“Nova francia”?

Kinship and Identity among the Frankish Aristocracy

in Conquered Byzantium, 1204-1282

Volume 1

Erica Jo Gilles

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE

BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Advisor: William Chester Jordan

June 2010
 UMI Number: 3410876

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ii
 ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, a community of Flemish and French

aristocrats, known to historians as the Franks, settled in Constantinople and other

conquered Byzantine lands. This community was a small elite, ruling over indigenous

populations in unfamiliar lands, and they came to think and act in ways foreign to their

kin and colleagues in the west. This dissertation brings together western and eastern

sources to consider the Franks’ relationship to the west and their interactions with

neighbors and subjects.

The dissertation explores the transforming identities of the Franks in

Constantinople from their installment in 1204, through exile in 1261, to the final major

push to retake the city in 1282. The first generation, representated by the Flemish

emperors Baudouin I and Henri, retained its western affiliations and prejudices, but was

increasingly willing to make alliances and enter into marriages with neighboring

powers. The Courtenays, who came to power after Henri’s death in 1216, brought with

them a closeness to the Capetian monarchy and the papacy which shaped the Latin

Empire’s relationship with the west until the mid-1240s. The 1230s and the arrival of

Jean de Brienne as regent-emperor saw a deepening reliance on the west culminating in

Baudouin II’s two trips to the west. The failure of papal and Capetian support to result

in sufficient aid resulted in an expansion of Frankish appeals to the Hohenstaufen and

Spanish rulers. This wider net characterized the search for aid after the Byzantines

retook the city in 1261 as well.

iii
 During these decades, the Franks pulled back from engagement with their

neighbors and the pursuit of alliances with them, focusing instead on western aid. I

argue that this reorientation and the Franks’ communication with the west create false

impressions of continued prejudice against eastern neighbors and of a lasting, unaltered

western identity. The Franks’ actions, including disengagement from their western

land, describe more flexible attitudes than their language suggests. Even in their limited

time in Constantinople, the Franks made a varying set of accommodations to life in the

east and the resulting culture was neither fully western nor wholly other.

iv
 CONTENTS

ABSTRACT iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vi

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND NAMES x

ABBREVIATIONS xi

MAP OF THE LATIN EMPIRE xii

INTRODUCTION 1

PART 1: THE FLEMISH EMPERORS

CHAPTER 1: Foundation of the Latin Empire, 1204–1205 28

CHAPTER 2: Adaptation and Conservatism, 1205–1216 59

PART 2: THE FRENCH EMPERORS

CHAPTER 3: French Nobles to Latin Emperors, 1216–1228 90

CHAPTER 4: Papal Support and French Identity, 1228–1236 133

PART 3: BAUDOUIN II DE COURTENAY AND MARIE DE BRIENNE

CHAPTER 5: Crusade, Kinship and Land, 1236–1243 172

CHAPTER 6: The Latin Empire and European Politics, 1243–1247 228

CHAPTER 7: In a Strange Land, 1246–1261 265

CHAPTER 8: The Franks in Exile, 1261–1282 306

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED 345

v
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is a privilege to thank the many people and institutions who aided in the

completion of this project. The Graduate School and Department of History at

Princeton University supplied financial and institutional support. During a research

year in France, the Centre d’études médiévales d’Auxerre provided me with an

apartment, a place to work, and the resources with which to do so. Archivists and

librarians in Auxerre, Besançon, Dijon, Paris and Troyes helped me navigate the

labyrinth of the French archives and locate thirteenth-century documents in its midst.

Some material from those months has found its way into this dissertation, while much

remains to be mined in future projects. In the summer of 2006, grants from the Program

in Hellenic Studies and the Group for the Study of Late Antiquity let me to travel to

Greece to visit the remains of Frankish culture. After my time in the green and

temperate countryside of Burgundy and Champagne, the Peloponnese was a revelation

to me as, I cannot help but think, it must have been to the people I study.

At Princeton, I have been blessed with wonderful teachers and readers. William

Chester Jordan encouraged me to read generously and to think critically. His own work

stands a model for weaving archival documents into an elegant story. Over the years,

he has become a valued friend as well as trusted critic, and I look forward to the

continuation of both relationships. Conversations with Peter Brown have planted seeds

in my work that may take years to see fruition. I come back again and again to the

unexpected questions he asked and connections he made. In a year devoted to her own

research, Tia Kolbaba accompanied me on an exploration of the relations between

Byzantium and the West. Our conversations stimulated my thinking and guided me to

vi
the Latin Empire. Molly Greene graciously read several chapters of this dissertation at

short notice. Her queries about context and purpose forced me to articulate answers that

I had previously taken for granted. At the end of this process, John Haldon’s challenge

that identity and culture be brought explicitly to the fore shaped my introduction and

has become central to my thinking about how to push this project forward. I am

extremely grateful for Anne Lester’s willingness to read and engage with my work. Her

thoughtful and wide-ranging comments will guide my revisions and her enthusiasm has

provided a much welcome lift at the end of the journey.

The staff members of the History Department, in particular Judy Hanson,

Audrey Mainzer, Reagan Maraghy and Minerva Fanfair, were immensely helpful as I

stumbled through the administrative aspects of graduate school. Their patience is

admirable.

At Brown University, Amy Remensnyder’s classes drew me centuries away

from my initial plan to study international relations. She and Susan Ashbrook Harvey

guided my first foray into research with gentle but firm hands. Their gifted teaching

inspired me as an undergraduate and continues to do so as I transition to the other side

of the classroom. Through lectures and tutorials, Jonathan Shepard introduced me to

Byzantium. The question lingering behind this dissertation – that of relations between

Western Europe and Byzantium – arose for me during that year in Cambridge, traveled

back with me to Brown, underpinned my undergraduate thesis and animated my

graduate career.

Many others have contributed, in ways large and small, to the completion of this

project. At the very end, Magdalena Alagna’s sharp eye for inconsistencies saved me

vii
from many errors. Over the years, conversations with Guy Geltner and Christopher

MacEvitt have helped me understand what kind of historian I am and can be. Nadia

Ellis, Shellie Garceau, Angela Gleason, Stephen Russell and Will Slauter opened their

homes to me and helped make a commuting life possible. Yael Sternhell made me feel

welcome wherever she was, including with her and her parents, Zeev and Ziva, during a

visit to Israel. I wrote these acknowledgments across a café table from Jordan Pascoe.

Her presence across this and many other tables made the process of finishing this

dissertation not merely bearable but pleasurable.

I have known Katy Tischler since before either of us can remember. What I

know of friendship, I discovered first with her. Her son, Owen Jolles, has taught me

many things about trains, trucks, and, of course, the depths of love. At the Horseshoe

and the Mothership, at the Annex and Butler, at Johnny’s and Queer Soup, the

following people (and too many others to fit here) have brought me joy, comforted me,

and helped me laugh at myself and the universe: Elizabeth Siegel Abram, Tomara

Aldrich, Emily Barabas, James Byrne, Thomas Boeve, Peggy Carr, Damián Fernández,

Fran Hutchins, Maya Soifer Irish, Laura Kalba, Nancy Khalek, Jennifer Kingsley, Jamie

Kreiner, Manning Krull, Noah Lansner, Ayelet Leibovitch, Tamara Mahoney, Kamdyn

Moore, Edward Muston, Kate and Matt O’Brien, Daniel Schwartz, Brian Squibb, Jack

Tannous, Annie Twitty, Keri Walsh, Eric Yellin, LJ folks, and the SBLS crew,

particularly Meghan Faux, Marie Tatro and Ryan, Shantonu Basu, Cathy Bowman,

Nandini Chandrasekaran, Herman De Jesus, Emilie Eagan, Catherine Hagarty, Laurie

Izutsu-Keener, Pete Kempner, Pavita Krishnaswamy, Jennifer Light, Hannah Roman,

Sonja Shield, Jennifer Sinton, and Navid Vazire. It is a privilege to know them.

viii
 My siblings, Alison, Duncan, Nellie and Hadiya, are responsible, I like to think,

for both my virtues and my faults. We love, frustrate, and admire each other. That they

are also my friends is a gift beyond measure. The determination of my grandparents,

John and Jo Hicks and Paul and Helen Gilles, continues to awe me. I love them all very

much.

This dissertation is, and must be, dedicated to my parents, Timothy and Sealy

Gilles. Their encouragement and support – emotional, financial, intellectual and

practical – has made everything else possible. My mother, in addition, has been a

treasure trove of advice on all things academic. I can only hope to imitate, in some

small way, their generosity – not only towards their children, but also towards their

relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, students, fellow dogwalkers, and the other

random connections they welcome into their home and lives.

ix
 A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND NAMES

Instead of Anglicizing all proper names, I generally give the names of persons and
places in the modern form that reflects their cultural origin or location. I also preserve
the “de” of French names. Thus, Pierre II de Courtenay instead of Peter II of Courtenay
and Geoffroy de Villehardouin instead of Geoffrey of Villehardouin. Greek names and
terms are translated as closely as possible, following the forms in the Oxford Dictionary
of Byzantium.

The names of kings, western emperors, and popes are given in their English versions, as
are Greek persons and places where the closer transliteration seems awkward. Thus,
Philip Augustus, Gregory IX, and Nicaea.

***

Following scholarly usage, I use “Frank” to describe individuals who came from
Franco-Flemish lands and settled in conquered Byzantine territories, as well as their
descendents who remained in the east. This term originates in the Byzantine practice of
calling western Europeans phrangoi. In modern scholarship, Frank has been used to
describe Latin Christians who settled in areas conquered in the crusades, whether in the
Aegean or the Holy Land. It distinguishes these individuals from their eastern
neighbors and western Europeans, as well as the Venetians and Lombards who made up
the other communities in the Latin Empire.

x
 ABBREVIATIONS

AD Archives Départementales (Yonne)

AN Archives Nationales, Paris
Arsenal Bibliotheque de l'Arsenal, Paris
JS Journal des savants
MGH Const Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Constitutiones et
acta publica imperatorum et regum. Hanover, 1826-1934.
MGH SS Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores. 32 vols.
Hanover and Leipzig, 1826-1934.
PG Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca, ed. J. P.
Migne, 161 vols. Paris, 1857-1866.
PL Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina, ed. J. P. Migne,
221 vols. Paris, 1844-1864.
RHC Occ Recueil des historiens des Croisades, Occidentaux. 5 vols.
Paris, 1844-1895.
RHGF Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France. Ed.
Martin Bouquet et al., 24 vols. Paris, 1738-1904.
RISS Rerum Italicarum Scriptores. Ed. Ludovicus Antonius
Muratorius, 25 vols. Mediolani, 1723-1751.

xi
From: John Haldon, The Palgrave Atlas of Byzantine History (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). xii
 INTRODUCTION

In 1243, Baudouin II de Courtenay, a Franco-Flemish aristocrat, a relative of the

French king’s, and the Latin emperor of Constantinople, wrote to Blanche of Castile,

the Queen Mother of France and his cousin and aunt by marriage. The Latin emperor

denied a report that he had Greeks in his council, assuring Blanche that he depended

solely on the “council of the noble and good men of France who are among us.” 1

Despite being born and raised in Constantinople, he affirmed his identification with the

land his parents came from. Moreover, in a tone that one historian has called “almost

tearful,” he stated his absolute dependence on Blanche herself and on her son Louis IX. 2

In a second letter, Baudouin II broached the astonishing possibility of an alliance with

the Muslim sultan. To confirm the alliance, a marriage was required and he sought the

Queen Mother’s help in persuading his sister to send her daughter to marry the sultan.

In this letter, Baudouin II emphasized the distance between him and Blanche,

explaining the customs and practices in “these parts” in contrast to those in Europe. 3

These letters fascinate me. They mirror the complexity that almost forty years

of residence in Constantinople had created for (and in) the once-Westerners and their

descendants who lived and ruled there. Writing in the same year to the same

correspondent, Baudouin II reinscribed the tie between the Franks and France but set

them apart. The Franks were living in “these parts” and, as a result, were ensconsed in

1
F. Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores (Paris, 1636), V: 424-26: “consilio nobilium ac
bonorum virorum Francie.”
2
Robert Lee Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261)” (Harvard University, History,
1947), p. 614.
3
Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, pp 424-26: “Multi etiam nobiles Pagani in partibus illis
habent uxores Christianas, quae in lege sua assidue perseuerant, videlicet Grecae, Armeniacae, Tuerae, et
Rossae.”
1
a cultural environment where different expectations—vastly different ones—were the

norm. Yet, they were still, in the eyes of their emperor, “men of France.” The distance

did not negate this affiliation.

These letters are insistent reminders that the individuals populating this study

were real people, whom we inadequately reconstruct from collections of documents and

artifacts. They built personal relationships and made missteps in them. They sought

approval. They had crazy ideas—that Blanche of Castile would support a marriage

between a French noblewoman and the sultan—but strove to justify them. The state

that the Franks created failed, but they were willing to invest a significant amount of

energy to gain help for it and preserve or recover it. It is the label of “failure,” in fact,

that I most resist. The Latin Empire only existed for fifty-seven years, and for many of

those years its weakness was on parade throughout Europe in the form of pleas for aid.

Yet, the end does not tell us everything—one of the contentions of this dissertation is

that it may tell us very little or, rather, something different from what seems apparent.

To cite just one example—the failure to mount a crusade to recover the Latin Empire

did reflect a prioritization of the Holy Land over Constantinople. Yet, the evolving

plans for one also reveal the place of the Eastern empire and its emperor in Western

imaginations and desires.

The questions raised by letters are touchstones in this dissertation. What did it

mean, in Baudouin II’s eyes, to be “of France”? What did Blanche think when she read

of the proposed marriage of a French noblewoman and a Muslim sultan? Who were the

men in Constantinople and how did they define their own membership in the various

communities—political, cultural, religious—to which they belonged? How did others

2
perceive them? These letters offer an explicit rendering of what is so often implicit. In

them, Baudouin II gave voice to sentiments of belonging and identity, sentiments more

often seen sidewise and faintly. This dissertation seeks those tantalizing whispers in the

writing and actions of the Franks and weaves them into a story of adaptation and

conservatism.

Ethnicity, Identity, and Frontiers

This dissertation is, above all, a study of a community. It explores the

transforming identities of the Franks in Constantinople from their installment in 1204,

through their exile in 1261, to the final major push to retake the city in 1282. I trace the

Franks finding their feet, so to speak, in their new environments, adapting to new

circumstances and abandoning old prejudices. Entering Constantinople in 1204, the

Fourth Crusaders assumed the mantle of the Byzantine Empire and looked to its

territory as their own. In the early years, the necessities of rule often outstripped the

Franks’ mental horizons and they engaged in behavior, most particularly marriages, that

clashed with their prejudices. As time went on, the opinions of the Franks softened

toward their neighbors and they began to see them as appropriate partners and

legitimate allies. In the 1230s, the imperial heir Baudouin II traveled to the West. He

or his wife Marie was in the West for almost the whole period until the fall of the Latin

Empire in 1261, when they permanently (although reluctantly) made their home there.

The descendants of men who brought Western Christianity and Franco-Flemish culture

to the East returned to Europe with their Eastern priorities, ambitions, and titles.

Before embarking on the project, it is appropriate to offer some thoughts on

ethnic identity and, more broadly, on communal identity and frontier societies in the

3
Middle Ages. The question of ethnicity, a category often linked to nationalism and the

rise of the nations, has found a sometimes uncomfortable home in medieval

scholarship. 4 Medieval people demonstrated affinities with others, based around the

perception of cultural similarities and linked to an understanding of origin and

transgenerational membership. The boundaries surrounding these communities were

maintained, often by external markers such as hairstyle, language, and religious

practice, and were traversed in various ways. Some identities were more easily

adopted, discarded, or transformed than were others. These cultural identities interacted

with political, religious, and occupational or class (to use another imported and

contentious term) affiliations in a complex and highly contingent way. 5

Because of the nature of the sources, which will be discussed below, it is very

difficult to speak of the internal characteristics of Frankish culture and society. We are

on much firmer ground in discussing their relations with others—whether allies or

enemies, neighbors or far-off correspondents. In thinking about communal identity in

this context, Fredrick Barth’s article, written more than forty years ago now, remains

pivotal. In it, he suggested that scholars conceive of ethnicity in terms of the

boundaries that circumscribed various communities rather than the cultures within those

boundaries. He regarded culture “as an implication or result, rather than a primary and

definitional characteristic of ethnic group organization.” 6 Instead of seeing ethnicity as

a product of culture, he identified the most important feature of ethnic groups as the

4
See the attempts made to reconcile national identity and medieval circumstances in Simon Forde, Leslie
Johnson, and Alan V. Murray, eds., Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages (Leeds: University
of Leeds, 1995).
5
See for example Gill Page, Being Byzantine: Greek Identity Before the Ottomans (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
6
Fredrik Barth, ed., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).
4
“self-ascription and ascription by others. A categorical ascription is an ethnic ascription

when it classifies a person in terms of his basic, most general identity, presumptively

determined by his origin and background.” 7 In a volume discussing Barth’s work, the

editors asserted that “ethnic identities are products of classification, ascription and self-

ascription and bound up with ideologies of descent.” 8 A more recent definition, given

by Gill Page in a study of Byzantine Roman identity, articulated these features clearly

and is worth quoting in its entirety:

Ethnicity, or ethnic identity, is a property of a group. It is a faith on the part of

the members of the group that they are in some sense the same, and that this
sameness is rooted in a racial kinship stretching into the past. Further, this act of
faith is inherently defensive—it arises and gains its strength from a contrast with
another group (or groups), who are seen as not the same, and as presenting a
threat to the survival or at least prosperity of one’s own group. 9

The emphasis on boundaries posits that ethnic identity requires a group of

people outside the boundary. Without the oppositional group, the ethnic group does not

exist. Moreover, as Barth argued, the key aspects of ethnic identity are the markers

that, in the eyes of the members, distinguish their group from another, not an outsider’s

or scholar’s perspective. 10 These insights are particularly significant in the case of the

Franks. Their relocation from Europe resulted in an entirely new set of oppositional

groups. As we will see, this meant the elision of divides inherited from Europe (the

French-Flemish one most obviously). Moreover, Baudouin II’s correspondence with

Blanche reveals that his understanding of acceptable boundary transgression,

7
Ibid., p. 13.
8
Fredrik Barth, “Enduring and Emerging Issues in the Analysis of Ethnicity,” in The Anthropology of
Ethnicity: Beyond "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries", ed. Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers (Amsterdam:
Hague, Netherlands, 1994), p. 4.
9
Page, Being Byzantine, p. 11.
10
Barth, “Enduring and Emerging Issues,” p. 12.
5
specifically with regard to intermarriage and political participation, came to differ from

hers.

This view of ethnic identity has been suggestive in the medieval context. Two

communities in particular are worth mentioning here for the light they shed on Frankish

society: the Venetians in Crete and the Anglo-Irish in Ireland. In both cases, the

conquerors sought to rule over their new possessions through an elite sent from the

homeland. These elites evolved over time into what in the Irish context was called a

“middle nation.” Neither Irish nor any longer truly English, the ruling class In Ireland

came into conflict with both. To the dismay of the English, they “forsaking the English

language, fashion, mode of riding, laws and usages, live and govern themselves

according to the manners, fashion and language of the Irish enemies.” 11 Yet, the Irish

also complained that the Anglo-Irish were dangerous and treacherous, ruling unjustly,

creating trouble, and not rendering to the English king what was his due. 12 The Irish, in

other words, claimed to be more loyal than the Anglo-Irish to whom the land was

entrusted. In Crete, a similar dynamic emerged. The Venetians who settled in Crete

crossed the boundaries separating them from the Greek inhabitants—adopting Greek

language, marrying Greek women or entering into nonmarital sexual unions with them,

patronizing Greek religious institutions, and adopting Greek styles. 13 In the fourteenth

century, the antagonism between the government in Venice and the Venetians in Crete

became so extreme that the latter rebelled. 14 In these two places, the experience of

11
From the Statutes of Kilkenny in 1366, quoted in James Muldoon, Identity on the Medieval Irish
Frontier: Degenerate Englishmen, Wild Irishmen, Middle Nations (Gainesville, FL: University Press of
Florida, 2003), p. 43.
12
Ibid., p. 41.
13
Sally McKee, Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity, The Middle Ages
Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), pp 100-32.
14
Ibid., pp 133-67.
6
living among and ruling a different ethnic group caused the ruling elite to transform

itself in ways that marked them as not-English or not-Latin, as the case may be.

Although there are many examples of the redrawing of cultural boundaries and

the redefining of acceptable transgressions in Constantinople, it is far from clear that the

Franks took on a distinct ethnic identity that set them apart from Europeans. Unlike the

Venetians in Crete or the Anglo-Normans in Ireland, the Franks were not in

Constantinople for long enough to develop a feeling of descent distinct from their

European origins. Quite the opposite, the Franks emphasized their kin relationships

with European ancestors, siblings, and cousins. Their actions and writings display a

new sense of communal identity, but insofar as historians can see into the often-veiled

world of Constantinople, this identity did not differ enough from that of Western

Christendom to permit us to speak of a separate ethnic group.

Here, again, Barth and those writing after him are useful in reminding us that

culture and ethnicity do not need to be wholly bound together. The Franks’ writings

and actions demonstrate a communal identity lodged in a sense of place. Their origin in

the West, more particularly France and Flanders, their permanent residence in

Constantinople, and their continued ties to their lands of origin defined their

community. At least these are the aspects that we can see. Religion also played a part,

although the evidence is much more mixed in that area. In the end, little is known about

the Franks’ religious practices and so little can be ascertained about the role that

religion played in their identity vis-à-vis their neighbors. In communications with

Europe, religion played a large role. The bonds between the Franks and Europe were

most often expressed in terms of kinship and Christianity, although Baudouin II and

7
Marie also fought to preserve ties that drew upon their territorial base in France and

Namur. The papal rhetoric certainly suggests a strong religious identity and a stark

divide with the Byzantines but, as we will see, the Franks’ actions frequently

contradicted this language. During Henri’s reign, adherents to the Eastern rite

approached him to provide protection against papal demands. This discrepancy

suggests that the Franks expressed this aspect of their identity differently depending on

the audience.

Their remembered origin combined with a commitment to permanent settlement

distinguished the Franks from both their neighbors and their kin. Even if we set aside

the question of ethnicity per se, the work of Barth and subsequent scholars draws our

attention inexorably to the boundaries between the Franks and others. Luckily, it is

these boundaries that can be seen most clearly—both explicitly, when the emperor

Henri spoke to his daughter of her Bulgarian fiance’s savagery, and implicitly, when the

barons turned to a French nobleman rather than the Bulgarian tsar to assume the

imperial regency. Years later, Philippe de Toucy entertained Louis IX’s men with

stories of Franco-Cuman alliances—stories that revealed the boundary between the

Franks and the Cumans in its transversing but also the boundary between the storyteller

and the Western crusaders.

In 2002, Nora Berend, in a preface to a collection of essays, noted that the study

of “the medieval frontier” and “frontier societies” had recently enjoyed a burst of

popularity. 15 In addition to that book, other collections of essays, edited by Daniel

Power and Naomi Standen, Robert Bartlett and Angus Mackay, and Michel Balard and

15
David Abulafia and Nora Berend, eds., Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2002).
8
Alain Ducellier, have addressed aspects of diverse frontier experiences, including

Iberia, Wales, Denmark, Ireland, Byzantium, China, Lithuania, Hungary, Crimea,

Cyprus, and the Levant. 16 Internal frontiers, such as those created by church reform in

England, have also been explored. In 2006, a collection of essays stemming from the

Third European Congress of Medieval Studies three years earlier addressed a dizzying

array of frontiers, frontier peoples, and frontier artifacts, ranging from the status of

Finns in Sweden to Hebrew manuscript production.

The notion of a frontier or frontier society has different meanings. In Giles

Constable’s view, the medieval world was filled with indefinite divisions where each

side bled into the other—between kingdoms, ecclesiastical and secular spheres, canon

and civil law, different occupations and levels of freedom and nobility, religions, the

earthly and the divine, living and dead, languages, and so on. Constable’s scope, and

that of the collection in which his article appears, is so broad that every divide, it seems,

creates a frontier and in these frontiers categories blur and overlap. Although his

emphasis on these divisions as “less stable and more porous” and his move to see them

“less as dividers than as points of contact” are well taken, the ever-expanding scope of

the concept undercuts the power of the frontier as an analytical tool. 17

16
Daniel Power and Naomi Standen, eds., Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands, 700-1700
(Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999); Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay, eds., Medieval Frontier Societies
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Michel Balard, ed., Etat et colonisation au Moyen Age et à la
Renaissance (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1989).
17
Giles Constable, “Introduction,” in Frontiers in the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Third European
Congress of Medieval Studies (Jyvä skyla, 10-14 June 2003), ed. O. Merisalo (Louvain-la-Neuve:
Fédération internationale des instituts d’études médiévales , 2006), p. 6. Zaroui Pogossian’s article on the
Armenian church’s response to claims of Roman primacy, for example, makes an important point about
how increased understanding of Rome’s argument, in this case, created resistance in the Armenian
church. Where the frontier is here, however, is less clear. Zaroui Pogossian, “The Armenian Reaction to
the Concept of the Primacy of the Roman Church in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,” in Frontiers
in the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Third European Congress of Medieval Studies (Jyvä skyla, 10-14
June 2003), ed. O. Merisalo (Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération internationale des instituts d’études
médiévales, 2006), 259-90.
9
 Other scholars have articulated more bounded understandings of frontiers.

Powers drew a distinction between the concept of a political frontier and that of a

frontier of settlement. In the first, frontiers are political boundaries or borders and

operate as “zones of passage and contact.” In the second, frontiers are zones of

settlement dividing civilization from wilderness. 18 Setting aside Frederick Turner’s

notion of American exceptionalism and the civilized-wild divide, medieval historians

have found fruitful his rendering of the dynamism created in the frontier. Powers

placed studies of frontier societies into three categories: the settlement-wilderness

divide, “sharp clashes at the fringes of expanding societies,” and “political borders as

zones of passage and contact.” These categories, while encompassing various aspects

of frontier societies, do not quite suit our purposes. The story of the Latin Empire

includes aspects of all three models. Western Christendom, including the first

generation of settlers, regarded the Bulgarians and, even more so, the Cumans as

barbarian peoples. Early marriages between the Franks and the Bulgarians revealed the

barbaric-civilized divide. The conquest of Constantinople marked one of the great

attempts to expand Western Christendom and resulted in clashes. Yet, the expansion

quickly turned sour as the growing power of the Greek states and the Bulgarians

buffeted the Franks. Finally, the borders between the Latin Empire and its neighbors

created opportunities for increased contact and communication. Thus, while Powers’s

categories are helpful in identifying relevant issues, they do not provide a template for

this study.

18
Daniel Power and Naomi Standen, “Introduction,” in Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands,
700-1700 (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1999), pp 10-11.
10
 David Abulafia has proposed an understanding of the medieval frontier as “a

conceptual tool used by historians in a wide variety of ways to make sense of social and

political developments in those areas of medieval Europe where the predominant values

and assumptions of Latin Christendom encountered (or indeed collided with) the values

and assumptions of other societies; and pari passu for Byzantium and its own

neighbors.” 19 The Latin Empire, of course, fits with Constable’s view of frontiers. But,

more usefully, the Latin Empire is a prime example of Abulafia’s frontier. The Franks’

entrance into Constantinople brought the Fourth Crusaders into unexpected and intimate

contact with unfamiliar cultures. They found, to the north, Bulgarians and Cumans, to

the south and east, Turks, and, everywhere it seemed, displaced Byzantines eager to

return to their ancient capital. In Constantinople and the other lands they occupied, they

had to learn how to rule in a Byzantine context. Although a focus on communal

boundaries allows us to track the changing self-ascription of the Franks and their

essential cultural characteristics, the identification of the Latin Empire as a frontier

society helps us make sense of these and other changes in Frankish culture and their

own relationships with neighbors and faraway allies (or enemies).

Sources and Historiography

Evidence is sadly lacking for many aspects of the Latin Empire. Narrative

sources from Constantinople itself disappear after Henri de Valenciennes’s account

comes to an end barely five years after the city’s capture. 20 Instead, historians are

19
Abulafia and Berend, Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices, p. 5.
20
Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” in Geoffroi de Ville-Hardouin conquête de
Constantinople, avec la continuation de Henri de Valenciennes, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Libraire de
Firmin-Didot, 1882), 305-421. See the commentaries in Gaston Paris, “Henri de Valenciennes,”
Romania 19 (1890): 62-72; Jean Longnon, “Sur l'histoire de l'empereur Henri de Constantinople par
Henry de Valanciennes,” Romania 69 (1946): 198-241. This lack of narrative sources produced in
Constantinople does not only impede our understanding of the internal workings of the Latin Empire, it
11
dependent on Western and Byzantine narratives. Until the early 1240s, the Western

accounts of Aubri de Trois-Fontaines and Philippe Mouskès provide crucial

information. Georgius Akropolites’ history is the most informative from the Byzantine

side, although Georgius Pachymeres’s and Nikephoros Gregoras’s are also useful and

Nicetas Choniates’s provides a famous account of the fall of Constantinople. 21 If a

central register or copy of documents produced by the Frankish government survived

the recapture of the city in 1261, it has long been lost. Many communications from the

Latin Empire are known only from the responses to them or from their capture in

narrative accounts. 22

The lack of information makes it tempting to look beyond Constantinople to the

Franks in Greece and the Aegean Islands in order to complete the picture. These

societies were also established in the wake of the Fourth Crusade and they were tied,

through loose but important bonds, to the Latin Empire. Yet very different

circumstances governed the fates of the principality of Morea (or Achaia), the duchy of

Athens and Thebes, Negropont, and the other islands. These communities outlasted the

also makes impossible, for example, the kind of analysis undertaken by Rebeca W. Corrie, Anne Derbes
and Mark Sandona, and Bianca Kühnel in Daniel H. Weiss and Lisa Mahoney, eds., France and the Holy
Land: Frankish Culture at the End of the Crusades (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
21
Georgius Acropolites, Opera, ed. A. Heisenberg (Leipzig, 1903). Translation in Georgios Akropolites,
George Akropolites: The History, trans. Ruth Macrides, Oxford Studies in Byzantium (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007). Nicetas Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, ed. Ionnes Aloysius van Dieten,
Corpus fontium historiae Byzantinae; Ser. Berolinensis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter et socios, 1975).
Translation in Nicetas Choniates, O City of Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates, trans. Harry
Magoulias, Byzantine Texts in Translation (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1984). Nicephoros
Gregoras, Historia byzantina, Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae (Bonn, 1829). Georges
Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ed. Albert Failler, trans. Vitalien Laurent (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1984).
22
Hendrickx did a remarkable job in compiling an accounting of the documents known to historians,
either directly or indirectly. Benjamin Hendrickx, Regestes des empereurs latins de Constantinople
(1204–1261/1272), Byzantina (Thessaloniki: Byzantine Research Centre, 1988). See the survey of
surviving documents from the eastern Mediterranean in Alexander Daniel Beihammer, “Introduction,” in
Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean 1000-1500: Aspects of Cross-Cultural Communication, ed.
Maria G Parani, Christopher David Schabel, and Alexander Daniel Beihammer, The Medieval
Mediterranean 74 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp 10-17.
12
Latin Empire and, because of their longevity and their control over rural areas, provided

much greater opportunity for sustained interaction between the Franks and the Greeks

they ruled. 23 Moreover, compared to the Latin Empire, the societies in southern Greece

have left an abundance of documentation, particularly in the form of the Chronicle of

Morea and the Assizes of Romania. 24 It is tempting to use these sources to fill in

lacunae in our understanding of the Latin Empire, even when they do not directly speak

to its history. The other Frankish communities in the Aegean will, of course, come into

the story presented here. It would be misleading to leave them out. Yet, they come in

as backdrop and ancillary players in the region not, or rather very rarely, as stand-ins for

the Latin Empire. At times, silence is all we can hear from eight hundred years ago.

The Latin Empire occupies a liminal position in medieval history. Established

in Constantinople from 1204 to 1261, but, uncoupled from Byzantine traditions by the

conquest, it has no natural home in a discrete scholarly field. Byzantinists and Western

medievalists alike tend to regard the Latin Empire as an aberration not worth sustained

attention. In crusade studies, scholars have demonstrated great interest in the Fourth

Crusade, but less attention has been paid to the empire it created. Although the crusader

23
See, for example, Jeannine Horowitz, “Quand les Champenois parlaient le Grec: La Morée franque au
XIIIe siècle, un bouillon de culture,” in Cross-cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period: Essays
Presented to Aryeh Grabois on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. Michael Goodich, Sophia Menache, and
Sylvia Schein (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1995), 111-150.
24
G. Recoura, ed., Les assizes de Romanie: édition critique avec une introduction et des notes,
Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études (Paris, 1930). Alfred Morel-Fatio, ed., Libro de los Fechos et
Conquistas del Principado de la Morea compilado por commandamieno de Don Fray Johan Ferrandez
de Heredia maestro del Hospital de S. Johan de Jerusalem. Chronique de Morée aux XIIIe et XIVe siècle.
(Geneva, 1885); Jean Longnon, ed., Livre de la conqueste de la princée de l’Amorée: Chronique de
Morée (1204-1305) (Paris: Librairie de la société de l'histoire de France, 1911); John Schmitt, ed., The
Chronicle of Morea. To Chronikon tou Moreos (London, 1904); Charles Hopf, Chroniques gréco-
romanes inédites ou peu connues (Berlin, 1873).
13
states in the Holy Land have merited a great deal of interest, only recently has scholarly

interest turned, and even now only slightly, to their companion in Constantinople. 25

Although details are best addressed as they arise, a brief survey of recent work is

useful in establishing the contours of the field. Since the 1940s, Benjamin Hendrickx,

David Jacoby, Jean Longnon, and Robert Wolff have led the way in writing histories of

the Latin Empire and its principals. Longnon’s L’empire latin de Constantinople et la

principauté de Morée, published in 1949, remains essential. 26 Like other authors, he

lauded the second Latin emperor, Henri, and dismissed the contributions of later

emperors, providing only a very abbreviated description of the empire after 1230. His

book, although offering a useful summary, tends to glide over the documents

themselves, with few footnotes to point the reader in the right direction. Other works

by Longnon, including a catalog of Fourth Crusaders and a number of articles

concerning life in the Frankish states, round out to some extent the portrait in his

book. 27

Hendrickx, Jacoby, and Wolff, along with others, provide depth and analysis to

Longnon’s history. Wolff’s dissertation, The Latin Empire, was unfortunately never

published, but, supplemented by his numerous articles, has been invaluable in this

25
Heidi Bridger had embarked on a study of Frankish settler societies, including the Latin Empire, but
informed me she has since abandoned the project. Brendan McGuire at the University of Saint Louis is, I
believe, studying relations between the Latin and Greek churches in the early years of the thirteenth
century.
26
Jean Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée (Paris: Bibliothèque
historique, 1949).
27
Jean Longnon, “La campagne de Henri de Hainaut en Asie mineur en 1211,” Bulletin de la classe des
lettres de l'académie royale de Belqique 34 (1948): 442-52; “La reprise de Salonique par les Grecs en
1224,” Actes du VIe Congrés International d'Étides Byzantines I (1950): 141-146; “La vie rurale dans la
Grèce franque,” JS (1965): 343-357; Les compagnons de Villehardouin: Recherches sur les croisés de la
quatrième croisade (Geneva: Libraire Droz, 1978); “Les premiers ducs d'Athènes et leur famille,” JS
(1973): 61-80; “Les Toucy en Orient et en Italie au treizième siècle,” Bulletin de La Société des Sciences
Historiques et Naturelles de l'Yonne 96 (1957): 3-11; “Problèmes de l'histoire de la principauté de
Morée,” JS (1946): 77-92; 147-61; Recherches sur la vie de Geoffrey de Villehardouin (Paris: É.
Champion, 1939); “Sur l'histoire de l'empereur Henri de Constantinople par Henry de Valanciennes”
14
study. 28 Working from the available primary sources, Wolff reconstructed in great

detail the history of the Latin Empire and the activities of its principals, supporters,

enemies, and neighbors. His focus on the Latin Empire did not prevent him from seeing

events in Western Europe. Unlike Longnon, Wolff provided extensive footnotes and

transcriptions of original primary sources. My analysis departs from his, in particular

in his assessment of the capacities and prejudices of various individuals. Much work

has been done on frontier societies since his studies and a greater appreciation for the

creative adaptations of the individuals in them. His disdain for Baudouin II, for

example, prevented him from a full appreciation of that emperor’s efforts to preserve

and strengthen his position. My differences with Wolff, however, which are more

explicit in these pages than are the many moments of convergence, should not be taken

to imply a generalized disagreement with his work, to which I owe a great deal.

Benjamin Hendrickx published articles and the register of known documents

produced by the Latin emperors and the regency governments. This work, like Wolff’s,

is invaluable for identifying sources and assessing their reliability. A quick glance

through the pages reveals that the documentation for the first twelve years of the Latin

Empire, the reigns of Baudouin II and Henri, vastly outstrips that of the later period.

Three of Hendrickx’s articles deal with the institutions of the Latin Empire, including
28
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261)”. His articles include: “A New Document
from the Period of the Latin Empire of Constantinople: The Oath of the Venetian Podestà,” Annuaire de
L'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves XII (1953): 539-73; “Baldwin of Flanders and
Hainaut, First Latin Emperor of Constantinople: His Life, Death, and Resurrection, 1172–1225,”
Speculum 27, no. 3 (1952): 281-322; “Hopf's so-called 'Fragmentum' of Marino Sanudo Torsello,” in The
Joshua Starr Memorial Volume (New York: Jewish Social Studies, Publication V, 1953), 149-59;
“Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of Constantinople,”
Speculum XXIX (1954): 45-84; “Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204–1261,”
Dumbarton Oaks Papers VIII (1954): 228-303; “Romania: The Latin Empire of Constantinople,”
Speculum XXIII (1948): 1-34; “The Latin Empire of Constantinople,” in A History of the Crusades, vol. 2
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 187-233; “The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the
Franciscans,” Traditio II (1944): 213-237; “The Organization of the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople,
1204–1261: Social and Administrative Consequences of the Latin Conquest,” Traditio VI (1948): 33-60.
15
the emperor, the empress, the regents and regency councils, diplomatic envoys, and the

chancery. He concluded that the Latin Empire was basically a Western empire, with the

exception of titles and ceremonies. The functioning of the government and its relations

with other powers operating within its borders, such as the Venetians and the Frankish

princes in Greece, were based on a Western model of feudalism and household

government. Although my work does not tackle Hendrickx’s central question—the

nature and structure of the government—I do emphasize the often un-Western cultural

milieu that emerged in Constantinople. Moreover, in my opinion, Hendrickx’s

institutional view did not place enough emphasis on the practical role of the barons

within the government.

For the role of the Venetians in the Latin Empire, David Jacoby’s prolific body

of work, which contains a number of important studies about Venetian communities in

the Aegean and the Frankish settlements in Greece, is indispensable. 29 The individual

studies come together to paint a portrait of important aspects of life in the Franco-

Venetian East. Two pieces, in particular, separated by thirty-five years, address the

relations between Franks and Greeks and have been particularly influential in my

thinking about cross-cultural interactions. 30 His assessment of the Greek population of

Constantinople argued that “despite Latin immigration, the Greeks remained an

29
See the multiple Variorum reprints of his articles: Byzantium, Latin Romania and the Mediterranean
(Aldershot England: Ashgate/Variorum, 2001); Commercial exchange across the Mediterranean:
Byzantium, the Crusader Levant, Egypt and Italy (Aldershot England: Ashgate/Variorum, 2005);
Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XIIe au XVe siècle: peuples, sociétés, économies (London:
Variorum Reprints, 1979); Société et démographie à Byzance et en Romanie latine (London: Variorum
Reprints, 1975); Trade, commodities and shipping in the medieval Mediterranean (Aldershot: Variorum,
1997). See pp 22-24 below for a discussion of the status of the Venetians in Constantinople.
30
David Jacoby, “The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the
Peloponnesos after the Fourth Crusade,” American Historical Review LXXVIII (1973): 873-906; David
Jacoby, “The Greeks of Constantinople under Latin Rule 1204-1261,” in The Fourth Crusade: Event,
Aftermath, and Perceptions, ed. Thomas F Madden, Crusades 2 (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008),
184.
16
overwhelming majority among Constantinople’s inhabitants in the Latin period” and

that this necessarily resulted in mixed marriages and nonmarital sexual relationships.31

Jacoby’s argument for their existence, despite the general silence of the records on this

matter, reminds us that much is left unknown about life in Constantinople.

In 1995, Peter Lock published a survey of the Frankish states in the Aegean.

The book encompasses all the Western establishments, which he groups into six

entities: the Latin empire, the kingdom of Thessaloniki, the lordship of Athens and

Thebes, the duchy of the Archipelago, the triarchies of Negropont, and the principality

of Morea, or Achaia. He provides a relatively brief account of the history of each of

these, in addition to the Venetian and Genoese communities, and a sweeping but detail-

filled discussion of lordship and governance, religious institutions and practices, the

economy, and culture. It is in this final area, which appears in the chapter “Symbiosis

and Segregation,” that my assessment differs most from Lock’s. Here, as elsewhere, he

often relies on evidence from the principality of Morea, and from the fourteenth

century, to speak broadly about the culture created in the Frankish states. It is an

interesting approach, but, in my opinion, leads to some distortions of the situation in the

Latin Empire. More particularly, Lock’s central question about the culture of the

Frankish communities is whether a hybrid Franco-Greek culture developed. He

concludes that one did not. This approach, however, does not leave room for an in-

depth consideration of the culture that did develop, one that was neither fully Western

nor wholly Byzantine. Lock acknowledged that “Frankish Greece was a frontier society

throughout its existence.” 32 Lock’s consideration of the frontier aspect of the Frankish

31
Jacoby, “The Greeks of Constantinople under Latin Rule 1204-1261,” pp 66, 67-72.
32
Peter Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500 (London: Longman Group Limited, 1995), p. 281.
17
states, however, resulted in a focus on how the conquerors gained and maintained their

power and how they segregated themselves from local populations in order to do so.

The present study suggests an alternative.

Recently, the eight-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople

prompted a number of colloquia, conferences, and seminars, many of which have

generated article collections. Although the Latin Empire appears in some of these, it is

far from the main focus. 33 This dichotomy—the great interest in the crusade, but the

lack of interest in the state created by it—is an extension of the prejudices of centuries,

beginning, indeed, with contemporary narratives. 34

The past decade or so has seen a significant increase in interest in the

principality of the Morea, encouraged by archaeology underway in the Peloponnese.

The Dumbarton Oaks Symposium in 2009 focused on “Morea: The Land and Its People

in the Aftermath of the Fourth Crusade” and featured talks that relied heavily on

archaeological findings. Clare Teresa Shawcross’s recent book The Chronicle of Morea

provides a rigorous analysis of the four versions that have survived (French, Greek,

Catalan, and Italian) and brings the texts into conversation with the circumstances of

their production and of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century developments in the Morea

and elsewhere. 35 This meeting of text and context sheds light on both and permits her

to put forward a number of new suggestions and conclusions. Shawcross’s portrait of

33
See the articles of David Jacoby: “The Venetian Government and Administration in Latin
Constantinople, 1204–1261: a State within a State,” in Quarta crociata: Venezia, Bisanzio, impero
latino, ed. Gherardo Ortalli, Giorgio Ravegnani, and Peter Schreiner (Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze,
lettere ed arti, 2006), 19-80; “The Greeks of Constantinople under Latin Rule 1204-1261”.
34
For an explicit statement of this, see Michael Angold, The Fourth Crusade: Event and Context
(Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2003), p. 125.
35
Clare Teresa Shawcross, The Chronicle of Morea: Historiography in Crusader Greece (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009). My own work has also greatly benefited from conversations with
Shawcross in the Hellenic Studies Program at Princeton University and beyond.
18
the emergence of a group identity among the Franks, one that included accommodations

with the conquered peoples in Morea and opposition to newly arrived Westerners in the

later thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, has also been very influential in my own

work. 36 But, again, interest in the Morea has not yet been matched by a corresponding

interest in the Latin Empire.

The Beginning

The Fourth Crusade is a necessary backdrop for the history of the Latin Empire

and the Franks in Constantinople. It explains, after all, how they got there and, perhaps

more important, who they were. I will not recount the well-known details of how the

Fourth Crusade unfolded from Innocent III’s original call until the attack on

Constantinople in the spring of 1204. Others have already done so. 37 Neither will I

engage with the disputes that continue to swirl around the apportioning of blame for the

Fourth Crusade’s diversion to Constantinople. Whether it was a series of accidents, or a

Venetian plot, or even a long-awaited Montferrat revenge is only of incidental interest

to the questions undertaken here. A brief summary, however, places the inception of

the Latin Empire in context.

In the winter of 1199–1200, at a tournament in northern France, a series of

nobles took the cross, including Thibaut III de Champagne, Louis de Blois, and

Baudouin IX of Flanders. The crusaders’ agents approached Venice to arrange for

transportation, and, in the spring of 1201, an agreement was achieved. After the death

36
See, for example, Ibid., pp 203-49.
37
Most important Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of
Constantinople, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997). Others have also written
full-length histories: W. B Bartlett, An Ungodly War: The Sack of Constantinople & the Fourth Crusade
(Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 2000); John Godfrey, 1204, the Unholy Crusade (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1980); Jonathan Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople (London: Jonathan
Cape, 2004). More recently, Angold, The Fourth Crusade.
19
of Thibaut III de Champagne, Bonifacio del Monferrato replaced him as the crusaders’

paramount secular leader. The composition of the Fourth Crusade mirrored its

leadership—primarily northern French and Flemish barons, with a significant showing

of northern Italians and, of course, the Venetians with their ships.

The crusade, however, did not command the level of participation that its

organizers had envisioned. As a result, they were unable to meet their financial

obligations to Venice, which had built ships for a much larger force. After a lengthy

delay, the crusade’s leaders agreed to accompany the Venetians to Zara, where the

combined forces captured the port, restoring it to Venetian control. In the meantime,

the crusaders were approached by Alexios Angelos (the soon-to-be Alexios IV) who,

with the backing of his brother-in-law Philip of Swabia, convinced them to accompany

him to Constantinople. There, he promised, the people would welcome him as the

rightful heir, and he would provide them with funds to continue their expedition. Once

Alexios IV was installed in August 1203 his relationship with the crusaders

disintegrated, and they did not receive the funds they had been promised.

In March 1204, a month after the overthrow of Alexios IV, Bonifacio del

Monferrato, Baudouin IX of Flanders, Hugues de Saint-Pol, and Louis de Blois

concluded a new agreement with the doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo. In addition to

designating how future spoils would be divided, the agreement established

arrangements for the election of a new emperor, if the crusaders succeeded in

conquering Constantinople. 38 Up until this moment, arguments can (and have) been

made that the crusaders did not plan to seize the empire. Here, however, we have an

explicit statement of the intention to conquer Byzantium and install a Latin emperor. A
38
Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople, pp 175-76.
20
month later, the treaty was realized with the conquest of the city and the election of

Baudouin IX of Flanders as emperor. The events of March and April 1204 were a long

way from the commitment of the crusaders and Venetians, made at Zara and confirmed

at Corfu, to restore Alexios IV to the imperial throne. 39

The election of Baudouin IX, count of Flanders and vassal of both the French

king and the Holy Roman Emperor, as Baudouin I, emperor of Constantinople, signaled

the triumph of the French and Flemish factions over the Italian supporters of Bonifacio

del Monferrato. Various considerations drove Baudouin I’s selection: the preferences

of the doge and his representatives; the composition of the crusading army, particularly

its strong Flemish component; and the expected arrival of his wife, Marie. As a one-

time Genoese ally, moreover, his rival Bonifacio del Monferrato was unacceptable to

the Venetian party. 40 Under the Komneni, the Venetians had experienced the turmoil

when their trading privileges were revoked and their community attacked and they

wanted to confirm their position with a reliable ally as emperor. The Flemish crusaders

had been surprisingly loyal to Baudouin I, following him to Constantinople while many

others left their leaders to go to the Levant. 41 The history of the crusader states had

revealed how difficult it could be to convince Westerners to settle permanently in the

East. As a candidate for emperor, Baudouin I could boast loyal followers who might

stay and provide a core of settlers for the new empire. His two brothers, Henri and

Eustache, were also with the crusading army at Constantinople. The expected arrival of

his wife completed the picture: with followers, brothers, and a wife Baudouin I could

easily root himself in the East.

39
Ibid., pp 81-99.
40
Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin, p. 230.
41
Ibid., pp 7, 137.
21
 His elevation established a Flemish-French dominance in Constantinople, a

dominance of barons as well as of emperors. Other groups, of course, were intimately

involved in the affairs of the Latin Empire. The northern Italian adherents of Bonifacio

del Monferrato and the Venetians were prominent in the events of 1204, but their

communities developed along different paths, although these often intersected with that

of the Flemish and French barons and emperors. Boniface had sought the imperial

crown and, after losing it, fought for and received the kingdom of Thessaloniki instead.

His followers, along with some French nobles, accompanied him to his new land. 42 The

history of the Lombards in Thessaloniki diverged from that of the Flemish and French

barons in several important ways. First, the Lombard barons in Thessaloniki were often

at odds with the emperors, particularly over inheritance of the kingdom. In addition, the

Western occupation of Thessaloniki was short-lived: The city fell to the Greeks in

1224, although the title continued to be granted and claimed into the fourteenth

century. 43 Perhaps most relevantly, the bonds of vassalage, politics, and kinship that

tied the imperial barons to the French king and to each other did not include the

northern Italians. As a result, although the settlers in Thessaloniki serve as an

interesting contrast to those in Constantinople, theirs is a different story.

The other major party—the Venetians—held a position in the empire that David

Jacoby has characterized as a “combination of subordination and parity.” 44 From the

beginning, instead of angling for the imperial throne, the doge preferred to control the

42
Ibid., p. 231. Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, ed. E. Faral (Paris: Société
d'édition "Les belles lettres", 1938), p. 86, ch 279. Translation in Geoffrey of Villehardouin, “The
Conquest of Constantinople,” in Chronicles of the Crusades, trans. M. R. B. Shaw (London: Penguin
Books, 1963), p. 101.
43
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 320. Longnon, “La reprise
de Salonique par les Grecs en 1224”.
44
Jacoby, “The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesos
after the Fourth Crusade,” p. 147.
22
patriarchate. The pact of March 1204 made provisions for the future of the empire,

should it be captured. At almost every turn, the details of this pact reveal and reaffirm

the distinction between the Venetians and the other crusaders. The council that elected

the emperor consisted of half Venetians and half non-Venetians and the offices of

patriarch and emperor were to go to a Venetian and a non-Venetian. The empire itself

was to be divided among the emperor, the Venetians, and non-Venetian crusaders. 45

The distinction was maintained after the city had been conquered and Western rule

established. The Venetians took on a constitutional role in the Latin Empire as

members of the imperial council, one that affirmed the integrity of their community and

its status as separate from that of the emperor and barons. 46 Within the empire,

representatives of the Venetian state, the podestà and his council, not the emperor,

governed its citizens. 47 Preservation of a separate community was a priority: In 1205,

the podestà decreed that Venetian-held land could only be alienated to other Venetians,

not to foreigners. 48 Throughout the Western occupation of Constantinople, agreements

between the Venetians and the emperors continued to use language and make provisions

that demonstrate the continued distinction between the two communities. 49 The divide

was sharp enough for Jacoby to conclude that “the Venetian portion of the Latin empire

45
Gottlieb Lukas Friedrich Tafel and Georg Martin Thomas, eds., Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und
Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig (Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856), vol I, p. 444.
46
Ibid., vol I, no. CLX, pp 571-74.
47
For a discussion of the podestà’s status and his subordinate position to Venice see Wolff, “A New
Document from the Period of the Latin Empire of Constantinople: The Oath of the Venetian Podestà”.
48
David Jacoby, “The Venetian Presence in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” Jahrbuch
der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 43 (1993): 155-57. Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, vol I, p. 559.
49
See, for example, the confirmations of the partitions of the empire by the regent Conon de Béthune, and
the emperors Robert de Courtenay and Jean de Brienne Ibid., I: 214-15, 227-30, 277-88, nos. CLVI,
CCLV, CCLXXVII.
23
was thus a true state within a state.” 50 The division between the Venetians and other

elements in the Latin Empire, along with the particular status of Venetian overseas

communities, renders their story related to but different from the one told here. 51

***

In 1974, Hendrickx published an article, “The Main Problems of the History of

the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261).” In it, he noted a peculiarity about

the position of Western lords in the East:

[M]ost of the nobles, who stayed in the Latin Empire of Constantinople after the
fourth Crusade, found themselves in a double, often triple feudal dependence:
first they depended on the original lord in their country of provenance,
secondly—at least theoretically—on the new Latin emperor of Constantinople,
and thirdly, often as a result of circumstances, land-divisions or free
engagement, on one of the important feudal lords of the new Empire. 52

With this insight, Hendrickx brushed on the strange condition of the Westerners abroad:

their relocation did not dissolve their original relationships—whether kin- or marriage-

based, feudal, or political. However, in their new home they developed new bonds—

feudal and political ties, to be sure, but also new kin relations established through

marriages. It is the overlap, with all the associated conflicts and collaborations,

between the original ties and the new ones that concerns me here.

50
Jacoby, “The Venetian Government and Administration in Latin Constantinople, 1204–1261: a State
within a State”.
51
For studies of Venetians in Constantinople see the work of David Jacoby, including “Venetian Settlers
in Latin Constantinople (1204–1261): Rich or Poor?,” in Byzantium, Latin Romania and the
Mediterranean, Variorum (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 181-204; “The Venetian Presence in the Latin
Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261)”; Société et démographie à Byzance et en Romanie latine; “From
Byzantium to Latin Romania: Continuity and Change,” in Latins and Greeks in the Eastern
Mediterranean after 1204, Mediterranean Historical Review (London, 1989); “The Venetian Government
and Administration in Latin Constantinople, 1204–1261: a State within a State”. For a study of another
Venetian colony, see McKee, Uncommon Dominion.
52
Benjamin Hendrickx, “The Main Problems of the History of the Latin Empire of Constantinople,”
Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire 4 (1974): 792-93.
24
 In studying this overlap, I reexamine some central assertions commonly

accepted by historians, in particular about the Franks’ level of adaptation in response to

their local cultures. Although historians have typically disparaged the emperors except

Henri, I argue that, with the partial exceptions of Robert de Courtenay and Jean de

Brienne, the emperors sought to make the most of their advantages and, most important,

to integrate into local networks as much as possible without losing their affiliation with

the West. When the emperors failed to do so, the Frankish barons of Constantinople

stepped in. The affiliation with the West, although it was insufficient to ensure the

preservation of the Latin Empire, repeatedly demonstrated its potential to raise aid, even

if that potential was never fully realized. In preserving that relationship, the emperors

were pursuing the best strategy available to them.

The rhetoric preserved in communications with the West shows that the Franks

recognized the requirements of a Western identity and were able to articulate and claim

these characteristics. Reading just below the surface, however, and looking to their

actions as well as their statements I uncover their ability to transcend Western

prejudices and restrictions on behavior in order to participate in the local environment.

The Franks and their supporters, especially the papacy, developed a schema that

highlighted the importance of Western control over Constantinople—or, rather,

schemata, since the strategies changed over time. These public presentations, however,

did not always reflect the actual attitudes or policies of the Franks.

This degree of involvement with the West set the Latin Empire apart from other

frontier societies in the Middle Ages. This relationship was governed by a cluster of

factors, including kinship, land ownership and lordship, the historical status of

25
Constantinople, the crusading movement, and the commitment to the Holy Land. The

interaction among these sheds light not only on the Latin Empire but also on the

Western actors.

The story of the Latin Empire weaves through dramatic developments in

thirteenth-century Europe: the Fourth Crusade and other thirteenth-century, crusading

enterprises; the fate of Jerusalem; Franco-Flemish conflict; the consolidation of

Capetian power; the piety and actions of Louis IX; the worsening clashes between the

Hohenstaufen rulers and the papacy; the arrival of the Mongols; the imperial hopes of

Alfonso X of Castile; and the ambition and success of Charles d’Anjou. Franks in

search of aid interacted at length with the Capetians and the papacy but also spent time

and corresponded with influential individuals in Flanders, England, Germany, Castile,

and Aragon. With two major exceptions—Blanche of Castile and Gregory IX—

Western clerical and lay elites cared primarily about how the Latin emperor and the

prestige, titles, privileges, and rights he carried could be employed in furtherance of

their own priorities, or how he interfered with their goals. The Latin Empire may not

have mattered to most Western Europeans for its own sake. Yet, it clearly held a role in

the imagination of Western society, if only to be used as a pawn. Through a series of

discrete episodes, this dissertation looks at Western views of Constantinople and the

Latin Empire.

In addition to its involvement in Western developments, the Latin Empire’s

existence transformed the history of the Byzantine Empire. It exposed and exacerbated

the centrifugal forces at work in the Byzantine Empire, since Constantinople, even

26
before 1204, was losing control over the provinces. 53 The conquest and the new

intimacy between Franks and Greeks drove, in the end, a deeper wedge between

Western Christendom and Byzantium. 54 In this sense, the frontier created by the Latin

Empire had an impact far beyond the immediate transformations in the Frankish

community in Constantinople. Classic accounts of the Byzantine world during and after

the period of Frankish rule focus on internal developments or relations between various

exiled Greek states. 55 Michael Angold’s recent book on the Fourth Crusade and its

aftermath shows a new interest in the Frankish establishment, although the connection

to the Byzantine world is still underdeveloped. On the other hand, Gill Page’s study of

Byzantine Roman ethnic identity argued that “the phenomenon of Frankish conquest

and rule was the single most critical impetus for developments in the sense of ethnic

identity.” Specifically, “the conquests by the Franks in fact effected a significant shift

in the relationship between the Byzantine Romans and their western neighbours that

was more about rapprochement than any ethnically conditioned hostility.” 56 Looking

from the other side of the divide, very similar conclusions will be drawn in this

dissertation about Frankish communal identity and the balance between rapprochement

and hostility—and how the balance changed over time.

53
See Angold, The Fourth Crusade.
54
The major work on the relationship between Byzantium and Rome continues to be Walter Norden, Das
Papsttum und Byzanz: Die Trennung der beiden Mächte und das Problem ihrer Wiedervereinigung bis
zum Untergange des Byzantinischen Reichs (1453) (Berlin: B. Behr, 1903).
55
Michael Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of
Nicaea, 1204–1261 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); D. M. Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957).
56
Page, Being Byzantine, p. 6.
27
 CHAPTER 1:

FOUNDATION OF THE LATIN EMPIRE, 1204–1205

The Fourth Crusaders who settled in Byzantine territories entered a new world,

one filled with unfamiliar actors, cultures, and religions, and, in response, they and their

descendants were alternatively flexible and intransigent. They compromised, easily it

seems, on some issues, adapting to their new surroundings and neighbors, but retained a

Western outlook that impeded full participation in their environment. In exploring this

community, my dissertation centers around several connected questions: How did the

Westerners who settled in the Latin Empire and their descendants modify their attitudes

and practices in response to their new environment? To what extent did they retain

their Western allegiances and loyalties and how were these transformed? Through these

questions I seek to understand the changing communal identity of the Franks in

Constantinople. In these two chapters, I consider the first Western emperors in

Constantinople, two brothers, Baudouin I, count of Flanders and Hainaut, and Henri of

Hainaut. They governed Constantinople, respectively, from 1204 to 1205 and from

1205 to 1216. When taken together, their imperial tenures show a remarkable change

over a relatively brief period of time. Whereas Baudouin I remained aloof from the

local alliance networks, Henri willingly participated, even arranging marriages with

Bulgarians, Greeks, and Hungarians. He retained Western sentiments and prejudices,

but these did not prevent his integration into local structures.

