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FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R.No. 240662, September 16, 2020 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. RAYMUNDO

RAPIZ Y CORREA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT,

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This appeal assails the Decision1 dated February 7, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08109 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Raymundo Rapiz y
Correa" which affirmed appellant's conviction for simple rape, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed January

29,2016 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pinas City, in Criminal
Case No. 15-1121, is MODIFIED in that the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages are INCREASED to P75,000.00   EACH;   and   appellant   is  
further ORDERED to PAY  P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Except as otherwise
modified herein, the rest of the assailed Decision STANDS.

SO ORDERED.2
 Facts

The Charge

Raymundo Rapiz y Correa (appellant) was charged with the rape of AAA3 in Criminal
Case No. 15-1121, viz.:

That on or about the 2nd day of April 2015, in the City of Las Pinas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design and by means of force, threat, and intimidation and did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with complainant AAA, against her
will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275, Las Pinas City.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the merits ensued.

Proceedings before the Trial Court

Prosecution's Version

On April 2, 2015, AAA (complainant) and appellant were left all alone in the latter's
house. When she heard appellant call for her, she immediately approached but he
suddenly pointed a deadly weapon at her. She got shocked and was unable to react
when he undressed her and himself too. He asked her to lie down on the bed, after
which, he got on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. He threatened to kill
her and her mother if she would tell her mother about the incident. Before her mother
arrived, appellant tightly held her hands, went outside, and sharply stared at her. She
could not do anything but cry.6

On April 3, 2015, appellant brought her near a balete tree. There, he hugged her,
kissed her on the lips, fondled her breasts, and touched her vagina. He lay near her
and slept. They went back to appellant's house by 11 o'clock in the evening.7

On April 4, 2015, around 11 o'clock in the evening, appellant told her to go to the

Canon Vulcanizing Shop where he was working. When she got there, appellant
locked the door of the shop. He proposed to court her, but she refused because she
thought he is her uncle, that is, she believed that he and her mother are cousins.
Appellant got mad and no longer talked to her. They were able to go home by 1
o'clock in the morning.8

On April 6, 2015, around midnight, appellant promised to buy her a pair of slippers
and dress in Baclaran. They later went there, but he did not make good his promise.
He just made another promise to buy for her another time. He then took her to a zoo
and kissed her there. They went home afterwards.9

On April 7, 2015, her mother, BBB, filed a complaint before the barangay against
appellant's live-in partner. The reason for the complaint was that complainant and
appellant's live-in partner had apparently gotten into a fight. Appellant's live-in partner
was jealous whenever complainant conversed with appellant. Complainant attended
the hearing before the barangay where she disclosed that appellant had inserted his
penis into her vagina three (3) to four (4) times already and it all happened in
appellant's house.10

Medico-legal officer Police Senior Inspector Reah Mangroba Cornelio, M.D. (Dr.
Cornelio) examined complainant and made the following findings:

xxx

HYMEN: Presence of deep healed lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions and deep
healing laceration at 6 o'clock position.11

xxx

Conclusion

Medico-legal evaluation shows clear evidence of recent blunt penetrating trauma to

the hymen.12

Defense's Version

Appellant Raymundo Rapiz testified that complainant's mother BBB had falsely
accused him of raping her daughter because he refused to lend her P1,500.00. BBB
needed the money so she and complainant could go back to Mindoro.13

He worked at a vulcanizing shop owned by a certain Jonivie Canon and her husband,
Antonio Canon (Spouses Canon). He used to reside in Montanes Compound at No.
358, Barrio Talon, Angela Road, Las Pinas City. The compound was owned by
Antonio Jesus Montanes. On March 20, 2015, he chose to move and live in the
vulcanizing shop because he was ashamed of the behavior of complainant and her
mother. Both allegedly arrived at the compound on March 3, 2015, fighting and
cursing each other - "Narinig ko pa yung sigaw nya doon na ''Tang ina ka. Kahit
hubaran kita sa kalsada pagpilahan kita sa mga lalaki wala kang magagawa'."14

Complainant and her mother were supposed to help him wash his clothes, but it never
happened. Instead, BBB made complainant work as a canteen helper near the
vulcanizing shop. BBB even told every man in the canteen to treat complainant as if
she were his wife.15

