April 6, 1970. At this point, private respondents
filed a petition for appointment of a new receiver with the
court a quo. This petition was granted and the receiver was
reappointed. Petitioner sought the annulment of this Order
with the Court of Appeals, but said Court ruled that its
decision had already become final and that the records of
the case were to be remanded to the trial court.
Not satisfied with such denial, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and3
mandamus with preliminary
injunction before this Court, praying for the annulment of
the Order reappointing the Receiver. On July 13, 1970, the
petition was dismissed by this Court on the ground of
insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion.
II
The judgment having become final and executory private

respondents filed a motion for the execution of the same,
praying as follows:
„WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to

order the issuance of a writ of execution in accordance with the
judgment of this Honorable Court, confirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, commanding any lawful officer to
deliver to defendants Comintan and Zamora the land subject of the
decision in this case but allowing defendants to file a bond in such
________________
3 Docketed as G. R. No. L-32206, entitled „Bartolome Ortiz vs. Hon. Union C.

Kaynan, Eleuterio Zamora, Quirino Comintan and Vicente Ferro.‰
152

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
amount as this Honorable Court may fix, in lieu of the P13,632.00

required to be paid to plaintiff, conditioned that after the
accounting of the tools collected by plaintiff, there is still an amount
due and payable to said plaintiff, then if such amount is not paid on
demand, including the legal interests, said bond shall be held
answerable.
„Ordering further the plaintiff to render an accounting of the
tolls he collected from March of 1967 to December 31, 1968 and
from September 1969 to March 31, 1970, and deliver said tolls
collected to the receiver and if judgment is already executed, then to
Quirino Comintan and Eleuterio Zamora; and,
„Finally, to condemn plaintiff to pay moral damages for
withholding the tools which belong to your movant in an amount
4
this Court may deem just in the premises.‰
Acting upon the foregoing motion, respondent Judge issued

an Order, dated September 23, 1970, stating, among others,
the following:
„The records further disclosed that from March 1967 to December

31, 1968, plaintiff Bartolome Ortiz collected tolls on a portion of the
property in question wherein he has not introduced any
improvement particularly on Lot No. 5785-A; PLS-45 awarded to
defendant Quirino Comintan, thru which vehicular traffic was
detoured or diverted, and again from September 1969 to March 31,
1970, the plaintiff resumed the collection of tools on the same
portion without rendering any accounting on said tolls to the
Receiver, who was reappointed after submitting the required bond
and specifically authorized only to collect tolls leaving the
harvesting of the improvements to the plaintiff.
*** *** ***
„In virtue of the findings of this Court as contained in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the defendants are jointly

obligated to pay the plaintiff in the amount of P13,632.00 as
reasonable value of the improvements he introduced on the whole
property in question, and that he has the right of retention until
fully paid. It can be gleaned from the motion of the defendants that
if plaintiff submits an accounting of the tolls he collected during the
periods above alluded to, their damages of about P25,000.00 can
more
________________
4 Annex „D‰, Petition, p. 48, Rollo.
153
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 153

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
than offset their obligation of P13,362.00 in favor of the plaintiff,

thereafter the possession of the land be delivered to the defendants
since the decision of the Supreme Court has already become final
and executory, but in the interregnum pending such accounting and
recovery by the Receiver of the tolls collected by the plaintiff, the
defendants pray that they allowed to put up a bond in lieu of the
said P13,632.00 to answer for damages of the former, if any.
„On the other hand, plaintiff contends in his opposition,
admitting that the decision of the Supreme Court has become final
and executory; (1) the offer of a bond in lieu of payment of
P13,632.00 does not, and cannot, satisfy the condition imposed in
the decision of this Court which was affirmed in toto; (2) the public
sale of Portion ÂBÊ of the land has still to take place as ordained
before the decision could be executed; and, (3) that whatever sums
plaintiff may derive from the property cannot be set off against
what is due him for the improvements he made, for which he has to
be reimbursed as ordered.
*** *** ***
„Let it be known that plaintiff does not dispute his having

