The Arab World

the long run there is no acceptable alternative to the comprehensive transformation of Arab
society. As a first step toward transformation, we turn now to analysis of the fundamental
building blocks of Arab society.

― 12 ―

2—
Arab Society:
Basic Characteristic Features

Stretching some 5.25 million square miles between the Gulf and the Atlantic, the Arab world
is officially composed of twenty-one states and inhabited by a mostly young population
expected to number over 200 million before the end of the twentieth century. Besides linking
Asia and Africa, it has long served as the gateway to Europe. It is not unusual for scholars
and laity alike to wonder whether this Arab world constitutes a society. Skeptics conceive of
the Arab world as a collection of independent states increasingly asserting their differences,
peculiarities, and separate identities, an image reinforced during periods of intra-Arab
conflict. It is important to note, however, that this model bases itself on states formed in very
recent times and uses "national" boundaries and political configurations to prove its point,
rather than looking at the social and cultural connections within Arab society.
Views emphasizing the mosaic nature of Arab society have also been reinforced over time by
the transitions experienced by contemporary Arab society since the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire initiated a desperate search for a new order. The emerging Arab society has been in
flux, pulled constantly between opposite poles: past versus future, East versus West,
tradition versus modernity, sacred versus secular, ethnicity versus class solidarity, unity
versus fragmentation, and so on. It appears to be in conflict with itself and with other
societies. These internal contradictions are perhaps responsible for the various
characterizations of Arab society in the West—such as mosaic, segmentary, mercantilistic and
agricultural, patriarchal, patrimonial, tribal, inherently religious, Asiatic in its mode of
production, dependent, underdeveloped, or stratified.
Nevertheless, deriving their overarching identity from shared social patterns and culture,
rather than from an artificially imposed polity or religion, the inhabitants of Arab countries
overwhelmingly perceive themselves, and are perceived by others, as Arab. The Moroccan
sociologist Abdelkebir Khatibi has observed that Arab identity is shaped by where Arabs stand
in time and

― 13 ―
space, by their history, by their memory, by the places in which they have lived and died.[1]
This basic identity, rooted in territory and civilization, is reconstituted in individuals and in the
collective memory. It is perpetuated from one century to the next, feeding on nostalgia for
the past as well as on dreams of the future.
Before we can analyze the potential of the Arab world to use this shared sense of identity to
constitute an integrated society, we need to know more about the distinctive national identity
or identities of Arabs. In addition to the coincidence of communal and class cleavages, this
inquiry will reveal the interplay of the social and political realities of the Arab world, and the

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new and old dynamic forces that have shaped and reshaped it. Let us turn first, however, to
the methodologies that will enable us to make this examination.

A Critical Approach: Some Methodological Observations

This study may be described as critical and dynamic. Unlike Orientalism (Western scholarship
on "the Orient" from the perspective of "the Occident"), my criticism of Arab society is deeply
embedded in a sense of belonging and of commitment to its transformation. I identify with
the forces of change in opposition to those upholding the status quo. My approach may also
be characterized as sociological, analytical, structural, and dialectical. Regardless of the labels
used to describe the type of analysis used in the pages that follow, I have undertaken to
explore the total Arab situation, guided by these principles:
1. The phenomena under study are examined in their social and historical contexts. The
starting point is society in history, rather than polity (particular nation-state boundaries) or
religion (Islam). This principle is diametrically opposed to the assumption that guides
Orientalist studies—namely, the perception of Arab society as a collection of political entities
and of Islam as a peculiar religion superimposed on society rather than emerging out of a
certain social reality. Orientalists have emphasized texts rather than actual behavior in
everyday life and have tended to see society as a product of religion rather than the other
way around.
2. I seek to portray society as changing rather than static. The forces of change are explained
in terms of internal and external contradictions, renewed historical challenges, encounters
with other societies, the discovery and development of new resources, and invented or
borrowed innovations. In this process, the West has served more as a challenge than as a
model to be emulated. This, too, contrasts with the Orientalist approach, which has
essentialized the social and political characteristics of Arab society (that is, sees them as
inherent).
3. My investigation emphasizes social class and analysis of the structures

― 14 ―
ordering Arab society. The communal strife existing in some parts of the Arab world is
examined in a socioeconomic context as a form of conflict masking deeper structures of
stratification. Furthermore, class contradictions are linked to external pressures as well as
internal differentiation among Arabs. Indeed, class and nationalistic struggles are inexorably
linked by the dual nature of internal and external domination and exploitation.
4. I treat behavior as a complex network of relationships to be examined in holistic and
integrative ways. Aspects of human behavior, group formation, institutions, culture, and so
on, are explored, not as separate entities, but in terms of the relationships among them.
Separate chapters are devoted to social class, family, politics, religion, and culture only for
ease of analysis; we must always keep in mind the interrelationships among these aspects of
Arab society.
5. The prevailing conditions and the dominant culture render Arabs alienated. Although many
have sought self-deliverance from this state of alienation through compliance or escape, the
struggle to transform reality and achieve the nahda (Arab renaissance) continues unabated in
many forms. This book attempts to explain the sources of alienation and the forces sustaining
the struggle against it.
My approach may be described as dynamic because, in contrast to the Orientalist
construction of Arab society as static, it portrays Arab society as being in a state of constant
change; as analytical because it attempts to explain rather than merely describe the
phenomena under study; as dialectical because it emphasizes the social contradictions at the

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root of the ongoing struggle to transcend dehumanizing conditions; as sociological because it

examines human behavior and issues in a social and historical context; and as critical
because, out of deep concern and affinity, it calls for the replacement of the prevailing order
with a new one.
Simply put, Arab society is presented in this analysis from a self-critical Arab perspective.
This effort constitutes an integral part of the task of developing an Arab sociology free both
from the metaphysical thinking that traditionally prevails in the Arab world and from Western
knowledge rooted in relations of domination (that is, "Orientalism"). In urging the
decolonization of Arab sociology, Khatibi calls this process "double criticism."[2] Another
Moroccan writer, Taher ben Jelloun, also calls for the liberation of sociology from its colonial
legacy, which he sees as emanating from the need of a colonial administration "to know
perfectly the society it had decided to dominate. Sociology was the part of the colonial
strategy of penetration and pacification."[3] Hence the dual task undertaken here of
unlearning and relearning.