The spouses Canon testified on appellant's character. They knew him to be

industrious, very helpful, and accommodating to his relatives. They believed that
appellant could not have raped complainant because he had a live-in partner, a
certain Ana. In the later part of March 2015, appellant approached Antonio Canon and
told him the latter stories on how BBB would do everything to put him in jail.
Eventually, BBB's wish happened.16

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision17 dated January 29, 2016, the trial court found appellant guilty as
charged. The trial court observed that complainant could write her name but did not
know how to read. She could only count up to ten (10) in Filipino and up to thirty (30)
in English. She gave a truthful and accurate narration on how appellant sexually
ravished her. By reason of appellant's moral ascendancy over her, being her mother's
cousin, he was able to unduly influence and intimidate her into having sexual relations
with him. The inconsistencies in complainant's testimony were badges of truth. Her
testimony on her sexual ravishment was corroborated by Dr. Cornelio's medico-legal.
The supposed inconsistency as to the actual time the rape incident took place, i.e.,
"April 2, 2015 at 4 o'clock in the afternoon" was indicated in the request for genital
examination issued by Police Senior Inspector Joylene Bulan while "April 2, 2015 at
9:10 o'clock in the morning" was indicated in Dr. Cornelio's medico-legal report-----
Refers to a trivial, if not irrelevant, detail. For time is not an element of rape.
Appellant's denial is a weak defense when pitted against complainant's positive and
categorical testimony. Further, BBB's alleged resentment against appellant for the
latter's supposed refusal to lend her money is too shallow a reason, nay, motivation to
falsely charge appellant with rape.18 The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the court finds Raymundo Rapiz
guilty with moral certainty of rape under Article 266-A paragraph l(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, without the possibility of parole.
He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the
amounts of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000,00 as moral damages, with the
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED. 19

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of conviction. He
argued: a) the trial court erred in giving weight to complainant's and BBB's
inconsistent and incredible testimonies on the circumstances surrounding the rape
incident; b) the prosecution was unable to prove that the alleged rape actually
happened on April 2, 2015 because complainant, on cross, testified that it happened
on March 16, 2015. Further, there was a conflict between complainant's testimony
and BBB's, i.e. complainant said she immediately informed her mother about the
incident, while BBB asserted she learned of the incident only on April 9, 2015;
c) complainant's actions during and after the alleged rape incident were inconsistent
with those of a real rape victim: she could have resisted and shouted for help
considering she was already a twenty (20) year old woman. She even visited
appellant at the vulcanizing shop two (2) days later and went with him to Baclaran on
the following day; and d) his defense of denial has more weight considering the
incredible testimonies of complainant and her mother.20

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor General Bernard
Hernandez and Senior State Solicitor Ma. Zorayda Tejones-Zuniga, countered that
complainant's testimony sufficiently established all the elements of rape. She is a
credible witness because no woman would concoct a story of defloration and allow
the examination of her private parts in the process. The medico-legal report materially
corroborated complainant's tale of sexual ravishment. Time is not an element of the
crime of rape, thus, whether the incident happened on April 2, 2015, or on another
date is immaterial. The inconsistencies between the testimonies of complainant and
her mother hinge on  minor details which do not deviate from the fact that the rape
incident did occur. Also, the alleged grudge that BBB had against him is too trivial a
reason to impel her and complainant to falsely charge him with rape. Appellant's story
that he was in the vulcanizing shop at the time the rape happened does not hold
water because the vulcanizing shop is only about eight (8) meters away from his
house. Nor can his defense of denial be accorded credence. The award of civil
indemnity and moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00
each. Complainant should also be awarded P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.21

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By its assailed Decision22 dated February 7, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed in

the main, with modification increasing the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages to P75,000.00 each and awarding exemplary damages of P75,000.00.

The Present Appeal

Appellant now seeks anew a verdict of acquittal. Both appellant23 and the OSG24
manifested that, in lieu of their supplemental briefs, they were adopting their
respective briefs in the Court of Appeals.

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in convicting appellant of rape?

Ruling

We acquit.

The general rule is that the lone testimony of the victim in a prosecution for rape, if
credible, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. The rationale is that, owing to
the nature of the offense, the only evidence that can be adduced to establish the guilt
of the accused is usually only the offended party's testimony.25

Yet, the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused demands no less

than a moral certainty of his guilt free of reasonable doubt. More, the prosecution
evidence must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense. The testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, her own credibility must also be put
on trial.26

The crime of Rape is defined and penalized under Article 266-A of The Revised Penal
Code (RPC), viz.:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1)   By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
 a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of

authority; and

d)  When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.

xxxx

The elements of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the
offender is a man who had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished
such act through force or intimidation upon her; or she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or she is under 12 years of age or is demented. The RTC and
the CA both found that complainant's testimony clearly established appellant's carnal
knowledge of her against her will by employing threat and intimidation.