As a study of the Latin Empire, this story properly begins with the election and

coronation of Baudouin I as emperor of Constantinople. He did not long enjoy the

28
imperial crown: elected on May 9, 1204, he was captured by Kalojan, the Bulgarian

tsar, in mid-April of 1205 and died in custody sometime before July 1206. His brief

reign provides insufficient evidence to judge his capacity for adaptation. The most that

can be said is that, despite his acquisition of new territory and title, in the year he spent

as emperor he displayed an unredeemed Western attitude. He maintained his

connections and acted in accordance with his history, with little accommodation for his

new surroundings. This mind-set can be seen both in his communications with the

West and his relations with his new neighbors and colleagues, now subjects. Baudouin

I was crowned emperor in May 1204, but the Frankish outlook and approach that

characterized the actions of his nephew, Baudouin II, would take time to develop.

Baudouin I’s actions provide a baseline from which to evaluate later emperors

and barons. An examination of his reign sets the stage, in a sense, for the more nuanced

discussions to come. It introduces the major players—the papacy, the Capetian

monarchy, Flanders, France, Bulgaria, Nicaea, and Epiros—and the important themes—

the hope for Western aid, the need for support, the threat from the Latin Empire’s

neighbors, and the rise of Greek powers in exile.

Baudouin I and the West

Baudouin I’s reign began, several weeks after his coronation, with a round of

correspondence to the West. Three letters were addressed, respectively, to Innocent III,

the abbot of Cîteaux and other Cistercian abbots, and the archbishop of Cologne, while

one was directed to “all the Christian faithful.” 57 None of the surviving letters were

57
See Robert d'Auxerre, “Chronicon,” in MGH, ed. Oswald Holder-Egger (Hanover, 1882), 267 and W.
Prevenier, ed., De Oorkonden der Graven can Vlaanderen (1191-aanvang 1206), Recueil des actes des
princes belges (Bruxelles: Académie royale de Belgique, 1964), no. 271, pp 567-95. The archbishop of
29
directed specifically to secular rulers, although the distribution was wide and the letters

would have made their way to European courts. 58 These letters explained the events

leading up to the conquest of the great city and announced the election of Baudouin I as

emperor. Innocent III was the most important of the correspondents. His invocation

and support of the Fourth Crusade had transformed into disapproval and then

excommunication as the crusaders diverted from their original trajectory to Zara and,

finally, Constantinople. Securing papal support, which Baudouin I’s letter successfully

did, was essential to the Latin Empire’s identity as a crusader state and its attempts to

muster and maintain Western support.

Baudouin I wrote to Innocent III at least six times during his year-long reign. 59

Following his initial report, he asked the pope to confirm the March Pact between the

crusaders and the Venetians, which divided Byzantine territory and established the basis

for government. He requested Innocent III’s cooperation in a Western grant, and,

shortly before his capture, he sent a summary of the military situation. Two other

letters extended invitations—one for members of religious orders and Parisian masters

and students and one for papal envoys.

Baudouin I was not alone in recognizing the papacy’s importance to the Franks.

Surviving correspondence from the Latin Empire includes a large percentage of letters

to popes. Many of these were in the same vein as Baudouin I’s: containing information

about events in and around Constantinople with the goal of encouraging the pope to

send financial support and to advocate for the Latin Empire’s interests with Western

Cologone may have been selected because he was a relative of Baudouin’s: “consanguineo suo” Ibid., p.
578.
58
See the version preserved in Robert d’Auxerre’s chronicle: Robert d'Auxerre, “Chronicon,” pp 266-70
59
Hendrickx identified six separate communications. Hendrickx, Regestes, no. 3, 22, 24, 36, 39, 40, pp
13, 26, 27, 33-34, 36-37.
30
rulers. 60 Others addressed ecclesiastical matters—appointment of clerics, collection of

monies, patriarchal elections, and treatment of the Greek clergy and laity. 61 The

patterns of document preservation explain, in part, the skewed balance of

correspondence toward the papacy. The relative sophistication of the papal bureaucracy

meant that correspondence to and from popes was more likely to survive to the modern

period than other documents. I will argue, however, that for the first twenty and

probably even thirty years of the Latin Empire the surviving correspondence accurately

reflects the greater closeness of the Latin Empire to the pope than to Western secular

rulers. In particular, for Baudouin I and Henri connections to their previous overlords

and other powerful secular men in the West were centered on their abandoned Western

lands rather than their new Eastern concerns.

Baudouin I’s nonpapal correspondence to the West generally related to his

position as count of Flanders and Hainaut. The count left on crusade planning to return

home. 62 His promotion to emperor had given him another territory to worry about, but

it had not severed his connection to Flanders. In the most obvious demonstration of this

dual identity, he referred to himself in his letters as both count of Flanders and emperor

of Constantinople. 63 Upon his departure for the crusade, Baudouin I had appointed

60
See a letter in 1206 from Henri requesting aid and in 1210 demonstrating Innocent’s knowledge of the
alliance between Henri and Michael of Epiros. Ibid., p. 45, no. 52. J.P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae Cursus
Completus, Series latina (Paris, 1844), 216: col 353-54, no. CLXXXIV For other communications see
Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 64-66, no. 82-85.
61
See for example a letter from Innocent to the patriarch of Constantinople concerning ecclesiastical
property and in 1209 revealing that Henri had asked that a certain cleric be named a canon of St Sophia.
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 109-10, no. CCX.
62
Numerous examples show that Baudouin I’s plan was to return home. In July 1204, Philippe, marquis
of Namur, stated that he had custody of Baudouin I’s land while his brother was abroad. Prevenier,
Oorkonden, p. 607, no. 276: “eo tempore quo illustris comes Flandrie et Hainonie Balduinus in partibus
transmarinis peregrinabatur, cuius terram ego Ph[ilippus], frater eiusdem, tunc temporis custodiebam.”
63
C. Duvivier, Les influences françaises et germaniques en Belgique au XIIIe siècle. La querelle des
d'Avesnes et des Dampierre jusqu'à la mort de Jean d'Avesnes (1257) (Bruxelles, 1894), vol II, pp 189-
31
baillis to govern his land, and he continued to write to these men after his coronation

and to refer to them as baillis, thus reinscribing their temporary status. 64 Although he

had relinquished day-to-day operations, he showed no signs of permanently alienating

his Western lands. The count-emperor wrote to Philip Augustus, Innocent III, and

various individuals in Flanders concerning routine matters, such as the property and

donations of his clerk and companion on the crusade, Gautier de Courtrai, and the

creation of a chapter at the church in Courtrai. 65

Baudouin I’s continued engagement with his land allowed him, on at least two

separate occasions, to turn his Western land and connections in Flanders to the

advantage of the Latin Empire. He instructed the count of Namur and the baillis of

Flanders to use his Flemish income to pay subsidies to knights willing to come to the

aid of the Latin Empire. 66 This is the first but far from the last example of a Latin

emperor employing his Western lands to finance the enterprise in Constantinople. 67 It

signaled Baudouin I’s commitment to the Latin Empire, but also telegraphed his

continued involvement in Flanders and his confidence that he could control its

resources. He also wrote to several bishops asking them to encourage men to come and

90, no. 2: “B., Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator a Deo coronatus Romanorum, moderator et
semper augustus, Flandrie et Hainoie comes” (June of 1204).
64
For two letters referencing his baillis, one written to the baillis themselves and the other to the French
king, see: Prevenier, Oorkonden, p. 617, no. 282: “ballivus suis de Flandria” and Ibid., p. 625, no. 286:
“mandavimus itaque baillivis nostris de Flandra.”
65
Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 27-31, no. 24-31. Prevenier, Oorkonden, pp 628-29, no. 288. For a summary
of Gautier de Courtrai’s career see Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin, p. 191. Several charters
reveal Baudouin IX acting in Courtrai before the Fourth Crusade. C. Duvivier, Chartes inédites
concernant les comtes de Hainaut (887–1207) (Bruxelles: Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et
des beaux-arts de Belgique, 1903), pp 320-21, 321-34, no. 168, 171. Charles Liévin Mussely, Inventaire
des archives de la ville de Courtrai (Courtrai, 1854), pp 76-77, no. 2.
66
Migne, PL, 215: col. 1035-36, no. 298.
67
Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, p. 179: “As far as is known the Latin emperors were the
only rulers of the Aegean to exploit home resources to bolster their position in the Aegean in the
thirteenth century, that is after the initial expenses of going on crusade had been met.” See extensive
discussion of Baudouin II’s activities in the west in chapters 5 and 6 below.
32
join him, although in this letter he was careful to portray the enterprise in

Constantinople as the first step in a project to retake the Holy Land. 68 He did not take

for granted that they would be willing to commit aid to the Latin Empire itself, but

instead linked it to the larger and more legitimate crusading project.

This connection between the capture of Constantinople and the eventual

recovery of Jerusalem was a feature of the early years of the Latin Empire. The

Byzantines had long been seen as hindering the cause of the crusader states in the Holy

Land. Upon hearing of the conquest of the city, Innocent III described the event as part

of a divine plan that would lead to the freedom of the Holy Land and the unity of all

Christians under the papacy. 69 By the summer of 1205, however, not even a year after

his first ecstatic letters, Innocent III was disillusioned with the capture of

Constantinople. 70 In a stern letter to the papal legate Peter Capuano, he noted that the

legate’s departure from the Holy Land to proceed to Constantinople had resulted in the

absence of leadership in a time of crisis. Innocent III’s charges to the legate could also

apply to the crusaders: “[W]e undertook to dispatch you not to capture the empire of

Constantinople but for the defense of the remnants of the Holy Land and for the

restoration of what has been lost.” 71 No longer was the capture of Constantinople a

blessing for the Holy Land; now it was an obstacle. This question of the relationship of

the Latin Empire to the Holy Land was one that dogged the Franks throughout the

thirteenth century. It quickly became clear that the Latin Empire needed support and

68
Prevenier, Oorkonden, p. 632, no. 290.
69
See the translations and commentary gathered in Alfred J. Andrea, Contemporary Sources for the
Fourth Crusade, The Medieval Mediterranean, v. 29 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp 113-26, 131-30.
70
See Angold, The Fourth Crusade, pp 113-15.
71
Translation from Andrea, Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade, p. 165. Migne, PL, 215:
700: “Debueratis ergo causam vestrae legationis attendere, ac sollicite cogitare, quod non ad capiendum
Constantinopolitanum imperium, sed defendendas reliquias terrae sanctae, ac perdita.”
33
would not be able to participate in any drive to retake Jerusalem or provide protection

for the crusader states.

Although the Franks’ closeness with the papacy is evident from the very

beginning, their eventual intimacy with the Capetians is not reflected in the early

record. Starting in the 1220s, the Franks and their erstwhile allies, the popes, appealed

to the French monarchy for financial support and guidance, appeals that were met, at

least sometimes, with a positive response. Baudouin I also wrote to his king and lord

from Constantinople. These letters addressed feudal matters, however, particularly the

transfer of property for which Philip Augustus was overlord. 72 They did not address the

concerns or needs of the Latin Empire. Of course, there were many European rulers

who did not merit Baudouin I’s individualized attention. But, in 1204, both past and

future developments suggested the logic of a close relationship with the French king.

That it did not develop merits some explanation.

In Philip Augustus, Baudouin I and, later, Henri were faced with a ruler whose

lineage ought to have predisposed him to provide help to the newest crusader state, but

whose personal history suggested that he would be uninterested. On the one hand, the

Capetians had a long and storied involvement in crusading and crusader states, and

Baudouin I had an additional basis for appeal as the king’s vassal. On the other hand,

Philip Augustus had, after the frustrations of the Third Crusade, displayed little interest

in crusading. The lord-vassal relationship was complex as well. Baudouin I, as count

of Flanders, had fought against Capetian authority, a struggle that continued in Europe

72
Prevenier, Oorkonden, pp 616,25, no. 281, 86.: “modis omnibus affectuose rogamus ut sepedictum
Walterum ... feodum illud in pace et transquilitate possidere faciatis” and “quod serenitati vestre preces
porrigimus affectuosas ... ut si forte aliqui contra hoc mandatum nostrum ire voluerint, voluntas predicti
Walteri, quantum in hoc, et concessio nostra per manum et potestatem vestram mancipetur effectui.”
34
while the count-emperor was busy establishing a new state in the East. Philip Augustus,

then, was both a natural ally and a natural enemy for Baudouin I and his brother Henri.

Jonathan Philips fleshed out the relationship between France and the Holy Land,

long acknowledged as a special one, in his work on Western aid to the crusader

settlers. 73 In the twelfth century, the king, nobles, and clerics of Jerusalem made the

French kings primary targets in their search for help against the threat of Muslim

neighbors and, eventually, Mongol invaders. Examples abound. Louis VI’s approval

was sought for Fulk of Anjou’s marriage to Melisende, heiress to the kingdom of

Jerusalem. 74 In the 1160s alone, Louis VII received separate (although often related)

pieces of correspondence from the king of Jerusalem, the master of the Templars, the

preceptor of the Templars, the prince of Antioch, the patriarch of Antioch, the patriarch

of Jerusalem, and the assembly of nobles and clerics. The requests made to the French

king contrast with the dearth of appeals individually targeted at other rulers, although

the king of England and the German emperor were often approached during general

missions sent to the West. 75 These efforts had mixed success: The approach to Louis

VII in 1145 prompted the Second Crusade, but others, such as the series of letters in the

1160s, garnered little aid.

This close, but often fruitless, relationship between Jerusalem and France

continued into the reign of Philip Augustus, king of France for the first two decades of

the Latin Empire’s existence. The Franks in the Levant and their supporters persisted in

73
Jonathan Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119–
1187 (Oxford: Clarendon Publishers, 1996).
74
Ibid., p. 24.
75
More general appeals that included these other rulers happened in 1169, 1171, and 1184. For a history
of appeals to the West in the twelfth century, see Ibid., throughout, esp. pp 7, 77-78, 106-11, 141-49, 177-
86.
35
placing hope in the French connection, despite the lack of direct results. The pope

appealed directly to Philip Augustus and Henry II in 1181. In 1185, envoys from the

crusader kingdom came to the West in order, as Phillips argued, “to convince a western

monarch to accept these symbols [the keys of Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre] and to

travel to the east.” 76 Despite the kin relationship between Henry II of England and the

king of Jerusalem, they first offered the keys to Philip Augustus, who refused to accept

them. 77 Philip Augustus, along with the English king and many great French barons,

was only moved to go on crusade after the fall of Jerusalem in 1187.

Philip Augustus’s reluctance to aid the crusader states in the early 1180s grew

stronger after the Third Crusade. Disappointed by his reception in the East and jealous

of Richard the Lionheart, the French king never again supported crusading with any

enthusiasm, despite prominent French participation in the Fourth Crusade and the

Albigensian Crusade. Even Innocent III’s pleas that Philip Augustus intervene in the

struggle in southern France did not produce substantial results. The king’s conflicts

with England and Flanders always took precedence over crusading projects, whether

near or far. 78

If the Capetian legacy of involvement with crusades and the crusading states

was mixed, the relationship between the French kings and the counts of Flanders was

even more problematic. Baudouin I was the vassal of the French kings for Flanders and

of the German emperors for Hainaut. When he inherited his territory in 1194, he also

76
Ibid., p. 257.
77
Ibid., pp 246-48, 257.
78
John W. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the
Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp 207-9, 336-59.
36
acquired a conflict with the French king centered around Flemish independence. 79

There were only brief respites in the fighting through the 1180s and 1190s. By 1197,

according to Gabrielle Spiegel’s evaluation, “practically the entire Flemish aristocracy,

led by Baudouin, was in open rebellion against Philip Augustus.” 80 A truce established

in 1200 lasted long enough for the count to leave on crusade, but there is little reason to

believe that either the truce or Baudouin I’s subsequent departure repaired his personal

relationship with the king. Baudouin I and his two brothers Henri and Eustache

remained in the East, but the conflict in Flanders continued, and only the decisive

victory of Philip Augustus at Bouvines in 1214 put an end to the rebellious actions (if

not desires) of the Flemish barons. It is not a surprise, then, that, despite the

prominence of French and Flemish barons in the Latin Empire and the history of French

interest in the crusader states, correspondence between the emperors in Constantinople

and the Capetians is rare during the period of the Flemish emperors (1204–1216). This

division would be ameliorated with the succession of the Courtenays, close kin and

loyal vassals of the Capetians, to the throne in Constantinople.

Despite their previous difficulties, Baudouin I and Philip Augustus maintained

cordial relations after Baudouin I left for the crusade. In announcing the establishment

of a chapter at Courtrai, mentioned above, Baudouin I expressed a concern that his

baillis would be slow to carry out his instructions and requested the king’s support in

ensuring that they acted in accordance with his orders. Their relationship was good

enough that he expected the king to exert himself to accomplish the enclosed request.

79
For a summary of events see Gabrielle M. Spiegel, Romancing the Past: the Rise of Vernacular Prose
Historiography in Thirteenth-Century France (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), pp
23-53.
80
Ibid., p. 39.
37
 Not all of Baudouin I’s correspondence with Philip Augustus dealt with Flemish

concerns. The count-emperor sent relics from the castle of Boucoléon to the king,

including those “de ligno Crucis dominice longitudine unius pedis aut amplius; de

capillis Domini; una de Spinis Spinee Corone quam capiti eius plebs perfida Iudeorum

imposuit; de veste in qua nutritus fuit; de purpura in qua ante Pilatum a militibus ipsius

fuit illusus tempore Passionis; una de costis beati Philippi apostoli, & unus dens

eiusdem.” 81 Relics were chief among the treasures of Constantinople desired by

Westerners and, in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, many relics made their way to

the West through official and unofficial channels. 82 In particular, relics of the Passion

were widely sought after and, luckily for the Latin emperors, were present in

Constantinople. Baudouin I’s gift to Philip Augustus was unusual, however. Few

official shipments of relics were made during Baudouin I’s reign and, as far as the

record shows, only two were made by the count-emperor himself. 83 Even Philippe de

Namur, Baudouin and Henri’s brother, had to wait until Henri’s regency to receive

relics from one of his brothers. 84 In addition to the shipment to Philip Augustus,

Baudouin I sent relics, although stolen by Genoese corsairs, to Innocent III to

accompany the letter reporting the fall of Constantinople. Eager for papal approval, the

81
Comte Paul Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae (Paris: CTHS, 1878), II: 64-65, no XIV.
82
See the indispensable collection of sources concerning Byzantine relics and the Fourth Crusade in
Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae. Riant’s introduction is a useful summary on the translation
of relics. See also Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople, pp 194-
95.
83
Riant published records of donations from individuals other than Baudouin I. Riant, Exuvie sacrae
Constantinopolitanae, II: 58-62, no. IV-IX.
84
Charles-François-Joseph Galliot, Histoire générale ecclésiastique et civile de la ville et province de
Namur (Bruxelles, 1788), V: 358. Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 74. Henri also gave
relics to clerics. Ibid., II: 78, 81, 82-83, 99-100.
38
count-emperor sent proof of the benefits of the conquest. 85 The pope, as an influential

and important ally of the Latin Empire, was an obvious choice for such an honor and

prestigious company for Philip Augustus. Philip Augustus’s inclusion as a recipient

suggests, as the other evidence does not, that Baudouin recognized the importance of a

good relationship with the Capetian king and was taking the first steps to encourage it.

Yet, there is no evidence of a direct request for assistance or of royal aid in response to

this shipment. Baudouin I was aware of the Latin Empire’s need for material support,

since he sought it from his own lands, but he was either reluctant to ask Philip Augustus

for help or did not believe the king would respond positively. It is tempting to see this

shipment as a sign of Baudouin I’s mellowing toward Philip Augustus and his hope for

the king’s help. Unfortunately, the count-emperor’s death soon after leaves this as

conjecture.

Baudouin I’s continued identification with Flanders, already seen in his self-

titling and his correspondence involving his Western territory, is also evident in witness

lists to his charters. In February 1205, the emperor distinguished between the men of

Flanders—Guillaume, advocate of Béthune, Roger de Courtrai, Eustache de

Salperwick, Lambert de Moregem, Eustache de Gentbrugge, Simon Crakelin, Raoul and

Gautier de Passchendale, Lambert de Poelvoorde, Gilbert d’Ypres, and Robert de

Wavrin—and the men of Romania, i.e. the Latin Empire 86—Conon de Béthune, master

Amaury of Arras, Geoffroy marshal of Champagne, Milo le Bréban, Manessier de

85
Genoese corsairs seized the relics en route to western Europe. Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 13-14, no. 3.
Migne, PL, 215: col. 433, no. CXLVII. Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 56-57. The
messenger, a Templar himself, also carried relics for that order. The history of relic shipments from
Constantinople suggests that messengers often had the discretion to give relics to their home churches or
orders.
86
For discussion of the term “Romania,” see Wolff, “Romania: The Latin Empire of Constantinople”.
39
l’Isle, and Macaire de Sainte-Menehould. 87 Both categories corresponded to areas

under Baudouin I’s authority. All the men were his allies, but the distinction is

carefully drawn and shows his continued affiliation with men from Flanders

specifically, even as he expanded his land holdings to include Romania.

These witness lists also suggest the possibility of a nascent identity among those

men who chose to stay in Constantinople. The division was not guided by origin alone,

but by commitment to the Latin Empire. As might be expected, all the “men of

Flanders” were Flemish. 88 But of the “men of Romania,” four were from Champagne

and the other two from Flanders. These men, with the possible exception of Amaury,

about whom little is known, had a higher profile in the Latin Empire than did the men of

Flanders. The list suggests that they had, in February 1205, committed to remaining in

the Latin Empire. The clearest evidence of this commitment comes from the behavior

of the brothers Guillaume and Conon, who were placed in separate categories.

Guillaume left with many others crusaders following the disaster at Adrianople, while

Conon was one of the group begging them to stay. According to these documents, in

87
This list is compiled from two separate documents one identifying “Willelmo, advocato Betunie,
Rogero de Curtraco, Eustacio de Salperwic, Lamberto de Morenghem, Eustacio de Ghentbrugghe” and
“Conone de Betunia, Giffrido, marescallo Campanie, Milone de Brabant, Manesero de Insula, Machario
de Sent Mainihout.” Prevenier, Oorkonden, p. 616, no 281. The second included among the men of
Flanders “Simon Crakelin, Radulphus de Paskendale, Walterkinus de Paskendale, Lambertus de
Polvorde, Gilbertus de Ypra, Robesote de Waurin” and among the men of Romania “Magister Amalricus,
prepositus Atrebatensis.” Ibid., p. 621, no. 283. For identifications see Longnon, Les compagnons de
Villehardouin, pp 42, 45, 48, 145-46, 160, 191-92.
88
To be from Flanders, of course, did not mean that the men were not also French. Clari perceived
Baudouin I’s supporters as French. Robert de Clari, La conquète de Constantinople, ed. Philippe Lauer
(Paris: Libraire ancienne Édouard Champion, 1924), p. 93, ch XCV: “Quant le parole fu oïe, si en furent
tout li Franchois molt liés, et teus autres i eut qui en furent molt dolent, si comme chil qui devers le
marchis se tenoien.”
40
February, one brother had already committed to remain in the empire while the other

had indicated his intention to return home. 89

Yet, even these “men of Romania,” soon to become Franks in the

historiography, echoed European affiliations and showed their translation into this new

environment. The non-Flemish men in the list came from Champagne, not St-Pol or

royal lands, although many crusaders came from these areas. 90 Baudouin I’s closeness

with the Champenois knights is not surprising, since his wife, Marie, was the sister of

Thibaut, the deceased count of Champagne. Thibaut had died before the Fourth

Crusade departed but his widow claimed the loyalty of the Champenois crusaders. This

marriage created a tie that Baudouin I maintained when he moved East and that made

his relationship with the men from Champagne closer than that with men from other

parts of the French kingdom. The “feudal” character of crusade participation and

settlement, discussed by Jean Richard, was sustained in the early Latin Empire. 91

Baudouin I kept his men, or those connected to his wife, close to him. These witness

lists, then, simultaneously show the emergence of a new affiliation along with the

strength of old associations.

Baudouin I and His Neighbors

The count-emperor’s actions in the East, particularly his treatment of his

neighbors, confirm his conservatism and his continued Western sensibilities and

attitudes. When they captured Constantinople, the crusaders entered into a complex

89
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 184-86, ch 376-77. Translation in
Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 125-26.
90
According to Longnon’s account of the Fourth Crusaders, the largest group by far was from Flanders
(ninety knights). The second-largest group was from the royal domain, with Champagne a close third,
and significant numbers from St Pol, Amiens, Burgundy, Lombardy and the Empire, Blois, Clermont, and
Perche. Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin.
91
Jean Richard, “Les etats féodaux et les conséquences de la croisade,” in Etat et colonisation au Moyen
Age et à la Renaissance, ed. Michel Balard (Lyon: La Manufacture, 1989), 181-92.
41
system of diplomatic and cultural alliances. The new emperor proved reluctant,

however, to adapt his practices to local circumstances. In the single year of his reign,

Baudouin I was faced with a rebellion from Bonifacio del Monferrato, the continued

resistance of Greeks to his rule, and the serious threat posed by Bulgaria under the rule

of Kalojan. He was convinced to make peace with Bonifacio, a fellow Westerner and

crusader, but he avoided alliances with local powers. This approach was evident before

the capture of Constantinople when the barons refused an offered peace with Bulgaria, a

costly move. 92 Instead of appeasing the Bulgarians, the crusaders antagonized them,

“on any reckoning a bad miscalculation.” 93 In reaction, Kalojan joined with Greeks in

Adrianople to resist the Franks. It was in an ensuing battle that Baudouin I was

captured. 94

Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, a Western chronicler with an interest in events in the

East, told an apocryphal story concerning Baudouin I’s captivity: Kalojan’s wife, a

Cuman princess, approached the emperor, offering to release him if he would marry her

and bring her back to Constantinople. Baudouin I refused her offer and, in retaliation,

she told Kalojan that his captive had offered her marriage and the imperial crown if she

helped him escape. Kalojan killed the count-emperor. 95 This story is suspect, since it is

not attested by an author closer to the events. The themes, however, are familiar.

92
Clari, La conquète de Constantinople, pp 62-65. Translation in Robert de Clari, The Conquest of
Constantinople, trans. Edgar Holmes McNeal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), pp 86-88.
For Villehardouin’s assessment of Kalojan’s power and independence see Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La
conquête de Constantinople, I: 206, ch 202. Translation in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of
Constantinople,” p. 79. For secondary accounts see Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la
principauté de Morée, pp 62-66 and Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, 52-53.
93
Angold, The Fourth Crusade, p. 132.
94
Wolff summarized contemporary sources reporting Baudouin I’s capture and death. Wolff, “Baldwin
of Flanders and Hainaut, First Latin Emperor of Constantinople: His Life, Death, and Resurrection,
1172–1225,” pp 289-90.
95
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” in MGH SS, ed. Paul Scheffer-Boichorst (Hanover, 1874), p.
885, ll 25-41.
42
Throughout the history of the Latin Empire, marriages with foreigners played an

important role in diplomatic negotiations and solutions to conflicts. It is not difficult to

imagine, although there is no evidence for it, that Baudouin I’s release was contingent

on a military alliance ensured by a marriage. His rejection is in character. He had

already refused an alliance with Kalojan, and the crusaders were generally convinced of

the Bulgarians’ barbaric nature. 96 Aubri de Trois-Fontaines’s story, centered on

marriage to a foreigner, highlights one of the most significant areas of change in the

settled Frankish community. Several decades later, marriages with Bulgarians and

Cumans were an accepted part of diplomatic strategy for the Franks in Constantinople.

Baudouin II was even willing to promote a marriage to a non-Christian. In these early

years, however, Westerners felt cultural superiority over their neighbors, which made

them reluctant to form alliances. Here is the “purity” that Angold discusses. Yet,

although the sense of difference never disappeared for the Franks, the resistance to

intermarriage faded. If Baudouin I had lived he, like his brother and many other

settlers, might have adopted a new attitude. His conservatism serves as a measure of

the settlers’ state of mind upon their arrival and provides a baseline from which to

evaluate change.

Aubri de Trois-Fontaines’s story is a reminder that, entering into

Constantinople, the Fourth Crusaders also entered a network of alliances and diplomatic

practices, which prominently featured marriages. The previous twenty-five years had

seen a great deal of turmoil in Constantinople and marriage to imperial women had

come to the forefront as a method of creating and strengthening claims to the imperial

throne. This method was also available to Baudouin I and Henri, yet they did not seek
96
See pp 60-66 below for Henri’s resistance to arranging marriages with Bulgarians.
43
legitimacy in marriage alliances. Baudouin I based his right to occupy the throne on the

conquest of the city, made possible by divine support, and his subsequent election,

conducted according to the procedures laid out in the agreement between the Venetians

and the crusaders. His colleague, Bonifacio del Monferrato, who had lost the election,

turned to marriage and the Byzantine tradition to assert his own claim to the imperial

throne. Baudouin I and Henri, however, apparently secure in their own legitimacy,

arranged marriages to solve conflicts and secure allies, not to bolster the ideological

basis of their imperial rule. The Franks, from the beginning, saw themselves as outside

the Byzantine tradition.

Marriages had featured prominently in the rebellions, usurpations, and

assassinations that plagued Byzantium from the death of Manuel Komnenos in 1180.

His son Alexios II was a minor, and a struggle for control over the government followed

between the empress Maria of Antioch, Manuel’s widow and Alexios’s mother, and

Maria porphyrogenita, Manuel’s eldest surviving child from a previous marriage. Both

women had men to support them: The widowed empress ruled with her lover, the

protosebastos Alexios who was also Manuel’s nephew. In turn, Maria porphyrogenita

had the support of her husband, Ranieri del Monferrato, brother of the future Fourth

Crusader Bonifacio del Monferrato. 97 In 1182, Andronikos Komnenos, Manuel’s

97
Upon their marriage, Renier had been given the new name “John,” the title of caesar, and control over
Thessaloniki. For the Byzantine practice of renaming foreign spouses see Ruth Macrides, “Dynastic
Marriages and Political Kinship,” in Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers of the Twenty-fourth Spring
Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990, ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1992), pp 276-77.
44
cousin, returned to Constantinople, seized power, and murdered all four protagonists,

along with young Alexios II. 98

The early 1180s demonstrated that although imperial legitimacy was primarily

lodged in the male heir, it was not solely so. Maria porphyrogenita claimed power for

herself, despite the existence of her younger brother, also a legitimate child born in the

purple. 99 Men seeking promotion claimed authority through imperial daughters and

widows. Ranieri del Monferrato and Alexios protosebastos exercised power with an

imperial lover or spouse and asserted legitimacy through these relationships. 100

Andronikos also took the opportunity presented by marriage. After murdering the child

emperor, Alexios II, Andronikos married his young widow, Agnès. This marriage

allowed Andronikos to reinforce his claim to the throne, one already established by his

kin relationship to Manuel, his military success over his rivals, and the support of the

populace. He ordered that paintings of imperial figures be replaced with those of him

and his wife or him alone. 101 When he was overthrown in turn by Isaac II Angelos,

Andronikos fled with Agnès.

Marriage featured prominently in another episode involving the Montferrats. In

1187, Corrado del Monferrato, Ranieri’s and Bonifacio’s brother, arrived in

98
Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire, 1025–1204: a Political History, 2nd ed. (London: Longman,
1997), pp 263-65. Charles M. Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180–1204, Modern Revivals in
History (Aldershot, Hampshire: Gregg Revivals, 1992), pp 18-20, 31-37.
99
Maria’s claim may have stemmed from a sense of disappointment: Until Alexios’s birth in 1169 she
had been the only heir.
100
Prior to Alexios’s birth, Manuel had planned for his daughter Maria porphyrogenita to succeed him.
He arranged her engagement to Béla of Hungary, who would share imperial power with his wife.
Alexios’s birth displaced Maria as heir and the engagement with Béla ended. Pál Engel and Andrew
Ayton, The Realm of St. Stephen: a History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526, International library of
historical studies (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), pp 52-53.
101
Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, pp 332-33. Translation in Choniates, O City of Byzantium:
Annals of Niketas Choniates, p. 183. Agnès fled Constantinople with Andronikos after he was
overthrown. Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, pp 346-37. Translation in Choniates, O City of
Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates, p. 191.
45
Constantinople and married Isaac II Angelos’s sister. He received the title of caesar, as

his brother had, and became an imperial adviser. Corrado was involved in imperial

politics, defending Constantinople and Isaac’s throne against the rebellion of Alexios

Branas. The emperor apparently promised Corrado more than the title of caesar,

probably even recognition as heir to the empire. Nicetas Choniates, the Byzantine

historian, related the Westerner’s disappointment with his position: “Conrad was

openly displeased that the emperor showed him favors he considered unbefitting his

family status and not harmonious with his imperial marital connection and was unhappy

that all his proud hopes resulted only in his wearing the buskins of uniform color that

are given but to a few (I speak of the insignia of the kaisars).” 102 Despite his marriage,

Corrado’s aspirations were never realized; facing resentment and opposition to his

ambitions in Constantinople, he left the city and his Byzantine wife for Jerusalem. 103

Once his political ambitions were dashed, his marriage was forfeit.

The tumultuous period between Andronikos’s death and the coronation of

Baudouin I in 1204 saw four emperors and repeated rebellions challenging the peace of

the capital. Marriage was a tool in these struggles, although far from the only or even

most important one. Each of these emperors claimed a relationship to the Komneni, but

the legitimacy of imperial rule was lodged more directly in the support of the populace

and patriarch and military strength than in the degree of kinship with the previous

102
Translation from Ibid., p. 217. Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, p. 395, ll 37-41: “Ὁ δὲ
δυσχεραίνων προδήλως πρὸς ἣν εὕρατο ἐκ βασιλέως φιλοφροσύνην ὡς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ γένει ἀπᾴδουσαν
καὶ τῷ Βασιλείῳ κήδει ἀσύμφωνον, ὁρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς ὑπερηφάνους ἐλπίδας καταληγούσας ἐς μόνον τὸ
μὴ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁμόχρωμον ὑπόδημα τοῦ ποδὸς (τὸ τῶν καισάρων λέγω παράσημον).”
103
Western and eastern sources recount these events: Clari, La conquète de Constantinople, pp 32-40.
Translation in Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople, pp 59-66. Robert d'Auxerre, “Chronicon,” p. 250.
Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, pp 382-94. Translation in Choniates, O City of Byzantium:
Annals of Niketas Choniates, pp 209-17. Analysis is in Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180–
1204, 78-84.
46
emperor. 104 This turmoil prepared Byzantine inhabitants of the capital to accept

outsider candidates for the throne. The Fourth Crusaders, had they been more astute,

might have secured support from the populace. Entering Constantinople, particularly

with Bonifacio del Monferrato, the brother of two past contenders for the throne, the

crusaders did not appear so different from other emperor-making factions. In fact, a

Greek delegation of high-ranking clergy and members of the Varangian Guard offered

the imperial crown to Bonifacio before the Latin forces entered the city. 105 With the

noteworthy exception of Bonifacio del Monferrato, however, the crusaders were not

interested in entering into the Byzantine tradition of imperial succession.

Bonifacio sought to harness the potential in marriage when, soon after the

conquest of Constantinople, he married Margaret-Maria of Hungary, the widow of the

Byzantine emperor Isaac II Angelos and the sister of the king of Hungary. Having lost

the imperial election to Baudouin I, Bonifacio invoked this marriage as an alternative

path to power. 106 In doing so, he demonstrated more interest in local feelings and

loyalties than his colleagues did. Although his challenge to Baudouin I failed,

Bonifacio strengthened his prestige and power in the areas he ruled. In the spring of

1204, he requested and was granted the kingdom of Thessaloniki instead of the land

originally set aside for him, “because it [Thessaloniki] lay near the territory of the King

104
For examples of the patriarch and the populace influencing imperial selection see Ibid., pp 31-37, 47-
57, 67-75, 120-24, 257-58. The Komneni emperors had married many of their family members to
Byzantine aristocratic families. This policy created many hopeful claimants to the Komneni heritage.
Paul Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), pp 180-85, 202-17.
105
Queller and Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople, pp 187-92.
106
For a heroic view of Boniface, suggesting his ambition, see: Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, The Poems of the
Troubadour, Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, trans. Joseph Linskill (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964), pp 299-
312
47
of Hungary, whose sister he had married.” 107 According to Geoffroy de Villehardouin,

Bonifacio’s marriage to Margaret effectively induced the Greeks near Demotika to

accept him: “[B]ecause his wife, the former empress, was known to them, the Greeks

began to rally to his side … to acknowledge him as their lord.” 108 Both Choniates and

Robert de Clari, a crusader from Picardy, recounted how Bonifacio used Margaret and

her children to challenge Baudouin I’s authority among the Greeks. In Choniates’s

version, Bonifacio broke with his fellow crusaders and had Margaret’s son proclaimed

emperor. 109

Bonifacio’s marriage into the imperial family did not guarantee his claim to

imperial power. Robert de Clari confirmed that Bonifacio asserted his wife’s status to

establish his authority, but dismissed its efficacy. After failing to take Adrianople by

siege, Bonifacio appealed to the city: “‘How now, lords? Do you not know that this

woman was the wife of Isaac the emperor?’” His wife came forward and brought her

children forward and asked “‘How now? Do you not recognize me to be the empress

and do you not recognize my two children whom I had of Isaac the emperor?’” The

nobles admitted that they knew her and her children, but refused to acknowledge her

son as emperor. Instead, they told Bonifacio to have the boy crowned in

Constantinople, and then they would recognize him as emperor. 110 Without a proper

107
Translation from Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 97. Geoffrey de Villehardouin,
La conquête de Constantinople, II: 70, ch 264: “por ce qu’il ere devers le roi de Hungrie, cui seror il
avoit a fame.” See also Clari, La conquète de Constantinople, pp 98-99, 105. Translation in Clari, The
Conquest of Constantinople, pp 119-21, 124.
108
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 88, ch 279: “Et lors comencent li
Grieu a lui a torner par l’acointement de l’empereris, et de tote la terre de la entor, a une jornee ou a deus,
venir a sa merci.” Translation in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 101.
109
Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, pp 600-1. Translation in Choniates, O City of Byzantium:
Annals of Niketas Choniates, pp 329-30.
110
Clari, La conquète de Constantinople, pp 98-99: “‘Ba! Seigneur, de ne connissiés vous que che fust
chi femme Kyrsaac l’empereeur’ Si amenoit se femme avant, et disoit se femme: ‘Ba! De ne me
48
election and coronation, Bonifacio’s marital credentials could only bring him so far.

They made the Greek population more amenable to his rule but did not gain him the

throne.

Bonifacio’s participation in the Byzantine tradition of marrying imperial women

to establish political authority and legitimacy was a natural outgrowth of his personal

and familial history. Moreover, Bonifacio’s circumstances left him with few other

options. His rival had been elected according to the principles established in the March

Pact of 1204. Both parties, crusader and Venetian, recognized his legitimate right to the

throne. Bonifacio, the loser in the election, needed an ideological foundation for his

challenge to Baudouin I’s rule and allies. In contrast, Baudouin I and Henri were secure

in the legitimacy of their rule, acquired through election, coronation, and succession.

They did not see the need for further affirmation through imperial kinship. Rather, the

marriages they arranged dealt with practical rather than ideological challenges to their

authority.

The first imperial marriage healed the divide between the Franco-Flemish

settlers and the northern Italian ones, more specifically between Baudouin I and

Bonifacio del Monferrato. As discussed above, Bonifacio’s failure to secure the throne

through election had not diminished his ambition, and he had invoked his marriage to

claim imperial authority. In 1206, Henri, the newly crowned emperor of

Constantinople, married Agnes, Bonifacio’s daughter. Although the sources did not

connissiés vous que je soie empereris et de ne connissiés vous mes deux enfans que jou euch de Kyrsaac
l’empereeur?’ Si amenoit avant ses enfans, tant que uns sages hons de le chité respondi: ‘Ouil,’ fist chis,
‘nous connissons bien que che fu femme Kyrsaac et que che furent si enfant.’ ‘Ba,’ fist li marchis, ‘pour
coi ne connissiés vous dont l’un des enfans a seigneur?’ ‘Je le vous dirai,’ fist chis, ‘alés en
Constantinoble et faites loi coroner; et quant il ara sis en le caiiere Coustentin et nous le sarons, adont si
en ferons chou que faire en deverons.’” Translation in Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople, pp 119-20.
49
explicitly link the marriage to the rivalry, it was a significant element of the conflict’s

resolution. Geoffroy de Villehardouin, who was involved in the negotiations, recounted

how the barons and the doge pushed the marquis and the emperor to come to terms.

Bonifacio agreed to allow the doge and three leading barons—Louis de Blois, Conon de

Béthune, and Geoffroy de Villehardouin—to arbitrate the disagreement. These four

then wrote to Baudouin I urging him to accept their judgment, advising, or perhaps

threatening, that “they, for their part, would not countenance a war of this kind on any

pretext whatsoever.” 111 Baudouin I returned to Constantinople where he was persuaded

to accept the arbitration. The arbiters decided that Thessaloniki should go to Bonifacio

and Demotika be returned to the emperor, a conservative resolution that preserved the

original division of territory. 112

In Geoffroy de Villehardouin’s account, Henri’s engagement to Bonifacio’s

daughter, a critical element of the resolution, is delayed to later in the narrative.

Although the chronicler did not explicitly link the marriage with the conflict, there can

be little doubt of the connection. In 1206, Bonifacio sent Otho de la Roche, a baronial

ally, to tell Henri, who was by this point emperor, that Agnes, Bonifacio’s daughter, had

arrived from Lombardy and that the previously arranged marriage could proceed. 113

Presumably, Agnes had been summoned for precisely this purpose. The timing

111
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 102, ch 293: “Et sachiez que il vos
mandent il ne souffriroient la guerre en nulle fin.” Translation in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of
Constantinople,” p. 103.
112
Robert de Clari painted a different picture: the emperor angered, Boniface scared, the emperor willing
to accept terms, and the barons reluctant. Geoffroy de Villehardouin was closer to the events, even
involved, and more likely to know the story. Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople,
pp 104-14, ch 296-305. Translation in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 104-7.
Clari, La conquète de Constantinople, pp 99-100, 104-5. Translation in Clari, The Conquest of
Constantinople, 120-21, 124. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines also referred to the episode. Aubri de Trois-
Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 885, ll 10-11.
113
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, p. 264, ch 450. Translation in
Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 146.
50
suggests as much. It had been more than a year since the arbitration, more than enough

time for her to have received word from her father and traveled to the East. The

marriage, solemnized in the beginning of 1207, initiated the final steps in the

reconciliation. Bonifacio and Henri then met face-to-face, which they had not done

since the initial conflict erupted. Bonifacio performed homage to the emperor and

acknowledged holding Thessaloniki from him. They agreed to participate in a joint

campaign in the fall against Kalojan. 114 Although Villehardouin did not include the

marriage in his account of the arbitration, it was an integral part of the negotiation and

subsequent peace. It explains the delay between the agreement and the performance of

homage and establishment of an offensive alliance.

For Bonifacio, the marriage secured the desired imperial title for his family,

although he himself would never hold it. At their wedding, Agnes, as well as Henri,

wore a crown, a fact important enough to be noted by Villehardouin. 115 When the

emperor and the marquis met in the summer of 1207, Bonifacio asked after his daughter

and “was delighted when the Emperor told him she was expecting a baby.” 116 Perhaps

he was joyous at the idea of a grandchild, probably more so at the prospect of a

descendant who might one day be emperor as Bonifacio had wished to be. This

ambition came to nothing, since if Agnes and Henri had any children, they did not

survive to adulthood.

114
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, pp 308-12, ch 495-97. Translation in
Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 158-59. Choniates also described the joint venture.
Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, pp 635-36. Translation in Choniates, O City of Byzantium:
Annals of Niketas Choniates, p. 348-49.
115
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, p. 272, ch 457-58. Translated in
Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 148.
116
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, p. 310, ch 496: “Et li marchis demanda
novelles de sa file l’empereris Agnès; et on li dist que ele ere grosse d’anfant, et il en fu mult liez et
joianz.” Translation from Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 158.
51
 Bonifacio was not the only actor in the post-1204 Byzantine world to employ

marriage as a legitimating tactic. Byzantine elites exiled by the crusaders to Asia Minor

and Greece continued to use marriages to make alliances and to establish authority in

new areas. Directly after the conquest of Constantinople, Alexios V had in his company

the wife and daughter of Alexios III, his predecessor and rival. Alexios V proposed an

alliance, one solidified by his marriage to Eudokia, Alexios III’s daughter. The pact did

not last long: Alexios III betrayed and blinded his new son-in-law. Marriage could

build alliances, but blinding, the traditional Byzantine method of rendering one unfit for

the imperial throne, was more effective in neutralizing a rival. Alexios III did not waste

the resource of his daughter: Eudokia, before 1204 the wife of a Serbian ruler,

subsequently married Leo Sgouros, who held out against the crusaders at Corinth.

Two other marriage alliances proved significant in the foundation of the two

most successful Greek states-in-exile, each of which would challenge the Franks’ hold

on Constantinople: Nicaea and Epiros. One of these marriages preceded the Fourth

Crusade. Theodore Lascaris, who founded the exile Greek state in Nicaea, was married

to Anna, a daughter of Alexios III’s, and appointed despot by his father-in-law. After

1204, Theodore Lascaris ruled in Asia Minor with this title for two years before being

crowned emperor there. 117

The other great Greek state in the Latin Empire’s reign was the Doukai-ruled

polity centered around Epiros and Thessaloniki. Directly after the conquest of

Constantinople, Michael Angelos Komnenos Doukas, great-grandson of Alexios I

Komnenos and cousin of Isaac II and Alexios III, went on campaign with Bonifacio del

117
Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea,
1204–1261, pp 37-40.
52
Monferrato. When the opportunity arose to establish himself at Nikipolis at the end of

1204, however, Michael quickly deserted the Latins. 118 A relative of his late wife’s had

been governor there, and Michael enhanced this connection by marrying his widow.

Although he would eventually build an empire that challenged the Franks in

Constantinople, originally he focused on northern Greece and carved out territory from

the land granted to the Venetians in the partition. 119

The Greeks’ interest in using marriages to establish and further claims

manifested itself throughout the history of the Latin Empire. As the land of the

Byzantine Empire was parceled out, marriages played an essential role in the shifting

alliances among the individuals who claimed and held that land. If Bonifacio’s actions

showed one possible role of marriage in the post–Fourth Crusade world and the

difficulties of realizing its benefits, the marriage of another imperial widow, Agnès of

France, demonstrated a different potential, one actually fulfilled. Agnès, the daughter

of Louis VII, the sister of Philip Augustus, and the widow of the emperors Alexios II

and Andronikos Komnenos, was in her early thirties when the crusaders arrived, and her

career sheds light on the cultural divide between East and West and on the possibilities

that marriage could create. As a child Agnès had been sent to Constantinople to marry

Alexios II and more than two decades later the gulf between her and the men from her

118
Peter Lock proposed that Michael Doukas abandoned Bonifacio del Monferrato because of the “lack
of prospects.” Lock contrasted that explanation with the possibility of “nationalistic fervour” as a
motivation. Michael Doukas’s subsequent behavior, however, in particular his inability to commit to an
alliance, suggests that his vaulting ambitions prompted his move away from Boniface and toward the
promise of his own territory. Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, p. 278
119
In typical Venetian strategy, they focused on securing the ports, Durazzo and Corfu, and were willing
to come to terms with Michael, allowing him to consolidate his power. Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros,
pp 13-19.
53
homeland was vast. 120 Upon their arrival, the crusaders did not know whether she was

alive. They asked after her and were informed that she had married, for a third time,

one Theodore Branas, an important Greek general and the descendant of the rebel

Alexios Branas. 121 The barons went to visit her and treated her with honor, “but she

met them with very bad grace and was very angry with them, because they had come

there and had had this Alexios crowned. And she was unwilling to talk with them but

had an interpreter talk for her, and the interpreter said that she did not know any French

at all. But Count Louis, who was her cousin, made himself known to her.” 122 The

cause of Agnès’s anger is not clear. Her loyalties are by no means self-evident: The

new emperor was the son of Isaac II Angelos, who had successfully rebelled against her

second husband Andronikos, but Andronikos had killed her first husband. The Western

assault on and capture of Constantinople, attended by fires and pillaging, might have

frightened or angered the ex-empress. Constantinople had been her home since

childhood, and she presumably lost friends, either to death or exile. Regardless of the

basis of her anger, Robert de Clari described a woman who, after so many years in

Byzantium, identified completely with Byzantine culture and interests and disassociated

herself from her original homeland and relatives. She had forgotten French, or at least

claimed to have done so. The crusaders’ lack of knowledge about whether she was

alive suggests infrequent communication with the French royal court. Her absence in

120
Magdalino, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180, p. 100. Various sources related Agnès’s
early career: Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, pp 275-76. Translation in Choniates, O City of
Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates, p. 153. Clari, La conquète de Constantinople, pp 19-20.
Translation in Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople, pp 48-49.
121
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 885, ll 21-24.
122
Translation from Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople, p. 79. Clari, La conquète de Constantinople,
p. 54: “et ele leur fist molt mauvais sanlant et molt estoit corchie de chou qu’il estoient la alé et de chou
qu’il avoient chelui Alexe coroné; ne ne voloit parler a aus, aius i faisoit parler un latimier, et disoit li
latimiers qu’ele ne savoit nient de Franchois. Mais li quens Loeis (chis estoit ses cousins) si s’acointa a
lui.”
54
Western chronicles confirms this impression of distance. Robert d’Auxerre, who

offered an account of Andronikos’s career, did not mention his marriage to Agnès,

although he did note her first marriage to Alexios II. 123

Agnès’s extraordinary biography made her an anomalous figure. At a young

age, she was established in a foreign capital, married to and surrounded by foreigners.

She was quickly caught up in the drama of imperial succession and, while still a child,

lived through a massacre of Westerners in her adopted city. Agnès’s cultural and

linguistic distance from her homeland lacks a direct correspondence in the lives of the

Franks. Unlike Agnès, the Fourth Crusaders were adults who had developed careers

and loyalties in the West, and they had the company of fellow countrymen in their new

home. They could and did bring with them Western ways of acting and thinking, and

they provided, for themselves and their children, an alternative to Byzantine culture.

Agnès’s early history, nevertheless, demonstrates the distance, both physical and

cultural, that separated Constantinople and France—a distance that became evident in

different ways during the span of the Latin Empire. She may have, at least in her own

mind, crossed the boundary that encircled a French or Western identity and become

Byzantine. In rejecting French, and doing so angrily, she rejected her own origins and

childhood in favor of a new linguistic and, presumably, cultural identity. Yet, Robert de

Clari’s account suggests that, to the crusaders, she was still a French princess, despite

the linguistic difference and her sharp response. She could still be drawn back in to the

network created by her birth.

Agnès’s disappearance from Western sight and her reaction to the crusaders

bespeak the gulf between Byzantium and the West in the late twelfth century. Her later
123
Robert d'Auxerre, “Chronicon,” pp 246-47.
55
career, under Latin rule, attests to the possibilities present in cross-cultural alliances

between Franks and Greeks, especially those enforced through marriage. The marriage

between Agnès and Branas served both the couple and the crusaders well. In the

immediate aftermath of the Fourth Crusade, the Greeks in Adrianople and Demotika

allied with the Bulgarian tsar Kalojan but soon grew frightened of him. 124 In the spring

of 1206, the citizens of these cities approached Branas and begged him to broker a

peace between them and Henri, the regent, offering to turn Adrianople and Demotika

over to the crusaders. No powerful Greek state existed to protect them, and the Franks

were a less threatening and more appealing master than were the Bulgarians. The

French agreed and Branas, with Agnès, was placed in charge of the two cities. 125 This

strategy of granting two extremely important cities to a Greek ally of the Latin Empire

was effective. Once they joined with the Latin Empire against Kalojan, the Greeks of

Adrianople remained reliable allies and staunchly resisted Bulgarian sieges despite the

great pressure put on the city. 126 According to Villehardouin, they appealed to Henri

for help and welcomed him when he arrived to protect them from the Bulgarians. 127

Adrianople remained under Western jurisdiction for almost twenty years until Epirote

124
Acropolites, Opera, pp 21-24, ch 13. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp
139-41, ch 13.
125
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, vol II, pp 214-16, 226, 254-56, ch 403,
413, 441-42. Translation in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 138-41. Chronique
d'Ernoul et des Bernard le trésorier (Paris, 1871), p. 390.
126
Adrianople’s importance was recognized early on by Henry’s advisers who counseled him: that it was
better to lose land in Anatolia “than risk losing Adrianople and the main part of their empire.”
Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 152-53, 156. Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La
conquête de Constantinople, p. 302, ch 488: “Or prist l’emperere conseil a ses homes; et distrent que il
ne pooient les .II. guerres souffrir ensemble, et que mielz valoit cil damages assoffrir que la parte
d’Andrenople ne de l’autre terre.”
127
Ibid., pp 234-40, ch 422-27. Translation in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 139-
41, 157.
56
forces seized it in 1223. 128 Branas’s loyalty matched that of the city he ruled, and he

remained an ally of the Franks when many other Greeks were in revolt. 129 His father

or grandfather had rebelled against Isaac II Angelos and sought the imperial throne, but

Branas did not evince these ambitions. He could have used his marriage to Agnès to

challenge Frankish rule. Instead, the couple set aside any reservations they had and

cooperated with the new regime. Branas was important enough that Aubri de Trois-

Fontaines knew of him and labeled him “Grecum potentissimum.” 130 The couple’s

continued allegiance to the Franks and the significance of that commitment were

reinforced in their daughter’s marriage to Narjot de Toucy, an important baron, adviser

to the Courtenay emperors, and bailli of the empire. 131 Agnès’s movement away from

her French roots came full circle as her daughter reentered the French milieu of the

imperial barons.

Before fully moving onto Henri’s reign, and its substantial changes in policies

and attitudes, it is worth pausing for a moment to survey the marriages arranged under

Baudouin I’s rule and consider their efficacy in achieving certain objectives. In the first

year of the Latin Empire, four crusader marriages intervened significantly in events in

and around Constantinople, although the role they fulfilled was not always the intended

one. To take them in chronological order: Baudouin I’s marriage to Marie of

128
Alice Gardner, The Lascarids of Nicaea: The Story of an Empire in Exile (Amsterdam: Adolf M.
Hakkert, 1964), p. 117. Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 103-4. See Jean de Brienne’s letter and
promise to take back Adrianople and Didymoteichos. Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 267-68. The
capture of Adrianople is related in Acropolites, Opera, pp 339-41, ch 24. Translation in Akropolites,
George Akropolites: The History, pp 171-73, ch 24.
129
Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, pp 629-30, 642. Translation in Choniates, O City of
Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates, pp 345, 352. Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur
Henri,” pp 328-33, ch 543, 546. Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, pp 214-16,
226, ch 403, 413. Translation in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 133-34, 136.
Longnon discussed Branas’s role. L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp 133-
34.
130
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 947, ll 3-4.
131
Ibid., p. 885, ll 21-24.
57
Champagne, enacted before the Fourth Crusade, facilitated the count-emperor’s close

relationship with men from Champagne, several of whom turned out to be very

important figures in the history of the Latin Empire. Agnès and Branas’s marriage, also

occurring before 1204, pulled Branas into the Western circuit and was central in the

surrender of Adrianople and its subsequent loyalty to Constantinople. Bonifacio’s

marriage to Margaret-Maria, although it did not win him the imperial throne, increased

his appeal to the Byzantine population and thus aided his conquest of Thessaloniki.

Finally, Henri and Agnes’s marriage played a critical role in resolving the enmity

between Bonifacio and the Flemish emperors. These marriages, disparate as they were,

gave the Franks ample reason to view marriage as an effective tool in resolving conflict

and ensuring loyalty.

58
 CHAPTER 2:

ADAPTATION AND CONSERVATISM, 1205–1216

Henri took control in Constantinople first as regent for his captured brother and

then as emperor himself once Baudouin I’s death seemed certain. Modern historians

agree with contemporary observers that Henri’s reign was the apogee of the Latin

Empire. No subsequent ruler displayed his combination of military and diplomatic

skills, finely tuned judgment, and willingness both to fight and to negotiate. During

Baudouin I’s reign, Henri was a loyal supporter who carried out his brother’s

policies. 132 Over the decade of his own rule, however, Henri demonstrated a

willingness to compromise that his brother lacked. His sentiments—both toward the

West and his neighbors—were similar to his brother’s, but he was willing to set aside

these feelings in the interest of the empire. 133 A “Frankish” sensibility can be discerned

in the settlers during Henri’s reign. He himself developed, over time, a subtle

understanding of his Greek subjects and various neighbors and brought that

understanding to life in his actions. Aggression was the hallmark of Baudouin I’s

attitude toward neighboring countries. Under Henri, however, Constantinople’s

interactions with her neighbors evolved to include alliances. He participated in the

132
In March 1205, Baudouin I recalled Henri from Asia Minor to assist him in the European campaigns.
Villehardouin, "La Conquête de Constantinople," 202, ch 340. Translation in Villehardouin, “The
Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 116. Godfrey, 1204, the Unholy Crusade.
133
The words of Akropolites have been extremely influential in formulating this opinion. Acropolites,
Opera, p. 28, ch 16: “Ὁ δ’ εἰρημένος Ἐρῆς, εἰ καὶ Φράγγος τὸ γένος ἐτύγχανεν, ἀλλ’ οὖν τοῖς
Ῥωμαίοις καὶ ἰθαγενέσι τῆς Κωνσταντίνου ἱλαρώτερον προσεφέρετο, καὶ πολλοὐς εἶχε τοὺς μὲν τοῖς
μεγάλοις τούτου συντεταγμένους, τοὺς δὲ τοῖς στρατιώταις, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πλῆθος ὡς οἰκεῖον περιεῖπε
λαόν.” Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 153: “The said Henry, even
though a Frank by birth, behaved graciously to the Romans who were natives of the city of Constantine,
and ranked many of them among his magnates, others among his soldiers, while the common populace he
treated as his own people.”
59
system of diplomatic relations that his brother had avoided. Not only was Henri willing

to make treaties with the foreign powers surrounding Constantinople, but also he

solidified these arrangements with marriages. During Henri’s reign, four members of

the imperial family, including him, intermarried as part of alliances with the Doukai, the

Bulgarians, and the Hungarians.

The transformation of attitude is most marked in relations with Bulgaria: Where

the crusaders refused an alliance in 1203, Henri and his barons planned and executed

two marriages. These occurred in the context of the chaos following Kalojan’s death.

There were four rivals for the Bulgarian throne, all Kalojan’s nephews: Boril, who

married Kalojan’s widow and was crowned tsar; John Asen, who fled upon Kalojan’s

death; Strez, perhaps Boril’s brother; and Slav, who set himself up in Byzantine

territory. 134 Kalojan’s punishing attacks on the Latin Empire and his capture of

Frankish leaders including Baudouin I had made obvious the threat a strong Bulgarian

leader posed to Constantinople. Henri and his barons saw the benefit in preventing the

consolidation of power in Bulgaria and they used alliances with the various factions to

prevent any one from dominating. Two different sources agree that Henri was reluctant

to ally with the Bulgarians because he saw them as savages, but that he bowed to his

barons’ insistence.

In the summer of 1208, Slav successfully requested a marriage with the

emperor’s illegitimate, Western-born daughter. The marriage, glossed as a union of a

civilized Westerner with a savage, proved a harbinger of future alliances. Henri de

134
Plamen Tzvetkov, A History of the Balkans: a Regional Overview from a Bulgarian Perspective (New
York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), pp 178-79. G. Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs von
Konstantinopel von 13 Januar 1212. Überlieferingsgeschichte, Neuedition und Kommentar,” Byzantion
43 (1973): 410-14.
60
Valenciennes reported Slav’s proposal: “I am a rich enough man in land and treasure of

silver and gold; and people see me in my country as a genteel man. So I ask you, if you

please, to give her to me.” 135 The terms were agreed upon and Slav did homage to

Henri and went on campaign with Eustache, Henri’s brother. 136 The wedding took

place the following autumn, after Slav’s demonstration of loyalty on the battlefield. No

record survives of the bride’s journey to the East, but it was most likely for this

marriage. She was certainly born before the Fourth Crusade, since she was old enough

to marry in 1208 and to discuss the marriage with her father.

