FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 204803. September 12, 2018.]

SALVADOR P. ALMAGRO, BASILIO M. CRUZ, FRANCISCO M.

JULIANO, ARTURO L. NOVENARIO and the HEIRS OF
DEMOSTHENES V. CAÑETE , petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC., LUCIO TAN and JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA ,
respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court filed by petitioners Salvador P. Almagro (Almagro), Basilio M. Cruz
(Cruz), Francisco M. Juliano (Juliano), Arturo L. Novenario (Novenario) and the
heirs of Demosthenes V. Cañete (Cañete) (collectively, petitioners), seeking
to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) December 7, 2012 Amended Decision 2
in CA-G.R. SP No. 111466. The CA reversed its earlier Decision 3 dated
January 31, 2012 where it issued certiorari in favor of petitioners against the
May 15, 2009 4 Decision and August 7, 2009 5 Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 10-003508-08. In its
Amended Decision, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC in affirming the July 16, 2008 6 Decision of Labor Arbiter Donato G.
Quinto, Jr. (Labor Arbiter) dismissing petitioners' complaint for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). HTcADC

This case arose out of the labor dispute in the 1990's between PAL, a
domestic corporation organized under the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines operating as a common carrier transporting passengers and
cargo through aircraft, and Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines
(ALPAP), the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of
all PAL's commercial pilots. 7
On December 9, 1997, ALPAP filed a notice of strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board on grounds of unfair labor practice and
union-busting by PAL (strike case). The Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Secretary (Secretary) assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute on December 23, 1997. 8 Despite the assumption of jurisdiction
by the Secretary, ALPAP declared and commenced a strike on June 5, 1998.
After failed conciliation efforts, the Secretary issued a return-to-work order 9
(return-to-work order) on June 7, 1998 addressed to all striking officers and
members of ALPAP. The strike, however, continued until June 26, 1998 when
ALPAP's officers and members attempted to report for work. 10 The
employees who attempted to return to work signed PAL's logbook for
"Return to Work Returnees/Compliance" (PAL security logbook) on June 26,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 1998. 11 PAL, however, refused to accept these returning employees on the
ground that the deadline imposed by the return-to-work order on June 9,
1998 had already lapsed. 12
This refusal of PAL to accept ALPAP's officers and members back to
work prompted ALPAP to file an illegal lockout case against PAL with the
NLRC on June 29, 1998. 13 With the Secretary still exercising jurisdiction over
the dispute, the illegal lockout case was consolidated with the strike case in
the DOLE. In a Resolution 14 dated June 1, 1999, the Secretary: (1) declared
the loss of employment status of all officers and members who participated
in the strike in defiance of the return-to-work order; and (2) dismissed the
illegal lockout case against PAL. This Resolution was questioned by ALPAP
but eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 152306, in a Resolution 15
dated April 10, 2002.
On January 13, 2003, ALPAP filed a motion with the Secretary to
determine who among its officers and members should be reinstated or
deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for their actual participation
in the strike. 16 ALPAP claimed that PAL dismissed all its members
indiscriminately, including those who did not participate in the strike. The
Secretary denied the motion on the ground that G.R. No. 152306 has
determined with finality that "the erring pilots have lost their employment
status" and "because these pilots have filed cases to contest such loss
before another forum." 17 When the case was brought up before the CA via
Rule 65, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Secretary. In G.R. No. 168382 titled Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 18 (Airline Pilots), this Court affirmed the
CA's finding and further declared that there is no necessity to conduct a
proceeding to identify the participants in the illegal strike. The records of the
case reveal the names of the pilots who returned only after June 9, 1998 or
the deadline imposed in the return-to-work order. 19
Both Decisions in G.R. No. 152306 and Airline Pilots attained finality.
Petitioners, who were former senior pilots of PAL, were among those
refused by PAL to return on June 26, 1998. They instituted the consolidated
complaints of illegal dismissal and monetary claims against PAL, Lucio Tan,
and Jose Antonio Garcia, subject of this controversy: (1) NLRC-NCR Case No.
00-07-05400-98 filed by Almagro on July 3, 1998; and (2) NLRC-NCR Case
No. 00-11-08918-98 filed by Cruz, Juliano, Novenario, and Cañete on
November 4, 1998. 20
On August 25, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 21 in
petitioners' favor. However, on January 10, 2002, the NLRC set aside the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter for want of jurisdiction, declaring that the
rehabilitation of PAL is a supervening event that divested the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC of jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC also issued an order
staying all claims against PAL. This Court upheld the NLRC's ruling owing to
the pendency of PAL's rehabilitation and the stay order issued in its favor. 22
After PAL's rehabilitation was declared a success by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on September 28, 2007, petitioners moved for the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 resumption of the consolidated cases before the Labor Arbiter.
Subsequently, proceedings ensued and both parties submitted the same
evidence previously submitted before the same Labor Arbiter. 23
In his July 16, 2008 Decision, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
consolidated complaints. The Labor Arbiter stressed that petitioners were
among the hundreds of ALPAP members who signified their intention to
return to work by signing the PAL security logbook only on June 26, 1998;
this is an admission that they, indeed, participated in the illegal strike staged
by ALPAP. Further, despite the opportunity given to them, petitioners did not
dispute that they were the persons depicted in the photographs submitted
by PAL. He thus gave credence to the affidavit of Candido Tamayo, the
Senior Field Agent of PAL's Security and Fraud Prevention Department at
that time, who testified that he took the photographs that captured some of
the petitioners participating in the strike. 24 Because of petitioners'
participation in the illegal strike and their willful defiance of the return-to-
work order, petitioners lost their employment status in PAL. 25 aScITE

