Luther’s Law/Gospel Hermeneutic

Adam Darnell
Methods and Issues in Biblical Interpretation
BTI 6500

April 5, 2011
 Luther’s law/gospel hermeneutic generated the only major church schism since 1054

A.D. and has influenced nearly five hundred years of theology since. This hermeneutic redirected

Christendom and the history of the Western world. With it, Luther opened the door to the

Protestant Reformation, and it continues to guide millions of the world’s Christians. In a simple

summary of his hermeneutic, Luther writes, “By the words of God . . . I mean both the law and

the gospel, the law requiring works and the gospel faith.”1 Woven throughout all of Scripture are

both law—by which Moses demands unattainable perfection—and gospel—which offers the free

righteousness of Christ. This distinction between law and gospel is central to Luther’s

hermeneutic and theology, and it remains productive in Lutheranism and the wider Protestant

world.

Historical Context

Luther’s historical context sheds light on both the development and application of his

hermeneutic. Through the street preaching of Geert do Groote, reading Thomas a Kempis’

Imitation of Christ, and practicing devotio moderna, Luther drank in the theology and piety of

his day: works-righteousness, which is the idea that people earn salvation through good deeds

done in obedience to God’s law. The expression of this soteriology popular in Luther’s day was

developed by Ockham. It can be described as follows. First, a person must make an effort to

attain to God’s perfection. Second, God graciously enables the person to become more righteous.

Third, God’s grace and the individual’s works complement one another until a person either dies

and goes to purgatory or attains perfect holiness and immediately enters heaven after death.

Because of the likelihood of loved ones suffering in purgatory, the Catholic church invented

1 Martin Luther, “The Bondage of the Will,” in Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia

Publishing House, 1963), 33:133.

1
indulgences, a means through which people could purchase righteousness in this life for their

deceased loved ones in the next, thus hastening them to heaven.

The weight of this works-based salvation burdened Luther greatly. Knowing that he could

not attain to the perfection God required, he lived in dread of God’s wrath. Seeking his own

salvation, he became an Augustinian monk and later a priest, performing nightlong vigils,

flagellations, pilgrimages to Rome, and spending hours in confession. Luther nearly hated God

when he discovered salvation by faith alone while lecturing at the University of Wittenburg. In

teaching on Psalm 22, Luther realized that Jesus could only utter, “My God, my God, why have

you forsaken me?” if Jesus himself became sin, taking on the judgment earned by humans. God’s

justice was therefore satisfied at the cross, and Jesus imputed his righteousness to those who

repent and believe. The implication was massive: righteousness is offered at the cross. It need not

be earned.

This retelling of Luther’s context and conversion is an important reminder since his law/

gospel hermeneutic so closely aligns with his personal experience. Luther was burdened by

God’s law before he discovered grace in the gospel. In most any command of Scripture, he saw a

burden impossibly heavy that could only be lifted by the gospel. Luther experienced law and

gospel, and Scripture must be divided into law and gospel.

Luther’s Hermeneutic

Now, I ask you, what good will anyone do in a matter of theology or Holy Writ, who has
not yet got as far as knowing what the law and what the gospel is, or if he knows,
disdains to observe the distinction between them? Such a person is bound to confound
everything—heaven and hell, life and death—and he will take no pains to know anything
at all about Christ.2

2 Luther, “The Bondage of the Will,” 33:132.

2
Law and Gospel

Foundational to Martin Luther’s hermeneutic is the distinction between law and gospel.

This distinction is in fact so foundational for Luther that he explains it on nearly every page of

his writings. Here, four primary texts will suffice: a sermon on 2 Cor 3:4–11, an excerpt from

Lectures on Romans, and select passages from “A Brief Instruction on What to Look for and

Expect in the Gospels” and “How Christians Should Regard Moses.”