There being only one witness to her harrowing experience, the Court must go over
complainant's testimony with close scrutiny. Complainant testified on what happened
to her on April 2, 2015:

Fiscal Castillo

Q: You said that you got frightened. What did you do when you got frightened after
your Tito Raymundo threatened you to kill you if you don't go near him?

Witness:

A: I did not do anything. I just remained silent.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: After you go near your Tito Raymundo, what did he do next?

Witness:

A: He removed all my clothes

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What were you then wearing?

Witness:
A: I was wearing a short and a t-shirt.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: How did your Tito Raymundo remove your clothes?

Witness:

A: He held both of my hands and then he cover[ed] my mouth.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What [did] he [use] in covering your mouth?

Witness:

A: His hands, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which hand?

Witness:

A: Flis right hand, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which hand [did] he [use] in holding your hand?

Witness:

A: Left hand, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Now, how did your Tito Raymundo remove your clothes?

Witness:

A: HINAWAKAN NIYA NGA PO.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Will you please demonstrate it to the Honorable Court?

Witness:

A: He used both of his hands in removing my clothes.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Which [was] [removed] first, your t-shirt o[f] your shorts?

Witness:

A: My T-shirt, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And after your T-shirt was remove[d] by your Tito Raymundo, what did he do next?

Witness:

A: Then he remove[d] also my bra, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And what else did he do after removing your bra?

Witness:

A: Then he remove[d] my shorts, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: While your Tito Raymundo [was] removing your clothes, referring to your t-shirt,
bra and your shorts, what were you doing?

Witness:

A: Nothing, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Why [did] [you] not shout?

Witness:

A: Because I was frightened at that time, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:
Q: Why [did] [you] not run away?

Witness:

A: NATAKOT NA NGA PO AKO KAMI LANG PONG DALAWA NUON.

xxx

Q: What did your Tito Raymundo do after removing your t-shirt, bra and your shorts?

Witness:

A: BINABOY NIYA PO AKO.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your answer "BINABOY"? What exactly did he do to you?

Witness:

A: PINASOK NIYA PO YONG ARI NIYA SA ANO KO PO.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your statement "ANO"?

Witness:

A: PINASOK NIYO PO YONG TETE NIYA SA HARAPAN KO PO.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What do you mean by your statement "HARAPAN"?

Witness:

A: BINABOY NIYA PO AKO DAHIL MAY GUSTO PO SIYA SA AKIN.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Will you please point to the Interpreter what part of your body were you referring
when you said "HARAPAN KO PO"?

Witness:

A: Here. (And the witness is referring to her vagina).

Court:

So there was this insertion of the penis to the vagina of the witness.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What did you feel Madam Witness when your Tito Raymundo inserted his penis in
your vagina?

Witness:

A: It was painful. There was pain.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: And for how long the male organ of your Tito Raymundo remained inside your
vagina?

Witness:

A: NANGHIHINA NA PO AKO NUON NOONG SINUOT NIYA PO.

xxx

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: Why [did] [you] not shout to call the attention of the people outside while your Tito
Raymundo [was] inserting his penis into your vagina?

Witness:

A: Because he was threatening me, Prosecutor.

Fiscal Castillo:

Q: In what manner was he threatening you then?

Witness:

A: He tightly [held] my hands and I could not go outside the house. KASI PO PAG
LUMABAS PO AKO PAP ATA YIN NIYA PO AKO.
Fiscal Castillo:

Q: What was your position Madam Witness when your Tito Raymundo [was] inserting
his penis into your vagina?

Witness:

A: I was lying, Prosecutor.

xxx

Q: Why were you then lying when your Tito Raymundo was removing your t-shirt, bra
and shorts?

Witness:

A: NAGHIHINA NA NGA PO AKO.27

In reviewing the foregoing testimony, we adhere to the guidelines laid down in People
v. XXX,28 viz.:

Specifically, for the review of rape cases, the Court has consistently adhered to the
following established principles: a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it
is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to
disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.

