1.

Details of Module

Module Detail
Political Science
Subject Name
0 7: Political Theory and Thought: Western and Indian Traditions
Paper Name
What is Theory and Why do we need Social and Political Theory
Module Name/Title

Module Id

Pre-requisites
Module try to study nature and scope of political theory and
Objectives changing contours of political theory by engaging with the shifts
in the notion of the ‘political’ and how that impacts the role of
political theory.

Theory, political, political theory, political philosophy, empirical,

Keywords normative, positivism, behaviouralism, postmodernism

2. Development Teams

Role Name Affiliation

National coordinator
Prof. Ashutosh Kumar Department of Political
Principle Investigator Science, Panjab
University, Chandigarh
Dr. Krishna Menon Associate Professor,
Paper Coordinator Department of Political
Science, Lady Shri Ram
College, University of
Delhi.
Lakshmi Radhakrishnan JNU, Delhi
Content Writer/Author (CW)
Dr. Krishna Menon Associate Professor,
Content Reviewer (CR) Department of Political
Science, Lady Shri Ram
College, University of
Delhi.

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 Language Editor (LE) Professor Ashutosh Panjab University,
Kumar Chandigarh

Module 1: WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY?

(Political theory has been an important component to understand political phenomena. The subject matter,
nature and scope of political theory however has been differently perceived by different scholars and in
different periods of time. Over the years, political theory has made a transition from speculation and
philosophical claims of consensus to a more conflict-ridden and fragmented arena of the ‘political’ that
has considerably expanded from a narrow focus on the state and government to a more fuzzy domain that
transcends the narrow ‘regiments’ of political and social. The relationship between the empirical and the
normative has also undergone changes with a broader agreement towards a mutual engagement between
the two. This paper maps the changing contours of political theory by engaging with the shifts in the
notion of the ‘political’ and how that impacts the role of political theory.)

Political theory comprises of two words- ‘political’ and ‘theory’. The meaning, nature and scope
of political theory therefore depend on the changing notions of the two concepts. This essay
deals with an introduction to the domain of political theory. It deals with the
definitions/meanings that have been attributed to political theory as well as the changes that have
occurred over the past few years that have changed the idea of political theory. The essay
therefore proceeds in the following manner:

 What is theory and why do we need theory?

 What is distinctive in political theory, or how is it different from other social theories?
 What have been the changes in the nature and scope of political theory over the years?
 Why is political theory still important in the study of politics?

Understanding ‘theory’

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Theories are generally understood as statements that explain a particular event or act. In this
assumption, theory is an explanatory statement. This has however been contested especially by
political theorists. Rajeev Bhargava (2010: 5) contends that theory is an explanatory statement
but that this is not a sufficient understanding of theory. Bhargava points out two issues with
theory as a mere explanatory statement: first, an explanatory statement does not constitute a
theory, on its own; and second, all theories are not explanations. For example, if we argue that
honour killing exists in some parts of India because the society is patriarchal, it is an explanation
for honour killing but not a theory of honour killing. Theory therefore delves deeper into the
issue, and is much more than an explanation. Secondly, a few theories may explain or justify
actions, but not all of them. In Bhargava’s view, there are larger evaluative questions behind
these justifications (ibid). For example, if we explain honour killing as a manifestation of
patriarchy, we may also have to justify why there should be gender equality, or if there are other
forms of equality that are required in conjunction with gender equality.

How do we define theory then? Theory is a very broad term that implies “an explanatory
proposition, an idea or set of ideas that in some way seeks to impose order or meaning upon
phenomena” (Heywood 2004: 10). In the nineteenth century, the term ‘theory’ had a negative
connotation, as it was used to refer to speculations or ‘untested facts’ (Vincent 2007: 8). Theory
has always been, however, linked with philosophy and knowledge, the earliest evidences being
the works of Plato and Aristotle. However, in Greek philosophy, ‘theoria’ however was a
spectacle or an event, and not something we build and apply as in the case of modern theories
especially after the hegemony of natural sciences (see Vincent 2007). Vincent however argues
that the nature of theory has always followed the broad contours of philosophy (ibid: 8-9).

Rajeev Bhargava defines theory as “a particular form of language-dependent systematic

expression different from but related to other forms of systematic reflections on the world”
(Bhargava 2010: 9-10). This alludes to the fact that theory is a product of reflections on certain
events or experiences, and not mere explanations. Theorising is the ability of human beings by
virtue of their existence as ‘concept-bearing animals’, who live the world through not only
sensory experiences but also through concepts, images and representations (Bhargava 2010: 6-7).
Such ‘lived experience’ distinguishes human life from the life of other species. However, all
such reflections do not constitute theory.

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Theory is therefore distinctive from all thoughtful reflections as well. Bhargava (2010) defines
theory as a form of “systematic reflection” with six distinctive features:

 Conceptual sensitivity
 Rational structure
 Aspiration for a humanly achievable truth and objectivity
 Generality
 An explicit mandate to unearth assumptions and presuppositions
 Strong non-speculative intent.

