Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

DOI 10.1007/s12117-017-9301-z

Fragmentation and cooperation: the evolution

of organized crime in Mexico

Laura H. Atuesta 1 & Yocelyn Samantha Pérez-Dávila 1

Published online: 21 February 2017

# Springer Science+Business Media New York 2017

Abstract Some researchers suggest that the observed boom in the levels of
violence in Mexico since 2008 are a consequence of placing federal military
forces in states with a significant organized crime presence. However, little
has been said about the role of the changeable, competitive, and violent
nature of criminal organizations on this increasing violence. Using the
literature on inter- and intra-state conflicts as matter of analogy to explain
organized crime developments in Mexico, fragmentation and cooperation
seem to be determinant forces that alter the equilibrium within Mexican
criminal groups, affecting their territorial control. By using a private dataset
gathered by the Drug Policy Program at the Center for Economic Research
and Teaching (CIDE), we examine the evolution of criminal organizations in
Mexico by focusing on their different alliances and fragmentations from
December 2006 to December 2011. Our analysis suggests that violence is
a consequence not only of the law enforcement actions, but also of the
fragmentation and cooperation within and between private groups.

Keywords Organized crime . Instra-state conflicts . Fragmentation . Cooperation:

criminal groups

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s12117-017-9301-z)

contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

* Yocelyn Samantha Pérez-Dávila

[email protected]

Laura H. Atuesta
[email protected]

1
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE)- CONACYT, Drug Policy Program, Calle
Circuito Tecnopolo 117, Col. Tecnopolo Pocitos II, C.P. 20313 Aguascalientes, Ags, Mexico
236 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

Introduction

Levels of violence in Mexico has increased substantially since the implementation of

the war against organized crime in 2006. Because the rise of violence was observed
after the government implemented its military operations, some authors (Merino 2011;
Guerrero-Gutiérrez 2012; Escalante 2013; Hope 2013, 2014) have argued that the
introduction of the federal forces to fight criminal groups was the primary cause of
the violence boom. This paper adds to the existing literature by analyzing the mech-
anisms of fragmentation and cooperation within and between criminal groups to better
understand the relationship and causality between the implementation of governmental
repressive measures against organized crime and the rise in violence.
Previous literature has suggested that violence is caused by the government response
to organized crime. Some mechanisms have been explored to explain this relationship.
For example, Calderón et al. (2015), Osorio (2015) and Phillips (2015) suggest that
repressive law enforcement policies (killing or arresting kingpins or lieutenants) cause
fragmentation of groups and furthermore increase violence. Atuesta and Ponce (2016)
posit that the implementation of law enforcement policies increases the number of
active criminal groups, and consequently influences the level of violence between
criminal groups. Rios and Shirk (2011) analyze the power vacuum caused by law
enforcement policies that has been translated into an escalation of violence. Other
reasons given to explain the boom in violence in Mexico have included the political
changes observed in the country since 2000 with the end of the PRI hegemony
(Grayson 2011; Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009); changes in the international are-
na—mainly the closure of the Caribbean route to traffic Colombian cocaine (Hope
2013); and the regulatory environment in which the organized crime groups operate
(Cory et al. 2012).
This article looks to a new perspective of the same phenomenon, by looking how the
dynamics of fragmentation and alliance formation, irrespective of concrete government
interventions, and the changeable, competitive and violent nature of criminal groups,
also escalated violence. By analyzing how the main cartels in Mexico have evolved, we
see that they have fragmented – as groups split – and cooperated – i.e., formed alliances
– in order to survive. We examine this evolution using a dataset gathered by the Drug
Policy Program of the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE)1 (hereafter
PPD Dataset). We use the PPD Dataset with two main purposes: first, to identify the
main fragmentations and alliances in the organized crime structure from 2007 to 2011;
second, to analyze the correlation between each of the fragmentation and cooperation
events with the levels of violence.2 For the first time, we are able to attribute homicides
to specific groups, allowing us to draw conclusions regarding the proportion of
violence that is caused by a fragmentation or by the creation of an alliance (for
details about the PPD Dataset, see Atuesta et al. 2016).
Our results suggest that criminal groups cooperate through alliances and become
fragmented depending primarily on their relation with other groups, the period of time
1
CIDE is a Mexican center for research and higher education specialized in social sciences. More information
at http://www.cide.edu/sobre-el-cide/
2
We are using homicides categorized as “executions” allegedly related to organized crime as proxy for
violence. Other indicators of violence can be used (i.e. number of disappearances, extortion, kidnappings, and
torture, among others).
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 237

analyzed, and the geographical location of their operations. During the five years
examined (2007–2011), the structure of organized crime evolved from being comprised
of five visible groups participating in less than 20 violent events in 2007 to nearly
eighty identified cartels, gangs, and small organizations, participating in more than a
thousand events in 2011. 3 Fragmentation and cooperation are inherent to the
nature of organized crime and have represented the criminal groups’ response
to law enforcement strategies. Results also suggest a relationship between law
enforcement actions (for example, a leader’s death or incarceration), the evolu-
tion of the group (i.e., offspring emancipation), and the number of homicides
attributable to the affected group.
The main contribution of this work comes from the detailed information used for the
analysis. The information gathered from the PPD Dataset, and the corresponding
analysis, corroborate previous qualitative studies of organized crime in Mexico.
However, this is the first time that the data available provide detailed information on
the cooperation and fragmentation of groups, allowing us to conduct an in-depth
analysis of the evolution of organized crime and, thus, an analysis of the evolution of
violence in Mexico.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two offers a theoretical
framework for studying fragmentation and cooperation. Section three introduces a
historical overview of the evolution of the organized crime in Mexico making emphasis
on the time periods where fragmentations and alliances are observed. Section four
provides a typology of the different fragmentations and alliances, and analyzes the
effect these forces have on the level of violence. Finally, section five concludes with an
argument that fragmentation and cooperation are determinants for violence, and the
primary reason why the government should carefully modify its actions to stop altering
these forces.

Fragmentation and cooperation of criminal groups

This section reviews the literature regarding intra-state (i.e., civil war) and inter-state
wars in order to analyze conflicts not only through the relationship between criminal
groups and the government, but also through the interactions between different criminal
groups. While inter-state wars are defined by the Human Security Report Project as
conflicts fought by two or more states, Small and Singer define a civil war as “any
armed conflict that involves military action internal to the metropole, active participa-
tion of the national government, and effective resistance by both sides” (as cited by
Sambanis 2004). Although we do not classify the Mexican situation as civil war per se,
we use this literature- both on inter- and intra-state conflicts- as a matter of analogy to
explain organized crime developments in Mexico.
Alliances and cooperation have been studied primarily in the context of inter-state
wars. Three lines of research have been explored in this literature: (i) the relationship
between alliance formation and war; (ii) the motivation for formation of alliances; and
(iii) the reliability of alliances (Smith 1995). Cooperation has also been explored in the