The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It ruled that petitioners
acted in a concerted effort with the union, despite being on official leave.
The NLRC also gave probative value to the photographs taken by Candido
Tamayo. 26 The declaration of the illegality of the strike involved "the
consequence of loss of employment [of] all members, who in one way or
another supported the strike." 27
When the case was brought up before the CA via petition forcertiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA initially issued certiorari in favor
of petitioners. The CA found that petitioners proved that they were on official
leave of absence when (1) ALPAP staged the strike on June 5, 1998; and (2)
when the strikers were ordered to return to work. 28 On the other hand, PAL
failed to adduce evidence that petitioners were among the strikers on that
date. Their signatures on the logbook cannot be deemed to be admissions of
their involvement in the strike because these are not clear and unequivocal
statements. The CA also noted that the return-to-work order partakes of a
penal law as it imposes the ultimate penalty of dismissal. As such, the
return-to-work order should be interpreted as to include only those who
participated in the June 5, 1998 strike. 29 For want of substantial basis in fact
and in law, the CA set aside the NLRC's Decision and awarded full
backwages and monetary claims to petitioners. 30
Upon PAL's motion for reconsideration, 31 the CA promulgated its
Amended Decision 32 reversing its earlier ruling. 33 It took judicial notice of
this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 152306 and Airline Pilots, and declared that the
signatures in the PAL security logbook of the pilots who attempted to
belatedly comply with the Secretary's return-to-work order on June 26, 1998
sufficiently established that they are the strikers who defied the return-to-
work order. 34 In addition to the incident on June 26, 1998, petitioners'
common actions and behavior before and during the strike revealed their
intent to paralyze the operations of PAL. 35 As early as December 1997, the
Secretary already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and proscribed any
activity that would exacerbate the situation, yet petitioners still opted to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 take their respective leaves prior to the brewing strike. 36 Noteworthy also
was the fact that some of the petitioners were seen at the strike area even
after the return-to-work order was issued. 37 Thus, the CA found that the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case.
In this petition, petitioners assail the findings of the administrative
agencies and the CA. They posit that this Court may review the factual
findings of the administrative agencies and the appellate court when: (1) the
findings are grounded on speculation, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; and (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 38
First, petitioners question the CA's conclusion that they participated in
the illegal strike based on their signatures on the logbook. 39 They claim that
their signatures are not admissions that they were strikers because they only
signed the logbook along with the ALPAP striking pilots in the hopes that
they would be allowed to regain their employment. 40 Moreover, they signed
the logbook at the time they were already dismissed by PAL on June 9, 1998.
41