The difference between the Flemish noblewoman and the Bulgarian prince was

explicitly mapped onto a civilized-savage distinction. Geoffroy de Villehardouin, the

marshal, described the emperor’s daughter to Slav as “beautiful, wise, courteous and

kind, patient, and endowed with all good qualities that a young noblewoman ought to

possess.” 137 In Henri de Valenciennes’s account, the emperor himself made the contrast

more explicit. In speaking to his daughter, he called her “wise and courteous” while

warning her that her new husband was “a little savage.” 138 The cultural distance was

135
Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” p. 332, ch 547: “je sui assés riches hom de
terre et de tresor d’argent et d’or; et assés me tient on en mon pais por jentill home. Si vous pri, s’il vous
plaist, que vous le me donnés.”
136
Acropolites, Opera, pp 38-39, ch 24. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p.
172, ch 24. Hendrickx, Regestes, p. 67. Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” pp 330-
34, ch 545-49. See analysis in Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp
100-1, 104-5.
137
Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” p. 336, ch 555: “belle, sage, courtoise et
deboinaire, et soufrans, et entechie de toutes boines teches ke damoisiele doit avoir en soi.”
138
Ibid., p. 338, ch 558-59: “Biele fille, or soiiés sage et courtoise. Vous avés un home pris avoec lequel
vous vos en alés, ki est auques sauvages; car vous n’entendés son langage, ne il ne reset point dou vostre.
Pour Diu, gardés ke vous jà pour chou ne soiiés ombrage vers lui, ne changans de vostre talent, ne vilaine.
Car molt est grans hontes à jentill feme quant elle desdaigne son mari, et si en est trop durement blasmée
à Diu et au siecle. Sour toute rien, por Diu, gardés ke vos ne lassiés vo boin usage pour l’autrui mauvais.
Si soiiés simple, douche, deboinaire, et soufrans tant comme vostre maris vaudra; et si honnerés toute se
gent por s’ounor. Mais deseur tout, gardés toutes voies ke vous jà por lor amour ne por lor acointance,
quele ke il l’aient à vous ne vous à eus, retraiiés vostre cuer de nostre gent amer, dont vous iestes
estraite.”
61
further reinforced with the observation that “you do not understand his language, and he

does not know yours.” He advised his daughter to treat her husband well and, indeed,

to honor him, since to do otherwise would bring great shame on her. Yet, this

relationship should not cause her to relinquish her identity: “[B]e careful not to

abandon your good habits for the bad ones of others.” Moreover, he advised her “be

careful, however, that for their love and their company, whether it may be from them to

you or you to them, that you do not break your heart of love for your nation, from which

you came out of.” In other words, do not become a Bulgarian. Henri believed that his

daughter could honor her new husband, even be close to him, but retain her natal

affiliation. Marriage should not wipe away this allegiance and the sentiment that

accompanied it. In response to Henri’s warning, his daughter expressed her affection

for him and offered a prayer for the quick defeat of his enemies and the increase of his

honor, a devotion that acknowledged the military context of the marriage and expressed

her willingness to play her role in the alliance. 139

Henri’s own marriage to a Bulgarian followed his daughter’s. In April of 1211,

Boril, Kalojan’s nephew and successor, launched an unsuccessful attack on the Latin

Empire. Defeated and confronted both with internal dissent (from supporters of his

cousin John Asen) and with the alliance between Slav and Henri, Boril was ready to

make peace. Henri’s alliance with Boril’s weaker rival had successfully forced the

Bulgarian ruler to negotiate. 140 The agreement included the marriage of Maria, Boril’s

139
Ibid., pp 338-40, ch 559.
140
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 129. Henri discussed these
developments in his letter to the West. Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs”
62
daughter, to the emperor. 141 According to Robert de Clari, the barons urged Henri to

seek Maria’s hand in marriage. Henri balked saying that “he would never take a wife of

such low lineage.” 142 Only vocal baronial advocacy persuaded him to make overtures

to Boril. They argued in favor of the alliance, “for they [the Bulgarians] are the most

powerful people and the most dread enemy of the empire and of the land.” 143 The

barons’ argument admitted the foreignness of the Bulgarians; they did not try to

convince Henri that they were not savage, but rather that the alliance was necessary and

thus the disadvantage should be overcome. Robert de Clari reaffirmed this perception

when he called Bulgaria “chele sauvage terre.” 144 The practical demands of the

situation, however, were stronger than Henri’s prejudices, and a joint campaign in

Serbia followed the wedding. 145

In both Henri de Valenciennes and Robert de Clari, the word “sauvage”

describes the Bulgarians and their land. Henri’s utterances within the texts specifically

identified language and birth, or lineage, as markers of difference. His conversation

with his daughter suggests that the habits and customs of the Bulgarians also offended

him, although he did not specify what those were. The shared religious allegiance was

not mentioned in these episodes. The marriages of Henri and his daughter to Bulgarians

141
Baudoin d'Avesnes, “Livres de Baudoin d'Avesnes,” in Recherches et materiaux, ed. J. A. C. Buchon
(Paris), p. 505. Andreas Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–1280 d.c.,” in Rerum italicarum
scriptores, ed. Ester Pastorello (Bologna, 1938), p. 285, ll 31-34. Latrie, Chronique d'Ernoul et des
Bernard le trésorier, p. 391. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 886, ll 28-32. See the
description in Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp 127-28.
142
Translation from Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople, pp 127-28. Clari, La conquète de
Constantinople, p. 108, ch CXVI: “Et li empereres respondi ke femme de si bas parage ne prendroit il
ja.”
143
Translation from Clari, The Conquest of Constantinople, p. 128. Clari, La conquète de
Constantinople, p. 108, ch CXVI: “nous vous loons bien que vous vous acordés a aus, car che sont le
plus fort gent et le plus doutee de l’empire ne de le tere.”
144
Ibid..
145
Little is known about the military action; only a vague reference in a Serbian chronicle attests to it.
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp 149-50.
63
were the first of their type, but they were far from the only examples in the Latin

Empire. Over the years of occupation, the settlers’ stance evolved away from that of

Western Europeans, and they viewed their neighbors with more equanimity. In later

marriages between the Franks and their neighbors, the cultural or religious difference

was still acknowledged, but the language of disgust disappeared. These marriages show

the beginning of that process.

The Bulgarian alliances served Henri and the Franks well. In 1211, Slav was

ranged with them against Boril. 146 Near the end of his life, he rejoined the Bulgarian

court under John II Asen. The peace with Boril even outlived the alliance’s principal

actors. Henri died in 1216 and a year later Asen and his brother arrived in Bulgaria and

overthrew Boril. 147 The connection with Constantinople was ruptured but open warfare

did not break out. Circumstances in both polities created little incentive for either

cooperation or conflict: The Latin Empire lost three rulers in three years; the new

Bulgarian ruler had to establish his power; and each state was too concerned with other

matters to constitute an active threat.

These marriages showcase another feature of Frankish society in the Latin

Empire: the central role of the barons in governance. The barons had already flexed

their muscles in forcing reconciliation between Bonifacio and Baudouin I. In later

years, barons would make marriage alliances in pursuit of imperial goals. 148 In these

early years, their role was more limited but still essential. This arrangement set the

Latin Empire apart from many Western governments but echoed the situation in the

Latin kingdom of Jerusalem in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The nobility of that

146
Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs,” pp 417-18.
147
Tzvetkov, A History of the Balkans: a Regional Overview from a Bulgarian Perspective, pp 182-83.
148
See pp 200-23 below.
64
crusader kingdom began to consolidate as a group in the mid-twelfth century, and the

baronial opposition and civil war during the reigns of Fulk of Anjou, Melisende, and

Baudouin III further strengthened their power. 149 In particular, the barons in Jerusalem

exercised impressive influence over royal marriages. They forced two monarchs,

Amalric and Sibylle, to set aside their spouses before ascending the throne. The

involvement of the barons in their monarch’s marriage demonstrates one way in which

Western practices were modified to accommodate to local circumstances. This power

over marriage was rooted in the West where vassals’ counsel on the matter of a lord’s

marriages was a long-standing custom. In the crusader states, which were in perpetual

need of alliances and treaties, marriage was a political, diplomatic, and military matter.

When they advised Henri, the barons acted not only in their role as vassals but also as

stakeholders in the government. If the depictions of Henri de Valenciennes and Robert

de Clari are accurate, the barons adjusted more quickly than Henri to the realities of

their new situation and were more willing to accept and encourage foreign marriages, at

least for the emperor if not for themselves. Repeatedly, the barons of the Latin Empire

exercised their influence in matters of diplomacy and marriage. In the case of Robert’s

marriage, considered in the next chapter, they used violence when influence failed.

The Bulgarians were not the only threat in the region, nor were they the only

target for alliances. The Latin Empire also had to contend with displaced Byzantines in

Asia Minor and mainland Greece. Once the exiled Greek elites established themselves

in the new centers of Epiros and Nicaea, they, like the Bulgarians, formed a direct threat

to the Latin Empire. In an attempt to manage these threats, Henri and subsequent

emperors sought and formed alliances with the Greek rulers. Marriages sometimes
149
See, for example, Joshua Prawer, Crusader Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp 27-35.
65
accompanied the agreements. In 1209, Henri arranged the first imperial marriage

between a Frank and a Greek, honoring Michael Doukas as his alliance partner. For the

Franks, it seems, marriages with Greeks had many pitfalls, but they were not savages, as

the Bulgarians were.

In the summer of 1209, Henri’s campaign against the Lombard barons brought

him near Michael Doukas’s territory. Epiros was a powerful force in the region and had

the potential to threaten Western control of both Thessaloniki and southern Greece.

Michael’s brother, Theodore, was supporting Leo Sgouros, a Greek holding out against

the Franks in Corinth and, later, Argos. 150 Michael approached Henri and proposed a

treaty. According to Henri de Valenciennes, the emperor sent two envoys, Conon de

Béthune and Pierre de Douai, with the following suggestion: If Michael acknowledged

Henri as lord for all his territory, the emperor would treat him as he treated his own

brother. When presented with this offer, Michael extended a counterproposal: If his

daughter and the emperor’s brother, Eustache, were joined in marriage, Michael would

give Eustache one-third of his land and commit himself to serve the emperor. This

marriage translated an inimical relationship into a familial tie and was amenable to the

emperor’s envoys and to the emperor and his brother. 151 The marriage and alliance

quickly followed. 152

The alliance with Michael was perfectly designed to increase Eustache’s power

base near Thessaloniki, which would in turn increase imperial authority there. It also

removed Michael as an enemy and introduced the possibility that he would provide the

150
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 25-29.
151
Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” pp 416-20, ch 688-94. Nicol discussed this
alliance. Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 28-29.
152
Confirmation of the marriage comes in a letter of Innocent III’s: “E. fratri ejus, cui idem Michalicius
filiam suam primogenitam tradiderat in uxorem.” Migne, PL, 216: col 353-54.
66
Franks with military assistance in Greece. Epiros, carved from Venetian spoils, would

remain within its current boundaries and not strike at imperial or baronial lands. As in

his alliances with the Bulgarians, Henri was trying to manage his neighbors and

potential threats, not obliterate them. He had resigned himself, at least in the short term,

to the presence of powerful states in the vicinity.

Henri de Valenciennes described the negotiations between Henri and Michael

Doukas. This scene presents a contrast in several ways to those between Henri and

Slav, recorded in the same text. Although the text breaks off before Henri’s reaction to

the marriage with Michael Doukas, there is no suggestion in the work that the Greeks

were inferior or the connection unsuitable. Although Slav himself came before the

emperor, Conon de Bèthune and Pierre de Douai travelled to see Michael Doukas. Both

Slav and Michael Doukas proposed the respective marriages, yet in the latter case the

imperial envoys first undertook to persuade the Greek of the suitability of a proposed

peace treaty. Henri had sent a letter but the envoys added “beautiful polite speeches”

making the emperor’s case. 153 Michael Doukas’s somewhat haughty demeanor (he

made the suggestion about the marriage “smiling”) was worlds away from Slav’s

prostrations. 154 Moreover, although the emperor Henri did not initially suggest the

marriage, he did offer to treat Michael “as his own brother,” suggesting the kin nature

of their new relationship. 155

153
Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” p. 418, ch 692: “Et Cuenes de Biethune et
Pieres de Douay se prendent à parler et à dires uns biaus mos polis, et à mettre avant le parole de lor
segnor par si grant mesure, et à deffendre se partie en respondant ke mestiers lor iert si tempréement, ke
chil ki encontre eus estoient en estoient ausi come tout abaubi.”
154
Ibid., p. 420, ch 693: “Adont lor dist ausi come en sozriant.”
155
Ibid., p. 418, ch 690: “à mon frere proprement.”
67
 The evaluation of Michael Doukas in this episode is not positive. The emperor

described Michael Doukas as “treacherous and false.” 156 The accusation of treachery,

of course, echoes Western negative attitudes toward Greeks. It could be interpreted as a

stock insult, parallel to the Bulgarians’ savagery, except that, in the case of Michael

Doukas, as we will see, the accusation of inconsistency and treachery was perfectly

appropriate.

Despite the religious schism between the Greeks and Latins and the often-heated

rhetoric surrounding their differences, as marriage partners, the Greeks were far more

familiar to Westerners than were Bulgarians. During the reign of Manuel Komnenos,

marriages between Byzantines and Westerners were common. Manuel married his two

children, Alexios and Maria, and several of his nieces to Westerners. Manuel himself

had married Maria of Antioch, a cousin of Eleanor of Aquitaine’s. The religious schism

did not prevent or even present a serious obstacle to marriages. 157 The cultural distance

from the Bulgarians was far more significant in this regard.

Michael may have been a culturally acceptable relative, but, in spite of the

marriage, he was a wholly unreliable ally. By the following summer, he had reached an

agreement with the Venetians in which he promised his loyalty and free trade for their

merchants in return for recognition of his territorial holdings. 158 Secure in his lands, he

went on the offensive against the Franks, capturing and killing the constable of the

156
Ibid., p. 418, ch 689: “mervelleusement trahitres et faus.”
157
See Raymond H. Schmandt, “Orthodoxy and Catholicism: Public Opinion, the Schism, and the Fourth
Crusade,” Diakonia III (1968): 297-98.
158
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 30-31. Michael Doukas referred to himself as “Ego Michael
Comnanus Dux, filius quondam Seuastocratoris Joannis Ducis.” Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, pp 119-
23, no. CCXXIII and CCXXIV.
68
Latin Empire and many of his companions. 159 He followed this initial strike by allying

with a contender for the Bulgarian throne, Strez, with whom he launched a joint attack

on Thessaloniki. 160 Michael’s career was one of mercurial loyalties: He briefly

rejoined with Eustache, only to betray him and capture Larissa in the summer of 1212.

Luckily for the Franks in Thessaloniki, he appears to have lost interest in that city and

turned against another ally, attacking the Venetian possessions Durazzo and Corfu.

Of the marriages considered so far, only this last one failed to achieve its goal,

and it failed spectacularly. The breakdown of the alliance reflects not a problem with

marriage’s efficacy, but rather with Michael’s personality. Donald Nicol summarized

Michael’s career succinctly: “The promises and treaties that Michael found it expedient

to make with Italians and Franks alike were never more than breathing-spaces in his

campaigns against them, solemnly made and simply broken.” 161 Michael never truly

committed to any ally: He made and broke alliances with Venetians, the pope, the

Bulgarians, and the Nicaean Greeks, in addition to the Latin Empire. 162 There is no

sign that anything could have assured his loyalty. Not even marriage, which was

successful in other circumstances, could turn such an erratic self-server into a reliable

ally. Despite Michael’s treachery, however, Henri adhered to the core assumption that

marriage had the power to transform antagonism into alliance. His outrage at Michael’s

behavior confirms the point. To Henri, Michael was a “traditor potentissimus” who,

159
The Venetians apparently did not see a conflict of interest in having an accord with Michael as he
moved against the Latin Empire.
160
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 33-34. Papal letter to the patriarch of Constantinople calling for
excommunication of those who join with Greeks to oppose the Latin Empire and especially with Michael.
Augustus Potthast, Regesta pontificum romanorum inde ab a. post christum natum MCXCVIII ad a.
MCCCIV (Berlin, 1875), p. 357. no. 4139. Constantin Jos Jireček, Geschichte der Bulgaren (Prague:
Von F. Tempsky, 1876), pp 243-44.
161
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, p. 26.
162
Ibid., pp 32-42.
69
along with his ally Strez, betrayed no fewer than four oaths of loyalty to Henri alone. 163

His use of the term “traditor” suggests a Christian betraying another Christian. Under

these circumstances, Henri’s continued willingness to renew cooperation with Michael

is striking. It cannot be blamed on either relentless optimism or naïveté; in his dealings

with Bulgarians and the Lascarids of Nicaea, the emperor had demonstrated

considerable political acumen. A more likely explanation is that the lure of peace was

too great to resist. Faced with threats from Asia Minor, a recent and fragile peace with

Bulgaria and the rebellion of the Lombard barons, Henri would have found even a brief

period of quiet in Greece tantalizing. The anomalous failure of this particular marriage

to secure peace did not interfere with the Latin emperors’ continuation of the practice.

In Henri’s letter to the West in 1212, he talked about Slav, Boril, and Michael,

the former as an ally and the latter two as enemies. Slav appeared (briefly) as “our

associate Slav, our son-in-law” but the relationships with the other two men were not

explicitly mentioned. 164 When discussing an earlier campaign against the Bulgarians,

Henri noted that Michael had been an “associatus” of the Franks, specifically Eustache,

the same word used to describe Slav. 165 This difference reflects Henri’s agenda.

Although the conflict with Boril had already been resolved, the Franks’ defeats of their

enemies appear as heroic events on the battlefield, not resolved through the murkier

process of diplomacy. With Michael, of course, the failure of the marriage to secure

peace made broadcasting it unappealing. To the West, Henri portrayed the Franks as

163
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 122. An edition of the letter
with a commentary has been published in Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs”. An older edition can be
found in M. J. J. Brial, ed., Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France (Paris, 1822), XVIII: 530-
33.
164
Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs,” p. 418: “associati Sclavo, genero nostro.”
165
Ibid., p. 414.
70
beset on every side by enemies and triumphing on the battlefield. This presentation

supported his stated need for more men to hold the territory. 166

Henri preserved himself and his close relatives for marriages that resolved a

conflict and pacified, at least for a short time, an enemy. The Latin Empire’s perilous

position, even during Henri’s largely successful reign, made this focus necessary. A

final marriage, however, suggests that Henri was responsive to the need to solidify

friendships as well. The closest natural ally the Westerners had in the region was

Andrew, king of Hungary. Hungary straddled eastern and western Europe

geographically and culturally. Twelfth-century Hungarian rulers and their kin

frequently married both Westerners, including relatives of the kings of Aragon and of

France, and their own neighbors, including nobles from Serbia, Byzantium, and

Russia. 167 The Hungarian church was loyal to Rome, despite its proximity to

Constantinople, and Hungarian kings played an important role in papal plans for the aid

of the Holy Land. 168 The Fourth Crusade risked squandering this relationship with the

attack and capture of Zara, a Hungarian possession, an act that threatened the Hungarian

commitment to the crusading enterprise and the Latin Empire. 169 Healing this breach

was essential, especially given the unpredictable nature of the relationship with various

Bulgarian factions. An alliance with Hungary could provide much-needed practical

support to the Latin Empire as well as a deterrent to her enemies.

166
Ibid., p. 418.
167
Engel and Ayton, The Realm of St. Stephen: a History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526, pp 50-51, 89.
In the 1160s, Manuel’s daughter had been engaged to Béla of Hungary. Twenty years later, Isaac II
married Maria of Hungary, who would go on, after his death, to marry Bonifacio del Monferrato. Brand,
Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180–1204, p. 78. See pp 47-49 above.
168
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 905, ll 37-41. Andrew sent a representative to the synod in
1215 in the church of St Salvatoris. Ibid., p. 903, l 30. On the election of Pierre see Potthast, Regesta,
no. 5440. On preparations Ibid., no. 5456.
169
Z. J. Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century, East European Monographs (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp 26-29.
71
 In 1215, Andrew married Yolande de Courtenay, daughter of Pierre de

Courtenay and Yolande of Flanders, Henri’s sister. 170 Although there is no direct

mention of Henri’s involvement in the marriage, the circumstantial evidence is

substantial. The marriage to Yolande with her Western prestige and Eastern

connections fits perfectly into Andrew’s career. 171 He arranged marriages with

important foreigners for himself and his children, mixing alliances with nearby rulers

and those in the West. 172 His marriage to Yolande marked a period during which he

focused on alliances closer to home. Two years after their marriage, in 1217, he went

on crusade and arranged a series of engagements with Eastern powers: his son to the

daughter of Theodore Lascaris, his niece to the sultan, his younger son to the daughter

of an Armenian ruler, and his daughter to Asen. 173 An alliance with the Franks was

perfectly in line with these other arrangements. In addition to a general desire for good

relations with Constantinople, Andrew may have sought Henri’s aid in his struggle with

170
In 1220, the pope placed Yolande under his protection, ensuring her portion should Andrew
predecease her. Potthast, Regesta, no. 6328. Augustino Theiner, Vetera Monumenta Historica
Hungariam Sacram (Rome: Typis Vaticanus, 1859), II: 13-14, nos. 22, 50. Reinhold Röhricht, Studien
zur Geschichte des Fünften Kreuzzuges (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1968), p. 23, ftnt 7-8, pp 30-31. For
reports of Yolande’s death see Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 933, ll 7-9.
171
Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century.
172
His first marriage was to Gertrude, the daughter of the duke of Merania on the Dalmatian coast, and
one of their daughters, the famed Saint Elizabeth, married a German nobleman. Later in his reign, he
married his daughter to James I of Aragon and his third marriage, after Yolande’s death, was to the
daughter of the margrave of Ancona, in northern Italy. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 873, l
11, p. 898, ll 24-30. Engel and Ayton, The Realm of St. Stephen: a History of Medieval Hungary, 895–
1526, pp 90-91, 97. Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century, pp 41, 46-48.
173
Ibid., pp 67-70. Theiner, VMH, pp 20-21, nos. XXXII-XXXIII. The marriage between his daughter
and Asen was delayed until 1221 because Asen had to get papal approval to set aside his first wife.
Tzvetkov, A History of the Balkans: a Regional Overview from a Bulgarian Perspective, p. 183. Also,
Anka D. Vasileva, “Les relations politiques bulgaro-latines au cours de la période 1218–1241,” Bulgarian
Historical Review 7 (1979): 77. In the early 1220s he embarked on an unsuccessful attempt to separate
his son Béla from his wife, the daughter of Theodore Lascaris. The pope refused to consent, and Béla
and Maria were reunited and fled to Austria to escape Andrew’s anger. In 1224, the pope and other
ecclesiastics used their powers to bring about reconciliation. The conflict is dealt with in a series of papal
letters: Potthast, Regesta, pp 73-79, 89-93, nos. 6845, 7124. Theiner, VMH, no. LXXXV.
72
Serbia. 174 In 1215, Henri had recently triumphed over his greatest enemies and sealed

treaties with Bulgaria and Nicaea. For once in its besieged history, the Latin Empire

was in a position to help others. 175 Although Andrew sought close relationships with

the West, a marriage to such a distant noblewoman was unlikely to tempt him without

further incentive.

The history of Yolande’s family confirms the likelihood that Henri participated

in arranging the marriage. The Courtenays were a powerful French aristocratic family

with close ties to the French kings and an intricate involvement in French and Flemish

politics. Her marriage to the king of Hungary was an unusual one; members of her

family had previously remained close to home: Her sisters who married before 1217

did so among the Champenois, Burgundian, and Flemish nobility. 176 Her brothers

174
One source asserts that Henri and Andrew allied against the king of Serbia. Hendrickx, Regestes, pp
95-96, no. 137.
175
Zoltan J. Kosztolnyik suggested a further, specific rationale for Andrew’s interest in the alliance: a
desire for the throne in Constantinople. He pointed to Andrew’s crusade in 1217 as a ploy intended to
help him gain favor with the pope and the imperial barons so they would promote him to emperor, a
position left vacant by Henri’s death. By going on crusade, Andrew was “imitating the political
circumstances that had surrounded the Fourth Crusade” in order to “realize his goal of gaining great
power and predominance in Byzantium.” Andrew was a candidate for the imperial throne after Henri’s
death, a candidacy helped by his marriage to Yolande. It is doubtful, however, that he arranged the
marriage to Yolande in order to stake a claim to Constantinople: she was, at the time, the niece of an
emperor who had a brother, a sister, an illegitimate daughter, and a wife. In 1215, there was no indication
that Henri would die so soon and without an heir. Compared to the other marriages arranged by the Latin
emperor—his own, his illegitimate daughter’s, his brother’s—one to Henri’s niece from the West cannot
have offered much hope for succession to the throne. Although we know that Andrew was under
consideration for the crown at Constantinople after Henri’s death, it would be a mistake to read backward
from that unexpected circumstance. Andrew may have aspired to Constantinople, but his marriage to
Yolande was similar to his other marriages in the region, part of strategies creating alliances, not seeking
thrones. If Henri arranged the marriage between Andrew and Yolande, he was implementing a long-
standing practice in the region for ensuring friendship and support, one that Andrew, in particular, was
likely to understand. Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century, p. 60. See pp 89-98 below for a
full discussion of events after Henri’s death. Potthast, Regesta, no. 5440.
176
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 906, l 30: “Unam filiarum eius, Hyolenz nomine, duxit
Andreas rex Ungarie; secundara, nomine Sibiliam, habuit Radulfus de Eddolduno in Bituria, quam postea
duxit comes Henricus de Vienna et Ardenna; tertiam habuit Lascarus Grecus, qui dicebatur imperator
Nicee, sed de ista filios non habuit; quartum Gaufridus iunior de Villa Harduini, filius Gaufridi principis
de insula Montionis; quintam Galtherus de Barro super Sequanam, comitis Milonis filius, quam postea
duxit Odo, Alexandri filius, frater ducis Burgundie Odonis.”
73
Philippe, Henri, and Robert were involved in French and Flemish politics. 177 Her

siblings who entered the church did so in France. 178 There was no reason for Yolande

to break with this pattern, except for the Latin Empire’s need to enhance its ties to

Hungary, the closest friendly, established power to the new Aegean states, the most

important of which was ruled by her uncle. 179 Two years after Yolande’s marriage, her

parents became emperor and empress of Constantinople. 180 Although there is no sign

that this development was being considered in 1215, it suggests that the older Yolande

maintained a close relationship with her brothers even after they became emperors of

Constantinople. Henri’s appeal across Europe to his sister, requesting a bride for his

Hungarian alliance, is not confirmed but its occurrence is almost certain.

The four marriages of Henri’s reign, along with those made after his death, were

central to the empire’s foreign policy. Contemporaries as well as historians saw the

connection between marriage and political necessity in the Latin Empire. Baudouin

d’Avesnes described, incorrectly, Henri’s actions after his success against the rebellion

of the Lombards in Thessaloniki: “[H]e made peace with John, the king of Bulgaria, and

with Theodore Lascaris, and the third with king Andrew of Hungary. These three

young ladies were daughters of the count Pierre d’Auxerre and the countess Yolande,

sister of the emperor. By these marriages he acquired great peace and great aid, but he

177
Rigord, “Gesta Philippi Augusti,” in Oeuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, historiens de
Philippe-Auguste, ed. H.-F. Delaborde (Paris: Libraire de la société de l'histoire de France), yr 1214.
Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 20. Jean Du Bouchet, Histoire généalogique de la maison royale de Courtenay
(Paris, 1661), Preuves, p. 17.
178
Augustin Berton, Courtenay et ses anciens seigneurs: notes historiques (Marseille: Laffitte, 1975), pp
67-68.
179
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 882, ll 42-43. Andrew’s brother, Emery, had died in 1204.
A conflict over succession arose between Andrew and Emery’s young son. Andrew claimed the throne
and then Emery’s son died in exile and the pope recognized Andrew as the rightful successor.
Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century, pp 29-32.
180
See pp 89-98 below.
74
did not live long afterwards, and he died without heirs. 181 Baudouin correctly reported

the marriage between Andrew and Yolande, but the rest is wrong: The marriage

alliances with Bulgarians involved Henri’s daughter and Henri himself, and they were

alliances with Slav and Boril, not Kalojan or John Asen. The marriage between

Theodore Lascaris and the daughter of Pierre and Yolande de Courtenay came later.

More important than the details, however, is the explicit linking of marriage and

diplomatic alliances; through marriage, various alliances brought peace and aid to the

empire. As with Aubri de Trois-Fontaines’s description of Baudouin’s death, the

centrality of marriage is clear, even if the details are slippery.

Despite the language of cultural difference, then, Henri’s decisions about

marriages were governed by strategic considerations. Kin connections had the clear

purpose of ensuring peace, but marriage was not the only diplomatic strategy and not all

alliances were accompanied by weddings. Marriages might not be possible or desirable

due to the lack of available partners, vast cultural or religious differences, or the

practical concerns of political and diplomatic affairs. Marriage was reserved for the

more highly valued alliances and, thus, the most feared enemies or desired friends. The

Franks’ greater interest in securing territories in Greece, Thrace, and Constantinople’s

hinterland, which they viewed as necessary for their continued hold on the city, than

their interest in conquering lands in Asia Minor was reflected in the marriages arranged

during Henri’s reign. In particular, Henri and his advisers reserved marriage for

dealings with their European neighbors, Bulgaria, Epiros, and Hungary. In Asia Minor,

181
Baudoin d'Avesnes, “Livres de Baudoin d'Avesnes,” p. 505: “il fist pais à Johennis le roi de Balquie,
et à Toldre Lascre, et la tierce au roi Andrieu de Hongrie. Ces trois demoiselles estoient filles le conte
Pierron d’Ausoirre et la contesse Yolent, suer l’empereour. Par ces mariaiges aquist il grant pais et grant
aide; mais il ne vesqui gaires après, ains moru sans hoirs de sa char.”
75
they followed a different strategy, making alliances that sought to turn neighbors

against each other and establish borders. Until Henri’s great military victory in 1211,

however, these alliances were, at best, short-term and unstable. The difference in

strategy reflected, primarily, an assessment of the threats posed by the various actors.

Among the minor potentates who asserted power in Asia Minor following 1204,

two substantial Greek states emerged at Nicaea and Trebizond. Trebizond’s distance

from Constantinople prevented it from becoming a serious challenge to the Latin

Empire. 182 Nicaea was founded by Theodore Lascaris, the son-in-law of Alexios III and

despot of the Byzantine Empire. 183 Under his rule, Nicaea quickly emerged as the most

powerful of the new actors in Asia Minor and developed into a threat, or at least a

nuisance, to the Franks. The straits provided a natural barrier, but one that was quickly

compromised. Soon after 1204, Lascaris reconstituted a Greek fleet and used it in the

islands and to conquer coastal towns in Asia Minor. Henri did not have the resources to

defeat Lascaris definitively, especially with the Bulgarian threat looming, but he also

could not risk a hostile fleet off his shores, a fleet that could someday cut off supplies

from Europe and besiege Constantinople. 184 Henri’s strategy toward Nicaea was one of

containment; if he could keep them to Asia Minor, he could focus on solidifying his

European possessions.

182
A. A. Vasiliev, “The Foundation of the Empire of Trebizond (1204–1222),” Speculum 11, no. 1
(1936): 3-9. Trebizond had the advantages of prominent founders—the grandsons of Andronikos I—and
a strong economic foundation.
183
Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea,
1204–1261, p. 37. Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, pp 67-68. Although Lascaris used his title as despot in
order to establish his authority, he based his rule on his efforts on behalf of the populace, not on his
kinship with Alexios III.
184
For the Nicaean fleet during Lascaris’s reign and his use of naval power in the islands and the coastal
towns, see Hélène Glykatzi Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer (Paris, 1966), pp 303-13. Angold, A Byzantine
Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204–1261, pp 196-200.
76
 Geoffroy de Villehardouin’s account described the new empire’s difficulty in

balancing the two fields of war. After his initial successes north and west of

Constantinople in 1204, Baudouin I sent men across the straits into Asia Minor where

they established Western authority in Cyzicus, Nicomedia, Spiga, and elsewhere. 185

The Bulgarian threat, however, soon necessitated the recall of forces from Asia Minor

for a concentrated push at Adrianople. 186 The chronology is murky, but Nicaea and

Constantinople appear to have been at peace from the middle of 1205 to November of

1206. 187 Lascaris then violated the treaty and allied with Kalojan for a joint attack

against the Latin Empire in the Balkans and Asia Minor. 188 This attack on two fronts

created great difficulties for Henri. According to Villehardouin, “the Emperor was

quite distracted. His forces on the other side were so widely scattered, and everywhere

so heavily engaged that they could do no more than they were already doing, while he

himself had only a very small body of troops in Constantinople.” 189 Henri repeatedly

made plans to withdraw troops from Asia Minor, only to be forced to reengage there by

185
See Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 112-22, ch 304-313. Translation
in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 107-11.
186
See Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 150-54, ch 340-44. Translation in
Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 116-17.
187
Acropolites, Opera, pp 11-12, ch 7. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp
119-20, ch 7. Macrides argues that these events pertain to 1205 and 1208, Ibid., "Introduction," pp 83-84.
Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 51-52, no. 62. Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II:
266, ch 453: “En cel termine Toldres li Ascres, qui tenoit la terre d’autre part del Braz, avoit triues a
l’empereor Henri, et ne li ot mie bien tenues, ainz li ot fausees et brisies.” Translation in Villehardouin,
“The Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 163.
188
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 266-302, ch 453-88. Translation in
Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp 146-56. Choniates remarked on how the Greek
resistence in Thrace forced Latin forces to withdraw from the East. Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae
Historia, p. 625. Translation in Choniates, O City of Byzantium: Annals of Niketas Choniates, pp 342-43.
189
Translation from Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 150. Geoffrey de
Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 276-78, ch 462: “Mult fu destroiz l’empereres, quant
il l’oï: que ses genz estoient departies d’oltre le Braz en tant de leus; [et estoient si chargié en chascun leu
de la guerre qu’il ne pooient plus] et l’empereres ere en Constantinoble a pou de gent.” Phrase in
brackets excluded from text by Faral.
77
Theodore Lascaris’s offensive maneuvers. 190 He did not want to commit his limited

resources to Asia Minor, but he could not allow Nicaea to rise unchecked. The Franks

twice allied with Trebizond, which ensured that polity’s continued aggression toward

Nicaea.

In the spring of 1207, the combat in Asia Minor ended with a two-year truce,

which gave Theodore Lascaris permission to tear down important Latin fortifications

but committed him to releasing his Latin prisoners. Theodore Lascaris had made the

first overture toward peace and Henri had trepidations about the provisions: He

consulted with his barons, who advised that it was essential not to fight on two fronts

simultaneously and that relinquishing strongholds in Asia Minor was far better than

losing Adrianople. 191 The relief of that important city and the protection of

Constantinople from the Bulgarian threat had to be the top priorities. The treaty with

Nicaea was ideal since it pacified the Greek threat, allowing the Franks to withdraw

troops from Asia Minor, and because the treaty disrupted the disastrous alliance

between Bulgaria and Nicaea.

Nicaea’s acceptance of the treaty suggests that the Frankish strategy was

successful. Treaties with the Latin Empire delayed the Greeks’ ultimate goal: the

reconquest of Constantinople and the reconstitution of the Byzantine Empire. But

Lascaris was faced with challengers in Asia Minor, including the Greek general Manuel

Mavrozomes, who enjoyed the support of the Seljuks, and the Trebizond prince, David

190
Ibid., II: 274-304, ch 459-89. Translation in Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” pp
149-56.
191
Geoffrey de Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 302-4, ch 487-89: “et distrent que il
ne pooient les .II. guerres souffrir ensemble et que mielz valoit cil damages assoffrir que la parte
d’Andrenople ne de l’autre terre: et si avroient parti lor anemis, Johannis le roi de Blakie et de Bougrie et
Toldre l’Ascre, qui estoient ami, qui e’entraidoient de la guerre.” Translation in Villehardouin, “The
Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 156. For discussion see Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 58-59, no. 73.
78
Komnenos, who had Frankish support. 192 The Turks, who had been growing in power

in Asia Minor for more than a century, also presented a threat to Nicaea, one that

Lascaris sought to neutralize with an alliance. 193 Balancing these various threats and

still consolidating his own authority, Lascaris seemed to think better of his ambitions to

retake Constantinople, at least for the moment.

In 1210, the fragile peace in Asia Minor fell apart. The sultan Kaykhusraw

joined with Alexios III against Lascaris and signed a treaty with Henri. This latter

agreement is recorded in Henri’s letter to the West in 1212: “the Sultan of Iconium,

who confirmed his friendship with us by oath and agreed upon aid against that

Lascaris.” 194 The precise nature of the oath and the aid is not clear. The mere fact of

the alliance with a Muslim power against Greek Christians, however, demonstrated the

flexibility that came to mark the Latin Empire’s relations with her neighbors. Whatever

the emperor’s prejudices may have been, they did not preclude this potentially useful

partnership. As in the case of Henri’s agreements with Lascaris, the accord with the

192
Angold, A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea,
1204–1261, pp 12-13. David Komnenos had attacked Nicaea at least twice, probably in 1206 and 1207.
Choniates, Nicetae Choniatae Historia, pp 626, 640-41. Translation in Choniates, O City of Byzantium:
Annals of Niketas Choniates, pp 343, 351.
193
The Seljuk civil war ended in 1205 with the accession of Kay Khusraw, a Byzantine ally, who entered
into a peace treaty with Lascaris for several years. The Turko-Byzantine relationship was not solely
marked by conflict and competition. From the end of the twelfth century, we have increasing evidence of
trade relationships between Turks and Byzantines and the incorporation of Christians into Turkish
communities, including incidences of intermarriage and Christians with Turkish titles. The Greeks in
Nicaea confronted a situation governed in part by the civil war among Kilic Arslan II’s sons after his
death in 1192. Kay Khusraw, who was originally chosen by his father and dispossessed by his brothers,
finally regained the sultanate in 1205. In the intervening years, he established a good relationship with
the Byzantines. He took refuge in Constantinople during the fraternal conflict, was closely allied with a
Byzantine military aristocrat, and turned over a Byzantine rebel to Isaac Angelos. Ahrweiler, Byzance et
la mer, p. 303; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and
History, c. 1071–1330, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1968), pp 114-17; Speros
Jr. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the
Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century, Publications of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies
(Berkeley: UCLA, 1971), pp 216-44.
194
Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs,” p. 414: “Soldanus Iconii, qui nobiscum amicitiam juramento
firmaverat et auxilium contra ipsum Lascarum pepigerat.”
79
Turks was short-lived. In 1210–1211, Nicaean forces defeated the Turks and

Kaykhusraw was killed. 195 The Turko-Nicaean treaty was renewed and the preexisting

boundaries reinstituted. 196

Peace with the Turks and the removal of Alexios III as a threat allowed Lascaris

to launch a military offensive against Constantinople. This effort was unsuccessful. In

October of 1211, the Franks resoundingly defeated the Nicaean forces, despite the

numerical superiority of the Greeks. 197 Lascaris turned over three castles in Neocastra,

thus creating a buffer zone between Thrace and Bithynia and establishing the frontier

between Latin and Greek territory. 198 This agreement may also have included

provisions for negotiations with the papacy and an agreement about the safe passage of

crusaders through Nicaean territory. 199 Henri’s actions after the treaty confirmed his

desire for peace, not conquest, in Asia Minor. He did not attempt to rule his new

acquisitions for financial benefit. Instead, as in Adrianople, he put a Greek general,

Georges Theophilopoulos, in charge and allowed the region to maintain Greek law,

customs, and practices. The strategy was effective: Henri spent the remaining years of

195
Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History, c.
1071–1330, p. 120; Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, pp 82-84; Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 14-15.
196
Cohen suggests that the Seljuks preferred to have a “buffer state” between themselves and the Franks.
Frequent invasions and other unwelcome developments on the Seljuks’ eastern borders also made action
there a priority and peace in the West appealing. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the
Material and Spiritual Culture and History, c. 1071–1330, pp 121-22.
197
Henri bragged about this victory in his letter to the West the following year. Although such a source
must be suspect, the terms of the treaty bear out his boast. Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs,” pp
414-18.
198
See summary in Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, pp 84-86.
199
Acropolites, Opera, pp 26-28, ch 15. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp
148-49, ch 15; pp 52-53, ftnt 13-19. Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 90-91, no. 129. See discussion in John S.
Langdon, Byzantium's Last Imperial Offensive in Asia Minor: The Documentary Evidence for and
Hagiographical Lore about John III Ducas Vatatzes' Crusade against the Turks, 1222 or 1225 to 1231
(New Rochelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1992), p. 42, ftnt 3 and Longnon, “La campagne de Henri de
Hainaut en Asie mineur en 1211,” 450-52.
80
his reign at peace with Lascaris and protected from an attack originating in Asia

Minor. 200

I can find no reference to a marriage alliance, or even the suggestion of one,

between the Franks and the various groups in Asia Minor during the turmoil of the

years 1206–1212 and after that until Henri’s death in 1216. In the cases of the

Trebizond Greeks and the Turks, the absence is unsurprising. Trebizond was far from

Constantinople and its allegiance was relatively unimportant. The Turks were a far

more substantial force, but if Henri considered the Bulgarians barbarous, how much

more so were the Turks? Consideration of a marriage with Muslims would have to wait

until the next generation of rulers.

In contrast to these two powers, Nicaea, as Epiros, was a dangerous neighbor

that provided perfectly reasonable marriage partners for Westerners. Soon after Henri’s

death, in fact, a marriage united Lascaris with the daughter of Yolande de Courtenay,

the new empress. Henri’s approach to Nicaea, different from that to Epiros, stemmed

from the assessment that the European provinces were more important than Asia Minor.

The conclusion his advisers reached at the time of the second Latin-Nicaean treaty

supports this interpretation: They should make concessions in Asia Minor in order to

ensure the safety of Adrianople. The contemporary narratives of Valenciennes and

Villehardouin, men intimately involved in imperial affairs, reinforce this point with

their focus on events in Thrace and Greece. Of course, Henri’s letter to the West in

1212 claimed that Lascaris was his greatest enemy. This portrayal, however, came in

the aftermath of the Franks’ victory over Nicaean forces. The rhetorical depiction of

200
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 209-10. See Acropolites, Opera, pp
28-29, ch 16. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 153, ch 16. Hendrickx,
Regestes, p. 91, no. 130.
81
Lascaris as a great rival had the benefit of inflating the importance of Henri’s victory

over him and does not outweigh the evidence pointing toward the prominence of

European concerns.

In 1211, a marriage may simply not have been necessary. Lascaris was more

willing to come to agreement with Constantinople and turn his attention elsewhere than

his colleagues in Greece and the Balkans were. Nicaea had its eastern border to worry

about—soon after the treaty with Henri, Lascaris made a marriage alliance with an

Armenian prince. 201 Certainly, if Lascaris had grand plans to attack Constantinople, his

defeat in 1211 would have given him pause. Militarily victorious and secure behind a

buffer zone, Henri scarcely needed marriage to solidify the peace.

Through alliances, Henri and his barons attempted to reduce their threat to

Frankish power. Henri was far from the first ruler of Constantinople to embark on such

a strategy. Studying the Byzantine Empire, Catherine Holmes and Jonathan Shepard

uncover how the rhetoric about a frontier can either mask or reveal the reality of its

functioning. After the seventh century, Byzantine elites responded to the shrinking of

the empire by shifting the discussion away from a focus on natural boundaries and

toward an emphasis on diplomatic connections. Even after the language of expansion

returned in the middle of the tenth century, it did not always accurately reflect the

situation on the ground. Forts and relationships with local potentates came to replace

sovereignty. 202 In the later tenth century and the eleventh century, the border was still

less militarized than it appeared in the rhetoric. Titles and salaries were used as much

201
Lascaris set aside his Armenian wife; possible motives are discussed in Gardner. Gardner, Lascarids
of Nicaea, pp 87-88.
202
Jonathan Shepard, “Emperors and Expansionism: From Rome to Middle Byzantium,” in Medieval
Frontiers: Concepts and Practices, ed. David Abulafia and Nora Berend (Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2002), pp 55-82.
82
as military force to ensure the security of border regions. 203 Lacking the power of

Byzantium, even during its weaker periods, the Latin Empire survived through a collage

of peace treaties with its neighbors. Certain, strategic conquests—Adrianople and

fortresses in Asia Minor—were placed under the control of friendly Greeks who could

more easily secure the loyalty of the population and create, at the least, a buffer zone

between the Franks and external threats.

Henri and the West

In Henri’s relationships with his neighbors he was able to overcome his Western

attitudes and prejudices in order to operate effectively in his new environment, but he

did not set them aside. This image of Henri, his attitudes and actions sometimes in

direct conflict with each other, is mirrored in his relationships with the West. He did

not turn his back on the West. Like Baudouin I, Henri maintained a relationship with

Innocent III, but no secular Western ruler. Certain correspondence reveals his

continued involvement in Western concerns, but not an overriding one. His primary

concern was his new empire and his self-image was located there.

In the immediate aftermath of Baudouin I’s capture, “the barons now decided to

send and ask for help from Pope Innocent of Rome, from France and Flanders, and from

other countries.” 204 The choice of Innocent III was to be expected from his role in the

Fourth Crusade and Baudouin I’s prior correspondence with him. The specific

203
Catherine Holmes, “Byzantium's Eastern Frontier in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries,” in Medieval
Frontiers: Concepts and Practices, ed. David Abulafia and Nora Berend (Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2002), pp 83-104.
204
Translation from Villehardouin, “The Conquest of Constantinople,” p. 129. Geoffrey de
Villehardouin, La conquête de Constantinople, II: 196, ch 388: “Lors pristrent li baron un conseil que il
envoieroient a l’apostoile de Rome Innocent et en France et en Flandres et par les autres terres por
conquerre secors.” The messengers brought relics to the cathedral of Soissons, the abbey of Notre Dame,
Saint Jean des Vignes, the abbey of Longpont, Saint Etienne of Châlons, and Saint Aubins of Namur.
Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin, p. 116.
83
identification of France and Flanders reflected the expectation that the Franks’ family,

vassals, and lords would be a fruitful source of aid. The barons sought to further exploit

these connections with messengers who came from these areas. The three

messengers— Névelon, the bishop of Soissons, Jean Bliaud, and Nicolas de Mailly—

hailed from the royal domain, Hainaut, and the county of Amiens, respectively. 205 The

barons were sensitive to how Western politics might affect the messengers’ reception.

The representatives covered both sides of the French-Flemish conflict. Névelon had

been an ally of Philip Augustus’s, while Jean Bliaud appeared in an act of Baudouin in

1200 and was very likely a partisan of the count. In a charter documenting the donation

of relics to St Stephen’s of Châlons-sur-Marne, Névelon makes reference to his mission

“to the lord pope and the kingdom of France.” 206 As a bishop and the king’s ally in

prior conflicts, Névelon was more likely to receive a positive reception in Rome and

France than were his fellow messengers. One can imagine that Jean Bliaud was sent to

Flanders and Hainaut. 207 These men joined their Western connections to commitments

to the new state; all three headed back to the Latin Empire after their mission, although

Névelon died en route. Their advocacy was presumably all the more powerful because

of their commitment.

The outreach to lay Westerners in the initial aftermath of Baudouin I’s capture

was not a harbinger of practices in Henri’s reign. Henri had only one regular Western

correspondent: Innocent III. As his brother had done, Henri wrote to the pope

requesting aid, reporting on events in the Latin Empire, and addressing ecclesiastical

205
See the entries in Ibid., pp 115-16, 173-74, 199-200.
206
Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 66.
207
Jean Longnon speculated that his mission was to try to garner aid from Pierre de Douai. Longnon, Les
compagnons de Villehardouin, p. 173.
84
appointments and conflicts. 208 Of course, as was the case with Baudouin I, the uneven

balance of the documentary record, leaning toward the papacy, could be a result of the

nature of recording and preservation, as much as a reflection of the original

correspondence. The nature of the occasional other correspondence, however, and its

concurrence with the records from Baudouin I’s reign, suggests that the surviving

record matches, at least in part, the reality.

The only surviving correspondence between the emperor and the king contains

confirmation of Baudouin I’s death, sent in the second half of 1206. Like Baudouin I’s

letters concerning Courtrai, this communication pertained to Philip Augustus’s role as

overlord for the county of Flanders. Similar letters were sent to two of Henri’s brothers:

Philippe de Namur, the regent for Flanders and Hainaut, and Godfrey, priest of Saint

Amatus in Douai. 209 None of these sought financial or military help or advice. The

emperor’s silence vis-à-vis the French king suggests a disinterest in Western affairs,

confirmed by his lack of participation in events in Flanders. At Baudouin I’s death, his

daughter Joan inherited the county, a change that gave Philip Augustus the opportunity

to increase his authority in Flanders. Acting in his role as lord, the French king brought

Joan and her sister to his court and arranged their marriages. Henri did not intervene in

these matters. Of course, Yolande’s marriage to Andrew of Hungary, if indeed it was

208
See a letter in 1206 from Henri requesting aid and in 1210 demonstrating Innocent’s knowledge of the
alliance between Henri and Michael of Epiros. Hendrickx, Regestes, p. 45, no. 52. Migne, PL, 216:
353-54, no. CLXXXIV. Innocent wrote to the patriarch of Constantinople concerning ecclesiastical
property and in 1209 one of his letters revealed that Henri had asked that a certain cleric be named a
canon of St Sophia. Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 109-10, no. CCX. For other communications see
Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 64-66, no. 82-85.
209
Brial, Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, XVIII: 527-29. Jacques de Guise, “Annales
Hannonienses,” in MGH SS, ed. E. Sackur, p. 259. Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 37-42, no.
CLXXVI.
85
arranged by Henri, shows that he maintained a relationship with his sister and brother-

in-law, one strong enough to put him in a position to propose such a marriage to them.

Henri was not more forthcoming with other Westerners. He sent a certain Pierre

Gérard to John, king of England, in 1208. 210 Unfortunately, the content of the message

has not survived. We only know that John took Pierre under his protection. Henri’s

letter of 1212 announcing his victories over his enemies and making a bid for further

reinforcements, already discussed above, was sent to “all his friends,”. 211 The text does

not specify who his friends were, or if they included kings or princes. In the same year,

Henri sent a letter to the prelates ultramontanis, possibly referring to Italy, requesting

special aid. 212 No letter specifically to France survives.

These sparse pieces of correspondence create an impression of a distance,

possibly increasing over the years, between Henri and his homeland. Other evidence

confirms that Henri’s allegiance to his European identity diminished during his reign.

In the early years, Henri acknowledged, in words and actions, his identity as a

Westerner and his devotion to Western institutions and culture. An early letter

reporting Baudouin I’s death confirmed Henri’s affinity with France. The letter refers

to “Principes et Barones et totus populus Franciae in Constantinopolitano.” 213 Later on

in the same letter, Henri identified the patriarch as a member of “populus Venetorum,”

setting the cleric (and the Venetians in general) apart from the French contingent. 214 In

this formulation, Henri imagined the empire as a French enterprise, with the Venetians

210
Thomas Rymer, Foedera, conventiones, litterae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica etc., (London: A.
& J. Churchill, 1704), I: 148. Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 63-64, no. 81.
211
“universis amicis suis.” Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs,” p. 411.
212
Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 87-88, no. 124. Philippe Lauer, “Une lettre inédite d'Henri Ier d'Angre,
empereur de Constantinople, aux prélats italiens (1213?),” Mélanges Schlumberger I (1924): 201.
213
Brial, Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, XVIII: 529.
214
Ibid.: “populo Venetorum.”
86
as an important yet discrete group. Whatever bad feelings might have lingered between

him and Philip Augustus, he included himself and the other Flemish nobles in the Latin

Empire in the “populus Franciae.”

In his use of titles, however, Henri displayed a reorientation to the East that

outstripped his brother’s. During his short reign, Baudouin used his Flemish titles

alongside his new ones: “Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo imperator

Constantinopolitanus, a Deo coronatus Romanorum moderator et semper augustus,

Flandrie et Haynonie comes.” 215 Starting with his correspondence as regent, however,

Henri omitted any mention of his Western lands: “imperii Romani moderator.” 216 As

emperor, Henri styled himself as “Dei gratia, fidelissimus in Christo Imperator a Deo

coronatus Romanie moderator et semper augustus.” 217 Any prior affiliation with

Flemish lands was absent from his self-referencing, if not completely out of his

consciousness.

Henri’s actions, in particular his shipment of relics and his relationships with

ecclesiastical institutions, also revealed a shifting set of affiliations. His record of relic

shipments, at least early in his reign, demonstrated his continued devotion to the West.

He gave relics to his brother Philippe and sent additional ones to a church in Liesses in

the care of Thomas, a monk. 218 He also asked the patriarch of Jerusalem to give relics

to the same Thomas, here identified as the abbot of Liesses. 219 In 1209, Innocent III

215
Prevenier, Oorkonden, p. 592, no. 274.
216
Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 74.
217
Prinzing, “Der Brief Kaiset Heinrichs,” p. 411. Prinzing discusses the transition from “Romanorum”
to “Romanie” in the imperial title and its implications for the territorial understanding of the emperor’s
authority. Ibid., pp 402-4
218
Thomas was identified as the brother of Gérard de Walincourt and might have been related to the
Matthieu de Walincourt who was on the Fourth Crusade and remained in the Latin Empire. Hendrickx,
Regestes, pp 46, 66-67, nos. 53, 86, 87. Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 74, no. XXIII.
219
Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 68-69, no. 90.
87
confirmed Henri’s gift to the abbey of Saint Bavon in Ghent. 220 Through these

donations Henri affirmed his connection with his land of origin, at least for several

years following his settlement abroad.

He was not the only Frank whose gifts revealed a continued affection for his

original home. Nevélon carried relics to his cathedral of Soissons, among other

places. 221 Ponce de Chaponay, also known as “de Ludguno,” brought relics to Renaud

II de Forez, the archbishop of Lyon. 222 The emperor probably took advantage of

Ponce’s origins by orchestrating an appeal to Renaud or others in Lyon, one made more

attractive by a hometown boy with precious relics from Constantinople. This strategy

was successful in Lyon or elsewhere: He returned to Greece with money and provisions

in the following year. 223

Although Henri’s contributions show a continued attachment to his homeland,

his involvement in Eastern ecclesiastical matters confirms the evidence of his titles and

correspondence: that he was committed to his new territory. He resolved a conflict

with the Latin church in the conquered lands, one that had prompted a number of

appeals to Innocent III. 224 He sent relics to Western institutions early on, but he also

made donations to a church in Constantinople and restored Greek monks to the

monastery of St Marie of Chortaïtis, near Thessaloniki. 225 Henri’s language, his

correspondence, and his ecclesiastical relationships agree with the portrait compiled

from his diplomatic relationships: one of a man who reoriented his life and concerns

220
Ibid., pp 80-81, no. 113.
221
Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 58-61, 65-68.
222
Ibid., II: 81. See Gallia Christiana, t. 4, for details about Renaud’s tenure.
223
Hendrickx, Regestes, p. 66, no. 86. Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin, p. 219. Henri de
Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” pp 403-5, ch 666.
224
Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 77-81, 83-84, 91-92, nos. 109-12, 114, 118-19, 131-32.
225
Ibid., pp 83, 88-90, nos. 117, 125, 127.
88
toward the East and, in the process, gradually became more removed from his Western

connections, but did not abandon his Western identity. Henri’s death, however, in

1216, without a son to inherit his throne, threw the barons of Constantinople back on

their origins in France and Flanders for a new emperor and empress. The ties may have

been attenuated in Henri’s reign, but they were not broken.

89
 CHAPTER 3:

FRENCH NOBLES TO LATIN EMPERORS, 1216–1228

Henri’s death in 1216 set in motion a reorientation of the Latin Empire toward

France and, more particularly, the French monarchy. With the succession of Henri’s

brother-in-law and sister, Pierre II and Yolande de Courtenay, the Latin Empire retained

its Flemish connections but began to develop strong ties to the French kings and

queens. 226 As with that of Baudouin I, Pierre II and Yolande’s reigns were too short

and the evidence from them is too sparse to permit definitive conclusions about their

accommodation to new circumstances. Their careers prior to their succession, however,

speak to the concerns of the Constantinopolitan barons in 1216 on the occasion of their

choice of a new emperor. This history provides essential background for the close

relationship that eventually developed between the Courtenay emperors and the

Capetians, a relationship strikingly different from that pursued by the first two

emperors. This chapter considers the selection of Pierre II and Yolande, the evidence

for Yolande’s cultural flexibility during her short reign, and the evolution in imperial

identity and strategy under their son Robert. Between Pierre II and Yolande’s

coronation in 1217 and Robert’s death in 1228, the empire moved into the orbit of

France and the French monarchy, where it continued, at least, until the mid-1240s.

In the last chapter, I argued that marriages provide a window into the priorities

of the crusader settlers in Constantinople and their attitudes, particularly with respect to

226
Although my general practice is to refer to individuals with the imperial numbers (Baudouin I not
Baudouin IX), I have retained Pierre II’s comital number. He died before reaching Constantinople and
thus the discussion of his life centers on his actions in the West. In particular, this usage eases the
distinction between Pierre II and his father, Pierre I de Courtenay.
90
their non-Latin neighbors. Even more so than a marriage alliance, however, the

selection of a new emperor sheds light on these questions. When Henri died, the

question of his successor was unresolved. The barons faced a decision over the nature

of imperial leadership and which polity the Latin Empire should tie itself to.

Within months of Henri’s death, the barons settled on two candidates, Andrew,

the king of Hungary, and Pierre II de Courtenay, a French baron. Both men were

married to relatives of the emperor and would bring with them certain advantages. An

emperor from Hungary would solidify the alliance with a friendly neighbor who

adhered to Rome and had military and financial support at hand. An emperor from

France would reinforce the connection to that kingdom, a connection rooted in the

Fourth Crusaders’ origins but not exploited in the early years of the empire. The choice

of the latter went a long way toward shaping the Latin Empire’s connection to the West

and determining its cultural identity.

To a modern observer, Henri’s brother, Eustache, appears an obvious choice.

He had been a strong presence in the empire from its early years, figuring in important

military campaigns. 227 He had married the daughter of Michael Doukas, despot of

Epiros, from whom he received lands. 228 Henri’s succession after Baudouin I’s death

created precedent for Eustache’s smooth elevation to the throne. Instead, however, the

barons quickly decided to seek a new emperor outside of the Latin Empire, looking to

France and Hungary. 229 No record survives of the decision-making process, and

227
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp 123-28. Robert Lee Wolff
and H. W. Hazard, The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, vol. 2, A History of the Crusades (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp 208-10.
228
See pp 66-68 above.
229
The deliberations cannot have been lengthy: Henri died in June 1216 and by January 1217, Honorius
had received and responded to a letter from Andrew concerning the offer of the crown to him and to
Pierre de Courtenay. Petrus Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III (Rome: Typographia Vaticana, 1888), I:
91
although one can easily explain the other candidates’ appeal, there is no evident reason

why Eustache did not succeed his brothers as emperor. Wolff has argued, based on

Eustache’s absence in Flemish sources, that he was illegitimate and, therefore,

considered ineligible. 230 Possibly the need for external help was desperate enough to

necessitate the aid that would most likely accompany an external candidate. Whatever

the reason, Eustache apparently did not resent the turn of events. He was a member of

the delegation that offered the crown to Pierre II and Yolande de Courtenay and was

present at their coronation outside of Rome. 231 Had he strongly opposed the Courtenay

accession, one would not expect to see him facilitating the transition.