― 15 ―

Some Characteristic Features of Arab Society

Chapter 3 includes a comprehensive analysis of Arab identity in its many aspects. We need to
begin, however, with an overview of contemporary Arab society. The most important thing to
remember about the characteristics summarized below is that they constitute interrelated
features, not elements to be considered in isolation.

Social Diversity

The literature on social diversity and cleavages in Arab society and the Middle East as a whole
suffers from several fallacies, two of which are most pertinent here. One is the tendency,
particularly among Orientalists, to speak both of the mosaic nature of Arab society and of the
existence of a unified mentality, or one Arab mind, without any awareness of the
contradiction between these two abstractions. The other is the emphasis either on communal
cleavages or on class conflicts, with the result that one becomes explanatory while the other
is ignored. The interplay and coincidence of these two cleavages are rarely examined in their
historical and social contexts. The diversity that characterizes Arab society needs to be
analyzed within a three-dimensional framework: (a) a homogeneity-heterogeneity
continuum; (b) the processes of conflict-accommodation-assimilation; and (c) social class
cleavages.
The continuum that covers the range from a completely homogeneous society to one of great
heterogeneity encompasses a complex system of vertical loyalties and communal
differentiations (ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal, local, regional, and the like) that coincides
as well as conflicts with social class cleavages. Arab society has historically been highly
heterogeneous. Certainly, one may argue that there has recently been a resurgence of
communal loyalties and mobilization, confirming the mosaic and segmentary structures of
society. What cannot be granted is the static conception of these loyalties and cleavage as
permanent, unchanging forms of differentiation.
The characterization of Arab society as heterogeneous, however, needs to be accompanied by
an explicit clarification that not all Arab countries are similar in this respect. In fact, they
differ widely in regard to their positions on the homogeneity-heterogeneity continuum.
Compared to other Arab countries, Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, may be described as
rather homogeneous as far as communal cleavages are concerned. These two countries tend

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to have fewer ethnic, religious, and tribal differences (and, hence, conflicts) than other Arab
societies, and are characterized more by social complexity and social class cleavages. A
second group of Arab countries, such as Lebanon and Sudan, occupy a position close to the
opposite end of the continuum, each being more of a mosaic in structure and social
composition. A third set, such as Syria,

― 16 ―
Algeria, Arabia, and Morocco, tend to occupy positions more in the middle of the continuum.
The application of the conflict-accommodation-assimilation model reveals great diversity in
Arab society in the handling of ethnic or class conflicts. Highly heterogeneous Arab countries
like Lebanon and Sudan have fluctuated between accommodation and conflict, including
sustained violent encounters between self-assertive communities. Here accommodation
means adoption by the elites representing the different communities of a policy of
coexistence without compromising their separate identities. Such communities achieved
accommodation, for instance, in the Lebanese national pact of 1943. By contrast, attempts at
maintaining stability through the use of some conflict-regulating practices, the management
of differences, and consociational democracy have not been successful. Success eluded
Lebanese and Sudanese elites because they failed to accommodate the divergent interests of
their communities. Moreover, their commitment to the maintenance of the status quo—and
their own power bases—reflects a lack of concern about growing socioeconomic inequalities.
These elites never intended to concern themselves with the task of transcending cleavages or
with the need to meld conflicting private identities into a more comprehensive national
identity. On the contrary, they attempted to suppress any popular movements working
toward such goals.
How do these lenses help us understand what we see when we look at the Arab world? If the
two continua of homogeneity-heterogeneity and conflict-accommodation-assimilation are
applied simultaneously to an analysis of Arab society, some tentative generalizations can be
made. A few Arab countries—including Egypt and, to some extent, Tunisia and Libya—may be
characterized as relatively homogeneous. Without communal fragmentation to focus conflict,
it has been possible to foster a shared social identity. The historian Gamal Hamdan has
argued that Egypt has certain historically significant features that make it a peculiar example
of the Hegelian synthesis, combining thesis and antithesis in a "balanced and authentic
composition" and rendering Egypt "the master of moderate solutions" and a "centrist nation
in the full sense of the world." It is important to note the complex interactions necessary to
achieve this balance. The basic elements contributing to this synthesis, according to Hamdan,
are a relatively homogeneous population, centralized political unity, historical continuity, and
geographical uniformity (that is, a single agricultural region extending along the Nile river
and one desert oasis). "Egypt is the strongest force among Arab countries twice: once by its
mere size, and once by its absolute homogeneity," Hamdan concludes.[4] Another Egyptian
historian, Hussein Fawzi, has addressed himself to the same issue, noting that Egypt's
homogeneity explains the continuous, unified way of life "underlying all those successive
civilizations" that made Egypt "the most ancient of nations on the surface of the planet."[5]

― 17 ―
This unique, agriculturally based social homogeneity may at least partly explain the presence
of a highly centralized political system. This is reinforced by extreme bureaucratization and a
strong consensus among Egyptians on issues of national identity, as well as on political issues
and national heroes—such as Ahmad 'Arabi, Sa'ad Zaghloul, and Gamal Abdel Nasser—in
modern history. The appearance of perhaps the first form of monotheism under Akhenaton in
1379–1362 B.C., and the ease with which internal uprisings have been crushed, have