collected tolls during the periods from March 1967 to December 31,
1968 and from September 1969 to March 31, 1970. The Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of this Court in its findings that said
tolls belong to the defendants, considering that the same were
collected on a portion of the land in question where the plaintiff did

not introduce any improvement. The reimbursement to the plaintiff
pertains only to the value of the improvements, like coconut trees
and other plants which he introduced on the whole property. The
tolls collected by the plaintiff on an unimproved portion naturally
belong to the defen-dants, following the doctrine on accretion.
Further, the reappointment of a Receiver by this Court was upheld
by the Supreme Court when it denied the petition for certiorari filed
by the plaintiff, bolstering the legal claim of defendants over said
tolls. Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court rendered the decision
the decision of this Court retroactive
from March 22, 1966 although pending appeal its
implementation was suspended, it is our honest conviction,
therefore, that the putting up of a bond by the defendants pending
accounting of the tolls collected by the plaintiff is justified and will
not prejudice anybody, but certainly would substantially satisfy the
conditions imposed in the decision. However, insofar as the one-half
portion ÂBÊ of the pro perty, the decision may be executed only after
public sale by the Bureau of Lands shall be accomplished.
154

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
„WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Execution filed by the

defendants to be meritorious, the same is granted; provided,
however, that they put up a bond equal the adjudicated amount of
P13,632.00 accruing in favor of the plaintiff, from a reputable or
recognized bonding or surety company, conditioned that after an
accounting of the tolls collected by the plaintiff should there be
found out any balance due and payable to him after reckoning said
obligation of P13,632.00 the bond shall be held answerable
5
therefor.‰
Accordingly, a Writ of Execution was issued after private

respondent Quirino Comintan had filed the required bond.
The writ directed the Sheriff to enforce the decision of the
Court, and stated, in part, the following:
„But should there be found any amount collectible after accounting

and deducting the amount of P13,632.00, you are hereby ordered
that of the goods and chattels of Bartolome Ortiz of Bo. Kabuluan,

Calauag, Quezon, be caused to be made any excess in the above-
mentioned amount together with your lawful fees and that you
render same to defendant Quirino Comintan. If sufficient personal
property cannot be found thereof to satisfy this execution and
lawful fees thereon, then you are commanded that of the lands and
buildings of the said BARTOLOME ORTIZ you make the said
excess amount in the manner required by the Rules of Court, and
make return of your proceedings within this Court within sixty (60)
days from date of service.
„You are also ordered to cause Bartolome Ortiz to vacate the
property within fifteen (15) days after service thereof the defendant
Quirino Comintan having filed the required bond in the amount of
THIRTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO
6
(P13,632.00) PESOS.‰
On October 12, 1970, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order and Writ of
Execution, alleging:
„(a) That the respondent judge has no authority to place

respondents in possession of the property;
________________
5 Annex „A‰, Petition, pp. 17-20, Rollo.

6 Annex „C‰, Petition, p. 38, Rollo.
155
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 155

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
(b) That the Supreme Court has never affirmed any

decision of the trial court that tolls collected from
the diversionary road on the property, which is
public land, belong to said respondents;
„(c) That to assess petitioner a P25,000.00 liability for
damages is purely punitive imposition without
factual or legal justification.‰
The foregoing Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
respondent Judge per Order dated November 18, 1970.

Said Order states, in part:
„It goes without saying that defendant Comintan is entitled to be

placed in possession of Lot No. 5785-A of PLS-45 (Calauag Public
Land Subdivision) and enjoyment of the tolls from March, 1967 to
March, 1968 and from September, 1969 to March 31, 1970 which
were received by plaintiff Bartolome Ortiz, collected from the
property by reason of the diversion road where vehicular traffic was
detoured. To defendant Comintan belongs the tolls thus collected
from a portion of the land awarded to him used as a diversionary
road by the doctrine of accretion and his right over the same is ipso
jure, there being no need of any action to possess said addition. It is
so because as consistently maintained by the Supreme Court, an
applicant who has complied with all the terms and conditions which
entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, acquires
a vested right therein and is to be regarded as equitable owner
thereof so that even without a patent, a perfected homestead or
sales application is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected
by the fact that the paramount title is still in the Government and
no subsequent law can deprive him of that vested right. The
question of the actual damages suffered by defendant Comintan by
reason of the unaccounted tolls received by plaintiff had already
been fully discussed in the order of September 23, 1970 and the
Court is honestly convinced and believes it to be proper and regular
under the circumstances.
„Incidentally, the Court stands to correct itself when in the same
order, it directed the execution of the decision with respect to the
one-half portion ÂBÊ of the property only after the public sale by the
Bureau of Lands, the same being an oversight, it appearing that the
Sales Application of defendant Eleuteria Zamora had already been
recognized and fully confirmed by the Supreme Court.
„In view thereof, finding the motion filed by plaintiff to be
without merit, the Court hereby denies the same and the order of
September 23, 1970 shall remain in full force subject to the amend-
156