This turn abroad to find a ruler fits a pattern established in the Latin Kingdom of

Jerusalem, where from the 1120s until the middle of the thirteenth century the repeated

failure to produce male heirs resulted in the selection of rulers from the West. Fulk

d’Anjou, Guy de Lusignan, Corrado del Monferrato, Henri de Champagne, Jean de

Brienne, and Frederick II Hohenstaufen all had origins and careers in the West before

coming East and, by original design or later development, marrying into a claim to the

throne. 232 These men were attractive to the barons of the crusader kingdom for several

reasons. They stood apart from local rivalries and power struggles and had the potential

to produce much-needed Western support. When selected from the West to marry an

heiress, as in the case of Fulk, Jean, and Frederick, the new rulers were expected to

291. Theiner, VMH, I: 4, no. 5. See Wolff’s brief discussion Wolff, “The Latin Empire of
Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 452-54.
230
Ibid., p. 452.
231
Eustache was a witness to Pierre and Yolande’s confirmation of the partition of the empire, following
their coronation. The identification is unmistakable: “Huestatio cognato et fratre nostro.” Tafel and
Thomas, Urkunden, II: 192-93.
232
For an in-depth analysis of the relations between the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and the West,
including marriage alliances, see Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East
and the West, 1119–1187.
92
bring with them financial and military assistance. Corrado and Henri, already present in

the Holy Land when their marriages were arranged, had displayed military prowess and

might reasonably be expected to encourage reinforcements from the West. Only the

selection of Guy diverged from this pattern of securing a ruler with a considerable base

of military strength, and, perhaps as a result, some contemporaries considered him to be

an unwise choice. His selection came in the midst of internal political strife in the

kingdom of Jerusalem, a pressing circumstance that did not allow for the delay involved

in waiting for a candidate from the West. 233 In general, nonetheless, crusader barons

preferred external candidates for the crown of Jerusalem since they offered money,

men, and military leadership and were not tainted by local rivalries. Men like these

presented similar advantages to the Latin Empire.

By these criteria, both Andrew of Hungary and Pierre II de Courtenay were

attractive candidates, albeit for different reasons. Andrew was a friendly neighbor of

Constantinople’s, with strong Western connections and firm religious allegiance to

Rome. His marriage to Henri’s niece, Yolande, suggests that the emperor considered

Andrew’s continued friendship important to Constantinople. 234 He could provide

substantial military support, and reinforcements would always be nearby in Hungary.

On a strategic level, a close alliance between Hungary and the Latin Empire would

allow operations against the Bulgarians on two fronts. There were certain

disadvantages to Andrew’s candidacy, nonetheless. Although Hungarian kings

frequently married into Western dynasties and Andrew himself wed a Franco-Flemish

233
Ibid., pp 242-43.
234
See pp 72-74 above.
93
aristocrat, he and his nobles were definitively neither French nor Flemish. 235 Andrew’s

succession presented risks to the Latin Empire and the Frankish nobles. He would

likely regard the interests of the kingdom of Hungary higher than those of the Latin

Empire and perhaps even rule or, rather, exploit the latter for the benefit of the former.

In addition, he could infiltrate the ranks of the Frankish barons with Hungarian nobles

who would take over important government positions. 236 The proximity of Hungary to

Constantinople made these plausible scenarios.

Andrew’s parents-in-law, Pierre II and Yolande de Courtenay, offered a second

possibility and the final choice. They were a “power couple” for the Latin Empire,

since Henri’s sister, Yolande, provided a kinship tie to the previous emperors and Pierre

II brought with him a wealth of military experience, a crusading history, and a close

relationship with the French king. They also, obviously, had as a son-in-law the king of

Hungary, an alliance that might ensure Hungarian support without the danger of

Hungarian domination. Pierre II and Yolande’s history prior to 1216 is of particular

interest here for several reasons. It explains why the barons chose them to become

emperor and empress and highlights the barons’ attitudes and priorities. In addition, the

subsequent connection between the Latin Empire and France was contingent on the

relationships formed by the Courtenays in France before their migration. The marriages

they arranged for their daughters in France provide a template and basis of comparison

for marriages arranged in the Latin Empire. In the Courtenay family, as in France more

broadly, marriage was a tool for resolving conflict and strengthening the family’s

position. These earlier marriages lacked the cultural diversity found in marriages

235
See p. 71 above for the Hungarian dynasties’ marriage patterns.
236
This possibility has a parallel in the succession of Fulk d’Anjou to throne of Jerusalem.
94
around Constantinople, but they show how attractive it would have been for the settlers

to turn to marriage as a solution to conflicts and a means for consolidating power.

Pierre II and Yolande were unusual in their apparent eagerness to leave their

European lives for an unknown adventure in the East. Henri died in June of 1216 and

ten months later they were crowned outside of Rome before setting out for

Constantinople. Once they got word of the offer, they had to decide to go and then

make arrangements for their Western lands and their journey East. They did this

remarkably quickly, suggesting that they were eager to accept the crown. A study of

this couple, who grabbed at what others dismissed or ignored, suggests the grounding of

the appeal of the Latin Empire for some, at least, in the West.

In 1216, Pierre II was a former crusader, a prominent figure in northern French

politics, a substantial heiress’ widower, a Flemish noblewoman’s husband, and the

French king’s cousin and staunch ally. He had inherited Courtenay, south of Paris,

from his mother, Élisabeth, and he traced his kinship to the French king through his

father, Pierre I, son of Louis VI. His marriage to Agnès of Nevers in 1184 brought

with it the titles and lands of Auxerre, Nevers, and Tonnerre. These combined

advantages of kinship, property, and title placed him in the elite circles closest to the

king. They also ensured his familiarity to the barons of Constantinople.

In his relationship with Philip Augustus, Pierre II maintained a connection that

his father had inherited and fostered. Pierre I had remained close to his brother, Louis

VII, participating in the Second Crusade and in negotiations for peace with England. 237

237
Du Bouchet, Histoire généalogique de la maison royale de Courtenay, Preuves, pp 8-9.
95
In his titles, Pierre I referred to himself as “regis frater,” asserting his royal identity. 238

His son continued to cultivate the connection. Charters and narrative sources reveal

Pierre II in the king’s company. 239 The count witnessed important royal documents,

including two dealing with Philip Augustus’s separation from his wife and two treaties,

one between the French and English kings and the other between Philip Augustus and

Thibaud de Champagne. 240 In this last document, Pierre II was listed as a potential

hostage for the king if he broke its terms. 241 This agreement and Pierre II’s role, settled

in 1198 before the Fourth Crusade, would have been familiar to the Champenois

contingent in the Latin Empire. 242 Pierre II’s marriage to Yolande, the sister of the

count of Flanders, added this kin tie to his French ones.

Contemporary chroniclers provide support for the argument that Pierre II and

Yolande’s connections with the French king and the count of Flanders were essential to

the barons’ calculations. In announcing Pierre’s selection, Baudouin d’Avesnes

238
Ibid., Preuves, pp 7-8. Mathieu Maximilien Quantin, Cartulaire général de l'Yonne (Auxerre:
Perriquet, 1854), I: 222, no. 404.
239
For a 1215 charter in Philip’s presence see, for example, AD Yonne, G 1592, fol 58r-v; fol 252r-v
(copy) where Pierre acknowledged that he held lands from the bishop of Auxerre. LeBeuf published an
almost identical version. Jean Lebeuf, Memoires concernant l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile d'Auxerre
(Paris: Perriquet et Rouillé, 1743), IV: 77, no. 126. A summary is in Mathieu Maximilien Quantin,
Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle (Auxerre: Société des
sciences historiques et naturelles de l'Yonne Auxerre, 1873), p. 392, no. 750. For Pierre II on crusade and
campaign with Philip Augustus, see Guillaume le Breton, “Gesta Philippi Augusti,” in Oeuvres de Rigord
et de Guillaume le Breton, historiens de Philippe-Auguste, ed. H.-F. Delaborde (Paris: Libraire de la
société de l'histoire de France, 1885), p. 286. Rigord, “Gesta Philippi Augusti,” p. 72. For charter
evidence of Pierre II’s as present in Philip Augustus’s company and acting as a witness or guarantor see
Alexandre Teulet, ed., Layettes du Trésor des Chartres (Paris: Henri Plon, 1866), I: 229a-b. 252a, 272,
nos. 620, 716, 741. Pierre II, along with Robert de Courtenay and Hervé de Nevers, was a member of the
group of French nobles who wrote in protest to the pope in 1205. Ibid., I: 291b-92a, nos. 762-65.
240
Baldwin, Government of Philip Augustus, pp 426-27.
241
The two versions of the agreements, of Philip Augustus and Thibaut, are preserved in AN, J 198, no. 4
(Philip) and AN, J 199, no. 2 (Theobald). They are published in Auguste Longnon, Documents relatifs
au comté de Champagne et de Brie 1172–1361 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1901), I: 467-68. More
recently, in Theodore Evergates, Littere Baronum: the Earliest Cartulary of the Counts of Champagne,
Medieval Academy Books (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), pp 159-60.
242
One of Thibaud’s witnesses, Guy de Chappes, was on the Fourth Crusade, although he returned to
Champagne in 1205. For a biographical sketch of Guy de Chappes see Longnon, Les compagnons de
Villehardouin, pp 57-58.
96
mentioned both relationships: “… count Pierre d’Auxerre, who had as wife the sister of

the emperor. He was the fraternal cousin of Philip [Augustus] of France.” 243 The

continuator of Brother Guillaume de Nangis also referred to Pierre II by referencing

both of his prestigious relatives “Pierre de Courtenay, count of Auxerre, relative of

Philip, king of France, and brother-in-law of the late emperor Henri.” 244 The

Byzantines, too, were aware of the kin relationship, suggesting that the Franks

considered it important enough to publish the information abroad. 245

Although Pierre II’s membership in Capetian circles was important to the

barons, Yolande’s origins were more so. Accounts of the couple’s coronation

emphasize her relationship with Henri. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines described the

transition in this way: “[T]he death of the emperor Henri of Constantinople was

announced and count Pierre d’Auxerre, his brother-in-law, was elected as emperor.” 246

The second continuation of the chronicle of Robert d’Auxerre reads, “Pierre, count of

Auxerre, brother-in-law of the dead emperor, a man strong in faith and arms, was

elected as emperor.” 247 Yolande’s significance in the empire following the death of

243
Baudoin d'Avesnes, “Livres de Baudoin d'Avesnes,” p. 505: “conte Pierron d’Aussoire qui avoit à
feme la serour l’empereour. Cil quens estoit cousins germains le roi Phelippe de France.”
244
Du Bouchet, Histoire généalogique de la maison royale de Courtenay, p. 16: “Petrum de Cortenaio
Autissiodorensem comitem Philippi regis Franciae consanguineum, et Henrici defuncti imperatoris
sororium.”
245
Akropolites spoke of the relationship between Yolande and the two prior Latin emperors in discussing
Pierre II’s fateful journey east. Acropolites, Opera, p. 25, ch 14: “ὁ μὲν οὖν ῥηθεὶς Πέτρος γαμβρὸς
ὑπῆρχεν ἐπ’ ἀδελφῇ τοῦ πρώτως βασιλεύσαντος ἐκ τοῦ Λατίνων μέρους Βαλδουΐνου καὶ τοῦ
μετ’αὐτὸν Ἐρῆ, ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ ἡ αὐτῶν ἀδελφὴ Ἰολεντία.” Translation from Akropolites, George
Akropolites: The History, p. 145, ch 14: “The said Peter was brother-in-law, through marriage to the
sister of Baldwin, the first on the side of the Latins to rule as emperor, and of Henry [who ruled] after
him. Their sister was called Iolanda.”
246
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 905: “nunciatur interea mors imperatoris Henrici
Constantinopolitani et eligitur comes Petrus Autisiodorensis in imperatorem, sororius eiusdem.”
247
Ibid., pp 281-82: “Petrus comes Autissiodorensis, defuncti imperatoris sororius, vir fide et armis
strenuus, in imperatorem eligitur.”
97
Pierre II affirmed her importance as a relative of the previous emperors’. 248 Although

Pierre II’s birth and history increased his appeal, he was only a candidate because of his

marriage.

Before considering Pierre II and Yolande’s actions as rulers, it is worth lingering

on a specific aspect of their French careers: the marriages of the Courtenay family.

These marriages flesh out a picture of the Courtenays before their accession. Moreover,

marriage was an essential tool for Yolande and her children in Constantinople and their

Western experience provided the background for their actions in the East. Pierre II’s

marriages were tightly bound to his relationship with Philip Augustus. His first wife,

Agnès, countess of Nevers and heiress to Auxerre, Nevers, and Tonnerre, was under the

protection of Philip Augustus when he granted her in marriage to his cousin, in return

for Pierre II’s concession of Montargis. 249 Agnès’s death in 1192/3 left to her husband

the task of safeguarding her inheritance for their daughter Mathilde. 250 Pierre II and his

daughter were then players in a complex peace arranged between Philip Augustus and

the count of Flanders. In order to seal the peace, Pierre II was to marry Yolande, the

count’s daughter, and Mathilde was to marry Philippe de Namur, the count’s son. 251

Pierre II and Yolande’s wedding was celebrated soon after the treaty in 1193, but

248
See pp 103-13 below.
249
For a brief discussion, see Baldwin, Government of Philip Augustus, p. 27. The grant is printed and
cataloged in several places, including H.-F. Delaborde et al., Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste (Paris,
1916), I: 134-35, no. 106. Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, V: 36, no. 107. A possible later
confirmation is preserved in Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 2. Philip Augustus’s confirmation is in Delaborde et
al., Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste, II: 548-50, no. 453. Léopold Delisle, Catalogue des actes de
Philippe Auguste (Paris, 1856), p. 96, no. 399.
250
For Agnès’s death, see AD Yonne, H 1669 and Lebeuf, Memoires concernant l'histoire ecclésiastique
et civile d'Auxerre, IV: 60, no. 84; Quantin, Cartulaire général de l'Yonne, II: 447-49, nos. 41-42.
251
AN J 1040, n 1, published and cataloged in Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, V: 36, no. 107;
Delisle, Catalogue des actes de Philippe Auguste, p. 96, no. 399; A. Wauters, Table chronologique des
chartes et diplômes imprimés concernant l'histoire de Belgique (Bruxelles, 1866), III: 25. For Philip
Augustus’s confirmation, see Delaborde et al., Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste, II: 548-50, no.
453. For a narrative witness, see Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 899, ll 16-19 (noting Pierre
and Yolande’s marriage under 1214).
98
Mathilde’s youth delayed her marriage. In the end, deteriorating relations between the

king and the count, culminating in a military conflict in which Philippe fought with his

brother and was captured by the French king, turned the delay into a cancellation.

Mathilde was later married as part of a different reconciliation, that between Pierre II

and Hervé de Donzy. 252 It is a sign of the significance of her marriage that Pierre II

swore that, if his daughter did not marry Hervé, he would not allow her to marry

Philippe de Namur or anyone else without the king’s permission. 253 Mathilde was

heiress to substantial lands, and Philip Augustus wanted to prevent her inheritance from

falling under the control of a possible enemy. 254

Pierre II and Yolande’s marriage failed to achieve its original purpose, the seal

of a Franco-Flemish peace, but it united two powerful families, each with an impressive

crusading history. 255 Although no witness attests directly to their personal relationship,

252
Hervé and Pierre were both violent and aggressive men. In this conflict, Hervé had soundly defeated
and captured Pierre. The marriage was part of the peace. Baldwin, Government of Philip Augustus, p.
99. For the agreement and Philip Augustus’s confirmation see Delisle, Catalogue des actes de Philippe
Auguste, p. 136, no. 574; Quantin, Cartulaire général de l'Yonne, II: 500-2, nos. 491-92; Teulet, Layettes
du Trésor des Chartres, I: 207, no. 502. Robert d'Auxerre, “Chronicon,” p. 259.
253
Both Pierre II and Yolande made this promise to Philip Augustus in December 1199. Delisle,
Catalogue des actes de Philippe Auguste, p. 136, no. 574; Wauters, Table chronologique, III: 119-20. In
1200, Philippe de Namur renounced his claims to Mathilde and ratified the peace treaty between the king
and the count of Flanders. Ibid., III: 129. Philippe de Namur eventually married Philip Augustus’s
daughter. Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, I: 361a-b, no. 952.
254
Philip Augustus’s hand is apparent in later marriages that implicated Mathilde’s lands. In 1215 and
1219, Hervé swore that his daughter, named Agnès after her grandmother, would not marry without royal
consent. Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, pp
71-2, no. 154. In 1221, Agnès married Guy of Châtillon, the count of Saint-Pol. Lebeuf, Memoires
concernant l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile d'Auxerre, III: 163; Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres,
I: 516b, no. 1447. The king used the rich and powerful inheritance of Auxerre and Nevers to further his
interests. Hervé and Mathilde’s marriage did more than keep the land out of the hands of an adherent of
Flanders, it provided Philip with a loyal vassal in Hervé. Baldwin, Government of Philip Augustus, pp
194, 262, 270-78, 333, 426-27.
255
For consideration of the crusading traditions, see Krijnie Ciggaar, “Flemish Counts and Emperors:
Friends and Foreigners in Byzantium,” in The Latin Empire: Some Contributions, ed. V. D. van Aalst and
K. N. Ciggaar (The Netherlands: A. A. Bredius Foundation, 1990), 33-62; Phillips, Defenders of the Holy
Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119–1187, 271-81; Elizabeth Siberry, “The
Crusading Counts of Nevers,” Nottingham Medieval Studies XXXIV (1990): 64-71. Pierre II participated
in the Third Crusade and the Albigensian Crusade. Lebeuf, Memoires concernant l'histoire
ecclésiastique et civile d'Auxerre, IV: 58-59, no. 81.
99
evidence points to their marriage as an alliance of like-minded individuals. They appear

in charters together, and in 1199 Yolande affirmed her husband’s oath to support Philip

Augustus. 256 They were also a fertile couple, being the parents of thirteen children. 257

Pierre II’s roles in the king’s struggles with the counts of Champagne and

Flanders have already demonstrated his orientation toward northern France and the

crown. The marriages and religious vocations of his children confirm the family’s

focus on French and Flemish affairs. Of Pierre II and Yolande’s sons, two, Philippe and

Henri, became marquis of Namur, an inheritance from their mother. 258 Their sons

Robert and Baudouin II inherited the throne of Constantinople. Of their daughters who

married or entered religious institutions before 1217, only the younger Yolande went far

afield. 259 The other women married men of substance near to the center of familial

power, including the count of Vianden, the son of the count of Bar-sur-Seine, the

grandson of the duke of Burgundy, the lord of Castres, and of La Ferté-Alais. 260 Three

of their children, Constance, Pierre, and Sybille, entered the church. 261

256
See Pierre’s donation for an anniversary for him and Yolande. Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire
suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, pp 16, 20, nos. 32, 40. For her confirmation see:
Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 3.
257
Berton, Courtenay et ses anciens seigneurs: notes historiques, pp 67-68.
258
For documents concerning Yolande’s inheritance and her transfer of Namur to Philippe, see: Galliot,
Histoire générale, V: 356, 378-80; Wauters, Table chronologique, III: 367, 415, 460. Philippe never
married and died during Louis VIII’s siege of Avignon. Henri’s wife, Élisabeth, is mentioned in several
charters, but no children survived. Galliot, Histoire générale, V: 399-405, 408-11. Baudouin II
inherited Namur in 1237.
259
See pp 72-74 above. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 906, l 30: “Unam filiarum eius,
Hyolenz nomine, duxit Andreas rex Ungarie; secundam, nomine Sibiliam, habuit Radulfus de Eddolduno
in Bituria, quam postea duxit comes Henricus de Vienna et Ardenna; tertiam habuit Lascarus Grecus, qui
dicebatur imperator Nicee, sed de ista filios non habuit; quartum Gaufridus iunior de Villa Harduini, filius
Gaufridi principis de insula Montionis; quintam Galtherus de Barro super Sequanam, comitis Milonis
filius, quam postea duxit Odo, Alexandri filius, frater ducis Burgundie Odonis.”
260
Marguérite first married Raoul of Issoudon, in Berry, and then Henri, the count of Vianden. For the
acquisition of Issoudon and continued interests there, see Baldwin, Government of Philip Augustus, pp
21, 26, 97, 298, 342. For Marguérite’s marriage to Raoul see Delisle, Catalogue des actes de Philippe
Auguste, p. 459, no. 2071. For her later marriage to Henri see Galliot, Histoire générale, V: 417-18;
Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III: 11-12, no. 3604. Élisabeth married Gaucher, the son of the
count of Bar-sur-Seine, and then Eudes de Montaigu, the grandson of the duke of Burgundy. See letter
100
 In addition to his close relations with the French king and his involvement in

Flemish and French politics, Pierre II could claim military experience, if not always

prowess. The count participated in at least two of Philip Augustus’s most important

military endeavors: the Third Crusade and the Franco-Imperial conflict culminating at

Bouvines. 262 Another conflict, that with a neighbor, Hervé de Donzy, ended with Pierre

II’s capture in 1199. 263 The count also had a long-running quarrel with the bishop of

Auxerre. 264 Pierre II might have been, as Wolff and others have accused him, “one of

the most turbulent, quarrelsome, and notorious barons in all France,” but he had

experience in governing, negotiating, and fighting, and he would have been familiar in

these roles to the Burgundian, Champenois, and Flemish barons in Constantinople. 265

Pierre II and Yolande’s political affiliations and their children’s marriages

centered on Flanders and France. Their acceptance of the imperial crown marked a

departure from their prior careers, although one perhaps foretold by their daughter’s

marriage to the king of Hungary. Their reasons for accepting the envoys’ proposal are

unclear, but several possibilities present themselves. A chronicler in Auxerre suggested

from Baudouin to Blanche. Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 424: “Nobilem mulierem
Elisabeth dominam Montis-Acuti, sororem nostram, et Odonem eiusdem castri Dominum virum suum.”
Éléonore married Philippe de Montfort, lord of Castres and of La Ferté-Alais, south of Paris, also a
committed crusader who, after her death, relocated to the Holy Land and became lord of Tyre. Philippe
de Montfort took the cross with a collection of important French barons including Robert de Courtenay,
his uncle-in-law, and Guy de Forez, the husband of Mathilde de Courtenay. He was also the nephew of
John d’Ibelin, lord of Beirut. Wolff and Hazard, The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, 2: 469, 553, 559-60.
261
In 1210, a charter of Pierre II’s refers to “clericus P., filius ejus.” Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour
faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, p. 42, no. 92. The count made a donation in
1210 to the abbey of Fontevrault for his daughter Sybille to enjoy during her life. Ibid., p. 42, no. 93. I
cannot find a reference for Constance, but Berton apparently could. Berton, Courtenay et ses anciens
seigneurs: notes historiques, p. 68.
262
For Pierre on crusade with Philip Augustus see Rigord, “Gesta Philippi Augusti,” pp 83-84, ch 56. For
Pierre at Soissons and Bouvines see Breton, “Gesta Philippi Augusti,” p. 286, ch 194. The last also
records that Pierre’s son, Philippe of Namur, was among the forces opposing the king at Bouvines.
263
Berton, Courtenay et ses anciens seigneurs: notes historiques, pp 47-48.
264
Constance Brittain Bouchard, Spirituality and Administration: The Role of the Bishop in Twelfth-
Century Auxerre (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1979), pp 129-31.
265
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 456.
101
that Yolande was the driving force, urging her husband to accept the crown. 266 Family

feeling and pride in her brothers’ accomplishments as crusaders and emperors may have

inclined her to take over their empire. Moreover, Pierre II was likely dissatisfied with

his situation in France. His most important territories were the inheritance of his

daughter’s from her mother. At Mathilde’s marriage to Hervé, the newlyweds received

Nevers and Pierre II was granted Auxerre and Tonnerre until his death, at which point

they would pass to Mathilde. 267 He was a prosperous man but could scarcely have

rejected out of hand the challenge of a new realm to pass on to his sons. Finally, Pierre

II’s career suggests an affinity for violence and conflict, and his personal inclination led

him to seek out new adventures and battles.

Pierre II and Yolande’s new commitment did not precipitate a complete break

from their earlier lives. In provisions for departure, they made fairly typical donations

to local monastic institutions. 268 Pierre II retained the lordship of his territories,

including those destined for Mathilde, but he ceded Auxerre to its burgesses for a period

of six years in exchange for money to fund his expedition. 269 The temporary nature of

the grant suggests his concern for the future, that he kept his possessions as insurance if

the relocation to Constantinople failed. Even if he remained in the East, he could use

future income from his Western lands to support his new Eastern enterprise. Crusaders

266
“Historia episcoporum autissiodorensium,” in RHGF (Paris: V. Palme, 1879), p. 728: “instigante
uxore.”
267
Lebeuf, Memoires concernant l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile d'Auxerre, III: 133-24. For the letter
of Hervé de Donzy’s confirming the arrangement and announcing the approval of Philip Augustus see
Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, I: 206-7, no. 502.
268
These included donations to Pontigny (AD Yonne, H 1399, p 483, French summ) and to Andresy and
Saint Germain (Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe
siècle, pp 84-85, nos. 181-88.)
269
Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum (Lutetiae Parisiorum: Sumptibus
F. Delaulne, 1717), I: col 846. Robert d'Auxerre, “Chronicon,” p. 282. For a discussion see Wolff, “The
Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 458.
102
had long used their lands to support crusading ventures. Baudouin I had set a precedent

for charging Western lands to support the Latin Empire in particular, one that would be

continued by his nephew, Baudouin II. There can be little doubt about the temporary

nature of Pierre II’s grant. In 1220, when rumors of Pierre II’s death had been heard but

not confirmed, Hervé attempted to take control of Auxerre. Honorius III intervened,

insisting that Hervé relinquish his claim and asking the king to compel his

compliance. 270 It was not until the end of 1221, four years after Pierre II’s capture, that

Honorius III acknowledged Mathilde’s right to control the city, thus severing the ties

between Auxerre and the Latin Empire. 271 Likewise, Pierre II and Yolande’s eldest son,

Philippe of Namur, did not swear fidelity to Philip Augustus with respect to Courtenay

until 1223. 272

The Courtenays in Constantinople

Yolande was not merely a conduit of imperial legitimacy. Her role in the new

empire surpassed and superceded her husband’s. Outside of Rome, in the spring of

1217, the pope crowned both: “Pope Honorius III consecrated Pierre count of Auxerre

as emperor of Constantinople and Yolande, his wife, as empress.” 273 They confirmed

the partition of the empire, opening with: “[W]e, Pierre, by the grace of God most loyal

in Christ, crowned by God emperor of Constantinople, moderator of Rome, and always

270
Ernest Petit, Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne (Impr. Dijon: Darantiere, 1885), vol. 3, part 4, pp 184-
85, nos. 1620 and 1631. Bouchard discusses this conflict in the context of William of Seigneley, the
bishop of Auxerre whom Pierre placed in charge of Auxerre during his absence. Bouchard, Spirituality
and Administration: The Role of the Bishop in Twelfth-Century Auxerre, p. 132.
271
Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, p. 118, no.
270: “accepimus, quod cum certe de obitu clare memorie Petri, imperatoris Constantinopolitani,
civitatem Autissiod.” See Berton, Courtenay et ses anciens seigneurs: notes historiques, pp 58-60.
272
Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 20. Du Bouchet mistakenly dates the charter to 1232. Du Bouchet, Histoire
généalogique de la maison royale de Courtenay, Preuves, p. 17.
273
Robert d'Auxerre, “Chronicon,” p 281-82: “Honorius papa III consecrat Petrum comitem
Autissiodorensem in imperatorem Constantinopolitanum et Yolandem, uxorem eius, in imperatricem
dominica qua cantatur Misericordia Domini in monasterio Sancti Laurentii extra muros.”
103
augustus and we, Yolande, his wife, by the grace of God empress.” 274 After their

coronation, Pierre II headed for Constantinople by an overland route, intending to

confront the ruler of Epiros, Theodore Doukas, who had come to power in 1215 after

the murder of his brother, Michael Doukas. Theodore Doukas was no more reliable

than was his brother. 275 After Pierre II unsuccessfully attacked Durazzo, Theodore

Doukas promised him safe passage through Epirote land, a promise that he broke in a

spectacular fashion by attacking and capturing the new emperor, who eventually died in

custody. 276

Yolande also proceeded to Constantinople, but she went by sea with her two

daughters, Agnès and Marie, and she arrived safely. She did not long outlive her

husband, but contemporary chronicles and documents confirm that she ruled in

Constantinople as empress. As Aubri de Trois-Fontaines put it, “[T]he wife of Pierre

escaped with her daughters, and as long as she lived, she ruled the land and empire.” 277

A letter of the Venetian podestà to the doge, written after Yolande’s death, clarified her

position. The podestà described various recent events, dwelling in particular on the

conflict over church property. 278 What is relevant here is the clear indication that

Yolande ruled in her own right, not merely as regent for an absent son or husband.

274
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 194, no. CCIL: “nos Petrus, Dei gratia fidelissimus in Christo
Constantinopolitanus Imperator a Deo coronatus, Romanie moderator et semper augustus; et nos Yolens,
eius uxor, eadem gratia Imperatrix.”
275
See pp 68-70 above
276
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp 152-57; Nicol, The
Despotate of Epiros, pp 51-53; Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 464-67.
277
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 906: “evasit tamen cum filiabus uxor eiusdem Petri, que
quamdiu vixit terram illam et imperium gubernavit.”
278
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, pp 215-21, no. CCLVII. This problem had been plaguing the Latin
Empire and the patriarchate for several years. Honorius had attempted to place the disposition of this
question on hold after Henri’s death, but when the papal legate John Colonna arrived in Constantinople in
1218, he was assigned to resolve the issue. An involved and difficult negotiation followed, some details
of which were reported by the podestà to the pope. These matters do not directly concern us here and
have been discussed by Wolff. Wolff, “Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople, 1204–1261”.
104
According to the podestà, the barons swore to “the lady Empress and her heirs” that

they would accept “for lord and emperor Philippe, son of the Empress.” 279 As Henri’s

sister, Yolande was the heir to the throne, and the barons’ oaths were taken to her.

Honorius III likewise referred to her as the empress of Constantinople in several letters,

with no suggestion that she held the throne as regent for an absent husband, son, or

brother. 280

Being brief, Yolande’s tenure as empress is poorly documented. Some

information comes from papal letters, all of which confirm the portrayal of her rule in

the podestà’s letter. Honorius III responded to her request concerning an episcopal

appointment and in a letter to the legate listed her at the head of those who unjustly

detained property of the chapter of the Holy Apostles. 281 She was the recipient of papal

assurance that only the pope or his legates could pronounce a sentence of

excommunication on her or place her land or churches under interdict. 282 By October

1219, she was dead and Conon of Béthune, the regent, was confirming, once again, the

division of the empire. 283

The limited documentation makes it impossible to know whether she shared her

brothers’ enmity for the French king or her husband’s loyalty to him. No record

survives of correspondence between her and Philip Augustus, but our general ignorance

about her tenure makes an argument from silence even more suspect than usual. Her

behavior prior to 1217 suggests that she shared her husband’s affiliations; in France,

279
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, p. 220, no. CCLVII: “dominae Imperatrici et suis heredibus” and “pro
domino et Imperatore Philippum, filium eiusdem dominae Imperatricis.” The succession following
Yolande’s death will be discussed presently.
280
See his letter to “imperatrici Constantinopolitane illustri” protecting her from excommunication laid
by anyone other than the pope. Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, p. 352, no. 2128.
281
Ibid., pp 154 and 237, nos. 912 and 1434.
282
Ibid., p. 352, no. 2128.
283
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, pp 214-15, no. CCLVI.
105
they frequently acted in concert, including her confirmation of Pierre II’s oath of loyalty

to Philip Augustus. 284 Her sons’ imperial reigns offer more information and do, in fact,

show the growth of a relationship between the Courtenay emperors and the Capetian

kings.

Some of our strongest evidence for Yolande’s attitudes and practices come from

the marriages of her daughters, Agnès and Marie. They accompanied Yolande and

were likely included in the party in order to establish marriage alliances with

Constantinople’s neighbors. Just as Bonifacio’s daughter and, probably, Henri’s

daughter had been summoned from the West, so were Agnès and Marie brought from

France in order to serve the political needs of the Latin Empire. Yet, in arranging

marriages, Yolande demonstrated different priorities than did her brothers. She chose

as husbands for her daughters two rulers with whom the Latin Empire did not yet have a

connection by marriage: Geoffroy II de Villehardouin, prince of the Morea, and

Theodore Lascaris, emperor of Nicaea. In doing so, the new empress solidified one

alliance and neutralized an enemy. Their marriages fit with those of Pierre II’s other

daughters, intended to further the family’s prestige and strengthen its position, primarily

with its neighbors. After their coronation, Pierre II and Yolande had new neighbors

with whom to make alliances.

Agnès’s marriage was arranged first. En route to Constantinople, Yolande and

her companions stopped in Greece where Agnès married Geoffroy II, son of Geoffroy I

de Villehardouin, prince of the Morea, and grandnephew of Geoffroy, the marshal of

Champagne and chronicler of the Fourth Crusade. Their marriage was of long duration,

284
For her confirmation of Pierre’s oath see Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 3. Pierre and Yolande made several
joint donations. Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 1; AD Yonne, H 1476; Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire
suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, pp 42, 84, nos. 93, 187.
106
although it did not produce any known children. 285 The Villehardouin were an

unsurprising ally for Constantinople. In 1217, political and feudal ties, a common

French origin, and shared enemies already bound the Villehardouin to Constantinople.

Geoffroy I and Geoffroy the Chronicler had been on the Fourth Crusade and settled in

the East. Geoffroy I was a leader in the conquest of southern Greece and, after the

death of Guillaume de Champlitte, became prince of the Morea. At the Parliament of

Ravennika in 1209, Geoffroy recognized Henri as his overlord and the emperor

confirmed him in his lands and his position as seneschal of the Latin Empire. 286 The

marriage of Geoffroy II and Agnès eight years later solidified this beneficial

relationship. The connection proved to be durable. The Villehardouin princes

supported the emperors on several occasions, including providing a cash subsidy to Jean

de Brienne and sending a naval fleet to relieve Constantinople in 1236. 287

It is difficult to evaluate to what extent the marriage between Agnès and

Geoffroy II was necessary for maintaining the close relationship between the emperors

and the Villehardouin princes. Perhaps the other ties would have been sufficient. Wolff

certainly thought so, arguing that it was the oath that bound Geoffroy I to Henri at

Ravennika that brought Geoffroy II to the rescue of Constantinople. 288 The fourteenth-

285
The Chronique d’Ernoul provides an account of this marriage. Chronique d'Ernoul et des Bernard le
trésorier, p. 392. Geoffroy died in 1246. In 1247, while at Namur, Baudouin referred to his sister Agnès,
wife of the prince of Achaia, as one of his possible heirs. She was probably, then, still alive in or around
1247. AN, J 509, n. 2, published in Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III: 11-12, no. 3604.
286
Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” p. 406, ch 669-70: “Et là devint Joffrois hom
l’empereour Henri, et li empereres li acrut son fief de le senescaucie de Romenie; et il en baisa
l’empereour en foi.”
287
John S. Langdon, “The Forgotten Byzantino-Bulgarian Assault and the Siege of Constantinople 1235–
1236, and the Breakup of the entente cordiale between John III Ducas Vatatzes and John Asen II in 1236
as Background to the Genesis of the Hohenstaufen-Vatatzes Alliance of 1242,” in Byzantine Studies in
Honor of Milton V. Anastos, ed. Speros Vryonis, Byzantina kai Metabyzantina (Malibu: UNdena
Publications, 1985), pp 116-18.
288
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 555. See pp 162-64 below for a
consideration of Geoffroy II’s aid to Constantinople.
107
century Chronicle of the Morea, however, suggests that contemporaries perceived the

Courtenay-Villehardouin marriage connection as central to their relationship. 289 Under

no circumstances should the section of the Chronicle on the marriage be used

uncritically to ascertain facts. At many points, it is verifiably inaccurate, but as a work

of creative imagination it explores the value of marriage to Western and Eastern powers

respectively. Moreover, it captures the mentality of the actors well—or seems to.

According to the Chronicle, Robert, the emperor of Constantinople, sent his daughter to

Spain to marry the king of Aragon and, therefore, as the Chronicle explicitly states, to

receive troops and assistance from him. On the way, the ships stopped in Greece, and

there Agnès was persuaded to marry Geoffroy. This marriage, understandably, angered

Robert, but his barons convinced him to accept it, a story that resonates with the role of

Henri’s barons in the matter of the Bulgarian alliances. 290 Both the proposed marriage

with the king of Aragon and the actual one with Geoffroy had provisions attached

ensuring support for the Latin Empire when needed. But the barons agreed that “this

relationship by marriage [with Geoffroy de Villehardouin] was more advantageous than

the one with the king of Aragon, who was so far away.” 291 By the fourteenth century,

the settlers had learned that Western promises of assistance were usually empty. They

projected back on the early thirteenth century a preference for alliances with friendly

289
Longnon, Livre de la conqueste, pp 62-66, ch 177-86. Schmitt, The Chronicle of Morea. To
Chronikon tou Moreos, pp 166-74. A translation is available in Harold Lurier, trans., Crusaders as
Conquerors: The Chronicle of the Morea (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp 144-46.
290
See p. 63 above.
291
Translation from Lurier, Crusaders as Conquerors: The Chronicle of the Morea, p. 146. The French
version reads: “Et li baron qui moult estoient sages, si debatirent la chose en maintes manieres. Si se
acorderent tout a une voulenté et dirent a l’empereor que ceste chose estoit bien avenans et que Dieux
proprement l’avoit ordiné et destiné, pour quoy ces .ij. seignors feussent une chose pour aidier et secourre
l’un l’autre, et deffendre leurs pays contre leurs anemis et de conquester sure aux.” Longnon, Livre de la
conqueste, p. 64, ch 183. The Greek account includes the following: “ἐπεὶ ἦτο ἐπιδεξιώτερον αὐτὴ ἡ
συμπεθερία, / παρὰ εἰς τὀν ρῆγαν ντἐ Ραγγιοῦν ὅπου ἔνι οὕτως μακρέα.” Schmitt, The
Chronicle of Morea. To Chronikon tou Moreos, p. 172.
108
neighbors over ones with distant Westerners. In the Chronicle, the barons argued for

Geoffroy’s greater reliability, noting that Constantinople and the Morea had a shared

enemy in the Greeks and that Geoffroy had agreed to bind himself to Robert as his

vassal. The Chronicle places tremendous weight on the marriage. It attributes the lord-

vassal relationship between Constantinople and the Morea to the marriage, when in fact

the political connection was formed at the Parliament of Ravennika in 1209. 292 For the

fourteenth-century historian, the marriage was the initial and primary connection. Even

if the anonymous author exaggerated its significance, his focus suggests that the

marriage was understood as foundational in the Courtenay-Villehardouin alliance. 293

Agnès’s marriage was designed to further the interests of the new empire, but

her spouse was still a French aristocrat, in family background, religion, and culture

similar to someone she might have married in France. The same cannot be said for

Marie’s husband, Theodore Lascaris, the Greek imperial claimant based in Nicaea, who

was in language, religion, and culture a foreigner. 294 Henri had cited him as the Latin

Empire’s “first and greatest” enemy but had established peace with him without

simultaneously concluding a marriage alliance. 295 Yolande remedied this upon her

arrival in Constantinople. The alliance had evident advantages for both sides. For the

Latin Empire, it ensured continued peace in Asia Minor while Yolande established

herself and her rule in Constantinople. Along with the change in power in Bulgaria and

292
Henri de Valenciennes, “Histoire de l'empereur Henri,” p. 406, ch 669-70.
293
See pp 163-64 below for a discussion of Wolff’s dismissal of the marriage in creating a lasting bond
between the Villehardouin and the Courtenay.
294
For Greek reference for their marriage see Acropolites, Opera, pp 24-26, 30-31, ch 14, 18. Translated
in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 145, 157, ch 14, 18.
295
See pp 77-82 above.
109
Theodore’s focus on Thessaloniki, the new alliance also ensured the capital a break

from external threats.

This marriage encouraged Lascaris to direct his attempts to regain

Constantinople into diplomatic veins instead of, or sometimes in addition to, military

ones. 296 In becoming Pierre II and Yolande’s son-in-law, he added to the heft of his

claims the throne, particularly as assessed in the Byzantine tradition. After marrying

Marie, he was the widower and husband, respectively, of two potential heiresses to the

imperial throne: a Byzantine one and a Latin one. Yolande’s own succession and rule

affirmed the possibility of female inheritance. Two other developments following the

marriage support the conclusion that Lascaris sought Constantinople through marriage

and diplomacy: an agreement between Lascaris and the podestà and a proposal for a

council to consider reunion between the Greek and Latin churches. 297

In August of 1219, before Yolande’s death, Lascaris entered into a five-year

agreement with the podestà. This was apparently a renewal of agreements in 1214. 298

He promised to protect the men and goods of Venice within his land and granted them

the right to trade without being subject to tolls or other exactions. Nicaean merchants

296
See Langdon’s evaluation: “If Theodore I Lascaris, with his Constantinopolitan roots and marriage
connections to the imperial Angeli, sought after 1211 to achieve this end through dynastic maneuvering
and détente with the Latin officials of Romania (namely, the feudal dynasty of Hainaut and Courtenay,
the Venetian merchant oligarchy, and the Roman church), his successor John III Ducas Vatatzes, the
scion of Thracian δυνατοι and the inheritor of a proud military tradition, eschewed diplomatic wrangling
and negotiation with the hated Latin interlopers in the oecumene in favor of a more direct military
solution to his life’s ambition of the restitutio orbis.” Langdon, Byzantium's Last Imperial Offensive in
Asia Minor, p. 5.
297
Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, pp 95-113. See the letter of the Greeks: Johanne Baptista Cotelerio,
Ecclesiae graecae monumenta (Paris: Luteciae parisiorum, 1677), III: 495-520.
298
There is a reference in the treaty to “nuper transacte treuge.” Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 207,
no. CCLII. Wolff suggests that the previous agreements might have been completed at the time of
Lascaris’s marriage to Marie. Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 474.
Jacoby, whose opinion on matters of the Venetians in the Latin Empire is expert, locates them in 1214.
David Jacoby, “The Economy of Latin Constantinople, 1204–1261,” in Urbs Capta: The Fourth Crusade
and Its Consequences = La IVe Croisade et conséquences, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou, Réalités byzantines
(Paris: Lethielleux, 2005), pp 206-7.
110
could likewise trade in Constantinople and Venetian territories, but they were not

exempt from duties. Provisions were made for the treatment of shipwrecks, inheritance,

coinage, and Venetian mercenaries. Most surprisingly, Lascaris promised not to sail a

fleet through the Hellespont to Constantinople without Venetian consent. This clause

provided protection to Constantinople against a naval attack. Lascaris also recognized

the Venetian right to land in the empire, calling the potestà “domini altissimi Ducis

Venecie Potestate Venetorum in Romania et Despote Imperij Romanie et quarte partis

et dimidie eius Imperij uice sui dominatore.” 299

In 1219/1220, the Nicaean patriarch called for a synod of the four Eastern

patriarchs at which they would prepare to send an envoy to the papacy “with a view to

eliminating scandals, to giving peace to the Churches and to bringing all Christians for

the future to one mind.” 300 Church union would put Lascaris in a much stronger

position with regard to the crusader settlers in Constantinople. Both Innocent III’s

joyous response to the fall of Constantinople and his later condemnation of the emperor

and barons were based on a desire for church union. If the Nicaean church returned to

communion with Rome, it would remove the pillar of justification for the Western

occupation of Constantinople and, in a succession crisis, make it much more likely that

the barons would incline toward Lascaris or perhaps his children. The synod never

299
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 205-6, no. CCLII.
300
For announcements of the synod and its purpose see V. Laurent, Les regestes des Actes du
Partriarchat de Constantinople, Fasc. IV (Les regestes de 1208 á 1309) (Paris, 1971), I, fasc. IV: 29-30,
nos. 1222-24. I relied for details and the translation on Joseph Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–
1400 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1979), pp 49-50. See also: F. Dölger, Regesten der
Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches (Münich, 1932), III: 7, no. 1704.
111
occurred because of the ensuing schism between the Nicaean and Epirote churches, an

issue not directly of concern here. 301

These events—the marriage and its accompanying truce, the gesture toward

church union, and the agreement with the podestà—reveal a “wait and see” attitude on

the part of Lascaris. As Lascaris’s wife, Marie probably encouraged this approach.

Mouskès credited her with being “saçans et aspre,” and she may have used those

attributes to influence her husband. 302 His willingness to negotiate, however, should not

be mistaken for an abandonment of his designs on Constantinople. Although his

agreement with the podestà reflects a policy of reconciliation, its language reveals that

Lascaris had not lost sight of his ultimate goal. The text grants Lascaris imperial titles:

“Teodorus, in Christo Deo fidelis Imperator et moderator Romeorum et semper

augustus, Comnanus Lascarus.” It repeatedly uses the phrase “mei Imperij” and even

“terrarum Imperij mei in Constantinopli.” 303

He also did not renounce the use of military force against the Franks. During

the interregnum following Yolande’s death, he was also engaged in military action.

According to Mouskès, when Robert de Courtenay was crowned emperor, “the barons

were in the east against Lascaris, who in the spring after the death of [Robert’s] mother

301
There are numerous modern accounts of the ecclesiastical relations between Nicaea and
Epiros/Thessaloniki, see, for example: Francois Bredenkamp, The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki
(1224–1242) (Thessaloniki: Thessaloniki Municipal History Centre, 1996), pp 99-102, 133-41, 208-17;
Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, pp 112-13, 125-35; Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400, pp 49-50;
Apostolos Karpozilos, The Ecclesiastical Controversy between the Kingdom of Nicaea and the
Principality of Epiros (1217–1233) (Thessaloniki: Kentron Byzantinon Ereunon, 1973); Nicol, The
Despotate of Epiros, pp 76-78; D. M. Nicol, “Ecclesiastical Relations between the Despotate of Epiros
and the Kingdom of Nicaea,” Byzantion XXII (1952): 207-228.
302
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 160. “La tierce fu saçans et
aspre; Cele si fu donnee a Lascre, Un haut prince de la Turkïe, Qui frant tiere ot en sa bailli.” Philippe
Mouskès, Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskès, Collection de Chroniques Belges inédits (Brussels,
1838), II: 765, ll 23009-12.
303
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 205-7, no. CCLII.
112
sought to take the empire by force.” 304 Lascaris’s abrupt turn to military action was

likely a direct result of the barons’ choice of Robert and of the information that the new

emperor was proceeding to the East. The barons’ decision to turn again to the West and

overlook Lascaris’s claim to the throne undoubtedly angered the Nicaean emperor,

whose marriage had raised hopes that the Franks would not meet. Nevertheless, despite

his disappointment and the renewal of military conflict, Lascaris did not become an

intractable enemy. As we will see, he unsuccessfully sought to renew the marriage tie

with an engagement between Robert and his own daughter Eudokia.

A contemporary confirmation that the marriages of the Latin Empire were

arranged with peace and aid in mind comes from Baudouin d’Avesnes. He explicity

acknowledged the purpose behind the marriages, to strengthen the position of the

empire, although he was mistaken about the details. 305 He described the outcome in

simple words: “By these marriages he acquired great peace and great aid.” 306 These

marriages, part of the complex web of alliances surrounding Constantinople, as well as

with Yolande’s actions more generally, demonstrate that, whatever provisions Pierre II

and Yolande made for their lands in the West, the empress viewed her relocation to the

East as permanent. Further, she displayed, in a short period of time, a willingness to

conform to Frankish expectations. Besides marrying her daughters to neighbors,

including a non-Latin, she gave her youngest son, who was born in Constantinople, the

same name as her brother, the first Latin emperor. Upon her death, however, it was not

304
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 405, ll 23083-87: “si baron ièrent en l’ost / Contre Lascare, qui lues
tantost / Qu’il sot la mort sa mère en voir, / Vot l’empire par force avoir .”
305
Among other mistakes, he stated that one of Pierre II and Yolande’s daughters married “Johennis le roi
de Balquie.” Baudoin d'Avesnes, “Livres de Baudoin d'Avesnes,” p. 505.
306
Ibid.: “Par ces mariaiges aquist il grant pais et grant aide.”
113
this boy, Baudouin II, who inherited. Instead the barons again turned to the West for a

new emperor.

The Interregnum and the Selection of Robert

Two years passed between Yolande’s death and the arrival of her son Robert,

the new emperor. For a large part of the period between 1216 and 1221, then, the

barons and Venetians ran the empire in the absence of a resident emperor or empress.

Wolff suggested that this situation necessarily created great weakness: “[S]o great had

been Henry’s achievements that his enemies did not yet realize the vulnerability of the

Latin Empire without him.” 307 The absence of an emperor, however, does not

necessarily indicate a lower quality or intensity of governance. If contemporary

portrayals of Robert are to be believed, Constantinople was more secure under its

regents with an empress than under its new emperor. 308 From the initial conquest of

Byzantine lands, the barons played a substantial role in the governance and defense of

the empire. 309 Conon de Béthune, the first regent after Yolande’s death, had far more

experience in the East than did either Yolande or Robert, including a previous stint as

regent after Henri’s death. 310 In a polity where the loyalty of the populace was more a

matter of practicality than of sentiment, the absence of a crowned emperor may not

have had a significant impact. Henri, the most popular emperor among his Greek

307
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 481.
308
See, for example, Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 910, ll 41-43.
309
Along with Venetian advisers, they formed a council that assisted the emperor, decided when to call
the knights to fight in campaigns, and had jurisdiction over relations between the emperors and the
nobles. Longnon, Recherches sur la vie de Geoffrey de Villehardouin, pp 191-92, no. 74.
310
For Conon de Béthune’s earlier position as regent, see Honorius’s introduction of his legate in
Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, p. 92, no. 526. For his stint after Yolande’s death, see his own
confirmation of Venetian privileges in Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, pp 214-25, no. CCLVI. Conon was
on the Fourth Crusade and was an important baron in the new empire. He was a member of delegations
for several diplomatic initiatives. The choice of papal legate to replace Anseau may have been less
fortunate from a military standpoint. Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin, pp 146-49.
114
subjects, was so because of his treatment of the Greek church and populace, not because

they felt an inherited loyalty to or affinity with him as their ruler. 311 The barons’

assertiveness, already noticeable under Henri’s rule, increased during the interregna and

Robert’s reign. Their prominence in all matters of statecraft became one of the central

features of the Latin Empire, a development that set this state apart from many of its

European contemporaries but paralleled developments in other crusader states.

Robert was not the first choice to succeed his mother on the imperial throne.

The same letter in which the podestà described the conflict over church property also

mentioned the question of Yolande’s successor. The barons swore to accept “pro

domino et Imperatore Philippum, filium eiusdem dominae Imperatricis” and they

anticipated his arrival by the feast of the nativity of John the Baptist, the 24th of June

1220. 312 They were mistaken. Philippe did not come East, choosing instead to remain

in Namur. No source speaks to his reasons for refusing the offer of the crown. His

prominent position in the West and his involvement in Flemish politics probably made

him reluctant to abandon his Western life for an unknown future in the East. The

barons, at Philippe’s direction, turned toward his younger brother Robert, who accepted

their offer and traveled to Constantinople via Hungary. 313 The barons’ expectation of a

311
See Akropolites’ account of Henri. Acropolites, Opera, p. 26, ch 15. Translation in Akropolites,
George Akropolites: The History, p. 153, ch 15.
312
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 220, no. CCLVII.
313
Mouskès, Ernoul and Baudouin d’Avesnes all give essentially the same details. Chronique d'Ernoul et
des Bernard le trésorier, p. 393: “Quant li emperis fu morte, li chevalier de le tiere manderent le conte de
Namur qui fiex estoit l’emperis, qu’il alast en Costantinoble, que li tiere li estoit eskeue. Quant li
mesages vinrent à lui et il orent conté lor message, il dist qu’il s’en conselleroir. I s’en consella, mais
[consaus] ne li aporta mie qu’il i alast; ains i envoia Robert sen frere, qui maisnés estoit de lui, et si lor
manda qu’il le coronassent, qu’il n’i pooit aler et qu’il n’iroient noient.” Baudouin d’Avesnes related
Robert’s journey through Hungary. Baudoin d'Avesnes, “Livres de Baudoin d'Avesnes,” p. 506: “Cil
s’en ala par Hongrie, où il fut receus à grant honour de sa serour, qui estoit roine de la terre, et dou roi
Andrieu. Il sejourna tout l’yver en Hongrie, car il n’avoit mie bien les passaiges à sa volunte.” Mouskès,
Chronique rimée, II: 404, ll 23041-23053: “Son fil mandèrent Felippon, / Et il en a dounet le don /
Robiert, son frère, par consel, / Ne faire n’en vot aparel. / Robiers, ses frères, s’atorna, / Viers Hungrie
115
resident emperor by June proved overly optimistic; Robert did not appear in

Constantinople until March of 1221 when he swore to respect the conventions already

made with the Venetians, particularly the division of the empire, as his predecessors had

done and his successors would do. 314

Robert’s succession is generally considered to have been a disaster for the

empire. During his reign, the Franks lost Thessaloniki and Adrianople, along with their

possessions in Asia Minor. His selection was due entirely to his status as Pierre II and

Yolande’s son and not to any particular strengths or skills. In fact, his character was

deplored. Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, for example, dismissed him as “quasi rudis et

idiota.” 315 Little is known about his life before his arrival in Constantinople, other than

his capture while fighting for Philip Augustus in the conflict with Flanders. 316 In the

several years since Pierre II’s departure, the Courtenays in France had retained their

intimacy with the Capetians. In particular, Robert’s uncle, also named Robert, and his

elder half-sister Mathilde, were prominent in royal politics. The barons did not select

Robert, however, for his loyalty to the crown. Their first choice, Philippe, marquis de

Namur, had opposed the king and his own father at Bouvines, but he had military and

administrative experience that would have served the empire well. 317 Their quick turn

to Robert reveals that their primary requirement was the issue of legitimate succession;

that Robert was partial to France not Flanders and apparently bereft of talents probably

s’acemina. / Venus i est à serour, / Moult le reciut à grant ounor / Li rois Andrius, si fist sa suer, / Et s’ot
tout leur avoir à fuer. / Tout l’ivier furent à plenté, / Mais ne porent à volenté / Passer par la tière
sauvage.”
314
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 901. ll 41-43. Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 227-30,
no. CCLX.
315
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 910.
316
Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierre, I: 73-74. Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 410,
v 23221-21, 23233-34.
317
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 485.
116
never came up. The concerns that motivated the baronial selection of Pierre and

Yolande and, later, Jean de Brienne were passed over in favor of the principle of

primogeniture.

Philippe’s refusal to come East had serious implications for the future of the

Latin Empire. Had he become emperor in Constantinople, he might have continued

Baudouin I and Henri’s stance toward the West, including their coolness toward the

Capetians. Instead, the Franks received an emperor oriented toward France, a

preference that would endure for several decades. The first direct appeals to the French

kings survive from Robert’s reign, and these appeals would become thereafter a

prominent feature of diplomacy of the Latin Empire.

Robert in Constantinople

For better or for worse, Robert arrived in Constantinople in 1221. Five years

had passed since Henri’s death. Developments in Asia Minor and relations with Nicaea

have already been addressed. 318 On the European side of the small empire, Epiros and

Bulgaria had suffered from dynastic transition in the 1210s. Theodore Doukas focused

his attention on retaking Thessaloniki and making gains against the Bulgarians,

although he took the time to capture Pierre II. 319 By 1222, with the aid of alliances

with the Albanians, the Serbians, and Slav, Henri’s former brother-in-law, Theodore

Doukas had conquered northern Greece, including parts of Bulgaria, putting him in an

excellent position to launch an attack on Thessaloniki.

318
See pp 110-17 above.
319
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 57-61.
117
 In Bulgaria, after years in exile, Asen overthrew his cousin Boril, defeated his

other rivals, and was crowned ruler of Bulgaria in 1218. 320 He acted quickly to

establish himself and make allies in the region, in part by weaving his family into the

web of marriage alliances. The same year that Asen took power, Andrew of Hungary,

returning from crusade, stood at the Bulgarian border requesting safe passage. Asen

took advantage of the situation, expressing his willingness to aid Andrew, if the king

would agree to a marriage between Asen and Andrew’s daughter. 321 In making the

arrangement, Asen recognized Andrew’s strength, his danger as an enemy, and his

potential as an ally. Andrew responded to Asen’s proposal positively and informed the

pope of the arrangement. But it seems the Hungarian king was still reluctant. The

marriage was not solemnized until Robert’s trip across the Balkans to Constantinople, a

journey that included passage through Bulgarian territory. The coincidence of the

marriage, after having been put off for several years, with Robert’s arrival suggests that

in exchange for the celebration, Asen promised the new emperor, to whom he would

soon be related, safe conduct. 322 Andrew, Robert’s brother-in-law, apparently cared

320
Acropolites, Opera, pp 32-33, ch 20. Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 161, ch 20.
321
Wolff asserts that this daughter was the child of Andrew and Yolande: “[S]hortly thereafter he [Asen]
had married a daughter of the king of Hungary, and had thus become Robert’s nephew-in-law.” Wolff,
“The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 480. Vasileva agrees that this was a “mariage
d’une nièce de Robert avec le roi Asen.” Vasileva, “Les relations politiques bulgaro-latines au cours de
la période 1218–1241,” 78. The basis for this conclusion is unclear to me. A daughter of Andrew and
Yolande would be a child in 1218. Andrew had three sons and two daughters with his first wife,
Gertrude, who died in 1213. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 898, l 25. Engel states, without
attribution, that Maria, Asen’s bride, was Andrew’s eldest child. Engel and Ayton, The Realm of St.
Stephen: a History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526, p. 91. Andrew’s journey home from the Levant
involved other engagements: between his son Andrew and the daughter of the Armenian king and his
daughter and the son of Theodore Lascaris. Theiner, VMH, I: 20-21, nos. XXXII, XXXIII. Vasileva,
“Les relations politiques bulgaro-latines au cours de la période 1218–1241,” pp 75-77. For a summary
(and negative evaluation) of Andrew’s crusade, see Röhricht, Studien zur Geschichte des Fünften
Kreuzzuges, pp 23-30. Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople,” pp 386-94.
322
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 404-5, ll 23045-70. For discussion of the relation between the
marriage and Robert’s safe passage, see Vasileva, “Les relations politiques bulgaro-latines au cours de la
période 1218–1241,” pp 78-79.
118
enough about his safety to move forward with the marriage. The engagement may

explain the absence of major Bulgarian attacks on Constantinople between Yolande’s

death and Robert’s arrival. 323 A Hungarian promise of nonaggression against or even

support for Bulgaria drastically reduced any possible threat to Bulgaria from the Latin

Empire and thus Asen’s need to combat it. At a time when Asen was recovering from a

long campaign against his predecessor and still consolidating his power, external peace

was welcome.

Robert’s single status when he arrived in Constantinople presented an

opportunity quickly taken. The series of weddings discussed so far, those of Baudouin

I, Henri, and Yolande’s reigns, demonstrate how closely marriages were linked to the

priorities of the empire. This had not changed with Robert’s succession. Around the

time of his arrival in Constantinople, Frankish envoys negotiated an agreement with

Theodore Lascaris to end the conflict in Asia Minor and reinstate the peace between

Constantinople and Nicaea. The terms of the peace were light: Lascaris’s brother was

released in exchange for Latin soldiers in Greek custody and a marriage was arranged

between Robert and Eudokia, Lascaris’s daughter. 324 This agreement may again show

the influence of Marie de Courtenay, Lascaris’s wife and Robert’s sister, in facilitating

the negotiation or urging her husband to accept the terms. 325 The speed of the

agreement, apparently coinciding with Robert’s arrival, suggests that the barons

conceived of and even executed the agreement during the interregnum. The baillis and

323
See Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 507-8.
324
Acropolites, Opera, pp 30-32, ch 18. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p.
157, ch 18. Western sources also discuss the marriage: Baudoin d'Avesnes, “Livres de Baudoin
d'Avesnes,” p. 507; Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 406-407, ll 23117-23146.
325
Mouskès suggested as much. Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 407, ll 23128-23130: “Mais sa suer, qui
l’avoit à drue, / S’en péna forment pour son frère, / Qui de la tière iert emperère.”
119
the rest of the barons were well-placed to judge the importance of a peace with Nicaea

and to determine that its confirmation was worthy of an imperial marriage. 326

Lascaris’s marriage to Marie de Courtenay provided a successful model, since it had

calmed the conflict between Constantinople and Nicaea and mitigated Lascaris’s

hostility to the Franks. Robert’s subsequent reluctance to solemnize the marriage

confirms that he was not the driving force behind the negotiation.