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contributed as well. As a result of all these characteristics, a strong sense of Egyptian identity
developed at the expense of other loyalties, including even Arab and Islamic affinities.
In contrast, and representative of a mosaic society par excellence, Lebanon and its elites
managed with external support to impose a discriminatory political system on the country.
This system ensured the dominance of private over public identities, and of the few over the
many. Composed of several religious minorities, none of which constituted a majority,
Lebanon devised a political system that gives one community (the Maronites) predominance
over others. Exacerbating this religious (or, more accurately, sectarian) divisiveness were
growing socioeconomic disparities. Hence, intercommunal relations oscillated between
conflicts and elite attempts at accommodation. As a highly stratified communal society,
Lebanon failed to establish a consensus on national identity or to reform its rigid, confessional
(that is, sectarian) political system.[6] Aggravated by regional and domestic problems, the
country suffered two civil wars during less than a half-century of independence.
Sudan also continues to suffer from recurrent civil wars and political crises. Social cleavages,
political rivalries, and regional as well as ethnic and tribal disparities were exacerbated by the
colonial legacy and regional conflicts. The resulting Sudan became a mosaic society unable to
achieve national integration. The north-south civil war and the violent struggle for power
between rival northern groups have been further complicated lately by attempts at the
Islamization of Sudanese laws.[7]
With Egypt and Sudan marking the ends of the continuum, a number of Arab countries fall
midway between relatively homogeneous societies and mosaic ones. These countries include
Syria, Algeria, and Morocco, which despite their heterogeneity or pluralistic structures have
managed to accommodate divergent communities and groups within relatively unified social
and national orders. While their diverse communities—delineated by ethnic, sectarian, tribal,
and local boundaries—continued to maintain their private and distinctive identities, a public
national identity was forged and a strong central state was formed (or imposed) to ensure
the reconciliation of private and public identities. The failure to democratize their political
systems and to prevent the monopolization of power by certain elites, however, threaten
these nationalistic achievements.

― 18 ―
In the case of Syria, being socially heterogeneous (that is, composed of several religious,
sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and local communities) has not undermined a strong sense of Arab
identity and Syria's sense of historic responsibility as the citadel of the Arab world. Both the
minorities in power and those without power have outdone one another in defending what are
rhetorically defined as Arab causes.
Modern Algeria has been molded by a traumatic and unusual historical experience—a century
and a quarter of national resistance culminating in a revolution that finally liberated the
country from one of the harshest forms of colonization, that of French imperialism. This
revolutionary legacy has enabled the society to overcome its ethnic and tribal differences but
not its social disparities. Currently, bilingualism and hierarchical communal relationships are
being slowly but steadily undermined by an active process of Arabization that will reinforce
the dominant ideal that the "Algerian personality is an Arab personality and an integral
part . . . of the Arab nation."[8] To be complete, however, I think this process needs to be
accompanied by an equally significant process of democratization to favor diversity rather
than imposed uniformity. Lack of democracy and centralized state capitalism have
undermined civil society and contributed to the emergence of a militant Islamic movement.
Morocco historically has been more isolated and less vulnerable to foreign control than the
other North African countries, and it has thus been conceptually and normatively unified. Yet
the central authority could not exert its control over the whole country. Consequently, it was
divided into at least three zones or concentric circles of power. The first circle, Bled el-

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Makhzen, represented the locus of power and was based in urban areas. The second circle
represented subject tribes in intermediary zones surrounding the cities. The third circle, Bled
es-Siba, represented peripheral and dissident tribes.[9] The concepts of tripartism and
dualism are expressed in Abdallah Laroui's The History of the Maghrib . He concludes that
social diversity changed its form and meaning from stage to stage, but "the image we retain
of the Maghrib is one of a pyramid with different levels: anthropological, linguistic, socio-
economic, in short historical, and at each level lies the sediment of an unresolved
contradiction."[10] At the present time, Morocco continues to be highly pluralistic in structure
and orientation.
These pluralistic societies and others such as Iraq and Yemen have managed in their modern
history to achieve consensus occasionally on some fundamentals such as national identity.
They have asserted the need for social and political integration and have created unified
educational systems. Yet internal crises and divisiveness continue to characterize their
history. These negative outcomes may be attributed mainly to a combination of external
interventions, vertical loyalties, class cleavages, and, certainly, the lack of democracy. The

― 19 ―
observation of Hanna Batatu on the coincidence of communal and class divisions prior to the
1958 Iraqi revolution still applies today. He notes "a great degree of coincidence between all
these hierarchies; that is, those who stood, say, at the top in the scale of power tended also
to stand at the top with respect to wealth or in terms of religious, sectarian, ethnic, or status
affiliation."[11] The coincidence of these communal and class divisions must still be seen
today as providing the roots of Iraqi upheavals in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

Pyramidal Class Structure

Conventional Western literature on Arab and other Middle Eastern societies has persistently
avoided any serious discussion of social class structure. Instead, it has conceived of Arab
societies simply as a mosaic. At the margin of this mainstream discourse, however, there has
been some occasional speculation on problems of social stratification. Whenever a discussion
of this nature has taken place, it has evolved into a heated exchange. One point of view
reaffirms the conclusions of the mosaic model and questions the relevance of class analysis.
For instance, C. A. O. van Niewenhuijze and James Bill, in separate works, dismiss class
analysis in economic terms and instead use Weberian concepts of status and power.[12]
Similarly, Iliya Harik has more recently dismissed the thesis put forward by some writers that
the Lebanese civil war is actually a class struggle and expressed his "belief that class
distinctions in Lebanon are too obscure to sustain the class struggle argument."[13]
Bryan S. Turner, by contrast, has pointed out that anyone "who wants to develop a Marxist
analysis of North Africa and the Middle East must start with a critique of the mosaic theory
and all its related assumptions." Such a critique, he explains, is required because mosaic
analysts believe "that traditional Middle Eastern societies were not 'class dominated' and that
in the modern Middle East 'social class' is only in the process of emerging alongside other
forms of social stratification."[14] Nicholas S. Hopkins has applied ideas of class derived from
the Marxist tradition to changes in the social structure of an agricultural town in Tunisia,
concluding that essential changes in the mechanization of agriculture and in the improvement
of communications "led to a shift in the organization of work away from a pattern based on
mobilization of labor within the household or the extended kindred . . . and toward a pattern
of labor determined by wage labor." Consequently, this Tunisian agricultural town has shifted
from a society in which rank was based "on vertical rather than on horizontal links" to one
"based on class." Hopkins argues further that not only is there class in the objective sense,
"there is also class consciousness, at least in embryonic, symbolic form."[15]