Following these principles, the Court has also refined how rape is proved. The
credibility of the complainant is the single most important issue in the prosecution of
rape cases. The categorical and candid testimony of the complainant suffices, and a
culprit may be convicted solely on the basis of her testimony, provided that it hurdles
the test of credibility. It should not just come from the mouth of a credible witness, it
should likewise be credible and reasonable in itself, candid, straightforward and in
accord with human experience. Where the discrepancies and contradictory
statements on important details in the testimony seriously impair its probative value,
cast serious doubt on its credibility, and erode the integrity of the testimony, the Court
should acquit the accused.

It is true that the Court accords great respect to the trial court's findings on witnesses'
credibility. This is because trial provides judges with the opportunity to detect cues
and expressions that could suggest sincerity or betray lies and ill will, not reflected in
the documentary or object evidence. The exception, of course, is when the trial court
and/or the CA overlooked or misconstrued substantial facts that could have affected
the outcome of the case. (Emphasis supplied)

Stated differently, where the credibility and reliability of witnesses and their respective
testimonies are key, then:

First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.

Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in
reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.

Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask
yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.29

While we believe complainant's claim of sexual intercourse with appellant, the

prosecution evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the
result of or was accomplished through force or intimidation or moral ascendancy.

It is the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

the elements of the crime of rape, which includes as above stated that an accused 
had   carnal   knowledge  of a  complainant  through   force  or intimidation. Lack of
consent through any of the modes mentioned in the RPC or case law as where moral
ascendancy is involved is not to be presumed.

However, where an accused alleges consent to the sexual act as a defense, it is his

burden of evidence to prove this allegation by substantial evidence. Thus:

Consensual sexual congress as an affirmative defense needs convincing proof such

as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the consensual romantic
relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal
knowledge of the complainant, the burden shifts to the appellant to prove his defense
by substantial evidence.... Furthermore, even assuming arguendo, that there was
some form of amorous relationship, such averment will not necessarily rule out the
use of force or intimidation by appellant to have sex against her will.30

Here, appellant did not raise the affirmative defense of consensual sex. He in fact

denied having carnal knowledge of complainant. Hence, it behooves the prosecution
to prove each of the elements of rape beyond a reasonable doubt, especially that the
sex between complainant and accused occurred through force, intimidation or moral
ascendancy. This the prosecution evidence distinctly failed.

First. Complainant mentioned that appellant threatened her with a weapon.

Interestingly, the type of weapon was never identified by complainant. She never
described how it was used to threaten her. Instead, she proceeded to describe how
she felt weak and felt that she had no other choice but to comply with appellant's
directives. As her testimony progressed, there was no longer any mention of the
purported weapon. Did appellant continue to threaten her with it? Did appellant bring it
with him when they went to the bedroom? What did appellant do with the weapon
while he was raping her? We will never know.

Surely, a person who has been threatened with a weapon will definitely remember
what was used on him on her, especially in cases where a person is threatened to do
something against his or her will, more so in the heinous crime of rape. Testimonial
evidence, to be believed, must come not only from the mouth of a credible witness,
but must also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience. A
credible witness must, therefore, be able to narrate a convincing and logical
story.31 In this case, the weapon disappeared from the narrative without any logical
explanation. Such omission leads us to conclude that the "weapon" was contrived by
complainant to give color to her claim that she was threatened by appellant.

Second. Intimidation is peculiarly addressed to the mind of the person against whom it

may be employed, and its presence is basically incapable of being tested by any hard
and fast rule. Intimidation is normally best viewed in the light of the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time and occasion of the crime.32

Complainant's claim that she was intimidated into submitting herself to appellant's
lewd designs is likewise incredible. True, appellant is her mother's cousin and
exercises moral ascendancy over her. But, complainant was already 20 years old at
the time and she was of sound body since she was able to work as a helper at a
nearby canteen. She may be illiterate, but the same cannot be considered as
equivalent to mental retardation. She is of sufficient mental aptitude and is perfectly
capable of at least resisting appellant's advances, if indeed his advances were
unwanted.

The rule is that in making a diagnosis of mental retardation, a thorough evaluation

based on history, physical, and laboratory examination made by a clinician is
necessary.33 The reason for this requirement is well-explained in both medical and
psychology literature: mental retardation is a recognized clinical syndrome usually
traceable to an organic cause, which determinants are complex and
multifactorial.34 As the boundaries between normality and retardation are difficult to
delineate, proper identification requires competent clinical evaluation of
psychosomatic parameters in conjunction with medical and laboratory tests.35

Here, the record is bereft of any evidence that a comprehensive medical evaluation
was had to properly determine complainant's mental status. There is as well no
allegation about deficiencies in her mental state.

