Anatolica XLIV, 2018, 229-255. doi: 10.2143/ANA.44.0.

3285056

THE ‘AYNALI MARTINI’: THE OTTOMAN ARMY’S FIRST

MODERN RIFLE
Julian Bennett*

Abstract
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 is generally recognised as the most calamitous
of the several wars fought by the ‘modernised’ Ottoman Army of the late 19th century as it
ended with the Russian army at the gates of Constantinople in the west, and in occupation of
Erzurum in the east. The only major Ottoman feat of arms in that campaign was the ‘Plevna
delay’, where between July and December 1877, the garrison of Plevna, under Nuri Osman
Paşa, resisted two major attacks by Russian forces and a third with their Romanian allies,
thus preventing the Russians from advancing on Constantinople until the following year. The
successful defence of Plevna was to a great extent due to the defensive earthworks built there
by the Ottoman garrison and which resisted all attempts at destruction through artillery fire.
But the main factor in the ‘Plevna delay’ was the wholescale employment by the Ottoman
garrison of the Peabody-Martini rifle, a weapon that had only recently entered the Ottoman
infantry inventory. While the story of the Siege of Plevna itself within the wider context of
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 is well known among those interested in the military
affairs of the period, the history and nature of the rifle that played so significant a role there
– its biography, as it were – is not well known outside of specialist military reference works, a
vacuum this article seeks to fill.

Introduction

The defeat suffered by the Ottoman Empire in the Ninth Russo-Turkish War of 1877-
1878, the eleventh such conflict between the two states in a series stretching back to 1568-
1570, and the fourth in the 19th century alone, was the most disastrous of them all. At the end
of the ’93 War, as it is often referred to in contemporary and even some modern sources, from
the Islamic year it began, 1293, one Russian army was encamped at San Stefano (Ayastefanos,
today Yeşilköy), with an unimpeded view towards Constantinople’s Land Walls, and a second

*
Associate Professor, Department of Archaeology, İhsan Doğramaci Bilkent Üniversitesi, Ankara, Turkey.
I owe special thanks to the staff at Bilkent University Library for their help in securing reference material, especially
Semra Kesler (Humanities), and Fusun Yurdakul (Inter-library Loans), and to Evgeni Radushev (Department of
History, Bilkent University), for his assistance with the Osmanlıca texts inscribed on the later Peabody-Martini
rifles. Others who assisted significantly with preparing this article were: Dave Hughes (Society of American Bayonet
Collectors); Lisa Traynor and Henry Yallop (Royal Armouries Museum, Leeds, UK); Shua Kisilevitz, Anna Eirikh-
Rose, and Assaf Peretz (Israel Antiquities Authority); the staff of C&Rsenal, USA, and of the Jandarma Müzesi,
Ankara; and the late John Ward, Mike Hibberd, John P. Sheehan and Ed Hunt (independent researchers). It is
impossible to name all those members of on-line forums specialising in Peabody-Martini and associated matters
who have helped also but I trust they know who they are and I thank them! Naturally, I alone am responsible for
the statements, views and conclusions here.
230 Julian Bennett

was ensconced in Erzurum, the key strategic point for the defence of Eastern Anatolia. More-
over, the war was brought to its end only by the intervention of the ‘Great Powers’ in a strange
alliance of disparate countries led by Great Britain and bonded only by fierce opposition to a
Russian capture and subsequent annexation of Constantinople, the key to the Black Sea and
trade routes beyond.
The reasons for the Ottoman defeat – or, rather, collapse – in the face of the Russian
advance on Constantinople in 1877-1878 are many and various and have been discussed and
analysed by numerous scholars from the moment the war ended to modern times. All agree,
however, that there was one bright flourish of Ottoman military glory in the campaign, the
fierce resistance of the garrison at Plevna (modern Pleven, Bulgaria). Under its commander,
Nuri Osman Paşa this held firm for almost five full months, from the 20th July to the 10th
December 1877, despite repeated shelling and three major attacks, a Romanian force joining
the Russians for the last of these assaults, and only surrendered owing to the application of the
age-old method of circumvallation and consequent starvation.1 Thus the ‘Plevna Delay’, as the
Russian operational plan envisaged its army being at Constantinople within five weeks of the
campaign’s start, and so by September 1877,2 not in January 1878 as happened. Quite simply,
while Plevna evaded capture the main Russian force dared not commit itself to advancing on
the Ottoman capital for fear of an attack from the rear. But what is more, this ‘Plevna Delay’
permitted the ‘Great Powers’ of the time to rally together and under British leadership oblige
Russia to withdraw – even as its army was at the gates of the ‘City of the World’s desire’. Hence
the ‘Sick man of Europe’ was granted ‘another forty years of life’.3
The ‘Plevna Delay’ owed much to the superb system of earthwork defences and re-
doubts Nuri Osman Paşa caused to be provided around the town. These were so well-designed
and constructed that, combined with inferior Russian artillery and gunnery, the defenders
survived several bombardments essentially unscathed, three of great severity in pursuance of
‘softening up’ the occupants prior to major infantry attacks.4 But the key factor in the defence
against all three main attacks on Plevna was the garrison’s use of its standard service firearm,
the Peabody-Martini Rifle. It was the Ottoman Empire’s first modern rifle and at the time of its
introduction also one of the most advanced infantry firearms of the period. Popularly known to
Turkish-speaking users – official and unofficial – as the ‘Aynalı Martini’, or ‘Mirrored Martini’,

1
There are several contemporary or near contemporary works in English that provide detailed accounts of the
Siege of Plevna and the ‘Plevna Delay’, e.g., Hozier 1877; Greene 1879; Herbert 1895; Trotha 1896; Ryan 1897;
and Maurice 1905. There are naturally a number of accounts in other languages, in particular the full-length near-
contemporary Ottoman account of the siege in Osmanlıca translated into Turkish with a commentary: Talat and
Yalazan 1997. Of the many others, the various parts devoted to the siege in Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902 are
especially informative, as their volume was translated directly from the official Russian account of the war for the
benefit of the Austrian High Command. The only ‘modern’ works in English are those of Furneaux 1958, and the
Plevna-focussed chapters in Barry 2012 (the account provided by Trenk 1997 is untrustworthy in some respects).
2
Cf. Barry 2012, 104.
3
Taylor 1980, 245. Despite the ‘Plevna delay’ being a crucial event in Ottoman history, with a wide-ranging impact
on international affairs in the ‘Great Game’ of the time, its 140th anniversary in 2017 was not apparently marked in
any obviously public way in Turkey.
4
Cf. Ryan 1897, 220-224.
 Anatolica XLIV,  231

in reference to the steel plates housing its firing mechanism,5 it was introduced into Ottoman
military service in 1874, and remained ‘on the books’, as it were, until at least the First World
War. Yet despite this long and valued period of service, a comprehensive account of its devel-
opment and employment in Ottoman use is wanting, what detailed information there is on the
subject being scattered through several reference sources, some difficult to obtain in the normal
run of things.6 Hence this article which attempts to rectify this omission.

‘Newfangled Jimcracks’

The ultimate origins of the Peabody-Martini Rifle can be traced back to the American
Civil War of 1861-1865, an episode in history that holds a pivotal place in the development
of many modern military tactics and weaponry. On the one hand it was the last major conflict
fought with both sides using Napoleonic-style field tactics: a reliance on in-line formations
and blanketing firepower with artillery focussed of the planned point of attack, followed at
the appropriate moment by close combat with the bayonet as the decisive armed strike.7 On
the other hand, it was the first modern war in that the two sides used a wide range of recently
developed (and so ‘modern’) technologies in addition to those standard field tactics in support
of a major campaign, all of these new systems being ancestral to many in use today. So, for
example, communication methods, using the telegraph, along with defined transport routes,
in this case the railway network, for concentrating troops and supplies where needed; aerial
reconnaissance with balloons, providing information regarding enemy positions on the eve of
and during battle; and last but not least new infantry weapons. It is the latter that is relevant
here, for aside from other weapons deployed for the first time in full-scale combat, such as
rifled musketry firing an aerodynamically-shaped projectile (the ‘Minié Ball’) and the Gatling
Gun, the American Civil War also saw the appearance in battle – if on an occasional basis only
– of the breech-loading rifle, a weapon that greatly increased a soldier’s rate of fire, and the
precursor of modern infantry weapons.
The advantages of a breech-loading long firearm for rapid firing by infantry troops
were known well before the Civil War. Indeed, in 1819 the US army had adopted for limited
service use the breech-loading Hall Model 1819 Rifle once it was shown how a man with this
could fire between eight and ten rounds in one minute, against the three or so shots managed