While Scripture uses both terms to speak of the whole of God’s Word, Luther also

understands the use of these words in a narrower sense. One of Luther’s chair texts for

establishing this distinction is 2 Cor 3:4–11. In 2 Cor 3:4–11, it is God “who has made us

[Christians] competent to be ministers of a new covenant, not of the letter but of the Spirit. For

the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life” (v. 6). 3 Luther explains, “The letter is to [Paul] the

doctrine of the Ten Commandments,” or “the whole Law of Moses.”4 Furthermore, the law is

impossible to keep without Christ, and in fact it “kills,” in the sense that it—with its demands

and burdens—causes human nature to be “incensed at God’s judgment” and even “question the

equity of his dealings” until a person is either rescued by the gospel or “utterly despairs.”5

Indeed, this was Luther’s experience, and in this way, “the Law works sin in the heart of man”

because he comes to disdain God (Rom 7:8–9).6 Luther sees the law as God’s word and “noble

doctrine,” but “it remains on the surface; it does not enter the heart as a vital force which begets

3 All Scripture references taken from the English Standard Version of the Bible unless otherwise noted.
4 Luther,
“Twelfth Sunday After Trinity,” in Sermons of Martin Luther, ed. John Nicholas Lenker (Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988), 233.
5 Ibid., 235.
6 Ibid.

3
obedience.”7 The law merely commands. It grants neither the ability nor the desire to meet its

own requirements. Indeed, the more the law is pressed onto a man apart from the gospel, the

more he hates both the law and God himself.8 In the law, God commands the impossible.9

Distinct from “the letter” is “the Spirit,” which is associated with “a new covenant” (2

Cor 3:6). This is gospel, which “does not teach what works are required of man . . . but it makes

known to him what God would do for him and bestow upon him, indeed what he has already

done” for man in Christ through his justifying imputed righteousness.10 Where law imposes

impossible standards, gospel offers the consolation that the standards of the law are met perfectly

in Christ and that his righteousness can be credited to the sinner. This teaching is “of the

Spirit” (2 Cor 3:6) in that no man could have discovered or accepted it apart from the Holy

Spirit, because man only naturally understands works-righteousness, even if he hates it.11 Grace,

in that sense, is an alien notion.

In Lectures on Romans, Luther distinguishes law and gospel in this way: “The law

uncovers sin; it makes the sinner guilty and sick; indeed, it proves him to be under

condemnation . . . The gospel offers grace and forgives sin; it cures the sickness and leads to

salvation.”12 Law is found in any text that unmasks sin and brings guilt. The ultimate end of this

guilt is that the sinner feels “sick,” despairing under its weight, and knowing his inability to meet

7 Luther, “Twelfth Sunday After Trinity,” 235.

Classics, ed. John Baillie, John T. McNeill, and Henry P. van Dusen (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961), 301.

4
the requirement set before him. At that point, he needs the gospel, which is found in any text that

frees the sinner from such oppression by offering gracious forgiveness. The despair is removed

as salvation is applied. Essentially any commanding text could be categorized as law in Luther’s

hermeneutic, and any text that teaches grace is gospel. Such is Luther’s expression in Lectures on

Romans.

“A Brief Instruction on What to Look for and Expect in the Gospels” and “How

Christians Should Regard Moses” further clarify Luther’s distinction. Law does not apply to the

Christian, whereas gospel does. 13 The commandments of the OT do not pertain to the Christian,

whereas preaching the gospel, being saved, and loving neighbor as self do. The law of Moses is

God’s word, but it is not spoken to Gentiles. The gospel, on the other hand, is for Gentiles. For

Luther, “the foundation of the gospel is that before you take Christ as an example [which would

merely be another law], you accept and recognize him as a gift.”14 All that Christ has done

belongs to the believer. This is gospel. The division is critical, “for everything depends entirely

upon it.”15

From this brief examination of four of Luther’s writings, it becomes clear that there is not

only an intellectual opposition to law, but also a very personal one. It should also be noted that

Luther appears to equivocate somewhat in his usage of both law and gospel. In some places law

refers to the Mosaic law, while in others it refers to any command found in Scripture. Likewise,

gospel sometimes refers to either justification by faith, the NT, or any exhibit of grace found in

Scripture. Despite these multifaceted uses, Luther’s core distinction is relatively clear: Christians

13 Martin Luther, “How Christians Should Regard Moses,” in Luther’s Works, 35:170.
14 Ibid., “A Brief Instruction on What to Look for and Expect in the Gospels,” in Luther’s Works, 35:119.
Emphasis added.
15 Ibid., “How Christians Should Regard Moses,” 35:171. Emphasis added.