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
ment that the execution of the decision with respect to the one-half
portion ÂBÊ shall not be conditioned to the public sale by the Bureau
of Lands.
7
„SO ORDERED.‰
III
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, contending that

in having issued the Order and Writ of Execution,
respondent Court „acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion, because
the said order and writ in effect vary the terms of the
judgment they purportedly seek to enforce.‰ He argued that
since said judgment declared the petitioner a possessor in
good faith, he is entitled to the payment of the value of the
improvements introduced by him on the whole property,
with right to retain the land until he has been fully paid
such value. He likewise averred that no payment for
improvements has been made and, instead, a bond therefor
had been filed by defendants (private respondents), which,
according to petitioner, is not the payment envisaged in the
decision which would entitle private respondents to the
possession of the property. Furthermore, with respect to
portion „B‰, petitioner alleges that, under the decision, he
has the right to retain the same until after he has
participated and lost in the public bidding of the land to be
conducted by the Bureau of Lands. It is claimed that it is
only in the event that he loses in the bidding that he can be
legally dispossessed thereof.
It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits of the
property, including the tolls collected by him from the
passing vehicles, which according to the trial court
amounts to P25,000.00, belongs to petitioner and not to
defendant/private respondent Quirino Comintan, in
accordance with the decision itself, which decreed that the
fruits of the property shall be in lieu of interest on the
amount to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for
improvements. Any contrary opinion, in his view, would be
tantamount to an amendment of a decision which has long
become final and executory and, therefore, cannot be
lawfully done.
________________
7 Annex „G‰, Petition, pp. 69-71, Rollo.
157
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 157

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
Petitioner, therefore, prayed that: (1) a Writ of Preliminary

Injunction be issued enjoining the enforcement of the
Orders of September 23, 1970 and November 18, 1970, and
the Writ of Execution issued thereto, or restoring to
petitioner the possession of the property if the private
respondents had been placed in possession thereof; (2)
annulling said Orders as well as the Writ of Execution,
dissolving the receivership established over the property;
and (3) ordering private respondents to account to
petitioner all the fruits they may have gathered or collected
from the property in question from the time of petitionerÊs
illegal dispossession thereof.
On January 29, 1971, this Court issued the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. On January 30, 1971, private
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Modification of the Order dated January 29, 1971. This was
followed by a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and
Manifestation on February 3, 1971. In the latter motion,
private respondents manifested that the amount of
P14,040.96, representing the amount decreed in the
judgment as reimbursement to petitioner for the
improvements, plus interest for six months, has already
been deposited by them in court, „with the understanding
that said amount shall be turned over to the plaintiff after
the court a quo shall have determined the improvement on
Lot 5785-A, and subsequently the remaining balance of the
deposit shall be delivered to the petitioner (plaintiff
therein) in the event he loses the bid for Lot 8
5785-B in
favor of private respondent Eleuterio Zamora.‰ The deposit
is evidenced 9by a certification made by the Clerk of the
Court a quo. Contending that said deposit was a faithful
compliance with the judgment of the trial court, private
respondent Quirino Comintan prayed for the dissolution of
the Writ of Injunction.
It appears that as a consequence of the deposit made by
private respondents, the Deputy Sheriff of Calauag,

Quezon
________________
8 Private respondentsÊ Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and