5
As in, e.g., the folk ballad ‘Hekimoğlu derler benim aslima’. Cf. the way by which the Winchester Model 1866
repeating rifle was generally known as the ‘Yellow boy’ in reference to the yellow gunmetal used for its receiver
mechanism: Trevelyan 2016, 41.
6
For earlier brief accounts, see: Hull 1979, 20-22; Achtermeier 1980, 38-43; Seel 1981a; and Hintermeier 2001.
None of these provides a fully detailed account of the rifle from its introduction up to the end of its service life,
which is attempted here. That aside, note that in this article as a whole, paired references have been given where
possible to compensate for the general lack of availability of much of the rarer source material used except for those
with access to a specialist library or Inter-library loan system.
7
As according to the dicta of, for example, the Russian General A. Suvorov, such as: ‘The bullet is a mad thing;
only the bayonet knows what it is about’, and ‘Attack with the cold steel! Push hard with the bayonet’: cf. Duffy,
1982, 191-192.
232 Julian Bennett

in the same time using a muzzle-loading musket.8 However, senior officers in the US army re-
sisted the full-scale adoption of this or similar weapons for various reasons. Some, for instance,
with no sense of irony, disparaged the speed with which the soldier could shoot-off ammuni-
tion causing – it was feared – potentially fatal ammunition supply problems in battle; others
were concerned that such rapid-firing using the then standard black powder charge might foul
and so jam quickly the breech chamber, requiring a dangerous pause while cleaning the weapon
during combat; still others noted how the imperfect sealing of the chamber and resulting loss
of pressure observed in countless models of breech-loaders submitted for official trials reduced
the effective range of any bullets fired from such a weapon.9 These attitudes prevailed even as
the Civil War was in progress despite the unquestioned success in action of the breech-loaded
Sharps Model 1859 Rifle and its carbine version used by two specially formed regiments of
snipers commanded by Major General Hiram Berdan – and so the term ‘Sharpshooter’ for a
marksman. Old attitudes died hard, with Colonel J.W. Ripley, the Union’s head of the Ord-
nance division in the Civil War period, allegedly dismissing such weapons as ‘newfangled Jim-
cracks’, ostentatious items that had no real functional and so no real combat value.10 Especially
so, given their weight, price, and reliance on specialised ammunition.11
Thus the American Civil War began with troops mainly equipped with smooth-bored
muzzle-loading muskets alongside a relatively small number of men who had one or other
version of a rifle, that is to say, a long firearm with a rifled-barrel ensuring greater accura-
cy, although over time the armies of both sides gradually replaced their muskets with rifled
weapons, typically the Springfield Model 1861 or British Pattern 1853 rifle. Like the muskets
they replaced, however, these were muzzle-loaders also, the only breech-loaders in rare use by
either side, such as the Sharps Model 1859, being generally privately purchased. Even so, from
President Lincoln downwards, the clear superiority of breech-loaders over musket-loaders in
terms of their firing-rate could not ignored.12 And as the war progressed, many private inven-
tors sought to develop a suitable breech-loading mechanism for military use, and so win a
potentially lucrative arms contract, one of them being the Boston resident Henry O. Peabody:
and so the development of the eponymous mechanism, which went on to become the basis of
two of the most famous rifles in military history: the British Martini-Henry and the Ottoman
Peabody-Martini. 13

8
Walters 2006, 159, with Huston 2004, 114-115, and Rose 2008, 75-88.
9
Cf. Huston 2004, 129-130, with 190; and Emerson 2004, 6. In 1858, William Greener, a contemporary authority
on small arms, observed himself how the lack of an effective seal to then existing breech-loading mechanisms
resulted in weapons that did ‘not shoot nearly so well, and are not half so safe, as muzzle-loading guns’: Greener
1858, 335-337.
10
Kurtz 2006, 143, with Bruce 2011, 112.
11
Trevelyan 2016, 19.
12
Bruce 2011, 116
13
The principal modern summaries for the activities of H.O. Peabody and the adoption of his mechanism by the
Providence Tool Company of Rhode Island, who produced the Peabody-Martini rifle and carbine, are Hull 1978,
and Achtermeier 1980, 28-44, the latter being based almost entirely on the analysis of the company’s papers as
presented in Stewart 1973, a work only viewable at Brown University, RI.
 Anatolica XLIV,  233

The Peabody Mechanism

The Peabody mechanism, as fully formed in 1862, was developed – as was the way of
the world – on earlier such devices, including, among others, the trigger-guard lever system
for opening and closing a falling block mechanism for loading and firing as employed in the
Sharps Model 1859 Rifle. What distinguished Peabody’s system in the first instance from this
and other breech-loaders then being developed was in part a smoother operating breech block
for loading and ejecting a round, using a rear hinge, along with a proprietary metallic cased
cartridge, as opposed to a paper or linen-wrapped one, this being detonated by a hand-cocked
hammer system on the right hand side of the receiver. But another vital contribution to the fu-
ture development of breech-loading mechanisms for military use was, as the patent explained,
a spring system in the receiver that did ‘not merely draw out the [fired] cartridge-case but throws
it out with such force as to throw it over the breech-frame and entirely clear of the gun, thereby obvi-
ating the necessity of using the fingers in any way for its removal’.14 In other words, the rifle could
be loaded, fired, and re-loaded in a series of five simple actions: pushing the lever mechanism
down with one hand to open the breech ready for loading; inserting a cartridge; pulling up the
lever to close the breech while cocking the hammer simultaneously with the thumb; firing the
rifle; and then pushing down the lever to open the breech and eject the spent cartridge ready
for inserting a new one.15
Peabody’s load, fire, and eject system showed its worth in US army trials in May 1862,
where field use revealed a firing-rate of ten rounds a minute: but as the US Ordnance Board
was then in process of deciding on a suitable calibre bullet for army use no decision was made
as to its possible adoption.16 On the other hand, the reliability and simplicity of the Peabody
mechanism did catch the eye of J.B. Anthony, of the Rhode Island-based Providence Tool
Company (hereafter the PTCo), who on the 26th October 1864 leased its use possibly with
a view to converting muzzle-loaders to breech-loaders, a process then popular with the US
Army’s Ordnance Board.17 Then, when a further series of trials to select a breech-loading rifle
for future army use were announced for December 1864 to 9th April 1865, the PTCo sub-
mitted a rifle fitted with the Peabody mechanism and its proprietary cartridge for assessment,
this being chosen for field trials alongside 19 others selected from an initial 65 models.18 J.B.
Anthony learnt that the PTCo entry was selected as the best choice available before any official
announcement was made on the matter and bought the full use of the patent on 15th April
1865.19 But, as it was, the Civil War ended before this prototype of the future Peabody Military
Rifle – and so the direct ancestor of the Peabody-Martini and the Martini-Henry Rifles – was
confirmed as the winner of these trials, thus ending any urgency to develop and adopt an en-

14
Cf. US patent 35947 A, granted on the 22nd July 1862.
15
Cf. the contemporary illustrations in Norton 1880, 42, and republished in Hull 1979, 16.
16
Hull 1979, 7.
17
Achtermeier 1980, 30, contra Hull 1979, 23.
18
As per the letter written by J.B. Anthony to his colleagues that day, transcribed in Hull 1979, 47 and Achtermeier
30-31.
19
Cf. Hull 1979, 8, with Achtermeier 1980, 30, where the year the patent was bought is erroneously given as 1864,
one year before the trials took place.
234 Julian Bennett

tirely new breech-loading army rifle for service use. Instead, now that hostilities had ceased, the
head of the US Army Ordnance Board recommended in his report for 1865 that the possibility
of converting existing war-surplus stocks of muzzle-loading rifles to breech-loaders be exam-
ined, using a method developed by ‘the master armorer at the Springfield Armory’.20 This was a
natural and, of course, more economical alternative to paying for the development and pro-
duction of an entirely new breech-loading rifle given how some one million Springfield Model
1861 Rifles had been produced for US army use during the Civil War,21 along with perhaps
as many English Pattern 1853 Rifles, of which a substantial number would have survived the
fighting in working order.
If nothing else this decision confirmed the advantages in combat of breech-loaders
over muzzle loaders, an advantage that could no longer be ignored among serving officers of
the United States military. Or elsewhere, for that matter, the French and British governments,
for example, having taken steps as the Civil War came to an end to convert their stocks of muz-
zle-loading muskets into breech-loaders as an interim measure while searching for acceptable
purpose-made versions.22 Forward thinkers in the US Army likewise argued for the eventual
adoption for service use of a purpose-built breech-loading rifle rather than a weapon converted
this way and so another series of trials for these was held in May-June 1866, with weapons
firing the now agreed calibre of .45: yet again, a rifle submitted by the PTCo using the Peabody
mechanism performed well enough to be identified as the lead contender – only for the Ord-
nance Office to again delay a decision with further trials at some unspecified future date.23 The
decision evidently did not dishearten J.B. Anthony entirely, though. As early as January 1865
he had begun exploring foreign military and local markets for sales of both a military and a
civilian hunting and sporting version of ‘Peabody’s Patent Breech-Loading Rifle’, stating in an
advertising broadsheet issued at the time by the PTCo how: ‘The rapidity with which it can be
loaded and fired is believed to be equal, if not superior, to that of any [other] breech-loader, and in
continuous firing to that of any repeater’.24

20
Cf. Norton 1880, 14 with 24. The ‘master armourer’ was E.S. Alin: hence these converted rifles are often referred
to as the ‘Alin’ Springfields, the first versions being the M.1865, superseded by the M.1866, with the M.1873
becoming the standard infantry rifle: Walters 2006, 461-462.
21
Cf. McChristian 2006, 29-30; and Knapp 2002, 401.
22
The British chose eventually to convert their Pattern 1853 Enfield rifles with a breech-loading and side-hammer
ignition system developed originally in 1862 by the American J. Snider and the Frenchman F.E. Schneider (cf.
Clode 1869, 534-536), and adapted for British service use with a metallic-cased cartridge designed by their Colonel
E.M. Boxer: thus the introduction into service in late 1866 of the P.1853/66 ‘Snider Enfield’ rifle and its ‘Boxer’
cartridge (Walters 2006, 456-457). The French meanwhile converted their Mle 1853-54 muskets with a Snider-type
mechanism, but relied on a paper-wrapped cartridge for their Fusil Mle 1867 or ‘Tabatière’ rifle (Walters 2006, 480).
23
Norton 1880, 24; cf. Hull 1979, 9-10.
24
A reproduction of the January 1865 PTCo catalogue is published in Hull 1979, 45-46; the reference to the
repeater is to the Winchester Model 1866 Rifle, a repeating rifle with its tubular magazine holding 15 or more
cartridges.
 Anatolica XLIV,  235