3
The number of events related to organized crime gathered in the PPD Database is greater than these numbers.
However, a criminal group is not always identified.
238 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

civil war literature by examining the rationality of self-interest individuals to get

involved in an alliance, and the role of reputation and signaling on the formation and
reliability of alliances (Hugh-Jones 2013; Powell and Stringham 2009).
The civil war literature has also studied group fragmentation, by analyzing how
fragmentation dynamics affect the level of violence or the outputs of intra-state
conflicts. Pearlman and Gallagher-Cunningham (2012) studies the complex behavior
among factions, concluding that coalition building is more prompt to fragmentation
than unitary groups. Other authors such as Gallagher-Cunningham et al. (2012) and
Bakke et al. (2012), analyze how fragmentation increases violence and affects the
duration of war. The civil war literature shows mixed results regarding the effect of
fragmentation in conflict: while some authors argue that fragmentation extends the
duration of war and increases violence (Gallagher-Cunningham et al. 2012), some
others suggest that fragmentation events cluster at the end of conflict and induce
factions to negotiate peace settlements (Findley and Rudloff 2012).
Although it is difficult to prove causality between the formation of an alliance and
the probability of war, alliances are understood as endogenous to the evolution of
conflict and violence. Levy (1981), in the context of inter-state wars, suggests that the
type of alliance matters on the evolution of violence; other studies (both in intra- and
inter-state wars literature) argue that it is the credibility and the information provided by
each of the parties that determines violence (Smith 1995; Gallagher-Cunningham
2013). For Smith (1995), when two or more states decide to cooperate, the balance
of power changes, causing other parties to refrain from attacking or retaliating.
However, because alliances are costly, actors may give incomplete or false information
regarding their willingness to cooperate (Smith 1995; Hugh-Jones 2013). This situation
creates instability at the moment that cooperation is needed, making alliances unreliable
in most cases. Cooperation, then, is understood to be an altruistic measure, since self-
interested individuals may choose to cooperate instead of retrenching individually. This
situation has been explored not only in alliances among countries (Hugh-Jones 2013),
but also in civil war contexts, with cooperation agreements among private groups
(Leeson 2006).
In the context of civil wars, alliances allow groups to survive for longer periods of
time (Levy 1981). When groups become weakened, either because they were targeted
by the government (Rudloff and Findley 2016; Bakke et al. 2012; Gallagher-
Cunningham et al. 2012) or via clashes with rivals, the formation of an alliance is an
opportunity to recover and survive for longer periods of time. However, if the alliance
is unreliable, or the individual interests of the members differ, the cooperation might not
last long and fragmentation can occur.
Fragmentation can result not only when a group disintegrates, but also when some
factions of the same group become independent (Gallagher-Cunningham et al. 2012;
Gallagher-Cunningham 2013). These independent groups should be analyzed not as
unified organizations, but rather as sets of factions with different interests and a
common objective (Gallagher-Cunningham et al. 2012; Findley and Rudloff 2012;
Gallagher-Cunningham 2013). According to Gallagher-Cunningham et al. (2012), a
“group is often a collection of factions (…) Each group is comprised of ‘factions’
which are organizations that claim to represent the interests of the group in the struggle
for greater self-determination. Factions can be armed groups, paramilitary organiza-
tions, political parties, or civic organizations.”
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 239

Governmental policies
Decapitation strategy

Common enemy Territory control

Creation of new
groups
Fragmentation Groups are Groups join together Creation of
debilitated for a coalision an Alliance
Existing groups
become independent

Different perspectives Common enemy Factions seeking Costs of cooperation

among different members disappear political relevance increase

Further fragmentation
Existence of a unitary
group with common
interests

Fig. 1 Theoretical interactions between fragmentation and cooperation

Figure 1 depicts these interactions graphically. In the first mechanism, the fragmen-
tation of groups, caused by law enforcement policies or by clashes with the competi-
tion, debilitates factions that cannot survive without the creation of an alliance. As such,
it is in the interest of debilitated actors to cooperate (Findley and Rudloff 2012). The
second mechanism is observed when an alliance is broken either because different
factions have different interests (Bakke et al. 2012); because the common purpose of
the alliance disappears (i.e., the existence of a common enemy); or because the costs of
cooperation increase. The rupture of the alliance generates separate factions and further
fragmentation.
When a group is formed as a coalition, it is more probable that different factions
have different interests, and that the unity of the coalition will be threatened by external
factors such as the disappearance of a common enemy or a change in the balance of
power in a specific territory.4 In these cases, fragmentation is more likely than when the
organization has strong ties and institutions, and when it is created with a unique
command (Bakke et al. 2012). 5 A fragmentation, then, can be observed in two
situations: first, with the split of a coalition (formed by different groups) and second,
with the disintegration of a group. In the first case, the groups that were members of a
coalition become independent. In the second case, the new factions of the disintegrated
group create new organizations with independent objectives.
Bakke et al. (2012), in the context of civil wars, proposes three dimensions in which
a fragmentation is analyzed: (i) organizations with a greater number of factions have
higher chances of fragmentation; (ii) more centralized organizations impose more
discipline and rules, making fragmentation less likely; and (iii) organizations with more
institutions and rules are more stable and have lower chances of fragmentation.
Having discussed the determinants of cooperation and fragmentation, one important
question is whether these forces generate greater levels of violence or perpetuate armed
conflicts. The literature offers mixed conclusions regarding the effect of fragmentation
and cooperation on violence and conflict. Levy (1981), in the context of inter-state
4
Alliances and coalitions are not the same. According to Smith (1995), an alliance is a nonbinding agreement
between two nations. A coalition is a group of nations that fight together in war, with or without a previous
agreement.
5
A unique command allows an organization to be institutionalized, with all factions being represented by the
organization (Bakke et al. 2012).
240 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

wars, argues that more permanent alliances, compared to ad hoc alliances, actually
increase the probability of war. Findley and Rudloff (2012), when analyzing violence in
civil wars, suggest that fragmentation debilitates groups, and such groups are more
likely to accept peace settlements and to terminate conflicts. Rudloff and Findley
(2016), also in the civil wars context, look beyond the end of a conflict, arguing that
a peace settlement achieved with fragmented factions tend to be less permanent than
any other agreement, suggesting that violence would increase when peace is broken.
Staniland (2012) posits that lethal competition between groups (in intra-state wars) can
lead to defection; moreover, those surviving but weakened end up searching for state
protection. In addition, non-state group fragmentation could allow the government to
divide leaders and co-opt them in order to sue for peace (Driscoll as cited by Pearlman
and Gallagher-Cunningham 2012).
In this article we analyze the different fragmentations and alliances observed in the
organized crime structure in Mexico using the theoretical framework described above.
Moreover, we analyze the effect that these two dynamic forces have on the evolution of
violence, and consequently on the perpetuation of the war against organized crime in
Mexico. We test two theoretical arguments.

(i). Fragmentations of criminal structure, can occur in three different ways, as a

disintegration of already established alliances, because factions of a unitary group
become independent, or because successions within the same organization debil-
itate the unity of the group. In each case, the level of violence increases as new
competitive groups fight for controlling the territory.
(ii). Alliances are created because groups debilitated after a fragmentation decide to
collaborate with each other, because they are facing a common enemy, or because
they want to control territory. Once these external factors disappear, the cooperation
between groups also tends to disappear. However, alliances allow criminal groups to
survive for longer periods of time, and their effect on violence could be positive or
negative, depending on the conditions under which the cooperation takes place.

To test these arguments empirically, we identify fragmentation and cooperation

events in the evolution of Mexican organized crime. Then, using a typology for
fragmentations and alliances, we test their effect on the level of violence in the country.

Fragmentation and alliances in the Mexican organized crime structure

In what follows, a brief history about the formation of the main cartels in Mexico is
provided with the objective of identifying fragmentations and alliances in the organized
crime structure. We use the PPD Dataset from which we are able to identify at least 200
different groups from 2007 to 2011. These groups communicate with each other
through narcomessages left next to the executed bodies, and we use this information
to identify rivalries, alliances, and fragmentations.6

6
The online appendix provides a detailed description of the groups forming alliances and fragmentations, and
a brief description of the PPD Dataset information used for this analysis.
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 241

Mexican cartels are usually composed by different groups from which we can
identify the following:

& Leaders: capos that lead or manage the cartel.