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My own view is that the persistence of communal cleavages complicates rather than nullifies
social class consciousness and struggle. This persistence of communal cleavages and vertical
loyalties in some Arab countries is owing to

― 20 ―
the perpetuation of traditional systems in which communities are linked to their local za'ims
(traditional leaders) through patron-client relationships. To the extent that constructive
change can be introduced in these areas, such traditional systems will give way, increasingly,
to other social and class relationships.
To Marxists, sectarianism, tribalism, and the like constitute false consciousness that masks
class interests and mystifies class struggle. Western functionalists, by contrast, view these
communal cleavages as "a premodern phenomenon, a residue of particularism and ascription
incompatible with the trend toward achievement, universalism and rationality supposedly
exhibited by industrial societies."[16] Western sociologists whose point of departure is a
sociobiological paradigm have argued that ethnic and racial solidarity are extensions of
kinship sentiments. For instance, Pierre van den Berghe asserts that there "exists a general
behavioral predisposition, in our species as in many others, to react favorably toward other
organisms to the extent that these organisms are biologically related to the actor. The closer
the relationship is, the stronger the preferential behavior." He concludes, therefore, that
"ethnic solidarity is an extension of kin-based solidarity—that is, of nepotism." But he realizes
that as human societies grow, the boundaries of ethnicity become "increasingly manipulated
and perverted to other ends, including domination and exploitation."[17] I would argue,
however, that just because ethnicity is more primordial than class does not mean that it is
always more salient. As distinct principles of social organization, class and ethnicity
interpenetrate in complex and varying ways. This interplay becomes one of the most difficult
problems facing sociological analysis of complex societies.
Nevertheless, examination of the Arab situation in depth reveals a clearly pyramidal social
class structure. This means that the majority of the people are relatively poor. The middle
class, in turn, is significantly small in size. Wealth and power are concentrated in few hands.
This kind of triangular class structure differs sharply from the diamond-shaped structure that
indicates the presence in society of a significantly large middle class—the configuration for
which Westerners interested in class analysis always look. In both structures, however, social
class formations proceed from contradictory relationships and antagonistic interests.
How do class-based configurations relate to the continua discussed earlier? Social class
cleavages based on social contradictions, divergent positions in the socioeconomic structures,
and control or lack of control over the means of production are more relevant than communal
cleavages in relatively homogeneous Arab societies such as Egypt and Tunisia. In more
pluralistic societies, such as Syria and Algeria, where class is becoming increasingly relevant,
there is some coincidence of class and communal cleavages. In mosaic societies such

― 21 ―
as Lebanon, there is much greater evidence, not of communal cleavages as such, but of
communal stratification. This means that besides class cleavages, one or a few communities
enjoy more power, wealth, and status than others. In a previous study on the relationship
between religious affiliations and political orientations among university students in Lebanon,
I concluded that strong ideological positions can be analytically connected to class origins if
these connections are examined in their historical and socioeconomic contexts. One basic
finding of this study was that "those students who come from deprived families and deprived
religious communities—such as the poor Shi'ite students—showed the most significant
inclination to adopt the leftist ideology. In contrast, those students who came from privileged

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families and privileged religious communities—such as the rich Maronite students—showed

the most significant inclination to adopt the rightist ideology."[18]
One may also suggest that the greater the socioeconomic inequalities in mosaic societies, the
more the likelihood of uprisings. However, such uprisings are more likely to result in civil
wars (in which one controlling elite is substituted for another), rather than popular
revolutions (in which society is transformed, and the dominant order is replaced by a new
order). The reverse pattern is more likely to emerge in relatively homogeneous societies. In
the latter, the greater the inequalities, the greater the class solidarity, mobilization, and
prospect of revolution. If these assumptions are correct, one should expect the first Arab
popular revolution to take place in Egypt or Tunisia. This does not, however, exclude the
possibility that revolutions may occur in more pluralistic societies as well.

Social Complementarity

This sociological analysis begins with the assumption that the Arab world constitutes a single
society rather than a disparate collection of sovereign states. The latter view is often
advanced by Western mainstream scholars and the mass media, but it ignores the artificial
nature of many of these recently created political entities. If one begins by looking at social
organization rather than political structures, one discovers that social diversity and local or
regional peculiarities do not preclude Arab commonalities, especially in those areas addressed
by this book—such as family, social class structure, religious and political behavior, patterns
of living, change, and the impact of economic development. Many of these commonalities will
be discussed in the next chapter. Here, the point is that political fragmentation has been
caused by the interplay of internal and external forces. Current political configurations—the
array of particular states born of specific international circumstances—thus cannot be
expected to reflect social and cultural complementarity, however strong its presence may be.
Nor are common Arab interests and shared aspirations for unity provided with an outlet in
contemporary political configurations. Thus the bewilderment with which Arab intellectuals

― 22 ―
have looked at their society after the defeats in the Six-Day War of June 1967 and the 1991
Gulf War is an expression of concern, rather than a farewell to the renaissance (nahda ) of
Arab society or an announcement of the death of Arab civilization.[19] Yet the Gulf War may
prove much more devastating than Arabs can admit.

Transition and the Arab Renaissance

One of the basic contradictions of mainstream Western scholarship is its simultaneous

emphasis on the complexity of Arab conflict on the one hand and its portrayal of Arab society
as constant and static on the other. In fact, some Arab intellectuals have themselves
deplored the lack of change and lamented the futility of struggle. A more sober sociohistorical
examination of Arab society, coupled with contextualized interpretations of Arab writers'
reflections, would show that Arabs have actively struggled for a century and a half to meet
the challenges of modern times. The result has been a battle between the old and the new in
every aspect of human life. Confrontations between vehemently opposed forces have led to a
strenuous process of rebirth.
The intensely transitional nature of contemporary Arab society makes generalization difficult.
Arab society today is neither traditional nor modern, old or new, capitalist or socialist or
feudal, Eastern or Western, religious or secular, particularistic or universalistic in its cultural
orientations. It is this very complexity that led to my definition of Arab society as an

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association of all these contradictions and several others in a contradictory world.