Second , petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that they defied
the return-to-work order. According to petitioners, the return-to-work order
was addressed only to striking officers and members of ALPAP, and was not
even served on petitioners. 42 They further argue that they are not strikers
because it was "legally impossible for [them] to have engaged in a strike
considering the established and admitted fact that they were all on approved
official leaves during the material period." 43 They were not expected or
suffered to work during the period of their vacation leaves, and this kind of
stoppage of work was with PAL's consent. 44 In fact, the records establish
that each of the petitioners reported for duty immediately after the
expiration of their respective leaves. 45
Third, petitioners maintain that the conclusions reached by the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter (that petitioners acted collectively with ALPAP) are
based on mere conjectures and surmises bereft of any evidentiary support.
Petitioners did not sign the logbook to signify that they were strikers. 46 Both
tribunals gave undue importance to the photographs presented by PAL, the
integrity of which is not only highly suspect, 47 but some did not contain a
time stamp as opposed to the photograph of strikers holding placards. 48
Meanwhile, petitioners Cañete and Juliano were not even shown to be at the
strike at any time. 49
Fourth, petitioners claim they are not bound by the ruling in Airline
Pilots whether by res judicata or stare decisis. 50 They were not parties
thereto because ALPAP initiated the case. In the absence of a special
authority issued by petitioners, ALPAP has no legal standing whatsoever to
prosecute petitioners' illegal dismissal complaint. The ruling in Airline Pilots
therefore finds no application to petitioners who neither took part in the
strike nor agreed to be represented by ALPAP. 51 Further, in Airline Pilots, the
defense of being on official leave at the time of the strike was not
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 appreciated because it was belatedly raised. 52 Moreover, the difference
between the evidence presented in this case and in Airline Pilots constitutes
a "powerful countervailing consideration" that bars the application of the
doctrine stare decisis. 53 The tribunals glossed over the fact that petitioners
immediately reported for work upon the expiration of their leaves, only to be
informed that they had already been dismissed on June 9, 1998. 54 HEITAD

In its comment, 55 PAL opposes the petition on the following grounds:

(1) the petition is defective in form as to petitioner Almagro since it lacks a
valid certification of non-forum shopping — the verification and certification
was not executed by Almagro but by his supposed attorney-in-fact; 56 (2) the
petition raises factual issues beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition; 57 (3)
the CA's Amended Decision, in affirming the rulings of both the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter, is supported by facts established by evidence and by law and
jurisprudence; 58 and (4) in refusing to accept those who offered to return to
work only on June 26, 1998, PAL acted in accordance with law. 59
In resolving the issue of whether the CA committed error in finding that
the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion, we find that the
determinative issue is whether petitioners are bound by the findings in
Airline Pilots that the signatories in the PAL security logbook on June 26,
1998 participated in the strike and defied the Secretary's return-to-work
order.
We deny the petition.

We first identify the boundaries by which we decide this case. In labor

cases brought up via a Rule 45 petition challenging the CA's decision in a
special civil action under Rule 65, this Court's power of review is limited to
the determination of whether the CA correctly resolved the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. We said in
Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation: 60
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed
CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that
we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the
review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision.
In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the
same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the
prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision
before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on
the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be
keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on
appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the
approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a
labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA
correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling on the case? 61 (Citations omitted;
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 emphasis in the original.)
We thus go back to the basic precepts governing a Rule 65 petition. A
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 does not concern errors of
judgment; its province is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion, as distinguished from mere errors of
judgment, connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave,"
discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by or to act at all in contemplation of law. 62
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the
NLRC when: (1) its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial
evidence or in total disregard of evidence material to, or even decisive of,
the controversy; (2) it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice; (3) the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor
Arbiter; and (4) it is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. 63
Measured by these standards, we find that the CA, in its Amended
Decision, did not err when it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC.

II

The CA concluded that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed

to the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC as the same were in
accord with Airline Pilots.
The Court in Airline Pilots ruled on two points. First, there was no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary in merely noting ALPAP's
twin motions in due deference to a final and immutable judgment rendered
by this Court in G.R. No. 152306. Second , there is no necessity to conduct a
proceeding to determine the participants in the illegal strike or those who
refused to heed the return-to-work order because the ambiguity can be
cured by reference to the body of the decision and the pleadings filed.
Explaining the second point, this Court referred to the PAL security logbook
signed by members and officers of ALPAP on June 26, 1998: ATICcS