Bhargava uses these features to demarcate theoretical expositions from ideology, cosmology,
speculations, empirical enquiries, rich insights, ad hoc reflections and all other related narratives
(see Bhargava 2010: 17-8). Conceptual sensitivity is one distinctive feature of theory. For
philosophers and theorists, there is an “almost obsessive and self-conscious concern with the
internal structure of concepts, with how concepts relate to one another and come in clusters and
how, in turn, they mark their own boundaries” (Bhargava 2010: 11). Conceptual sensitivity
involves not only an elaboration of different conceptions of an idea, but also the reasoning as to
the choice of the conception. For instance, it is not only the task of theory to explicate the
different notions of freedom, justice, etc.; a theory of justice should also explain, say, why a
capability theory of justice is chosen over procedural justice. Theories should also have a
rational structure. There should be reasons, and a chain of reasons, that make a theory. For
example, if we are espousing a theory of affirmative action, there could be many reasons- that
this can foster diversity and politics of presence, it ensures redistribution in favour of the
disadvantaged, that it is a corrective to historical injustice, etc. Though many theorists are
particular with a final reason, the final justification is not a criterion, for it may not be possible.
Bhargava contends that it is this persistent requirement of reasons that enhances the subversive
potential of theories to transform the social order (see Bhargava 2010: 14). A third characteristic
of theory is its aspiration to truth and objectivity. Some theorists, especially natural science
theorists are obsessed with Truth and universalism. Natural science theories claim scienticity and
objectivity along with universalism. Thus, that water freezes at zero degree celsius is a universal
truth. Many theories of social phenomena have also tried this. August Comte’s ‘science of
society’ and the behavioural movement in Political Science are examples. However, especially

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with post-positivism, social theories have tried to distance themselves from scientific claims by
virtue of the latter’s deterministic claims, non- accommodation of the vantage points of the
marginalised, etc. However, increasingly, social science theories emphasize on theories as
objective only to the extent that they are not founded on subjective experiences and prejudices.
They have also increasingly accepted the near impossibility of theories or any form of
knowledge (including facts) to escape subjectivism. Bhargava thus stresses on an aspiration to
objectivity but underlines the context dependent nature of every theory: “We must rid ourselves
of the illusion that like god, we humans can stand outside all perspectives and attain god-like
objectivity or an eternal truth of the matter” (ibid: 15). It may be exceptional for theories to be
universal but there should be some degree of generality in a statement to qualify as theory. For
instance, that women are victims in the existing social order need not be a universal statement,
for women might be exercising agency in certain ways and contexts, and also because some
women may be oppressors as well- for men and women. However, since most contexts suggest
the victimhood of women, it can be a general statement. A theory should hence cover a ‘wide
variety of related but disparate phenomena’ (ibid: 17). Also, theories cannot be purely
speculative. It should pass through the empirical phenomena and lived experiences. In other
words, modern theories cannot be exclusively metaphysical.

Shaun Best (2003) points out four characteristics common to all social theories:

 An epistemology, or a body of knowledge of what we know and how we know

 An ontology, or the nature of reality
 A historical location, ie., all social theories are products of a particular period of time and
reflects realities of that time
 A set of prescriptions that suggest how we should behave, how the society should be
organized, etc.

Social theories therefore deal with human beings as individuals as well as groups in society; they
deal with society and the interaction of people with social structures, processes and institutions.
Thus, the study of caste hierarchy, the conflicts around ethnicity, the dynamics of familial and
even interpersonal and intrapersonal relations- all could be differentiated as understandings/
theories of social phenomena and not natural processes. If this is the case with any social theory

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that engages with social phenomena, what makes a theory ‘political’? This can be understood
only if we explore what constitutes the ‘political’.

What is ‘political’?

The central question or object of political theory has been ‘what is political’ (Hindess 1997;
Dean 2006: 752; Bhargava 2010). The meaning, nature and scope of political theory indeed then
depends on defining or rather redefining the boundaries of the political (Held 1991; Farrelly
2003). As Held argues, “The debate over what constitutes the ‘political’ is a debate about the
proper terms of reference for political reflection and about the legitimate form and scope of
politics as a practical activity” (Held 1991: 7).

David Held (1991) argues that prior to the 1970s, ‘political’ mainly dealt with nature and
structure of government; it was treated as a domain separate from society and the personal. In
such understanding, political theory stood for the study of the nature of government as well as
the proper ends of the government- the nature and limits of state action, and excluded for
instance, the sources of power in society (Held 1991). For example, secularism as a policy of the
state would be part of political theory but the civic or social relationships between two
communities will be the domain of sociology; the vulnerability perceived in the psyche of a
community – the fear of the other- again would not be accepted in this phase as the proper focus
of political theory. In other words, prior to the 70s, modern social studies was based on strict
disciplinary boundaries that demarcated ‘social’, ‘political’, ‘psychological’, etc. However,
‘political’ has increasingly changed today, making the subject of political theory also more
diverse and complex (Held 1991; Ball 1995; Vincent 2007). Thus Andrew Vincent writes,
“…politics is the site of multiplicity of vocabularies” (Vincent 2007: 9). This indeed makes the
engagement of political theory with more diverse issues imperative. Interestingly, the expansion
of ‘political’ also signifies the shift from politics as an arena of consensus to politics as a site of
multiplicity of values, claims, experiences, etc particularly implies the increasing proximity of
political theory to practice:

Politics becomes a much more elusive quarry. Politics is therefore neither an

unmediated tabula rasa, nor a way of being that can be studied on an
unproblematic empirical level and then simply be addressed by theory. The
nature of political theory is therefore taken to be both internally complex and
deeply contested (Vincent 2007: 10).
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For instance, take the case of classical political philosophy. Most works reflect a consensus in
the goal of state or politics- eudemonia in Aristotle, the General Will in Rousseau, etc. even
liberal political theory, albeit its stress on individualism and aversion to ends-based theory is
based on a single notion of Truth and a universal notion of the individual. Such consensus has
been broken down in contemporary political theory. Politics is increasingly seen as a site of
conflicting values and interests. For example, except for the deliberative democrats who believe
in consensus, Marxists, feminists, critical race theorists, poststructuralists, etc- all bring out the
conflictual nature of the ‘political’ in their own ways.

Bhargava (2010) also concedes that the term ‘political’ has multiple meanings. The earliest is the
idea of political as decision making in a political community, a notion Bhargava traces to ancient
Greek polis but also in Arendt’s idea that living in a polis implies decisions through words and
persuasion and not through force and violence (Bhargava 2010: 20). In this classical view of
‘political’, Bhargava contends that there is no distinction between social and political theory and
also no separation between empirical and normative. In this definition of political, “Political
theory is about how and with what justification decisions are made concerning the good life of a
community” (ibid: 21). Akin to David Held’s contention that the political is no longer an arena
of consensus, Bhargava also argues that with the advent of modernity, differences between and
within groups have become a reality within the political space; this has converted political to
‘power over others’ (see Bhargava 2010: 22). The central question of political theory in this
more adversarial and competitive notion of the political is ‘who wields power over whom and
why’ (ibid). However, unlike others who explain political theory as characterized by a conflict
between the normative and empirical, or as a debate between political theory and political
science, Bhargava speaks of a corresponding change in the relationship between the two after the
advent of modernity:

Political science, then, came to mean an empirical enquiry into the exercise of this
power, and political theory, the most general reflection on the processes, mechanisms,
institutions, and practices by which some people are excluded, by others from
significant decision making (Bhargava 2010: 22).

This however is also fraught with the problem that there is an end to the dialogue of the polis;
decisions are taken by the sovereign and political becomes the domain of the sovereign (ibid:
23). In other words, this represents the transition to the notion of the political as the domain of
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the modern state and its institutions and processes; political science and political theory
therefore tended to study exclusively the what - the components of the state and their existence,
as well as the ‘how’ of decision making in these institutions. Such notion of political represents a
clear separation of political theory from social theory. While state became the major object of
study in political theory, social theory studied the structures and processes outside the state
(Bhargava 2010: 23). The assumption was that the key decision making actor is the state, and
hence a privileging of this narrow definition of ‘political’. Both Held and Bhargava therefore
agree that the early phase of modern political theory is premised on the idea that political theory
is exclusively about the study of state action and its limits- a very narrow field.

The narrow definition of political as a realm of state has been challenged especially by most
sections of feminist theory that purport to dismantle the dichotomy between the public and
private, as well as the idea that the public domain is exclusively the state (Held 1991). The state
centrism in political science faced major challenges when the ‘embeddedness’ of the state in
society or social relations and structures of power was exposed by Marxists, feminists, critical
race theorists, postmodernists and others. For example, take the argument of Gopal Guru (2001)
that the Indian Constitution guarantees legal rights against untouchability but lacks provisions for
the moral goods of recognition, dignity and a guarantee against humiliation. Guru thus concedes
that the legal rights recognised by the state are welcome; however, they do not change
untouchability and other forms of caste discrimination in the civil society. Thus, caste
hierarchies, their manifestations, personal relationships, civil society, the state- all are part of the
political in this example. Also, it implies that the state cannot be studied as an independent actor.
The state migt be free of caste discrimination; but the social fabric is characterized by casteism
and the state may not be untouched by it, intentionally or unintentionally. Similarly, the radical
feminist slogan ‘personal is political’ once again pushes the boundaries of the political by also
including the intimate and the private as political. Power is located in patriarchy as a total system
that pervades every aspect of life and society. The locus of the political is not the state; it is only
one of the sites of political, albeit a strong site of power. For socialist feminists, capitalism and
patriarchy were the real loci of power and not the state. This phase once again collapses the
social and political into a single entity.

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The postmodernists, especially, brought to the fore the idea that power is not concentrated in the
sovereign as a direct command or control over others; on the contrary, power is more capillary
and disciplinary and is located more in social institutions and norms (see Foucault 1975).
Political theory is not really different from social theory in this perspective, though
postmodernism questions ‘theory’ itself. In view of these new developments in the ‘political’,
Bhargava (2010) defines political theory as a ‘particular form of word-dependent systematic
reflection’ with a wide range of objects of study. Its objects of study include the collective power
to take decisions ,about the good life of a political community, conflict over who should take
decisions and the competing visions of good life, mechanisms of power, use of state power, as
well as forms and manifestations of power in locations other than the state (Bhargava 2010: 25-
6).