Manifestation, pp. 87-88, Rollo.
9 Annex „B‰ of above Supplemental Motion, p. 91, Rollo.
158

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
ousted petitionerÊs representative from the land in10question

and put private respondents in possession thereof.
On March 10, 1971, petitioner filed a „Comment on
RespondentsÊ ÂMotion for ReconsiderationÊ dated January
29, 1971Ê and ÂSupplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and Manifestation,‰ contending that the tender of deposit
mentioned in the Supplemental Motion was not really and
officially made, „inasmuch as the same is not supported by
any official receipt from the lower court, or from its clerk or
cashier, as required by law;‰ that said deposit does not
constitute sufficient compliance with the judgment sought
to be enforced, neither was it legally and validly made
because the requisites for con-signation had not been
complied with; that the tender of legal interest for six
months cannot substitute petitionerÊs enjoyment of the
fruits of the property as long as the judgment in Civil Case
No. C-90 has not been implemented in the manner decreed
therein; that contrary to the allegations of private
respondents, the value of the improvements on the whole
property had been determined by the lower court, and the
segregation of the improvements for each lot should have
been raised by them at the opportune moment by asking
for the modification of the decision before it became final
and executory; and that the tolls on the property
constituted „civil fruits‰ to which the petitioner is entitled
under the terms of the decision.
IV
The issue decisive of the controvery is·after the rendition

by the trial court of its judgment in Civil Case No. C-90 on
March 22, 1966 confirming the award of one-half of the
property to Quirino Comintan·whether or not petitioner is
still entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all the
fruits of the property, such as the tolls collected by him
from March 1967 to December 1968, and September 1969
to March 31, 1970, amounting to about P25,000.00. In
other words, petitioner contends that so long as the
aforesaid amount of P13,682.00
________________
10 Manifestation of Deputy Sheriff Gregorio B. Pamisaran, p. 95, Rollo.
159
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 159

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
decreed in the judgment representing the expenses for

clearing the land and the value of the coconuts and fruit
trees planted by him remains unpaid, he can appropriate
for his exclusive benefit all the fruits which he may derive
from the property, without any obligation to apply any
portion thereof to the payment of the interest and the
principal of the debt.
We find this contention untenable.
There is no question that a possessor in good faith is
entitled to the fruits11
received before the possession is
legally interrupted. Possession in good faith ceases or is
legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are
made known to the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by
the filing of an action in 12court by the true owner for the
recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that the
possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in
court, or when he answers the complaint, must be13delivered
and paid by him to the owner or lawful possessor.
However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor
in fact can still retain the property, pursuant to Article 546
of the New Civil Code, until he has been fully reimbursed
for all the necessary and useful expenses made by him on
the property. This right of retention has been considered as

one of the conglomerate of measures devised by the law for
the protection of the possessor in good faith. Its object is to
guarantee the reimbursement of the expenses, 14
such as
those for the preservation of the property, 15
or for the
enhancement of its utility or productivity. It permits the
actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not
been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the
possession for those necessary expenses and useful
improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The
principal characteristic of the right of retention is its
accessory character. It is accessory to a principal obligation.
Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the
________________
11 Article 544, New Civil Code.

12 Tacas v. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356; Article 528, New Civil Code.
13 Araujo v. Celis, 16 Phil. 329.
14 IV Manresa, 1951 Ed., pp. 293-294.
15 Ibid., pp. 316-318.
160

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
fruits terminates when his good faith ceases, it is

necessary, in order that this right to retain may be useful,
to concede to the creditor the right to secure
reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing
its proceeds for the payment of the interest as well as the
principal of the debt while he remains in possession. This
right of retention of the properkty but the creditor,
according to Scaevola, in the light 16 of the provisions of
Article 502 of the Spanish Civil Code, is considered not a
coercive measure to oblige the debtor to pay, depriving him
temporarily of the enjoyment of the fruits of his property,
but as a means of obtaining compensation for the debt. The
right of retention in this case is analogous to a contract of
antichresis and it can be considered as a means of
extinguishing the obligation, inasmuch as the right to
retain the thing lasts only for the period necessary to

enable the creditor to be reimbursed
17
from the fruits for the
necessary and useful expenses.
According to Manresa, the right of retention is,
therefore, analogous to that of a pledge, if the property
retained is a movable, and18to that of antichresis, if the
property held is immovable. This construction appears to
be in harmony with
_______________
16 Now Article 594, New Civil Code.

