1) The Government sought to deduct compensation owed to PIATCO for the NAIA-IPT III due to alleged structural defects, specifically a ceiling collapse.
2) However, the Government failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that the airport suffered from structural defects.
3) Both sides presented conflicting expert findings and evidence, leaving the case in equipoise. As the party bearing the burden of proof, the Government's case failed since it could not establish its claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
1) The Government sought to deduct compensation owed to PIATCO for the NAIA-IPT III due to alleged structural defects, specifically a ceiling collapse.
2) However, the Government failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that the airport suffered from structural defects.
3) Both sides presented conflicting expert findings and evidence, leaving the case in equipoise. As the party bearing the burden of proof, the Government's case failed since it could not establish its claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
1) The Government sought to deduct compensation owed to PIATCO for the NAIA-IPT III due to alleged structural defects, specifically a ceiling collapse.
2) However, the Government failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that the airport suffered from structural defects.
3) Both sides presented conflicting expert findings and evidence, leaving the case in equipoise. As the party bearing the burden of proof, the Government's case failed since it could not establish its claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
1) The Government sought to deduct compensation owed to PIATCO for the NAIA-IPT III due to alleged structural defects, specifically a ceiling collapse.
2) However, the Government failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that the airport suffered from structural defects.
3) Both sides presented conflicting expert findings and evidence, leaving the case in equipoise. As the party bearing the burden of proof, the Government's case failed since it could not establish its claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
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G.R. No.
181892 September 8, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,
the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS M. MUPAS, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 117, Pasay City, AND PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., Respondents.
BRION, J.:
Doctrine:
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a person is innocent of wrong; that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; that private transactions have been fair and regular; and that the ordinary course of business has been followed.
The burden of proof remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed.
If the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the allegations of the plaintiff and the other consistent with the defense of the defendant, the evidence does not fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails.
The reason for this rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. Thus, even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side when this evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
Facts:
This is a consolidated case with GR Nos. 181892, 209917, 209696 and 209731.
On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a Concession Agreement with PIATCO for the construction, development, and operation of the NAIA-IPT III under a build-operate-transfer scheme. PIATCO engaged the services of Takenaka and Asahikosan on this project.
On November 29, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared in her speech that the Government would not honor the PIATCO contracts.
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III before the RTC of Pasay, Branch 117. When it reached to the SC, the court ruled to remand the case to the lower court for proper determination of just compensation.
On April 11, 2006, the RTC ordered the Board of Commissioners to resume its duties. In compliance, the BOC submitted its Inception Report and Inception Framework to the RTC. On April 24, 2007, the parties and the BOC conferred to set the ground rules and procedure in determining the just compensation due to the NAIA-IPT III.
On April 26, 2006, the Government asked the RTC to stop the payment of ₱3 billion proffered value in view of an alleged supervening event - the collapse of the ceiling of the arrival lobby section of the north side of the NAIA-IPT III on March 27, 2006. The Government claimed that the collapse created a 100-square foot hole in the ceiling and caused heavy asbestos pipes to fall on the floor of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government likewise informed the Court that the MIAA requested the Association of Structural Engineers of the Philippines (ASEP) to investigate the cause of the collapse.
Hence, the Government seeks to deduct the structural defect in NAIA-IPT III to the total amount to be paid to PIATCO.
Issue:
Whether the Government proved that the NAIAIPT III suffered a structural defect that will make PIATCO, Takenaka and Ashikosan held liable? Ruling:
No, the Government failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that the NAIAIPT III suffered a structural defect.
Equiponderance of evidence on the alleged structural defects of the NAIA-IPT III favors PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan. Nonetheless, even without considering and/or giving probative value to the additional evidence presented by Takenaka and Asahikosan before the CA, this Court finds that the Government failed to establish by preponderance of evidence that the NAIA-IPT III suffered from structural defects.
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a person is innocent of wrong; that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; that private transactions have been fair and regular; and that the ordinary course of business has been followed.
Based on these presumptions, we presume that Takenaka and Asahikosan built the NAIA-IPT III in accordance with the specifications required under the Onshore Construction Contract and Offshore Procurement Contract. We also presume that the NAIA-IPT III is structurally sound and compliant with the applicable building codes and other laws at the time it was designed and built. However, these presumptions are merely disputable presumptions and may be overcome by contradicting evidence. The burden of proof lies with the Government to prove by preponderance of evidence that the NAIAIPT III suffered from structural defects. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of credible evidence."
The Government's burden of proof to show that the NAIA-IPT III is indeed defective does not shift to its adverse parties. The burden of proof remains throughout the trial with the party upon whom it is imposed.
It is the burden of evidence that shifts from party to party during trial. This means that the burden of going forward with the evidence is met by the countervailing evidence of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan which, in turn, balances the evidence introduced by the Government. Thereafter, the burden of evidence shifts back to the Government.
In the present case, the experts and consultants of the Government, PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosa arrived at conflicting findings regarding the structural integrity of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government's experts detailed with particularity the alleged defects of the NAIA-IPT III, which allegations the experts of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan refuted with particularity.
Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when the scale of justice shall stand on equipoise and nothing in the evidence inclines a conclusion to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
If the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the allegations of the plaintiff and the other consistent with the defense of the defendant, the evidence does not fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails.
In the present case, PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan, met the Government's allegations regarding the structural integrity of the NAIA-IPT III.
A reading of the reports of the parties' respective experts shows that each party presented an equally persuasive case regarding the structural soundness or defect of the NAIA-IPTIII. The Government's case on the alleged structural defect of the NAIA-IPT III has been met by equally persuasive refutations by the experts of PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan.
As a matter of law and evidence, the Government's case regarding this matter must fail. Since PIATCO, Takenaka and Asahikosan presented equally relevant and sufficient countervailing evidence on the structural soundness of the NAIA-IPT III, the scales of justice tilt in their favor. Neither party successfully established a case by preponderance of evidence in its favor; neither side was able to establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. As a consequence, we can only leave them as they are.