The Königgrätz effect

The Battle of Königgrätz (Hradec Králové), on 3rd July 1866, between Prussia and
Austria, likely greatly calmed any remaining doubts senior military officers in many countries
may have yet harboured about the combat value of breech-loading rifles. The universal opinion
as events moved incrementally towards the battle, which many observers recognized as the
deciding contest in the so-called ‘Seven Weeks’ War’, was that the Prussian army would be
defeated with major losses: after all, it had not faced a major European power since the Battle
of Waterloo fifty years before, and despite its success against Denmark in the Second Schleswig
War of 1864, it was better known for its skill and appearance on the parade ground rather than
the military field.25 In the event, though, the Austrian army was effectively annihilated, with
losses of some 45,000 against 10,000 Prussian killed and wounded, the complete destruction
of the Austrian forces being prevented only by the judicious use of their cavalry. What brought
about the surprising Prussian victory was its use of the bolt-actioned breech-loading ‘leichtes
Perkussionsgewehr Model 1841’. Better known as the ‘Zündnadelgewehr’ or ‘Needle-firing gun’,
on account of its percussion method, using a long needle-like firing pin, this weapon, which
had seen limited service use in the Second Schleswig War, had an effective range of 730–1,100
m., and could be loaded, fired, and re-loaded from a standing, kneeling, or prone position, at
the rate of six or so rounds per minute.26 Thus the Prussian infantryman had a distinct advan-
tage over his Austrian counterpart using a standard muzzle-loading firearm, fortunate indeed
if he could fire two rounds a minute, and who had to either stand or kneel when reloading,
forming a clear target for his opponent.27
Even non-military specialists saw how the overwhelming Prussian success at König-
grätz was due in the main to their breech-operated Zündnadelgewehr.28 As such, it is likely to
have provided the impetus for the military of those nations lacking the industrial base for large-
scale weapons production to seek abroad for reliable breech-loading rifles to equip their own
armed forces. Be that as it may, it was surely hardly coincidental that in the months following
immediately on from Königgrätz the PTCo received a rash of requests from outside of the
USA for trials of their Peabody Military Rifle – presumably on the basis of its proven success
in trials before the US Ordnance Board, even though the US Army itself had not accepted it
for military use. What is certain is that already in August 1866, the Province of Canada tested
and in September approved the purchase for its militia and volunteer units of 5,000 ‘Peabody
military muskets’, each priced at US$ 25.29 The following month the Peabody Military Rifle
was trialled by Austria, although the Austrian High Command settled eventually on a local-
ly-derived version of the falling block system developed by J.Werndl, and in some respects

25
E.g., Friedrich Engels, writing on 20th June 1866, before the battle: cf. Engels, 1975a, 173.
26
Strachan 1985, 38-40.
27
Cf. Fuller 1958, 139.
28
Cf. Engels, writing on 6th July 1866, giving full credit to the Zündnadelgewehr for the Prussian victory: cf. Engels
1975b, 188.
29
‘Muskets’ still being the colloquial term for ‘long firearms’. For details of the Canadian contract, cf. Hull 1979,
11 and 49, with Achtermeier 1980, 32-33. As it was, 3,000 only were delivered as in March 1867, Ottawa used a
contract option allowing them to cancel any further deliveries once that number had been delivered: Hull 1979, 11.
236 Julian Bennett

influenced, it is said, by the Peabody design.30 Further trials were commissioned later that same
year by Denmark and by Russia, although in the event neither submitted an order;31 and by
the Swiss also, who followed through with an order for 15,009 in June 1867.32 This perhaps
persuaded Prussia to test an example of the Peabody Military Rifle in September 1867,33 al-
though nothing further came of that. Then on the 4th April 1868 came an order from Romania,
an Ottoman vassal state with a semi-independent status, for 15,000 Peabody Military Rifles,
with the order for another 10,000 coming that October.34 By the end of the year Spain had
ordered around 30,000 Peabody Military Rifles and Carbines for its garrison in Cuba, and a
contract came from Mexico in 1870 for 8,500.35 But what must have formed the crème de la
crème of the PTCo order book for the period 1866-1870 was the 1870 agreement with France
to supply 35,000 Peabody Military Rifles and perhaps as many as 16,000 older muzzle-loading
rifles converted to breech-loaders using the ‘Peabody system’, this being to compensate for the
shortage of their own Mle 1866 ‘Chassepot’ rifles, needed urgently in response to a Prussian
threat of war. 36 This threat became a reality with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War of
1870-1871, by the end of which some 39,000 Peabody Military Rifles were reportedly held in
French ordnance stocks.37
Even as these sales confirmed the efficiency of the Peabody mechanism others looked
to improve it. This became clear to the PTCo in June 1867 when a Peabody Military Rifle
was entered in a series of trials before the Ordnance Select Committee of the British Army to
choose a breech-loading rifle for future service use. Among the other competitors was a rifle
submitted by the Swiss-Hungarian Friedrich von Martini and it soon became obvious that
his system was an ‘improved’ version of the Peabody mechanism, presumably developed after
the Swiss army received samples of the Peabody Army Rifle for testing in 1866. 38 Martini’s
mechanism incorporated two incremental refinements of great significance, the first allowing
the cocking of the mechanism by lifting the lever action, the second eliminating the external
hammer firing system entirely in favour of central firing pin, so allowing the use of a more
30
Cf. Norton 1880, 97 and 99; with Hull 1979, 11.
31
Denmark: Norton 1880, 29, and Hull 1979, 11; Russia: Hull 1979, 12. For the PTCo’s decision not to pay a ‘fee’
for an already provisionally agreed Russian contract, so loosing this to Colt’s Berdan Rifle, see Achtermeier 1980,
33. Irony of ironies, as the 1877-1878 War saw the Berdan matched in combat against the Peabody-Martini, and an
American military observer considered the Berdan no match for the Peabody-Martini (Hozier 1877, 353), although
it was notorious for the destructive power of its bullet (e.g., Ryan 1897, 132, 133, and 143).
32
Norton 1880 28-29; Hull 1979, 12; Achtermeier 1980, 3-34.
33
Norton 1880, 31; Hull 1979, 12
34
Norton 1880, 29; Hull 1979, 12; Achtermeier 1980, 34-35: the initial order was for rifles chambered at .41
calibre, as used by the Swiss army, but the second required rifles chambered at .45 calibre, known by then to be
superior in terms of its ballistic properties.
35
Norton 1880, 29, with Hull 1979, 14, and Achtermeier 1980, 36.
36
Achtermeier 1980, 35-36 for these totals, but Norton 1880, 29, and Hull 1979, 14, speak of 39,000 rifles, Hull
noting some carbines also. For the Peabody conversion system, see Hull, 1979, 52.
37
Hull 1979, 14, where it is stated that 33,000 were delivered, and notes examples with German markings,
evidently captured during the war. According to Achtermeier 1980, 36 and 71, of the 51,000 total he claims were
ordered, about 33-39,000 were delivered before 1871, some of these being offered after the war to Romania, but
leaving the PTCo with the rest and an unpaid bill for these.
38
Norton 1880, 28-29; Hull 1979, 12; Achtermeier 1980, 33-34; and Rose 2009, 182.
 Anatolica XLIV,  237

reliable centre-fire cartridge. The resulting mechanism had a somewhat higher rate of fire as
three simple movements only were involved in its operation: opening the breech and loading
a cartridge; closing the breech which cocked the weapon simultaneously; then, after firing,
opening the breech and ejecting the spent cartridge ready for reloading.39 On the 11th February
1868, the British Ordnance Select Committee recommended the adoption of Martini’s mech-
anism for further testing in combination with a barrel using the rifling system demonstrated in
the same trials by Alexander Henry along with the ‘Boxer’ metallic-cased cartridge. However,
an extended series of trials was to follow before a final version of the ‘Rifle, Breech-loading,
Martini-Henry’ was approved formally for British army use on 12th October 1874.40
Martini had applied on the 22nd July 1868 for a provisional British patent for the
mechanism he submitted to the British trials, receiving a formal grant on the 22nd January
1869.41 This gave Peabody and the PTCo a chance to open a law suit in London on the 14th
April 1869 for patent infringement.42 But, although Martini later freely admitted in print
that his mechanism owed much to the Peabody system, he successfully argued how the basic
concept behind the falling-block mechanism, on which the law case centred, was in common
use.43 Then, as if to add salt in the wound, he went on to apply for and win a US patent on the
25th May 1869 for his ‘certain new and useful Improvements in Breech-Loading Fire- Arms’,
following this with upgraded versions of the mechanism on the 30th May 1871 and the 15th
October 1872.44
Meanwhile, the PTCo was still trying to sell its Peabody Military Rifle to the US army
and an example was submitted to an Army Board that met on the 10th March 1868 with evi-
dent success.45 Even so, it was decided to convene yet another board to re-examine the wider
choice of breech-loading rifles now becoming available, this meeting in the summer of 1870
when it surprisingly rejected the Peabody Military Rifle.46 This was a startling decision in the
eyes of the PTCo, given how well the rifle had been received in Europe and elsewhere, and was
apparently due to repeated problems with the extractor system owing to imperfect cartridges.
Despite appealing the decision so ended J.B. Anthony’s efforts and dreams of supplying the
Peabody Military Rifle to his own country’s army,47 although the PTCo did manage to sell
some of the surplus rifles remaining from the French contract to the National Guards of Con-

39
Becket 2013, 239-240.
40
Becket 2013, 241-242. This in its various adaptations became the standard infantry weapon for the late 19th
century British army, and those of a certain age or who are dedicated cinephiles will know the weapon for its
appearance in the film Zulu.
41
GB patent No. 2305
42
Achtermeier 1980, 34.
43
Cf. Martini’s letter to The Engineer for 11th June 1869, on his system being an ‘improvement’ of the Peabody
mechanism, and a second in the same paper for 25th June 1869 (quoted in Temple and Skennerton 1983, 48),
stating how ‘That system [i.e., the falling block] is, however, neither peculiar to the Peabody firm, nor is Mr. Peabody
its inventor.’
44
US patents 90614A, 115546A, and 132222 A; Martini renewed his British patent 2925 on the 31st October, 1871.
45
Norton 1880, 24-25.
46
Norton 1880, 25.
47
Norton 1880, 28.
238 Julian Bennett

necticut (in 1871), Massachusetts (1872), and South Carolina (1877).48 Instead it found its
future, or so it seemed at the time, in supplying a version of the Peabody Military Rifle to the
Ottoman Empire, and so the birth of the ‘Aynali-Martini’.