What is political theory?

The compound term ‘political theory’ is a product of nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Vincent
2007: 8). The subject and scope of political theory has been a contentious issue in recent times.
For example, Nelson underscores the dimension of criticality as crucial to political theory, while
Anderson identifies political process as the subject matter of political theory (see Mion 1987).
Different scholars have therefore identified different issues as the foci of political theory. For
example, Terence Ball argues that there is much scholarship on political theory that tends to look
at political theory as the history of political thought or the study of canons. Ball defends this
methodology in political theory on the ground that interpretation of texts is inescapable and
necessary (Ball 1995: 5). Andrew Heywood speaks of two types of political theory- traditional
political theory and formal political theory. In Andrew Heywood’s view, traditional political
theory is the “analytical study of ideas” or doctrines in political thought and in that is clearly
normative and ethical (Heywood 2004: 10). This is closer to philosophy and literary analysis,
while formal political theory is based on economic model building to study the behaviour of
rational, self-interested actors. All these point to the diversity in the methods, approaches and
subject matter of political theory. At the same time, Dryzek et al. (2006) points out the
commonalities in terms of commitments to democracy, justice, etc. despite the variety in terms
of approaches, methods, etc. This perhaps vindicates Berlin’s argument in the 1960s that political
theory can survive only in a pluralistic context and that it cannot be scientific; it should never

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aspire to be scientific (see Grant 2004: 175). Pluralities therefore are a hallmark of political
theory today though we can identify certain themes like aspirations towards a just society,
equality, etc.

One of the contentious debates in political theory has also been its relationship with political
philosophy. Very often, the two are interchangeably used by virtue of the normative
underpinnings of political theory. The discipline of political theory, often studied as a subset of
political science, and more recently, the study of political life, is by and large, regarded as a
normative discipline (see Pettit 1991; Hindess 1997). Leo Strauss (1988) argues, in a similar
vein, that every political action has an end- either preservation, or change of the existing social
arrangement. Writing on political philosophy, Strauss, defines the goal of the discipline as “the
attempt truly to know both the nature of political things and the right, or the good political order”
(Strauss 1988: 345). As Strauss contends, political goal is necessarily about common good
though the latter is essentially controversial (ibid). These perspectives underscore the primacy of
normative and prescriptive tasks of political theory.

The normative essence of political theory is reasserted by Philip Pettit in his work Contemporary
Political Theory (1991). Following Plamenatz, Pettit argues that political theory should be
engaged with the purposes or ends of government, and not how it functions (Pettit 1991: 1).
Pettit outlines three types of endeavours that political theory has been preoccupied with, which
establishes political theory as a normative enterprise: first, the study of values relevant to
assessing political arrangements; second, the types of arrangements human beings will choose
during a social contract; and third, the arrangements that are feasible. The assessment of values
involves two tasks: deciding the values that are desirable, as well as establishing the relation
between them. For instance, liberty and equality may be two values that are desirable; we also
need to assess their priority in a political arrangement, how much of one can be sacrificed for the
other, etc. As a normative study of political life, political theory is more concerned with ‘what
ought to be and not what is; in other words, it is concerned with normative ends rather than
explanations of political events. The overwhelmingly normative nature and role of political
theory is visible in Philip Pettit’s definition of political theory:

Political theory is a normative discipline, designed to let us evaluate rather than

explain; in this it resembles moral or ethical theory. What distinguishes it

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 among normative disciplines is that it is designed to facilitate in particular the
evaluation of government or, if that is something more general, the state (Pettit
1991: 1).

Andrew Vincent in his work The Nature of Political Theory (2007) offers another perspective on
the normative nature of political theory. Vincent contends that standard texts of political theory
are about a certain normative value- democracy, liberty, rights, justice, etc.- and their promotion.
Hence, “[T]heory, in this mould, is commonly seen as a form of practical philosophy, orientated
to, for example, certain kinds of substantive conceptual, normative, and evaluative forms of
analysis” (Vincent 2007: 1). Thus a definitive goal of political theory, in Vincent’s analysis is
‘systematic self-critical reflection’ (ibid: 2). Vincent argues that all philosophy implies theorizing
or theory, but all political theory is not philosophy (Vincent 2007: 9). This implies that political
theory cannot be reduced to political philosophy. Others like Ruth Grant (2004) reduce the
different normative questions in political theory into two types: to seek the best political option
or to guard against the worst (Grant 2004: 179). As an example, Grant suggests that Plato was
looking for the former while Locke was concerned about the latter in their respective
engagements with the political.