In the absence of a weapon, appellant's threat of killing her would have been an idle
threat, or at least considerably less threatening.  Complainant never once mentioned
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

that appellant forcibly held her or pushed her to a lying position. Appellant only laid his
hands on her when he covered her mouth and seemingly took his time in taking off
her clothes. Also, nowhere is it indicated in her testimony that appellant continually
threatened to kill her if she did not comply with his wishes. Not once did she resist
appellant's advances. We note that appellant threatened complainant only once and
before he made his move on her. We simply find it implausible that a single threat, a
weak one at that, would immediately deprive a woman of her free will and immediately
subject her to the whims and caprices of a man without even giving the slightest
resistance.

Admittedly, not all victims react the same way. Some people may cry out, some may
faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the
intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to
offer any resistance at all. Resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no
burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation
employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was
more or less irresistible is beside the point.36 But in this case, complainant's total
passivity is baffling. Her narration of the events simply does not make sense and
makes her testimony incredible.

Nor can moral ascendancy be considered to have supplanted force and intimidation in
this case. For moral ascendancy can only be considered if rape of minor was
committed by a close kin or a relative within the third civil degree by consanguinity or
affinity. People v. Gacusan37 explains:

Recent cases reiterating that moral ascendancy replaces violence or intimidation in

rape committed by a close-kin cited People v. Corpuz.

In Corpuz, the accused was the live-in partner of the victim's mother. The victim, AAA,
was 13 years old when accused Corpuz started raping her. The repeated rape
incidents made AAA pregnant.

Accused Corpuz admitted his sexual encounters with AAA. He insisted, however, that

he never forced himself to AAA since he even courted her. Similarly, he admitted that
he was the father of AAA's child.

Nonetheless, this Court affirmed his conviction and held that:

[I]n rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation
be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.

In People v. Fraga, accused Fraga raped the daughters of his common-law partner.

Fraga tried evading his conviction by shifting from his defense of alibi to lack of force
or intimidation. While this Court affirmed Fraga's conviction since force and
intimidation was sufficiently proven, it also emphasized that:

[A]ccused-appellant started cohabiting with complainants' mother in 1987. As the

common-law husband of their mother, he gained such moral ascendancy over
complainants that any more resistance than had been shown by complainants cannot
reasonably be expected.

In People v. Robles, accused Robles raped his common-law wife's daughter. This

Court affirmed his conviction and likened Robles' moral ascendancy over the victim to
that of a biological father; thus:

Moral ascendancy and influence by the accused, stepfather of the 12 year—old

complainant, and threat of bodily harm rendered complainant subservient to
appellant's lustful desires... Actual force or intimidation need not even be employed
for rape to be committed where the over powering influence of a father over his
daughter suffices, (citations omitted)

Complainant is a full grown 20-year old woman at the time of her alleged sexual
ravishment. More, appellant is not even considered a close kin under the law, being
her mother's cousin. Verily, moral ascendancy cannot be taken into account and
considered as substitute for threat or intimidation.

Indeed, rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is,
against the will of the female. It is also committed without force or intimidation when
carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her consent. Carnal
knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is above the age
of consent or is capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent. The female must not
at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to penetration, however
reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents
the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial
coercion.38 Here, there is no doubt that complainant had impliedly given her consent
for appellant to have carnal knowledge of her. Her actions, or lack thereof for that
matter, speaks for itself.

Third. The reasonable doubt on the nature of complainant and appellant's sexual

congress is reinforced by their subsequent actuations. Time and again, this Court has
emphasized that a woman's conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical
value in gauging the truth of her accusations. It must coincide with logic and
experience.39 Here, complainant's actuations whenever she was with appellant are
not those of a woman whose virtue had been outraged.

Complainant admitted that the following day, on April 3, 2015, she had gone to
rendezvous with appellant to a balete tree. There, he hugged her, kissed her on the
lips, fondled her breasts, and touched her vagina. He lay near her and slept. She
never mentioned that she was threatened or forced to go with him. There is
reasonable doubt that she voluntarily submitted to appellant's ministrations while
shielded by the balete tree from prying eyes.