& Armed wings: groups with the objective of protecting an organization, business, or
territory. They are under command of the main cartel and are not involved in drug
trafficking. Instead, they concentrate on attacking and defending territory.
& Operator/gunmen: operators are individuals that are responsible for turfs, while
gunmen are hired to kill and/or protect the organization.
& Local bands: these bands are not created by the cartel; however, they are “hired” to
lead local fights. They usually operate local illegal markets with the protection of
the cartel.
& Bands originated by or with the support of the cartel: the cartel contributes to the
formation of these bands, either by fragmenting and leaving a power vacuum, or by
directly supporting their creation.
& Alliances: agreements between two or more independent groups to attack a com-
mon enemy, to avoid violence in a specific territory, or to pursue (temporarily)
common interests.7

The timeline starts with the Guadalajara Federation (Fig. 2). After his incarcera-
tion in 1989, Felix Gallardo, the Federation leader, wanted to divide the drug business
into seven territories under the Guadalajara’s umbrella (Astorga 2005; Hernández
2012). However, this division was not followed, and instead, three organizations were
born: the Gulf Cartel in Tamaulipas, the Juarez Cartel in Chihuahua, and the Tijuana
Cartel in Baja California. Further fragmentation was observed when the Sinaloa Cartel
and the Beltran Leyva Organization (OBL) born as emancipations of the Juarez Cartel;
and Los Zetas became independent from the Gulf Cartel.
The Carrillo brothers led the Juarez Cartel for 20 years: Amado Carrillo until 1997
and Vicente Carrillo until his incarceration in 2009. According to Valdés-Castellanos
(2013a, b), the Juarez Cartel had the protection of public servants from the municipal
level to the military forces, who served as a surrogate personal army. Nevertheless, La
Linea, Los Aztecas and the Nuevo Cartel the Juarez appear as armed wings of the
Cartel. The evolution and the composition of the Juarez Cartel from 2008 to 2011, is
observed in Fig. 3.
Guzmán Loera, El Chapo, with his partners, El Mayo Zambada y Nacho Coronel,
constructed a drug empire known as the Sinaloa Cartel, after he emancipated from the
Juarez Cartel. Although he was incarcerated several times since 1994, he was able to
continue leading the organization until his final capture in 2016.8
Although its complex structure, and attacks from several enemies, the Sinaloa Cartel
has survived since its origins in 1994, by implementing an “outsourcing” model in
which different groups were allowed to be part of the organization. Armed groups as
Gente Nueva, Los M’s and Los Pelones began protecting the Cartel in 2007 and 2008
when the Sinaloa Cartel was locked in deadly battles against the Tijuana and Gulf

7
A more elaborated typology for defining alliances is presented in section 4.
8
El Chapo escaped from jail in 2001, and in 2014, was recaptured. He escaped once again in 2015, and in
January 2016 he was captured for the last time.
242 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

Fig. 2 Fragmentation of the Guadalajara Federation

Cartels, as well as the Beltran Leyva brothers. By 2009 and 2010, the Sinaloa
Cartel had expanded to include more groups and had become more dispersed,
involving the participation of more than 13 armed wings, related and originated
bands, as shown in Fig. 4.

Fig. 3 Evolution of the Juarez Cartel

Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 243

Fig. 4 Alliances of the Sinaloa Cartel with different groups

Similar to El Chapo, the Beltran Leyva brothers (Arturo, Hector and Alfredo) got
involved in the drug trafficking business by working as hitmen and transporters for the
Juarez Cartel, and later for the Sinaloa Cartel.9 When in 2008, Alfredo was captured
during a military operation, the brothers suspected that El Chapo had betrayed them.
This event caused a rupture and the formation of the Beltran Leyva Organization
(OBL) as an independent organization, contributing to the creation of several bands
and leaders associated with the Beltran Leyva brothers (See Fig. 5).
Two main fragmentations were observed from the OBL. The first one was led by
Edgar Valdez Villareal “La Barbie” who was hired by Arturo Beltran as an operator
when the OBL worked for El Chapo. When Arturo was killed in December 2009,10 La
Barbie did not recognize Hector as a successor and decided to split from the OBL,
forming his own organization in 2010. The second fragmentation was organized by
Hector Beltran, who created a new organization with the remnants of the OBL, and
named it “Cartel del Pacifico Sur (CPS)”.
The Gulf Cartel,11 in Tamaulipas, also suffered from fragmentations and alliances,
as shown in Fig. 6. The Cartel’s leadership changed hands several times, until Salvador
“Chava” Gomez and Osiel Cardenas decided to jointly command the organization.
However, Osiel killed Chava in 1999 earning the nickname of “Mata amigos” (Friend
killer), and during the following years, Osiel focused on gaining dominion of the Gulf
Cartel, and creating Los Zetas for protection. Los Zetas - composed of former members
of a specialized unit in the army, and former members of the Guatemalan special

9
Based on the profile of the OBL developed by InSight Crime (2015b).
10
See more http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2009/12/17/actualidad/1261004404_850215.html.
11
This section is based on Valdés-Castellanos (2013a, b); and the Gulf Cartel profile by InSight Crime
(2015c).
244 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

Fig. 5 Evolution of the Beltran Leyva Organization (OBL)

military group - helped the Gulf Cartel to expand their territory even across the southern
border to Guatemala.12
In September 2012, the Gulf Cartel’s leader, El Coss, was incarcerated; and in
January 2013, his successor was murdered, while in August of the same year, the
new leader was arrested. After this lack of leadership and with a violent offshoot (Los
Zetas) becoming a dangerous enemy, the organization faced instability and a power
vacuum.
On the western side of the country, the state of Michoacán became a valuable
territory for the drug business because of its fertile lands for poppy production, and
because it has the Port of Lazaro Cardenas, main entrance from the Pacific Ocean, and
exit to Asia and the rest of North America. For years, the Millennium Cartel (also
called the Valencia Cartel) controlled the drug traffic in the state, maintaining a low
profile. It was not until 2001 that violence arose, when Los Zetas arrived in Michoacán
to control all illegal operations in the area. The Millennium Cartel defended itself,
trying to protect their territory, but the military superiority of Los Zetas overcame the
Millennium’s resistance.13
Los Zetas, after controlling the territory, trained local people (mostly ex-members of
the Millennium Cartel), and began extorting the local society. These events were the
main cause for the creation of La Familia Michoacana in 2006, with the objective of
expelling Los Zetas from the state, and attacking their main business:
methamphetamine.

12
Los Zetas profile is based on Hernández (2012) and Valdés-Castellanos (2013a, b).
13
The story of criminal groups in Michoacán is based on Valdés-Castellanos (2013a, b) and the profile of La
Familia and Los Caballeros Templarios developed by InSight Crime (2015a, 2015d.).
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 245

Fig. 6 Evolution of the Gulf Cartel

La Familia had two interesting and unique characteristics: its territorial

expansion, not only in Michoacan but also to the neighboring states such as
Guanajuato and Guerrero; and the principles on which they operated. Members
of La Familia held strong religious principles, including a feeling of “social
duty.” La Familia’s objective was not only to rid the territory of Los Zetas, but
to provide protection for the civilian population as well. However, as violence
intensified in Michoacán (basically because of the rivalry of La Familia and
Los Zetas), several groups arose, claiming to defend the society from La
Familia. Among these “self-defense” groups are El Vengador del Pueblo
(The Town’s Avenger), El Señor Justicia (Mr. Justice) and Pueblos Unidos
(United People).
The leader of La Familia, El Chayo, was killed in 2014 during a military
operation, causing internal fights in the organization. While some decided to
form an alliance with La Resistencia, others formed the Cartel Jalisco Nueva
Generación (previously called Mata-Zetas and the product of an alliance with
the Sinaloa Cartel). In 2011, “La Tuta” and Enrique Plancarte left La Familia
and formed Los Caballeros Templarios (see Fig. 7). But in February 2015,
“La Tuta” was captured by the federal police and Los Templarios debilitated.
According to Insight Crime (2015a), La Familia remained active due to the
weakness of Los Templarios.
From this historical description of organized crime in Mexico, we identified the
different moments in which groups are collaborating and fragmenting. Figure 8
shows these alliances and fragmentations in a chronological order, while Fig. 9
depicts these events and correlates them with the number of homicides observed in
246 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

Fig. 7 Evolution of La Familia Michoacana

the country. Although it is not possible from the graph to attribute causality
between specific fragmentation and cooperation events and the increasing vio-
lence, we observe a violence peak after specific events. For instance, after the
fragmentation of the OBL and the emancipation of La Barbie in 2010, or the
alleged death of La Familia’s leader and the creation of Los Templarios in 2011.
The next section categorizes these events by proposing a typology based on the
theoretical framework described in section 2, and analyzes the homicides that are
attributable to specific fragmentation and cooperation events.