That political theory is strictly not political philosophy has also been the claim of many works of
political theory (see Mion 1987; Ball 1995; Parekh 1996; Pocock 2006). Mion argues that
‘methodological frustration and philosophical uncertainty’ are endemic to political theory (Mion
1987: 74). However, political philosophy, in this perspective, is expected to be linked with and
informing political practice and should be in the service of the political processes. Similarly,
J.G.A. Pocock defines political theory as “the construction of heuristic and normative statements,
or systems of such statements, about an area of human experience and activity called ‘‘politics’’
or ‘‘the political”’’ (Pocock 2006: 165). In this definition, political theory acknowledges certain
norms and procedures through which statements are constructed, validated and critiqued (ibid:
166). However, Pocock distinguishes theory from ‘political philosophy’ in that the latter seeks
to find out how these procedures have been arrived at; in other words, political philosophy seeks
to explore how the discipline of political theory has been constructed (ibid). Elizabeth Frazer
(2008) further makes a distinction between ‘theory of politics’ and ‘political theory’. In Frazer’s
account, the former denotes a certain distancing between theorizing and the object of theory,

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whereas political theory emphasizes ‘the extent to which the theory has political effects…”
(Frazer 2008: 171).

The subject of political theory however has not been an exclusive engagement with normativity.
Indeed there are others who see the expression ‘political theory’ itself as an oxymoron- while
theory or theoria deals with the realm of thinking or contemplation, politics is about praxis (see
Cavarero 2004). Caverero therefore makes a case for expressing political theory as ‘politicizing
theory’ rather than as theorisation of politics, for the latter implies “the reduction of politics to
the principles of theoria” (ibid: 60, italics in original).

Political theory has also raised questions on methods to arrive at these norms or political
statements. Vincent (2007) iterates that the way one theorizes- the method- influences the
substance of theory. He thus calls for study of political theory as not only the conventional
domain of ‘internal substantive matter’ but also the processes of theorising (ibid: 2).
Methodological discussions have been dominant in the writings of the ‘Cambridge school’ of
historians of political thought, notably Quentin Skinner, John Dunn and Geoffrey Hawthorn (see
Leopold and Stears 2008). For Ruth Grant (2004), political theory is not only about moral
judgements but also their competing claims. As Grant writes, “Political theory as a discipline
develops diagnostic tools to identify and to understand what sort of political disagreement is
involved in any given situation, and theorists sometimes construct new alternatives that alter the
nature of the conflict” (Grant 2004: 184-5).

At another level, many writers underscore the limitations of this division of labour between
normative political theory and empirical political theory (see Shapiro 2004; Swift and White
2008). Adam Swift and Stuart White (2008: 49) argue that normative political theory can be
limited in understanding the real phenomenon of politics unless coordinated with empirical
social science. As Swift and White point out, “Some theorists are interested less in evaluating
policy options than in questioning the basic assumptions that govern the way policies are
discussed and decided in systems like our own” (Swift and White 2008: 52). This in turn brings
us back to Pettit’s idea that accords importance to the feasibility of values and moral judgements.
This also suggests possibility of conflict between the desirable and the feasible. The statement
suggests a division of labour between political theory and other domains of political science. It
presumes that political theory is more about basic assumptions or moral arguments and not about

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policy options. For example, a political theorist will be more occupied with reasons to justify the
abolition of poverty or the mitigation of climate change and not in fact choosing a better strategy
to eradicate poverty or address environmental issues. In Swift’s and White’s contention, this
could turn out to be a limit for the scope of political theory. Swift and White therefore
recommend a collaboration between normative political theory and empirical social science:

For us, the political theorist is making a vital yet distinctive contribution to a
collaborative division of labour. She clarifies concepts, interrogates claims
about how the political community should organize its collective affairs
(including claims about what should count as that community’s ‘collective
affairs’), and argues for particular principles (or conceptions of values, or
balances of competing values). It is, typically, only when combined with
empirical knowledge, of the kind generated by social science, that her analysis
and justification of fundamental principles implies particular policies (Swift
and White 2008: 68).
However, such collaboration is not new in the study of politics. One cannot argue that political
philosophy or theory have been completely divorced from empirical reality (see Grant 2004).
Aristotle’s discussion of regime types in Politics is an illustration (see Grant 2004: 176). Grant
contends that empirical political theories cannot be devoid of normative values. However, for
Grant, the unique contribution of political theory lies in its endeavour to engage in a humanistic
study of political life. This indicates the significance of historical and philosophical dimensions
of political theory (ibid: 187).

Evolution of Political Theory

Political theory is widely held to have originated in the modern period. Political theory hence is
widely regarded as a product of modernity that was ushered in by Enlightenment in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, there have been debates regarding the modern
origins of political theory. A few scholars are of the view that political theory has its origins in
classical Greece, which witnessed the first ‘reflective approach to the study of politics’ (Frank
2006: 176). In Jill Frank’s view, ancient Greek philosophers transcended the modern boundaries
of ‘political’ by also reflecting on ethics, virtue, etc. The strength of this approach is explained as
follows:

Eric Nelson, in a similar vein, speaks of ‘republican political theory’ that emerged in early
modern Europe- alluding to the Greek and Roman traditions that qualify to be described as

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political theory (Nelson 2006). Contemporary scholars have also alluded to Islamic political
theory, Confucian political theory, etc., challenging the euro-centrism in political theory. There
are however those who endorse and reinstate the primacy of western political theory as well.
John Dunn for instance defends the relevance of western political theory on two counts: the
continuous and self conscious historical development of political theory; and its rigourous and
systematic historical analysis (see Dunn 1996).