A review of the records reveals that in [the strike case], the

DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and members to have
lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz.:
their participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their
defiance of the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The
records of the case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots.
The logbook with the heading "Return to Work
Compliance/Returnees" bears their individual signature signifying
their conformity that they were among those workers who returned
to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by DOLE.
From this crucial and vital piece of evidence, it is apparent that each
of these pilots is bound by the judgment. Besides, the complaint for
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a
finding that there was no illegal lockout would be enforceable against
them. In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they
comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1,
1999 DOLE Resolution.
ALPAP harps on the inequity of PAL's termination of its officers
and members considering that some of them were on leave or were
abroad at the time of the strike. Some were even merely barred from
returning to their work which excused them for not complying
immediately with the return-to-work order. Again, a scrutiny of the
records of the case discloses that these allegations were raised at a
very late stage, that is, after the judgment has finally decreed that
the returning pilots' termination was legal. Interestingly, these
defenses were not raised and discussed when the case was still
pending before the DOLE Secretary, the CA or even before this Court.
We agree with the position taken by Sto. Tomas and Imson that from
the time the return-to-work order was issued until this Court rendered
its April 10, 2002 resolution dismissing ALPAP's petition, no ALPAP
member has claimed that he was unable to comply with the return-to-
work directive because he was either on leave, abroad or unable to
report for some reason. These defenses were raised in ALPAP's twin
motions only after the Resolution in G.R. No. 152306 reached finality
in its last ditch effort to obtain a favorable ruling. It has been held
that a proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already
available to the parties during the pendency of such proceedings;
otherwise, it may give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings.
ALPAP was given all the opportunities to present its evidence and
arguments. It cannot now complain that it was denied due process.
Relevant to mention at this point is that when NCMB NCR NS
12-514-97 (strike/illegal lockout case) was still pending, several
complaints for illegal dismissal were filed before the Labor Arbiters of
the NLRC by individual members of ALPAP, questioning their
termination following the strike staged in June 1998. PAL likewise
manifests that there is a pending case involving a complaint for the
recovery of accrued and earned benefits belonging to ALPAP
members. Nonetheless, the pendency of the foregoing cases should
not and could not affect the character of our disposition over the
instant case. Rather, these cases should be resolved in a manner
consistent and in accord with our present disposition for effective
enforcement and execution of a final judgment. 64 (Citations
omitted.)
The impact of Airline Pilots in illegal dismissal cases filed by officers
and members of ALPAP involved in the June 1998 strike has also been
settled by this Court in Rodriguez v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 65 (Rodriguez).
The complainants in Rodriguez were 24 pilots who filed an action for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries, and damages against PAL citing
the same reasons as petitioners — that some of them were on official and/or
medical leaves at the time of the strike. The Labor Arbiter found for the
complainants, but was reversed by the NLRC. The CA reinstated the Labor
Arbiter's decision. When it was brought up before this Court, we declared
that Airline Pilots is res judicata, under the concept of conclusiveness of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 judgment, as to the issue of who among the members and officers of ALPAP
participated in the illegal strike and defied the return-to-work order:
Bearing in mind the final and executory judgments in the 1st
and 2nd ALPAP cases, the Court denies the Petition of Rodriguez, et
al., in G.R. No. 178501 and partly grants that of PAL in G.R. No.
178510.
The Court, in the 2nd ALPAP case , acknowledged the illegal
dismissal cases instituted by the individual ALPAP members before
the NLRC following their termination for the strike in June 1998 (which
were apart from the Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases of ALPAP before
the DOLE Secretary) and affirmed the jurisdiction of the NLRC over
said illegal dismissal cases. The Court, though, also expressly
pronounced in the 2nd ALPAP case that "the pendency of the
foregoing cases should not and could not affect the character of our
disposition over the instant case. Rather, these cases should be
resolved in a manner consistent and in accord with our present
disposition for effective enforcement and execution of a final
judgment." TIADCc