5
are not bound by the commands of Scripture, wherever they are found. Christians live by the

gospel, which is freedom from the law as well as freedom to love as Christ loved, without the

need to earn grace.

Luther and the Uses of the Law

Another lens through which to view Luther’s hermeneutic is his understanding of the uses

of the law. These are derived from his reading of Scripture, and they also inform his reading. The

three uses of the law, as arranged by later Lutherans, are curb, mirror, and guide. Law in

Scripture functions as a curb by restraining men from expressing their most evil inclinations. It

functions as a mirror by reflecting man’s guilt back onto himself so that he may see the depth of

his sin. Third, law functions as a guide toward holiness for Christians.

As a curb or restraint, Luther understood law as binding only on the Jews.16 “Moses was

an intermediary solely for the Jewish people.”17 At the same time, Luther takes pains to say that

Jews and Gentiles do share some applicable laws, but those are only they which can be derived

from natural law. The commandments of Moses only apply in the NT era if they agree “both with

the New Testament” and the natural law.18 Outside of the church, Luther condones using the law

as curb in suggesting it as a model for secular government.19

Luther’s emphasis is on the second use of the law, and it is debated whether he upheld its

third use. Lecturing on Galatians, Luther writes, “The proper use and aim of the Law is to make

guilty those who are smug and at peace, so that they may see that they are in danger . . . so that

16 Luther, “How Christians Should Regard Moses,” 35:164.

18 Ibid., 165.
19 Ibid., 166.

6
they may be terrified and despairing . . . To the extent that they are such, they are under the

Law.”20 Those who think they are without sin have neglected to look into the mirror of God’s

law, which clearly reflects depravity. Luther later writes, “All the Law can do is to render us

naked and guilty.”21 The law as a mirror functions further “to reveal the wrath of God to us.”22

Correlative to Luther’s own experience, he understand the law primarily functioning as a mirror

on sin that drives one to Christ.

While both law and gospel are divine words, according to Luther, many have accused

him of antinomianism because of his emphasis on law as mirror coupled with his hesitance to

apply the law as a guide to those who are in Christ. Luther does emphasize the individual’s

inability to obey the commands of the law perfectly. For him, the main goal of the law is not

obedience, but repentance and joy in the free grace of the gospel. However, it is not true that

Luther is antinomian. Instead, he affirms the need to conform to the laws of Moses that are

corroborated by natural law or explicitly taught in the NT.

Early Lutheran Articulation

Philipp Melanchthon

Luther’s law/gospel hermeneutic (and the corresponding doctrine, justification by faith)

drew many followers, not the least of which was Philipp Melanchthon. In his Apology of the

Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon clarifies Luther somewhat, writings, “All Scripture should

be divide into these two main topics: the law and the promises. In some places it communicates

20 Martin Luther, “Lectures on Galatians,” in Luther’s Works, 26:148.

7
the law. In other places it communicates the promise concerning Christ.”23 Clearly for

Melanchthon, law is not relegated to the OT, nor gospel to the NT. Instead, law is clearly defined

as “the commandments of the Decalogue, wherever they appear in the Scriptures.”24 Moral

commands are law, in whichever testament they are found. Pertaining to the gospel, Melanchthon

articulates a hermeneutic incorporating redemptive history when he writes, “All Scripture

promises are to be related to [Christ], who was dimly revealed at first, but more clearly as time

went on.”25 Melanchthon maintained Luther’s law/gospel distinction, but developed it somewhat

and also taught more clearly the use of law as a guide for justified sinners.

The Formula of Concord

The Formula of Concord was written in 1577 to establish unity among Lutherans by

addressing controversial theological issues. Among the questions it answers are two pertaining

specifically to law and gospel. In section five, the Formula considers whether unbelief is rebuked

by the law or if unbelief is the one sin rebuked by the gospel. Already, this reveals something of

the development of the law/gospel hermeneutic, pressing as it does the division near its breaking

point. Nevertheless, the Formula urges the preservation of the law/gospel distinction “with great

diligence in the church as an especially glorious light, through which the Word of God . . . is

properly divided” (2 Tim 2:15).26

23 Philipp Melanchthon, “Apology of the Augsburg Confession,” in The Book of Concord: The Confession

of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, trans. Charles Arand et al.
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 121.
24 Ibid.