Most works on political theory speak of the ‘decline’ of the discipline, particularly, normative
political theory in the 1950s and 1960s (see Miller 1990; Held 1991; Vincent 2007). The 1950s
witnessed the decline of political theory echoed as its ‘death’ By Peter Laslett. The horrors of
Nazism, the rise of empiricism and logical positivism, and behaviouralism were responsible for
the crisis in political theory (White 2004: 1). The absence of any ‘commanding work’ of political
philosophy in the 50s and 60s is taken as the ground for the decline in political theory (see Berlin
2012). David Held (1991) blames positivism and particularly logical positivism1 for displacing
the place of value judgements and normative political theory with empirical political science, the
hallmark of the ‘behavioural revolution’. This was exemplified by David Easton’s ‘systems
approach’ that eschewed the normative concerns of the state (see Ball 1995: 39). The resistance
to values and normativity was so profound that Peter Laslett declared the ‘death of political
theory’ for the time being. On a different note, Bhikhu Parekh (1996) challenges the decline of
political theory in the 50s and 60s. Parekh contends that these two decades saw some of the path-
breaking works in political philosophy including those of Michael Oakeshott, Hannah Arendt,
Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper and many others. The period also witnessed the reconstruction of
Marxist political philosophy by Marcuse, Althusser, Sartre and Habermas (see Parekh 1996:
504). However, Parekh does recognise the two decades as a distinctive phase in political
philosophy for three major reasons:

 Most of the political philosophers of the period hardly engaged with the works of others.
 There was an awareness that political philosophy is under stress from various factors
including positivism; hence the general tone suggested that either it was an impossibility,
or was a non-necessity, for the western world has agreed on philosophical principles.

1
The idea that all knowledge should be based on sensory perceptions and that social sciences should also
follow the same methodology of natural sciences.

14
 This tended their works to treat political philosophy as a distinct, self-contained mode of
inquiry rather than an extension of political science.
 They critiqued almost all existing paradigms, having been victims of Nazism and
Stalinism. Popper’s attack on historicism, Oakeshott’s criticism of rationalism and
Berlin’s denouncement of moral monism in favour of pluralistic ends are a few examples.
The fears arising of Fascist and Communist totalitarianism are abundant in these writings
explain the apathy and often resistance to the prescriptive and normative roles of political
philosophy.

Parekh therefore argues that political philosophy was ‘dead’ not because there was an absence of
works in the field. It was deemed ‘dead’ because it did not conform to the established meanings
of political philosophy:

As we saw, most political philosophers of the 1950s and 1960s did not share this view and
regarded political philosophy primarily as a contemplative, reflective and explanatory inquiry
concerned to understand rather than to prescribe. Since their writings did not conform to their
critics' narrow standards of what constituted “true” political philosophy, the latter predictably
pronounced the discipline dead.

(Parekh 1996: 507).

In a similar vein, Terence Ball (1997) alluding albeit to the decline in political theory, contends
that in the 1950s and 1960s, the task of political theory was deemed to be a mere clarification of
concepts that can be used in political science. In other words, rather than being normative,
works of this period wanted to clarify concepts as a helping hand to empirical political science
(ibid: 31). Ball gives the example of Oppenheim’s efforts in the 60s to make freedom an
empirical concept. Indeed, in his essay “Whither Political Theory?”, Terence Ball represents the
debate on the decline in political theory in the 50s and 60s as a ‘paradox’: “political theory was
in some quarters dead or dying; and yet it could not die” (Ball 1995: 43). Ball explains this by
throwing light on the distinction made by such scholars between ‘first-order theorizing’ and
‘second-order theorizing’. While the first order theorizing was about political and social
arrangements, the second order theorizing was about norms and political philosophy. Thus both
Parekh and Ball bring home the point that engagements with political philosophy suffered a

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decline in the 50s and 60s, but engagements with institutions and processes were very much in
vogue. This is iterated in MacIntyre’s thesis ‘the end of the end of ideology’ as he claims that
first-order theorizing was happening even in classrooms and the social movements of the 60s
(see Ball 1995: 48).

However, by the 1970s, challenges to positivism took the shape of different alternatives that
were engaging not only with meaning and explanation of social phenomena; they were
highlighting the role of history and contexts for understanding politics. Hermeneutics and other
post-positivist methodologies gradually replaced the scienticism in social studies. The 1962
essay of Isaiah Berlin “Does Political Theory Really Exist?” throws light on the inefficacy of a
science of politics, since questions of political obligation, nature of political arrangement, etc.
involve conflicting arguments and answers. Indeed, for Berlin, a society where ends collide or
where there is a clash of value judgements is the only society where political philosophy is
possible. Berlin’s argument is also an attempt to rescue political theory from the dangers of
monistic normativity that were also regarded as the bases for both fascist and communist
totalitarianism in the 40s and 50s.