The Petitions at bar began with the Illegal Dismissal Case of

Rodriguez, et al. and eight other former pilots of PAL before the NLRC.
Among the Decisions rendered by Labor Arbiter Robles, the NLRC,
and the Court of Appeals herein, it is the one by the NLRC which is
consistent and in accord with the disposition for effective
enforcement and execution of the final judgments in the 1st and 2nd
ALPAP cases.
The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became final and
executory on August 29, 2002 and September 9, 2011,
respectively, constitute res judicata on the issue of who
participated in the illegal strike in June 1998 and whose
services were validly terminated.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements for res judicata in the second concept, i.e.,
conclusiveness of judgment, are extant in these cases.
There is identity of parties in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases,
on one hand, and the Petitions at bar. While the 1st and 2nd ALPAP
cases concerned ALPAP and the present Petitions involved several
individual members of ALPAP, the union acted in the 1st and 2nd
ALPAP cases in representation of its members. In fact, in the 2nd
ALPAP case , the Court explicitly recognized that the complaint for
illegal lockout was filed by ALPAP on behalf of all its members who
were returning to work. Also in the said case, ALPAP raised, albeit
belatedly, exactly the same arguments as Rodriguez, et al. herein.
Granting that there is no absolute identity of parties, what is
required, however, for the application of the principle of res judicata
is not absolute, but only substantial identity of parties. ALPAP and
Rodriguez, et al. share an identity of interest from which flowed an
identity of relief sought, namely, the reinstatement of the terminated
ALPAP members to their former positions. Such identity of interest is
sufficient to make them privy-in-law, one to the other, and meets the
requisite of substantial identity of parties.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 There is likewise an identity of issues between the 1st and
2nd ALPAP cases and these cases. Rodriguez, et al., insist that they
did not participate in the June 1998 strike, being on official leave or
scheduled off-duty. Nonetheless, on the matter of determining the
identities of the ALPAP members who lost their employment status
because of their participation in the illegal strike in June 1998, the
Court is now conclusively bound by its factual and legal findings in
the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.
In the 1st ALPAP case , the Court upheld the DOLE Secretary's
Resolution dated June 1, 1999 declaring that the strike of June 5,
1998 was illegal and all ALPAP officers and members who participated
therein had lost their employment status. The Court in the 2nd ALPAP
case ruled that even though the dispositive portion of the DOLE
Secretary's Resolution did not specifically enumerate the names of
those who actually participated in the illegal strike, such omission
cannot prevent the effective execution of the decision in the 1st
ALPAP case. The Court referred to the records of the Strike and Illegal
Lockout Cases, particularly, the logbook, which it unequivocally
pronounced as a "crucial and vital piece of evidence." In the words
of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case , "[t]he logbook with the
heading 'Return-to-Work Compliance/Returnees' bears their
individual signature signifying their conformity that they
were among those workers who returned to work only on June
26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by DOLE. x x x In fine,
only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the
entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE
Resolution." 66 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment is
embodied in the third paragraph of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. 67 Otherwise known as "preclusion of issues" or "collateral
estoppel," the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of
any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits and conclusively settled by the judgment
therein. This applies to the parties and their privies regardless of whether the
claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will
be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit. 68
Conclusiveness of judgment applies where there is identity of parties in
the first and second cases, but there is no identity of causes of action.
Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular
facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action. 69 AIDSTE

Here, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment also applies because the

determination of who participated in the illegal strike subject of the return-
to-work order, and who defied the return-to-work order has long been
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 declared settled in Airline Pilots. In this case, it is undisputed that all
petitioners signed PAL's logbook for return to work returnees/return to work
compliance. 70 They are thus covered by the Court's finding that those who
participated in the strike had lost their employment. Hence, this question
cannot be raised again here.
Furthermore, although the parties are not exactly the same, the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment still applies because jurisprudence
does not dictate absolute identity but only substantial identity of parties. 71
There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community of interest
between a party in the first case and a party in the second case, even if the
latter was not impleaded in the first case. 72 As this Court explained in
Rodriguez, ALPAP and petitioners "share an identity of interest from which
flowed an identity of relief sought, namely, the reinstatement of the
terminated ALPAP members to their former positions." 73

III

In addition to the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, we find that

the principle of stare decisis equally applies to this case.
The time-honored principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere
literally means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which
are established." The rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issue where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated
and decided by a competent court. 74 It is one of policy grounded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions:
Time and again, the Court has held that it is a very desirable
and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by
the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It
proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. 75 (Italics
in the original.)
In this case, not only are the factual circumstances of the two cases
similar, the petitioners in Rodriguez and in this case also raise the same
arguments and defenses against their dismissals from PAL. In fact, there was
another illegal dismissal case filed by former pilots raising the same
arguments as petitioners here and in Rodriguez which this Court eventually
reviewed in G.R. No. 180152, titled Romeo N. Ahmee, et al. v. PAL (Ahmee,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 et al.). In our Resolution 76 dated February 4, 2008, we likewise affirmed the
findings of the CA in that case that the signatures on the same logbook
establish Ahmee, et al.'s participation in the strike and defiance of the
return-to-work order. 77 Collectively, these cases serve as strong precedents
in this case which this Court is duty-bound to follow.
We do not agree with petitioners that the difference between the
evidence presented in this case and in Airline Pilots constitutes a powerful
countervailing consideration that would bar the application of the doctrine of
stare decisis. In both cases, PAL presented the same PAL security logbook
containing signatures of former PAL employees who attempted to report for
work on June 26, 1998.
In sum, the doctrines of conclusiveness of judgment and stare decisis
warrant the denial of the petition. The CA correctly determined that the
NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Labor
Arbiter's Decision. Both the Labor Arbiter's and the NLRC's Decisions were
based on substantial evidence. The logbook presented by PAL in this case,
having the weight accorded to it by this Court in Airline Pilots and Rodriguez,
serves as substantial evidence in proving that petitioners defied the return-
to-work order. Thus, it cannot be said that grave abuse of discretion
attended the administrative agencies' disposition of the consolidated
complaints. AaCTcI

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Amended

Decision dated December 7, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 111466 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro, C.J., Bersamin and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
Tijam, * J., is on official business.