Nevertheless, crises are ever-present, equaled only by dreams of overcoming them.
The tendency in mainstream Western literature to ignore the complex transitional situation of
the present-day Middle East may explain some of the prevailing oversimplifications and
misconceptions. Of particular significance in this respect are those oversimplifications
pertaining to structural change and the definition of Arab identity. Since the establishment of
Israel and the emergence of a large body of literature to legitimize its existence and
territorial expansions, these oversimplifications of Arab society have grown even wilder.
Development in the Middle East, we are told, is hampered largely by resistance to change,
and the root of this vehement resistance lies in cultural attitudes and in the individual and
collective psyche. This view ignores the significance of the prevailing relationships of
dependency, as well as the existing socioeconomic and political structures, and reveals the
animosity toward Arabs (and especially toward Muslims) that underlies many scholarly
pretensions. Thus Menahem Milson asserts, for example, that there is a need "to take into
consideration certain cultural attitudes to power and government deeply rooted in Islamic
tradition, which tend to discourage resistance to the incumbent government, no matter how it
assumed power. The very possession of coercive power becomes, as it were, a source of
political legitimation."[20]

― 23 ―

Patriarchal Relations

The family is the basic unit of social organization and production in traditional and
contemporary Arab society, and it remains a relatively cohesive institution at the center of
social and economic activities. It is patriarchal; pyramidally hierarchical, particularly with
respect to sex and age; and extended. Yet the Arab family has been undergoing significant
changes as a result of structural change at the level of production and needs to be examined
carefully. It must be placed in the context of the transitional nature of Arab society. Both the
internal and external confrontations that Arab families are facing and the struggle for social
transformation that Arab society is waging emerge clearly from such an examination.
The traditional Arab family constitutes an economic and social unit in all three Arab patterns
of living—bedouin, rural, and urban—in the sense that all members cooperate to secure its
livelihood and improve its standing in the community. Farms, shops, businesses, and herds
are commonly owned and managed for the benefit of all. The success or failure of an
individual member becomes that of the family as a whole. This centrality of the family as the
basic socioeconomic unit is now being increasingly challenged by the state and other social
institutions. But the network of interdependent kinship relations continues to prevail. In this
network, the father continues to wield authority, assume responsibility for the family, and
expect respect and unquestioning compliance with his instructions. Thus the continued
dominance of the family as the basic unit of social organization and production has
contributed to the diffusion of patriarchal relations and to their application to similar
situations within other social institutions. Specifically, the same patriarchal relations and
values that prevail in the Arab family seem also to prevail at work, at school, and in religious,
political, and social associations. In all of these, a father figure rules over others,
monopolizing authority, expecting strict obedience, and showing little tolerance of dissent.
Projecting a paternal image, those in positions of responsibility (as rulers, leaders, teachers,
employers, or supervisors) securely occupy the top of the pyramid of authority. Once in this
position, the patriarch cannot be dethroned except by someone who is equally patriarchal.
Hisham Sharabi points out that because of the prevailing patriarchy, modernization could
only be "dependent modernization," that is, distorted and inverted modernity. In other words,

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this modernization has not only failed to break down patriarchal relations and forms, it has
provided the ground for producing a hybrid—the present neopatriarchal society, which is
neither modern nor traditional, but which limits participation by its members because of the
continued dominance exercised by single leaders.[21]

Primary Group Relations

A highly distinctive feature of Arab society is the continuing dominance of primary group
relations—that is, those characterized by intimate, personal, informal, noncontractual,
comprehensive, and extensive

― 24 ―
relations. By entering into these primary relations, which they do freely and spontaneously,
individuals engage in an unlimited commitment to one another. They derive satisfaction from
extensive affiliations and develop a sense of belonging. These relations, however, though
they result in lifelong friendships, may also contribute to the development of repressed
hostilities and jealousies. They are centered in the extended family and in the communal
system typical of bedouin, agricultural, and service-oriented societies. Thus, in contrast to
the atomized industrial and capitalist societies of the West, social relations in mercantilistic
and agricultural Arab society exhibit the following characteristics.
First, Arabs tend to interact as committed members of a group, rather than as independent
individuals who constantly assert their apartness and privacy. My own experience upon my
arrival in the United States illustrates this. One of the first things I observed was that
Americans travel on their own, hardly relating to one another. This is in sharp contrast to
Arabs, who almost always travel in the close company of two or more people, intimately and
spontaneously engaged in lively conversation. Finding myself in the moving crowds of New
York City, however, I realized I had to view the people around me in new ways. I realized
that what I saw in America were crowds not groups. What you have is a mass of individuals
who maintain their psychological distance in spite of their spatial closeness. What I observed
was people colliding into each other rather than relating to each other. In fact, some seemed
to be speaking audibly or even loudly, but to themselves, almost completely oblivious of
others. Since then I have been intrigued by the loneliness that exists in the midst of city
crowds. Personal space seems to be narrowing, in sharp contrast to the social psychological
distance, which continues to expand.
Second, Arabs, even in big cities, experience a strong sense of belonging through sustained
commitments and loyalties to family, community, and friends. What seems to be the source
of this sense of well-being is affiliation rather than the individual achievement that
characterizes Western capitalist societies. Yet both orientations can have negative
consequences. Arabs, especially the young, complain a great deal about family and
community pressures and the constant interference in their private lives. Citizens of
capitalist, atomized societies complain of the lack of family life, while insisting on narrowly
defined contractual commitments and cherishing their privacy.