The Birth, Debut and End-life of the ‘Aynali Martini’

As the American Civil War ran its course the types of infantry firearms used in that
conflict and their capabilities did not escape the often myopic view common to many govern-
mental dignitaries at Constantinople. The standard Ottoman infantry firearm at the time was
one or other form of smooth-bore percussion-fired muzzle-loading musket, although from
August 1853 onwards certain elite units were equipped with French- and Belgian supplied
Mle.1849 rifles, capable of a longer range and more accurate firing using the ‘Minié Ball’.49
Even as the Civil War was in progress, though, the Ottoman government saw the need for
more modern firearms. Thus in 1863, a rapid modernisation programme was initiated to pro-
vide its infantry and cavalry with these. There followed an initial order with a consortium of
Birmingham gunsmiths for 50,000 rifled muzzle-loading Enfield muskets of the type favoured
by both sides in the American Civil War, and a second in 1865 for 21,000 Enfield rifles fitted
with breech-loading Snider mechanisms along with 6,000 of these devices for converting muz-
zle-loaders into breech-loaders, a third order for 3500 more rifles being placed in July 1868.50
The Bab-i-Ali then explored what surplus weaponry was available in the United States,
leading in 1869 to a contract for 114,000 ‘English Enfield’s’ and 125,000 US ‘Springfield’s’ at
$4 and $7 respectively, with an option on another 120,000 Enfield’s supplied at a later date, all
of these firearms, along with the initial Birmingham purchases, being subsequently converted
to the Snider breech-loading system at the Tophane, the official armoury in Constantinople.51
In addition, between 1870 and 1871, the Ottoman government received from the Winchester
Repeating Arms Company between 46,000 and 56,000 of their Model 1866 repeating rifles
and carbines,52 the latter intended principally for use by the Ottoman dragoon regiments, but
also by a small number of other mounted troops.53 The end result was that by 1872, Constan-

48
Respectively 2,000 and 2,941 of the rifles, and 350 of the carbines: cf. Hull 1979, 15-16.
49
Engels 1984, 501 (originally published as a leader in the New York Daily Tribune 3944, 7th December 1853), with
Köremezli 2013, 124, and Uyar and Erickson 2009, 171.
50
Ward 1946, 13, with Taylerson 1983, 472, and Walters 2006, 459-460; but note that Gencer et al. 1981, has
somewhat different figures and foreign sources also for the Snider conversions used in the Ottoman Empire, a topic
deserving further investigation elsewhere.
51
Cf. Achtermeier 1980, 37; Sander and Kurthan 1977, 56-58; and Seel 1981c, 1578. All contemporary or near
contemporary references in Ottoman and other records refer usually to these conversions simply as Snider rifles: e.g.,
Dwight 1881, 84; Norman 1878, 16, 27, and 48, etc., etc. A common Turkish-language name for a Snider converted
rifle was ‘igneli tufek’ or ‘needle gun’, as it used a long needle-like firing pin, as with the Prussian Zündnadelgewehr.
52
For the first figure, cf. Williamson 1952, 55-58, Trevelyan 2016, 49 and 60, and Seel 1981c, 1578; for the second,
Gencer et al. 1981, 152 (Tablo 4).
53
Gencer et al. 1981, 152 (Tablo 4). The rifle model is never referenced directly as such in contemporary sources
except for one of 1879 reporting losses in the 1877-1878 war (see below, page page 247); the carbine was supplied
evidently as a cavalry weapon as is indicated by many contemporary observers, e.g., Maurice 1877, 18; Greene
 Anatolica XLIV,  239

tinople had received some 512,500 Enfield and Springfield rifles for use by the infantry arm
of the Ottoman army, all of these already or about to be converted to breech-loaders, 54 along
with possibly as many as 48,314 Winchester rifles, and 18,425 Model 1866 repeating rifles and
carbines.55
News of the Ottoman re-armament programme using older weapons converted to
breech-loaders evidently reached J.B. Anthony. Even though the PTCo had effectively aban-
doned military weapons production in 1871, after making at least 112,265 of their Peabody
Military Rifles, it still had some unsold examples of these left over from the French 1870
contract,56 and, more importantly, the necessary machinery in situ as well as the experienced
craftsmen on hand to re-start production of this rifle if a new order came through. Thus on 8th
February 1872 negotiations began with Constantinople via Blacque Bey, the Ottoman repre-
sentative in Washington DC, to supply the Bab-i-Ali with 50,000 Peabody Military Rifles,57
only to come to an abrupt end when Sultan Abdülaziz Baḫtsiz Şehīd received a gift of allegedly
as many as 50,000 Martini-Henry Rifles from Ismail, the Khedive of Egypt.58 These, it is said,
so impressed the Sultan that in May 1872 he decided to equip the Ottoman army with the
same rifle and a competition was announced to that effect to take place that summer to win
a contract for 200,000.59 Despite submissions from a Birmingham consortium and the Win-
chester Repeating Rifle Company,60 the competition was won on the 25th July by the PTCo
through Blaque Bey and the company’s agent in Constantinople, William de St.Laurent, the

1879, 141 (stressing how dragoon regiments only were supplied entirely with the weapon, along with two squadrons
in each lancer unit); Herbert 1895, 23; with Norman 1877 adding that the Winchester was in use also by mounted
jandarma (18-19), field artillery gunners (44), and Circassian irregular cavalry (e.g., 112, 114, etc.).
54
The total is derived from the sources cited in footnote 52 excluding the tables of Gencer et al. 1981. Of these
weapons, official Ottoman records indicate that an all-round total of some 392,000 were available for service use in
1877: Dwight 1881, 84, with Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902, 33.
55
For the numbers and supply of the Winchesters, see Williamson 1952, 55-58; Trevelyan 2016, 49 and 60; Seel
1981c, 1578; and Gencer et al. 1981, 142.
56
Hull 1979, 14, Achtermeier 1980, 36 and 37.
57
Hull 1979, 20.
58
McCoan 1889, 144, with Weigall 1915, 106, are the ‘contemporary sources’: see also Hull 1979, 20; and
Achtermeier 1980, 38. But the accuracy of the ‘contemporary sources’ for this exceptional generosity on the part
of the Khedive is highly doubtful. Aside from the fact there does not seem to be any independent evidence that
Martini-Henry Rifles may have been sent to the Khedive this early, the number of 50,000 allegedly presented in
this way simply cannot be true as their production had barely started. By the end of 1871 less than 300 had been
distributed for evaluation under service conditions (Temple and Skennerton 1983, 84 and 111; Becket 2013, 242),
which identified a series of defects requiring modification and so the ‘Second Pattern’ of the rifle, approved for
production on 3rd November 1872, with further changes resulting in the ‘Third Pattern’, introduced officially for
service use on 1st October 1874 (Temple and Skennerton 1983, 112), although actual examples were not issued on
a wholesale basis until 12th October 1874 (Becket 2013, 242). Thus while it is not impossible that the Khedive had
somehow received or acquired one or more of the Martini-Henry trials rifles by the spring of 1872, the total number
made by then cannot have approached anything near the alleged 50,000 at his disposal.
59
Norton 1880, 62; Hull 1979, 20, Achtermeier 1980, 38.
60
Norton 1880, 63. An attempt at winning the contract made by the BSA Company in Birmingham, England,
then in the process of tooling up for production of the Martini-Henry, rifle, failed – it is said – because their samples
arrived too late for consideration as their local agent was ‘also acting for two firms in the United States [i.e., PTCo
and Winchester] and had deliberately held back B.S.A.’s entry in the hope that the order would go to one of the American
companies, from which a larger commission could be expected’: cf. Ward 1946, 16.
240 Julian Bennett