25 Philipp Melanchthon, “Loci Communes,” in Melanchthon and Bucer, ed. William Pauck, vol. 19 of The

Library of Christian Classics, ed. John Baillie, John T. McNeill, and Henry P. Van Dusen (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1969), 72.
26 “Formula of Concord,” in The Book of Concord, 500.

8
 The Formula’s solution as to whether the gospel condemns unbelief hinges on one’s

definition of gospel. It argues that Scripture uses the term in various ways. Gospel can refer to

the whole of biblical teaching, in which case the gospel does condemn. Elsewhere, such as 2 Cor

3:4–11, Scripture distinguishes between law and gospel. In these cases, the gospel is “nothing

else than a proclamation of comfort and a joyous message which does not rebuke or terrify,”

freeing man from the law and directing him to Christ.27 To preach that the gospel contains rebuke

is to fail to rightly divide the word of truth and to open the door “again to the papacy.”28 In this

way, the Formula maintains a clear and hard distinction between law and gospel. The Formula of

Concord also affirms the third use of the law, reconciling between Luther and Melanchthon’s

disciples by apparently following Melanchthon. 29 Significantly, the earliest Lutheran writings

maintain Luther’s distinction and affirm the third use of the law.

Luther’s Law/Gospel Hermeneutic Today

Douglas J. Moo

NT scholar Douglas J. Moo holds to what he terms “a modified Lutheran view” of the

relationship of the law and the gospel.30 His point of departure with Luther is in his definition of

law. Where Luther understands law as “God’s Word in its commanding aspect,” Moo more

narrowly understands the NT use of “law” as referring to the Mosaic law specifically.31 This is a

result of Moo’s attention to salvation/redemptive history. He uses salvation history as a

27 Ibid., 501.
28 Ibid.

29 Ted Peters, “Law-Gospel Dialectic in the Pulpit,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 39, no. 3 (Fall 2000):
189.
30 Douglas J. Moo, “The Law of Christ as the Fulfillment of the Law of Moses: A Modified Lutheran
View,” in Five Views on Law and Gospel, ed. Wayne G. Strickland (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 319.
31 Ibid., 321.

9
framework for organizing Scripture, with its two characteristics: historical periodization and

corporate focus.32 A basic feature of Scripture is the understanding that salvation is “the

culmination of a historical process that features several distinct periods of time.”33 The center

point of this historical process is the death and resurrection of Christ. There is therefore a

contrast between the time before Christ and the time after. Moo’s argument is that the NT writers

understand the Mosaic law as “relegate[d] basically” to the time before Christ. 34 This shares

much with Luther.

The salvation-historical approach also highlights the corporate focus found in Scripture.

Through this lens, Moo argues that the law/gospel distinction in the NT is more fundamentally

between the corporate effects of the law in the era before Christ and the corporate outworking of

the gospel in the time after Christ, as opposed to the time in the individual’s life before he

confesses Christ and the time afterwards.

Applying his understanding of salvation history to Luther’s hermeneutic, Moo argues

“that the Mosaic law is basically confined to the old era that has come to its fulfillment in Christ”

and is therefore “no longer . . . directly applicable to believers who live in the new era.”35

Moo’s understanding of the purpose of the Mosaic law differs from the Lutheran

articulation of the three uses of the law, in part because Moo defines law differently. For Moo,

the purpose of the Mosaic law was “never intended to be, and in could never in fact be, a means

of salvation,” but rather was to reveal God’s character and demand conformity to it, to

32 Moo, 321–2.
33 Ibid., 321.
34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 322–3.

10
“supervise” Israel, and to “imprison Israel and . . . all people under sin.”36 In the classic terms,

Moo sees in the Mosaic law primarily a curb and mirror. Thus far Moo is in line with Luther

himself, with two caveats: (1) Moo defines “law” somewhat differently than Luther, and (2) Moo

sees the Mosaic law functioning as a curb and mirror primarily in the era before Christ.