1986 1993 1996 1997 1999 2001 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2015

• F: Juarez • F: Rafael • C: Osiel • C: El • F: Osiel • C: El • C: Sinaloa • F: Beltran • C: OBL • F: Los Zetas • F: La • C: La

and Guajardo and Chava Chapo kills Chava Chapo cooperate brothers works emancipate Familia Familia
Tijuana and and • C: Osiel and El s with separate with Los • C: Los Zetas and fragments and CJNG
Cartel are Amado Carrillo and Mayo armed from El Rojos OBL into
born from Carrillo brothers Arturo build Wings Chapo • C: OBL Resistencia,
• C: Los Mazatlecos
Guadalaja fight Decena Sinaloa • C: La with the Caballeros
and Los Zetas
ra Los Zetas Cartel Linea the Gulf y CJNG
(against Sinaloa)
armed Cartel • C: Gulf Cartel and
wing of La Familia
the Gulf • F: La Barbie
• C: emancipates
Messages • F: Hector
of Juarez, separates and
Los Zetas builds CPS
and Beltran
• C: La Resistencia,
Los Zetas and CPS
(against La Barbie)
• C: Milenio, Familia
and Golfo
(messages signed
as MFG)

Fig. 8 Timeline of cooperation (BC^) and fragmentation (BF^) events

Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 247

1600 The Caballeros

La Barbie vs Templarios vs La
OBL Hector Beltran
1400 fragmentation
The Caballeros Templarios
appear
1200
Milenio, La Familia
Death of Arturo Beltran
& Gulf
Los Rojos vs La Familia
1000
Number of deaths

OBL & Los Zetas

Alleged death of
800 El Chayo
Murder of Edgar Guzman OBL vs Gulf
(El Chapo´s son) CPS, La Resistencia & OBL
vs La Barbie
600 Los Rojos
active in
Alfredo Beltran Los Zetas
400 is captured emancipation
Los Zetas
vs Gulf
200
Sinaloa vs Zetas,
vs OBL, vs

0
May-05 Oct-06 Feb-08 Jul-09 Nov-10 Apr-12

Fig. 9 Correlation between fragmentations and alliances and the number of homicides allegedly related to
criminal rivalries. Source: PPD Dataset

Typology of fragmentations and alliances in the structure of organized

crime in Mexico and their impact on the level of violence

We identify four types of fragmentations and three types of alliances, following

the theoretical arguments presented in section 2. The state has played a role in
most of the fragmentations and alliances, since in several cases the main reason
for a group’s debilitation is typically the capture of its leader. We then
specifically exclude a category related to law enforcement. Once the different
episodes observed in the evolution of organized crime have been categorized
into fragmentations and alliances, we analyze the effect that these two forces
have on the level of violence.
We identify four types of fragmentations by cause: (i) loss of reputation;
(ii) through heterogeneous factions; (iii) successions within the same orga-
nization; and, (iv) broken alliances. The three types of alliances include
those seeking: (i) to control territory and obtain protection; (ii) to shore up
factions weakened after a fragmentation; and (iii) to confront a common
enemy. However, these categories are not exclusive. For instance, an alliance
could be formed in order to strengthen already debilitated groups and to
confront a common enemy. A fragmentation, on the other hand, could be
caused because an alliance was broken, and also because the incarceration or
killing of a leader debilitated the group and factions began acting
independently.
To analyze the correlation between each of these types with the levels of
violence in Mexico, we use as indicator the homicides identified in the PPD
Database that are attributable to specific groups, and the proportion of these
killings where at least two groups are identified as rivals (usually after a
fragmentation), or as allies (evidence of cooperation). Specifically, in the
“executions” category, the PPD Database identifies groups that were tied to
specific events, either because they signed or directed the narcomessages left
next to the executed bodies, because a member of a specific group was killed
248 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

or arrested, or because the governmental authorities had specific information

linking the event to a criminal group.14

Types of fragmentations

Fragmentation by loss of reputation

Fragmentations by loss of reputation are caused by the betrayal of one of the members
of a group or alliance, causing the failure of the alliance. In a cooperation framework,
reputation of the alliance is seen as a public good; when the alliance cannot build a
reliable reputation, rivals are not deterred from attacking a “failed cooperation.” As a
consequence, other members do not have incentives to participate in the cooperation
system (Hugh-Jones 2013). When alliances are broken, the group’s reputation and the
levels of violence are altered. Groups bargain with each other through reputation and
the betrayal of already formed alliances, significantly affecting the reputation of the
group and dramatically changing the organized crime scenario. There are two frag-
mentations by loss of reputation observed on the evolution of the organized crime in
Mexico: the first is related to the Sinaloa Cartel and the second to the Gulf Cartel.
El Chapo, head of the Sinaloa Cartel, intended to build a Federation in which the
participation of other organizations — such as the Beltran Leyva Organization — was
allowed under the supervision of the main leadership. However, El Chapo directly
undermined the establishment of the Federation by attacking his enemies and betraying
his allies. The betrayal of El Chapo to the Beltran Leyva brothers fragmented the
agreement previously established between the Sinaloa Cartel and the brothers, driving
them to create their own organization (the OBL), and later on to create an alliance with
the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas to confront Sinaloa. A second example is observed in the
Gulf Cartel. The agreement between Osiel Cardenas and Salvador (Chava) Gómez for
the creation of a group was terminated when Osiel killed Chava to remain the sole
leader of the organization.
Fragmentation by loss of reputation increases violence between groups. Figure 10
shows the total number of deaths associated with the OBL and the proportion of these
deaths that are attributable to the rivalry of the OBL and the Sinaloa Cartel, after El
Chapo betrayed the Beltran brothers. After its separation from the Sinaloa group in
2008, the number of deaths associated with the OBL grew from 21 in 2008 to 510 in
2011. In 2009, the year in which the OBL activity increased substantially, messages
from the OBL accusing El Chapo of being a traitor began appearing. In terms of
territorial expansion, one year later the clashes were not only concentrated in the north
(Sinaloa, Sonora, and Durango) but also in the center (Morelos) and the south
(Guerrero) of the country. In 2011, the clashes between these two groups continued,
but because of the appearance of La Barbie, the OBL had to distribute its efforts

14
The PPD Dataset is comprised of three categories: confrontations (between criminal groups and the
government, or within criminal groups); aggressions (from criminal groups to the government); and execu-
tions (violent homicides that are allegedly related to organized crime). From the executions category, 11% of
the homicides are “labeled,” i.e., events where a message was left with the executed body. From this
percentage, approximately 70% of the messages were attributable (either signed by or directed to specific
groups; Atuesta(2016)).
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 249

700
596
600
500 510

Deaths
400 317
300
198
200 144
100
21 28
0 7
2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
OBL OBLvsSinaloa
Fig. 10 Number of deaths attributable to the fragmentation between the OBL and the Sinaloa Cartel. Source:
PPD Dataset

amongst more enemies. From 2008 to 2011, the clashes between the Sinaloa Cartel and
the OBL left 387 dead.