Spontaneity and Expressiveness

Notwithstanding religious taboos and social and political repression, Arabs tend to express
themselves spontaneously and freely in several areas of life, particularly in those related to
human emotions and the arts. Undeterred by their need for affiliation and group solidarity,

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they openly express their likes and dislikes. Joy and sadness, hope and despair, satisfaction
and discontent, congeniality and aggression all characterize their

― 25 ―
art. Hence, there is the perception by themselves and others that they tend to be emotional
rather than rational and calculating.
Of course, to overstate this tendency and to make such generalizations without appropriate
qualifications may border on the stereotyping of a whole culture. A keen observer, however,
cannot fail to take note of such spontaneity and intensity of feelings, particularly in times of
stress or joy and in areas of interpersonal relationships. To balance this, such an observer
would also have to notice the existence of religious and political taboos and the tendency
toward conformity. Moreover, self-censorship and the practice of taqiyya (dissembling—the
denial of certain feelings and beliefs—in order to avoid certain persecution) also constrain
emotional expression. Spontaneity and expressiveness encourage the Arab inclination toward
the arts, particularly literature and poetry, at the expense of the sciences. To the extent that
this is so, present-day Arab culture seems to be more literary than scientifically oriented.
Two related phenomena need to be mentioned. One manifestation of expressiveness is the
emphasis on the significance of "the word" in Arab culture. Besides the role played by the
word in literature and, especially, poetry, words are the most celebrated artistic elements in
music and drawing (see Chapter 10). Another manifestation is the great stress on symbolism,
imagery, and metaphor in everyday ordinary communication. As an example, an American
receiving condolences on the death of his young daughter was moved when an Arab friend
said, "Life is God's garden out of which, now and then, He picks the most beautiful flower."

Continuing Dependency and Underdevelopment

Arab society continues to suffer from dependency as well as widening gaps or disparities
between the privileged few and the deprived classes. These disparities also emerge between
rich and poor Arab countries and between Arab society and the developed societies of the
West. Being increasingly integrated into the global capitalist economic system and locked into
a network of dependent relations, the Arab world seems to lack control over its resources and
destiny. Oil-wealth, neopatriarchal relations, and external control have all resulted in the
emergence of marginal ruling families and classes, and a distorted development directed
toward consumption rather than production. As indicated earlier, Arab society today is neither
traditional nor modern. One feature of neopatriarchal societies, Hisham Sharabi has noted, is
"the absence equally of genuine traditionalism and authentic modernity."[22] This distorted
duality is made even more complex by another duality, the intra-Arab and inter-Arab
stratification systems. The growing disparities between the lavishly rich and the desperately
poor within the boundaries of specific countries are manifested either in great wealth enjoyed
by the few in the midst of acute poverty (Egypt, Morocco) or unwavering poverty in the midst
of unusual wealth (oil-producing coun-

― 26 ―
tries).[23] The same patriarchal and neopatriarchal relations continue to prevail in both sets
of countries. Nevertheless, rich Arab countries conduct themselves as regional powers by
imposing a system of local dependency on poor countries. This intra-Arab stratification
system results in a dual or even triple dependency, which weighs heavily on impoverished
countries.

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What adds to the complexity of this situation is the pressing need to cope with formidable
modern challenges from within highly rigid systems. While there seems to be a strong
determination to adopt and imitate the most fashionable and technologically sophisticated
innovations, the process of development continues to be hindered by prevailing
socioeconomic and political structures and by a network of authoritarian relationships.[24]

Alienation and the Lack of Civil Society

The conditions described above—dependency, underdevelopment, patriarchal and

authoritarian relationships, social and political fragmentation, class distinctions, successive
historical defeats, and a generalized state of repression—have rendered the Arab people and
society powerless. Having lost control over its resources and destiny, and failing to develop a
vision for the future, the society seems to lack a core and a will of its own. Instead, it drifts at
the mercy of historic challenges and events. Its material and human resources have been
harnessed for the benefit of a small segment of the population and on behalf of antagonistic
external forces.
The Arab world does not seem to be a society that functions well. This is so because, in order
for civil society to function properly, its affairs must be the affairs of the people themselves
and not merely of the ruler and the state. Basic human rights and vital functions of society
have been constantly undermined and curtailed by authoritarian regimes. Arabs have become
powerless and subordinated to the whims of their rulers. Consequently, Arab states represent
a force directed against society, and Arab society has been unable to cope with disasters. It
needs to develop a will of its own if it is to confront trying historical challenges. Instead of
realizing the dreams they have set for themselves for a century and a half, Arabs have
undergone shockingly bitter experiences and setbacks. Goals such as national unity and state-
building have eluded them. Equally unachievable has been the establishment of democratic
institutions and associations. Even economic goals such as comprehensive development and
the overcoming of socioeconomic disparities remain out of reach. In short, Arabs lack control
over their destiny (see Chapter 12).
Successive failures to achieve such goals have reinforced the other conditions that continue
to contribute to the strong sense of alienation. Arabs, as will be shown, have become
powerless, not just in relation to the state, but even in relation to their own institutions. They
are alienated from, and within, religious and family structures, institutions of learning, places
of work, political parties, unions, and other sorts of social organizations. In all these instances,

― 27 ―
people are excluded from participation in the making of their own futures and the shaping of
their own destinies; hence the growing gap between dream and reality.
The characteristic features noted above, and others that will be discussed in the next chapter,
should be perceived as interrelated aspects of the present Arab social situation and should be
seen in their social and historic contexts. To focus on them out of context or by separating
out a few as independent variables is to miss what constitutes a distinctive Arab whole. One
other point needs to be reasserted. These characteristic features are constantly changing,
which requires us to use a dynamic rather than a static approach to the study of Arab
society. Thus, what we might conclude at this stage is that fragmentation, disparities,
dependency, alienation, underdevelopment, and the like represent major obstacles to the
effective functioning of contemporary Arab society.