PTCo agreeing that within six months of receiving the necessary pattern rifles and cartridges,
they would supply the first of the 200,000 of their own version of the Martini-Henry Rifle
with a ‘quadrangular’ socket bayonet, at a cost of 63 English shillings apiece.61 At this point,
though, Oliver Winchester, fortuitously in Constantinople acting on his own behalf, made use
of his local contacts on 1st August to underbid the PTCo by offering the same number of rifles
for 62 English shillings each. In the event the threat of a lawsuit from PTCo, as they owned
the Peabody section of the mechanism, along with an intervention by the US government, and
an awareness of his own company’s inability to meet the contract itself, obliged Winchester to
surrender the contract to the PTCo as of 1st January 1873.62
The contract with the PTCo specified that the rifles were to be exact copies of the
Martini-Henry Rifle as approved for service use with the British Army with certain specif-
ic changes.63 One was relatively minor, that the tangent-sights be graduated in metres from
1-1,300 using the Persian-based Turkish number-system. A more significant difference was the
demand they be chambered for a thinner ‘Berdan’-type cartridge, resulting in the 11.43 × 55R
‘Peabody-Martini Turkish Military cartridge’. This fired a lead bullet with a nominal calibre of
.45 inches, as with the Martini-Henry, but was smaller in diameter than its .577-450 ‘Boxer’
cartridge, and so necessitated modifying the extractor and chambering system of the mech-
anism, albeit incidentally resulting in a stronger and better sealed and so more efficient re-
ceiver.64 A final adjustment required by the Sublime Porte was that the side of the receiver be
stamped with the Sultan’s tughra, to denote imperial ownership of the weapon, and the rifle’s
serial number in Turkish numerals.65 These differences apart, none of which would be apparent
without a detailed examination, the Peabody-Martini Rifle was to be in all effects and purposes
a direct clone of the Martini-Henry Mk. I Rifle.
On 11th March, 1873, the PTCo appointed Azarian Effendi Père et Fils as their agent
in Constantinople.66 On that same day he negotiated a second contract for a further 300,000
rifles, and then a third on 23rd August 1873 for 100,000 more, thus 600,000 in all.67 The total
of 600,000 made this the largest ever contract received by a fire-arms maker in the United
States. But a stay in commencing production on the first 100,000 was forced on the PTCo
partly by a delay in receiving the agreed three pattern rifles and the specimen cartridges to serve
as models for their own product; but also in receiving the necessary cash deposit for full-pro-
duction. A further complication came in the July of 1873, when Martini, who had patented his
system in the US the previous year,68 opened a claim against PTCo for their intended use of his
modified version of the Peabody action. This was not settled until October when Peabody and
the PTCo were obliged to acknowledge his ‘improvement’ to the original Peabody mechanism
as in the Martini-Henry Rifle, and the requirement they pay Martini two English shillings
61
Achtermeier 1980, 38.
62
Hull 1979, 20- 21, and Achtermeier 1980, 38-39, with Sander and Kurthan 1977, 64.
63
Cf. Achtermeier 1980, 38.
64
Norton 1880, 67.
65
Achtermeier 1980, 39.
66
Cf. Hull 1979, 20-21.
67
Achtermeier 1980, 39.
68
US 132222 A of the 15th October 1872.
 Anatolica XLIV,  241

Fig. 1. A standard Peabody-Martini Rifle, shown here with a bayonet tenon

on the top barrel band and yataghan-style bayonet as introduced with the final
200,000 versions of the rifle (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 2. The right side of the receiver of a Fig. 3. The left side of the receiver of a standard
Peabody-Martini rifle showing the tughra Peabody-Martini rifle, with the maker’s
and serial number, and safety catch in mark (photograph courtesy of http://www.
the trigger guard, eliminated after 1876 militaryrifles.com/Turkey/TpeabMar.htm).
(photograph courtesy of http://www.
militaryrifles.com/Turkey/TpeabMar.htm).

Fig. 4. A Peabody-Martini breech block opened for loading, showing also the chequered thumb
rest characteristic of the Martini-Henry Mk. 1 Rifle (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).
242 Julian Bennett

royalty for each of the new rifles, along with, so it would seem, combining his name with
Peabody’s when advertising and marketing the rifle.69
The end result of these delays and the need to acquire the extra machinery and ap-
propriate manufacturing space was that production of the Turkish contract rifles did not com-
mence until April 1874: but even so, the PTCo was able to deliver the first of their 1,000
Peabody-Martini Rifles by the following March.70As required these were essentially indistin-
guishable from a Martini-Henry Rifle (e.g., Fig. 1). Closer examination, though, naturally re-
vealed the Turkish-numerals on the tangent leaf sight and, more obviously, the tughra stamped
above the Turkish-numerals used for the serial number on the right side of the receiver (Fig. 2),
the left side stamped ‘Peabody & Martini PATENTS / MAN’F’D BY / PROVIDENCE TOOL
CO. / PROV. R.I. U.S.A.’ (Fig. 3), 71 and the use of a small crescent moon and star symbol
above a PTCo inspection letter, for example an ‘H’, on the barrel bands, the upper right hand
side of the receiver plates, the cocking-indicator, and elsewhere (e.g., Fig. 11). Otherwise these
‘clones’, as it were, were direct copies of the Martin-Henry Mk. I Rifle, down to many of their
finest details, to the extent of having the same chequered buttstock end plate, and the cheq-
uered thumb rest on the top right of the receiver (Fig. 4).72
A more obvious visual difference was only apparent in the form of the socket bayonet
supplied with the Peabody-Martini Rifle, for as noted, the contract specified a socket bayonet
of quadrangular form (Fig. 5). Moreover, unlike being fitted with the blade parallel to the
right-hand side of the muzzle, as was usual for almost all socket bayonets, it was suspended
directly beneath the barrel (Fig. 6). The reason for the choice of a quadrangular section and
under-the-barrel location are unknown, and are features that at this time were shared only by
the Dutch Beaumont Model 1871 rifle, although the Swiss had earlier used quadrangular-sec-
tioned but side-mounted socket bayonets with their Model 1863 and Model 1871 rifles, while
the Peabody Military Rifles they bought in 1867 came with a similar model bayonet, as did the
Berdan rifled musket used by the Russians. Be that as may an under-the-barrel location might
be related to giving the rifle holder a direct line of sight when firing the rifle with bayonet
attached and when using the bayonet and rifle as a pike-like stabbing weapon. Whatever, the
bayonet itself had an overall length of 23.25 inches (591 mm), with a blade measuring 20.12
inches (514 mm), and weighing around 14 ounces (390 gr.). Thus, when fitted to the 49 inch
(124.5 cm) long rifle, it gave a pike-like weapon with a combined overall length of some 5
feet 8 inches (175 cm) from butt to the bayonet point. This seems an excess length in modern
eyes but it was deemed essential at a time when ‘bayonet reach’, the ability of an infantryman
to transfix a charging cavalryman or engage an enemy in bayonet combat when there was no
chance to re-load the firearm, was a major consideration in infantry weaponry design.73

69
Hull 1979, 21, Achtermeier 1980, 40, Rose 2009, 182.
70
Norton 1880, 63; Achtermeier 1980, 40.
71
On some versions of the rifle, the text reads ‘PATENT’ without the ‘S’ at the end.
72
Features such as these make it clear that the Peabody-Martini Rifle was indeed fashioned from an existing
production version of the Martini-Henry Mk.1 Rifle, which begs the question of where the three examples of these
sent as models from Constantinople came from.
73
E.g., Burton 1853, 7. Concern over the matter of supplying soldiers with a rifle and bayonet having a long
enough reach for close combat with the enemy continued into the First World War as was demonstrated by a British
 Anatolica XLIV,  243

Fig. 5. A Peabody-Martini socket bayonet and scabbard (photograph courtesy of Mick Hibberd).

Fig. 6. An early production Peabody-Martini Fig. 7. Side view from the right of a
Rifle with socket bayonet fixed, demonstrating Peabody-Martini Rifle with yataghan bayonet
the novel under the muzzle placement shared fixed to the bayonet tenon on the top barrel
with the Dutch Beaumont Model 1871 band (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).
rifle as opposed to the usual right-hand side
position of such bayonets (photograph from
the collection of the late John Ward).

Fig. 8. Peabody-Martini yataghan bayonets in their scabbards as seen at the Ankara Antika
Pazarı, the top one an original length version, with a repaired chape, the bottom one a shortened
and straightened version (photographed by the writer with permission of their owners).
244 Julian Bennett

With production of the Peabody-Martini Rifles for the Ottoman contracts finally un-
der way yet another halt in production threatened when Alexander Henry, who had patented
his rifling system in Britain in 1860 and taken out a US patent on it the 10th October 1871,
attempted in the early summer of 1874 to claim royalties on its use by the PTCo.74 His claim
was disallowed: as the court heard, the basic concept behind rifled-barrels was well established
in the United States and Henry had in any case neglected to apply for a US patent within one
year of its publication in Britain as was required by United States law for it to be applicable
there.75 Thus free to continue with production the PTCo managed to manufacture a further
53,600 Peabody-Martini Rifles in the course of 1874, well on the way to satisfying the initial
Ottoman contract for 200,000.76 Indeed, the final weapons for this were delivered to Ottoman
ownership by 9th November 1874,77 by when work had commenced on the second contract
for 300,000 more.
These two successes were perhaps the reason for J.B. Anthony’s visit to Constantinople
in January 1875, and his being honoured by the Sultan with enrolment in the Order of the
Osmani Second Class.78 Also at this time negotiations began for a fourth contract for 200,000
Peabody-Martini Rifles, and a request for a change, that the final 2,000 rifles of the second
and third contracts and – we might assume, those in the proposed fourth contract – be sup-
plied with yataghan sword-bayonets as opposed to the socket bayonets agreed in the first two
contracts.79 As it was the PTCo had produced some 10,411 Model 1860 sabres for the US
Army between January 1862 and July 1863, but many of these were rejected at the official
inspection stage for military issue, even if accepted eventually for use as meeting ‘serviceable
quality’.80 Thus perhaps rather than face a potential similar problem by producing these in-
house, the making of these yataghan bayonets was sub-contracted to the Ames Manufacturing
Co. of Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts.81 They followed the standard yataghan form popular
at the time, having a downward curved blade after the midpoint (Fig. 1). With their all steel
construction they weighed around 2 pounds (930 gr.), with an overall length of 28 inches (714
cm), and a blade length of 22.6 inches (575 mm), they were fixed to the rifle by means of a ten-
on on the right side of the top barrel band (Fig. 7),82 and housed in a leather scabbard with steel