Fragmentation by heterogeneous factions

As established in the literature of organizations, a group cannot be analyzed as a single

unit, as each of its members (or factions) have different ways of addressing the same
problem or operationalizing the same objectives (Scott 2013). In other words, a group
should be understood to be a coalition of heterogeneous interests that share a common
goal (Gallagher-Cunningham et al. 2012). When this common goal disappears, factions
seek their independence, causing fragmentation. Both the Gulf Cartel and La Familia
Michoacana suffered from fragmentations, explained by the existence of heterogeneous
factions. Typically, in this type of fragmentation, a unique group is fragmented in
different factions and new groups are born out of the split.
Osiel Cardenas, leader of the Gulf Cartel, decided to create a specialized group, Los
Zetas, for his personal protection. However, the alliance was broken when Osiel was
incarcerated in 2003. Los Zetas, an organization with its own structure and military
rules, decided to break away from the Gulf Cartel because they had different interests
and refused to recognize the new Gulf Cartel’s leaders. After this fragmentation, a
bloody war between the two groups was initiated, including turf wars against other
groups including the Sinaloa Cartel. Los Zetas were an armed wing of the Gulf Cartel
without being properly independent. However, because they have their own structure,
we classify them as an independent faction.
A second example of fragmentation by heterogeneous factions is observed in La
Familia Michoacana. The alleged assassination of the leader of La Familia, El Chayo,
in 2011 caused internal strife in the organization. While some decided to form an
alliance with La Resistencia, others formed Los Caballeros Templarios. In February
2015, when the leader of Los Caballeros Templarios was captured, the portion of La
Familia not under the command of Los Templarios found a new ally with the Cartel
Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). La Familia ended up fragmenting into three
different groups after its leadership decapitation: La Resistencia, Los Caballeros
250 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

Templarios, and the CJNG, with Los Caballeros Templarios being the only new group
created directly as a faction of La Familia. The other two fragmentations were already
extant groups.
Figure 11 depicts the number of deaths attributable to La Familia and the
proportion of these deaths caused because of the fragmentation of La Familia
and Los Templarios. Before 2010, La Familia had clashes mainly with Los Zetas,
fighting against their entrance to Michoacán. In 2010, La Familia fragmented and
Los Templarios was born. Three homicides in Guerrero and 17 homicides in
Michoacán were due to clashes between La Familia and Los Templarios in
2011. Although this directed violence continued in 2012, the PPD Dataset does
not provide information after 2011.

Fragmentations by successions within the same organizations

A third type of fragmentation is observed when the leader of an organization dies or is

incarcerated, and a new leader arises within the same organization. Sometimes these
transitions are extremely violent, as members of the same organization fight to obtain
power. In other cases, the succession is not accompanied by violence, but the
concurrent changes of leadership nonetheless weaken the structure of the group,
producing further fragmentation. Usually these fragmentations are caused by law
enforcement policies, but not as a result of being targeted by different organizations.
In fact, their main threat comes from inside the organization. As Bakke et al. (2012)
described, “infighting is potentially one of the most significant consequences of frag-
mentation. Infighting undermines a movement’s capacity for collective action and
diverts energy away from the pursuit of public, political aims and towards the pursuit
of private advantage.” We identify three fragmentations by succession in the period
analyzed: one in the Gulf Cartel and two in the OBL.
We already categorized the fragmentation by succession inside the Gulf
Cartel as a fragmentation by loss of reputation. The assassination of Chava
weakened the Gulf Cartel, and Osiel had to hire Los Zetas not only to protect
himself from external enemies, but also for his personal protection in an already
struggling organization. The incarceration and killings of the Gulf Cartel’s

300 264
250

200
165
Deaths

169
150

100
43
50
20
0
2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Familia FamiliavsCaballeros
Fig. 11 Number of deaths attributable to the fragmentation of Los Caballeros Templarios from La Familia
Michoacana. Source: PPD Dataset
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 251

leaders continued, and Los Zetas emancipated from the Gulf Cartel in 2010 to
pursue their own interests.
The inevitable fragmentation of the OBL gave birth to two main factions: La Barbie
and the CPS. With the support of La Resistencia, Los Zetas, and its armed wing “Los
Rojos,” the CPS fought against La Barbie in Morelos and Guerrero. Moreover, the
former OBL’s armed wings began fighting with each other, suggesting that they were
no longer aligned with the brothers: Los Charritos were fighting with La Mochomera, a
remnant group from the OBL, and Los Mazatlecos allied themselves with Los Zetas,
most likely to fight the Sinaloa Cartel.
The PPD Dataset allows for the tracking of Los Zetas’ fragmentation from the Gulf
Cartel. During 2008, the names Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel were used almost
interchangeably. In fact, most of the attributable messages left next to the bodies were
signed “Golfo-Zetas.” However, in 2010, the data suggest an important change:
messages began to be signed either by the Gulf Cartel or by Los Zetas. In most of
the cases, they appeared as independent groups, with one the victim and the other the
perpetrator. Clashes between them were observed all over the country, including the
states of Coahuila, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi, Tabasco,
Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas. This fragmentation has been responsible for at least 144
executions since 2010 (Fig 12).

Fragmentation caused by a broken alliance

The last type of fragmentation identified in the literature is the split of an alliance.
Usually, an alliance allows debilitated groups to survive longer. However, as the
alliance is formed by groups with their own structures, institutions, and rules, often
these coalitions do not last long, producing further fragmentation. As posited by
Pearlman and Gallagher-Cunningham (2012), “groups with unified leadership bodies
may weather the storms of insurgency, yet those under the leadership of a coalition of
factions are much more likely to divide.” We identify three fragmentations in this
category: the first is the division between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. The second
two are related to the Juarez Cartel: first when the alliance to El Chapo was broken, and
second comprises the emancipation of La Linea.

250
196
200 180 195

150
Deaths

100 85
53
50 59
16
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Gulf GulfvsZetas
Fig. 12 Number of deaths attributable to the fragmentation of Los Zetas from the Gulf Cartel. Source: PPD
Dataset
252 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

The fragmentation of the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas was already classified as a
fragmentation by heterogeneous factions when Los Zetas were analyzed as a faction of
the Gulf Cartel. However, even though the only reason why Los Zetas were created was
to protect the Gulf Cartel, these two organizations could be analyzed as two different
organizations, each with their own structure and rules. In fact, Los Zetas communica-
tion (through narcomessages) suggests that they were operating on their own in most of
the territory, following their own strategies. In this sense, we can study the fragmen-
tation of these two groups as a broken alliance where two already existing groups
became independent.
Two emancipations are observed in the Juarez Cartel. The first one was when El
Chapo became independent from Juarez to create the Sinaloa Federation. This “broken
alliance” between El Chapo and Juarez increased violence exponentially between the
groups. The second rupture is documented as the emancipation of La Linea from the
Juarez Cartel. La Linea was born as the main armed wing of the Juarez Cartel with the
objective of fighting the Sinaloa Cartel and defending the Juarez territory. An article
published by the Mexican journal Milenio (Mosso 2013) mentions the intent to create a
new group, Nuevo Cartel de Juarez, but further incarcerations of its leaders and the
decreasing power of La Linea as consequence of military attacks left the future of the
organization uncertain.
The violence caused by the fragmentation of the Juarez and Sinaloa Cartels is
observed in Fig. 13. For instance, from 1151 deaths attributable to the Juarez Cartel
in 2010, 1026 were against the Sinaloa Cartel (or any of its allied groups). In most of
the homicides in which the Juarez Cartel is identified, a message left next to the
executed bodies was signed by La Linea (since 2010) or mentioned the name of
Vicente Carrillo. The number of events in which the Juarez Organization was identified
decreased dramatically in 2011, and even though the data do not capture the activity
from the group Nuevo Cartel de Juarez, this group seems to be a new faction, or the
same group with a new name (PGR 2013).