The engagement between Robert and Eudokia bolstered the possibility that the

Frankish and Nicaean claims to Constantinople would be unified. Two marriages

would then unite the Courtenays and the Lascarids, and if Robert and Eudokia had a

child, he or she would be in line to inherit the throne. With Henri’s marriage to a

Bulgarian princess, the Franks had demonstrated their willingness to welcome an heir

with kin ties to a nearby rival. As Bonifacio del Monferrato had, Lascaris arranged for

his grandchild to inherit the throne he himself sought. Beyond the presumed good

relations that would follow the succession of Theodore Lascaris’s grandchild in

Constantinople, it was just possible that Robert would inherit Lascaris’s position after

the Greek’s death. The Byzantine tradition of men acquiring power through their wives

remained alive in the post-1204 Greek world. 327 Lascaris himself began his imperial

career as the husband of a princess, and he was succeeded by his son-in-law, John

Vatatzes, who overcame challenges from Lascaris’s blood kin. 328 Like Vatatzes,

Lascaris’s son-in-law Robert would have a claim to inherit through him and, thus,

reunite Constantinople with its territory in Asia Minor.

326
For the barons’ authority see the agreements between them and the Venetians and the church. Tafel
and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 214-14, no. CCLVI. Wolff, “Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of
Constantinople, 1204–1261,” pp 298-301, no. IV.
327
See pp 53-53 above.
328
Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, pp 118-19.
120
 Despite these numerous advantages, the marriage between Robert and Eudokia

never came to pass. Several possible reasons can be adduced. Lascaris and Marie’s

marriage created an affinity that, in turn, engendered opposition to the union from the

patriarch on grounds of consanguinity. 329 A more fundamental reluctance to make

peace with the Franks may have fueled the patriarch’s antagonism. From the Frankish

point of view, Lascaris’s death in 1222 before the marriage took place changed the

circumstances and reduced the Nicaean threat to Constantinople. Succession struggles

ensued in Nicaea, and the Latin Empire took advantage of the situation, providing a

haven for and military support to Lascaris’s brothers against John Vatatzes. 330

Perceiving a reduction in the threat from Asia Minor, the barons possibly preferred to

reserve an imperial marriage for another rival or ally. 331 Finally, politics aside, Robert’s

personal preference may have doomed the marriage. Robert’s later behavior shows that

he balked at a diplomatic marriage.

Indeed, Robert’s marriage, following a second, aborted engagement with

Eudokia, sits at the center of criticism of his reign. It was a notable and striking

exception to the rules of imperial politics. Reactions to it highlighted the centrality of

marriage in the diplomatic strategy of the Latin Empire. The renewal of Robert’s

engagement to Eudokia in 1224–1225 followed or was associated with an agreement

between Vatatzes and Robert that redrew boundaries in Asia Minor. 332 Instead of

329
The patriarch’s objection to the union is recorded in Akropolites. Acropolites, Opera, p. 31, ch 18:
“ἔνθεν τοι καὶ ἔρις ἐκ τοῦ τότε πατριαρχοῦντος Μανουὴλ τῷ βασιλεῖ ξυμβεβήκει, μηδ’ ὅλως τῇ
τοιαύτῃ ἀθεσμογαμίᾳ συγκατανεύοντος.” Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The
History, p. 157, ch 18.
330
Acropolites, Opera, p. 31, ch 18. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 157,
ch 18. See the discussion in Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, p. 315.
331
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 407, ll 23147-48.
332
For the renewal of the engagement, see Ibid., II: 409, ll 23195-206. In the early 1220s Vatatzes dealt
with several conspiracies and military forays by internal rivals. The years 1224–1225 were eventful for
121
following through with the marriage this second time, Robert wed the daughter of a

Western knight. This marriage had disastrous consequences for those involved. This

marriage and Robert’s behavior in other areas enraged the knights of the Latin Empire,

who broke into the castle, killed his mother-in-law, and mutilated his wife. 333 Enraged

and humiliated, Robert left for the West to seek papal support against his barons and

died on his return journey while visiting his sister Agnès, the wife of Geoffroy II de

Villehardouin. 334

Robert’s powerlessness against his barons is striking. The barons not only felt

justified in taking extreme actions, guaranteed to anger their emperor, but also he did

not have the power to punish them. Their actions testified to the empire’s priorities and

Robert’s failure, as emperor, to further them. He had twice rejected a marriage to the

relative of a dangerous rival, a marriage that would have solidified an alliance and

reduced a serious threat. He did not even have the good sense to create a family

connection to another important rival or ally. Instead, led by love, he married the

Nicaea: Vatatzes defeated Latin forces at Poimaninon; he seized Adrianople; Adrianople then went over
to Theodore Doukas; and Vatatzes and Robert concluded an alliance. Vatatzes conceded the areas of
Asia Minor near Constantinople and Nicomedia, in return for Pegai and the area south of there. For a
discussion of the dating of the agreement and its content see Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 107-8, no. 58.
Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, p. 137. For accounts of the events see Acropolites, Opera, pp 38-41, ch
24. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 172, ch 24. Baudoin d'Avesnes,
“Livres de Baudoin d'Avesnes,” p. 507; Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 409, ll 23195-206. For the
importance of these towns for naval operations, communication, and trade see Ahrweiler, Byzance et la
mer, pp 316-17.
333
Baudoin d'Avesnes, “Livres de Baudoin d'Avesnes,” p. 507: “au derrien parlerent tant preudome, que
li mariaiges fut jurés un autre fois de l’empereour Robert et de la fille Toldre Lascre; et furent delivré
grant plenté de prisonniers que li Grieu tenoient. Si fu li empereres Robers une piece en pais. Adont
avoit une dame en Constantinoble. Fille avoit esté un chevalier d’Artois qui avoit non Bauduin de
Neuvile. Li empereres Robers l’ama tant que il en laissa à parfaire le mariaige de la fille Lascre et de lui.
Si epousa celle dame coiement, et la mist avec lui manoir en son palais, et la dame sa mere aussi. Quant
li Fransois qui en Constantinoble estoient sorent ceste chose, trop en furent dolant et eshabi, car li
empereres ne soingnoit de chose que il eust à faire. Pour ce prinsent conseil ensamble; et s’en alerent en
la chamber l’empereour. Si prinsent la mere à la dame. Si l’envoierent noier en un batel, et la dame
coperent les nés et les bauleffres, et puis s’en alerent.” See also Chronique d'Ernoul et des Bernard le
trésorier, p. 394. For an unlikely varient see “Chronicle of St Martin,” in RHGF (Paris: Imprimerie
royale, 1840), pp 310-11.
334
Chronique d'Ernoul et des Bernard le trésorier, pp 394-95.
122
daughter of an unimportant knight. Robert acted not as emperor, with obligations to the

political community, but as an individual, free to make an alliance according to his

personal inclination. The barons acted not only out of personal disapproval, but also

from a conviction of their right to intervene as representatives of the government in

order to force Robert to live up to his official duties. 335

His marriage may have been unacceptable to the barons for an additional reason.

Not only did it fail to fulfill a political or strategic goal, but also it raised one knightly

family from relative insignificance to prominence. It is likely that barons resented the

elevation of one of their own. A parallel for this reaction appears in the kingdom of

Jerusalem, where the ruling family was expected to marry either neighboring elites or

Westerners. Marriage within the crusader nobility created tensions and conflicts. 336

Naomi Standen, in summarizing themes from a collection of articles on frontier

societies, notes the conflicts between central authorities and local leaders in frontier

regions. 337 In Iberia, northern China, the British Isles, Lithuania, and Prussia, frontiers

produced leaders who understood the nature of relationships across the borders very

differently than did the centralized authorities. They exercised not merely

independence from the center, but influence over it. Their actions created a second

frontier reality, one often far from the antagonistic relationships imagined and promoted

by their rulers. In the Latin Empire, a similar dynamic marked the divide between the

barons and Robert. A comment in a papal letter from 1223 about the danger of internal

335
Both Baudouin d’Avesnes and Ernoul note that the barons came together and acted in a council.
Baudoin d'Avesnes, “Livres de Baudoin d'Avesnes,” p. 507: “conseil ensamble”; Chronique d'Ernoul et
des Bernard le trésorier, p. 394: “consel ensanle”.
336
For an example of the problems created, see the case of Amalric, king of Jerusalem, whose first
marriage, to Agnès de Courtenay, was dissolved as a condition of his succession.
337
Power and Standen, “Frontiers in Question,” pp 24-26.
123
dissent among the Franks hints that the conflict between Robert and the barons started

soon after his ascension and that the move against Robert’s wife was only the final and

most extreme act. 338 A variety of factors, starting from the very nature of the conquest

and the selection of one of their own as emperor, reinforced by the necessity of having

devoted fighting men in the field and in the areas under Frankish control, and

heightened by the lengthy absence of an emperor in the late 1210s, strenghtened the

barons and affirmed their sense of autonomy. Certainly, the military defeats of 1223–

1226, in which the Latin Empire lost Thessaloniki, Adrianople, and most of their

possessions in Asia Minor, cannot have made Robert popular. For the Latin Empire,

the central authority against which the frontier pushed was not Constantinople itself, the

empire was too small and danger too frequently at the walls of the great city itself to

make that divide meaningful. Instead, it was the West and the emperors they sought

from there. Robert was a newcomer, as was his mother and as would be Jean de

Brienne. In 1221, however, Franks had ruled Constantinople for seventeen years. The

barons represented the knowledge and experience of those years.

Of all of the marriages we know about from the Latin Empire, Robert’s marriage

to his unnamed and unimportant bride is the only one without an identifiable political

motive. It manifests his refusal to adjust to his new position, evident both in his lack of

appreciation of his status and in his disinterest in furthering foreign policy objectives. It

contributes, understandably, to his reputation among contemporaries and historians as

338
César Auguste Horoy, ed., Medii ævi bibliotheca patristica (Paris, 1879), VII: col 227, no. 5: “et
praecipue cum Latinis existentibus in partibus Romaniae volumus, et consulimus te servare, cum ex
dissensione multa possint imminere pericula.”
124
an irresponsible dilettante. 339 He displayed a mindset more fitting to a French aristocrat

than an emperor.

Robert and the West

Robert’s reign showed certain continuity with those of his mother and uncles in

his communications with the papacy. In 1222 and 1223, he wrote several times to

Honorius III describing the desperate state of the Latin Empire. 340 Theodore Doukas

was increasingly tightening the circle around Thessaloniki and the city was in great

danger. 341 In March 1222, Bonifacio and Margaret’s son Demetrios was in the West

seeking aid. The pope was not insensitive to these pleas. In addition to providing moral

support and the excommunication of Latins who fought in Greek armies, he turned the

resources of the Hospital of Saint Samson in Constantinople to the defense of the city

and urged Theodore Doukas to abandon his aggression toward the Latin Empire. 342

This call, of course, was unsuccessful, and Honorius III embarked on the planning of a

crusade, to take place under the leadership of Guglielmo VI del Monferrato, Bonifacio’s

eldest son. The crusade would aid in the defense of Thessaloniki which, by 1223, was

under siege from Theodore Doukas. Guglielmo VI del Monferrato was undoubtedly

moved by his hereditary claim on the kingdom, although his younger brother had been

crowned king. In promoting the crusade, Honorius III mentioned that but also spoke of

the importance of Thessaloniki to the Latin Empire and the importance of the latter to

339
For contemporaries see Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 910. For modern evaluations, see,
e.g., Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 167 and Wolff, “The Latin
Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 484-85.
340
These letters are known from Honorius III’s responses.
341
The story of Epiros’s expansion in the early 1220s and the failure of the crusade is told in some detail
in Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 493-504.
342
See Horoy, Medii ævi bibliotheca patristica, IV: col 203-4, no. CCXXVIII, V: col 227-28, no. VII
Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, p. 95, nos. 4122-23.
125
the Holy Land. 343 He anticipated that, once the crusade arrived, it would be supported

by troops from Constantinople and the Morea. 344 This combination, of the promise of

land and the appeal to piety, was a potent one. In 1224, Guglielmo VI del Monferrato

fell ill, which delayed the crusade until the autumn, at which point the weather was too

bad to travel. 345 In the winter of 1224–1225, Honorius III placed a levy on the clergy of

half of their income and movable goods. 346 He also made arrangements for the

reinforcements from the Morea and Constantinople. 347 The crusade did, in fact, leave in

the spring of 1225, three years after Demetrios had first arrived in the West, but

Guglielmo VI del Monferrato died the following September and the crusade

disintegrated without any accomplishments. 348

As was appropriate, considering their leader, the crusaders appear to have hailed

primarily from Lombardy and Italy. In recruiting men, Honorius III wrote to the

archbishops of Genoa, Lucca, Milan, Padua, and Ravenna in Italy and Besançon and

Lyon in France and, in a separate letter, specifically mentioned that Guglielmo VI del

Monferrato was accompanied by men from Lombardy, Tuscany, and Burgundy. 349 This

emphasis on Italy was a result of the specific nature of this crusade—to protect (and

then regain) the inheritance of the Montferrat family in Greece. Robert, on the other

hand, with the support of Honorius III, initiated a turn to the Capetians.

343
Horoy, Medii ævi bibliotheca patristica, VII: col 349-50, no. CXXIX: “quod ejus ad partes illas
acessus toti Constantinopolitano imperio grandem potest utilitatem affere, considerantes etiam quod
corroboratio status ipsius imperii multum est utilis Terrae Sanctae negotio.”
344
Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, pp 206, 283-84, 286, 299-300, nos. 4754, 5186, 5189, 5202,
5277.
345
Honorius III related the circumstances in a letter to the prelates of Romania. Horoy, Medii ævi
bibliotheca patristica, IX: col 721-24, no. XXXIV.
346
Ibid. Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, p. 297, no. 5270.
347
His letter to Robert is from January 27, 1225. Ibid., pp 299-300, no. 5277. His letter calling on
Geoffroy, Otho de la Roche and the doge is from February 12, 1225. Ibid., no. 5304.
348
Richard of San Germano, “Chronica,” in RISS (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1937), col 996.
349
The letters come from early 1224. Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, nos. 4704, 4573.
126
 Records of two requests survive from Robert’s tenure, one from the emperor

himself and one from the pope. 350 Philippe Mouskés recorded Robert’s request to Louis

VIII. The emperor chose as his envoy the châtelain of Arras, a long-time possession of

Flanders, which Philip Augustus had obtained as part of Isabelle de Hainaut’s dowry.

Arras was located in northern France near Béthune and Saint Omer, an area that

produced several important barons in the Latin Empire. The selection of a messenger

from Arras suggests that he brought the appeal to the barons and people of northern

France and Flanders generally, in addition to the Capetians. 351 The mission garnered

promises from Louis VIII, but apparently no aid. According to Mouskés’s account, the

king acknowledged the kin relationship and agreed “pour son cousin,” Robert, to send

two or three hundred knights, but only after the king completed his mission in

Avignon. 352 The king’s death soon after the successful siege of Avignon makes it

impossible to know whether he would have fulfilled his promise. His response,

350
In his Registres, Hendrickx cites evidence of only two communications from Robert to the papacy and
two to the French kings, one of which I believe is a mistake. Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 103-6, nos. 50, 52-
53, 56. The second Capetian communication is a guarantee from Robert to Philip Augustus for the
promises made by Philippe, marquis of Namur. Delisle, Catalogue des actes de Philippe Auguste, p. 490.
no. 2221; Du Bouchet, Histoire généalogique de la maison royale de Courtenay, Preuves, 29. This
guarantee is more appropriately attributed to Robert de Courtenay, the butler of France, the emperor
Robert’s uncle, and a frequent presence in the charters of the kings of France. Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 20
and 22. Robert de Courtenay, the emperor’s uncle, had also served as guarantor for Alix, countess of
Angoulême; Mathilde, countess of Nevers; and Louis, count of Sancerre. Delisle, Catalogue des actes de
Philippe Auguste, pp 184, 469, 470, nos. 811, 2113, 2136. Logic dictates that further communication
took place and its records are simply not extant. Hendrickx cites only two letters to the pope from
Robert. It is impossible to believe that, during Robert’s seven-year imperial tenure, he wrote only twice
to the pope, his greatest supporter, who wrote frequently to him and was organizing a crusade to rescue
Thessaloniki in the early 1220s. Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 103-4, nos. 50, 52. For the crusade and papal
support of it see Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 490-93, 499-505.
Honorious’s correspondence to Robert survives, see Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, pp 83, 94-95,
129, 206, 299-300, nos. 4059, 4118, 4122-23, 4324, 4754, 5277. Honorious also refers to a request from
the emperor and patriarch in a letter to a Cistercian abbey in Constantinople. Ibid., pp 160-61, no. 4487.
351
See the missions of other envoys, for example, Nevélon de Soisson and Ponce de Lyon, pp 84-85
above.
352
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 539, ll 26875-92. See the discussion in Régine Pernoud, Blanche of
Castile, trans. Henry Noel (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc, 1972), pp 71, 106-11. Jean
Richard, Saint Louis: roi d'une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp 33-36.
127
however, makes it clear that aid for his cousin in Constantinople was not a high priority.

Despite this, his selection as the object of an appeal and his promise to send aid

manifests the tie between Constantinople and France, one renewed and personified in

the relationship between the emperor and king. The mission did not yield its hoped-for

results and it established a pattern that would be repeated: A Courtenay request to the

Capetians for support was met with a promise for future aid, which was only to be given

after the French king achieved more important priorities.

An earlier letter from Honorius III to Blanche of Castile, Louis VIII’s wife,

confirms and expands on the connection between the Courtenays and the Capetians.

The pope’s choice of Blanche as his correspondent when seeking royal aid was not

unusual. Blanche’s biographer, Pernoud, described her role: “When they wanted

something from the King, they went to the Queen. Even the Pope, whose legates kept

him well-informed, addressed himself to Blanche when he had some request to make of

Louis.” 353 The letter came in May 1224, not even a year after her father-in-law’s death,

and, describing the disastrous state of the Latin Empire, requested that Blanche

encourage her husband to send aid. 354 Honorius III relied on kinship and cultural

affinity as the basis for his appeal. The kinship between Louis VIII and Robert was

mentioned up front: “[C]onsobrino carissimi in Christo filii nostri Ludovici illustris

regis Francorum.” “Consobrinus” stands out as different from the more frequent

“consanguineus” that was often used to refer to cousins, as Louis VIII and Robert were.

Robert’s brother Baudouin II employed the term “consanguineus” in later letters when

353
Pernoud, Blanche of Castile, p. 92.
354
For the original text, see Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, pp 250-51, no. 5006; Horoy, Medii ævi
bibliotheca patristica, VIII: col 663-64, no. CCXXVII.
128
writing to Louis IX. 355 “Consobrinus,” in contrast, had a more restricted meaning,

according to Niermeyer, “cousin, son of my father’s brother . . . nephew, sister’s son,”

expressing a closer relationship than the general term. 356 By using this term, Honorius

III pointedly reminded Blanche of the kinship between the Capetians and the

Courtenays and hoped to invoke a sense of familial obligation in the queen and her

husband.

The pope also stressed the French nature of the enterprise in Constantinople. In

a famous phrase, Honorius III said that in the Latin Empire “quasi nova Francia est

creata.” 357 Just as a consobrinus had a greater claim on the French king than a non-

relative would, so did nova Francia have a claim greater than that of a non-French

enterprise. The French character of the Latin Empire was determined by the origins of

its original settlers. These nobles, and the ones who came later, created and extended

both the kin connection and cultural affinity. Honorius III’s language echoes Henri’s

reference to the “populus Franciae” in Constantinople almost two decades earlier.

Less often noted than nova Francia is the repetition of the word “Gallicus” in

Honorius III’s letter. The empire of Romania is “in Gallicorum manibus;” the “potentia

Gallicorum” is diminished; harm is done to “genti Gallicae;” it would be impious to

allow the “gentem Gallicam” to be killed; the “gentes Gallicae” could be saved by aid.

“Gallicus” stands out here because “Latinus” was a much more common appellation for

355
See, for example, Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 423-24 and Teulet, Layettes du
Trésor des Chartres, II: 464, no. 2954.
356
Although “consanguineus” does not merit a separate entry in Niermeyer, “consanguinitas” appears as
“relatives.” J. F. Niermeyer and C. van de Kieft, Mediae latinitatis lexicon minus (Leiden, The
Netherlands: Brill, 2002), I: 335.
357
Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, pp 250-51, no. 5006; Horoy, Medii ævi bibliotheca patristica,
VIII: col 663-64, no. CCXXVII.
129
the Westerners in Constantinople. 358 Honorius did refer to the settlers as “Latini,” but

only twice. Gallicus, with its precise usage of the ecclesiastical unit, including France

and northern Spain, perfectly emphasized the specific connection between the French

monarchy—defenders and supporters of the church in France—and their once-

compatriots in Constantinople. It reminded Blanche and, through her, Louis VIII, of

both the French and the religious nature of the Latin Empire. They were encouraged to

feel a sense of obligation based on kinship, shared culture, and, now, piety.

Although the letter is from Honorius and not Robert or the barons in

Constantinople, it mirrors the significance of kinship and cultural affinity with France

felt by the Franks. They had already sought two emperors in France and, following

Robert’s death, turned to France again for a ruler during Baudouin II’s minority. The

resort to France, in addition to reflecting their cultural origins, had other logic.

Although the Capetians had not yet demonstrated significant interest in the Latin

Empire, the French monarchy had a history of crusading enterprises and that, combined

with the kin and cultural connection, made it a promising source of help. 359 As

Mouskés’s account suggests, during his short reign, Louis VIII had other, more

immediate priorities than helping the Latin Empire, including military campaigns in

western and southern France. 360 Louis VIII’s early death in November of 1226, merely

three years after his father’s, left the throne to his young son Louis IX and the regency

in the hands of Blanche. Baronial opposition challenged Capetian power and, more

358
See, for example, other correspondence of Honorius from 1224 using referring to the settlers as
“Latini” Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, pp 283-86, nos. 5186, 5189, 5202. For the history of the
term “Romania” to refer to Byzantine territory see Wolff, “Romania: The Latin Empire of
Constantinople”.
359
See pp 35-36 above.
360
Pernoud, Blanche of Castile, pp 100-2, 105-11.
130
specifically, Blanche’s regency, creating further distractions. 361 In the 1240s, with her

son’s rule unchallenged and her own position secure, Blanche would renew her interest

in events and developments in Constantinople.

The connection between the Capetians and the Latin Empire arose during Louis

VIII’s reign in a final, unexpected way, one that demonstrates that ties between

Constantinople and Europe were far from severed. In the mid-1220s, a hermit claiming

to be Baudouin IX of Flanders and I of Constantinople appeared in Flanders and

garnered support from a coalition of nobles and townspeople opposed to Jeanne,

countess of Flanders and daughter of the true Baudouin. Jeanne appealed to Louis VIII

to judge the matter. The king sent Sybille de Beaujeu, his aunt and Baudouin I’s sister,

to meet with the claimant. She did not recognize him and decided that he must not be

her brother. Hiding her conviction, she convinced him to meet with Louis. After an

audience in which he was unable to answer the king’s questions about Baudouin I’s

past, the pseudo-Baudouin fled but was soon captured and put to death. 362 Louis’s

involvement in this affair was not a result of any interest in the fate of the Latin Empire.

Instead, he acted as a royal judge, whose authority would be respected. The incident

serves as a reminder that relocation to the East did not obliterate Western ties and

interests. For many, including the emperors, a lord-vassal relationship with the French

king was an important and continuing aspect of their identity.

Final evidence for the importance of kin connections came during Robert’s

reign. Visits to his sisters in Hungary and Greece bookended his undistinguished

361
Pernoud, Blanche of Castile, pp 117-44, 156-62; Richard, Saint Louis: roi d'une France féodale,
soutien de la Terre sainte, pp 36-49, 87-120.
362
Wolff, “Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut, First Latin Emperor of Constantinople: His Life, Death, and
Resurrection, 1172–1225,” 294-99.
131
imperial tenure, about which so little is known. He broke his original journey east with

a stop in Hungary where he remained during the winter. His sister Yolande had married

the king of Hungary more than six years previously, but a bond apparently remained

between the siblings. Returning to Constantinople, after his mission to seek papal

support, he rested in the Morea, where his sister Agnès was married to Geoffroy II of

Villehardouin. In the latter case as well, it may have been years since the siblings met;

no reference survives to Robert’s prior appearance in Greece or Agnès’s in

Constantinople. Robert’s stopovers may reflect familial sentiment, a shortage of allies

or both. Whatever the reason, these visits show the longevity of kinship and the

strength of alliances solidified by marriage.

132
 CHAPTER 4:

PAPAL SUPPORT AND FRENCH IDENTITY, 1228–1236

Robert’s death in 1228 created another hiatus in the succession to the imperial

throne, and another opportunity for the barons to consider their priorities and seek a

leader who was most likely to achieve them. The barons turned, as they had twice

before, to the West for a new emperor. But, with a young Baudouin II in the wings,

considerations of succession did not constrain their choice. Experienced warriors,

French aristocrats, and crusaders, they settled on a man who shared those qualities, Jean

de Brienne. In doing so, they relied on the matrix of kinship, religious allegiance,

crusading and regional identity for support. They affirmed their Western identity, in the

face of their quarter-century of residence in Constantinople. The events of the 1230s,

however, confirmed the difficulty the Franks faced in marshalling enough Western

support to protect and strengthen their small empire.

The first remarkable aspect of Jean de Brienne’s selection was the search for a

new ruler outside of Constantinople. Robert’s youngest brother, Baudouin II, born to

Yolande after her arrival in Constantinople, was eleven years old when he died. In

western Europe, Baudouin II probably would have succeeded his brother directly with a

regent or regents appointed to manage affairs until he reached maturity. 363 This

solution was possible in Constantinople. There were candidates perfectly capable of

assuming a regency. A logical first choice would have been his sister Marie, the widow

of Theodore Lascaris and Baudouin II’s closest relative. She was alive at the time of

363
One need think only of two of Baudouin II’s contemporaries, Frederick II and Louis IX, to be
reminded of the ubiquity and pitfalls of regencies in the western European Middle Ages.
133
Robert’s journey to the west and served as baillis during his absence, although she died

soon after him. 364 Even after her death, however, another regent would have been easy

to find. The barons had already demonstrated in the prior interregna and in their

dealings with Robert that they were willing, even eager, to take governance of the

empire into their own hands. Narjot de Toucy, the bailli after Marie’s death, was an

experienced lord whose work in the Latin Empire eventually won him recognition and

privileges from Gregory IX. 365 As bailli from 1228 to 1231, he displayed confidence

and skill in diplomatic negotiations and secured, at least temporarily, the Latin Empire’s

borders. As regent, or head of a regency council, until Baudouin II’s majority, he could

have done the same.

Several factors pushed the barons to seek a new emperor in the West. Although

the 1220s had seen few attacks on the Latin Empire, the situation around Constantinople

remained dangerous for the Franks. John Asen, Theodore Doukas, and John Vatatzes

were all powerful rulers and increasingly experienced military leaders. All three were

secure in their positions, relatively free from internal uprisings against them or

challenges to their rule, and interested in conquering Constantinople. 366 In such a

circumstance, the Franks would certainly benefit from a strong, militarily skilled leader,

as they had during Henri’s rule. The barons needed only look at the Fifth Crusade to

364
In a document originally misattributed to Henri’s wife, Marie renewed the privileges of the Pisans.
She is identified as “Maria, Dei gratia imperatrix, baiula imperii Constantinopolitani.” Lowenfeld,
Archives de l'Orient latin (Paris: E. Leroux, 1884), II: 256-57.
365
In 1234, Gregory IX granted Narjot a privilege also accorded to emperors and kings, that no one could
excommunicate him without specific papal permission. Gregory justified this privilege with reference to
the work and funds that Narjot had expended for the Latin Empire. L. Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX,
Registres des papes 9 (Paris: Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 1899), col 958-
59, no. 1746.
366
Akropolites reported a revolt by Vatatzes’s cousin in 1224–1225, which forced him to withdraw from
battle with the Latins. The rebellion, however, was not serious enough to necessitate the execution of its
leader. Acropolites, Opera, pp 36-38, ch 23. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The
History, p. 269, ch 23.
134
see the problems inherent in running a military campaign without a clear leader. Yet,

within the Latin Empire itself, the barons had frequently and successfully held the reins

of government. After Yolande’s death, they had lead military operations against

Theodore Lascaris in the absence of an emperor or empress and in 1228 Narjot de

Toucy was prepared to embark on truce negotiations with the Turks and Theodore

Doukas. In the Latin Empire, a regent or regency council might have actually

functioned.

Yet, further considerations were at hand. The barons were accustomed to

participating in government, but the prospect of promoting one of their own to imperial

status for the medium or even long term may have raised jealousy in the rest. Such

jealousy had already played a part in Robert’s downfall. 367 Drawing an emperor from

foreign lands circumvented this rivalry. Most important, a Westerner could be expected

to bring much-needed reinforcements of men and money. Pierre II had set out with an

army, although it never made it to Constantinople. Likewise, in the early 1220s,

Honorius III had gathered a crusade under William of Montferrat, who was interested in

prosecuting his claim to the throne of Thessaloniki. This was certainly the pattern in

the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. With all these concerns, the barons evinced no desire

to run the empire without an otherwise disinterested, adult, male ruler and began

immediately after Robert’s death to seek out an outsider to fill that role.

In need of an emperor, then, one to rule until Baudouin II could lead the

government and army, the barons faced, as they had at Henri’s death, a choice between

an Eastern candidate and a French one. In each man, they identified a possible father-

in-law for Baudouin II, one who had a marriageable daughter and a wealth of
367
See pp 121-23 above for a consideration of this issue.
135
experience in warfare and rulership. Nearby, the barons considered John Asen, tsar of

Bulgaria, a ruler who, after overthrowing his cousin a decade earlier, had consolidated

his power and defeated his enemies, demonstrating, in the process, a willingness to

make agreements with his neighbors, a lack of aggression toward the Latin Empire, and

a generous attitude toward conquered people. In the West, the barons set their sights on

Jean de Brienne, king of Jerusalem, a candidate who shared their cultural origins and

had an impressive career, but who lacked familiarity with the environment around

Constantinople. The story of the decision and the negotiations involved reveals a great

deal about the needs of the Latin Empire, as well as the barons’ own self-interest.

At some point in 1228, the barons and Baudouin II reached a tentative

agreement with John Asen. 368 The accounts of Italian authors Dandolo and Sanudo,

although not offering specifics, agree on the accord’s general principles: Baudouin II

and Asen’s daughter, Helen, would be married. In return, the Bulgarian tsar promised

to reconquer imperial lands in Thrace and Macedonia, which Theodore Doukas had

seized. Asen would fund this military operation from his own income. 369 Neither

368
The agreement is summarized in several sources. Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–1280
d.c.,” p. 292; Marino Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” in Gesta Dei per Francos, sive
Orientalium expeditionum historia 1095–1420, ed. Jacques Bongars (Hanover, 1611), pp 72-73.
Hendrickx cites a letter of the podestà, Giovanni Querini, as a source for the agreement between the
barons and John Asen. The “dominus rex Io.” is better identified as Jean de Brienne, however. The
agreement as described matches that between the barons and Jean de Brienne. In delineating the land that
the new emperor might leave his heirs, the podestà noted one of the limits as “illud quod Assanus inde
tenet.” The new emperor, however, is repeatedly referred to as Io, which contradicts the argument that Io
was Asen. Additionally, using Asen’s lands to describe the limit of the Latin Emperor’s jurisdiction
makes more sense if Io was Jean de Brienne. Roberto Cessi, Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di
Venezia (Bologne: Zanichelli, 1931), pp 210-11, no. 141; Hendrickx, Regestes, p. 113, no. 67. See also
Vasileva, “Les relations politiques bulgaro-latines au cours de la période 1218–1241,” 82-83.
369
Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–1280 d.c.,” p. 292: “Balduino heredi imperii
Constantinopolitani imperator del Çagora promisit totam occidentalem plagam ei aquirer, si eius filiam
acciperet coniugem.” Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” p. 73: “Promittebat enim Balduino
Imperator praedictus, sua gente, suis’que expensis propriis recuperare terram totam Imperii Romaniae,
quam praedecessores amiserant in partibues Occidentis.”
136
author mentioned the extent of Asen’s authority or Baudouin II’s status during the

minority—two issues that dominated the negotiations with Jean de Brienne.

Asen’s history and reputation both promoted and hurt his candidacy for the

imperial regency. Asen had already demonstrated his willingness to solidify alliances

through marriage. He took those alliances and their attendant obligations seriously.

Soon after his succession, he married Andrew of Hungary’s daughter. The celebration

of this marriage coincided with Robert’s journey across Bulgarian territory. In the

1220s, Theodore Doukas’s capture of Adrianople and Thessaloniki prompted Asen to

arrange a marriage between his own illegitimate daughter and Theodore’s brother,

Manuel Doukas. 370 A marriage between Baudouin II and Marie would have completed

Asen’s set of alliances with his powerful neighbors. Moreover, it would have improved

Bulgaria’s situation vis-a-vis the Doukai, who were now settled in Thessaloniki. The

two powers shared a border and the Doukai’s prior actions cautioned Asen against

feeling secure in his alliance with them. 371 A Bulgaro-Frankish alliance also had

positive precedents; two prior marriages between Bulgarians and Franks had been

arranged during Henri’s reign and each had produced peace and an offensive alliance of

the parties. 372

In his career, Asen demonstrated characteristics that made him appealing as a

ruler. He treated conquered peoples with generosity, a characteristic described by

370
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 104-5. This alliance did not prevent Theodore from attacking
Bulgaria in 1229, probably in part as a response to the proposed alliance with the Latin Empire.
371
See pp 66-70 above for Michael’s pattern of reneging on agreements. Theodore’s career was similarly
checkered: seizing Pierre II after promising him safe passage, attacking Bulgaria in 1216 and then again
between 1218 and 1223. See pp 103-4 above for the capture of Pierre. Ibid., pp 49-61.
372
See pp 60-65 above.
137
Akropolites. 373 After defeating Theodore Doukas in 1230, he seized his rival, his

advisers, and their possessions, but “was rather more compassionately disposed towards

the captured masses; he freed most of the army and especially the common people and

the rabble, and sent them to their villages and cities.” 374 The story gave Akropolites an

opportunity to evaluate the Bulgarian: “… a man who proved to be excellent among

barbarians not only with regard to his own people but also even with respect to

foreigners. For he was most compassionate to those foreigners who came over to him

and especially to the Romans, and he generously provided them with a living.” 375 For

Akropolites, Asen’s generosity was particularly notable since Asen was a Bulgarian. In

his description of Theodore Doukas, Akropolites insulted Theodore Doukas by likening

him to the Bulgarians. Theodore was “naturally unsuited to the institutions of the

imperial office, he handled matters in a Bulgarian or, rather, barbarian fashion for he

did not understand hierarchy or protocol or the many ancient customs.” 376 In contrast,

Asen acted in an un-Bulgarian matter, by declining to massacre the Greeks in conquered

areas and employing Greeks in his service.

373
Akropolites’ positive opinion of Asen is particularly notable, since Asen abandoned an alliance with
Nicaea. The Nicaean author’s interest in Bulgarian affairs only picked up after the alliance between
Bulgaria and Epiros in the mid 1220s. See his perfunctory account of Asen’s rise to power Acropolites,
Opera, pp 32-33, ch 20. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 161, ch 20.
374
Translation in Ibid., pp 178-79, ch 25. Acropolites, Opera, p. 42, ch 25: “φιλανθρωποτέρως δὲ περί
τὸ ἁλωθὲν πλῆθος ὁ Ἀσὰν διατεθείς, τοὺς πλείους τῶν στρατευμάτων καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς
χυδαιοτέρους καὶ σύγκλυδας ἐλευθεροῖ καὶ πρὸς τὰς αὐτῶν ἀποπέμπει κώμας τε καὶ πὸλεις.” This
act of generosity also served his self-interest, “for he wanted to rule over them.” “τάχα μὲν καὶ τὸ
φιλάνθρωπον ἐνδεικνύμενος, τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τούτῳ πραγματευόμενος.”
375
Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 211, ch 39. Acropolites, Opera, p. 64,
ll 7-11, ch 39: “ἀνὴρ ἐν βαρβάροις ἄριστος ἀναφανείς, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις γὰρ μόνον ἀλλά γε δὴ καὶ
τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. ἐχρήσατο καὶ γὰρ φιλανθρωπότερον τοῖς προσερχομένοις αὐτῷ ἐπήλυσι καὶ
μάλιστα τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, καὶ φιλοτίμως αὐτοῖς παρεῖχε τὰ σιτηρέσια.”
376
Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 162, ch 21. Acropolites, Opera, p. 34,
ch 21: “ἀφυῶς δὲ ἔχων περὶ τοὺς τῆσ βασιλείας θεσμοὺς βουλγαρικώτερον ἢ μᾶλλον
βαρβαρικώτερον ταῖς ὑποθέσεσι προσεφέρετο, οὐ τάξιν γινώσκων οὐδὲ κατάστασιν οὐδὲ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς
βασιλείοις ἀρχαῖα ἔθιμα καθεστήκασιν.”
138
 Asen’s strength and wealth matched his generosity. Sanudo referred to him as

“magnificus et potens.” 377 The Franks were in need of these qualities. Robert’s reign

had seen the loss of Adrianople and Thessaloniki, both of which were in Theodore

Doukas’s hands in 1228. Asen had the right resources and geographic base to mount a

serious challenge to Theodore’s expansion, a project that was also in his own interest.

Even if Asen failed to launch a military campaign, he could use his kin relationship with

Theodore Doukas to prevent or delay further attacks on Frankish territory.

Asen’s career suggested that he would treat the Latin Empire with care. The tsar

had granted Robert safe passage through Bulgarian territory when the new emperor

traveled to Constantinople in 1221. During Robert’s reign, the Bulgarians had refrained

from attacking Constantinople and the surrounding territory. 378 The Chronique

d’Ernoul suggests that Asen even provided active support for the Latin Empire: “li

Blac li aidierent se tiere à retenire, çou qu’il en trova.” 379 This aid may have included

dissuading Theodore Doukas, to whom he was related by marriage, from attacking the

city. 380

All these advantages led Wolff to chide the barons for rejecting Asen’s offer:

this story ... provides the outstanding single example, during the entire history of
the Latin Empire, of that diplomatic ineptitude and extreme individualism,
combined with a contempt for foreigners, which had, under Baldwin I, led the
barons to reject Greek, Vlach, and Turkish alliances. As regent, Asen would
probably have been able to maintain and strengthen the Empire, even though he
might well have turned it into a mere protectorate ... what may well have been
the last chance to stabilize the western position at Constantinople was now
lost. 381
377
Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” pp 72-73: “viri in illis partibus, tunc temporis magnifici
& potentis.”
378
Vasileva, “Les relations politiques bulgaro-latines au cours de la période 1218–1241,” p. 79.
379
Chronique d'Ernoul et des Bernard le trésorier, p. 394.
380
See Wolff’s discussion of this possbility. “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp
507-8.
381
Ibid., p. 516.
139
Wolff’s critique is based on the supposition, not an unreasonable one, that the Latin

Empire would have grown more powerful under the tutelage and control of Asen. The

advantages of such an alliance, according to Wolff, vastly outweighed any

disadvantages, such as becoming incorporated into Asen’s realm. At least one

contemporary observer agreed with Wolff’s later evaluation. Sanudo was quite clear

that the proposed alliance would have been a benefit to Baudouin II and the empire, and

he characterized the barons’ advice as “dolosum” and “inconsultum.” 382 I take issue

here with aspects of Sanudo’s and Wolff’s evaluations, in particular the reasons for the

barons’ rejection of a Bulgarian alliance and the wisdom of their action.

Wolff’s evaluation is rife with disdain. The Latin Empire evinced “diplomatic

ineptitude and extreme individualism, combined with a contempt for foreigners.” There

is, however, little reason to attribute the rejection of the Bulgarian alliance to these

causes. The deal arranged with Asen had benefits. It also, however, had certain

disadvantages. It was these disadvantages, not prejudice or stupidity, that prompted the

barons’ retreat. The barons’ actions did not reveal “contempt for foreigners” and the

evidence argues against such feelings on their part. After all, it was barons, albeit those

of an earlier generation, who had urged Henri to arrange two prior marriages with

Bulgarians. 383 A consideration of the biography of Narjot de Toucy, the bailli of the

empire in 1228 and one of the most powerful barons in the empire, confirms this point.

Narjot was a cosmopolitan man. His personal life reflected the flexibility increasingly

apparent among the Franks in the East, specifically in the arena of political marriages.

His first marriage was to the daughter of Agnès of France and Alexios Branas, a union

382
Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” p. 73.
383
See pp 63-66 above
140
that reinforced Branas’s relationship with the Franks. 384 In the late 1230s, after the

death of his first wife, he married a Cuman princess in order to seal an alliance.

Cumans were far more alien to the Franks than were the Bulgarians. Some Cumans had

relocated to Hungarian territory in the thirteenth century and, at least superficially,

converted to Christianity. 385 Narjot’s bride, however, was not a Christian or not reliably

so, since she was baptized on the occasion of their wedding. 386 His political behavior

matched his personal history. As regent, Narjot sent envoys to the sultan of Konya and

Theodore Doukas and established a temporary truce with Theodore. 387 It is hard to

imagine Narjot blocking the Bulgarian alliance because of prejudice.

It is possible, of course, that the prejudice rested with Baudouin II. According

to Sanudo, the imperial heir himself made the final decision about the marriage and,

thus, the alliance, although the advice of his barons guided his choice. 388 Baudouin II

was, at most, eleven years old when the deals with Asen and Jean de Brienne were

proposed. Given his age and the barons’ assertiveness, it is unlikely that his opinion

prevailed. Any position he had, moreover, was probably not guided by prejudice.

Baudouin II was no provincial French aristocrat. On the contrary, he was born and

raised in Constantinople. He had a familial connection to Greeks through his sister,

Marie, who was Lascaris’s widow and who had returned to Constantinople after her

384
See pp 54-57 above.
385
For the Cuman’s settlement and existence in Hungary see Nora Berend, At the Gate of Christendom:
Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000– c. 1300 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
386
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 947, ll 1-5. See pp 201-2 below.
387
Cessi, Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia, p. 208, no. 134: “cum legatione domini
Narzoti, baylivi imperii Constantinopolitani, ad dictum Soldanum.” Ibid., p. 209, no. 140: “Narzotus de
Tuciaco Cesar, potestas et ordinator et baiulus imperii Constantinopolis, et certeri barones iuramus ... ut
habeamus treuguam tecum altissimo imperatore grecorum domino Teodero, imperatore Comiano Duca.”
388
Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” p. 73: “dolosum sibi dederunt consilium, ut videlicet
filiam Imperatoris Exagorarum, quamuis formosam valdè, renueret et filia domini Iohannis, tunc Regis
Ierusalem, reciperet in uxorem.”
141
husband’s death. Her appointment as bailli after Robert’s death suggests that she was

involved in the court and may have raised Baudouin II. His political decisions

throughout his career show no evidence of being guided by prejudice—quite the

opposite. In the most flamboyant example, Baudouin II attempted to arrange a marriage

between his niece and the Turkish sultan in the 1240s. I cannot, of course, prove that

Baudouin II and the barons did not look on the Bulgarians with a distaste rooted in

cultural and ethnic difference, as Henri had twenty years before. They might very well

have. But there is no evidence for this prejudice or sign that, if it existed, it influenced

the decision to reject Asen as regent. Even Henri’s prejudice did not prevent him from

arranging two marriage alliances.

Wolff’s judgment of “diplomatic ineptitude” can be applied to the barons’

agreement with Jean de Brienne, but hardly to their other actions during the

interregnum. During his regency, Narjot reached out to Epiros and the Turks,

demonstrating an understanding of the environment and a willingness to participate in

the local network of allies and enemies. In negotiating a year-long truce with Theodore

Doukas, Narjot protected the empire from one of its enemies. On the Eastern front, his

envoy to the sultan attempted to secure an alliance against Jean Vatatzes. In

approaching Asen, the barons acted on their awareness that local alliances were an

important strategy to maintain power. Far from being isolationists, the barons sought

out relations with their neighbors. The deal with Asen certainly carried benefits for the

Latin Empire and was, again, a successful piece of diplomacy.

142
 Wolff also accused the barons of “extreme individualism,” which I understand

to mean the barons’ prioritization of their own interests over those of the empire. 389

This accusation has the most weight and, in fact, the barons might have based their

choice of Jean de Brienne in part on concern for their own security. But the evidence

contradicts, or at least complicates, Wolff’s image of self-centered men unconcerned

with the fate of their government. If the barons made political decisions with an eye

toward their own fortunes, they also made personal choices that served the polity.

These two sets of interests—those of the barons and the empire—were closely if not

inextricably intertwined. As a crusader state, an outpost of Western society in the East,

the cultural and religious composition of the government was an essential aspect of the

Latin Empire. The rule of Constantinople by Westerners constituted the state.

Instead of attributing the failed alliance to the barons’ individualism, ineptitude,

or prejudice, I would argue they made a calculated decision in response to the

possibility Wolff acknowledged but passed over, namely that Constantinople would

become a “mere protectorate.” Asen had the capacity to strengthen the Latin Empire,

but the cost might well have been its absorption into Bulgarian territory. Subsequent

events revealed Asen’s ambitions toward Constantinople. In 1230, in an inscription

celebrating his military victory over Theodore Doukas, Asen voiced his attitude toward

the Latin Empire, bragging: “To the Franks only the city of Tsargrad remains, but even

they have become subject to my Majesty, for they have no king but me, and owe their

389
This too is based on Sanudo’s evaluation: “tunc Barones suitimentes, quod postquam Balduinus suum
firmasset Imperium, ne procederet cõtra eos, propter o(se)nsam magnam quam in praedecessorem ipsius
commiserant, dolosum sibi dederunt consilium.” Ibid..
143
survival to me alone.” 390 In the 1230s, Asen and Vatatzes launched several joint attacks

on Constantinople, which threatened the survival of the city. For the barons, Asen’s

generosity and mercy were countered by his ambition. Although Asen might have been

a magnanimous regent, he had designs on Constantinople and could have used his

regency to gain direct control over the city. Accepting Asen as regent could have

reduced the Latin Empire to a subsidiary or even part of the Bulgarian polity. The same

risk had been inherent in the choice of Andrew of Hungary as successor to Henri, a

development the barons had likewise rejected. Even if the tsar did not seize control of

the city, a child born to Helen and Baudouin II, with the powerful Asen as a

grandfather, could well have ended up more sympathetic to Bulgarian interests than to

those of the immigrant French community. As examples in these pages have shown,

marriage did not obviate women’s ties to their natal family and its interests. Helen

might have maintained an allegiance to Bulgaria, one that could have passed to her

husband and children. Baudouin II’s young age and Eastern upbringing increased the

possibility that he would be swayed by his wife and father-in-law into an affection and

concern for Bulgaria.

As their actions against Robert’s wife indicated, the barons were willing to act to

preserve their influence. Dandulo specified that the barons who opposed Asen were

those “qui patrem tam seve offenderant,” referring to the outrage committed against

Robert’s wife and mother-in-law. 391 The rise of Asen in Constantinople threatened the

barons’ own power. As with Andrew of Hungary, Asen had a base that was close

390
Translation from Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, p. 113. Wolff also translated the text and included a
copy of the inscription. Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 536. For a
German translation see Jireček, Geschichte der Bulgaren, pp 251-52.
391
Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–1280 d.c.,” p. 292.
144
enough to provide, if he desired, his own men to run the empire. The barons had reason

to be anxious about their position in the city and government of the Latin Empire,

should Asen come to the throne. In contrast, a Western emperor would be more

dependent on them and their knowledge and experience in the region, even if he

brought his own men. The barons’ power had already survived the selection of two

Western emperors—Pierre II and Robert. It would survive a third.

Instead of choosing the Bulgarian tsar, the barons settled on Jean de Brienne, an

elderly but well-respected soldier and papal ally, with a demonstrated interest in the

East, and a daughter of the right age. In 1228, his career had already combined

achievements in France and Italy with a notable tenure as the king of Jerusalem. His

selection affirmed and deepened Constantinople’s connection to France. It also

emphasized, for contemporaries and historians, the crusader nature of the Latin Empire,

a characteristic constantly cited by the popes but remarkably ineffective as a recruiting

tool. The failures of Jean de Brienne’s reign show the Latin Empire’s precarious

reliance on this intersection of kin and crusading to maintain its existence.

Like Pierre II and the barons of the Latin Empire, Jean de Brienne was a French

aristocrat with origins in Burgundy and Champagne. Born around the middle of the

twelfth century, his early years are obscure. He acquired significant properties and in

the early thirteenth century the knight took on the title “count of Brienne” as regent for

his young nephew. 392 The Brienne lands were located in the county of Champagne and

the family was well-connected there. Jean appears in charters with Thibaut III of

Champagne, his widow Blanche, the archbishop of Sens, and the lords of Bar-sur-Seine,

392
Henri d' Arbois de Jubainville, Recherches sur les premières années de Jean de Brienne, roi de
Jérusalem, empereur de Constantinople (Paris, 1868), pp 235-41.
145
Chappes, Joigny, and Sancerre. 393 Jean’s tenure as king of Jerusalem did not sever his

connection to Champagne. On the contrary, he retained control of Brienne until his

nephew Gautier IV came of age. 394 Even its transfer did not end his involvement in

events in Champagne. 395 Jean’s Champenois origins gave him a great deal in common

with the barons in Constantinople. 396 Already an elderly man, Jean was older than most

of the men who lived in Constantinople in 1228. 397 But he would have known some of

their fathers and grandfathers, if not the barons themselves.

In addition to his roots and career in Champagne, Jean de Brienne had a

complex relationship, at times uneasy, at times close, with the Capetians. In 1214, he

witnessed Philip Augustus’s confirmation that neither the king nor his son Louis would

hear any case challenging Thibaud IV de Champagne’s right to his inheritance. 398

393
See Henri d' Arbois de Jubainville, Catalogue d'actes des comtes de Brienne, 950–1356 (Paris:
Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des chartes, 1872), pp 27, 29-30, nos. 119, 133, 135, 137-38; Charles Lalore,
Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Saint-Loup de Troyes, Collection des principaux cartulaires du diocèse de
Troyes I (Troyes: E. Thorin, 1875), pp 192-93; AD Aube, 4 H 34; Evergates, Littere Baronum: the
Earliest Cartulary of the Counts of Champagne, p. 87, no. 47, ftnt 3; Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour
faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, p. 135, no. 308. The connections here are
complex. Guillaume, the count of Sancerre, was Pierre de Courtenay’s brother-in-law and departed with
him for Constantinople. Du Bouchet, Histoire généalogique de la maison royale de Courtenay, pp 16-17.
Later in the thirteenth century, the French branch of the Courtenays married into the Joigny and Brienne
families. Arsenal, MS 6023, #28. Petit, Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne, vol III, part IV, p. 427, no.
2846. Jean de Brienne’s confirmation of Clarembaud de Chappes’s donations came as the latter prepared
to leave for the Fourth Crusade. AD Aube, 4 H 34, with a summary in Arbois de Jubainville, Catalogue
d'actes des comtes de Brienne, 950–1356, p. 29, no. 133.
394
For Jean de Brienne’s continued involvement see Ibid., pp 31-32, no. 145-47. In 1221, he requested
that Blanche of Champagne and Thibaut IV to put Gautier IV in possession of the county. Ibid., p. 32,
no. 148.
395
Ibid., p. 32, no. 149. He confirmed two transactions involving Erard de Brienne and local
ecclesiastics. AD Yonne H 706. AD Yonne G 464, with a summary published in Quantin, Cartulaire
général de l'Yonne, II: 135, no. 308.
396
The Champenois played an important role in the early years of the Latin Empire. Thibaud III de
Champagne had been the original leader of the Fourth Crusade, and the first generation of settlers boasted
a number of men from his county, most prominently Geoffroy de Villehardouin the chronicler and Milo
le Brebant who held important positions in Thibaud’s government.
397
Arbois de Jubainville, Recherches sur les premières années de Jean de Brienne, roi de Jérusalem,
empereur de Constantinople, p. 235. Upon his departure for Constantinople, Jean de Brienne left his
lands in the hands of Gautier IV, who would inherit them if Jean did not have any surviving children.
Arbois de Jubainville, Catalogue d'actes des comtes de Brienne, 950–1356, pp 34-35, no. 162.
398
Evergates, Littere Baronum: the Earliest Cartulary of the Counts of Champagne, pp 122-23, no. 88.
146
Jean’s close relationship with Blanche of Champagne after her husband’s death,

however, concerned Philip Augustus and apparently caused the king to recommend Jean

for the throne of Jerusalem, thus removing him as a possible threat to Capetian

power. 399 If so, his relations with the Capetians were repaired in the reign of Louis VIII

and the regency of Blanche of Castile. During Jean’s trip to the West from Jerusalem in

the 1220s, he married, late in life, Berengaria, princess of Castile and the niece of the

powerful French queen. 400 This marriage created a connection with the queen that

extended beyond formal kinship. Blanche, despite her childhood departure from Spain

to marry the future Louis VIII, remained close to her family, as letters between her and

her parents and sister attest. 401 Soon after their marriage, Jean and Berengaria visited

her aunt in France, where Berengaria participated in a religious procession with the

queen praying for Louis VIII’s military success. 402 After Frederick II supplanted Jean

de Brienne in Jerusalem, the ex-king was present at Louis IX’s coronation. He lived up

to the relationship his marriage had created and refused to join nobles opposing

Blanche’s regency. 403 Further proof of Jean’s closeness to the Capetians comes from

events after his departure for Constantinople. His sons were raised, in part at least, in

399
The continuation of Guillaume de Tyre provided an account of Philip Augustus’s choice of Jean de
Brienne. “L'Estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquest de la terre d'outre mer,” in RHC Occ (Paris:
L'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1859), pp 306-7.
400
Oswald Holder-Egger, ed., “Chronicon S. Martini Turonensi,” in MGH SS (Hanover, 1882), p. 470;
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 913, ll 45-46; Jules Viard, ed., Les Grandes Chroniques de
France (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France, 1932), VII: 8-9.
401
Régine Pernoud, La Reine Blanche (Paris: A Michel, 1972), pp 27, 71-76. See letters at Teulet,
Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II: 97-99, nos. 1813-21.
402
Pernoud, La Reine Blanche, pp 122-23. “et furent à ceste procession III roynes : madame Ysemburge
jadis femme le roy Phelippe; madame Blanche femme le roy Loys; madame Berengiere femme le roy
Jehan de Jherusalem.” Viard, Les Grandes Chroniques de France, p. 11.
403
Pernoud, La Reine Blanche, pp 138-41; Richard, Saint Louis: roi d'une France féodale, soutien de la
Terre sainte, pp 37-38.
147
the French court. 404 This was not an unusual practice. Blanche herself had spent her

teenage years in the French court, raised not only with Louis VIII but also with Thibaut,

future count of Champagne; Johanna and Margaret, daughters of Baudouin IX of

Flanders; and Arthur, count of Brittany; and his sister Eleonor, children of Geoffroy

Plantagenet. 405 This cohort lived in the court for different reasons—the king’s desire to

control an inheritance, to gain leverage over possible rivals, or to protect the subject

children. Jean de Brienne’s sons, however, did not inherit substantial lands nor did their

father present a threat to the Capetians that could be controlled by holding his children.

He entrusted his children to a kinswoman and ally while he set out on a final adventure

to the East.

Jean de Brienne’s French background and connections with the Capetians were

not the only elements in his appeal to the Franks. His crusading history and close

relationship with the papacy were well-known and important aspects of his selection.

As noted above, in 1208, the barons of Jerusalem asked Philip Augustus to choose a

husband for Maria, heiress to the kingdom. He pointed to Jean de Brienne, and Jean

married Maria in 1210. 406 Maria died two years later, after giving birth to their

daughter. Jean remained in power, ruling as regent for his daughter, in the face of

404
Guillaume de Nangis claimed that Jean de Brienne sent his sons with Baudouin II. Guillaume de
Nangis, Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis et de ses continuateurs de 1113 à 1300 et les
continuations de cette chronique de 1300 à 1368, ed. H. Géraud (Paris: Société de l'histoire de France,
1843), pp 187-88: “Misit etiam cum eodem tres filios suos, Alphonsum, Johanem et Ludovicum aetatis
parvulos, regem Franciae deprecans Ludovicum, et piam ejus matrem Blancham reginam, cujus erant
pronepotes, ut eos in clientes habere et recipere dignarentur.” See Richard, Saint Louis: roi d'une France
féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte, p. 164.
405
Pernoud, La Reine Blanche, pp 29-30.
406
“Eracles,” pp 306-8.
148
opposition and resistance from the barons in the crusader kingdom. 407 In 1217, as the

forces of the Fifth Crusade landed in Acre, Jean de Brienne participated in the crusader

council that decided the progress of the crusade. His participation showcased his

courage and his wisdom. His focus was on fortifying the kingdom’s possessions and

strengthening its position vis-à-vis its neighbors. Once sufficient forces arrived, he

successfully urged the crusaders to focus on Egypt, the capture of which, he and others

believed, would provide security for the kingdom and even make possible the recapture

of Jerusalem itself. In Egypt, Jean de Brienne was chosen as the army’s leader,

although he was eventually, and disastrously, overshadowed by the papal legate

Pelagius. 408 The constantly changing composition of the crusading army and its

leadership made decision making an unwieldy process, and Jean de Brienne and

Pelagius clashed. 409 The main disagreement was whether to accept the repeated offers

of a lengthy and favorable truce from the Egyptians. Jean de Brienne strenuously

advocated for the acceptance of such an agreement, although when overruled he

continued to lead the crusading force in military actions. Finally, in early 1220, faced

with new developments in Armenia and the ascendancy of Pelagius among the

crusading body, Jean de Brienne returned to his own kingdom. In his absence, the

crusading force remained in Damietta for over a year, unable to decide upon and

undertake any unified action. In the early summer of 1221, Jean de Brienne returned to

the crusading force to find it finally prepared to advance on the Egyptians. His

condemnation of the plan made no impact. The advance was disastrous and left the

407
Bernard Hamilton, “King Consorts of Jerusalem and their Entourages from the West from 1186 to
1250,” in Die Kreuzfahrerstaaten als multikulturelle Gesellschaft: Einwanderer und Minderheiten im 12.
und 13. Jahrhundert, ed. H. E. Mayer (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1997), pp 18-21.
408
“Eracles,” p. 329.
409
Chronique d'Ernoul et des Bernard le trésorier, pp 426-28.
149
army trapped by the Nile and by the Muslim forces. Jean de Brienne assisted in

negotiating a truce under much less favorable terms than the previous ones proposed.

The crusade ended in failure, but Jean de Brienne had demonstrated strong judgment on

military and diplomatic matters and had earned a reputation as a valiant soldier and a

committed crusader. For the barons, Jean de Brienne’s willingness to engage in

diplomatic negotiations when military action was unproductive matched their own

attitude. Here was a Westerner who already had a Frankish sensibility.