Again, on April 4, 2015, around 11 o'clock in the evening, she voluntarily went to the
vulcanizing shop. She did not state that appellant threatened or compelled her to go
to there in the middle of the night. When she got there, appellant locked the door of
the shop and proposed to court her - which can be construed as an attempt to
formalize, or at least put a label on, their relationship. She refused mainly because he
is her alleged uncle, which caused appellant to get mad and stop talking to her. Again,
the Court observes that the actuations of both parties are those of lovers trying to
determine if they should move forward and have a deeper connection after their
physical communion with each other.

Thereafter, on April 6, 2015, appellant promised to buy her a pair of slippers and
dress in Baclaran. When they went there, he did not make good his promise, but
made another promise to buy for her another time. He then took her to a place with
many animals and kissed her there. This time, there is no doubt that complainant
went with appellant willingly - this little excursion could even be considered a date.
Complainant was apparently comfortable and at ease in appellant's company that she
would allow herself to be seen in public with him and even be kissed by him.

Taking into account all the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that there is
reasonable doubt on the element of force, threat or intimidation in this case. There is
no moral certainty as to the crime of rape to speak of.

Reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence,
and it should pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. While no test
definitively determines what is reasonable doubt under the law, the view is that it must
involve genuine and irreconcilable contradictions based, not on suppositional thinking,
but on the hard facts constituting the elements of the crime.40

It has been repeatedly ruled that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the defense. The burden of proof rests on the prosecution. Thus, its failure to
discharge its burden in this case entitles appellant to an acquitta41 as a matter of
right. Surely, where the evidence of the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the
evidence for defense itself is equally weak, an accused must be duly accorded the
benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an
accused enjoys.42

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February

7,2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 08109 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant RAYMUNDO RAPIZ y CORREA is ACQUITTED of rape on ground
of REASONABLE DOUBT.

The Director of the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila is ordered
to immediately RELEASE RAYMUNDO RAPIZ y CORREA from detention unless he
is being held in custody for some other lawful cause; and to REPORT to this Court his
compliance within five (5) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, Reyes, J.C., Jr., Lazaro-

Javier, and Gaerlan,* JJ. concur.

Footnotes

* Designated as additional member vice J. Mario V. Lopez.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and

concurred in by Presiding Justice Romeo F. Barza and Associate
Justice Mario A. Lopez (now a member of this Court), all members of
the First Division, CA rollo, pp. 96-102.

2 Id. at 101.

3 The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other
information which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well
as those of her immediate family, or household members, shall not be
disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious initial shall, instead, be
used, in accordance with People v. Cabalquinto [533 Phil. 703 (2006)]
and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September
5, 2017.

4 CA rollo, p. 43.

5 Id. at 44.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 44

8 Id. at 44-45.

9 Id. at 45.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12  Id. at 46.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 47.

15 Id. Id. at 43-56.

18 Id. at 47-56.

19 Id. at 56.

20 Id. at 39-40.

21 Id. at 70-85.

22 Supra note 1.

23 Rollo, pp. 17-19.

24  Id. at 22-24.

25 People v. Umanilo, 784 Phil. 581, 586.(2016).

 26 People v. Rondina, 131 Phil. 410, 419 (2014).

27 CA rollo, pp. 48-51.

28 828 Phil.770, 782-783 (2018).

29 R. v. Lake, 2005 NSCA 162 (CanLII), , retrieved on 2019-07-01.

30 People v. Mantis, All Phil. 275, 287 (2004); People v. Nogpo, 603

Phil. 722 (2009); People v. Pascua, 453 Phil. 946 (2003).

31  Sps. De Leon v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 721 Phil. 839, 850

(2013).

32 See People v. Mateo, 588 Phil. 543, 558 (2008).

33 People v. Lamarroza, 359 Phil. 440, 448-449 (1998).

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 People v. Bisora, 810 Phil. 339, 344 (2017).

37 809 Phil. 773, 785-787 (2017).

38 People v. Amarela, et al., 823 Phil. 1188, 1211 -1212 (2018). 3"

People v. Laurente, 406 Phil. 337, 348 (2001).

40 People v. Ramos, 369 Phil. 84, 101 (1999).

41 People v. Tionloc, 805 Phil. 907, 920 (2017).

42 Astorga v. People, 480 Phil. 585, 596 (2004).

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