Types of alliances

Alliances among groups to control territory and to obtain protection

The most common type of alliance in the evolution of organized crime in

Mexico is represented by groups willing to control territory and obtain protec-
tion. The control of a specific territory allows criminal groups to ensure profits
from the drugs produced or sold there, or to benefit from rents obtained from
controlling the routes used to traffic drugs and other illegal goods to the U.S.
As with fragmentation, law enforcement policies can debilitate groups, and the
creation of an alliance in most of these cases is the only way groups can
survive for longer periods of time. From our analysis, of the ten alliances
recognized during the period, eight are categorized as alliances with the objec-
tive of controlling territory and obtaining protection. A brief description of
these alliances is included below:

& Osiel Cardenas and Chava Gomez created the Gulf Cartel and controlled the state
of Tamaulipas for the trafficking of illegal drugs to the U.S.
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 253

1400
1200 1151
1019
1000
1026

Deaths
800
875
600
400
175
200 36
1 5
0 16
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Juarez JuarezvsSinaloa

Fig. 13 Number of deaths attributable to the fragmentation of El Chapo (Sinaloa Cartel) from the Juarez
Cartel. Source: PPD Dataset

& El Chapo and the Juarez Cartel joined forces to expand El Chapo’s access to the
local market of Chihuahua.
& The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas banded together to provide protection to the Gulf
Cartel, and to allow its expansion to southern and western territories.
& El Chapo and Mayo Zambada created the Sinaloa Cartel to control the Sinaloan
territory.
& The OBL and Los Rojos combined, after the OBL was debilitated (because of its
fragmentation with the Sinaloa Cartel), to fight against Sinaloa and maintain control
of their territory.
& The Gulf Cartel and La Familia Michoacana merged to recover the state of
Michoacan after the entry of Los Zetas.
& Los Mazatlecos allied themselves to a stronger group, Los Zetas, to stay active for a
longer period of time and to fight the Sinaloa Cartel.
& La Resistencia, Los Zetas, and the CPS allied with one another after the fragmen-
tation of the OBL to fight La Barbie. Hector Beltran Leyva was debilitated after the
fragmentation of the OBL and the alliance with La Resistencia and Los Zetas was
the only way to keep control of his territory.

Figure 14 shows the efforts of different groups to control Michoacán, where

La Familia allied with the Gulf Cartel to expel Los Zetas form the state. From
516 homicides reported in Michoacan in 2009, 264 were attributable to La
Familia and 57 to clashes between La Famila (allied with the Gulf Cartel) and
Los Zetas. La Familia tried to control most of the neighboring states of
Michoacan, including Guerrero, Querétaro and the state of Mexico. In the case
of Michoacán, the debilitated group of La Familia produced further fragmenta-
tion, creating Los Caballeros Templarios. This emancipation led to 68 homi-
cides attributable to Los Templarios in 2011, who were also fighting to gain
control of the state over La Familia.

Alliance of factions weakened after a fragmentation

Most of the fragmentations identified in the previous sections were followed by a

cooperation agreement between groups. As stated in the theoretical framework, an
254 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

alliance is the only option groups have to strengthen themselves after fragmentation, to
fight their enemies, to control turf, and to obtain political relevance. Since these forces
are dynamic, and most of the groups lack reputation because of their changeable nature,
these alliances do not last long and are usually followed by further fragmentation
(Hugh-Jones 2013; Powell and Stringham 2009). We identified three alliances in this
category: the alliance between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas; the alliance between the
OBL and Los Rojos; and the cooperation agreement between La Resistencia, Los
Zetas, and the CPS.
The first two identified alliances in this category are groups that decide to
create an armed wing. We call these “alliances” because they can be identified
as independent groups with a well-defined structure, rules, and institutions.
Even if they were created as part of an already existent organization, they
were autonomous in their modus operandi and committed acts attributable only
to them, and not to the alliance or to the primary group. The Gulf Cartel was
debilitated, internally and externally, and the only opportunity for survival was
to ally with Los Zetas in exchange of protection.
A similar situation is observed with the OBL and Los Rojos. After the OBL
factionalized, intragroup violence increased between different factions. What was left
of the dismembered organization tried to align all the members and consolidate power
using the signature “El Jefe de Jefes,” and the name of “El color más fuerte,” indicating
an alliance with the armed wing, Los Rojos.
Finally, as explained in the first type of fragmentation, a debilitated Hector Beltran
Leyva created the CPS after the fragmentation of the OBL. By entering an alliance with
La Resistencia and Los Zetas, he was able to fight against La Barbie and keep control
of his territory. This alliance is observed in Fig. 15. The violence attributed to the OBL
increased from 2008 to 2010, passing from 21 to 596 homicides, and decreasing to 510
in 2011. Since 2009, the year in which the fragmentation took place, a sharp uptick in
violence attributable to the alliance of the OBL (through the CPS) and Los Zetas can be
observed, mainly against the rivalry organization of La Barbie.

600
516
500 509
427
400
Deaths

291
300 253 264

200 165 169

100 43 57 68
20 20
0 2 3
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Caballeros Familia FamiliavsCaballeros
FamiliavsZetas Michoacan
Fig. 14 Number of deaths in Michoacán and number of deaths in the state attributable to specific groups.
Source: PPD Dataset
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 255

Alliances to confront a common enemy

Since the structure of the organized crime in the country is ever-evolving, there have
been episodes in which the governmental forces debilitate or change the status quo of
groups active in a specific territory. As a result, other groups invade and try to control
the turf. In order to avoid the invasion of new groups, existent organizations, even if
former rivals, create alliances to fight a new common enemy. Because these alliances
are created only in response to an external threat, they often do not last long. As soon as
the external threat disappears, these groups, which usually do not share common
interests or objectives, tend to break up the agreement (Hugh-Jones 2013). These
temporary alliances are very common in Mexican organized crime. In the period
analyzed, we identified six alliances formed to confront a common enemy:

i. the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas to confront the Sinaloa Cartel;
ii. the Gulf Cartel and La Familia Michoacana to confront Los Zetas who wanted to
enter Michoacán;
iii. the Juarez Cartel, the OBL and Los Zetas to confront the Sinaloa Cartel;
iv. Los Mazatlecos and Los Zetas to confront the Sinaloa Cartel, specifically the
armed wing of Los Aztecas;
v. the OBL and Los Zetas to confront the Sinaloa Cartel; and
vi. La Resistencia, Los Zetas and the CPS to confront La Barbie.

In three of the six alliances identified in this section, Los Zetas cooperated with other
groups to fight Sinaloa. Even when Los Zetas were part of the Gulf Cartel, they
received and sent attacks to the Sinaloa Cartel; these clashes remained even after their
emancipation. Once they became independent, the fight was taken up against the
Sinaloa Cartel’s armed wing, Gente Nueva. From 2009 to 2011, this intense war
accounted for several incidents in the organized crime scene, affecting areas from north
to south. However, after their split from the Gulf Cartel in 2010, the clashes with their
former bosses gained significance; as such, the number of violent events where the Gulf
Cartel and Los Zetas were identified as rivals exceeded the number of events in which
Los Zetas had clashes with the Sinaloa Cartel. In the latter case, 123 killings were
identified in 2010 and 2011, while for the former, this figure was 144 for the same
period of time. Figure 16 compares the number of homicides caused by the clashes

700
596
600
510
500
Deaths

400 317
300
200
100 66 48
21 25
0
2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
OBL OBL&Zetas
Fig. 15 Number of deaths attributable to the alliance between the OBL and Los Zetas. Source: PPD Dataset
256 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

between Los Zetas (and their different alliances) to confront Sinaloa, with those
homicides resulting from their other rivalries (i.e. against the Gulf Cartel since 2010,
and against La Familia since 2009).