Parliamentary question on the matter on 19th May 1915: cf. Hansard Vol. 71, c 2329.
74
GB patent No. 2802, issued 15th November 1860; US patent 119846 A.
75
Full details of the case are given in Thurston 1878, and conveniently summarised by Norton 1880, 61. On 1st
May 1874, Henry, gave notice of his intention to prolong the original patent: London Gazette, 1st May 1874.
76
Norton 1880, 63.
77
Hintermeier 2001, 120.
78
Achtermeier 1980, 41, where it is stated that the only other foreigner to receive this distinction was Alfred Krupp,
the ‘Canon King’, then busy supplying the Ottoman Empire with artillery (e.g., Yorulmaz 2014, Chapter 3, passim),
although Menne 1938, 150, in listing the 53 Prussian and other honours Krupp received states that he received the
Medjidie Order, as did ‘Tom’ Bennett of the Winchester Repeating Rifle Company (Trevelyan 2016, 67), in his case
for supplying ammunition to the Ottoman government. In 1890 and 1892 Paul Mauser was to receive a series of
Ottoman awards for the supply of Mauser rifles to the Ottoman Empire, culminating in the Osmani Second Class:
Seel 1981 b, 1265.
79
Hull 1979, 21, with Hull 1989; Achtermeier 1980, 41.
80
Hull 1979, 5-6.
81
Hull 1979, 21. The history of the Ames’ Company is fully explored by Hamilton 1998.
82
Hull 1979, 21.
 Anatolica XLIV,  245

fittings when not in use (Fig. 8). The result for the infantryman wielding a Peabody-Martini
rifle with a fixed yataghan bayonet was a slightly longer weapon than before, at about 6 feet
(181.6 cm) long, but certainly a heavier one.
By the summer of 1876, work on the second contract of Peabody-Martini Rifles was
well advanced when the Ottoman government was hit by a series of financial crises. The agreed
payments to the PTCo for the first contract were stalled, promoting a refusal to deliver 40,000
already completed rifles of the second contract – and a threat even to cease arms production
entirely unless cash was forthcoming.83 On the 20th November 1876, by when the PTCo had
made an overall total of 369,200 Peabody-Martini rifles,84 the suggestion was made to lessen
production costs at no financial loss to PTCo by eliminating the safety mechanism on the
weapon, just as the British had done during production of the Martini-Henry Mark I.85 Then,
in February 1877, sufficient monies were received by the PTCo to pay for the release of the
40,000 rifles embargoed in 1876, and resume production of the remaining rifles for the second
contract, with 73,000 rifles ready for delivery by the summer of 1877.86
What prompted the Ottoman government to pay its dues to the PTCo in early 1877
and so release the 40,000 embargoed rifles and re-commence production of those ordered in the
second contract was quite simply the threat of war with Russia. Thus at about the time the war
actually began, in April 1877, the Ottoman army had access to 334,000 Peabody-Martini Ri-
fles, 323,000 ‘Snider’ rifles, and 39,000 Winchester Model 1866 repeating rifles and carbines,87
the rifles for infantry use, the carbines by the various cavalry and other mounted units.88 The
Peabody-Martini, including some of those supplied with the new yataghan-form bayonet,89
quickly proved its worth in action at the Siege of Plevna, playing a vital part in resisting the
three attempts at capturing the place, and thus substantially impeding the Russian advance on
Constantinople in what became known as the ‘Plevna Delay’.

83
Cf. Achtermeier 1980, 41-42.
84
Hull 1979, 22 for the total; Hintermeier 2001, 120.
85
Hull 1979, 21-22; Achtermeier 1980, 42: those completed with the safety mechanism are referred to by collectors
as the ‘Type A’ those without as the ‘Type B’. The same device had been eliminated on the Martini-Henry Mark I
some time earlier, on the 11th November, 1873, to be precise.
86
Achtermeier 1980, 42.
87
Dwight 1881, 84, reporting information received from Ahmet Mithad Effendi, the most prominent journalist of
the later Tanzimat period, and with access to government figures. Cf. Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902, 46, evidently
derived from the same or a similar source. Most if not all of the ammunition for these weapons came from the
Winchester Repeating Rifle Company, which supplied some 87.5 million Peabody-Martini cartridges in 1874 and
112.45 million in 1875, and 80.1 million Snider cartridges in 1876-1877: hence the award in 1877 of the Mejidie order
to the company’s chief negotiator ‘Tom’ Bennett while visiting Constantinople: cf. Williamson 62-63 with 65 and 67.
88
Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902, 44-45, where it is also observed that ‘nach officiellen türkischen Daten’
(‘according to official Turkish sources’), 310,000 only of the 334,000 Peabody-Martini’s had actually been issued for
service use. The distribution and use of the Winchester Model 1866 Rifle is a mystery element in the 1877-1878
War as unlike the carbine equivalent, used by mounted units, no sources identify it specifically as being used in the
campaign, although an Ottoman report for 1879 does refer, inter alia, to the loss of 28,527 rifles in the 1877-1878
campaign: see below.
89
Cf. Herbert 1895, 23: ‘The equipment [of the Turkish infantry] consisted of a Martini-Peabody rifle and sword-
bayonet’ and 352-353: ‘The bayonets were sharpened; the men had two each, one sword-shape, and one of the ordinary
[i.e., socket] kind.’
246 Julian Bennett

A detailed account of the Siege of Plevna and the ‘Plevna Delay’ is not necessary
here. But what cannot be eschewed is a rebuttal – no matter how brief – of a growing ten-
dency in some modern literature – especially ‘on-line’ sources – to down-play the role of the
Peabody-Martini in the defence of Plevna in favour of emphasising the use at close range by its
infantry garrison of an allegedly 8-12,000 or so rapid firing Winchester repeater rifles they were
armed with.90 This is to ignore contemporary accounts such as the memoirs of Osman Pasha,
along with others, stating quite categorically that the Turkish infantry at Plevna did not use
the Winchester Model 1866 Rifle.91 The Winchester carbine was, of course, issued to mounted
units or elements thereof: but as there were no more than 1500 or so cavalry of all kinds at
Plevna, 92 the maximum number of Winchester carbines available for its defence was probably
nearer 1,000. Quite simply, aside from how contemporary records indicate clearly that the
Winchester was not thought of very highly of as a service weapon,93 the rapid and devastating
fire that decimated the Russian infantry attacks on the place was the ease of loading and reload-
ing of the Peabody-Martini together with its capability for long-distance and plunging fire and
– in particular – an abundance of ammunition.94 Indeed, so effective was the rifle in this way
the Russian commander, General Skoubeloff, ordered the re-arming of one company in the
Russian 63rd Regiment with captured Peabody-Martini Rifles for an attack on one particularly
well-entrenched Ottoman position at the decisive Battle of Shipka in January 1876.95

90
E.g., Götz 1974, 60, and Trenk 1997, followed, without question by, e.g., Rose, 2009, 184-185 (where it is also
claimed that the Ottoman government was so impressed by the Winchester’s performance that after Plevna, another
140,000 were ordered!), Haag 2016, 140-141, and Trevelyan 2016, 64-66, especially 66. The origin of the belief can
be traced back to Boudre 1878, 350, where it is stated that each Ottoman infantry man on the front line was given
a Winchester in the early stages of the Battle of Plevna; and Springer 1891, 305, similarly, where it is stated that ‘...
jeder türkische Soldat ... mit 15 Patronen geladene Winchester-Gewehr und beschloss die Russen welche nach furchtbaren
Verlusten auf dem Sturm mussten’.
91
Osman Pacha et al. 1878, 210.
92
Berry 2011, Appendices VII, XIII, and XIX.
93
E.g., Osman Pacha et al. 1878, 350, on how the Winchester was considered so poor a firearm it was withdrawn
from use during the course of the 1877-1878 war. Also Greene 1879, 141, ‘Only the cavalry on the Turkish side was
inferior in armament to the cavalry of the Russians; the latter had the short Berdan ... while the Turks had the Winchester,
which, although a repeating arm, has such a small charge and short range as to make it a very inferior weapon’; and
Herbert 1895, 23, and 25, where it is noted how ‘The weapons gave satisfaction in 1877, except the Winchester
repeating carbine, against which frequent complaints were heard’. Contemporary statements such as these negate
completely those unsupported claims for the influence of the Winchester at Plevna and elsewhere in the 1877-1878
war along the lines of, e.g., ‘The Winchester 1866 ... proved the deciding factor because of its firepower in early battles
against Russia’ – Smith and Smith 1948, 395.
94
Cf. Greene 1879, 17: ‘The supply of ammunition was one of the few effective organizations in the Turkish army, and
the infantry were prodigal in its use. They frequently opened fire at a range of 2,000 yards when occupying field works, and
were accustomed to keep up an uninterrupted fusillade, often without raising their heads over the parapet to aim’. Also
Herbert 1859, 352-353, who notes that on the attempted break-out of the garrison on 9th November 1877: ‘Each
man carried 130 cartridges, eighty in the pouch and fifty in the haversack. Each battalion had a reserve stock of 180,000
cartridges (or 150 per man, taking the average at 100 men per battalion), in 180 boxes of 1,000 each’.
95
Greene 1879, 353-354.
 Anatolica XLIV,  247