The revival of political theory is traced to 1970s, particularly with John Rawls’ A Theory of
Justice (1971). It was also spearheaded by the launch of three journals that deal with political
philosophy: Interpretation (1970), Philosophy and Public Affairs (1971) and Political Theory
(1971) (see Ball 1995; Parekh 1996). For David Held, it is at this stage of challenging
behaviouralism that political theory’s critical role in social transformation was also underscored
(see Held 1991: 14). Held (1991) perceives this renewal of political theory in seven forms:

 As the history of political thought- an attempt to interpret the significance of texts in their
historical context. Works of Quentin Skinner and John Dunn are examples.
 As a form of conceptual analysis- that involves clarification of key concepts and issues
like democracy, sovereignty, justice, rights, etc. For example, John Rawls’ attempts to
define justice or Hayek’s work on liberty.
 As a systematic elaboration of the foundations of political value, or as an invigoration of
the moral foundations of political philosophy. Rawls’ A Theory of Justice is an example.

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  As a form of argument concerned with abstract theoretical questions as well as practical
political issues. For instance, the works by Iris Young, Joshua Cohen and Jurgen
Habermas on deliberative democracy are pointers towards the limitations of
representative democracy; at the same time, they also raise larger questions of rationality,
consensus-building, communicative action, etc.
 Political theory has also, in its new form, been an arena of debate between the
foundationalists like Rawls who reinstate universalist principles, and the anti-
foundationalists who are votaries of the contingency of meaning (eg. Lyotard, Rorty).
Michael Walzer offers another challenge to political theory through his assertion that
political philosophy is ‘embedded’ in a specific community; it can only be an expression
of the self-understanding of that community and is hence municipal in its scope (see
Parekh 1996: 509).
 As a form of systematic model-building. Antony Downs’ economic theory of democracy,
and von Beyme’s rational choice approach to political science are examples for this.

One cannot disagree with Held that none of these renewed versions of political theory are
beyond controversies and inconsistencies. What is interesting is that “political theory today
cannot be based purely on political philosophy or political science” (Held 1991: 19, italics in
original). Held highlights the brilliant career of political theory post its revival in the 70s in its
combination of ‘philosophical analysis of concepts and principles’ and the ‘empirical
understanding of political processes and structures’ (ibid). As he writes, “…political theory can
occupy a space between these forms of inquiry, engaging critically with the competing values
and interests that guide and orient modern politics” (Held 1991: 20). The conceptual-normative
and the empirical-analytic and the strategic (the feasibility question- to what extent can we
change the existing arrangements to reach where we expect to) become the vital components of
modern political theory. This is also evident in Parekh’s argument that though contemporary
political theory has a strong moral dimension, it is more contemplative and reflective rather than
prescriptive; it is not normative in orientation (Parekh 1996: 509). For example, we should
evaluate the different conceptions of justice, or philosophize a new notion; at the same time, we
also need to analyse the political structures that subscribe to this concept of justice, or find an
alternative political arrangement to apply the concerned idea of justice. For example, when
Amartya Sen evolved his capability-based notion of justice, or the idea of development as
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freedom and not mere growth, he also suggested political and social arrangements that can work
out the new propositions. Similarly, Rawls’ theory of justice is an engagement with political
philosophy as well as practical issues of politics (see Ball 1995; Parekh 1996). That political
theory is no longer normative is hence not agreed to by everyone. Many writers, as explained
earlier, underscore the essentially normative orientation of political theory (see Pettit 1991;
Hindess 1997; Farrelly 2003; Vincent 1999, 2007; Bhargava 2010). What is striking however is
how all of them also point towards the spaces for social and political arrangements as well in
contemporary political theory.

Another feature of political theory post its revival in the seventies is the pluralism in the
discipline in terms of ideas, issues, approaches and methods. The danger of appropriation of
normativity by totalitarian ideologies was addressed by Isaiah Berlin in his 1962 essay, “Does
political theory still exist?”. Berlin’s answer was that political theory can survive only in a
pluralist or potentially pluralist society- a society with competing and colliding ends (White
2004: 2). And indeed, this pluralism as been characteristic of political theory till date:

From the 1960s to the present, it is the production of paradoxes that stands out
as Western moral and political thought have confronted the challenges of
feminism, multiculturalism, environmentalism, critical race theory, and novel
claims on the part of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism (White 2004: 3).
Andrew Vincent (2007) highlights the complex and internally contradictory nature of political
theory in its modern and postmodern phases. Vincent concedes that politics itself has become so
conflictual and complex and so has political theory. Vincent argues that there are five
conceptions of political theory, each embodying a definitive foundational element: classical
normative, institutional, historical, empirical, and ideological political theory. Bhargava’s
explication of normative, explanatory and contemplative political theories also suggest the
multiple foundations and tasks of contemporary political theory. However, while the complexity
and diversity of issues in political theory expands its scope and ensure its longevity (Barber,
cited in Ball 1995), others also view this expansion as a challenge to the survival of political
theory. For example, Terence Ball (1995) views the distancing of political theory from its own
subject matter-politics- as a major challenge to the discipline. Ball contends that akin to the
behavourists, political theorists in the 80s and 90s also make the mistake of ‘professionalisation’

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of political theory by virtue of their preoccupation with methods, techniques and the debate over
‘meta-theories’.

Why do we need political theory?