17 „Notese en este caso una singularidad: En la situación juridica
prevista por el art. 502, la retención se considera, no como medio
coercitivo para obligar al deudor al pago, privandole temporalmente de
los beneficios que el goce de su propiedad pudiera reportarle, sino como
medio de obtener una compansación. La retención tiene en este caso
mucha analogia con el pacto anticrético, y podemos considerarla como
medio extintivo de una obligación, puesto que el derecho de retener la
cosa dura sólo el tiempo necessario para compensar con los frutos el coste
de las reparaciones extra-ordinarias indespensables para la subsistencia
de la cosa usufructuada. El Código se desvia conscientemente de las
propiedades genuinas del ius retentionis, pero la desviación es racionally
va derecha al logro de una finalidad juridica.Ê (8 Scaevola, Codigo, Civil.
1948 Ed., p. 478.)
18 „Facil es deducir, descartando el art. 494, por su menor relacion con
el caso en que nos encontramos, que el Código asimila el derecho de
retención en los bienes muebles a la prenda, y en los bienes inmuebles a
la anticresis, que confiere al acreedor el derecho de per-
161
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 161

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
similar provisions of the civil law which employs the right

of retention as a means or device by which a creditor is able
to obtain the payment of a debt. Thus, under Article 1731
of the New Civil Code, any person who has performed work
upon a movable has a right to retain it by way of pledge
until he is paid. Similarly, under Article 1914 of the same
Code, the agent may retain in pledge the things which are
the object of the agency until the principal effects

reimbursement of the funds advanced by the former for the
execution of the agency, or he is indemnified for all
damages which he may have suffered as a consequence of
the execution of the agency, provided he is free from fault.
To the same effect, the depositary, under Article 1994 of the
same Code, may retain the thing in pledge until the full
payment of what may be due him by reason of the deposit.
The usufructuary, pursuant to Article 612 of the same
Code, may retain the property until he is reimbursed for
the amount paid for taxes levied on the capital (Article 597)
and for extraordinary repairs (Article 594).
________________
cibir los frutos de un inmueble con la obligación de aplicarlos, al pago

de los intereses, si se debieren, y después al de capital de su credito (art.
1.881).
„An tratándose de cosas muebles, la ley hace cuanto está a su alcance
para hacer util o provechoso este derecho. De aqui el articulo 1.868: „Si la
prenda produce intereses, compensará el acreedor los que perciba con los
que se le deben; y si no se le deben, o en cuanto excedan de los
legitimamente debidos, los imputara al capital.Ê
„Respecto a la anticresis, véanse los articulos 1.882 y 1.883: ÂEl
acreedor, dice el primero, salvo pacto en contrario, está obligado a pagar
las contribuciones y cargas que pesen sobre la finca. Lo está asimismo a
hacer los gastos necesarios para su conservación y repación. Se deducirán
de los frutos las cantidades que emplee en uno u otro objetoÊ. ÂEl deudar,
dice el 1.883, no puede readquirir el goce del inmuebie sin haher pagado
antes enteramente lo que debe a su acreedor.Ê
„La posesión puede recaer en cosas muebles o inmuebles; la retencion
de que habla el art. 453 puede, pues, recaer sobre unas o otras
indistintamente. De aqui tal vez la generalidad de la expresion: retener
hasta el pago. Pero en el art. 453 se trata de gastos reem-bolsables, de
una deuda, como en los articulos 502, 522, 1.600, 1.730,
162