Basics of the Physical Setting, Demography, and Ecology

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Some basic facts pertaining to the physical environment, demography and ecology of the
Arab world need to be briefly described at this stage in preparation for a fuller discussion of
issues of social diversity and integration in the next two chapters.

Physical Environment

The Arab homeland extends from the Gulf and the Zagros mountains on the Iranian frontier
in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, and from the Taurus range on the Turkish
border in the north to Central Africa beyond the Sahara and the Horn of Africa in the south.
This vast region is one of contrasting natural habitats, geological and topographic
configurations, climates (mostly hot and deficient in rain), and patterns of settlement. This
physical variation encompasses a wide range.[25] For instance, desert and semidesert areas
that are virtually uninhabited (except for scattered oases) constitute more than 80 percent of
the total area of the Arab homeland. The climate of the desert (a high-pressure area) is
characterized by extremes in temperature, lack of rain, and the bedouin way of life, with its
legacy of authentic tribalism. By contrast, the coastal strips of land that embrace the
Mediterranean and extend on both sides of the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf are
mostly low-pressure areas of moderate temperature (rainy during the winter, and rainless
and hot during the summer). There are also plateaus, rising less than 1,500 feet (492
meters), in the Maghrib, the Fertile Crescent, and Arabia. Moreover, great mountain ranges
separate the cultivable lands and coastal strips from the deserts. The peaks of the Atlas
range of the Maghrib and the Zagros ranges reach over 13,000 feet (4,000 meters). The
Taurus range separating Syria and Turkey, the Yemen Highlands, and Jabal al-Sheikh

― 28 ―
(Mount Hermon) rise over 12,000 feet (3,700 meters). A range of mountains in the Levant
overlooks the Mediterranean and separates the coastal strip from the arid interior. The
inhabitants of these mountainous areas are peasants, villagers, and minorities whose relative
isolation, communal relations, and tribal social organization have made them historically less
accessible and vulnerable to invaders and central government control.
Also present are the river valleys of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates, which are agrarian and
densely populated. In contrast to the mountainous areas, river irrigation requires centralized
planning and government regulation. This made the inhabitants highly accessible to
government control. The peasants of Egypt and Mesopotamia (homelands of the most ancient
civilizations and empires) have had a totally different pattern of living in comparison with the
bedouin of the deserts and the peasants of the mountainous areas of the Levant, the
Maghrib, and Yemen.
Small valleys and plains overshadowed by mountains, steppes, and plateaus exist in different
parts of the Arab homeland, particularly in the Levant, Yemen, and the Maghrib. In addition,
there are a few lowland areas, such as that of the Dead Sea (395 meters below sea level).
These contrasting environmental settings and climates have contributed historically to the
emergence of contrasting patterns of living (see Chapter 4 on bedouin, rural, and urban
patterns of living) and have endowed them with distinctive cultural identities.

Population

The numbers presented here are estimates that indicate certain trends. Demographic trends,
however, need to be examined in the context of more comprehensive social structures. The

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population of the Arab countries was estimated to exceed 175 million in the 1980s and is
expected to reach almost 300 million early in the twenty-first century. A century earlier, the
total Arab population was estimated at around 22 million, and increased to 38 million by the
beginning of the twentieth century. The population of Egypt increased from 2.5 million in
1820 to 5 million in 1860, 9.6 million in 1897, 21 million in 1952, and 48 million in 1985. It is
expected to reach 67 million by the end of this century.[26]
Other basic demographic trends and indicators, not unlike those of other Third World
countries, may be briefly described. For instance, the population increase has been the result
of a sustained high birthrate and declining death rate. Since the beginning of the second half
of the twentieth century, the average annual rate of population growth has ranged between
2.5 percent and 3 percent owing to a crude birthrate ranging between 28 and 50 per
thousand and a declining death rate currently ranging between 3 and 20 per thousand. How
is this population distributed? Population density in the Arab world must be seen in terms of
the large stretches of uninhabited desert and semidesert, or arid, areas. Estimates
disregarding this fact were as low as 12/km2 in the early

― 29 ―
1980s, ranging between 1/km2 in Libya and 437/km2 in Bahrain. These estimates become
totally different once desert areas have been taken into consideration. The rates jumped to
1,049 per km2 in Egypt (some estimates are as high as 1,200 and 1,400), 750 in Qatar and
Bahrain, 395 in Saudi Arabia, 132 in Kuwait, 90 in Jordan, 47 in Iraq, and 53 in Syria.
This Arab population may be described as young in age and as dependent. Estimates show
that 45 percent of the population are below 15 years of age, that half are between 15 and 65
years old, and that only 5 percent are over 65 years old. In contrast, the average rate of
population below 15 years of age is estimated to be 37 percent for the whole world, 28
percent for the developed societies, and 42 percent for the less developed societies. Life
expectancy in the 1980s averaged about 55 years in the Arab world, ranging from 46 in
Somalia to 72 in Kuwait.
Quantitatively, Arab education has changed dramatically since the middle of the twentieth
century. By the late 1970s, enrollment in elementary schools increased for all Arab countries,
from 39 percent of children 6–11 years old (28 percent for girls and 50 percent for boys) in
1960 to 48 percent in 1965, 51 percent in 1975, and 60 percent in 1977 (46 percent for girls
and 72 percent for boys). The trend has continued, especially in some countries, such as
Oman, where rates of elementary school enrollment increased from 3 percent in 1970 to 69
percent in 1980; in Algeria, where this rate changed from 36 percent in 1960 to 60 percent in
1970 and 81 percent in 1980; and in Syria, where it went from 51 percent in 1960 to 80
percent in 1970 and 99 percent in 1980. These rates continued to be relatively low in some
countries, among them Sudan (from 12 percent to 24 percent to 37 percent), Morocco (from
33 percent to 34 percent to 46 percent), and Somalia (from 4–5 percent to 48 percent). On
the whole, taking 1960 as a base line (100 percent), the number of elementary students in
all Arab countries increased 349 percent in 1977 (in comparison to an increase of 528
percent in intermediary and 700 percent in secondary schooling). Qualitatively, education
also improved; it was extended to poor and rural areas as well as to women; it was made
public rather than private; and it was Arabized.[27]
A similar trend is reflected in the ongoing urbanization process. Because of natural growth
and rural-urban migration, the percentage of urban population increased from 10 percent at
the beginning of the twentieth century to 40 percent in the 1970s and is expected to reach
70 percent by the end of the century. The rates of urbanization, however, differ widely in
different Arab countries. Some of them are closer to city states, with an urbanization rate of
over 80 percent (95 percent in Kuwait, and about 80 percent in both Bahrain and the United
Arab Emirates). Some others continue to be essentially rural, with an urbanization rate as low