Jean de Brienne’s close relationship with the papacy was the final element in his

appeal to settlers in Constantinople, who relied on papal support and exhortations for

Westerners to aid the Latin Empire. This relationship, formed in the crucible of the

Holy Land, deepened after his son-in-law exiled him from Jerusalem. 410 When the

struggle between the papacy and Frederick II broke out into open conflict, Jean de

Brienne led papal forces in southern Italy against imperial possessions and then against

the Western emperor himself. 411 Even after his selection as Robert’s successor, Jean de

Brienne remained in the West to continue the fight. Only once the conflict had ended,

in 1230, with the reconciliation of Frederick II and Gregory IX, did the new emperor

make plans to travel East.

When Jean de Brienne finally turned his attention toward the Latin Empire, he

used his French background, his crusading career, and his papal ties to recruit men and

materiel. He proceeded to France where he gathered men to accompany him to

410
Arbois de Jubainville, Catalogue d'actes des comtes de Brienne, 950–1356, p. 30, no. 139. There are a
number of contemporary accounts of Jean and Frederick’s conflict. See, for example, Holder-Egger,
“Chronicon S. Martini Turonensi,” pp 470-76.
411
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, p. 196, no. 317. Chronique d'Ernoul et des Bernard le trésorier, pp
448-55; Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 925, ll 21-27. See the discussion in David Abulafia,
Frederick II: a Medieval Emperor (London: The Penguin Press, 1988), pp 148-55.
150
Constantinople. His trip made an impression, appearing in several different sources. 412

Despite his expansive career in the East and in the service of the papacy, his ties to

France remained powerful enough to make it a recruiting ground.

In support of this endeavor, Gregory IX wrote to the archbishop of Rheims in

December 1229. 413 The choice of Rheims, of course, matches with Jean de Brienne’s

recruitment in France. The letter itself, announcing Jean de Brienne’s new position,

also suggests his strategy. It begins with the dangers to the Holy Land and the threat

from the Muslims. It then asserts “so that, in the meantime, anxiously attending to help

in the aforementioned business [the state of the Holy Land], we provide for the Latin

Empire in every way that we can.” 414 It plays on the crusading ideal by explicitly

connecting the security of the Latin Empire with the reclamation of territories in the

Holy Land. Furthermore, Gregory IX used both Jean’s old and new titles, king of

Jerusalem and emperor of Constantinople, respectively, emphasizing the connection

between the two crusader states. 415 The schism with the Greeks does not feature in this

call.

The selection of envoys to negotiate the agreement with Jean de Brienne

reflected these strategies, suggesting that they may have originated as much in

412
Several sources report Jean’s return to France. “Eracles,” pp 379, 381: “et s’en ala en France li rois
Johan” and “Ci vos dirons dou roi Johan, qui li avint quant il s’en fu alez en France.” Richard of San
Germano, “Chronica,” p. 175, col. 1027, ll 3-6: “Rex quondam Iherosolimitanus de Francia rediens et de
partibus ultramontanis uenit Perusium.” Dandolo reports that “in kallendis augusti, parato Venetorum
stolo, ille, cum exercitu, Constantinopolim navigat et imperator coronatus est.” Dandulus, “Chronica per
extensum aa. 46–1280 d.c.,” p. 292.
413
J. van den Gheyn, “Lettre de Grégoire IX concernant l'empire latin de Constantinople,” Revue de
l’Orient latin IX (1902): 230-4. The letter does not appear in Auvray’s register. It is reprinted in part in
Wolff. Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 1347-48, ftnt 24.
414
van den Gheyn, “Lettre de Grégoire IX concernant l'empire latin de Constantinople,” p. 231: “ut
interim, iuvancia predictum negocium sollicite procurantes, succurramus modis quibus possumus imperio
Romano.”
415
Ibid., p. 231-32: “karissimum in Christo filium nostrum (Iohannem) Iherosolimitanum regem
illustrem in Imperatorem concorditer elegerunt.”
151
Constantinople as in Europe. The barons had sent envoys—Jean, bishop of Madyta;

Villain d’Aulnay; and Ponce de Lyon—who had plenary powers to negotiate with Jean

de Brienne. Ponce de Lyon had travelled for the Latin Empire during Henri’s reign,

bringing relics and seeking aid in the West. 416 Villain d’Aulnay was presumably related

to the Fourth Crusader Guillaume d’Aulnay, whose lands were in the royal domains and

Champagne. 417 The inclusion of the bishop befits a mission sent to the papacy.

The general parameters for Jean de Brienne’s succession and rule in

Constantinople were established in a draft agreement of December 1228. 418 Here

Wolff’s accusation of incompetence, quoted earlier in this chapter, seems justified. The

terms reflect Jean’s concerns and desires, and not the Latin Empire’s needs. Jean’s

imperial authority was complete. He was guaranteed the throne until his death, even

after Baudouin II came of age. In fact, he would be the sole emperor, with Baudouin II

holding the title of “imperator futurus.” At the age of twenty, Baudouin II would inherit

Nicaea, excepting lands that had been granted to barons and Nicomedia. He would then

do homage to Jean for the lands he received. Not only did Jean have the right of use of

imperial territory, but also he could bequeath to his heirs either the portion of the empire

in Asia Minor or substantial lands in Greece and the Balkans. These lands were not in

Latin hands at the time of Jean’s ascension, and their delineation demonstrates the

expectation that Jean would reconquer territory lost to the Greeks since Henri’s

death. 419 Throughout, the agreement protected Jean from what had happened to him in

416
See p. 88 above
417
Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin, pp 120-21
418
Cessi, Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia, p. 210-11, no. 141; Tafel and Thomas,
Urkunden, II: 265-70, no. CCLXXIII.
419
For a more thorough summary and analysis of the agreement see Wolff, “The Latin Empire of
Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 517-21. The text of draft agreement, copied in Ibid., pp 1337-39, ftnt 5.
152
Jerusalem: exile at the hands of his son-in-law. It was an extraordinary arrangement, in

the concessions made to him and particularly in stipulating Baudouin II’s inferior status.

Until his father-in-law’s death, Baudouin II held a position in the empire similar to that

of the barons.

The final agreement with Jean de Brienne was concluded in April 1229. The

final terms very closely matched those of the draft. The most substantial difference

strengthened Jean’s position even more. It stated that the agreement would hold even if

Baudouin II or Marie were to die before the wedding took place. This addition raised

the possibility that Jean could become emperor without the kin relationship to justify

it. 420 It suggests the pressure the barons were under. Sent from Constantinople to

solidify the agreement, the envoys were expected to bring back an emperor. According

to the Chronique d’Ernoul, Jean was reluctant to accept the crown. 421 He held out for a

guarantee that, once he committed to the Latin Empire, his position could not be taken

from him.

The terms were probably negotiated with the pope’s help. Gregory IX’s

confirmation of the agreement manifested his interest and revealed his presence at their

conclusion. 422 The circumstances suggest that the pope pressured the barons to

accommodate Jean’s anxieties. Jean’s exertions for the pope certainly earned him the

pontiff’s advocacy, and papal pressure could explain the barons’ remarkable

concessions. Support in the West for the Latin Empire was weak, but the barons had

previously drawn Pierre II de Courtenay and then Robert to the East. They might well

have persuaded another lord to come with fewer concessions. Notably, the agreement

420
The final agreement is preserved in Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 265-70, no. CCLXXIII.
421
Chronique d'Ernoul et des Bernard le trésorier, pp 470-71.
422
Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 265-70, no. CCLXXIII.
153
with Jean de Brienne was far more detrimental to Baudouin II’s position than was any

proposed in the alliance with Asen, although it may have been more beneficial to the

barons in assuring their continued dominance.

The barons and the Latin Empire received little in exchange for these generous

terms. It took Jean de Brienne more than two years after the agreement to arrive in

Constantinople. 423 Far from getting the aggressive and strategic soldier of the Fifth

Crusade, the barons welcomed into Constantinople a man who, according to Philippe

Mouskès, made “neither peace nor war.” 424 Other contemporaries agreed with

Mouskès’s harsh assessment. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines dismissed Jean’s

accomplishments: “Indeed, King Jean acquired land over the Greeks but tepidly.” 425

Jean’s failures as a ruler encompassed not merely military endeavors but, as Mouskès’s

comment suggests, diplomatic ones as well. There were few signs of outreach to

Constantinople’s powerful neighbors—Nicaea, Bulgaria and Epiros. Even these few

gestures, notably with Nicaea and Bulgaria, were not of Jean’s own initiative. More

surprisingly, despite Jean’s connections, no appeal from him to the West for aid

survives. Only late in his reign, when his son-in-law Baudouin II had reached an age to

aspire to his future throne, did Jean send the imperial heir to the West, as much,

perhaps, to remove a threat as to gain aid. Constantinople was a retirement position for

Jean and, at least for the first few years, he treated it as such. Like Baudouin I and

Robert, unlike Henri and Yolande, Jean never truly adjusted to his new environment. In

423
Gregory IX wrote to the patriarch of Constantinople in May 1231 telling him to expect Jean de
Brienne in August. Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, p. 417, no. 656.
424
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, II: 613, ll 29030-34: “S’en fu alés li rois Jehans./Là ot esté ne sai qans
ans,/Qu’il n’i ot pais faite ne gierre;/Ainc perdi priès toute la tiere.”
425
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 933, l 34: “Rex vero Iohannes super Grecos terram
acquirebat sed tepide.” See also Ibid., pp 938-39.
154
hindsight, it is apparent that the West lacked a deep interest in and commitment to the

fate of the Latin Empire. With Bulgaria and Nicaea growing in power, however, the

prospect of an emperor from the West, who would bring military and financial support

and an unadulterated commitment to Frankish interests, was deeply appealing. That this

promise did not come to pass is a different matter.

Diplomacy and Marriage in the Reign of Jean de Brienne

In bringing Jean de Brienne to Constantinople, the barons employed marriage in

a new way. Instead of operating as part of an alliance with a neighbor, this marriage

drew aid from the West. In choosing Marie over Helen, and Jean de Brienne over Asen,

the barons of Constantinople abandoned previous strategies and focused on creating and

making use of Western connections. In fact, the union between Baudouin II and Marie

to Constantinople had more in common with the marriages arranged for the heiresses of

the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem than it did with previous Latin Empire marriages. In

Jerusalem, a series of royal women—Melisende, Sybille, Isabelle, Marie, and Isabelle—

all married outsiders. 426 As Phillips noted about the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, “the

Frankish settlers might be capable of providing a spouse or regent but a western

marriage carried the added possibilities that an influx of men and money might

accompany the new arrival. 427 Jean, of course, was familiar with this pattern since it

was through external marriage that he both gained and lost power in Jerusalem. The

barons of Champagne were likewise aware of this possibility since their count, Henri,

had married the queen of Jerusalem and abandoned his Western lands, remaining in the

East until his death in 1197. Until the late 1220s, however, the Franks in

426
See pp 922-93 above for a discussion of the pattern of marriages in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.
427
Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119–1187, p.
20.
155
Constantinople did not match requests for Western aid with marriage proposals. As will

become apparent in succeeding chapters, Baudouin II and Marie’s marriage marks a

turning point in imperial marriage strategies, a turn toward the West for marriage

partners. Jean himself was uninterested in arranging diplomatic marriages with his new

neighbors, and his grandson was later proposed as a marriage partner for various

Western princesses. Events would reveal the weakness of this new strategy.

The 1230s, in particular, were a time when external alliances were critical. The

arrival of Jean de Brienne in 1231 coincided with a moment of strength for both Asen

and Vatatzes. In 1230, Theodore Doukas’s attack on Bulgaria ended in his defeat and

blinding. 428 Asen recovered territory in Macedonia but did not attempt to take

Thessaloniki. Instead, he supported Manuel, his son-in-law, in a successful bid to

succeed Theodore. 429 Asen’s defeat of Theodore and Manuel’s succession in

Thessaloniki left the Bulgarian tsar with a secure border. 430 Andrew, the king of

Hungary, was Asen’s father-in-law, and the two polities enjoyed good relations

428
The timing of the attack of 1230, after the expiration of a year-long truce between Epiros and the Latin
Empire, suggests that Theodore may have attacked Bulgaria as part of a strategy to capture
Constantinople. In the 1220s, Theodore had moved against Bulgaria in preparation for an attack on
Thessaloniki. In both cases, reducing the Bulgarian threat would remove a potential obstacle and open up
the path to his target.
429
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 109-11. Bredenkamp remarked on the catastrophe of Theodore’s
defeat: “For the all too short five years of Theodoros Doukas’ rule as emperor of the Empire of
Thessaloniki it seemed as if he was untouchable and unstoppable. Just as his career seemed to reach its
acme it was cut short by the defeat at the hands of the Bulgars. Never again was Theodore to rule as
emperor, nor the Empire of Thessaloniki to pose a substantial challenge within the field of international
relations.” Bredenkamp, The Byzantine Empire of Thessaloniki (1224–1242), p. 153. There are several
contemporary accounts of Theodore and Asen’s conflict, which apparently made quite an impression: In
Greek, Acropolites, Opera, pp 41-43, ch 25. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The
History, pp 178-79, ch 25. In the West, Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 927; Richard of San
Germano, “Chronica,” p. 166, ll 31-32.
430
Akropolites attested to the general peace of the Bulgarian-Thessaloniki border after Manuel’s rise and
attributed it to the kinship between Manuel and Asen. Acropolites, Opera, p. 44, ch 26. Translation in
Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 182, ch 26.
156
throughout the 1230s. 431 In Asia Minor, Vatatzes had spent most of the later 1220s

dealing with a Turkish threat on his border. In 1231, the Nicaean emperor and the

Turkish sultan finally reached a peace agreement, one made appealing to both sides by

threats posed by new actors in the region—the Khwarizmians and the Mongols in Asia

Minor and Jean de Brienne in Constantinople. 432

Although Asen and Vatatzes allied in the mid-1230s to present a serious threat

to Constantinople, immediately after Jean de Brienne’s arrival Vatatzes inclined toward

the Franks rather than the Bulgarians. In 1232, Germanus, the patriarch in Nicaea, met

Franciscan friars who were traveling through Asia Minor. Inspired by their piety, he

wrote to the pope, lamenting the division of the church and raising the question of

church union. 433 In his reply, Gregory IX also dwelt on the schism, urging the Greek

church to obedience. 434 A second letter arrived with a papal delegation, consisting of

two Dominicans and two Franciscans, in early 1234. 435 According to the friars’

431
For Bela’s summary of his relationship with Asen, in which he claimed Asen acted more as a subject
than a friend, see Theiner, VMH, I: 170-71, no. 308. For Gregory IX’s appeal to Bela to take arms
against Asen see Ibid., I: 140-41, no. 248.
432
The threat from the Turks, particularly in the Meander valley, must have been significant. Vatatzes
did not merely ignore Constantinople; he also did nothing to stop the spread of Epiros in Thrace and
Greece. This was a marked contrast to his offensive actions there in the early 1220s. Langdon has
analyzed a variety of different sources and his account of the conflict is found in Langdon, Byzantium's
Last Imperial Offensive in Asia Minor, pp 2-20.
433
Giovan Domenico Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Florence and Venice,
1758), XXIII: 47-56. A Latin version of the correspondence is preserved in Matthew Paris, Chronica
Majora, Rolls Series (London, 1976), III: 448-55.
434
Paris, Chronica Majora, III: 460-66; Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum, XXIII: 55-59.
435
Text in Paris, Chronica Majora, III: 466-69; J. Sbaralea, Bullarium Franciscanum (Assis: Edizione
Porziuncola, 1759), pp 103-5. Cataloged and summarized in Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, no. 1316;
Potthast, Regesta, p. 787, no. 9198. Gill gives a thorough summary of the embassy and the various
sources for it. Gill, Byzantium and the Papacy, 1198–1400, pp 65-72. See also Langdon’s consideration
of the implications for Byzantine ideas of imperial power and Wolff’s earlier discussion. John S.
Langdon, “Byzantium in Anatolian Exile: Imperial Viceregency Reaffirmed during Byzantino-papal
Discussions at Nicaea and Nymphaion, 1234,” in Presence of Byzantium: Studies Presented to Milton V.
Anastos in Honor of his Eighty-Fifth Birthday, ed. Andrew R. Dyck and Sarolta A. Takács (Amsterdam:
Adolf M. Hakkert, 1994), 197-233. Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 545-
49. The friars’ account survives and is published in Paul G. Golubovich, “Disputatio Latinorum et
157
account, written after their mission, the Greeks insisted on opening debate on

differences between the two churches, even though the friars were only authorized to

deliver a papal message and not to conduct discussions or negotations. Nonetheless,

they participated in conversations, although the two sides could not even agree on

which issue was the most salient: The Latins focused on the problem of unleavened

bread in the Eucharist, while the Greeks were primarily concerned with the filioque

clause. Both sides avoided the most pressing issue, that of papal primacy. The Greeks

called a council to discuss differences, but the friars refused to participate, since they

were only nuncii and not legati, and returned to Constantinople, where they promised to

await a written explanation and defense of the Greek position.

When the friars returned to Nicaea in April 1234, they had political as well as

religious goals. The Greeks had renewed their request for Western participation in the

council. Instructed by various figures in Constantinople, including Jean de Brienne,

members of the chapter of Hagia Sophia, and the prelates in Constantinople, the friars

left with a mandate to negotiate a one-year truce. 436 The Latin Empire had a pressing

need for peace. In 1233, while Nicaea awaited the papal envoys, Jean de Brienne had

led a failed offensive in Asia Minor that had no lasting benefits and only succeeded in

turning Vatatzes’s attention toward Constantinople. 437 The situation was quite

Graecorum seu relatio apocrisariorum Gregorii de gestis Nicaeae in Bithynia et Nymphaeae in Lydia,”
Archivum franciscanum historicum 12 (1919): 418-70.
436
Ibid., p. 446: “Verum tamen ne talia nostra tantum attemptare videremus voluntate, capitulum Sancte
Sophye et prelatos terre nec non et ipsum Imperatorem super hoc consuluimus negotio, qui omnes
unanimiter idem nobis consuluerunt.”
437
For analysis see Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, 145-48; Langdon, Byzantium's Last Imperial Offensive
in Asia Minor, p. 38; Langdon, “Forgotten Byzantino-Bulgarian Assault,” p. 128, ftnt 25; Wolff, “The
Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 541-43. Contemporary accounts include Aubri de
Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 933, ll 34-35; “Eracles,” p. 382. Acropolites, Opera, pp 47-48, ch 30.
Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 190, ch 30. See also the accounts
preserved in Cesare Baronio and Odorico Raynaldus, Annales ecclesiastici (Rome, 1588), yr 1232 46-53
158
desperate, with the empire suffering from extreme poverty and threatened on all

sides. 438 For the Franks, a truce was a higher priority than church union. The latter, in

fact, might put the Latin Empire in greater danger. Vatatzes saw church union as a path

to Greek restoration in Constantinople. He specifically asked the friars if reconciliation

between the patriarch and the pope would result in the return of the patriarchal see to

the Greeks. 439 He hoped that, once the schism was healed, the pope would step back

from supporting the Latin Empire and allow him to reestablish Greek rule in

Constantinople.

This query confirms the importance of papal support for the survival of the Latin

Empire. If the pope did not always come through with practical support, his backing

discouraged Constantinople’s neighbors from attack. Church union held dangers for the

Latin Empire. It would remove a central justification for the Western occupation of

Constantinople in the view of the papacy. Here the interests of the papacy and the Latin

Empire diverged. The Latin Empire’s dependence on the appeal of the crusade meant

that, if the pope withdrew his backing, even that promise (or threat) of Western military

support would be gone. Vatatzes as well as the Franks understood that. For the Franks,

and yr 1233 1-15. In 1233, Vatatzes was briefly distracted by a Venetian-backed revolt on Rhodes. For
an agreement between the doge of Venice and the lord of Rhodes, see Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II:
319-22, no. CCLXXXIX. For mention of the lord of Rhodes allied with Vatatzes seeMartino de Canale,
“Cronicon dei Veneti,” Archivio storico italiano VIII (1845): 362, ch 81. As was frequently the case,
“les Latins de Constantinople décidèrent d’attaquer les possessions côtières de Nicée sur la Propontide
micrasiatique.” Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, p. 318.
438
The friars provided a description of the situation of Constantinople. Golubovich, “Disputatio
Latinorum et Graecorum,” pp 445-46: “preterea terra Constantinopolis quasi destitua fuit omni presidio:
dominus Imperator pauper erat. Milites stipendiarii omnes recesserunt. Naves Venetorum, Pisanorum,
Aconitanorum et aliarom nationum parati fuerunt ad recedendum et quedam vero iam recesserent.
Considerantes igitur terram desloatam, timuimus periculum quia in medio inimicorum terra illa sita est.
Arsanus rex Bachorum ab Aquilone, Vatacius ab Oriente et Meridie, Emmanuhel circumdat eam ab
Occidente et ideo proposuimus tractare de treugis inter Imperatorem Constantinopolitanum et Vatacium
usque ad annum.”
439
Ibid., p. 445. See Langdon’s analysis. Langdon, “Byzantium in Anatolian Exile,” pp 213-14.
159
a truce, on the other hand, had the main secular benefit of union—peace—without the

dangers. Temporary truces were a way of life for the Franks.

Despite this mandate, the conversation between the friars and the Greeks once

again centered on religious disagreement. The friars ended their visit by anathemitizing

the Greeks and dismissing them as heretics. They departed abruptly, apparently without

paying their respects to the Nicaean patriarch, and they were chased by messengers

from the emperor and patriarch. 440 The mission had ended in failure, antagonizing one

of the Latin Empire’s most powerful and dangerous neighbors. Encouraged by the

exigencies of their situation, the Franks in Constantinople valued even a year-long

truce. Neither Vatatzes nor the friars had such motivation and their conversation

remained focused on the issues that divided them.

The friars’ mission was the only substantial diplomatic endeavor during Jean de

Brienne’s reign, and the friars were sent by the pope in response to a Greek request.

Although Jean de Brienne himself came to power through a marriage, no evidence of

important political marriages or even negotiations for them survive from his reign. Jean

de Brienne’s neighbors did not share his reluctance to engage in these negotiations. In

particular, marriage and the kin relationships it created were central aspects of Asen’s

diplomatic strategy. Asen valued his kin and the connection and affection that marriage

wrought. He often acted in concert with his in-laws and supported them. In the 1220s,

he had married a Hungarian princess and his daughters married into the Nicaean and

Epirote ruling families.

440
Paul G. Golubovich, Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell’Oriente Francescano
(Florence: Collegio di S. Bonaventura, 1906), p. 464. See Langdon, “Byzantium in Anatolian Exile,” pp
227-28.
160
 After the failure of the friars’ mission, Vatatzes turned from the proposed

rapprochement with the papacy to an alliance with Bulgaria, Constantinople’s other

great rival. Asen and Vatatzes’s joint action presented the greatest threat to the Latin

Empire since the beginning of Henri’s reign. Both Asen and Vatatzes enjoyed internal

security and peace with their neighbors. The Doukai were subdued under Asen’s

benevolent watch and Bela IV, the new king of Hungary, had no interest in attacking

Asen, citing their familial relationship. 441 In Asia Minor, the truce between Nicaea and

the Turks held. There was no other power to distract Asen and Vatatzes from an all-out

attack on Constantinople. Their new political relationship was sealed with a marriage

between Theodore II Lascaris, Vatatzes’s son and heir, and Helen, Asen’s daughter,

who had once been proposed as a bride for Baudouin II. A joint Bulgaro-Nicaean

attack on Latin lands immediately followed the wedding. In mid-1235, the combined

forces were besieging Constantinople itself by both land and sea. 442 The alliance

between Bulgaria and Nicaea required compromise. Vatatzes acknowledged and

validated Asen’s use of the title of emperor. The archbishopric of Trnovo was also

raised to an autonomous patriarchate. 443 In return, the majority of conquered lands

would be awarded to Nicaea. According to Akropolites, “the marriage connection and

the friendship” made possible the goodwill and favors bestowed by Vatatzes on Asen

and the Bulgarians. 444 No agreement that placed each party so much in the other’s

441
Theiner, VMH, I: 308.
442
Langdon, “Forgotten Byzantino-Bulgarian Assault,” pp 106-8. Asen was not present at the wedding.
Vatatzes brought Helen and her mother to Lampsakos where the patriarch married the young couple.
443
Acropolites, Opera, pp 50-51, ch 33. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p.
194, ch 33. See the discussion in Ioannis C. Tarnanidis, “Byzantine-Bulgarian Ecclesiastical Relations
during the Reigns of Ioannis Vatatzis and Ivan Asen II, up to the year 1235,” Cyrillomethodianum 3
(1975): 28-52.
444
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 194, ch 33. Acropolites, Opera, p.
51, ll 2-3, ch 33: “τοῦ κήδους ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς φιλίας.”
161
power would be acceptable without a marriage, a fact recognized by Western observers

as well. 445 In the end, however, neither the marriage nor the shared interests could keep

this alliance together. It fell apart because the two sides shared a goal, one that did not

allow compromise: the capture and control of Constantinople.

A variety of Greek and Latin writers documented the Bulgarian and Nicaean

attacks on the Latin Empire in 1235 and 1236, including Akropolites, Dandolo,

Mouskès, and Sanudo. 446 Wolff and Langdon have pieced together and recounted the

events of these years. 447 After an initial successful campaign in Thrace in the spring

and summer of 1235, Asen and Vatatzes led their combined forces to Constantinople.

Jean de Brienne was spurred to action and led a small number of knights to an

astounding victory. 448 At sea, the Venetians came to the rescue of Constantinople and

soundly defeated the Greek fleet. 449 The assaulting force retreated, and Asen and

Vatatzes spent several months consolidating their gains in Thrace. A second assault in

the winter of 1235–1236 was countered with the aid of Italian fleets; Angelo Sanudo,

the duke of the Archipelago; and Geoffroy II de Villehardouin, who was prince of the

445
Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” p. 73: “Ex praemissus autem Exagorarum Imperator
quam plurimùm prouocatus, filiam suum in coniugem dedit Imperatori Graecorum, partium Orientis, qui
ambo tali affinitate coniuncti contra Balduinum & Venetos terrâ mari’q; exercitibus praeparatis,
deuictis’q; eorundem Balduini & Venetorum vrbibus propè in ibi, & ferè fortilitiis vniuersis, ei solùm
vrbis Constantinopolis moenia remanserunt.”
446
Acropolites, Opera, pp 50-52, ch 33. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p.
194, ch 33. Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–1280 d.c.,” p. 295; Mouskès, Chronique rimée, pp
613-14, ll 29039-79; Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” p. 73.
447
Langdon, “Forgotten Byzantino-Bulgarian Assault”; Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople
(1204–1261),” pp 550-56.
448
Akropolites recorded only that Asen and Vatatzes withdrew when the winter arrived. Acropolites,
Opera, p. 52, ch 33. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 195, ch 33.
Western sources give a more detailed account of the battle and the Frankish victory. Gregory’s letter to
Bela of Hungary preserves a description of the action. Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, p. 218, no.
2872; Theiner, VMH, I: 140, no. 249. Mouskès praised Jean de Brienne’s courage. Mouskès, Chronique
rimée, pp 613-16, ll 29039-29121.
449
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, p. 218, no. 2872; Theiner, VMH, I: 140, no. 249. Italian sources
also describe the Venetian victory. Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–1280 d.c.,” p. 295; Canale,
“Cronicon,” pp 362-68, ch LXXX-LXXXV.
162
Morea, vassal of the Latin Emperor, and brother-in-law of the imperial heir Baudouin

II. 450

The Frankish defense of the city revealed both their potential for successful

action and the fundamental weakness in their reliance on the West for support. The

fleet aiding Constantinople conspicuously lacked any non-Italian, Western component.

All of the parties, in fact, had a clear self-interest in or a political tie to the Latin

Empire, or both. In particular, the Venetians had significant financial investments in the

Latin Empire. 451 Genoa and Pisa had less at stake, but their participation might further

open up the great city to their merchants. Some Genoese merchants had returned to the

city after 1232 and might have encouraged their government to come to the city’s

defense. 452 Moreover, the three Italian city-states were enjoying a temporary period of

peace and, therefore, had the freedom to send forces to Constantinople.

Geoffroy II de Villehardouin’s actions cannot so easily be attributed to financial

motives. Wolff explained Geoffroy’s commitment with reference to the political

relationship between the two polities:

This extraordinarily loyal behavior may, I think, be regarded as another tribute

to the effectiveness of the Emperor Henry’s work. Twenty-seven years after
Ravennika, where his father had sworn fealty to the Emperor, Geoffrey was still
faithful to the vow, despite the fact that the Princes of Achaia were now far

450
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” pp 938-39; Mouskès, Chronique rimée, p. 620, ll 29238-45.
For Sanudo’s support, see Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 555-56.
451
David Jacoby’s numerous publications are central to our understanding of the Venetian presence in
Constantinople. See, for example, Jacoby, “Venetian Settlers in Latin Constantinople (1204–1261): Rich
or Poor?”; Jacoby, “The Venetian Presence in the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261)”; Jacoby,
“The Venetian Government and Administration in Latin Constantinople, 1204–1261: a State within a
State”; David Jacoby, “Mutlilingualism and Institutional Patterns of Communication in Latin Romania
(Thirteenth - Fourteenth Centuries),” in Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean 1000-1500: Aspects of
Cross-Cultural Communication, ed. Alexander Daniel Beihammer, Maria G Parani, and Christopher
David Schabel, The Medieval Mediterranean 74 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 27-48.
452
Jacoby, “Venetian Settlers in Latin Constantinople (1204–1261): Rich or Poor?,” pp 198-99.
163
 richer and more powerful than their suzerains, and would have been able to flout
their wishes with impunity. 453

In line with his prior assessment of Henri’s accomplishments, Wolff praised him to the

exclusion of all others 454 Yet, Jean de Brienne and Baudouin II had, perhaps, Yolande

as much as Henri to thank for Geoffroy’s rescue of the city. According to the Chronicle

of Morea, the marriage between the Courtenay and the Villehardouin families was

pivotal to the alliance between Constantinople and the Morea. Agnès was still alive in

the mid-1240s, and she and Geoffroy had provided a haven for her brother Robert in

1228. 455 Her loyalty might still have been engaged by her youngest brother, Baudouin

II. Wolff also downplayed Geoffroy’s self-interest. The Latin Empire was too weak to

come to his aid, but it was a friendly actor in the region, and its continued existence

provided a check to their common enemies and distracted them from the Franks in

southern Greece.

According to Saulger, Geoffroy II de Villehardouin was not the only local ruler

who came to the support of Constantinople. The duke of the Archipelago, Angelo

Sanudo, twice sent ships to help relieve the attack. 456 The same political ties and self-

interest that motivated Villehardouin likely lay behind Sanudo’s assistance. Despite his

Venetian origins, Marco Sanudo became Henri’s vassal for the islands of the

Archipelago in 1207. 457 Angelo, his son, had renewed this allegiance to Robert, Jean de

Brienne, and Baudouin II. The Archipelago also drew closer to the Morea and

453
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 555.
454
See pp 107-9 above for a discussion of the Chronicle of the Morea’s account of the marriage.
455
Baudouin II referred to her as living in a charter of 1247. AN, J 509, no. 2, published in Teulet,
Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III: 11-12, no. 3604.
456
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 555-56.
457
William Miller, The Latins in the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece (1204–1566) (London: John
Murray, 1908), p. 570.
164
eventually was placed under the prince’s suzerainty by Baudouin II. 458 The duke’s

participation might have extended beyond military support to negotiations of a two-year

truce between Jean de Brienne and Vatatzes, although Saulger is the only source to

attest to the treaty. 459 By 1262, Angelo Sanudo had married the daughter of Macaire de

Saint-Ménéhould, apparently in the imperial palace. 460 It is tempting to think that this

marriage either helped cause Sanudo’s support of Constantinople in the mid-1230s or

was a result of that support—a reward.

Following the second siege of Constantinople, Asen withdrew from his alliance

with Vatatzes and resumed communication with the pope. In May 1236, Gregory IX

threatened to excommunicate him if he continued to ally with Vatatzes and attack

Constantinople. 461 Over the ensuing year, however, Gregory IX and Asen continued

communicating and must have made some progress in negotiations because, when a

papal envoy was sent to the Bulgarian capital a year later, no mention was made of

excommunication. 462 Asen had already demonstrated a willingness to switch between

Greek and Roman ecclesiastical authorities depending on his diplomatic needs. 463 He

did not welcome excommunication, but his overtures to the pope were more a product

of political circumstances than of religious anxiety. Vatatzes’s increasing strength and

458
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, p. 176; Miller, The Latins in
the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece (1204–1566), p. 574.
459
For an evaluation of this possibility, see Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),”
pp 555-57.
460
Marino Sanudo, “Istoria del regno di Romania,” in Chroniques gréco-romanes, ed. Carl Hopf, 1873, p.
115: “Ivi andò la Madre de Miser Marco Sanudo, la qual fù Figlia de Miser Machario di Santo Montalto
di Campagna di Franza, che fù gran Baron dell’ Imperio, ed essa era stata maritata in Palazzo del detto
Imperator Latino, la qual donò gran presenti al detto Imperator Balduin e ad alcuni Nobili Huomini e
Nobili Madonne, ch’ erano con lui.” See Miller, The Latins in the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece
(1204–1566), p. 574.
461
Theiner, VMH, p. 144, no. CCLV. Catalogued in Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, p. 694, no. 3156.
462
Theiner, VMH, pp 155-58, nos. CCLXXV-CCLXXVII, CCLXXIX, CCLXXX.
463
Tarnanidis, “Byzantine-Bulgarian Ecclesiastical Relations during the Reigns of Ioannis Vatatzis and
Ivan Asen II, up to the year 1235,” pp 28-52.
165
continued success threatened Asen. 464 With his defeat of Theodore Doukas, Asen

regained Bulgarian territory in the Balkans, which had been under the control of

Thessaloniki. But Vatatzes, as well, held Thracian land and had a base of support

there. 465 As the inscription at the church in Trnovo makes clear, Asen desired and

expected to be lord of Constantinople. Certainly, Vatatzes sought the same prize. The

alliance, however convenient, must have been fraught. Having made gains in Thrace,

Asen probably considered that further advances would bring him into conflict with

Vatatzes.

An obstacle impeded Asen’s withdrawal from the agreement: his daughter’s

marriage to Theodore Lascaris and her continued residence with her husband in Greek

territory. Accordingly, while he was corresponding with the pope, Asen wrote to

Vatatzes, requesting that Vatatzes return Helen to her natal family, purportedly for a

brief visit. With hindsight, Akropolites attributed to Vatatzes and his wife Eirene an

understanding of Asen’s true agenda—to break the alliance. Despite this, they agreed

to return Helen, trusting in God to punish the tsar should he withdraw from the

agreement. The scene of Helen’s reunification with her father is pitiful: “[H]e

proceeded towards Trnovo, his daughter crying and lamenting all the while and greatly

bewailing the separation from her mother-in-law, the empress Eirene, and her

husband.” 466 Helen and Theodore’s marriage was not merely a political alliance; it

464
Acropolites, Opera, p. 52, ch 34. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 198,
ch 34.
465
Langdon, Byzantium's Last Imperial Offensive in Asia Minor, pp 6-7.
466
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 198, ch 34. Acropolites, Opera, p.
53, ll 15-17, ch 34. “ἐχώρει περὶ τὸν Τρίνοβον, κλαιούσης μὲν τῆς αὐτοῦ θυγατρὸς καὶ ὀλοφυρομένης
καὶ τῆς πενθερᾶς καὶ βασιλίδος Εἰρήνης καὶ τοῦ συζύγου λίαν ἐποδυρομένης τὸν χωρισμόν.” For the
Cumans’ military prowess see Berend, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in
Medieval Hungary, c. 1000– c. 1300.
166
created emotional ties, ones that went beyond romance. Helen was nine years old and

Theodore eleven at the time of their marriage and “they were raised and educated by the

empress Eirene as she had a good nature and was of a kindly disposition.” 467 With her

marriage, Helen had entered into a new network of family and culture. Like Agnès of

France, who also married into a foreign culture at a young age, Helen did not want to

leave her marital family and culture for her natal one.

Helen’s return was followed by Asen’s decoupling from Nicaea, albeit briefly.

In 1237, he concluded a treaty with the Latins and the Cumans, a people who had been

mercenaries in armies across the Balkans and Asia Minor and recently attacked

Tzouroulos, a Nicaean possession to the west of Constantinople. During the siege,

Asen received word of the death of his wife, Maria of Hungary; one of their sons; and

the bishop of Trnovo. He interpreted this tragedy as evidence of divine disapproval of

his actions and abandoned his alliance with the Latin Empire. Helen returned to her

husband and the agreement between Bulgaria and Nicaea was reinstated, although the

original enthusiasm for joint action was never recovered. 468 Asen lacked commitment

to the renewed alliance. He granted safe passage to Baudouin II when the latter

returned from the West and, according to Akropolites’ account, committed other, minor

infractions of his agreement with Vatatzes, although the nature of the transgressions is

not specified. 469

467
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 191, 197, ch 31, 34. Acropolites,
Opera, p. 52, ll 13-15, ch 34: “ἀνήγοντο δὲ παρὰ τῆς βασιλίδος Εἰρήνης καὶ ἐπαιδεύοντο, οἷα ἐκείνη
φύσεως ἀγαθῆς τυχοῦσα καὶ πρὸς ἅπαν καλὸν ἐπινεύουσα.”
468
See analysis in Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 125-26, nos. 87-88. Acropolites, Opera, pp 54-56, ch 36.
Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 200-1, ch 36. Gardner argues, in the
absence of hard evidence, that circumstantial references point to Helen and Theodore’s marriage as a
happy one. Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, pp 202, text and ftnt 3.
469
Acropolites, Opera, p. 60, ll 4-9, ch 37: “ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Ἰωάννης καὶ αὖθις μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀσὰν
εἰρήνην εἶχε, καὶ τῇ συγγενείᾳ καὶ ἄμφω συνεδέδεντο, οὐκ ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦ Ἀσὰν τὰς ἐνόρκους
167
 For his own second marriage, Asen turned to his Greek neighbor and married

Eirene, the daughter of Theodore Doukas. In doing so, he ignored the rules concerning

degrees of consanguinity; the marriage was prohibited since her uncle, Manuel, was

married to Asen’s illegitimate daughter. 470 His marriage to Eirene corresponded to a

change in Bulgarian foreign policy. The tsar released Theodore Doukas, his new father-

in-law, and supported his attempt to reclaim Thessaloniki from his brother, and Asen’s

son-in-law, Manuel. This was a complete about-face from Asen’s position earlier in the

decade when he had blinded Theodore Doukas and supported Manuel’s bid for power.

Akropolites was explicit in describing Asen’s motivation for supporting Theodore:

“Asan was more fond of his father-in-law Theodore than [of] his son-in-law Manuel;

for he loved his wife Eirene exceedingly, no less than Antony did Cleopatra.” 471

Marriage did not create unbreakable ties, however, as is apparent in his dealings with

Vatatzes and Manuel. When Theodore, with Asen’s backing, overthrew his brother and

exiled him to Asia Minor, Manuel’s wife was returned to her father, Asen, as her sister

Helen had been. 472 This joint dissolution of kin and political connections emphasizes

their correlation.

συμφωνίας φυλάττοντος: ἔστι γὰρ ὅτε διὰ κέρδος μικρὸν παρεσπόνδει. τέως οὖν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ καὶ
πλατυκῶς ἔστεργε τὴν ἀγάπην καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων ἐποίει.” Translation from Akropolites, George
Akropolites: The History, p. 206, ch 37: “But the emperor John was again at peace with the emperor
Asan and both were bound by their kinship, even though Asan did not strictly observe the agreements
made on oath. For there were times when, for a small gain, he broke them. However, in-between times,
he publicly and generally showed affection and did what was required of friends.”
470
Akropolites noted this transgression. Acropolites, Opera, p. 60, ch 38. Translation in Akropolites,
George Akropolites: The History, p. 206, ch 38.
471
Translation from Ibid., p. 207, ch 38. Acropolites, Opera, p. 61, ll 11-14, ch 38: “ὁ δ’ Ἀσὰν τὸν
πενθερὸν μᾶλλον ἐφίλει Θεόδωρον ἢ τὸν γαμβρὸν αὐτοῦ Μανουήλ: ὑπερηγάπα γὰρ τὴν σύζυγον
Εἰρήνην οὐχ ἧττον ἢ Ἀντώνιος τὴν Κλεοπάτραν.” Macrides notes that Akropolites speaks of romantic
love only in relation to barbarians or to emperors in their affection for their mistresses. Akropolites,
George Akropolites: The History, p. 210, ftnt 10.
472
Acropolites, Opera, p. 61, ch 38. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 207,
ch 38.
168
 These developments can be taken to reflect on the Franks in several ways. They

reveal the willingness of the Franks’ neighbors, especially the Bulgarians, to enter into

alliances and marriages with neighbors and embark on joint action. For Asen, at least,

kinship and the political association were intimately connected. He acted in concert

with his son-in-law and fathers-in-law. For Bela, as well, marriage was the excuse, if

not the genuine reason, for remaining in peaceful relations with Asen. The proposed

marriage between Baudouin II and Marie, or some other marriage accompanying an

alliance, might have brought just such peace to the Latin Empire. Yet, these marriages

were not indissolvable. Far from it, they were often the casualties of changing political

allegiances: When one dissolved, so did the other. Marriage mattered, but the bonds

created by it were breakable. A marriage uniting the Franks and Bulgarians could also

have suffered this fate. Furthermore, the Asen-Vatatzes attack and the collapse of joint

action demonstrated these rulers’ desire to control Constantinople and the difficulty of

sustaining alliances between parties competing for control over the great city. Under

these circumstances, perhaps the temporary truces adopted by the barons were the most

practical, if makeshift approach. Most of all these developments reveal the complex

relationships among the Franks’ neighbors, relationships better negotiated by barons

steeped in the local circumstances than by Western popes and new emperors.

A Crusade

Under Jean de Brienne, the Latin Empire stepped back from the baronial policy

of local alliances. The threat posed by Asen and Vatatzes did not go unrecognized,

however. In 1234, Gregory IX had announced a crusade to the Holy Land and begun a

preaching and recruitment program. In late 1235, upon hearing of the attack on

169
Constantinople, Gregory IX called for the crusade to be redirected to aid the Latin

Empire. The crusade appeals were directed to the French barons, particularly any

Courtenay relatives, and the Hungarians. 473 With this focus, the pope returned to the

two strategies considered by Frankish barons after Henri’s death in 1216. France, as the

source of many original and later settlers in the Latin Empire, including the current

emperor and his heir, had already proven itself a fertile recruiting ground. For its part,

Hungary remained the Franks’ closest, nonaggressive, Rome-affiliated neighbor.

Gregory IX’s appeals and their failure highlight both the links between the Latin

Empire and other polities and the weakness of these connections.

There is no evidence that any French reinforcements participated in the defense

of Constantinople in 1235–1236. It is unrealistic, however, to expect their appearance

in the East so soon. Preparation for a crusade could take years, and even had the

crusaders been eager to go to Constantinople, they would not have made it in time for

the battle against Asen and Vatatzes in 1235–1236. The full expression of Gregory

IX’s efforts to divert crusaders to the Latin Empire in the late 1230s happened after Jean

de Brienne’s death and will be dealt with in the following chapter. I will undertake a

more detailed analysis of the pope’s language, methods, and, eventually, failure

there. 474

Despite Jean de Brienne’s connections in the West, his reign did not witness

increased support from France. Nor did he appear to seek it after his initial recruitment

trip. The only correspondence seeking aid during his reign came from the pope. There

is no evidence, as exists from Henri’s and Robert’s reign, for communications with

473
For a history of the Barons’ Crusade see Michael Lower, The Barons' Crusade: a Call to Arms and its
Consequences, The Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
474
See pp 175-83 below.
170
Western secular rulers until 1236. In that year, Jean de Brienne sent Baudouin II, who

was nearing his twentieth year, to seek aid from Western courts. This trip would set the

tone for Baudouin II’s reign and marked the first of a series of appeals to Western

powers, particularly the Capetians. It was a pivotal moment in the approach of the

Latin Empire toward garnering support. Yet this new break was not necessarily a sign

of a new attitude from Jean de Brienne. Baudouin II’s mission was in response to the

attack on Constantinople and the increased threat that the alliance between Bulgaria and

Nicaea presented. Jean de Brienne might have had other motives as well. The imperial

heir was nearing his twentieth birthday, at which point he would inherit lands in Asia

Minor and become, for these lands, the emperor’s vassal. The situation of the empire

meant that his territorial base would be very small, but his corresponding entrance into

imperial political life would have increased his capacity to challenge Jean’s power.

Mindful of his expulsion from Jerusalem, Jean chose to send away a possible threat to

his power. It is to Europe, and Baudouin II’s attempts there to gather an army and

support for his inheritance, that this study now turns.

171
 CHAPTER 5

CRUSADE, LAND AND KINSHIP, 1236–1243

In his history of the Latin Empire, Jean Longnon devoted a mere nine pages to

the last two decades of the empire, the reign of Baudouin II. 475 Robert Wolff reserved

his most dismissive language for these years: “[A] few miserable Latins clung

precariously to the depopulated capital city.” 476 According to him, the true question for

historians is “why the Empire held out as long as it did instead of falling to its enemies

at some earlier time.” 477 Unsurprisingly given his attitude toward the Latin Empire and

its principals, Wolff’s answer is lodged not in any positive action taken by the Franks,

but instead in the various distractions that prevented Constantinople’s neighbors from

launching an all-out attack on the city. The sad state of the empire during its final years

is impossible to dispute. A variety of sources, including Baudouin II’s own letters,

attest to its poverty and other dangers it faced. Both Longnon and Wolff, however,

devoted little space and analysis to the creative efforts made by the Franks to secure

their position. Appeals to the West and negotiations with Eastern powers marked the

quarter century between Jean de Brienne’s death and the Greek reconquest of the city.

In each of these areas, Baudouin II and his surrogates displayed a willingness to adopt

new strategies in order to strengthen their hold on Constantinople. That these actions

proved dramatically insufficient against the threats to the Latin Empire should not deter

475
Longnon stopped his history of the empire proper in 1259, two years before its fall. The events of
1259–1261 are placed in the history of the Morea. Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la
principauté de Morée, pp 178-86.
476
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 561.
477
Ibid., p. 562.
172
an appreciation of their creativity or a consideration of their meaning for the changing

identity of the Franks in Constantinople.

Baudouin II is, in many ways, the center of this dissertation. Of all the

individuals whose personalities and actions are preserved in the record, he is the most

visible example of a Frank born and raised in Constantinople. He was also far more

involved than his predecessors with Western affairs and politics. As such, his reign

provides multiple sites of interest for the questions of how the Franks dealt with their

Western relatives and supporters and vice versa.

The pattern of documentation for Baudouin II’s reign is, as for the entire history

of the Latin Empire, spotty. The richest record originates from the early years,

particularly his visit to the West in the late 1230s, when documents and narrative

sources chronicled his activities and interactions with others. Correspondence with the

Capetians gives historians precious mooring in the early 1240s, providing information

about Baudouin II himself and events in the Latin Empire. Baudouin II’s involvement

in peace negotiations between Frederick II and Innocent IV and his attendance at the

Council of Lyon permit an elaboration of his relationship with these two men and the

offices they filled. The last fifteen years of the empire, however, have left only snippets

of information. The most important and reliable Western narrative sources, Aubri de

Trois-Fontaines and Philippe Mouskès, break off in the early 1240s, and the death of

Gregory IX in 1241 ended his extensive correspondence with and about the Latin

Empire. Akropolites, who by the 1240s was in the service of the Nicaean emperor and

was providing a first hand account of many events, was far more interested in Nicaean

relations with the Bulgarians and other Greeks and internal developments, especially the

173
rise of Michael Palaiologos, than the Latin Empire. The empress Marie’s lengthy

sojourn in the West, which began in 1248, has left few traces. As this list, with its

absence of internal sources, suggests, the surviving record favors external relations.

Very little can be said with any certainty about the domestic affairs of the Latin Empire

during this period. 478 Despite these lacunae, much of the extant documentation bears

directly on the interests of this study: the relationship of the Frankish barons with

Europe and their attempts to deal with their neighbors through marriage alliances and

other mechanisms.

Baudouin II in the West: Crusade, Land, and Kin

In 1236, as Baudouin II reached his majority, Jean de Brienne sent him to the

West to seek aid. He was originally supposed to return in the spring of 1238 but

remained in the West more than a year after that deadline, despite receiving word of his

father-in-law’s death in late 1237. 479 Baudouin II’s first stop was Rome, where he

arrived in late 1236. He did not remain there long but quickly travelled to Paris and

then to Namur, where he remained for almost a year. In the spring of 1238, he briefly

visited England seeking aid. In the last year of his stay, he spent time governing his

lands in Namur and visiting Louis IX in France and the pope in Rome. In each of these

locales, he sought funds and support. Although the aid he gathered in the West was

often provisional, his trip was, overall, a success as he forged personal and political

relationships and gathered enough money and men for two armies.

478
Hendrickx’s institutional studies reflect this lack of information about events in the Latin Empire
during the later period. Benjamin Hendrickx, “Les institutions de l'empire latin de Constantinople (1204–
1261): le pouvoir imperial (l'empereur, les regents, l'imperatrice),” Byzantina 6 (1974): 85-154; Benjamin
Hendrickx, “Les institutions de l'empire latin de Constantinople (1204–1261): la cour et les dignitaires,”
Byzantina 9 (1977): 187-217.
479
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, col 805-6, nos. 3939, 3940.
174
 The themes of crusade, lordship, and kinship marked Baudouin II’s sojourn in

the West. During his almost three-year stay, he acted in both of his public personas: as

the heir to a crusading empire and as a Western noble. He sought and obtained support

for the Latin Empire but also established himself, through personal and feudal

relationships, as a participating member of the Western aristocracy. In the end,

however, his involvement in Western society highlighted his commitment to his Eastern

empire. Upon his departure and afterward Baudouin II leveraged his identity as a

French noble in order to raise money and men for the aid of Constantinople. His

actions demonstrated time and again that his territory in the East mattered far more to

him than did his possessions in the West.

In Rome, he enlisted the Latin Empire’s greatest ally, Gregory IX, who

employed one of the papacy’s greatest tools, the crusade, on his behalf. Already, in

December 1235, in response to a desperate missive from Jean de Brienne, Gregory IX

had ordered the redirection of the crusade to aid Constantinople. 480 Baudouin II’s

arrival again encouraged Gregory IX who, in the late 1230s, sent off a flurry of

communications directing the crusaders away from the Holy Land and harnessing their

resources for the Latin Empire. Letters seeking support for Baudouin II’s cause went to

prelates in France, Greece, and Hungary; to Asen, Béla IV, and several French nobles;

and to Louis IX. 481 An overly optimistic letter to Vatatzes warned him of the crusade

gathering in the West and advised him not to attack Jean de Brienne but instead to aid

the Franks in Constantinople. 482

480
Ibid., col 218, nos. 2872-79.
481
Ibid., col 497, 512-13, 521-22, nos. 3362, 3395, 3408-9.
482
Ibid., no. 3292. Full text is published in V. Grumel, “L'authenticité de la lettre de Jean Vatatzès,
empereur de Nicée, au Papae Grégoire IX,” Échos d'Orient, no. 160 (1930): 450-458. See also Norden,
175
 Despite the pontiff’s strenuous efforts, the Western response to pleas for aid was

decidedly mixed. In December 1235, Gregory IX wrote to Béla, his brother Coloman,

and important Hungarian ecclesiastics about the crusade. 483 The Hungarian kings had a

complex relationship with Rome. Béla’s father, Andrew II, had frequently been in

trouble with the papacy and its representatives, the central problems being the king’s

treatment of clerics and his apparent preference for Jews and Muslims in public

office. 484 The father and son, however, had not always had a good relationship, and

Honorius III intervened when Andrew II tried to force Béla to separate from his wife in

order to contract a new marriage alliance. 485 The appeal came at a difficult time for

Béla. Earlier in 1235, Andrew took the cross to go to the Holy Land and Gregory IX

granted the king a variety of crusading privileges. Just three weeks later, Andrew died

and Béla inherited the throne. Immediately following his official succession, Béla

embarked on a project to restore royal power and reclaim grants made during Andrew’s

reign. 486 This agenda earned him enemies among the Hungarian barons.

For several years Gregory IX persisted in attempts to persuade Béla to join with

the Franks in Constantinople. Béla refused to commit to an expedition, but avoided a

flat-out denial to the pope. In 1238, the king composed a lengthy response to the pope’s

exhortations. He did not linger on his political problems. Instead, the letter spoke of

his kin relationships with the rulers of Bulgaria and Nicaea and the difficulties attendant

Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp 751-52. Vatatzes’s response, which may not have been sent, was scathing
and precise in its derision. Grumel, “L'authenticité de la lettre de Jean Vatatzès, empereur de Nicée, au
Papae Grégoire IX”
483
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, col 218, nos. 2872-76.
484
Berend, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000– c.
1300, pp 149-89; Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century, pp 101-2, 112-13.
485
See the letters preserved in Theiner, VMH, I: 42, 44-45, nos. LXXXV, XC-XCV. Béla and his wife
fled Hungary for several years in order to escape Andrew’s pressure.
486
Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century, pp 121-24.
176
on crusade. 487 Béla was married to Marie, Theodore Lascaris’s daughter. He had

demonstrated his loyalty to her in the early 1220s when he defied his father and refused

to set her aside. A corresponding reluctance to enter into open conflict with her brother-

in-law is not surprising. His sister was John Asen’s wife. His language was explicit

about the closeness of these connections. 488 He also referred to his friendship with

Asen, which extended above and beyond their kin relationship. Only for the church and

in pursuit of salvation, declared Béla, would he transgress these relationships and attack

Asen. Gregory IX’s response made substantial concessions to Béla, including placing

the crusading army under the king’s control and absolving him of a prior

excommunication, although he did not entirely yield to the king’s extensive demands,

refusing the request to grant Béla authority to establish the ecclesiastical structure in

conquered territories. Even this was a minor issue, since Béla would be able to appoint

a bishop to exercise the powers of apostolic legate. 489 Béla continued to delay, and

soon the arrival of the Mongols on Hungary’s eastern border overcame all these

concerns and crusading plans. The decimation of Hungarian forces in 1241 left Béla

without resources to aid the Latin Empire, even had he suddenly been inspired to do so.

In December 1235, Gregory IX sent targeted appeals to Thibaut IV, count of

Champagne and king of Navarre, and the archbishop of Sens, along with a more general

one to French prelates. 490 Champagne and Sens were both logical choices. The

Champenois nobility had been tied to the Latin Empire from its inception, a connection

487
Theiner, VMH, I: 170-71, no. 308.
488
Ibid., I: 170, no. 308: “Ex inclite enim recordacionis sorore nostra filium habet et heredem, et nostris
iussionibus sic in omnibus est subiectus, ut non tam amicus, quam subditus videatur: ex cuius
impugnacione omnium amicorm et cognatorum quos hactenus habeamus in partibus Romanie, offensam
incurremus. Watacius enim nostram neptem suo filio duxit in uxorem, et nostre Karissime consortis,
Regine Hungarie, frater existit tanta nobis devocione coniunctus.”
489
Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century, pp 126-27.
490
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, col 218, nos. 2877-79.
177
renewed with the accession of Jean de Brienne. Thibaut IV was the posthumous son of

Thibaut III, an original leader of the Fourth Crusade. Auxerre, the Courtenay

possession, was in the archbishopric of Sens. As Honorius III did in his correspondence

with Blanche, Gregory IX focused his appeal on Baudouin II’s relatives, who might be

inclined to help their kinsman. In his letter to Thibaut, the pope directed the count-

king’s recruitment efforts toward this likely pool. Specifically, “he should admonish

effectively the noble man Erard de Chacenay and other relatives of the emperor of

Constantinople and noble man Baoudouin.” 491 Gregory IX’s reference here is almost

certainly to Erard II de Chacenay. 492 Both Erard II’s kin ties and his career marked him

as a good prospect for recruitment. His kin circle contains many names that will

already be familiar to readers of this study. He was the son of Erard I de Chacenay and

Mathilde de Donzy, a relative of Pierre II’s son-in-law. His grandmother was Agnès de

Brienne, Jean de Brienne’s aunt. 493 His wife, Emeline de Broyes, was the widow of a

Fourth Crusader. Erard II, his father Erard I, and his grandfather Jacques I were all

crusaders. In fact, Erard II had already fought with Jean de Brienne at Damiette in the

Fifth Crusade and they appeared together in a charter in 1223 or 1224. 494 There is no

record of his making a commitment to aid the Latin Empire, but his death in 1236

leaves unresolved the question as to whether he intended to do so. Gregory IX’s

491
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, 218, n. 2877: “nobilem virum Herardum de Chatenai et alios
consanguineos imperatoris Constantinopolitani et nobilis viri Balduini efficaciter moneat.”
492
Theodore Evergates’s new book on the Champenois aristocracy has made this and many other
identifications far easier with his extensive research and helpful prosopographical notes. For the
following information on Erard II, see Theodore Evergates, The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne,
1100–1300, The Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 219,
appendix D.
493
See Ibid., pp 253, 261, appendix E and Arbois de Jubainville, Recherches sur les premières années de
Jean de Brienne, roi de Jérusalem, empereur de Constantinople, p. 235.
494
Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, p. 308.
178
mention of Erard II demonstrates his belief that kinship and crusading remained the

strings that connected the Latin Empire to France.

As part of his first push for aid for the Latin Empire, the pope authorized the

commutation of the vows of four hundred crusaders, who had sworn to go to the Holy

Land, and their redirection to the Latin Empire. 495 In a letter to his representative, he

eschewed the language of kinship and presented the crusade to Constantinople in

relation to the Holy Land. He acknowledged the state of the Holy Land, “in the hands

of pagans,” and moved quickly on to the plight of the Latin Empire, describing the

threat posed by Asen and Vatatzes in great detail and referring to them as

“schismatics.” 496 This account was calculated to horrify the letter’s audience, relating

the capture of Gallipoli and the massacre of the inhabitants, the brave offensive of Jean

de Brienne, and the new attack on the city “with endless thousands of soldiers.” 497

After (hopefully) rousing the sympathies of his correspondents, Gregory IX noted that

the “preservation of this empire especially relates to the promotion of help for the Holy

Land,” which was dependent on the crusaders’ ability to pass through the land of the

Latin Empire unimpeded. 498 As a result, the crusaders should be encouraged to go to

the aid of the Latin Empire, for which service they would receive the same remission of

sins had they gone to the Holy Land.