The Peabody-Martini Rifle, then, was the fundamental infantry weapon in the Otto-
man resistance at Plevna and elsewhere in the Ninth Russo-Turkish War.96 But Plevna and other
actions in that campaign evidently resulted in their heavy wastage, including – as we have seen
– a sufficient number captured and used against their former owners by the Russian 63rd infan-
try regiment.97 Indeed, according to an official Ottoman reports in June 1879, the 1877-1878
War had resulted in the loss of 156, 277 ‘Martini-Henry’ rifles (by which the Peabody-Martini
is clearly meant as the Ottoman army never received any of these British-made weapons), to-
gether with 207,555 Snider rifles, 11,708 Winchester carbines and 28,527 Winchester rifles.98
The war also naturally drained Ottoman finances even further. Thus the last of the 600,000
contract rifles in the third PTCo contract were not paid for and completed before 24th Decem-
ber 1879,99 after which they were dispatched to Constantinople.
With the receipt of the last of these contracted rifles, records for 1880 indicate that the
Ottoman army had access to about 350,000 Peabody-Martini rifles, along with some 400,000
‘Snider’ rifles, 20,000 Winchester repeaters, and 20,000 Remington rifles.100 But however
much the Ottoman government may have wished for a renewed and continued supply of
Peabody-Martini Rifles to make up the losses of the 1877-1878 War and so bring the effective
total back up to the original 600,000, this was no longer possible. The life of the PTCo itself
was close to its end for a variety of reasons, but most especially the various defaults of the
Ottoman payments allied to a costly expansion into the sewing-machine industry.101 Having
declared bankruptcy on 19th April 1882, its gun-making machinery was sold that 1st August,
with the PTCo closing formally for business in 1885.102 It had by then manufactured some
630,737 Peabody-Martini rifles, 369,200 of Type A with the safety catch and 251, 537 of Type
B without this, 600,000 of these being delivered to the Ottoman government, along with a
further 5,000 examples for the Valide Sultan and 717 for private buyers, the 15,020 residue
being delivered to the civilian market.103
Yet the Peabody-Martini had clearly proved so vital in infantry use that by 1881 al-
ready, the Ottoman government had embarked on a programme of making its own substitutes
at Constantinople. Such is indicated by Ottoman records for the Tüfekhâne-i ‘Âmire that year
recording the manufacture of as many as 840 ‘Martini-Henry’ rifles a week as well as ‘Sniders’

96
Hence the observation alleged of a Romanian veteran of Plevna when France offered to sell to Romania the
surplus Peabody Military Rifles in their own stocks after the Franco-Prussian War: ‘If you must have a Peabody, get
a Peabody-Martini – the same as the Turk has!’: Achtermeier 1980, 35-36.
97
Greene 1879, 355, Grzesicki and Wiedstruck 1902, 122.
98
Olgun 2017, 629.
99
Hunt 1979, 22; Achtermeier 1980, 43.
100
Seel 1981c, 1579. The Remington rifles came with Egyptian troops sent for service in the 1877-1878 War: cf.
Maurice 1877, 17.
101
Achtermeier 1980, 42.
102
Achtermeier 1980, 43.
103
Achtermeier 1980, 43; Hintermeier 1981, 120. Gencer et al. 208, 152 (Tablo 4), note the models delivered to
the Valide Sultan arrived 26th Nisan 1291, but do not record the private purchases.
248 Julian Bennett

and Winchester repeating rifles.104 It seems likely that part of the workforce engaged in this
work was of Albanian origin, as gunsmiths from the Kosovo and Tetovo region had been busily
engaged for some time in their home region in making a generic version of the ‘Martini-Hen-
ry’ and other Ottoman service rifles for sale to local residents and others, Albanian nationals
certainly being employed at the Tüfekhâne-I ‘Âmire as late as 1903.105 Be that as it may, the
manufacture of these ‘clones’ meant that by 1886, the Ottoman army had between 339,160
and 450,000 Peabody-Martini rifles in service use or in store, along with 396,172 ‘Sniders’ and
9,370 Winchesters.106
This number of weapons was, however, apparently deemed insufficient or their types
too obsolete for the needs of the Ottoman army as then being reorganised with the help of
seconded German officers under the overall authority of Major (later General) Colmar von
der Goltz: so the Ottoman government began preliminary discussions on ordering 450,000
Martini-Henry Rifles from British manufacturers.107 The Mauser concern in Germany, hav-
ing been made aware of this potential contract, responded by entering their Gew. 71/84, a
bolt-actioned rifle with an 8-round tubular magazine, for a series of trials at Constantinople
in December 1886 against other competitors that included Martini-Henry, Mannlicher, and
Hotchkiss Rifles.108 The Sultan’s decision on these trials, made on either the 6th or 10th Febru-
ary 1887, was for the Mauser, and discussions began on purchasing 500,000 rifles and 50,000
carbines of a modified version of the Gew.71/84. 109 Thus the birth of the 9.5 × 60 mm calibre
‘Turkish Model’ 1887 rifle and carbine, and a long period of collaboration between Constan-
tinople and the Mauser concern that saw the introduction into Ottoman service of successively
the ‘Turkish Model’ 1890 rifle, with its smaller and more powerful 7.65 × 53mm cartridge
propelled by smokeless powder, and then, using the same cartridge, the ‘Turkish Model’ 1893
and ‘Turkish Model’ 1903.110
This decision to adopt the ‘Turkish Model’ 1887 and its successors did not, though,
end for once and all Ottoman military use of the ‘Aynali Martini’, even if an official inventory
in 1887 declared the 450,000 ‘Martini-Henry’s’ then in stock ‘obsolete and useless’.111 A report
submitted in 1890 to his government by the then British Naval Attaché at Constantinople
noted how in 1888, examples of ‘Martin-Henry’s’ were being made at the Tüfekhâne-I ‘Âmire
in 1888 at a rate of 100 a week, although this had dropped to ten a week at the time his report

104
Cf. Yorulmaz 2014, 97-98. It is not at all clear how these rifles may have been marked, although Martini-Henry/
Peabody-Martini Rifle look-a-likes, with tughras on the right-hand side of the receiver and a series of unintelligible
letter markings on the left-hand side, have been noted in the Ankara Antika Pazarı and elsewhere, and may well
represent these.
105
Olgun 2017, 630 with 637.
106
Yorulmaz 2014, 110, with 215.
107
Yorulmaz 2014, 33-34 and 110.
108
Yorulmaz 2014, 113-114.
109
Yorulmaz 2014, 116, for the 6th February, and Seel 1981a, 800, for the 10th.
110
For a detailed account, see Ball 2011, 374-388, where the rifles and the various carbine versions are profusely
discussed and illustrated.
111
Yorulmaz 2014, 110.
 Anatolica XLIV,  249

was compiled,112 this drop evidently in response to the arrival of their Mauser replacements.
And yet even as late as 1896, despite having been declared ‘obsolete and useless’ some 10 years
earlier, the Ottoman army registered some c. 500,000 ‘Martini’ rifles among its stock of rifles,
along with 150,000 ‘Sniders’; c. 50,000 Winchester repeaters; c. 50,000 Remington’s; 220,000
‘Turkish Model’ 1887 rifles and 4,000 carbines; 280,000 ‘Turkish Model’ 1890 rifles; and
201,900 ‘Turkish Model’ 1893 rifles.113
The ‘Martini-Henry’ rifles inventoried at this time were evidently not all PTCo prod-
ucts as the total of 500,000 or so is higher than the 350,000 indicated in the inventory list for
1880,114 and thus must include ‘clones’ produced at the Tüfekhâne-I ‘Âmire after 1881. But be
that as may the decision to keep this substantial number of Peabody-Martini or the locally-made
‘Martini-Henry’ rifles as a stand-by weapon was a testament to its reliability and durability if
future circumstances required, having won this reputation in the 1877-1878 war: as a contem-
porary observer then noted, a Peabody-Martini could be used in such ‘a condition that would
drive the captain of a line regiment into an early grave’. 115 To be sure, the Peabody-Martini
Rifle, along with one or other of the older Snider conversions, continued to be the standard
Ottoman infantry rifle almost until the end of the 19th century, owing to a failure to distribute
the stocks of Mausers to the army for training purposes, which meant that those already deliv-
ered remained in store right up until the outbreak of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897.116 That is
why in the event, some units were given Mausers in exchange for Peabody-Martini’s and other
rifles as they marched off to battle, and then had to be trained in their use under campaign
conditions, but even so, it is thought that as many as nine out of every ten divisions involved
in the campaign used Peabody-Martini or other long obsolete weapons, some units even being
armed with muzzle-loaders of an uncertain but evidently great vintage.117
In the years that followed the 1897 War the Ottoman army continued to build up its
stocks of Mauser weaponry while maintaining its reserve of Peabody-Martini and other rifles
for use by, or so it seems, second line army units and the Jandarma. In fact such was the reliance
on the Peabody-Martini even as an ostensibly secondary weapon for service use that in 1910 the
Ottoman government adopted finally a suggestion made initially some 20 years earlier by Paul
Mauser to re-chamber these to take the same 7.65 × 53 mm standard cartridge as employed in
the ‘Turkish Models’ 1890, 1893, and 1903, and thus avoid the potential logistical nightmare
during wartime of delivering the appropriate ammunition to units armed with either Mausers
or Peabody-Martini rifles.118 As it was, in 1892 the Österreichische Waffenfabriks-Gesellschaft
at Steyr, having heard of the possibility at the time that the Ottoman Peabody-Martini Rifles
might be converted to the Mauser standard cartridge, had patented a suitable conversion pro-
cess already: thus in early 1910 they received a contract to produce 200,000 new chambers

112
Cf. Yorulmaz 2014, 98.
113
Seel 1981c, 1579.
114
Seel 1981c, 1579.
115
Norman 1887, 184.
116
Seel 1981c, 1580.
117
Yorulmaz 2014, 129-130, for a selection of contemporary accounts regarding weapons in use in the campaign;
also Seel 1981c, 1580.
118
Cf. Hintermeier 2001, 119 and 124.
250 Julian Bennett

Fig. 9. A post-1910 Peabody Martini Rifle as chambered for the standard Mauser 7.65 × 53
cartridge, with the shortened barrel, ‘Turkish Model’ 1903 woodwork, alongside a straightened
yataghan bayonet associated with this firearm (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 10. The right hand side of a receiver converted Fig. 11. The left hand side of the receiver as in Fig.
to the Mauser 7.65 × 53 cartridge, showing the 10, showing the strengthening plate and the added
strengthening plate added to the rear of the breech legend in Osmanlıca script recording conversion
system (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan). to the Mauser 7.65 × 53 cartridge at the “Tüfenk
Fabrikası / İstanbul”, and the date 1327. Note also
the crescent and star inspection mark above the letter
‘M’ at the top left of the receiver plate as received
in the PTCo factory before being despatched to
Constantinople (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).