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as 30 percent or less, including Yemen,

― 30 ―
Oman, and Sudan. In between, there are those Arab countries that are about equally divided
between rural and urban, such as Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia. As will be shown in Chapter 4,
rural-urban migration has developed into an issue of grave concern because among other
things it both reflects and influences socioeconomic inequalities. Underdevelopment, the
decline of agriculture, and food dependency are affected as well. Other results of urbanization
include the increased availability of social services, the centralization of power, and the
intensification of social and political tensions. Thus the phenomenon of rural-urban migration
can be understood only in its social structural and historical contexts.
Another vital demographic issue is labor migration. As pointed out by Fred Halliday, "We are
seeing a process of increased inequality and deterioration in the productive and human
resources of the Arab world: first, between the oil-rich and population-rich states; and
second, between the Arab world as a whole and the industrialized economies." By 1980 more
than 3 million Arabs had migrated to other Arab states, and since 1945 more than 15 million
have migrated to Europe, where they currently form minority groups vulnerable to acute
discrimination (850,000 Algerians, 250,000 Moroccans, and 60,000 Tunisians have settled in
France).[28] An issue of grave concern is the magnitude of Arab labor migration to Arab oil-
producing countries, estimated to have doubled between 1973 and 1975, and reaching four
and a half million by the mid 1980s. At issue also is the fact that Arab and non-Arab labor
migrants constitute over half of the populations of some oil-producing countries.[29]
One final demographic issue of great significance is the confinement of women to family and
domestic production. In addition to being occupied with housework, women have been active
participants in such economic activities as cloth-making, weaving, sewing, livestock care,
farming, and the fetching of water. More recently, they have worked outside their homes as
secretaries, teachers, nurses, cleaners, factory workers, shop saleswomen, and the like. Yet,
as pointed out by Huda Zurayk and several others, such as Fatima Mernissi, their varied and
complex work has gone largely unacknowledged. So far, "the nature of women's work places
it largely outside the production boundary, and thus it goes largely unmeasured,
unrecognized, and unacknowledged in systems of economic and social accounting."[30]

Ecology

Some unique phenomena have emerged as a result of the historical interplay between the
two constituent elements (of people and geography) in Arab society. One of the most visible
is the relationship between contrasting natural habitats, or physical variations, and patterns
of settlement. It is no accident that desert and semidesert areas have been the homelands of
the bedouin. Rather, human adjustment to contrasting environmental settings resulted in the
formation of contrasting patterns of living (bedouin, rural, and urban), each with its own
distinctive social organization and value orientations.

― 31 ―
It also determined to a great extent the nature of the relationships among them. Conflicting
interests often resulted in violent encounters and the development of negative images and
perceptions of one another (see Chapter 4).
In addition to settlement patterns, forms of rule have varied under ecological influences. We
have noted that in contrast to rain-fed areas (Syria, Maghrib, Yemen), the river-irrigated

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valleys of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates required the development of centralized rule. The
rain-fed areas, on the other hand, have been inhabited by relatively isolated and diverse
communities. Their location made them less accessible to government control and to outside
invasions. This also explains why minorities sought refuge or survived in mountainous areas—
such as the Berbers in the Maghrib, the Zaydis in Yemen, the Kurds in Iraq, the Maronites in
Lebanon, and the Alawites in Syria.
Factors like geographic centrality, the struggle against aridity and desolation, internal strife,
and external invasions may have resulted in the appearance of the three great religions of
the area. Perhaps one of the most relevant phenomena is the emergence of monotheism in
Egypt, a development that could not have occurred in a fragmented society (see Chapter 7).
Successive civilizations, such as the Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Egyptian, Aramaean,
and Canaanite, appeared in this area, expanded to their natural limits, and then declined. By
doing so, they unified the region and left a legacy of great historical consequence to the
world that endures to the present. A part of this process was the human migration from
Arabia to the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, Sudan, and the Maghrib that facilitated Arabization and,
later, Islamization. The historic interplay between geographical habitats and inhabitants also
contributed to the emergence of the four distinctive regional identities of the present Arab
world: the Maghrib, extending over 4,715,443 km2 and constituting half the area of the Arab
homeland; the Nile Valley; the Fertile Crescent; and Arabia.

Conclusion

The centrality of the Arab world in ancient and modern times has qualified it to serve as an
important nodal point in human history. It has acted as a passage connecting Asia, Africa,
and Europe. It has produced some of the most important intellectual, cultural, and religious
contributions of recorded history. It is this position at human and geographic crossroads, and
not merely its oil and other resources, that makes the Arab world so strategically significant.
This chapter serves as a prelude to further exploration of the issues of social and political
integration analyzed in the following chapters. It also provides, along with the remaining
chapters of this section, a framework of analysis for a more comprehensive examination of
the structures and dynamics of society, culture and state in the Arab world that are
undertaken in Parts II and III.

― 32 ―

3—
Arab Identity:
E Pluribus Unum

A critical study of Arab consciousness of a sense of identity begins by discarding idealist

views of identity that overemphasize similarities. My analysis is dialectical, attaching greater
significance to common characteristics and interests in the context of history and networks of
relationships. Contextualization allows us to connect similarities as well as distinctive
differences.
From this perspective, identity refers to the sharing of essential elements that define the

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