495
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, col 218, no. 2879; Sbaralea, Bullarium Franciscanum, p. 179-80,
no. 185.
496
Sbaralea, Bullarium Franciscanum, p. 179: “olim Terra Sancta in manibus Paganorum” and “Vatacius
et Affanus scismatici nuper inter se iniquitatis inito foedere.”
497
Ibid.: “cum infinitis armatorum millibus.”
498
Ibid., p. 180, no. 185: “quod ipsius conservatio Imperii specialiter pertinet ad promotionem subsidii
Terrae Sanctae, de qua non nisi per partes Romaniae liber reditus peregrinorum habetur; et si, quod absit,
dictum Imperium dominio Graecorum, qui magis Latinos odiunt, quam Pagani, subjicitur, de facili
ejusdem Terrae dissidium sequeretur.”
179
 Papal hopes for the participation of Thibaut IV de Champagne, a distant relative

of Baudouin II’s, never came to fruition. 499 Gregory IX withheld funding from Thibaut

until December 1238, trying to compel him to participate in the expedition to

Constantinople, to no avail. 500 Only one great lord, Pierre de Bretagne, agreed to go to

Constantinople. Gregory IX announced his position at the head of the future army in

October 1236, but this commitment, at first so promising, dissolved. 501 The count

objected to serving under the leadership of Baudouin II, believing himself better suited

to lead an army than was the young and unproven emperor from the East. 502

The greatet asset Gregory IX was able to provide Baudouin II, and perhaps the

most needed, was money. In many parts of Europe, most particularly in England, the

pope focused on redeeming vows for money, which could then be used to aid

Constantinople. 503 In addition to advocating for the redemption of vows, he initiated

several levies on the clergy of the Morea, levies that the clergy resisted. 504 The Latin

Empire also benefited from Louis IX’s seizure of outstanding debts owed by Christians

to Jews in 1227. The pious king did not want to benefit from usury and so he proposed,

in 1234, to reduce the amount of the debts by one-third to ensure that he was only

499
Thibaut IV and Baudouin II were both descended from Louis VI. Marriages also created connections
between the two men and Baudouin II’s father-in-law, Jean de Brienne, had once been close to and
perhaps courting Thibaut IV’s mother, Blanche de Champagne.
500
For a description of Gregory IX’s efforts toward Thibaut IV see Lower, The Barons' Crusade: a Call
to Arms and its Consequences, pp 100-12.
501
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, col 497-98, no. 3363.
502
Lower, The Barons' Crusade: a Call to Arms and its Consequences, pp 117-24.
503
For Gregory IX’s efforts to raise money see Ibid., pp 121-24, 136-38. Gregory IX’s efforts to
encourage the redemption of vows and to regulate the use of the funds is well-documented. Auvray,
Registres de Grégoire IX, col 786-87, no. 3907; col 804, no. 3936; col 806, no. 3941; col 807-8, nos.
3944-45; col. 853-54, nos. 4028-29; col 954-55, no. 4206; nos. 4265-66, 4316, 4527, 4533, 4605-22,
4635, 5075, 5296, 5305, 6089. See also Sbaralea, Bullarium Franciscanum, pp 237, 240, nos. 256, 261
and Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 753, no. IX.
504
A number of documents track Gregory IX’s efforts to raise money from the Latin clergy in Greece.
Reports reached him that the clerics were arguing that funds outside of Greece should be exempt and that
the archbishop of Patras had fled Greece, taking monies with him. Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, col
47, no. 4546.
180
collecting the principal. Debtors who had already satisfied their debt to the king were

due a refund of this third. Some debtors, however, could not be found, and Gregory IX

wrote to Louis IX advising the allocation of their portions to aid the Latin Empire. 505 In

urging crusaders to redeem their vows and prescribing other fund-raising efforts,

Gregory IX sought to raise money to hire mercenaries. The Latin Empire’s extreme

poverty, attested in diverse sources, made monies in hand more useful to Baudouin II

than was the promise of Western soldiers who might not make it to the city or, if they

did, might descend into squabbles or insist on showy but essentially useless forays.

These funds could permit the hire of soldiers, perhaps even the Latin mercenaries who

were found in Turkish and Greek armies during the thirteenth century.

In late 1237, Baudouin II received news from Constantinople that the city was in

dire straits. 506 Since the death of Jean de Brienne, the Franks had been under attack.

Food was running short, and men were fleeing the city. If Vatatzes focused his attacks

and besieged the city again, the barons reported, there might not be enough men to

defend its walls. 507 In response, in the spring of 1238, Baudouin II sent the

accumulated crusading forces under the leadership of Jean de Béthune, who had

relevant connections and experience in both the East and the West. He was probably

related to Conon de Béthune, who had been on the Fourth Crusade and twice acted as

bailli of the empire. 508 More important, he was an experienced soldier who could be

505
Ibid., col 1169-70, no. 4601. For a discussion of the captio and Louis IX’s attempts to collect the
debts see William Chester Jordan, The French Monarchy and the Jews: from Philip Augustus to the Last
Capetians (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), pp 129-34.
506
Gregory IX used this account as reason for the levy on clergy in Greece. Auvray, Registres de
Grégoire IX, col 858-60, no. 4035.
507
See the account in Gualterius Cornutus, “Historia susceptionis Corone spinee,” in Exuvie sacrae
Constantinopolitanae, ed. Comte Paul Riant, vol. 2 (Paris: CTHS, 2004), pp 49-50.
508
For a summary of Conon’s career in Constantinople see Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin,
pp 146-49.
181
trusted to direct the army effectively, having participated vigorously in the defense of

the city in 1235. 509 His reputation evoked the glory of the crusade and the heroic

defense of the city. His appeal to the crusaders, however, reached beyond his military

reputation. His roots in Artois tapped into a regional loyalty awakened by Baudouin

II’s renewed contacts with his Western lands. The exact composition of this force is

unknown, but Baudouin II had spent most of 1237 in France and the Low Countries and

probably recruited men from his familial lands in Namur and Courtenay and the

surrounding regions. The choice of Jean de Béthune provided them with a leader from

their own cultural milieu.

Despite Baudouin II’s preparations, this initial force floundered and never made

it to Constantinople. As was so often the case, Western conflicts and ambitions blocked

the provision of aid to the crusader states. Earlier, Capetian involvement in the south of

France had served as an excuse for Louis VIII to defer sending aid to the Latin Empire.

Almost a decade before Jean de Béthune’s expedition, Jean de Brienne’s succession had

been delayed because of his participation in the conflict between Frederick II and the

papacy. The Latin Empire was not alone in experiencing this problem. Successful

crusading recruitment had always depended on the security of the crusaders’ Western

possessions. Popes recognized this reality and, in response, pushed for an end to

conflicts, declared Europe-wide peaces, and instituted protections for the property and

interests of crusaders when preparing for crusades. 510 In 1238, Frederick II, at Milan,

hindered the progress of the crusaders, flouting the pope’s specific orders. According to

Mouskès and Gregory IX, Frederick II did not delay the troops solely because of his

509
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, pp 613-16, ll 29039-29121.
510
For a summary of Innocent III’s decrees in preparation for the Fifth Crusade see Kenneth M. Setton,
The Papacy and the Levant: 1204–1571, II: 378-79, 383-84.
182
difficulties with the papacy or the legacy of Jean de Brienne’s opposition to him,

although these were factors. The Western emperor’s obstruction of the crusaders

followed an appeal from Vatatzes, who offered to do homage to Frederick II if he would

thwart the crusade. Frederick II, seeing the possibility of expanding his dominium, then

turned to Baudouin II and insisted that the young man become Frederick II’s vassal.

When Gregory IX heard of Frederick II’s actions, he demanded that the Western

emperor stop aiding the schismatic Vatatzes and permit the crusaders’ passage. 511

Frederick II eventually bowed to the imperative and allowed them to traverse his

territory, but the hinderance had done its damage. Jean de Béthune died in Venice

while negotiating transport and, deprived of their leader, the soldiers scattered, some of

them traveling to Greece but most returning home. 512 As was the case in 1235–1236, a

combined Venetian and Morean force lifted the siege without Western help. 513 The

empire was once again saved by its partner, Venice, and its vassals, while Western aid

remained a proposal more than a reality.

The collapse of Jean de Béthune’s army suggests a further difficulty in relying

on aid from the West. Even when it could be gathered, there was no guarantee that it

would arrive. This was why the financial support, raised by Gregory IX and Baudouin

II, was so important. The money would not disappear in Italy waiting for passage to be

arranged.

Baudouin II and the Capetians: Kinship, Land, and Piety

511
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, col 902-3, no. 4110; J. L. A. Huillard-Bréholles, Historia
diplomatica Friderici Secundi (Paris: Henricus Pl, 1852), V: 180; Sbaralea, Bullarium Franciscanum, p.
233, no. 250.
512
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, pp 632-33, 643-44, ll 29580-605, 29899-922.
513
Ibid., pp 633-34, ll 29606-621.
183
 Baudouin II’s second stop, the Capetian court, was a logical destination. He was

related by blood and marriage to the monarchy; Louis IX was his cousin and Blanche

was Marie’s great-aunt. 514 In addition to the kinship that linked the men, Louis IX was

Baudouin II’s overlord for Courtenay and other French territories. According to the

archbishop of Sens, in his account of the translatio of the Crown of Thorns, the visit

started off well. Louis IX, Blanche of Castile, and, indeed, the nobles of France

welcomed Baudouin II “joyfully, honorably and gladly.” 515 This visit established the

tone of Baudouin II’s relationships with the Capetians. Bound by kinship, lordship, and

friendship, they provided him with advice and advocacy, as well as much-needed funds.

The relationship deepened during Baudouin II and Marie’s sojourns in the Capetian

court and was maintained through correspondence in their absence. These interactions

showcase Baudouin II’s strongest assets—relics and land—but bring into sharp relief

the difficulties inherent in appeals to the West. In contrast to Angold, who saw the

relationship between Baudouin II and the Capetians as bringing “next to nothing in

terms of concrete help,” and Lock, who argued that “it is hardly surprising that the

rulers of the west would commit themselves no further than small gifts and unwanted

advice,” this chapter will argue that Capetian aid was significant but resulting less from

the Latin Empire’s appeal than from Baudouin II’s other resources. 516

Contemporaries recognized the kin connection between Baudouin II and the

Capetians. The archbishop of Sens referred to Louis IX as Baudouin II’s “regem,

consanguineum, dominum, et beneficum.” The kinship was important to the

514
For details of the relationship see pp 95-96, 146-48 above.
515
Cornutus, “Historia susceptionis Corone spinee,” p. 49: “Ingressus siquidem regnum Francie, ab ipso
rege et matresua et baronibus regni susceptus est gratanter, honorifice, et iocunde.”
516
Angold, The Fourth Crusade, p. 226; Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, p. 65.
184
archbishop, who elaborated on it, noting that Baudouin II sought help “from king Louis,

whose blood he had through his father and mother, from his [Louis IX’s] most prudent

mother Blanche, whose niece he married, from the nobles of the kingdom of France, his

relatives.” 517 This last detail, that Baudouin II was also related to the barons of the

French realm, reinforced the emperor’s connection to France, which was also defined:

“the kingdom of France, from which both his parents had come.” 518 According to the

archbishop, these relationships held great significance for Baudouin II. He offered the

Crown of Thorns to Louis IX because of them, desiring that the relic glorify and enrich

both the monarch and his land. The archbishop was not alone in acknowledging and

valuing this relationship. Guillaume de Nangis likewise recorded the relationship

between the king and the future emperor, although the reference is far more

perfunctory: “sui consanguinei sancti regis Franciae.” 519 These Westerners, at least,

perceived Baudouin II as intimately connected to France through his family, even

though he was raised elsewhere. It would be interesting to know whether Baudouin II

appeared western—in hair style, dress, demeanour—but the sources do not speak to

that. 520

Gregory IX’s appeal to piety failed to gather elite crusaders for the Latin

Empire. With relics, however, Baudouin II was able to leverage the religious assets of

Constantinople to gain support. While Baudouin II was in the West, the barons used the

517
Cornutus, “Historia susceptionis Corone spinee,” p. 49: “a rege Ludovico, de cuius sanguine ex
utraque parte patris et matris ortum habuerat, et a prudentissima matre eius Blanche, cuius neptem
duxerat in uxorem, a nobilibus etiam regni Francie baronibus, consanguineis suis.”
518
Ibid., p. 51: “regnum Francie, de quo parentes ipsius utrique processerant.”
519
Guillaume de Nangis, “Chronicon,” in RHGF, XX: 550.
520
I think here of Susan Einbinder’s description of the idealized memory of exiled Iberian Jews—in
North Africa they adopted Spanish fashions which they would not have been able to wear in Spain
because of requirements that they bear an outward mark of their Judaism. Susan L Einbinder, No Place
of Rest: Jewish Literature, Expulsion, and the Memory of Medieval France, The Middle Ages Series
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), pp 77-79
185
Crown of Thorns, their greatest relic, as collateral for a loan from the Venetians. Their

use of such a precious relic to obtain funds highlights, of course, their desperation and

their lack of other resources. Even their partners were unwilling to give money to the

Latin Empire or to loan it without prestigious collateral. When the loan came due, the

barons did not have the funds to pay it. Instead, they borrowed money, from the

Venetian noble Nicholas Quirino, to pay their creditors, with the Crown once again as

security. The agreement with Quirino expressed the expectation but not the certainty

that help would arrive from the West in the fall of 1238. If such aid arrived, the debt

would have to be discharged in twenty days. If it did not, payment was due on

November 20, 1238, two and a half months after the money had been advanced. 521 At

that point, the Crown would be taken to Venice, and the barons had another four months

to produce the money owed. If they could not do so, ownership of the relic would

transfer to Quirino. Jean de Béthune’s army never arrived and, unsurprisingly, the

barons could not come up with the necessary funds to redeem the Crown, which was

taken to Venice. Instead of relinquishing the relic to the Venetians, however, Baudouin

II took advantage of Louis IX’s piety to gain additional funds and the king’s favor. He

transferred the Crown to Louis IX. Although the exchange was couched as a gift, Louis

IX gave Baudouin II 10,000 livres, in addition to producing the funds to redeem the

Crown from Quirino. 522 The relic, which had already been used to obtain a loan, now

secured additional funds for Baudouin II’s crusade. In transferring the Crown of

521
Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 119, no. 60; Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, II: 346-49,
no. CCXCVI; Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II: 391. The Venetians repeatedly loaned money
to Baudouin II, Marie, and the barons.
522
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 947. Dandolo’s narrative is somewhat confused, placing
the mortgaging of the Crown in Jean de Brienne’s lifetime. Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–
1280 d.c.,” p. 297. Matthew Paris also mentions it. Paris, Chronica Majora, III: 517-18.
186
Thorns, Baudouin II returned to the practice adopted by his uncles Baudouin I and

Henri, but not in evidence during Yolande and Robert’s reigns, of donating relics to

Western institutions and individuals, this time with direct monetary reward. As a relic

of the Passion, the Crown of Thorns had enormous prestige and was welcomed into

France with great celebrations. Louis IX built the Sainte-Chapelle in order to house the

relics and contemporaries highlight the special connection between the kingdom and the

relics of the Passion. 523

For the Franks and Venetians, the relics were collateral. Their spiritual value

was significant because it could be translated into a monetary one and it gave them

meaning as part of a financial transaction. For Baudouin II, the relics also presented an

opportunity for him to make a “gift” to his relative and benefactor and emphasized the

religious foundation of the Latin Empire. For Louis IX, the financial transaction was

merely a way to access the spiritual value of the relics. The spiritual value, which

connected with his political program and his crusading plans, was the utmost concern.

Angold argued that the transfer of the Crown of Thorns and other relics to

Constantinople represented for contemporaries “a judgement on the Latin Empire which

had not proved itself worth of the responsibilities it had inherited from Byzantium.” 524

Support for the Latin Empire in France certainly trailed off in the 1240s and would

never again reach the level of Louis IX’s support in the late 1230s. However, as I will

523
William Chester Jordan, “Saint Louis' Influence on French Society and Life in the Thirteenth Century:
The Social Content of the Crusade of the Mid-Century (1248–54)” (Princeton University, History, 1973).
A recent article by Meredith Cohen summarizes much of the work on Sainte-Chapelle and provides new
insight into the place of the chapel in the religious life of Paris and the political program of the French
kings. Meredith Cohen, “An Indulgence for the Visitor: Sainte-Chapelle,” Speculum (2008): 840-83.
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines described how “regnum a domino Iesu Christo huc usque decoratur et
sublimatur.” Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 947, ll 13-14. The archbishop of Sens provided
the most vivid account of the relics’ arrival and the procession to Paris. Cornutus, “Historia susceptionis
Corone spinee,” pp 53-55.
524
Angold, The Fourth Crusade, p. 240
187
explore in the following chapters, there were many reasons for that, including missteps

on the part of Baudouin II.

Western Land for Eastern Gain

Relics and the crusade were not the only tools Baudouin II had to muster

support. His Western lands also carried the possibility of fund-raising and recruitment.

When Baudouin II left Rome for France, he carried with him papal letters ordering that

he be invested with all lands to which he had a legitimate claim. Pierre II’s holdings of

Auxerre, Nevers, and Tonnere had passed to Baudouin II’s half sister Mathilde, but he

inherited other lands in both France and the Low Countries. 525 Gregory IX threatened

those who blocked his claims with excommunication. 526 These letters suggest an

anxiety, justified by subsequent events, that the imperial heir would have a difficult

time laying claim to his Western inheritance. Pierre II and Yolande had been absent

from France at their deaths, and their lands passed to Baudouin II’s older brothers,

Phillipe and then Henri, who died in 1226 and 1229, respectively. 527 By Baudouin II’s

arrival in France in 1237, provisions made for the governing of his lands had been in

place for many years and the holders of these properties were not inclined to relinquish

them.

Louis IX invested Baudouin II with his French lands, which apparently included

territory in Champagne as well as in Courtenay. 528 Louis IX’s advocacy for Baudouin

525
Guillaume de Nangis, “Chronicon,” p. 550.
526
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, pp 621-22, ll 29278-84.
527
Cornutus, “Historia susceptionis Corone spinee,” p. 49: “hereditatem fratrum suorum, qui sine herede
decesserant, adiret, marchionatum scilicet Namurcensem cum paertinentiis et castellaniuam Curtineti.”
528
Mouskès misidentified the territory as Auxerre rather than Courtenay. Mouskès, Chronique rimée, p.
622, ll 29290-96: “Baudoins s’en part et si ome / A Paris vint, s’el congoi / Li rois, qui sa complainte oi, /
Si que, sains point d’aler en fuerre, / Li rendi la conté d’Auçeurre / Et tout son droit.” Guise, “Annales
Hannonienses,” p. 305: “Cui rex Francia reddidit omnes terras et possessiones, quas habere debebet in
Francia et Campania.” A letter from Gregory IX to Thibaut IV, count of Champagne, both mentions the
188
II’s interests was evident even this early in his visit. According to Gauthier Cornut,

impediments threatened Baudouin II’s possession of his inheritance, difficulties that

“were removed entirely by the order and power of the king.” 529 The archbishop did not

identify the origin of these difficulties, but Mathilde, Baudouin II’s half sister, is the

most likely culprit. Five years later, her challenge to his interests resulted in a second

appeal to Louis IX to defend them. 530 The French king, acting in his official capacity as

Baudouin II’s lord and in his personal capacity as a relative and supporter, defended the

young man’s inheritance. For Louis IX, Baudouin II was a Western noble entitled to

his inheritance, even if he never planned to remain in the West.

At most, Baudouin II spent a couple of months in Paris, and, by April 1237, he

was in the Low Countries where he remained for a year. Historians are much better

informed about Baudouin II’s activities in Hainaut and Namur than about those in

France. Charters describe donations, confirmations, and land transactions, made in his

capacity as marquis de Namur. He may have been equally active in his French lands;

unfortunately, the departmental archive of the Loiret, where Courtenay is located,

burned down when it was bombed in the Second World War. Very few medieval

documents survive. 531 Baudouin II’s charters from Namur, therefore, will have to

suffice as a basis for a discussion about his dealings with his Western lands. As Louis

IX had done with his French lands, Jeanne, countess of Flanders and Hainaut, Baudouin

kin relationship between him and Baudouin II and requests that the count turn over Baudouin II’s
possessions in Champagne. Martène and Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, I: 998.
529
Cornutus, “Historia susceptionis Corone spinee,” p. 49: “Si quas etiam in adeunda hereditate
difficultates reperit, per regis mandatum et potentiam penitus sunt amote.”
530
See pp 205-6 below for his correspondence with Louis IX about the conflict.
531
Personal correspondence, January 16, 2006, from Francoise Mignan at the Archives départementales
de Loiret.
189
II’s cousin, invested him with his inheritance. 532 In March 1237, perhaps in

recompense for her support, Baudouin II ceded to her several villages, Onnaing and

Quaroube, near Valenciennes, where he was a month later. 533 His presence in

Valenciennes, instead of Namur, may be a sign that he was unable to enter his lands.

His sister Marguerite and her husband Henri, count of Vianden, had taken control of

Namur after the death of the marquis Henri, Baudouin II and Marguerite’s brother. 534

As early as 1229, they called themselves “Henricus, marchio Namurcensis, Viennensis

comes, et Margareta, marchissa et comitissa, uxor ejus.” 535 Baudouin II’s claim to

Namur was clear; he was the only surviving brother of Philippe and Henri, neither of

whom had left children. Both the barons and the people of Namur recognized his right.

Marguerite and Henri, however, refused to turn it over to Baudouin II, who was

compelled to launch a military strike to enforce his claim. A short campaign was

followed by the countess of Flanders’s judgment. She ruled in favor of Baudouin II but

required that he pay a fine of seven thousand livres to compensate for the devastation

wrought during the conflict. 536 Jeanne’s decision reflected competing pressures on her.

532
Guise, “Annales Hannonienses,” p. 305: “Etiam Johanna, Flandriae et Hainoniae comitissa, germana
sua, reddidit libere quidquid in Hainonia et Flandria debebat.”
533
Frédéric Auguste Ferdinand Thomas de Reiffenberg, Monuments pour servir à l'histoire des provinces
de Namur, de Hainaut et de Luxembourg (Bruxelles: M. Hayez, 1844), I: 141.
534
See pp 103, 115-17 above for Yolande’s surrender of Namur to her and Pierre’s eldest son, Philippe,
and his refusal to go to Constantinople to succeed her. For his death during Louis VIII’s fateful crusade
to the south of France see Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, p 918, ll 38-39. Henri and Marguerite styled
themselves and acted as rulers of Namur. Frédéric Auguste Ferdinand Thomas de Reiffenberg, ed.,
“Chartrier de Namur,” in Monuments pour servir à l'histoire des provinces de Namur, de Hainaut et de
Luxembourg (Bruxelles: M. Hayez, 1844), pp 137-40.
535
They did so in a charter confirming a grant to the abbey of Floreffe. Charles Peeters, ed., Analectes
pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique de la Beligique (Louvrain, 1864), VIII: 370-71. Other charters
show Henri and Marguerite acting as rulers of Namur and referring to themselves as such. Dieudonné
Brouwers, ed., L'administration et les finances du comté de Namur du XIIIe Au XVe siècle, Documents
inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la province de Namur (Namur: Wesmael-Charlier, 1910), pp 35-37, nos. 66-
75, 78, 80-83, 85-94. Jules Borgnet and St. Bormans, Cartulaire de la commune de Namur (Namur: Ad.
Wesmael-Charlier, Libraire-Éditeur, 1876), pp 23-24, no.9.
536
The most detailed account is in Mouskès, Chronique rimée, pp 622-23, ll 29298-324. The Chronique
de l’abbaye de Floreffe makes brief mention of it. Frédéric Auguste Ferdinand Thomas de Reiffenberg,
190
She could not very well rule against Baudouin II when his claim was so clear, yet

neither did she want to offend Marguerite and Henri, who held other important

territories. Her rule was suseptible to challenges, as the case of the false Baudouin I

some years earlier revealed, and she could not afford to jeopardize allies. 537

Control of Namur was important enough to Baudouin II to defend it militarily—

because of family feeling, its utility to his Eastern goals, or most likely both. In Namur,

starting even before he wrested control from Marguerite and Henri, Baudouin II acted

as a Western noble—making donations, confirming those of his predecessors,

approving those of his vassals, and granting lands to secular lords. During the years

that Baudouin II spent in the West, he made donations or confirmed those of his

predecessors to the abbeys of Argenton, Floreffe, Géronsart, Grandpré, Moulins, Val-

Saint-George, and Villiers. Baudouin II’s donations targeted institutions connected

with prior rulers of Namur. 538 Floreffe, in particular, to which Baudouin II sold wood

and confirmed a donation, was a long-standing recipient of generosity from the rulers of

Namur. It was founded in part with donations from the count Godefroid and his wife

Ermesinde in 1121. 539 Sixteen charters of the rulers of Namur made or confirmed

donations to the abbey. Philippe, Baudouin II’s uncle, had donated a relic that he

received from either Baudouin I or Henri. 540 In the summer of 1239, Baudouin II added

himself to that company. Val-Saint-George, to which Baudouin II confirmed donations

ed., “Chronique de l'abbaye de Floreffe,” in Monuments pour servir à l'histoire des provinces de Namur,
de Hainaut et de Luxembourg (Bruxelles: M. Hayez, 1844), p. 75. Guise, “Annales Hannonienses,” p.
305.
537
Wolff, “Baldwin of Flanders and Hainaut, First Latin Emperor of Constantinople: His Life, Death, and
Resurrection, 1172–1225”. David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (London: Longman, 1992), pp 151-56.
538
In the spring of 1237, even before his victory against Marguerite and Henri, Baudouin II recorded
charters concerning the religious of Grandpré and Villers. His sale to Grandpré mentioned Philippe.
Galliot, Histoire générale, V: 418-19. Wauters, Table chronologique, IV: 305, 639.
539
Reiffenberg, “Chronique de l'abbaye de Floreffe,” pp 66-67.
540
Ibid., p. 72, ll 167-72.
191
and made a sale, was likewise probably founded by Godefroid, and donations of

Baudouin I (then Baudouin IX of Flanders and Hainaut) and his wife Marie enriched the

abbey in 1202, prior to their departure for the crusade. 541 Baudouin II granted the

hermitage of Marlagne, founded by his brother Philippe in 1225, to the abbey of

Moulins. 542

Baudouin II was particularly concerned to honor Philippe’s memory and created

a connection with his brother, whom he had never met, through charitable giving. He

confirmed Philippe’s donation to Géronsart, founded a chapel there, and provided for an

anniversary Mass to be said for Philippe’s soul. 543 In this charter, he referred to his

older brother as “carissimi et antecessoris nostri fratris, piae memoriae, Philippi comitis

Namurcensis.” 544 He also confirmed a foundation at Grandpré that Henri and

Marguerite had made in memory of Philippe. 545 Reflecting his dispute with his sibling,

the confirmation was written as a donation, referencing Philippe but not Marguerite or

her husband. Similarly, when Baudouin II confirmed the donation of Jean d’Auvelais

to the abbey of Floreffe, he did not mention the previous confirmation by Henri and

Marguerite. 546

Philippe had ruled Namur for more than a decade, inheriting the county from his

mother when she left for Constantinople. After Yolande’s death, he refused to abandon

his Western lands and commitments to succeed his parents in Constantinople. His

541
Peeters, Analectes, III: 480, 488.
542
Ibid., V: 375.
543
Galliot, Histoire générale, V: 413.
544
Ibid.
545
Ibid., V: 417-18. Henri and Marguerite’s donation is recorded in Brouwers, L'administration, pp 40-
41, no. 70.
546
Baudouin II’s confirmation accompanied his sale of woods to the abbey. Peeters, Analectes, VIII:
371-73. Henri and Marguerite’s confirmation came soon after they claimed the county. Ibid., VIII: 370-
71.
192
prestige and power at home were more appealing to him than a crown, even an imperial

one with crusading credentials. In confirming his brother’s donations and making

further ones in his memory, Baudouin II presented himself as Philippe’s rightful

successor, a position challenged by his sister. In ignoring her related confirmations and

donations, he sought to obviate the period of her illegitimate rule. Baudouin II’s

donations were clustered tightly around Namur, with the furthest institution the abbey

of Villers, twenty-three miles away. Only in his confirmations did Baudouin II venture

outside this circle circumscribed by family tradition and geography, making charters

acknowledging donations of the archbishop of Thessaloniki to the religious of Anchin

and of a vassal to the church of Saint Denis of Liège. 547

Baudouin II’s activities in Namur extended beyond donations and confirmations.

In July 1237, during his struggle for control of Namur, he conceded the châtellenie of

Samson to Foulques in return for a yearly rent. 548 Two years later, he transferred lands

to Warnier de Longchamps, who appears in several charters during the 1230s. 549 A

conflict over ownership of Biervliet was unresolved at his departure, and he

acknowledged that Robert, avoué of Arras, and Arnoul d’Audenarde would decide the

matter. 550 Baudouin II’s provisions for and dealings with Namur demonstrate his

interest in establishing his Western claims and his willingness, when present, to

participate in public life. Equivalent information about Courtenay is not available, but

547
Warin, the archbishop of Thessaloniki, had a long career in the Latin Empire and accompanied
Baudouin II on his return to Constantinople in 1239. Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin, pp
187-88. See Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 132-33, no. 202; Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II:
24. The vassal was Godefroid, lord of Sombreffe. Brouwers, L'administration, p. 65, no. 103.
548
Galliot, Histoire générale, V: 413-14; Reiffenberg, Monuments pour servir à l'histoire des provinces
de Namur, de Hainaut et de Luxembourg, I: 9-10, no. VI.
549
With Godefoid de Ville and Évard d’Émine, he witnessed the resolution to a conflict concerning the
abbey of Villers. Brouwers, L'administration, pp 33-35, no. 64. He also witnessed a charter of Henri and
Marguerite. Peeters, Analectes, VIII: 370-71.
550
Wauters, Table chronologique, IV: 310.
193
he probably acted similarly there. Namur was his maternal inheritance, Courtenay his

paternal one, and there is no evidence that he treated Courtenay differently from Namur

or other matters. Later correspondence with Louis IX about a conflict with Mathilde,

Baudouin II’s sister and countess of Nevers, shows that Baudouin II asserted and sought

to maintain his claims in France as well as in Namur. 551

Baudouin II’s engagement with affairs in his Western lands, however, did not

signal an abandonment of his Eastern possessions. On the contrary, Baudouin II was

predominantly committed to the success and, later, the recovery of the Latin Empire and

was willing to devote his Western resources to these aims. In the final six months of his

Western sojourn, this attitude was clear. Ten charters survive from this period, more

than from the previous two years combined. Confirmations of Philippe’s actions no

longer concerned Baudouin II. Instead, of these later documents, four are sales to the

abbeys of Floreffe, Grandpré, Moulins, and Val-Saint-George. 552 The money raised

from these sales most likely provided additional support for his return to

Constantinople.

Baudouin II went further. When preparing to depart for the East, he elected not

to try to govern Namur from Constantinople. Instead, he mortgaged the property to

Louis IX for 50,000 livres parisien. 553 Presumably, his conflict with his sisters had

551
Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II: 464, no. 2954.
552
Peeters, Analectes, III: 194-95, no. IX, V: 377-78. For the sale to Grandpré see Galliot, Histoire
générale, V: 418-19 and Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 131, 133, nos. 198, 199, 204. Of the other six
documents, three are confirmations, one is a donation, one concerns Marie’s dowry, one is a concession
of land to a vassal, and a final one concerns a conflict with the abbey of St Bavon.
553
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 947, ll 5-6: “Supradict* imperator iuvenis Balduinus
castrum de Namuco regi Francie Ludovico supra 50000 librarum Parisiensium invadiavit.” Mouskès,
Chronique rimée, ll 30447-460: “A Meléun, ù la cours jouste, / Fu cevaliers à Pentecouste / Et mesire
Alfons avoec lui, / Li frère au roi, ciertains en sui, / Et mains autres, par grant amour, / Pour joie de
l’emperéour. / Sa tière engaga de Namur, / Son castiel fort, ù il n’a mur / Qui ne soit en la dure roke; /
Desous, en l’aige, a mainte roque / Et pesçon autre, et si a port / U les gens font maint grant aport. / Si
194
taught him the difficulty of securing his property from afar. Proceeds from the land

would be difficult to collect from Constantinople. In the end, the mortgage to Louis IX

provided him with an immediate sum to pay for his army and to support the Latin

Empire and ensured that his rights would have a champion in the West. 554 Aubri de

Trois-Fontaines noted this transaction in conjunction with the gift of the Crown of

Thorns, both signs of the Capetian king’s centrality in Baudouin II’s schemes to raise

money and garner support for his empire.

The kinship that united the Capetians and the Courtenays, enhanced by personal

relationships, helped Baudouin II. Yet, kinship alone was not enough to inspire

Western aid. Baudouin II’s other assets—namely Western land and religious relics—

were necessary parts of these transactions. Louis IX’s most significant contributions

came with associated benefits for the king. In the case of Namur, the king gained

control of a county in an area where royal authority was not always certain. In the case

of the Crown of Thorns, the king followed his own inclination, undergirded by his great

piety. The king’s welcoming of the precious cargo and his memorable barefoot

participation in the procession of the relic to Paris demonstrated his devotion. It is hard

to imagine that Louis IX would have refused to purchase the Crown of Thorns,

regardless of its seller. During his time in France and after, Baudouin II established a

personal relationship with Blanche of Castile and Louis IX. Substantial practical

support, however, came from Louis IX only when other circumstances made it

l’orent li Templier en garde, / Pour le roi, ki son preut regarde.” Mouskés inaccurately stated that
Baudouin engaged Auxerre to the king. Auxerre, of course, was never Baudouin II’s to rule or alienate,
since it was the inheritance of his half-sister Mathilde. Ibid., ll 20460-61.
554
As a strategy to secure his Western lands, the mortgage to Louis IX had its disadvantages. Baudouin
II did not gain the approval of the king of the Romans, an omission that precipitated a serious challenge
to his possession of the land. See pp 275-86 below.
195
appealing. Lock places the Capetians with the papacy as interested in the Latin Empire

as “a symbol of the triumphant papal monarchy, of western interference with Greek life

and of the continuing crusade.” 555 Yet, Louis IX’s concern for Baudouin II centered on

their kinship, their lord-vassal relationship, and the land and relics that the Latin

emperor could provide. The crusade to Constantinople, the strength of the papacy, the

correction of the Greeks—there is no evidence to suppose that these concerns motivated

Louis IX.

Not all of Europe was concerned with what Baudouin II could offer. In

England, Baudouin II received support apparently without giving anything in return. In

the spring of 1238, perhaps emboldened by his success in Namur and his warm

welcome in France, Baudouin II traveled to England. His departure for Constantinople

was anticipated in the summer of 1238, and this trip was probably part of a final fund-

raising push. His unannounced visit, however, was greeted with suspicion. According

to Matthew Paris, the king complained that Baudouin II’s arrival without consultation

and permission “appeared contemptuous and arrogant.” 556 Baudouin II, after a year of

acting as marquis of Namur, had become acclimated to his position as a Western noble

and forgot, or perhaps never fully understood, that his other title required him to

observe a certain protocol. Emperor of Constantinople he was, but the Constantinople

of the Latin Empire was not what it had been under Byzantine control. In a polity

where the nobles were able to attack the empress without retribution, as they had during

555
Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, p. 278.
556
Paris, Chronica Majora, III: 481: “Qui cum apud Doveram applicuisset, dictum est ei ex parte
domini regis, quod inconsulte et secus quam deceret se ingessit in regnum alienum princepstantae
celsitudinis, rege inconsulto et absque ipsius licentiae, et videbatur contemptus et superbia.”
196
Robert’s reign, the emperor may not have seen himself as a “princeps tantae

celsitudinis.” 557

According to Mathew Paris, Henry III’s antagonism toward Baudouin II was

based on his association with Jean de Brienne, who had been welcomed in England but

then fought with French forces against the English. Like Frederick II, Henry III and the

English nobles remembered this betrayal and held it against Baudouin II. The English

king relented more quickly than the Western emperor: An apology from Baudouin II

sufficed to smooth the way and Henry III invited him to London where he was greeted

warmly and allowed to make his case. He did not remain long, but left England with

seven hundred marcs and “many precious and rich gifts,” which he received from Henry

III and Richard, earl of Cornwall. 558

In subordinating his Western interests to his Eastern ones, Baudouin II was

following in a tradition established by his uncle Baudouin I and his own parents, who

had used their Western lands to generate income which was then used in the East. 559

With Baudouin II, because his reign was longer, a clearer picture emerges of the

balance between West and East. Baudouin II’s orientation toward his Eastern

possessions should not be surprising in an individual who was born and raised in

Constantinople and had never even visited the West until he was almost twenty years

old. It is more startling that he was so invested in his Western lands once he arrived.

His actions demonstrate a cultural affinity with the West. With the exception of his

arrival in England, Baudouin II apparently moved easily in the circles of Western

557
Ibid.
558
Ibid.: “Et factum est, cum recederet a rege et comite R[icardo], cum multis et preciosis donativis
ditatus, septingentas circiter marcas reportavit.”
559
See pp 31-32, 102-3 above.
197
popes, kings, and lords. His relationships in the West, in the context of his family, his

lords, and his lands, reveal the complexity of his identity—forged in Constantinople,

marked by Western and Eastern influences, and focused, in large part, on the needs of

his Eastern empire.

Baudouin II’s Return to Constantinople

Despite Gregory IX’s failure to divert the great princes to Constantinople, the

young emperor’s trip to the West produced two major expeditionary forces: the one

under Jean de Béthune and a second one in 1239, which accompanied Baudouin II to

Constantinople and fought there. For this second force, Aubri de Trois-Fontaines

reported an army of seven hundred knights and thirty thousand foot soldiers. 560

Akropolites gave the fantastic figure of sixty thousand men and on this basis judged

Baudouin II’s trip to the West as a great success. 561 This substantial army the second

Baudouin II was able to raise provides a counterpoint to Gregory IX’s lack of success in

diverting the Holy Land crusaders to Constantinople. The efforts of the pope and the

Latin emperor in the mid- to late-1230s may not have produced another Fourth Crusade,

but they did result in a significant amount of support.

Baudouin II’s expedition lacked a Geoffroy de Villehardouin or a Jean de

Joinville to provide details about the composition of the army and actions of the

partipants and, as a result, we know little about it. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines and

Mouskés name some of the lords who went with Baudouin II: Humbert V de Beaujeu,
560
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 946, ll 44-46: “Erant usque ad 700 milites preter armigeros
et balistarios, bene fuerunt in equis 30000 preter pedites.”
561
Acropolites, Opera, pp 57-58, l 27- l 3: “καὶ συμμαχίαν ζητεῖ ἀξιόλογον, καὶ ἐπιτυγχάνει τοῦ
σκοποῦ. καὶ ἐν οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἑξήκοντα χιλιάδες συνηθροίσθησαν Φράγγων, ἵν’ ὅπως κατὰ
Ῥωμαίων χωρήσωσιν.” Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 203, ch 37:
“He asked him [Louis IX] for considerable military aid and was successful in his aim.” His evaluation,
although not born out by the facts, supports Mouskès’s account of Vatatzes’s concern about the Western
crusaders.
198
Thomas de Marle, Josseran Gors, Guillaume de Cayeaux, the castellan of Beaumetz,

and Watins de la Haverie. 562 Two of these men, Humbert V and Josseran, were

identified as Baudouin II’s relatives. Humbert V was Baudouin II’s cousin; his parents

were Guichard III (or IV) de Beaujeu and Sibylle de Hainaut, sister of Baudouin I,

Henri, and Yolande. 563 Thomas was the brother of Enguerran de Coucy and an

important lord in his own right. 564 Guillaume de Cayeux may have been a relative of

Anseau de Cayeux, regent of the empire. Two clerics are also identified: Warinus,

archbishop of Thessaloniki, and Baudouin, previously bishop of Sinigaglia and then of

Verissa.

Absent was Pierre de Bretagne, who had promised to lead his forces to

Constantinople, and, notably, Robert de Courtenay, Baudouin II’s uncle who had

administered the Courtenay lands when Pierre II and Yolande left for Constantinople in

1217. He had a long and significant career, including as the buticularius of France

under Louis VIII and his son. 565 He should have been a prime target for Baudouin II’s

crusade; in addition to his familial tie to Constantinople, Robert’s career included

562
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 946, ll 40-44: “Iste iuvenis imperator Balduinus, Petri
comitis Autisiodorensis filius ultimus, habuit in comitatu suo viros nobiles Thomam de Marla, fratrem
Ingelrannii de Coci, de parentela sua Humbertum de Belloioco, cognatum suum Iosserannum Grossum de
Burgundia, quondam archiepiscopum, qui fuerat Thessalonicensis, et episcopum Balduinum quondam
Semigallensem, qui factus est archiepiscopus Viscienensis.” Mouskès, Chronique rimée, 30475-88:
“Q’uns qu’autres ot pris Comes / Aine qu’en sa tière li prist sommes, / Mesire Yviers, cil de Bielgiu, /
Tint en son ost moult bien son liu, / Ses couzins, et moult de sa gent, / Assés i mist de son argent. / Et s’i
fu Tumas de Couchi, / Et pour Dieu et pour sa mierci, / Et li castelains de Biaumés, / Od lui son fil i fu
remés. / Et s’i fu Guillaumes de Keu, / Uns cevaliers c’on tint à preu / Et Wetins de la Haverie, / Et moult
d’autre bacelerie.”
563
Humbert V’s participation is confirmed in charter evidence. Ch. Kohler, “Documents inédits
concernant l'orient latin et les croisades (XIIe - XIVe siècle),” Revue de l'Orient latin VII (1899): 20-21.
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 868
564
Dominique Barthélemy, Les deux ages de la seigneurie banale: pouvoir et société dans la terre des
sires de Coucy (milieu XIe – milieu XIIIe siécle) (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1984).
565
Multiple charters show Robert de Courtenay in the company of the French kings and confirming or
witnessing the charters of others. See, as examples, Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II: 14a,
18b-21b, 33, 36b-38a, 44a, 152b, nos. 1610, 1621, 1655-56, 1663-66, 1993. Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 9,
11–19, 21–22.
199
crusading credentials and connections with the Toucy family. 566 Indeed, he took the

cross in the mid-1230s, but there is no evidence that he considered joining the diversion

to Constantinople. Instead, he accompanied the main force to the Holy Land.

As Jean de Brienne had eight years earlier, Baudouin II arrived with an army.

More passionate about defending Constantinople, the city of his birth, than his father-in-

law had been, Baudouin II launched a successful attack on Tzouroulos, a city that was

often the object of military efforts, most recently the Franco-Bulgarian attack in 1237.

Baudouin II’s military success was made possible in large part by the pacts that the

barons had negotiated with Asen and the Cumans in 1237. 567 Although Asen had

withdrawn from his alliance with the Franks, he provided the Western army with safe

passage through his territory, in violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of his renewed

agreement with Vatatzes. 568 The Franks’ deal with the Cumans was more durable. In

1239, before Baudouin II’s return, the Franco-Cuman collaboration was secured with

the first of three marriages. It involved Narjot de Toucy, whose first wife had been the

daughter of Branas and Agnès of France. After she died, he married the daughter of the

Cuman king Ione. 569 Aubri de Trois-Fontaines linked Cuman military aid to Narjot’s

marriage: “[A]nd the greatest part of the Cumans, with whom the noble lord Narjot de

566
Du Bouchet, Histoire généalogique de la maison royale de Courtenay, pp 27, 31; Teulet, Layettes du
Trésor des Chartres, II: 289a-299a, no. 2404.
567
See p. 167 above.
568
Acropolites, Opera, p. 58, ll 13-16: “οἱ μὲν οὖν Βούλγαροι τὰς μετὰ Ῥωμαίων σπονδὰς
παρεωρακότες ἄδειαν τοῖς Φράγγοις δεδώκασι διὰ τῶν ὀρῶν αὐτῶν διελθεῖν, τῷ δοκεῖν ὑπ’αὐτῶν
βιασθέντες τὴν ἐκβολήν.” Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 203, ch
37: “The Bulgarians, overlooking their agreements with the Romans, gave the Franks permission to cross
their mountains, supposeduly force by them to let them pass.” Aubri de Trois-Fontaines also reported
that the Franks passed through Asen’s territory, although he characterized that portion of the journey as
treacherous. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 946, l 46: “Cum maxima difficultate terram
Alsani transierunt.”
569
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines mentioned this marriage twice. Ibid., p. 947, ll 1-3 and p. 950, ll 17-19.
200
Toucy had joined in his second marriage, were of assistance to them.” 570 In 1241, two

other Franco-Cuman marriages confirmed the alliance, involving the nobles Guillaume

de Méry, son of the constable, and a certain Baudouin from Hainaut. 571 The Cumans

joined Baudouin II’s attack on Tzouroulos. Akropolites attributed the Frankish capture

of Tzouroulos to the overwhelming numbers of the Franco-Cuman forces, although he

also reported a rumor that some inhabitants contemplated supporting the attackers and

implied that this encouraged the governor to surrender. 572

The three marriages to Cuman women, occurring after the death of Jean de

Brienne, marked the Latin Empire’s return to investing its resources in relationships

with neighbors. As allies, the Cumans were noteworthy for their foreignness. Although

individuals had converted, as a people, they were still pagans and did not lead settled

lives. To Westerners, the Cumans remained profoundly strange. A decade after his

father married a Cuman princess, Philippe de Toucy visited Louis IX in Caesarea.

Joinville recorded the strange stories that Philippe told about the Franks’ ally and his

own relatives, the Cumans. In order to sanctify the agreement, blood from the rulers

and nobles of each side was mixed and drunk. They then sent a dog to run between the

two sides and cut it to pieces with their swords, swearing that this would be the

570
Ibid., p. 947, ll 1-3: “et maxima pars Comanorum fuit eis in auxilium, cum quorum domnis vir nobilis
Nargaldus de Torceio duplex fecerat matrimonium.”
571
Ibid., p. 950, ll 15-17: “Saronius insuper traditor quidem duas habebat filias baptizatas in
Constantinopoli, quarum unam duxit Guillelmus conestabuli filius, alteram Balduinus de Haynaco.”
572
Acropolites, Opera, p. 58, ll 16-18, 21-26: “τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄστυ τῆς Τζουρουλοῦ καὶ αὖθις ἑάλω,
ἐκστρατευσάντων κατ’αὐτῶν τῶν Λατίνων καὶ συμμαχούντων τούτοις καὶ τῶν Σκυθῶν … τὸ δὲ τῆς
Λατινικῆς δυνάμεως περιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπειροπληθὲς τῶν Σκυθῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἑλεπόλεων συχνόν τε καὶ
καρτερὸν παραδοῦναι τοῦτον τὸ ἄστυ τοῖς Ἰταλοῖς πεποιήκεσαν. φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ προδοσίαν
μελετῆσαί τινας κρύφα, κἀντεῦθεν πτοηθῆναι τὸ ἀπρόοπτον τῆς ἁλώσεως.” Translation from
Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 203: “So, then, the town of Tzouroulos was again
captured when the Latins, allied with the Scyths, marched out against them [the Romans] … The
superiority of the Latin force and the infinite number of Scyths, and the quantity and strength of the siege
towers had forced him to surrender the town to the Italians. (But some say that certain people meditated
betrayal secretly and that he feared an unforeseen conquest from this source.)”
201
punishment for whichever side abandoned the agreement. Philippe also related how a

Cuman knight was buried with his live sergeant and horse. 573 Philippe’s stories, while

acknowledging the Cumans’ foreign behavior and beliefs, also demonstate the Franks’

willingness to engage with and even participate in Cuman culture and practices.

Lock, with his focus on a hybrid Franco-Greek culture (or lack thereof),

proclaimed that the thirteenth century saw the decline of intermarriages between Greeks

and Latins and argued that “the upper levels of Latin society sought to maintain racial

and linguistic purity as well as the social exclusiveness as a mark of their

dominance.” 574 Yet, these marriages to Cumans suggest that Lock structured his

question too narrowly. Baudouin II and his son, Philippe de Courtenay, married

Westerners. Yet, the elite barons of the Latin Empire willingly, it seems, entered into

alliances with Cumans and Greeks.

The Franco-Cuman alliance and the accompanying marriages had a regional

parallel in the relationship between the Cumans and the Hungarians. When invited into

Hungary in 1238, the Cumans converted and the Hungarian king acted as godfather to

Köten, the Cuman leader, thus creating a kin relationship. A marriage between Béla

IV’s son Istvan and the daughter of a Cuman leader accompanied the renewal of the

alliance some years later. 575 In making their alliance, then, the barons of

Constantinople acted as their neighbors did.

Baudouin II and the West

573
Jean de Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, ed. Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Dunod, 1995), pp 244-46, ch 495-98.
Translation in Jean de Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, trans. René Hague (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1955), pp 150-51, ch 495-98.
574
Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, p. 291.
575
Berend, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000– c.
1300, p. 88.
202
 Gregory IX maintained his efforts in favor of the Latin Empire after Baudouin II

left for Constantinople. The pope continued to hope that he could collect, through the

redemption of vows, monies to send to the East. 576 The death of Gregory IX in 1241

ended this crusading push. When Innocent IV was finally selected in 1243, after a two-

year interregnum, he continued to support Baudouin II and the Latin Empire but did not

renew the call for a crusade. Although crusading failed to play a significant role in the

later part of the empire, kinship, land, and relics continued to structure Baudouin II’s

relationship with the West.

After returning to Constantinople, Baudouin II faced difficulties with his

Western lands. Gregory IX had placed Baudouin II’s family and Western lands under

papal protection in late 1239 and announced this to the archbishops of Reims and Sens

and the bishop of Liège. 577 In February 1240, Gregory IX transferred guardianship of

Baudouin II’s lands in the German empire and French kingdom from the bishop of

Cambrai to the archdeacon, chancellor and officials of Paris. 578 This transfer was made

because Baudouin II’s men were complaining that the bishop was not protecting the

Latin emperor’s land and interests. Gregory IX did not enumerate the problems left

unsolved by the bishop, although they might well have involved challenges from

Baudouin II’s sisters or others. The Parisian officials, although farther away than the

bishop of Cambrai, were less involved in local politics and thus had less at stake. The

papal intervention did not end Baudouin II’s troubles with his Western lands. Two

letters from Baudouin II to Louis IX in February 1242 reveal that, in the early 1240s,

576
See his letters Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, III, nos. 5047, 5075, 5123, 5296, 5305, 5312, 6089.
577
Ibid., III, nos. 4944, 4945, 4952, 4953.
578
Ibid., III: col 175, no. 5047. Gregory IX instructed the bishop of Cambrai to protect Baudouin II’s
properties in the German empire and French kingdom in December 1238, before the young man’s return
to the east. Ibid., II: col 1176, no. 4625.
203
Mathilde challenged Baudouin II’s possession of Bertry, Coulanges-sur-Yonne, Mailly-

le-Château, and Mailly-la-Ville, and their associated land. 579 One letter gave Louis IX

permission to deal in Baudouin II’s name with Mathilde in order to resolve the conflict.

It was an official document, asserting the necessity that kept Baudouin II from France

and granting Louis IX full authority to act in his place. 580 Louis had many obvious

advantages as an advocate: As the king of France and overlord of Mathilde’s and

Baudouin II’s lands, he had ex officio power to judge the conflict; as a relation and

often an ally of Mathilde in various matters, he might have been able to exercise more

informal suasion. Baudouin II’s choice also reflected a personal confidence that he

could trust Louis IX to look out for his best interests—despite the king’s desire to

maintain peace with the powerful countess of Nevers.

Baudouin II’s second letter also dealt with property, although it was a less

official and more personal letter. As thanks for Geoffroy de Villehardouin’s rescue

Constantinople with a naval fleet in the siege of 1235–1236, Baudouin II granted him

possession of Courtenay, the Latin emperor’s patrimonial land in France. He wrote to

Louis IX informing him of the transfer, and the king protested. The surviving letter is

Baudouin II’s reply. He began with an acknowledgment of Louis IX’s surprise at and

disapproval of the transaction and expressed his own surprise at the king’s reaction:

579
“castris ac pertinentiis de Betriaco, de Collungiis super Yonam, de Mallicastro et Mallivilla” see
Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II: 464, no. 2954 for the full text of the letter, quoted from here.
580
Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 423-24: “damus et concedimus auctoritatem et
plenariam potestatem constituendi pro nobis procuratorem vel procuratores ad prosequendam et
terminandam causam predictam et ad agendum quolibet genere actionis super castris et pertinentiis
supradictis, tam contra predictam comitissam sororem nostram, quam contra quoslibet alios detentores, et
ad prosequendum litem usque ad finem. -- Dedimus etim eidem domino regi potestatem componendi
super predictis, transigendi, donandi, quitandi et faciendi omnino quicquid viderit faciendum; quicquid
super hiis de ejus mandato aut dispositione ordinatum fuerit sive factum, ratum et firmum habituri et
inviolabiliter servaturi.”
204
“[W]e are even more astonished by your wonder.” 581 Baudouin II evinced frustration at

Louis IX’s lack of comprehension. He reminded Louis IX of the poverty and desperate

need of the Latin Empire. Given Geoffroy’s rescue of Constantinople, the emperor did

not understand why his grant of Courtenay was a surprise. In fact, he asserted a

willingness to agree to much more, had Geoffroy asked it. The emperor’s position is

clear: Courtenay might be his patrimony but Geoffroy de Villehardouin was a

necessary ally for Baudouin II’s true concern, the Latin Empire. Far from not being

wholly dedicated to the well-being of his Eastern lands, as Lock asserted, Baudouin II

was willing to sacrifice his Western possessions to support his Eastern venture. 582

After providing this explanation, however, the letter’s tone changed, turning on

sed. Baudouin II proclaimed his joy that Louis IX refused the transfer; he was as happy

as he would have been to inherit new land: “But once we understood that your majesty

refused to allow the said donation to the prince, you should know we were filled with as

much joy as if we had inherited another territory.” 583 Baudouin II’s actions make his

ecstasy suspect: He did not keep Courtenay for himself, but instead immediately

granted it to his wife as a marriage-portion, announcing as much in his letter. Most

likely, his expression of joy was a way of placating Louis IX. This transaction also

needed Louis IX’s approval and Baudouin II explained his reasoning. Marie’s original

marriage portion was the object of a conflict with Mathilde, the matter addressed in

Baudouin II’s other letter, and their possession was uncertain. The question of Marie’s

dower had been at issue for several years. In 1238, Baudouin II gave Blaton in the

581
Ibid., V: 423: “Nos verø super admiratione vestra potius admiramur.”
582
Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, pp 266-67.
583
Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 423-24: “Sed cùm intelleximus quòd dominatio
vestra ipsum Principem ad dictam donationem admittere recusaret, sciatis nos laetitia tanta repletos, quam
si aliam terram aequiualentem cum illa essemus adepti.”
205
diocese of Cambrai to Marie because of the conflict with Mathilde. 584 In granting

Courtenay to his wife, Baudouin II provided for her future even if Louis IX failed in

prosecuting his claims against Mathilde. The king had shown his commitment to

securing Baudouin II’s interest in Courtenay, and Baudouin II might have a reasonable

degree of confidence that, if Louis IX refused the transfer to Geoffroy de Villehardouin,

he would oppose any attempt to seize the land. Louis IX apparently approved Baudouin

II’s request and Courtenay was successfully preserved for Marie. 585

Baudouin II in the East

Louis IX was not Baudouin II’s only correspondent in the Capetian court. A

year and a half later, the Latin emperor wrote two letters to Blanche of Castile.

Whereas the letters to Louis IX focused on affairs in France, those to Blanche, both

dating from August 1243, dealt with issues more directly relevant to the Latin Empire.

One recounted a diplomatic alliance proposed between the Franks and the Turks and the

need for an accompanying marriage alliance between a Courtenay relative and the

sultan. The second addressed a report that Baudouin II had Greek advisers, although

the letter ranged over various topics. For a historian of the Latin Empire, these letters

are a rare, even unique, opportunity to gaze into the emotional and practical world of

Constantinople. Far from being form letters, rote correspondence from an emperor to a

queen, they are intimate, revealing details about the relationship between Blanche and

Baudouin II, the internal affairs of the Latin Empire, and Constantinople’s relationship

584
Arsenal, MS 6023, # 25. Registered in Wauters, Table chronologique, IV: 310; Petit, Histoire des
ducs de Bourgogne, IV: 316, no. 2346. Transcribed by Charles du Fresne Du Cange, Histoire de
l'empire de Constantinople sous les empeurs françois (Paris, 1657), II, Receuil, pp 3-4.
585
After Baudouin II’s death, Marie communicated with the archbishop of Sens about her fief of
Courtenay. AD Yonne, Bibliothèque de Sens, G 94, n 1; AD Yonne, G 230, fol 239 r; AD Yonne, G 229,
fol 9 r; AD Yonne, G 232, p 116. Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire général de
L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, III: 345, no. 684.
206
with her neighbors and the West. Read carefully, the letters also provide an intriguing

commentary on ethnic and religious identity. From his correspondence to Blanche,

Baudouin II emerges as a man on the cusp of two worlds. He understood, clearly, the

standards and considerations of Western society and the importance of conforming to

them. His need for Western support shines. In the pursuit of such aid, he had learned to

play to Capetian concerns and interests. But Baudouin II himself was not a Westerner.

He could bridge the cultural gap between Constantinople and Paris, but the distance was

far. Nowhere are the differences between the two more striking than in his letters to

Blanche.

Baudouin II’s correspondence with Blanche struck a personal, even affectionate

tone. The relationship that tied the Courtenay and the Capetians deepened during

Baudouin II’s visit to France. Although the known examples of financial aid during his

stay in the West came from the king not the Queen Mother, the two letters to Blanche

reveal a closeness not present in his correspondence to Louis IX. When writing to

Louis IX, Baudouin II opened with a standard salutation and then moved directly into

the purpose of the letter. Baudouin II referred to the king in very similar language in

both letters: The letter concerning Courtenay was addressed to “excellentissimo

Domino Ludovico Dei gratia Francorum Regi,” then a few words later the sender is

described as “consanguineus suus,” while Baudouin II gave authority to “excellenti

domino et consanguineo nostro Ludovico, Dei gratia regi Francorum” to act in the

conflict with Mathilde. 586 The kin relationship was mentioned but not harped on.

586
Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 423-24; Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II:
464, no. 2954.
207
 In contrast, both of Baudouin II’s letters to Blanche dwelt on his concern and

affection for her, his hope for and pleasure in her good health, and his reliance on her.

In both cases, the standard salutatio was followed by a repetition of the positive

sentiments. The tone, characterized by Wolff as “almost tearful,” and the repeated

assertions of his reliance on the Queen Mother and his welcoming of her criticism

confirm his dependence. 587 His letters to Louis, although by no means a boilerplate

example of correspondence, lacked similar personal language.

In the letter responding to Blanche’s criticism about the nature of his advisers,

Baudouin II began with assurances of his own and Marie’s good health and an

expression of his pleasure at news that the queen, the king, and her other sons were

prospering. Blanche had reported her and her sons’ good health in a letter carried by

the marshal of the Latin Empire, Villain d’Aulnay. She had also sent word about the

recent peace between the king and the counts of Toulouse and La Marche and Baudouin

II commented on that. The victory was of great import to Blanche and Louis IX but

does not appear to have directly touched Baudouin II. His mention of it demonstrated

to Blanche, and modern readers, his concern for and interest in her affairs.

Similarly, Blanche was informed about events in the East. She had heard about

a loan that Jean de Valenciennes had made to Baudouin II and queried the emperor

about it. He, in return, provided details of the transaction. 588 The main purpose of the

letter, however, was to deal with a report received by the Queen Mother that he

employed Greeks in his council. She had reprimanded him for this and the letter

587
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 614.
588
The text of the letter is in Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, pp 518-19, no. 3124. Jean de
Valenciennes appears in other documents confirming his status as a banker for Baudouin II and the Latin
Empire. See Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, III, no. 5312 and Wauters, Table chronologique, IV:
502.
208
contained Baudouin II’s response. He began by thanking Blanche profusely for her

concern: “[W]e are most thankful to you, serenitati; indeed, now we know and

recognize that you truly love us because you correct us and teach us so that we may turn

away from evil and strive to adhere to good.” 589 Despite his appreciation of her interest,

he assured her that it was unnecessary since “in no way have we used the counsel of any

Greeks, nor are we using it, nor will we use it.” 590 In fact, he asserted that he only

employed “the counsel of noble and good men of France who are among us,” a

construction that excluded not only Greeks but also non-French Westerners and Latin

Christians more generally. 591 The letter went on to repeat the denial and to suggest that

Blanche question any visitors to France from the Latin Empire as to its veracity. 592 It

ended with Baudouin II welcoming further correction from Blanche and affirming his

reliance on her and Louis IX. 593

This letter provides insight into one of the central questions of this dissertation:

to what extent Baudouin II and his compatriots retained a sense of French identity. His

close relationship with the Capetian monarchy is evident starting in 1237. But intimacy

with one or two individuals does not prove or even necessarily suggest a wider affinity.