Discussion

Table 1 shows the proportion of deaths attributable to fragmentations and alliances

from the total number of attributed homicides to specific groups. Only fragmentations
and alliances from 2007 to 2011 are analyzed, since the data are available only for those
five years. The groups with the greatest number of attributed homicides are Sinaloa,
followed by the Juarez Cartel and the OBL. From these fragmentations, the most costly
in terms of number of homicides are the fragmentations between the Sinaloa Cartel and
the Juarez Cartel (1922 homicides), followed by the OBL vs. Sinaloa (377 homicides),
and the Sinaloa vs. Zetas (203 homicides). On the other hand, the alliance between
OBL and Los Zetas after the OBL fragmentation produced 139 homicides from 2009
(11% and 9.6% of Los Zetas and OBL attributed homicides, respectively).
The most costly fragmentations, in terms of violence, are the broken alliance
between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Juarez Cartel, and the loss of reputation between
the Sinaloa Cartel and the OBL. Although the output in terms of violence of these two
events is not evidence enough to conclude that these two types of fragmentations are
costlier than the others, we can suggest that the peak observed in violence is a
consequence of the broken trust between both groups. And even though alliances seem
not be as violent as fragmentations, when an alliance is broken, violence seems to
upsurge to levels greater than those before the formation of the cooperation agreement.
In terms of how costly these fragmentations are for specific groups, we analyze the
proportion of homicides attributable to the fragmentation from the total homicides in
which the group was implicated. For 2010, the fragmentation between Sinaloa and
Juarez represented 89.1% of the total attributed homicides to Juarez, and only 64% of
the attributed homicides to Sinaloa, suggesting that the fragmentation was more costly
to Juarez than to Sinaloa. A similar situation is observed with the fragmentation
between Sinaloa and OBL: for the former, the fragmentation represents only 12% of
their total homicides, while for the latter, it was 26%.
The Sinaloa Cartel, with 3059 homicides attributable to its actions, was involved in
two fragmentations that represent 75% of their total attributable homicides: (i) by a
broken alliance with the Juarez Cartel; and (ii) by loss of reputation with the OBL. On
the other side, the Sinaloa Cartel was the common enemy of different alliances formed
between the OBL and Los Zetas; the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas; the Juarez Cartel, the
OBL and Los Zetas; and Los Mazatlecos and Los Zetas. Some of these rivalries
between the alliances and the Sinaloa Cartel are shown also in Table 1 (Sinaloa vs.
Zetas with 203 homicides and Sinaloa vs. Juarez with 1922 homicides).
The dynamics of the relationship between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas is shown
both as an alliance and as a fragmentation. Both groups were allied from 2007 to 2009,
and 229 homicides were attributed to this alliance. With their split, in 2010, 144
homicides were attributed directly to the fight between both groups. While the Gulf
Cartel benefited more from the alliance (35% of their attributable homicides were
conducted under the alliance with Los Zetas), the Gulf Cartel was also more damaged
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 257

600
491
500
463
400

Deaths
300
230
200
57 85
100 71 59
13 74 49
0 9 57 20 3
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Zetas ZetasvsSinaloa GulfvsZetas FamiliavsZetas
Fig. 16 Number of deaths attributable to Los Zetas and to other alliances to fight Los Zetas. Source: PPD
Dataset

with the fragmentation, with 22% of their homicides directed to Los Zetas (while the
fragmentation only represented 11% of Los Zetas’ homicides).
Although both fragmentations and alliances are observed in the PPD Dataset,
the number of homicides attributed to fragmentations and rivalries among
groups is greater than the number of homicides attributed to specific alliances.
This finding does not suggest that fragmentations produce more violence than
alliances, but that fragmentations are more “visible” in terms of violence than
alliances. Alliances take place in order to control territory or to survive for
longer periods of time, but an alliance not specifically direct or attribute its
violence to specific groups; only when the target is a common enemy. For
instance, the alliance between La Familia and the Gulf Cartel to fight Los Zetas
is observed as a rivalry between La Familia and Los Zetas, with 80 homicides
attributed to this fight, and also as a rivalry between the Gulf Cartel and Los
Zetas (during the same period of time), with 144 homicides attributed to this
fragmentation.

Conclusions

This paper examined the evolution of organized crime in Mexico, focusing on frag-
mentation and cooperation as two determinant forces that drive the behavior of criminal
groups. Organizations have survived enemies’ attacks (either from private groups or
public forces) through cooperation and the formation of alliances. Similarly, groups
have evolved by changing their internal structure and creating independent factions.
These two forces have marked the structure of organized crime and consequently the
evolution of violence in the country.
Although previous studies of fragmentation and cooperation have focused on inter-
and intra-state conflict, we use these theoretical frameworks to create a typology of the
different fragmentations and alliances observed in Mexico. We identify four types of
fragmentations and three types of alliances depending on their main causes and
determinants. Although the events analyzed are not exclusive (i.e., an event can be
categorized in two or more different types), we use different cases to exemplify the
correlation between each of the types and the level of violence attributable to each type.
258 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

Table 1 Number of deaths attributed to each group and proportion of these homicides attributed to specific
fragmentations and alliances

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total

Sinaloa Cartel 4 85 1224 1585 161 3059

Juarez Cartel 1 36 1019 1151 175 2382
OBL 21 217 596 510 1444
Zetas 13 57 230 491 463 1254
Familia Michoacana 43 264 165 169 641
Gulf Cartel 16 53 196 180 195 640
Caballeros Templarios 2 68 70
Fragmentations
Juarez vs. Sinaloa 16 875 1026 5 1922
%Juarez 44.4% 85.9% 89.1% 2.9% 80.7%
%Sinaloa 18.8% 71.5% 64.7% 3.1% 62.8%
Sinaloa vs. OBL 7 144 198 28 377
%Sinaloa 8.2% 11.8% 12.5% 17.4% 12.3%
%OBL 33.33% 45.4% 33.2% 5.5% 26.1%
Sinaloa vs. Zetas 9 71 74 49 203
%Sinaloa 10.6% 5.8% 4.7% 30.4% 6.6%
%Zetas 15.8% 30.9% 15.1% 10.6% 16.2%
Gulf vs. Zetas 85 59 144
%Gulf 47.2% 30.4% 22.5%
%Zetas 17.3% 10.6% 11.5%
Familia vs. Templarios 20 20
%Familia 11.8% 11.8%
%Templarios 29.4% 29.4%
Familia vs. Zetas 57 20 3 80
%Familia 21.6% 12.1% 1.8% 12.5%
%Zetas 24.8% 4.1% 0.6% 6.4%
Alliances
OBL-Zetas 66 48 25 139
%OBL 20.8% 8.1% 4.9% 9.6%
%Zetas 28.7% 9.8% 5.4% 11.1%
Gulf-Zetas 13 51 165 229
%Gulf 10.6% 96.2% 84.2% 35.8%
%Zetas 15.8% 89.5% 71.7% 18.3%

Note: not all homicides included in the PPD Dataset are labeled or with an identified group attributable to the
event. Where that is the case, figures are calculated only from those labeled homicides
Source: PPD Dataset

The results of this article can be summarized in two conclusions. The first one
related to the organized crime structure in Mexico, and the second one regarding the
relationship between fragmentation and cooperation agreements with the level of
violence observed in the country. The results shown in the previous section suggest
that the structure of organized crime in Mexico is not static, and criminal organizations
group together in order to survive longer, or fragment in order to pursue different
interests or to expand their dominion to new territories. By analyzing the different types
of fragmentations and alliances we observe that the main criminal groups in Mexico
have used these dynamic forces, and consequently, have created new rivalries, have
conquered new territories and have become more complex than the original drug cartels
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 259