In the era after Christ, Moo describes a three continuing functions of the Mosaic law.

First, though the Mosaic law as a whole is not binding on the Christian, individual

commandments within that law may be, so long as they are interpreted through the lens of Jesus’

teaching and example. 37 Particularly, Moo argues, “We are bound only to that which is clearly

repeated within New Testament teaching.”38 Second, the Mosaic law continues to illuminate and

explain elements within new covenant law. It reveals principles which may be ongoing. Third,

the Mosaic law is a “witness to the fulfillment of God’s plan in Christ . . . its authority is . . . the

authority of a prophetic witness.”39 In sum, Moo takes Luther’s law/gospel hermeneutic and

applies it through the lens of salvation history, maintaining its clear separation from the gospel.

Ted Peters

Ted Peters is Professor of Systematic Theology at Pacific Lutheran Theological

Seminary. He adapts Luther’s law/gospel hermeneutic and the three uses of the law for

contemporary preaching. As a curb, Peters struggles to reconcile “God’s commandments” with

today’s “deep reverence for freedom understood as the autonomy of the self.”40 His

understanding of law as curb shrinks from Luther’s view in which the law has greater authority

36 Moo, 324.
37 Ibid., 376.
38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Peters, 180.

11
to seeing the curb only as a gentle hedge that defines a community, thus bringing a corrective to

overly-individualistic modernity while harmonizing nicely with postmodernity.

Pertaining to law as mirror, Peters writes, “Preaching law does not reveal just any old sin.

It exposes our deep unwillingness to be dependent upon God. It exposes our reluctance to glorify

God and to give God thanks. . . . Rare are the preachers who even try.”41 Thus, he applies the law

as a mirror in much the same way as Luther did, and he sees the chief sin exposed by the law as

an “unwillingness to be dependent upon God.” In this way, Peters somewhat softens the law

from Luther’s earlier understanding. Where Luther understood the law to expose humanity’s

wickedness and to lead man to despair in his unrighteousness, Peters teaches only that the law

admonishes us for not being more thankful to God. He laments, “Rare are the preachers who

even try” to use the law as a mirror before their congregations, but Luther would likely criticize

Peters as one who does not “even try” to use the law as a mirror in its fullest accusing

expression.

Relating to law as guide, Peters helpfully distinguishes between spontaneity and coercion

when obeying God’s commands.42 One under the law obeys the law out of force, sensing God’s

wrath and obeying in fear. By contrast, those freed from the law by the gospel obey the moral

commands of God spontaneously, out of love, and without feelings of obligation.

In terms of the relationship of law and gospel, Peters terms his understanding,

“Dialectic.”43 Law and gospel as dialectic “recognizes both a distinction and an interdependence

between law and gospel . . . each needs the other for self-definition and this mutually defining

41 Peters, 184.
42 Ibid., 189.
43 Ibid., 187.

12
process constitutes the dynamic movement of the Word of God in preaching.”44 This is in

contrast to “diastasis,” which is preaching first the law in its most terrifying form and then the

gospel in its most beautiful expression, and to “synthesis,” which weaves both law and gospel

throughout, seeing each present in the other.45

A final key point in Peters’ adaptation of the law/gospel hermeneutic is the observation

that “distinguishing law from gospel cannot be accomplished simply distinguishing one type of

biblical passage from another. One and the same passage can function as law on one occasion

and as gospel on another,” depending upon how it is received.46 One passage may convict one

person and speak only grace to another. In this way and with his dialectic view, Peters softens

Luther’s law and gospel distinction.

Others

Schöne, evaluating an ecumenical document, highlights the import of the law/gospel

distinction in contemporary Lutheran theology. He notes that the Lutheran view of justification

stems directly from this hermeneutic, and even “takes this distinction as crucial and decisive for

all interpretation of Scripture.”47 Law and gospel distinguish between “the two kingdoms, the

two ways by which God rules and guides his church and the world . . . from which concept flows

the distinction between state and church.”48 The law/gospel distinction separates state and

44 Peters, 187.
45 Ibid., 186.
46 Ibid., 187.
47 Jobst Schöne, “The Leuenberg ‘Concord,’” Logia: A Journal of Lutheran Theology 20, no. 1 (Epiphany
2011): 17.
48 Ibid.