Footnotes

* On official business.

1. Rollo , pp. 55-93.

2. Id. at 99-114; penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, and concurred in
by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Ricardo R. Rosario.

3. Id. at 198-231.
4. Id. at 232-242.

5. Id. at 244-245.
6. Id. at 247-268.

7. Id. at 1122.

8. Id. at 1074-1076. The dispositive portion of the DOLE Secretary Order states:
  WHEREFORE, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at
the Philippine Airlines, Inc., pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 amended.

  Accordingly, all strikes and lockouts at the Philippine Airlines, Inc., whether
actual or impending are hereby strictly prohibited. The parties are also
enjoined from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation.

xxx xxx xxx (Id. at 1076.)

9. Id. at 1087-1088.

10. Id. at 1123-1124.

11. Id. at 1108-1121.

12. Id. at 255, 1124.

13. Id. at 1122-1125.

14. Id. at 1172-1178.

15. Id. at 1198.

16. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No.
168382, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 545, 551.

17. Id. at 553.

18. Supra.
19. Id. at 558-560.

20. Rollo , pp. 57, 61.

21. Id. at 628-671.

22. Id. at 19-20, 771.

23. Id. at 20.

24. Id. at 260-261.

25. Id. at 263.

26. Id. at 236-237.

27. Id. at 239.

28. Id. at 215.

29. Id. at 215-220.

30. Id. at 229-230. The dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the May 15, 2009 Decision

rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' dismissal from service is declared ILLEGAL.
Accordingly, Philippine Airlines is ordered, in lieu of reinstatement, to PAY
petitioners their full backwages computed, without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, from the time their compensation was withheld from them up to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 the time of their retirement, in the case of Basilio M. Cruz until April 15,
2007; Demosthenes V. Cañete up to November 29, 2000; Francisco M. Juliano
till June 9, 2001; Arturo L. Novenario to May 30, 2002; and Salvador P.
Almagro up till September 8, 1999, as well as the retirement benefits due
upon them.

31. Id. at 157-197.

32. Supra note 2.

33. Rollo , p. 113. The dispositive portion of the Amended Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our
decision dated January 31, 2012 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the NLRC, dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming the Labor
Arbiter's decision, is hereby AFFIRMED.

34. Id. at 102.

35. Id. at 109-110.

36. Id. at 110.

37. Id. at 111.

38. Id. at 68-69.

39. Id. at 69.

40. Id. at 85.

41. Id. at 89.

42. Id. at 74-75.

43. Id. at 70. Emphasis omitted.

44. Id. at 73.

45. Id. at 76.

46. Id. at 85.

47. Id. at 82.

48. Id. at 82-83.

49. Id. at 84.

50. Id. at 86.

51. Id. at 87.

52. Id. at 88.

53. Id.

54. Rollo , p. 89.

55. Id. at 972-1012.

56. Id. at 984-986.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 57. Id. at 986-988.

58. Id. at 988-1002.

59. Id. at 1002-1008.

60. Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation, G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009,
597 SCRA 334.
61. Id. at 342-343.

62. E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) v. Ando, Jr., G.R. No. 214183, February 20, 2017, 818
SCRA 165, 173-174. Citation omitted.
63. Id. at 174. Citation omitted.

64. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note
16 at 558-560.
65. G.R. Nos. 178501 & 178510, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 334.

66. Id. at 373-380.

67. Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their

successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a
former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
68. Tala Realty Services Corp., Inc. v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank,
G.R. No. 181369, June 22, 2016, 794 SCRA 252, 262-263.

69. Id. at 265.

70. Rollo , pp. 1109, 1116 & 1121.

71. See Rodriguez v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , supra note 65.

72. Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., G.R.
No. 167050, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 50, 58-59.

73. Rodriguez v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , supra note 65 at 379.

74. Light Rail Transit Authority v. Pili, G.R. No. 202047, June 8, 2016, 792 SCRA
534, 552. Citation omitted.

75. Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 181912 & 183347, November
29, 2016, 811 SCRA 27, 121, citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The
Insular Life Assurance, Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 197192, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA
94, 96-97.
76. Rollo , pp. 1398-1399.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 77. Id. at 1394.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com