observed at the beginning of the 1990s. Nowadays, the structure of organized crime in
Mexico is so complex that it is almost impossible to follow each split, revenge or
coalition between and within groups. From five visible groups observed in 2007, more
than eighty groups were identified in 2011. In the five-year period, we were able to
identified more than 200 groups; while some of them appeared only temporarily (active
only during one year), some others have changed names and objectives, or have
amalgamate with or fragment to other groups.
Moreover, relationships between criminal groups are rarely based on trust,
and without the existence of biding laws or contracts to follow, organizations
and alliances are weak. Mexican criminal organizations should be understood as
groups of different and independent factions that are cooperating temporarily,
but once the incentive to cooperate disappear (i.e. disappearance of a common
enemy, treason among members to pursue more power, or appearances of new
independent objectives), fragmentation will follow, causing severe consequences
in terms of violence.
The second conclusion concerns the correlation of these two dynamic forces with the
level of violence. The number of homicides attributable to a specific alliance or
fragmentation suggests that these forces are costly in terms of violence, and changing
the status quo of organized crime increases the level of violence observed in the country.
The evolution of organized crime, and consequently the level of violence, cannot be
understood only by analyzing the role played by the state on its war against organized
crime. In order to provide policies able to reduce violence, the evolution of organized
crime has to be studied by observing how criminal groups behave in fluid and surprising
ways. Although the government implicitly has supported (or not attacked) specific
cartels, law enforcement interventions have triggered (unintendingly) many of the
fragmentation and cooperation dynamics observed in organizations’ structures. The
beheading of an organization (through the killing or incarceration of its leader) can
provoke fragmentation within the group, or produce external competition when other
groups try to control the territory. However, law enforcement activities can also lead to
cooperation when groups decided to make an alliance to confront the attacks, form
horizontal alliances among different cartels (or pax mafiosia), or engage in vertical
alliances between small gangs and bigger ones (Polo 1995).
The complex influence of government drug interdiction leads us to suggest that
policies that alter the status quo of the organized crime have two primary, violent
outcomes: (i) a change in the dynamics between and within groups (understood as
fragmentations and cooperation agreements) causing further violence; and (ii) the
debilitation of criminal organizations that provides the opportunity for other groups
to expand and grow. Offering alternative policies to change these outcomes through
law enforcement is not an easy task. However, one important change that should
be taken into consideration in the Mexican security strategy is to avoid the military
intervention to address public security problems, and instead, consider
implementing a reform of the police structure and the legal system. But in order
to think about a solution, we need first to understand the nature of the problem
and the consequences generated by the current policies. An alternative solution
needs to avoid, if possible, these changing dynamics of fragmentation and coop-
eration, avoiding as well the optimal conditions for the criminal groups to survive
and evolve.
260 Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261

Compliance with ethical standards

Funding This study did not receive any funding.

Conflict of interest Author A declares that he/she has no conflict of interest. Author B declares that he/she
has no conflict of interest.

Ethical approval This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by
any of the authors.

Informed consent Not Applicable.

References

Astorga L (2005) El siglo de las drogas: el narcotráfico, del Porfiriato al nuevo milenio. Plaza y
Janés, México City
Atuesta L (2016) Narcomessages as a way to analyse the evolution of organised crime in Mexico. Global
Crime. doi:10.1080/17440572.2016.1248556
Atuesta L, Ponce A (2016) ¿Cómo la Intervención Gubernamental Altera la Violencia? Evidencia del Caso
Mexicano. Working paper, Drug Policy Program, CIDE
Atuesta L, Siordia OS, Madrazo A (2016) La ‘guerra contra las drogas’ en México: Registros (oficiales) de
eventos durante el período de diciembre 2006 a noviembre 2011. Working paper. Drug Policy Program,
CIDE, 2016
Bakke KM, Cunningham KG, Seymour LJ (2012) A plague of initials: fragmentation, cohesion, and
infighting in civil wars. Perspect Polit 10(02):265–283
Calderón G, Robles G, Díaz-Cayeros A, Magaloni B (2015) The beheading of criminal organizations and the
dynamics of violence in Mexico. J Confl Resolut 59(8):1455–1485
Cory M, Rios V, Shirk DA (2012) Drug violence in Mexico: data and analysis through 2011. Trans-Border
Institute, San Diego
Cunningham DE, Gleditsch KS, Salehyan I (2009) It takes two: a dyadic analysis of civil war duration and
outcome. J Confl Resolut. doi:10.1177/0022002709336458
Dudley S (2011) Zetas-La Linea alliance may alter balance of power in Mexico, http://www.insightcrime.
org/news-analysis/zetas-la-linea-alliance-may-alter-balance-of-power-in-mexico
Escalante F (2013) Homicidios 2008–2009: La muerte tiene permiso. Nexos, January 1
Findley M, Rudloff P (2012) Combatant fragmentation and the dynamics of civil wars. Br J Polit Sci 42(04):
879–901
Gallagher-Cunningham K (2013) Actor fragmentation and civil war bargaining: how internal divisions
generate civil conflict. Am J Polit Sci 57(3):659–672
Gallagher-Cunningham K, Bakke KM, Seymour LJ (2012) Shirts today, skins tomorrow dual contests and the
effects of fragmentation in self-determination disputes. J Confl Resolut 56(1):67–93
Grayson GW (2011) Mexico: narco-violence and a failed state? Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick
Guerrero-Gutiérrez E (2012) La estrategia fallida. Nexos, December
Guerrero-Gutiérrez E (2011) Security, drugs, and violence in Mexico: a survey. Lantia Consultores, México
Hernández A (2012) Los señores del narco. Grijalbo, Mexico
Hope A (2014) Las trampas del centralismo. Nexos, July 1
Hope A 2013) Violencia 2007–2011. La tormenta perfecta. Nexos, November 1
Hugh-Jones D (2013) Reputation and cooperation in defense. J Confl Resolut 57(2):327–355
Human Security Report Project Definitions. http://www.hsrgroup.org/our-work/security-stats/Definitions.aspx
InSight Crime (2015a) Familia Michoacana. http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-sobre-crimen-organizado-en-
mexico/familia-michoacana-perfil
InSight Crime (2015b) BLO. http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/beltran-leyva-
mexico
InSight Crime (2015c) Cartel del Golfo. http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-sobre-crimen-organizado-en-
mexico/cartel-del-golfo-perfil
Trends Organ Crim (2018) 21:235–261 261

InSight Crime (2015d) Caballeros Templarios http://es.insightcrime.org/noticias-sobre-crimen-organizado-en-

mexico/caballeros-templarios-perfil
Leeson, P.T. (2006). Cooperation and conflict. Am J Econ Sociol, 65(4), 891–907.
Levy JS (1981) Alliance formation and war behavior: an analysis of the great powers, 1495-1975. J Confl
Resolut 25(4):581–613
Merino J (2011) Los operativos conjuntos y la tasa de homicidios: Una medición. Nexos, June 1
Mosso R (2013) Cae Alberto Carrillo, lider del Nuevo Cartel de Juarez. Milenio.com. Retrieved May 13,
2015, from http://www.milenio.com/policia/Alberto-Carrillo-Nuevo-Cartel-Juarez_0_146385597.html
Osorio J (2015) The contagion of drug violence spatiotemporal dynamics of the Mexican war on drugs. J
Confl Resolut 59(8):1403–1432
Pearlman W, Gallagher-Cunningham K (2012) Nonstate actors, fragmentation, and conflict processes. J Confl
Resolut 56(1):3–15
Phillips B (2015) How does leadership decapitation affect violence? The case of drug trafficking organizations
in Mexico. J Polit 77:2
Polo M (1995) Internal cohesion and competition among criminal organizations. Econ Organised Crime, 87–
108
Powell B, Stringham EP (2009) Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey. Public Choice
140(3–4):503–538
PGR (2013) Células delictivas con presencia en el país. PGR, Mexico
Rios V, Shirk DA (2011) Drug violence in Mexico: Data analysis through 2010. Trans-Border Institute,
University of San Diego, https://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/2011-tbi-drugviolence.pdf
Rudloff P, Findley MG (2016) The downstream effects of combatant fragmentation on civil war recurrence. J
Peace Res 53(1):19–32
Scott WR (2013) Institutions and organizations: ideas, interests, and identities. Sage Publications, Thousand
Oaks
Sambanis N (2004) What is civil war? Conceptual and empirical complexities of an operational definition. J
Confl Resolut 48(6):814–858
Smith A (1995) Alliance formation and war. Int Stud Q 39(4):405–425
Snyder R, Duran-Martinez A (2009) Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored
protection rackets. Crime Law Soc Chang 52(3):253–273
Staniland P (2012) Between a rock and a hard place insurgent fratricide, ethnic defection, and the rise of pro-
state paramilitaries. J Confl Resolut 56(1):16–40
Valdés-Castellanos G (2013a) Historia del narcotráfico en México. Aguilar
Valdés-Castellanos G (2013b) El nacimiento de un ejército criminal. Nexos