13
church, meaning that the gospel is not to be a law for the secular world, but only for the church.

Luther’s hermeneutic and theological principle remains foundational in the Lutheran church.

Further evidence of this is found in the Lutheran work, A Summary of Christian Doctrine,

which devotes a chapter to “The Law and the Gospel.” There, Koehler builds a case for the third

use of the law on Luther’s simul iustus et peccator. Since Christians are justified sinners, they

continue to need the law’s correction of “the old Adam.”49 In agreement with earlier Luther

confessions, Koehler writes, “The confusion or mixing of [law and gospel] will make it

impossible for anyone to become a Christian or to remain in the faith.”50

Stephen D. Paulson, in “Law and Gospel: Two Preaching Offices,” suggests that

approaching law and gospel as a hermeneutic is inappropriate. Instead, “the proper context for

the distinction of letter and spirit . . . is preaching. . . . Its realm is not ‘meaning,’ but God’s work,

and so refers to what humans suffer or receive, not make.”51 Paulson’s main point is that

preachers should not fear preaching the law, for that is the command of the NT. While this is

correct, it is also true that one cannot separate hermeneutics and preaching. Indeed, Paulson

shows himself when he writes, “The law and gospel are distinguished primarily according to the

way they function for a community or person.”52 He cannot see law and gospel as hermeneutical

categories because he makes the law/gospel distinction primarily subjective—referring to what

humans suffer or receive and to how the law and gospel function relative to a group or individual

49 Edward W. A. Koehler, A Summary of Christian Doctrine, 3rd rev. ed. (St. Louis: Concordia, 2006), 262.
50 Ibid.

51 Stephen D. Paulson, “Law and Gospel: Two Preaching Offices,” Dialog: 170.
52 Ibid., 174.

14
—rather than objective. This is a departure from Luther, who largely saw the two categories as

static and external rather than dynamic and internal.

Conclusion

Martin Luther’s law/gospel hermeneutic has shaped centuries of Western thought both

within and outside of the church. The distinction between the two categories was central to his

hermeneutic and also to his theology—if one’s hermeneutic and one’s theology can ever be

separated. The division between the law that ruled Israel and points Gentiles to Christ and the

gospel that offers free grace through justification by faith is an enduring idea. This distinction

clearly stemmed from Luther’s personal experience, yet it also has a degree of biblical warrant,

particularly in 2 Cor 3:4–11. Melanchthon and other early Lutherans codified law and gospel and

handed it down to modern day Lutherans through their writings and founding confessions.

Today, the hermeneutic remains central to Lutheran writings, though some have softened the

distinctions between law and gospel in response to modern biblical scholarship and especially

the new perspective(s) on Paul. Luther’s law/gospel hermeneutic remains productive at both the

scholarly and ecclesial levels, even as it has been sharpened by nearly five hundred years of

reflection.

15
 Bibliography

Baillie, John, John T. McNeill, and Henry P. van Dusen, eds. The Library of Christian Classics.
30 vols. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953–77.

Koehler, Edward W. A. A Summary of Christian Doctrine. 3rd rev. ed. St. Louis: Concordia,
2006.

Kolb, Robert, and Timothy J. Wengert, eds. The Book of Concord: The Confession of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church. Translated by Charles Arand et al. Minneapolis: Fortress,
2000.

Lenker, John Nicholas, ed. Sermons of Martin Luther. 8 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1988.

Paulson, Stephen D. “Law and Gospel: Two Preaching Offices.” Dialog: A Journal of Theology
39, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 169–177.

Pelikan, Jaroslav, ed. Luther’s Works. 54 vols. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955–86.

Peters, Ted. “Law-Gospel Dialectic in the Pulpit.” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 39, no. 3 (Fall
2000): 178–192.

Schöne, Jobst. “The Leuenberg ‘Concord.’” Logia: A Journal of Lutheran Theology 20, no. 1
(Epiphany 2011): 13–22.

Strickland, Wayne G., ed. Five Views on Law and Gospel. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996.

16