Fig. 13. View from above of the muzzle of

a converted Peabody-Martini rifle muzzle
with stud for fitting a socket bayonet and
Fig. 12. The new serial marking on the breech top barrel band with a bayonet tenon
block of a post-1910 converted Peabody-Martin (lower left) for fitting a yataghan bayonet
Rifle (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan). (photograph courtesy of J.P. Sheehan).
 Anatolica XLIV,  251

and barrels to suit the Mauser cartridge along with 150,000 ‘Turkish Model’ 1903 sights, these
being supplied to Constantinople for fitting between October 1910 and March 1911.119
The converted rifles have a barrel length of 29.13 inches (740 mm), some 4 inches
(10 cm shorter) than before (Fig. 9), giving an overall length of 3 feet 9 inches (1.14 m). The
thicker and stronger barrel and chamber required for the new cartridge, which meant adding
a strengthening plate also to the receiver at the rear of the breech (Fig. 10), resulted in a rifle
that was now slightly heavier, at 9 pounds 4 ounces or so (4.12 kg). The left hand-side of the
receiver of these conversions received an Osmanlacı text beneath the original Peabody-Martini
marking indicating its conversion and the year this was done, as for example (e.g., Fig. 11),
‘Tüfenk Fabrikası / İstanbul / Sene – 1327’,120 and so ‘Rifle Factory, Istanbul, year 1911/1912’,
and the top of the breech facing the user was stamped with a new serial number (e.g., Fig. 12).
According to the known and recorded breech serials as collated by collectors, at least 2,337 con-
versions were completed in the year 1327 (1911/1912), 119,683 during 1328 (1912/1913),
and 164,236 in 1331 (1915/1916), although for some reason the highest individual number
reported, at 173,778, is on a conversion dated 1330 (1914/1915), and so the conversion was
done sometime before the serial number was added.121 The necessary new woodwork for the
conversion – the handguard and forestock – was configured to match the ‘Turkish Model’
1903 system and fitted with a ‘Turkish Model’ 1903 leaf sight, and as they were required to
take the existing stocks of Peabody-Martini bayonets,122 the muzzles were provided with both a
socket lug on the muzzle itself and a bayonet tenon on the top barrel bar (Fig. 13). Given the
existence of large numbers of Peabody-Martini yataghan bayonets that have been straightened
and shortened (as in Figs. 8, 9 and 14) to a blade length of around 18 inches (46 cm), reduc-
ing the weight to around 1 pound 12 ounces (800 gr), it is only natural to assume these were
adapted at this time to help provide better balance to the rifle when affixed. When not in use,
they were housed in a shortened version of the original leather scabbard (Fig. 8), although a
single steel example has been recorded (Fig. 14).
Photographic evidence would seem to confirm these conversions were in service use
during the First Balkan War of 1912-1913 by both regular and irregular troops,123 and so per-
haps they were used in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912 also. They were certainly in action
at Gallipoli, for the diary of Lt Mehmed Fasih, a serving officer there, reports for 22nd October
1915 that the newly arrived Turkish 64th Regiment was equipped with ‘modified Martini Ri-
fles’.124 Moreover, British Military Intelligence was evidently well aware of how the Ottoman
119
Cf. Hintermeier 2001, quoting the contract book of OEWG for 1869-1913, 130, contract numbers 1 to 4.
120
Sometimes the word for year and the number are reversed, and so, e.g., ‘1331 – sene’.
121
Royal Armouries Museum, inventory no. pr 6534 Catalogue-IRN-276788: this is perhaps the one in the now-
closed pattern room of the Royal Ordnance collection at Nottingham referred to by Hintermeier 2001, 125, as
being the latest example known to him. Note also that all of the conversions seen and recorded by the writer and
others on various collector’s on-line forums have certainly been original Peabody-Martini rifles, making it almost
definite that none of the ‘Martini-Henry’ clones made at Constantinople between 1881 and 1902 or thereabouts
were ever adapted for the Mauser cartridge.
122
Hintermeier 2001, 124.
123
Cf. Jowett 2011, 47.
124
Danişman 2001, 27. The regiment was part of the 7th Infantry Division, and had been alerted for combat
readiness as early as 26 April 1915: cf. Erickson 2007, 40.
252 Julian Bennett

army still relied on the Peabody-Martini Rifle despite it having been officially declared obsolete
in 1886. Such is made clear by their report for 1916 which notes how in addition to the various
Mauser and other rifles then in service with the Ottoman army, 500,000 ‘Martini-Henry [and]
Martini-Peabody rifles’ were available, of which 370,000 were said to date to the war of 1877-
1878 and so are certainly Peabody-Martini’s.125 The report goes on to note how the ‘two types
of Martini [sic]’ were being converted to take the Mauser 7.65 mm cartridge and that ‘about
180 Martini’s [sic]’ are, it is said, being converted daily in Constantinople’, noting later that
‘the Constantinople factory is said to turn out 100 or 150 [conversions] daily’,126 although the
only such conversions reported in the literature are all Peabody-Martini’s rather than ‘Clones’.
British Military Intelligence further concluded that as of July 1914, the ‘Henri-Martini’ (sic)
rifle was in use solely by the Lebanese Militia and some of the ‘Asian’ Gendarmerie units,127
although as we have seen above, converted versions were used by the Ottoman 64th Regiment
at Gallipoli.
Be that as it may, the First World War was the last campaign in which the
Peabody-Martini is known for certain to have been in service use. Indeed, it was most probably
gradually withdrawn from combat duty from 1916/1917 onwards, when Turkey began to be
supplied by Germany with a mix of their now obsolete Gew. 88 and surplus-to-requirements
but up-to-date Gew. 98. Certainly, there is no evidence for the Peabody-Martini Rifle having
been deployed during the Turkish War of Independence. But even if it was, it is likely to have
been retired for once and for all soon after 1933, when the army of the Turkish Republic began
to convert its stocks of German-made Mauser rifles for a 7.9 × 57 cartridge, this same calibre
being employed in the Turkish Mauser derivatives produced by the ASFA concern at Kırıkkale
after 1938. Be that as it may, those specimens of Peabody-Martini Rifles that survive in muse-
ums and in private collections are now the only clear if often neglected reminders of its impor-
tant role in the declining years of the Ottoman Empire. But for a more precise example of its
raison d’être in that tempestuous period we shall conclude this study with an example of a part-
ly-preserved regular Peabody-Martini yataghan bayonet found during controlled archaeologi-
cal excavations at the deserted Arab village of Qaluniya near Jerusalem (Fig. 15).128 The place
served as an Ottoman army outpost during the Great War of 1914-1918, before being ‘silently
dealt with’ by forces of the 60th British division as part of the advance on Jerusalem, at which
point, as the find shows, the garrison still relied apparently on a rifle and bayonet supplied at
least 36 year earlier, further testimony to the reliability and durability of the Peabody-Martini
Rifle as the Ottoman Army’s first modern rifle.
125
Anon. 1916, 10. The figures for the Mauser rifles were: 500,000 in 7.65 mm calibre, and so ‘Turkish Models’
1890, 1893 and 1903, and 200,000 in 9.5 mm calibre, the ‘Turkish Model’ 1887, and the report notes that
‘considerable numbers of Remington’s and Winchester repeating rifles’ were also in use. The source for the figures is
not clear, but records indicate that a total of 900,000 Mauser firearms of all models had been sent to Constantinople
between 1886 and 1908: cf. Yorulmaz 2014, 128. What is confusing here is the indication that 130,000 or so
‘Martini-Henry’ rifles were in Ottoman service: as noted earlier, there is no evidence the Ottoman army ever
received a supply of British-made Martini-Henry rifles and so these are presumably clones of one kind or another.
126
Anon. 1916, 11 with 57.
127
Anon. 1916, 55, with 11 and 102.
128
I am especially grateful to Assaf Peretz for information on this find, and to Shua Kisilevitz and Anna Eirikh-Rose
of the Israel Antiquities Authority, for permission to publish it here. For a preliminary account of the multi-period
site where it was discovered, but not the bayonet itself, see Kisilevitz et al. 2014.
 Anatolica XLIV,  253

Fig. 14. A shortened Peabody-Martini yataghan with a steel

scabbard (photograph courtesy of Mick Hibberd).

Fig. 15. The remains of a standard Peabody-Martin yataghan bayonet and its surviving
steel locket from its leather scabbard found in the remains of the Arab village of Qaluniya,
an Ottoman outpost in World War One (photograph courtesy of Assaf Peretz, and
Shua Kisilevitz and Anna Eirikh-Rose of the Israel Antiquities Authority).

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