There has been a wide variety of reasons that justify the utility of political theory. Those like
Michael Freeden (see Freeden 2005) who want to differentiate between political theory and
political philosophy primarily underscore the role of theory in understanding and facilitating the
political processes. Some others are uncomfortable with what Ian Shapiro calls the ‘narcissistic’
tendency of political theorists, wherein they treat political theory as a specialised activity
disengaged from the discipline of political science (see Shapiro 2004). Ruth Grant (2004) makes
it a central task of political theory, albeit the tensions with ‘political science’, for a mutual
engagement with politics, without becoming a science. Grant’s argument is therefore on lines of
mutual engagement between the normative and the empirical

All these works on political theory bring to focus the mistake of separating the empirical and the
normative. The mutual engagement of philosophy and political theory is underlined by Bhargava
as vital to understanding the role of political theory. Contemporary theory, Bhargava argues,
performs four ‘interrelated functions’: “It explains at the most general level possible, it evaluates
and tells us what we should do, and it speculates about our current and future condition. It also
tells us who we are” (Bhargava 2010: 28). Depending on the roles of theory, Bhargava classifies
them as explanatory, contemplative and normative theories (Bhargava 2010). Bhargava alludes
to two functions common to social and political theory – interpretation and explanation, and
secondly providing insights into social phenomena that may not be completely explained by
empirical inquiries- the ‘contemplative’ role of political theory (Bhargava 2010: 35-6). For
example, the interpretative and explanatory role of political theory may be explained in an
inquiry as to why women face discrimination despite constitutional guarantees of equality. For
example, Max Weber’s thesis that Protestant ethic was responsible for the rise of capitalism is an
explanatory theory (Bhargava 2010: 42). Similarly, Engels’(1884) argument that the rise of
private property, and the consequent patrilineal inheritance led to the ‘world historic defeat of the
female sex’ explains the rise of inequality of sex and patriarchy in relation to property. As far as

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contemplative role of political theory is concerned, the assumption is that certain phenomena
cannot be explained completely by facts or empirical studies. An example is Gandhi’s critique of
modern civilization in Hind Swaraj as he is contemplating the ill effects of modern civilization
rather than looking at societies that have taken the road to modern civilization (Bhargava 2010).
Another example is Marx’s analysis of capitalism and the prospective transition to socialism and
communism. In other words, this approach argues that facts cannot capture and explain all of
reality, and they have to be supplemented with some degree of contemplation. `
`
Political theory can also be a space for value pluralism. For example, Isaiah Berlin (1962) sees
theory as the arena of value pluralism rather than as a prescription of common good. Politics here
is distinct from the social, as politics is regarded as a sphere of political freedom, where
individuals can choose their own values. Similarly, Hannah Arendt’s proposition of separating
the personal from the political represents the fears of potentially totalitarian tendencies of
normative theories. As Moon (2004) argues, Berlin brings `home the point that values are
essentially plural; they are incommensurable and their order or priority cannot be established.
Thus Berlin and Arendt do not prescribe norms; they however see politics as a space to evaluate
competing claims of values- politics as a realm of value pluralism. Ruth Grant (2004) on the
contrary gives a different picture. She argues that determining relative significance of values is
necessary if political theory engages with complex problems. That leads us to a third role of
theory-normative. Political theory primarily is seen here as either an arena of evaluation of
norms or even as the instrument towards designing a good society or leading a good life. Value
judgements and the ‘ought’ questions are critical in politics. In Bhargava’s viewpoint, facts
cannot explain everything, and value judgements become necessary in political theory. In his
account, it is normativity that makes political theory irreducible to social sciences and empirical
theories (Bhargava 2010: 38).

Bhargava therefore lays down three major functions of political theory, which other social
theories do not undertake, which he explains as the distinctive functions of political theory. First,
political theory offers a “general reflection on the ‘human condition’” – this is more
philosophical and closer to metaphysical knowledge; second, the exercise of power as well as the
mechanisms of exercise of power- this involves not only studies of state but also on the
capillaries of society, if they are sites of power; third, political theory is also the “study of how

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this power should be wielded, by whom and why, and in the light of which values and ideas of
the good life” (Bhargava 2010: 41). The third element, Bhargava emphasises, is a prescriptive,
normative and largely an ethical function of political theory (ibid). Evaluation of judgements and
the methods of arriving at these principles of normative evaluation become significant for
political theory in this distinctive function.

Conclusion

In sum, the meaning, nature and scope of political theory has undergone changes over time.
Political theory has moved away from the narrow focus on state; to that extent that it has become
more diverse and has encroached into the terrains of social theory and even phenomenology as in
the case of experiential or standpoint theories. Political theory today engages with norms;
however, it is also preoccupied with empirical questions including how to design necessary
political arrangements for the cause of justice, equality, etc. At the same time, the anti-
foundationalism presented by postmodernism challenges the idea of theory itself. While
postmodernism questions meta-narratives or ‘grand theories’, the ‘micro theories’ also become
questionable, for perceptions may vary with subjects and subject positions. From this angle,
political theory has made a long trajectory from universalism to particularisms, from objectivism
to subjectivism and from foundationalism to anti-foundationalism.

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