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
In all of these cases, the right of retention is used as a
means of extinguishing the obligation. As amply observed

by Manresa: „El derecho de retención, lo hemos dicho, es el
derecho de prenda o el de anticresis constituido por19 la ley
con independencia de la voluntad de las partes.‰ In a
pledge, if the thing pledged earns or produces fruits,
income, dividends or interests, the creditor shall
compensate
20
what he receives with those which are owing
him. In the same manner, in a contract of antichresis, the
creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them
to the payment of the interest,
21
if owing, and thereafter to
the principal of his credit. The debtor can not reacquire
enjoyment of the immovable 22
until he has actually paid
what he owes the creditor.
Applying the afore-cited principles to the case at bar,
petitioner cannot appropriate for his own exclusive benefit
the tolls which he collected from the property retained by
him. It was his duty under the law, after deducting the
necessary expenses for his administration, to apply such
amount collected to the payment of the interest, and the
balance to the payment of the principal of the obligation.
We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after
deducting petitionerÊs expenses for administration, belong
to Quirino Comintan, owner of the land through which the
toll road passed, further considering that the same was on
portions of the property on which petitioner had not
introduced any improve-
________________
1.780, 1.866 y 1.881. Debemos deducir de aqui, como alguien lo hace,

que el derecho de retención en el poseedor se reduce a un simple deposito
en los bienes muebles y a una mera administración en los inmuebles?
Que bentaja reportaria esa deducción al poseedor ni al propietario, al
acreedor ni al deudor, al vencedor ni al vencido? No es más logico
equiparar el derecho de retención a la prenda o a la anticresis? La idea
del Codigo es mas bien ésta que la otra; propietario y poseedor ganan
mas con ella.‰ (IV Manresa, 1951 Ed., pp. 328-329.)
19 IV Manresa, 1951 Ed., p. 330.
20 Article 2102, New Civil Code.
21 Article 2132, Ibid.
22 Article 2136, Ibid.
163
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 163

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
Ment. The trial court itself clarified this matter when it

placed the toll road under receivership. The omission of any
mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be attributed
to the fact that the tolls appear to have been collected after
the rendition of the judgment of the trial court.
The records further reveal that earnest efforts have been
made by private respondents to have the judgment
executed in the most practicable manner. They deposited in
court the amount of the judgment in the sum of P13,632.00
in cash, subject only to the accounting of the tolls collected
by the petitioner so that whatever is due from him may be
set off with the amount of reimbursement. This is just and
proper under the circumstances and, under the law,
compensation or set off may take place, either totally or
partially. Considering that petitioner is the creditor with
respect to the judgment obligation and the debtor with
respect to the tolls collected, Comintan being the owner
thereof, the trial courtÊs order for 23
an accounting and
compensation is in accord with law.
With respect to the amount of reimbursement to be paid
by Comintan, it appears that the dispositive portion of the
decision was lacking in specificity, as it merely provided
that Comintan and Zamora are jointly liable therefor.
When two persons are liable under a contract or under a
judgment, and no words appear in the contract or judgment
to make each liable for the entire obligation, the
presumption is that their obligation is joint or
mancomunada, and each debtor 24is liable only for a
proportionate part of the obligation. The judgment debt of
P13,632.00 should, therefore, be pro-rated in equal shares
to Comintan and Zamora.
Regarding Lot 5785-B, it appears that no public sale has
yet been conducted by the Bureau of Lands and, therefore,
petitioner is entitled to remain in possession thereof.
25
This
is not disputed by respondent Eleuterio Zamora. After
public sale is had and in the event that Ortiz is not
declared the successful
_______________
23 Cf. Articles 1278, 1279 and 1283, Ibid.

24 Cacho v. Valles, 45 Phil. 107; Ramos v. Gibbon, 67 Phil. 371.
25 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 195, Rollo.
164

Ortiz vs. Kayanan
bidder, then he should be reimbursed by respondent

Zamora in the corresponding amount for the improvements
on Lot 5785-B.
WHEREFORE, in view hereof, the Order of respondent
Court of November 18, 1970 is hereby modified to conform
to the foregoing judgment. The Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, dated January 29, 1971, is hereby dissolved.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., and Guerrero,

JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result.
Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., are on official leave.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second
Division
Order modified.
Notes.·Where a person sells land and thereafter

obtains title to it thru fraudulent misrepresentations, he is
deemed to hold it in trust for the benefit of the person
prejudiced by it, and the action for reconveyance of the
property prescribes after the lapse of ten years. (Gonzales
vs. Jimenez, 13 SCRA 80).
One cannot recognize the right of another and at the
same time claim adverse possession which can ripen to
ownership, thru acquisitive prescription. For prescription
to set in, the possession must be adverse, continuous,
public and to the exclusion of all. (Corpus vs. Padilla, 5
SCRA 814).
Good faith must rest on a colorable right in the builder,
beyond a mere stubborn belief in oneÊs title despite judicial
adjudication. (Baltazar vs. Caridad, 17 SCRA 460).
A writ of possession is illegal where, in a mere suit for
prohibition, the lower court declared a person to be the
absolute owner of a parcel of land. (Magallanes vs. Sarita,
18 SCRA 575).
Rule that possessor in good faith entitled to
reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses incurred
by him and with light of retention is not applicable to
lessee who construct
165
VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 165

People vs. Ramos
building in the belief that he was the owner thereof.

(Laureano vs. Adil, 72 SCRA 148).
Under Article 559 of the new Civil Code, the title of the
possessor in good faith is not that of ownership, but is
merely a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for
acquisitive prescription, that the clause immediately
following provides that „one who has lost any movable or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from
the person in possession of the same. (De Garcia vs. Court
of Appeals, 37 SCRA 129).
The essence of the bona fide or good faith lies in honest
belief in the validity of oneÊs right, ignorance of a superior
claim, and absence of intention to over reach another.
(Negrete vs. Court of First Instance of Marinduque, 48
SCRA 113).
Where the party in physical possession of the land
acknowledges in a public document the ownership thereof
in another, it follows the latter has, as of that time, come to
be in constructive possession of the said land thru the
former. (Viacrusis vs. Court of Appeals, 44 SCRA 176).
··o0o··
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2 Ortiz vs. Kayanan, 92 SCRA 146, July 30, 1979

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 092 8/25/21, 7:32 AM

146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BARTOLOME ORTIZ, petitioner, vs. HON. UNION C.

Civil Law; Property; Possessor in Good Faith; Rights of a

not been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 147

Ortiz vs. Kayanan

secure reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing its

property held is immovable. This construction appears to be in

148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ortiz vs. Kayanan

Same; Same; Appropriation by possessor of property of the fruits

same was on portions of the property on which petitioner had not

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 149

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary

Civil Case No. C-90 was filed by Bartolome Ortiz who

The factual background of the case, as found by respondent

„* * * The lot in controversy was formerly the subject of Homestead

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

applications on the ground that the relinquishment of the

On March 22, 1966, respondent Court rendered judgment

„IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is

Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.

1 Annex „B‰, Petition, pp. 26-27, Rollo.

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 151

The judgment having become final and executory private

„WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to

3 Docketed as G. R. No. L-32206, entitled „Bartolome Ortiz vs. Hon. Union C.

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

amount as this Honorable Court may fix, in lieu of the P13,632.00

Acting upon the foregoing motion, respondent Judge issued

„The records further disclosed that from March 1967 to December

*** *** ***

„In virtue of the findings of this Court as contained in the

dispositive portion of its decision, the defendants are jointly

4 Annex „D‰, Petition, p. 48, Rollo.

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 153

than offset their obligation of P13,362.00 in favor of the plaintiff,

*** *** ***

„Let it be known that plaintiff does not dispute his having

collected on a portion of the land in question where the plaintiff did

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

„WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Execution filed by the

Accordingly, a Writ of Execution was issued after private

„But should there be found any amount collectible after accounting

that of the goods and chattels of Bartolome Ortiz of Bo. Kabuluan,

On October 12, 1970, petitioner filed a Motion for

„(a) That the respondent judge has no authority to place

5 Annex „A‰, Petition, pp. 17-20, Rollo.

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 155

(b) That the Supreme Court has never affirmed any

The foregoing Motion for Reconsideration was denied by

respondent Judge per Order dated November 18, 1970.

„It goes without saying that defendant Comintan is entitled to be

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, contending that

7 Annex „G‰, Petition, pp. 69-71, Rollo.

VOL. 92, JULY 30, 1979 157

* * ***

* * ***