This caveat is particularly true in Baudouin II’s case, since Blanche and Louis IX were

both his relatives and a source of aid. His closeness to them, therefore, need not signify

589
Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, pp 518-19, no. 3124: “serenitati vestre gratiarum uberrimas
referimus actiones; nunc enim scimus et cognoscimus quod nos vere diligitis monendo nos atque docendo
ut divertamus a malo et bono adherere nitamur.”
590
Ibid.: “consilio aliquorum Grecorum nullatenus usi sumus, nec utimur, nec utemur.”
591
Ibid.: “consilio nobilium ac bonorum virorum Francie qui apud nos sunt.”
592
Ibid.: “et ita invenietis procul dubio verum; et si ita inveneritis, supplicamus ut credatis et veritatem
super hoc inquiratis tam a latore presentium quam ab aliis omnibus qui ad partes vestras accedunt; nosque
semper vobis scribemus prout veritas rei erit, et, falsa suggestione abjecta, velitis credere veritati.”
593
Ibid.: “Si quid autem inveneritis emendandum, supplicamus quatinus nobis significare velitis et
corrigere, nosque invenietis paratos ad standum vestro consilio et mandato, serenitati vestre devotissime
supplicantes quatinus nostri dignemini misereri; omnes enim fiducia et spes nostra consistit in gratia
solius domini nostri regis, filii vestri serenissimi, et in vestra.”
209
a cultural affiliation, but rather an instrumental approach to his kin and possible

supporters. Baudouin II’s response to Blanche’s reprimand provides a rare direct piece

of evidence that Baudouin II, despite having been born and raised in Constantinople,

retained a strongly French identity. According to his own testimony, he did not merely

exclude Greeks from his counsel, but he relied solely on men from France, “viri

Francie.” This assertion raises two different but related questions: Is it true that

Baudouin II rejected advice from Greeks and sought it only from French nobles? And

what, or rather whom, did he mean when he said “nobilium ac bonorum virorum

Francie qui apud nos sunt”?

First, the denial. Baudouin II’s absolute denial of the charge that he relied on

Greek advisers lends credence to its veracity. Blanche had access to information about

events in the East and received reports from men other than Baudouin II. His proposal

that she query any visitors from the Latin Empire suggests that he was confident in what

she would learn: that he only had Franks in his council.

Wolff treated the letter at face value, using it to disparage Baudouin II’s policies

and to contrast him unfavorably with his uncle Henri: “[S]ince Henry’s death there had

been no successor with the vision or wisdom to conciliate the Greeks.” 594 Even if true,

Baudouin II’s denial does not necessarily speak to the Latin Empire's greater cultural

insularity than in its first decades. His career provides little evidence that he was

xenophobic or reluctant to negotiate and ally with foreigners. In fact, various events

point to his willingness to engage with non-Westerners and even non-Christians.

Baudouin II’s upbringing exposed him to Greeks. A series of marriages, already

discussed in this study, brought Greeks within his orbit. His sister Marie had, by all
594
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 614.
210
accounts, a successful marriage with the Nicaean emperor. After her husband’s death in

1222, she returned to Constantinople where she was bailli in 1228. 595 His brother,

Robert, had been engaged to a Greek princess who resided in Constantinople for some

time. 596 Instead of returning to Nicaea when the engagement was broken, she married

Anseau de Cayeux, who held important positions in Baudouin II’s government. Their

marriage lasted into Baudouin II’s reign, when the couple was together in

Tzouroulos. 597 The French princess, Agnès, married two Byzantine emperors and ruled

Adrianople after the Latin Conquest with her third husband, a Greek general. Their

daughter, half French and half Greek by birth and probably wholly Greek by culture,

married Narjot de Toucy, who acted as bailli several times.

All of these Latin-Greek marriages preceeded Baudouin II’s elevation, and the

disappearance of such alliances from the record could be taken as evidence that

Baudouin II did not share the openness of some of his relatives and barons. Despite the

absence of marriages, however, Baudouin II did not abandon truce negotiations with the

Greeks. In the mid-1230s, during his teenage years, a papal delegation sought to

negotiate a peace and possible church union with Nicaea. In the 1240s, Frederick II

aided the Eastern emperor in arranging two year-long truces with Vatatzes. And later in

his reign, Baudouin II was still interested in making peace with his Greek neighbors.

After Michael VIII Palaiologos assumed the throne, the Latin emperor sent envoys with

an ambitious request: that Nicaea relinquish Thessaloniki to the Franks in exchange for

595
See her charter of February 1228. Lowenfeld, Archives de l'Orient latin, pp 256-57.
596
Mouskès, Chronique rimée, ll 43195-206.
597
See the account of Vatatzes’s capture of the city. Acropolites, Opera, ch 47. Translation in
Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 245, ch 47.
211
peace. 598 These envoys, or perhaps different ones, may have even been Greek. 599

Outside of official contact, political and military intercourse between Franks and Greeks

is attested in several instances. There were Franks in the Nicaean army, a contingent

mentioned with respect in various episodes in Akropolites. 600 According to

Akropolites, Palaiologos’s first, failed attempt to capture Constantinople involved a

plan for his cousin and old prisoner, Anseau, to open the gate and allow the Byzantine

army in. 601 The identification of this Anseau is unresolved, but the story describes a

level of interaction between Latins and Greeks during the end of Baudouin II’s reign

that does not square with Wolff’s evaluation. 602 The evidence from the Latin Empire,

then, although sporadic, points toward a willingness on the part of Baudouin II and

other Franks to deal productively with the Greeks.

The lack of Greek men in Baudouin II’s council more likely reflected the

changed situation of the Latin Empire since his uncle Henri’s reign than a hatred or

distrust of Greeks. The empire in 1216 had included far more Greek subjects in Asia

Minor and Thrace than in the early 1240s. A number of factors, including the growth of

the Latin Empire’s neighbors under Asen, Vatatzes, and Theodore Doukas, Robert’s

incompetence and Jean de Brienne’s inaction combined to reduce the size of the area

controlled by the Franks. If Akropolites’ family is representative, a community of

598
Acropolites, Opera, ch 78. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 351-52,
ch 78.
599
Pachymeres, Relations historiques, I: 149-51.
600
See the account of Michael Palailogos’s trial, Theodore’s campaign against Bulgaria and Michael’s
decision to assume the throne. Acropolites, Opera, ch 76. Translation in Akropolites, George
Akropolites: The History, ch 50, 59, 76.
601
Acropolites, Opera, ch 83. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 368, ch
83.
602
For a discussion of Anseau’s identity, see Georgios Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History,
trans. Ruth Macrides, Oxford Studies in Byzantium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 369, ftnt
3.
212
Greeks remained in Constantinople after the conquest and some fled during Courtenay

rule. 603 With the reduced Greek population in Constantinople, along with the loss of

Adrianople, Thessaloniki, and other Frankish possessions during the 1220s and 1230s,

there were simply fewer Greeks available to serve Baudouin II.

It is not necessary to dismiss entirely the news reported to Blanche. The

marriages of Frankish barons to Greek women produced bicultural partnerships and

families. The reports received by Blanche might have referred to these individuals, who

could legitimately be called, by Baudouin II, French but may have appeared Greek.

Certainly, Philippe de Toucy, whose grandfather was Branas and grandmother the

hellenized Agnès of France, served in important positions in the Latin Empire.

Although he was French enough to meet the standards of Joinville and Louis IX, he, or

others like him, may have seemed less than fully Western, especially when in

Constantinople.

Perhaps even more likely was that Baudouin II was using a sleight of hand to

obfuscate the truth. David Jacoby identified four different Greeks who served in

Baudouin II’s government and one who served him or the patriarch—as the epi ton

deeseon (receiver of petitions), as high-level secretaries, in the treasury and as a

clerk. 604 If Blanche was referring to these men, or some like them, Baudouin II could

honestly deny that they were in his council but possibly avoid the question of whether it

was appropriate to be employing Greeks at all. If Blanche’s concerns were about the

loyalty of Baudouin II’s Greek officials, these anxieties were well founded. Of the five

603
According to Akropolites, his family stayed in Constantinople because of his expenses and
obligations. His father sent him to Nicaea in 1233, during the reign of Jean de Brienne. Acropolites,
Opera, p. 46, ch 29. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 189, ch 29.
604
Jacoby, “The Greeks of Constantinople under Latin Rule 1204-1261,” pp 60-61. See also Jacoby,
“Diplomatics in the Eastern Mediterranean”.
213
men that Jacoby identifies, one, the treasury official, advised the Byzantine commander

on the capture of the city and the two secretaries, Nikephoros and Aloubardes, moved

into the service of Palaiologos after 1261. In the end, whatever the actual composition

of Baudouin II’s advisery core, he confronted Blanche’s concerns head-on and with an

absolute denial. If he believed that Greeks could be useful advisers, he did not try to

convince her of it. Her support was too important to do so.

This issue is worth approaching from a different direction. If Baudouin II’s

council consisted of “nobilium ac bonorum virorum Francie qui apud nos sunt,” as he

promised Blanche, who were the men who advised him? First of all, Baudouin's

description excluded the Venetians who resided in Constantinople and provided

frequent assistance to the Latin Empire. As other evidence affirms, they continued to

maintain a separate identity from the Franks. A number of Baudouin II’s advisers have

already appeared in these pages. Some of them were men of an older generation, who

had come from the West in a previous migration; others were of the emperor’s

generation and, like him, had been raised in the East. As noted, Jean de Béthune, who

led the short-lived crusade in 1238, was probably related to the Fourth Crusader Conon

de Béthune. An Anseau de Cayeux, the son or grandson of the Fourth Crusader of the

same name, was regent in 1238 and he, or an aristocrat of the same name, governed

Tzouroulos in the 1240s. The Fourth Crusader Anseau de Cayeux came from the

northwest of France and took the cross in the company of the count of Saint-Pol. 605

Pierre and Yolande had also brought men with them in 1217. Narjot de Toucy, who

hailed from near Auxerre, died in 1241. Narjot’s son, Philippe, was regent during

605
Longnon, Les compagnons de Villehardouin, pp 200-1.
214
Baudouin II’s second absence in the West in the mid-1240s. 606 Geoffroy de Méry also

appeared in the Latin Empire in 1219 and became constable. His son, Guillaume,

married a Cuman princess in 1241. 607 These men were from French and Flemish

families, although they themselves were sometimes one or perhaps two generations

removed from residence in the West. Baudouin II maintained that they, and presumably

he himself, preserved their French identity despite their entirely Eastern careers. The

barons, some of them born and raised in the East as was Baudouin II himself, were,

according to this formulation, French men in the East, not Easterners with a French

heritage. Moreover, with his acceptance of Blanche’s criticism, Baudouin II implied

that the Latin Empire was, properly, an extension of France and thus that his advisers

should be purely French, whoever else might be resident in empire and even involved in

imperial affairs.

Although Baudouin II’s response to Blanche’s criticism emphasized his own

Frenchness and that of his empire, his other surviving letter to her affirmed the distance

and difference already announced by his disagreement with Louis IX over the fate of

Courtenay. Baudouin II’s remarkable letter laid out the possibility of an alliance

between the Latin Empire and the sultan of Konya, an alliance that would unite them

against Vatatzes, their common enemy. 608 Since he lacked appropriate female relatives

in Constantinople, the emperor wanted one of his nieces to come from France and

606
See especially AD Yonne, H 1561, but also AD Yonne, 815bis, AD Yonne, H 1435, AD Yonne, H
1636, AD Yonne, H 1669, AD Yonne, H 1848. Hervé and Mathilde, count and countess of Nevers,
guaranteed their protection to the chapter of Auxerre should Narjot return from Constantinople and
harrass the chapter. AD Yonne, G 1846. Petit also included a number of Toucy charters, Petit, Histoire
des ducs de Bourgogne, III: 405, 412, 415-16, 418, 429, 435,439, 453, 458, 467-68, 474-75, 484, nos.
1224, 1126, 1157, 1167, 1180, 1241, 1259, 1335, 1356, 1395, 1398, 1425-26, 1468. For a discussion of
the Toucy in the east see Longnon, “Les Toucy en Orient et en Italie au treizième siècle”.
607
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 950.
608
The full text of the letter is published in Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 424-26.
215
marry the sultan. The letter to Blanche sought her support in this endeavor. In content,

tone and structure, Baudouin II employed his best persuasive techniques to overcome

Blanche’s expected reluctance and convince her of the proposal’s adantages.

Indeed, the proposed alliance—between a Muslim Turk and a French noble—

was a surprising one. Muslim-Christian alliances were a feature of Eastern life,

particularly for the Byzantines, but marriages were less so. A variety of circumstances

in the early 1240s made an alliance between the Franks and the Turks especially, albeit

briefly, appealing to both sides. The deaths, in 1241, of John Asen, Manuel Doukas,

Narjot de Toucy, and Gregory IX had changed the dynamics of politics in the East and

the West. With Gregory IX’s death, the Latin Empire had lost its most vigorous

Western advocate, and the ensuing two-year vacancy in Rome, followed by the flare-up

of the conflict between the papacy and Frederick II, distracted Rome from its support

for the Latin Empire. In the East, on the other hand, the balance of power shifted and

the Latin Empire gained a brief respite from its enemies.

In 1241, Baudouin II’s capture of Tzouroulos was followed by a second

Frankish victory. Vatatzes, in response to the campaign north of Constantinople, had

embarked on a naval expedition, capturing several Frankish possessions and then sailing

to Constantinople itself. The Venetian podestà launched his ships, defeated the larger

Nicaean fleet, and raised the siege. 609 In Bulgaria, Asen’s son Kaliman succeeded him

609
Greek and Western sources recount the Latin victories. Acropolites, Opera, ch 37. Translation in
Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 203-4, ch 37. Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa.
46–1280 d.c.,” p. 298: “Anno ducis XIIIo Iohanes Vatacius, qui Federici imperatoris filiam sibi
copulaverat, cum galeis XXV et alliis navigiis per mare, et cum multitudine copiosa equitum et peditum
in terram, urbem obsedit: Tunc Iohanes Michael, pro Venetis potestas Constantinopolitanus, armatis XVI
galeis, egrediens, Grecos bello agrediture, et decem illorum galeas, reliquis fugatis cepit, et sic civitas ab
obsidione liberatur.”
216
and renewed peace treaties with Vatatzes and Constantinople. 610 Asens’s death proved

damaging to Bulgaria, which would not, within the span of the Latin Empire, rebound

to its previous strength. This development deprived Vatatzes of an active ally against

Constantinople. 611 Bulgaria’s retreat from an aggressive stance toward the Latin

Empire, which had been building since 1237, along with Baudouin II’s recent victories

in 1240–1241, made an attack on Constantinople a risky prospect for Vatatzes. Instead,

the Nicaean emperor agreed to a two-year treaty with the Latin Empire, one facilitated

by Frederick II, and turned to the problem posed by Thessaloniki. 612

Even more significant in transforming the environment around Constantinople

were the Mongol invasions into the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Béla IV had

already invoked the Mongol threat in communications with Gregory IX and asked for a

crusade to defend Hungary’s borders. 613 In 1241, the Mongols decimated Hungarian

forces, with ensuing population losses estimated at fifteen to twenty percent, putting an

end to any hopes of Hungarian support for the Latin Empire. 614 Further south, the

Mongols invaded Asia Minor and defeated the Turks. The news was serious; in

response, Vatatzes wrapped up his campaign in the West, coming to an agreement with

610
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 950, ll 12-15, 23-24. Acropolites, Opera, ch 39.
Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 210-15, ch 39. Akropolites gave Asen a
positive evaluation, particularly noting his generosity to foreigners as well as his own people. See p. 138
above.
611
Despite the history of cooperation between Bulgaria and Nicaea, the alliance was far from certain.
Akropolites twice stated that Vatatzes focused on Thessaloniki because “a young man ruled over the land
of the Bulgarians.” Translation from Ibid., p. 215, ch 40. Acropolites, Opera, ch 40.
612
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines recorded the treaties with Bulgaria and Nicaea: “Ceterum ab hoc festo sancti
Iohannis in biennium firmaverunt Constantinopolitani treugas ad Colmannum Alsani filium et ad
Vastachium et eius filium.” Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 950, ll 23-24. Akropolites offered
an account of Vatatzes’s move against Thessaloniki. Acropolites, Opera, ch 40. Translation in
Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 215-16, ch 40.
613
Berend, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000– c.
1300, p. 164.
614
See Berend’s discussion of the seriousness of the invasion. Ibid., pp 34-38.
217
the Doukai, and returned to Asia Minor. 615 Fearing further attacks, the sultan sought

allies in the Latin Empire and Nicaea. As a potential ally, Nicaea was a logical choice.

Although the two neighbors often met in battle, they also had a history of alliances.

Prior treaties had been arranged in 1211 and 1231, the latter also prompted by the

Mongol threat. At times, the relationship was even friendly, reflected in Akropolites’

reference to an unnamed sultan as an “intimate associate” of Theodore Laskaris’s. 616 In

1237, the Turks gave Manuel Doukas safe passage after his ship ran aground at Attalos,

apparently because of his relationship with Vatatzes. 617

In addition to this history, Nicaea was much better able than was the Latin

Empire to aid the Turks in their resistance to the Mongols. The Greeks were far

stronger and already established in Asia Minor. Given these advantages, the resulting

treaty between the sultan and Vatatzes is no surprise, and the positive relationship

between Nicaea and the Turks held for many years. 618

Before this treaty was finalized, however, the Turks also reached out to the Latin

Empire. Baudouin II treated the possibility of an alliance seriously and promoted it

enthusiastically to Blanche. A treaty had precedent. In 1228, Narjot de Toucy, as

bailli, sent an envoy to negotiate a truce with the sultan against Vatatzes. 619 There were

other interactions: Westerners, probably men originally in the service of the Latin

Empire, served in the Turkish army in the 1230s and 1240s. 620 The alliance suggested

615
Acropolites, Opera, ch 40. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 215-16,
ch 40.
616
Acropolites, Opera, ch 6. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 118, ch 6.
See Macrides’s comments at George Akropolites: The History, p. 119, ftnt 7.
617
Acropolites, Opera, ch 38. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 207, ch
38.
618
See below, chapter 6.
619
Cessi, Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio di Venezia, I: 208, no. 134.
620
See discussion in Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” pp 606-9.
218
by Baudouin II, however, was of a different type than were previous contacts.

According to his own description, it was to be permanent, solidified, and confirmed

with a marriage. In his letter, Baudouin II carefully explained the alliance’s appeal to

Blanche: the sultan’s wealth and power, the proximity of his lands to Nicaea, and their

common hostility toward Vatatzes. The letter then proposed a marriage between the

sultan and Baudouin II’s niece and sought to reassure Blanche’s concerns about both

the political and personal components of the alliance and to obtain her support for it.

A recapitulation of the proposal does not do justice to the letter’s crafting, which

conditioned the reader, more particularly Blanche, to hear the proposal favorably. The

opening of the letter lingered on the relationship between Baudouin II and Blanche.

The standard salutatio was followed by the repetition of similar sentiments in different

language. 621 Baudouin II then reminded Blanche of his absolute dependence on her

help, a theme that appears repeatedly in this and his other letter to the French queen:

“Truly, indeed, we should understand, and we want to acknowledge, that we obtain no

assistance at all, unless procured thanks to your grace.” 622 After setting the stage, both

by reminding Blanche of his affection for her and by emphasizing the central

importance of her help, Baudouin II launched into a description of his situation. Here,

he provided the rationale for the alliance: the wealth and power of the sultan, the

geographic reality that sandwiched Nicaean lands between the Franks and the Turks,

and the common enemy in Vatatzes. The terms were appealing, if vague. They

621
Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 424: “Nouerit excellentia vestra, nos gratia Diuina
praestante plena corporis hilaritate gaudere.” The salutatio is not striking: “EXCELLENTISSIME
dominae BLANCHAE, dei gratia francorum reginae illustrissimae, BALDUINUS eadem gratia
fidelissimus in Christo imperator, à Deo coronatus, Romaniae moderator, et semper augustus,
consanfuineus suus, salutem et prosperorum successuum cum assidua felicitate, continuum
incrementum.”
622
Ibid.: “Verè enim scire debemus, et volumus confiteri, nos nullum penitus obtinuisse subsidium, nisi
sublimitatis vestrae gratia procurante.”
219
encompassed not only a nonaggression pact, but also a requirement that each side

support the other, as much as was feasible, against threats and not enter into friendship

with the other’s enemies without consultation. 623 Such an agreement would provide the

Latin Empire with a potent ally against Vatatzes, one who could harass Nicaea’s eastern

frontier and prevent the Greeks from launching an all-out strike on Constantinople.

Baudouin II’s account of the negotiations highlighted the sultan’s great status

and his position in the universe of civilized nations. He acted as a Western ruler should,

receiving envoys with honor and sending prestigious ones in turn. The emperor

emphasized the sultan’s elite position, describing him and his holdings “the Sultan of

Iconia, a most powerful lord, there being no pagan, we believe, richer than him, ruling

in neighboring areas and near our fortifications. 624 According to Baudouin II, the

negotiations were conducted with great honor, each side sending important men as

messengers who were welcomed and honored at the other court. This description,

focused on secular similarities, turned attention away from religious difference and

made the sultan appear familiar. In this portrait, the sultan was a man who could be

dealt with and trusted.

Having laid his foundation, Baudouin II then specified the need for a bride in

order to secure the alliance, providing assurances as to her continued faithfulness to her

religion and casting the lure of introducing Christianity to Turkish lands. According to

Baudouin II, the sultan himself had suggested such an alliance. “So, in order to confirm

623
The terms of the treaty were expressed in flowery language but were short on specific mechanisms.
Ibid.: “et omnes amici nostri sint amici fui, et omnes inimici nostri inimici sui, et similiter sui nostri, et
alter alterum pro posse suo teneatur ad inuicem adiuuare, nec possit alter nostrum cum aliquibus inimicis
suis compositionem vel pacem facere, sine reliqui consilio et consensu.”
624
Ibid.: “Soldanum de Ycon, Dominum potentissimum, quo nullum ditiorem credimus esse Paganum,
tenentem in propinquis, ac vicinis nobis moenibus Dominatum.”
220
the said agreement and friendship entirely, he asked for a noble woman of our people in

marriage.” 625 By specifying that the sultan raised the possibility, Baudouin II affirmed

the sultan’s sincerity and his genuine commitment to the terms presented. The bride

would not be required to abandon her religion; on the contrary she could remain a

devout Christian, maintain chapelains and clerics and be attended only by Christian

servants. In effect, she would bring a small Christian world into Muslim lands. Beyond

the personal realm, the sultan promised to build churches in his territory and to place

those churches under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople. The sultan’s

envoy even suggested that if his bride treated him with love, the sultan might be swayed

to convert to Christianity. This marriage would expand Christendom in Turkish lands,

possibly extending to the highest stratum.

After proposing the marriage, Baudouin II returned to earlier points. He

mentioned again the prestigious envoy and reiterated his high evaluation of the sultan’s

position and the fruitfulness of an alliance against Vatatzes. In doing so, he deftly

framed the marriage with the inducements for it. Finally, at the very end of the letter,

came the request itself: a plea that Blanche induce and advise his sister, Élisabeth, and

her husband, Eudes of Montaigu, to send their daughter to be the sultan’s bride. The

queen was expected to add her inducements to those of Baudouin II’s messenger, a

certain Henri Verjus, who was raised with some of the Courtenay siblings and could be

625
Ibid.: “Item pro dicta confoederatione tenenda et amicitia plenius confirmanda petiit una mulierem de
nostro genere, in uxorem.”
221
trusted to deliver the emperor’s request. 626 Henri’s close relationship with the

Courtenays put him in a privileged position to persuade Élisabeth of the plan.

Baudouin II’s description of the alliance and marriage reflected his expectations

concerning Blanche’s reaction. It anticipated that Blanche would balk on both personal

and political grounds, and it covered both. Although the letter dealt with many issues,

the bride’s ability to maintain her religious allegiance was the predominant concern, and

Baudouin II provided absolute assurance on this matter. Not only would she have

personal freedom, but also she would be surrounded with other Christians, thus

reducing the temptations to conversion.

With these assurances, Baudouin II responded to a common anxiety about

Christian-Muslim relationships, namely that Christians married to or in service to

Muslims would be persuaded or coerced into conversion. 627 The anxiety about intimacy

between religious groups is more fully expressed, and that expression preserved, in

relation to Hungary. Nora Berend’s recent work on non-Christians in Hungary has

investigated the interplay among Hungary’s status as a frontier society, its elites’

approach to non-Christians, and the attitudes of Westerners, particularly popes, toward

Hungary and its non-Christian population. As she revealed, Hungary’s position on the

edge of Christendom and its relatively recent conversion to Christianity heightened and

focused papal concerns about interfaith relationships. These conditions combined to

create an impression that Hungary was just barely, or perhaps only temporarily,

Christian. As a result, the popes were concerned that non-Christians, specifically

626
Ibid.: “Pro negotio autem isto complendo dilectum et dielem ac familiarem militem nostrum
Henricum Verius latorem praesentium, qui cum fratribus et sororibus nostris semper fuit nutritus.”
Unfortunately, nothing else is known about Henri.
627
Jarbel Rodriguez, Captives & Their Saviors in the Medieval Crown of Aragon (Washington, D.C:
Catholic University of America Press, 2007).
222
Muslims and pagans, would seduce Hungarian Christians away from the faith. More

than thirty years after Baudouin II’s letter to Blanche, this anxiety about apostasy

reached its pinnacle with the figure of King László IV, who was the son of a Cuman

woman and who set aside his Christian wife for a Cuman mistress. His personal

situation and political actions, which included resistance to papal instructions and

reliance on Cumans as political allies, encouraged charges that he had abandoned

Christianity. Citing in part a purported alliance with the Mongols, the pope called for a

crusade against him, which László IV’s assassination in 1290 forestalled. 628

Like Hungary, the Latin Empire was on the edge of Christendom. Both shared

borders with and even sheltered within their boundaries Eastern Christians, pagans, and

Muslims. The circumstances of the two polities, however, were vastly different.

Hungary was an established state as the Latin Empire never would be. Béla IV loudly

trumpeted threats to Hungary’s very existence, but only the Mongols posed a serious

risk to the state. Although the Mongol attacks put severe pressure on Hungary and

resulted in large loss of life, they did not destroy the polity. The Latin Empire, in

contrast, was under great and constant threat from many sides, which it withstood only

for fifty-seven years. Menacing forces repeatedly approached the walls of

Constantinople during this period and often the walls themselves, not the defending

forces, dissuaded the attackers. On the other hand, the Christianity of the Latin Empire

never came into question. Its status as a crusader state inhabited and ruled by crusaders

provided a bulwark against suspicions that its rulers had abandoned the true faith.

Over-familiarity with non-Western Christians, as cited in Blanche’s letter, was not

628
See Berend, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c.
1000– c. 1300, pp 171-83.
223
interpreted as abandonment of allegiance to Rome. Other circumstances also affirmed

the position of the Latin Empire as indisputably within Christendom. The emperors and

nobles in the Latin Empire were, at most, two generations removed from western

Europe. Unlike the Hungarians, who entered Western Christendom at a fairly late

stage, the settlers in Constantinople came from areas long ago Christianized. Finally,

Constantinople was a visibly and prominently Christian city, an ancient and prominent

patriarchate and home to an array of dazzling relics and religious institutions. Its

capture by Westerners in 1204 returned it, from the point of view of the papacy, to its

proper place in Christendom, in adherence to Rome. Although the Latin Empire’s

political future was unstable, its religious adherence was firm.

The marriage proposed by the sultan and accepted by Baudouin II has several

parallels in thirteenth-century Hungary. The marriage, in either 1247 or 1254, between

Béla IV’s son Istvan and the Cuman princess Erzsébet is the most apparent. 629 As with

the proposed Franco-Turkish alliance, this marriage accompanied a high-level alliance,

one intended to be enduring. In writing to the pope, Béla IV emphasized the absolutely

essential status of the alliance in ensuring the safety and welfare of Hungarian

Christians, just as Baudouin II touted the advantages attendant upon an agreement with

the sultan. In the 1250s, Béla IV also proposed an alliance with the Mongols, which

included a marriage. This suggestion, known from the papal response, was absolutely

rejected. Alexander IV and Urban IV staunchly opposed the idea of a marriage alliance,

629
This alliance, of course, had its own parallels in the marriages between Frankish men and Cuman
women in 1239–1241. See pp 141, 201-2 above.
224
arguing that the Mongols sought to trick the Hungarians and gain their help fighting

other Christians. 630

Blanche’s response to Baudouin II’s plea does not survive. The popes’

reluctance, however, to countenance such marriages in the case of Hungary suggests

that Blanche would also be resistant. One factor in particular made the marriage

proposed by Baudouin II worrying. In the case of Istvan and Erzsébet, the non-

Christian foreigner was the wife and not the husband, and she came and integrated into

Christian society through baptism and a settled Christian life. In theory, as with the

marriages of Frankish nobles to Cuman women, her marriage was the mechanism

through which her entire people would become settled Christians. 631 Baudouin II’s

niece, on the other hand, would go into Muslim territory. 632 The letter suggests that she

too could be a tool of conversion by bringing Christianity with her, but that was only

suggested as a possibility and would result from, not precede or coincide with, the

marriage. Yet all these examples show how marriages, the resulting kinship, and

accompanying alliances were perceived as tools of conversion.

Baudouin II’s letters to Louis IX and Blanche contain a hint of the frontier

ideology developed and aggressively employed by Béla IV in his correspondence with

the papacy. Baudouin II lacked Béla IV’s confidence and his military and financial

630
C. Bourel de la Roncière, Registres d'Alexandre IV, Registres des papes 15 (Paris: Bibliothèque des
Écoles franç aises d’Athènes et de Rome, 1902), no. 2963; Theiner, VMH, I: 240-41, no. CCCCLIV.
Jean Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, Registres des papes du XIIIe siècle 13 (Paris: Bibliothèque des
Écoles franç aises d’Athènes et de Rome, 1884), p. 154, nos. 1242-43; Theiner, VMH, pp 264-65, nos.
CCCCLXXXIII-CCCCLXXXIV. Berend, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in
Medieval Hungary, c. 1000– c. 1300, pp 166-69.
631
Berend unpacks with delicacy the notion of “Christian” as it pertains to the Cumans and demonstrates
that for the church Christianity was linked to a settled lifestyle and an abandonment of pagan dress and
lifestyle, as well as an acceptance of Christian belief. The church perceived the Cuman tendency toward
syncretism as evidence of their continued paganism. Ibid., pp 244-58.
632
For concerns about the dangers facing Christian women in Muslim lands in the Iberian context, see
Rodriguez, Captives & Their Saviors in the Medieval Crown of Aragon.
225
strength. Whereas Béla IV made demands to the papacy, Baudouin II sent pleas. The

underlining message was the same, however. For states on the edge of Christendom,

different rules should apply. Louis IX’s objection to the transfer of Courtenay reflected,

in Baudouin II’s view, the center’s lack of understanding of circumstances on the

periphery. In his attempt to arrange an interfaith marriage, the emperor also tried to

teach the center, here represented by Blanche, about life—geography, religion, allies

and enemies—on the outer edge of Christendom. Baudouin II’s approach to Blanche

reflected his expectation that she would not understand these matters. He felt it

necessary to explain the status of the sultan and the geography of the region. He also

provided the following information, in support of the contention that the sultan would

allow his wife to keep Christian belief and practice: “So indeed the sultan was a son of

a Greek Christian, his father was similarly married to a Christian Greek the whole time

of his life. Indeed many noble Pagans in these parts have Christian wives, who

continue assiduously in the law, including Greeks, Armenians, Tverians and

Russians.” 633 As much as he relied on Blanche’s advice and assistance, he considered

her uninformed about matters “in partibus illis,” that is, in the East. Louis IX and

Blanche may not have questioned Baudouin II’s Christianity, as the pope challenged

that of the Hungarian kings, but they opposed his mechanisms for dealing with the

nature of life in the East and rebuked his efforts to deviate from practices and attitudes

as accepted in France. These four letters, precious because of their rarity, provide a

window into the myriad ways in which life for Westerners who moved East was

633
Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 424: “Ipse enim soldanus fuit filius Christianae
Grecae, uam pater suus similiter in lege Christiana Greca tenuit toto tempore vitae suae. Multi etiam
nobiles Pagani in partibus illis habent uxores Christianas, quae in lege sea assidue perseuerant, videlicet
Grecae, Armeniacae, Tuerae, et Rossae.”
226
radically transformed. The web of lordship and family, which Baudouin II participated

in in Europe and attempted to use to his advantage, was more set and structured than he

would have liked. The prejudices and opinions of Westerners, even those as

cosmopolitan as Blanche of Castile and Louis IX, hindered his efforts to secure

resources, financing, and allies for his faltering empire. In these letters, Baudouin II

tried to overcome these obstacles, present in the minds of his Western allies, but he

failed.

227
 CHAPTER 6:

THE LATIN EMPIRE AND EUROPEAN POLITICS, 1243–1246

In late 1243, Baudouin II followed his letters to Blanche of Castile with a visit to

the West. Lock presented Baudouin II’s time in the West as continuous, but, in fact,

there was a four-year break between his two visits and he exhibited different strategies

during each. 634 Any attempt to provide context for this visit comes up against the

limited nature of the record for these years, which makes it impossible to identify an

immediate cause for his journey, although a need for funds and, possibly, personal

inclination, seem the most likely reasons. The most detailed chronciler of the East,

Akropolites, was uncharacteristically silent about the period between 1243 and 1246

and no other source intervenes to provide an extensive narrative of events in and around

Constantinople. Here, the loss of Aubri de Trois-Fontaines and Philippe Mouskès is

keenly felt. The available sources, however, suggest that affairs in Constantinople were

in neither particularly good nor particularly catastrophic shape. Of course, the risk,

especially from Nicaea, was still present. The Turks and Nicaean Greeks concluded a

treaty in 1243, and, at the same time, the Mongol threat retreated temporarily. In

Thessaloniki, John Doukas had been compelled to forsake his imperial title for that of

despot and had sworn fealty to the Nicaean emperor. He died in 1244 and was

succeeded by his brother Demetrios, although their father Theodore Doukas remained

the real power. Michael II Doukas, who controlled Epiros, was focused on affairs in

Greece. With his eastern border secure and the Doukai, at least superficially, reconciled

634
Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, p. 63.
228
to Nicaean authority, Vatatzes could have turned his attention toward Constantinople. 635

Yet, the evidence argues against Nicaea mounting a direct attack between 1243 and

1246.

Mathew Paris did claim that “the emperor of Constantinople was fleeing from

the persecution of the Greeks.” 636 I think, however, that danger from ongoing attacks

can safely be discounted as an immediate cause. Mathew Paris did not provide any

details and quickly offered a second reason for this visit: extreme poverty. 637 It should

be no surprise that Matthew Paris embellished on the empire’s situation. He relished

the dire straits in which the Latin Empire found itself. He had similarly asserted that

Baudouin II had been “banished and outlawed from the empire” at the time of his first

visit, an evocative but inaccurate description. 638 The author of the fanciful Récits d’un

ménestrel de Reims also attributed Baudouin II’s journey to the West to his need for

money, adding the detail that his inability to pay his men had caused them to return to

their homelands. 639 Baudouin II’s behavior, discussed in detail below, provides support

for the proposition that general poverty rather than immediate military danger prompted

his trip. He was willing to remain for months in the papal curia, although immediate

635
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 136-42.
636
Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 299: “Ipsoque eodem tempore, cum fugisset imperator
Constantinopolitanus a persecutione Graecorum.”
637
Ibid.: “nec quicquam haberet in aerario, ut guerram amplius continuaret et Graecorum impetus
continuos sustineret, confugit ad consilium et auxilium imperatoris Romanorum Fretherici.”
638
Ibid., III: 480: “Eodem quoque anno, aetate adolescens, imperator Constantinopolitanus
B[aldewinus], filius Petri comitis Autissiodorensis, venit in Angliam, expulsus et proscriptus ab imperio,
auxilium petiturus.”
639
Natalis de Wailly, ed., Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims au treizième siècle (Paris: Librairie Renouard,
1876), p.224, ch 437: “Et li empereres Baudouins estoit juenes et enfantis; si despendi largement, et ne
prist pas garde à son affaire; si fu povres et endeteiz, et n’ot que donneir aus chevaliers et aus serjanz. Si
s’en partirent de lui une granz partie, et s’en ralerent en leur païs. Et quant li empereres vit qu’ainsi
estoit, si ot conseil qu’il venroit en France à l’apostoile qui estoit à Lion, et à la roïne qui estoit ante sa
famme, et requerroit ajue à l’apostoile et à la roïne.”
229
assistance was not forthcoming. Had the city been under serious attack, one would

expect him to launch a heavy recruitment campaign.

It is more likely that events in the West guided Baudouin II’s decision to embark

on his journey at that particular moment. In the spring of 1243, a letter arrived in

Constantinople from Frederick II, detailing the steps he had taken to encourage a papal

election. He bemoaned the state of the church, torn apart by discord and schism and left

adrift without a leader. 640 The letter focused entirely on the church and affirmed,

repeatedly, the author’s desire for its rejuvenation. In the two years of papal

interregnum (interrupted only by the brief and forgettable interlude of Celestine IV),

observers had increasingly blamed Frederick II for obstructing the election of a new

pope. This charge was not unfounded. In the spring of 1241, the Western emperor had

captured a number of bishops and two cardinals on their way to the church council.

Two years later, he still held the cardinals, namely the bishop James of Palestrina, who

had earned Frederick II’s enmity with his involvement in Lombardy in the mid-1230s,

and Otto of St. Nicholas, who was apparently won over to the imperial cause during his

captivity. The incarceration of these men and the poor treatment of James of Palestrina

had already injured Frederick II’s reputation. 641 As the interregnum continued, with

the cardinals in Rome divided over the choice of a new pope, his refusal to release his

prisoners took on a greater importance, since their participation might break the

640
Huillard-Bréholles, Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, VI: 90: “Orbis mutilatio propter
dissensiones et schismata et totius humani generis turbulentie que propter Ecclesie viduitatem antiqui
serpentis effuso veneno emerserunt et irruerunt.”
641
For French views of Frederick II’s capture of the prelates see Chris Jones, Eclipse of Empire?:
Perceptions of the Western Empire and Its Rulers in Late-Medieval France (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), pp
37, 45, 80-82, 93. Even Matthew Paris reported the sufferings on the voyage and in their prison. Paris,
Chronica Majora, IV: 129-30.
230
impasse. 642 Frederick II, understandably, was loath to set James and Otto free without a

significant concession in return, perhaps even a pope of his own choosing. As the

months passed, however, the cardinals became more intransigent and, after the death of

Celestine VI, they refused to hold a new election until James was freed. 643

Frederick II’s letter to Baudouin II announced his decision to free the cardinals.

He portrayed himself in the best possible light, noting that he released them regardless

of his own safety or interests because of his great desire to further the selection of a new

pope. 644 The letter was part of Frederick II’s larger campaign to explain his position

and his reasons for opposing the papacy. Constantinople was a little far afield for such

propoganda, but in his visit to the West, Baudouin II had established himself among the

ranks of Western nobles and as a favorite of the Capetian monarchy and the then pope,

Gregory IX. The very existence of the letter demonstrates that, in the five years since

Frederick II detained the forces of Jean de Béthune, the two emperors had repaired their

relationship, although the mechanism of this reconciliation is unknown. They may have

been communicating more broadly about affairs in the East. In 1241–1242, Frederick

II’s daughter, Anna-Constance, married Vatatzes, giving the Western emperor influence

there. 645

In June of 1243, the hope that Frederick II expressed to Baudouin II was

realized when Innocent IV was selected as the new pontiff. His tenure opened on an

642
Mathew Paris expounded in several places on the delay in the election and the desire of Christians to
have a new pope. Ibid., IV: 164-65, 170, 172-74, 194, 249.
643
See the account in Abulafia, Frederick II: a Medieval Emperor, pp 346-54. When describing the
cardinals’ refusal to elect a new pope, Mathew Paris recounted that “Veruntamen instanter dominum
imperatorem postulabant, ut si se pacis ac libertatis ecclesiasticae haberi cuperet aemulatorem, sub bonae
pacis spe certissima, quos adhuc tenuit incarceratos praelatos, ecclesiae, liberos abire permitteret.” Paris,
Chronica Majora, IV: 240.
644
Huillard-Bréholles, Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, VI: 90-92.
645
See below for a full discussion of the marriage.
231
optimistic note for the Latin Empire. In July, the new pope instructed the dioceses in

Greece and the Archipelago to start collecting ten thousand hyperpers for the aid of the

Latin Empire. 646 Two weeks later, he followed with the assignment of a tenth from

clergy of the Morea and Negropont to the patriarch of Constantinople. 647 The rapidity

of these actions suggested that Innocent IV, like his predecessor Gregory IX, would be

Baudouin II’s ally. There was more to be done, however; the pope had not yet

marshaled Western resources in support of the Latin Empire. Armed, then, with the

foreknowledge provided by Frederick II and the news of Innocent IV’s ascension and

his actions in favor of the Latin Empire, Baudouin II decided to travel west. He had

reason to hope that his arrival would move Innocent IV to expand his efforts in favor of

the Latin Empire, which had so far focused on raising money in Greece, to the rest of

Christendom. His previous visit had demonstrated the power of personal relationships

and face-to-face encounters in drumming up aid. It had encouraged Gregory IX’s

promotion of a crusade to the Latin Empire and resulted in significant financial support

from Louis IX. Unfortunately, in the mid-1240s Innocent IV, Frederick II, and Louis

IX, while all sympathetic to the Franks’ cause, had other concerns that took precedence.

For the pope and Western emperor, of course, their ongoing conflict was the first among

these. 648 The fall of Jerusalem in 1244, the crusade of Louis IX, and the continued

threat of the Mongols in the East also distracted these leaders and their successors from

a full-bodied support for the Latin Empire.

Baudouin II, Innocent IV, and Frederick II

646
Élie Berger, Registres d'Innocent IV, Registres des papes 1 (Paris: Bibliothèque des écoles franç aises
d’Athènes et de Rome, 1884), I: 6-7, no. 22.
647
Ibid., I: 8-9, 21, nos. 33, 94.
648
For view of this period, mostly sympathetic to Abulafia, Frederick II: a Medieval Emperor, pp 349-
74.
232
 The struggle between pope and Western emperor consumed Baudouin II’s time

and energy during the first year and a half of his visit. He entangled himself in the

conflict, intervening almost as Frederick II’s representative in an attempt to secure a

peace. His actions reflected an understanding that the dispute engrossed both parties

and hindered their ability and desire to support to his cause. If he brokered in a

solution, not only would it free up the resources, time, and energy of Western rulers, but

also their gratitude ought to incline them to support him. 649 For Baudouin II, this was a

new approach to obtaining aid. In the 1230s, he had maximized his own resources—

family, relics, and land; in this second journey he worked to free the energies of two

men who proclaimed their desire to support the Latin Empire.

Baudouin II began his visit in Rome, as he had seven years previously. His

transformation from an observer to a participant in the negotiations can be traced in

both papal and imperial documents. 650 In December of 1243, Frederick II wrote to a

correspondent in Rome about the papal overtures for peace. 651 Julius Ficker argued that

Baudouin II was the recipient, based on the salutation “serenitas vestra.” 652 No one else

in Rome at the time merited such a distinction, and Frederick II had similarly referred to

Baudouin II in his earlier letter as “vestra celsitudo.” 653 Other circumstantial evidence

supports this conclusion. The very existence of an earlier letter to Baudouin II increases

649
See the discussion in Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p 619-24
650
The most extensive of these is Frederick II’s encyclical chronicling the negotiations and their failure,
written in the summer of 1244. The letter is preserved in Monumenta germaniae historica, constitutiones
et acta publicat imperatorum et regum (Vimariae: H. Böhlau, 1893), II: 341-51, no. 252 and in Huillard-
Bréholles, Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, VI: 204-22. Frederick II recounted at great length
and with significant repetition the demands of each side. Unsurprisingly, he lingered on the pope’s
unreasonableness, his own willingness to comply with papal demands, and his deep desire for absolution,
which Innocent IV withheld.
651
Ibid., V: 197-98.
652
Ibid..
653
Ibid., VI: 92.
233
the likelihood of others. The two extant letters share a similar emphasis on Frederick

II’s desire for peace and his eagerness to come to terms. The Latin emperor’s later

involvement in the peace process also suggests a scenario in which, during this early

phase, Frederick II saw in Baudouin II a potential ally.

In March of 1244 Baudouin II was present at the signing of a peace that, for the

moment, kept the Western emperor off the papal list of excommunicates. 654 In letters

describing the agreement, both Innocent IV and Frederick II noted Baudouin II’s

presence. 655 Both the papal and imperial lists of the envoys exclude him, confirming

that he was not considered a representative of either side, but even this somewhat

passive participation was worthy of note. 656 In the spring of 1244, peace appeared

possible but was not yet achieved. The agreement, although it resolved in theory a

number of thorny matters such as the control of northern Italian cities and papal

primacy in the spiritual realm, lacked a mechanism for implementing its provisions. On

the one hand, Innocent IV did not want to absolve Frederick II without definitive

evidence of his military disengagement; on the other, Frederick II felt that he had

demonstrated his willingness to work with the papacy and his desire to resume his

position as a dutiful son of the church. He wanted absolution before he made military

654
Frederick II included the articles of the peace in a letter to Henry II. Paris, Chronica Majora, IV:
332-36. A useful summary of the events of the spring of 1244 is in Abulafia, Frederick II: a Medieval
Emperor, pp 359-60.
655
Innocent IV mentioned the agreement and Baudouin II’s presence in April 1244 in a letter to the
landgrave of Thuringia. MGH Const., II: 340, no. 249: “presentibus carissimo in Christo filio nostro
Constantinopolitano imperatore illustri.” Mathew Paris preserved one of Frederick II’s letter to Henry III
in which he noted: “de alia terra compromittatur in imperatorem Constantinopolitanum, dominos
Ottonem cardinalem et archiepiscopum Rothomagensem, ita quod ipsi de jure cognoscunt, sicut fuerit
cognoscendum.” Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 336.
656
Both Innocent IV and Frederick II named the western imperial envoys, Raymond de Toulouse, Petrus
de Vinea, and Thaddeus de Suessa. For Innocent IV, see MGH Const., II: 340, no. 251. For Frederick II
see Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 331-32.
234
concessions. 657 Witnessing the agreement and the subsequent impasse, Baudouin II saw

an opportunity. Trusted by both sides and without a specific agenda in the negotiations,

other than peace, he was in an ideal position to facilitate this final step.

According to Frederick II, Baudouin II was among those, including “the count

of Toulouse and other nobles and religious men,” who urged the pope to absolve the

Western emperor quickly. 658 Frederick II also mentioned Baudouin II and Raymond de

Toulouse as present alongside an unspecified group of cardinals when Innocent IV

attached conditions to Frederick II’s absolution. 659 The Latin ruler’s appearance with

Raymond de Toulouse, an ally and envoy of Frederick II’s, suggests that he was in the

imperial camp. By June of 1244, this allegiance was certain: He was with Frederick II,

witnessing one of the Western emperor’s charters. 660

By this point, Baudouin II was also playing an active role in the negotiations.

As Frederick II described the climax of the negotiations, he mentioned Baudouin II first

in the list of envoys sent to the curia and twice after that, each time with the count of

Toulouse. Baudouin II and Raymond de Toulouse made trips between the pope and the

Western emperor, attempting, on Frederick II’s behalf, to arrange a meeting between

the two parties. But at the end of June of 1244, Innocent IV’s reluctance to solidify

arrangements for the meeting transformed into an outright refusal as he fled to Genoa

and, eventually, to Lyon where he would remain for the rest of Frederick II’s life. 661

657
Abulafia, Frederick II: a Medieval Emperor, pp 361-62. For Frederick II’s frustration about Innocent
IV’s refusal to absolve him see: MGH Const., II: 341-51, no. 252.
658
Ibid., II: 345, no. 252: “imperatore Constantinopolitano, qui presens erat et casum imperii Romanie et
fere tocius Orientalis Terre miserabiliter causabatur, nec non comite Tholesano et quam pluribus aliis
nobilibus et religiosis viris suppliciter et instanter instantibus et nequeuntibus optinere.”
659
Huillard-Bréholles, Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, VI: 219: “Palam etiam coram
cardinalibus, imperatore Constantinopolitano et comite Tolosano.” MGH Const., II: 350, no. 252.
660
Huillard-Bréholles, Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, VI: 195-97.
661
MGH Const., II: 351, no. 252.
235
Baudouin II returned to the Western imperial court and spent, most likely, a year as the

Hohenstaufen emperor’s guest.

Baudouin II’s temporary attachment to Frederick II did not comport with his

behavior on his previous visit. The papacy and the Capetians had been his greatest

friends and supporters, and papal advocacy was essential if he expected to raise

significant aid. In 1244, however, Frederick II was able to offer something the pope

could not: a treaty with Nicaea. The Western emperor had been in contact with

Vatatzes for several years. In 1238, the latter’s promise of fealty had encouraged

Frederick II to block the progress of Jean de Béthune’s crusade. 662 Communications

between the two parties continued, and in 1241–1242, Frederick II’s daughter Anna-

Constance married Vatatzes. 663 Little is known about the negotiations for this union,

and Western sources give two different dates. Matthew Paris located the wedding in

1244, mentioning it along with the treaty of that year. 664 Dandolo, however, spoke of

the marriage as completed in his entry for 1241. 665 From the Nicaean side, Akropolites,

who might be expected to provide details, ignored the negotiations for the alliance and

its celebration. His only mention of Vatatzes’s second marriage arose in the context of

the Nicaean emperor’s affair with Anna-Constance’s attendant. 666 Blemmydes also

662
See pp 182-84 above. Kiesewetter provided a summary of contacts during that period. A.
Kiesewetter, “Die Heirat zwischen Konstanze-Anna von Hohenstaufen und Kaiser Johannes III. Batatzes
con Nikaia (Ende 1240 oder Anfang 1241) und der Angriff des Johannes Batatzes auf Konstantinopel im
Mai oder Juni 1241,” Römische historische Mitteilungen 41 (1999): 245-48.
663
Martin argued persuasively that three letters, two previously dated to 1247/8 and one undated, actually
belong to the period before 1241. J.-M. Martin, “O felix Asia! Frédéric II, l'Empire de Nicée et le
"césaropapisme",” Travaux et mémoires 14 (2002): 476-77.
664
Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 299: “Interim procuravit idem imperator Frethericus, ut filiam suam
cuidam magno principi Graecorum, nomini Battacio, matrimonio copularet.”
665
Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–1280 d.c.,” p. 298: “qui Federici imperatoris filiam sibi
copulaverat.”
666
Acropolites, Opera, pp 101-3, ch 52. Translation and commentary in Akropolites, George
Akropolites: The History, p. 271, ch 52. Ftnts 19 and 20, pp 274-74.
236
skipped over the wedding in favor of the affair. 667 The marriage, however, has been

conclusively dated to 1241 or 1242 through a combination of charter evidence,

uncovered by Stelian Brezeanu, and circumstantial factors, argued admirably by

Andreas Kiesewetter. 668

Baudouin II, always on the search for new Western allies, had reason to be both

concerned and encouraged by Frederick II’s alliance with Vatatzes. Frederick II might

lend his support to Vatatzes and hinder Baudouin II’s recruitment in the West, as he had

in 1238. But if Frederick II could be persuaded to support the Latin Empire’s cause, a

prospect more likely since the death of his old enemy Jean de Brienne, his relationship

with Vatatzes could be used to the Franks’ advantage. The Franks had a great belief in

the power of marriages to solidify shaky alliances and ensure periods of nonaggression

and were thus likely to see in the German-Greek alliance possibilities to be exploited.

It is not hard to imagine that in the winter and spring of 1244, as he fruitlessly

argued his case at the papal curia and watched the Western imperial envoys come and

go, Baudouin II decided that Frederick II’s help was valuable and worth exerting

himself to get. His goal in these months was to secure aid—whether from the pope or

Western emperor. After the Latin emperor had joined him, Frederick noted that, at an

earlier stage in the negotiations, Baudouin II “was present and pled the cause of the

667
Vatatzes’s mistress appeared twice in Blemmydes’s autobiography because of an incident in which she
entered Blemmydes’s monastery and he had her removed. He also wrote a letter recounting it. For
Blemmydes, it served as evidence of his willingness to stand up to earthly authority and to accept
punishment in exchange for heavenly rewards. Nicephorus Blemmydes, Nicephori Blemmydae
autobiographia, ed. Joseph A Munitiz, Corpus christianorum 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1984), pp 35-37, 67,
91-94. Translation in Nicephorus Blemmydes, Nikephoros Blemmydes, a partial account, trans. Joseph
A Munitiz (Leuven: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1988), pp 83-85, 118-19, 139-43.
668
Kiesewetter, “Die Heirat zwischen Konstanze-Anna von Hohenstaufen und Kaiser Johannes III.
Batatzes con Nikaia (Ende 1240 oder Anfang 1241) und der Angriff des Johannes Batatzes auf
Konstantinopel im Mai oder Juni 1241,” pp 249-50. St. Brezeanu, “Notice sur les rapports de Frédéric II
de Hohenstaufen avec Jean III Vatatzès,” Revue des études sud-est européennes 12 (1974): 583-85.
237
empire of Romania and generally of all the eastern lands.” 669 Frederick II’s insertion of

this statement into his account, which focused on the negotiations, suggests that

Baudouin II had linked the possibility of peace with his need for aid. Mathew Paris also

complained that the papal-imperial conflict inhibited efforts to act in the protection of

Christendom, although he was speaking of the threat posed by the Mongols. 670

Baudouin II’s move to the imperial camp obtained results. In 1244, according to

Matthew Paris, Frederick II obtained a one-year truce with Vatatzes for the Latin

Empire. 671 Matthew Paris’s misdating of the marriage alliance to 1244 where it

accompanied the treaty suggests the importance of the kin relationship in obtaining the

peace. In 1250, letters from Frederick II to Vatatzes also confirm, at a later date, the

closeness between father and son-in-law. No information survives as to the progress of

the negotiations for the treaty, so it is impossible to reconstruct a causal relationship

between them and Baudouin II’s advocacy on Frederick II’s behalf. Did Baudouin II

lend his help to Frederick II because of the latter’s willingness to open discussions with

Vatatzes or did Frederick II’s actions follow Baudouin II’s work for peace? Despite

this lack of certainty, as Wolff concluded, “that the two Emperors’ diplomatic efforts on

each other’s behalf were connected it is hard to doubt.” 672

669
MGH Const., II: 345, no. 252: “qui presens erat et casum imperii Romanie et fere tocius Orientalis
Terre miserabiliter causabatur.”
670
Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 277: “haec igitur terribilis epistola regum et magnatum corda, ad quos
pervenit, vehementer sollicitasset, et ad injuriam Christi et universalis ecclesiae et totius Christianismi
ulciscendam efficaciter erexisset, nisi Papae et imperatoris mutuum discidium totius mundi latitudinem
perturbasset.”
671
Ibid., IV: 299: “Qui Graecis tum terribiliter comminando, tum consultius postulando, tandem treugas
per annum unum impetravit.”
672
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 623. Wolff placed the marriage
between Anna-Constance and Vatatzes to this period instead of the earlier one, but his point is still valid.
See Kiesewetter, “Die Heirat zwischen Konstanze-Anna von Hohenstaufen und Kaiser Johannes III.
Batatzes con Nikaia (Ende 1240 oder Anfang 1241) und der Angriff des Johannes Batatzes auf
Konstantinopel im Mai oder Juni 1241,” pp 239-50.
238
 After June of 1244, Baudouin II disappears from sight until the imperial Diet in

Verona in the spring of 1245. 673 He came to the Diet from the imperial town of

Modena, a hint that he had spent the intervening year with Frederick II. 674 If true, this

lengthy stay, along with his presence at the Diet, shows his gratitude for the emperor’s

help and hope for further aid. Other than the truce with Vatatzes, however, no benefit

seems to have accrued for the Latin Empire. At the Diet, Baudouin II held a position of

some importance; he was the first attendee named in the list of Rolandus Patavini. 675

Frederick II may have invited Baudouin II to the Diet in order to give him

instructions for the church council in Lyon. There is little doubt that Baudouin II

arrived in Lyon in the company of the imperial envoys and probably as one of them. In

his accounting of the attendees, Matthew Paris placed Baudouin II first among the

secular lords, with Raymond de Toulouse immediately following. 676 Their appearance

together in Mathew Paris’s list suggests that they were originally representing Frederick

II and were charged with pleading his case, once again, with the pope and the attendees

of the council. Although the author of the Brevis Nota did not mention the Latin

emperor in this context, he described Thaddeus of Suessa, Frederick II’s mouthpiece at

the council, as “one of the envoys of Frederick II”; at the beginning of the council,

Baudouin II was probably in this company. 677

At the Council of Lyon, however, Innocent IV managed to divide Baudouin II

from his fellow envoys and return him firmly to the papal camp. Accounts of the

673
Rolandini Patavini, “Chronica,” in MGH SS, ed. Philippus Jaffé (Hanover, 1866), p. 82.
674
Richard of San Germano, “Fragmenta Memorialis Potestatum Mutinae,” in RISS, ed. L. A. Muratori
(Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1937), p. 189.
675
Patavini, “Chronica,” p. 82, ll 7-9: “eonvenerunt ad ipsum isti principes et barones: videlicet
imperator Constantinopolitanus, dux qui dicitur Austrie Stirieque, dux Carinthie, dux Moravii.”
676
Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 434.
677
MGH Const., II: 515: “Iudex Thadeus unus de nuntiis imperatoris surrexit.”
239
council agree that Innocent IV honored Baudouin II above all secular rulers and the

patriarch of Constantinople above all prelates. The author of Brevis Nota, when

describing the opening of the council, placed the emperor of Constantinople to the right

of the pope, while other lay princes sat to the left. 678 Similarly, the patriarch of

Constantinople, Nicholas of Placenza, had precedence over his colleagues. 679

According to Matthew Paris, the council opened with the testimony of the patriarch. 680

As befitted his surroundings, the patriarch began with the state of his church,

bemoaning the drastic reduction in the number of bishops in his jurisdiction. But he

explained the ecclesiastical problems as resulting from the military situation: “Greeks

and others, enemies of the Roman church, had violently occupied almost all the empire

of Romania, up to the gates of Constantinople.” He went on to descibe the actions of

these enemies: “[S]ince they are not at all obedient to the Roman church and detest it,

they oppose it in a hostile manner.” The formulation leaves no doubt as to the

relationship between the Roman church (ecclesia Romana) and the Latin Empire

(imperium Romaniae); it was the enemies of the first who had almost destroyed the

second. Concerned, perhaps, that the participants at the council would question the

678
“Brevis Nota,” in MGH Const. (Hanover, 1893), p. 513: “imperator vero Constantinopolitanus sedit
ad dexteram et quidam alii principes laici sederunt ad sinistram.”
679
Ibid.: “ex opposito tres patriarche ordinati fuerunt, videlicet Constantinopolitanus ad dexteram,
Antiochenus, Aquilegensis tertio.” The inclusion of Aquileia created some controversy. Canale also
noted the patriarch’s presence. Canale, “Cronicon,” p. 402: “A celui concil estoit Monseignor
l’Apostoile, et li Patriarche de Costantinople, et arcevesques et evesques, et grant partie des perlas de
Saint Yglise; mesages dou Roi de France et dou Roi d’Engleterre, et de maintes teres en estoient
mesages.”
680
Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 431-32: “Proposuitque patriarcha Constantinopolitanus statum et
necessitates ecclesiae suae; asserens quod olim habuit sub se suffraganeos plus quam triginta, quorum vix
jam tres remanserunt; subjungens insuper, quod Graeci et quidam alii totum jam imperium Romaniae
fere usque ad portas civitatis Constantinopolis inimici ecclesiae Romanae violenter occuparunt; qui in
nullo Romanae ecclesiae obedientes, ipsamque detestantes, hostiliter eidem adversantur. Unde dolor et
confusio omnium Christianorum imminet, cum ipsa sua ecclesia primo fuisset privilegiata, et merito plus
caeteris honoranda; primo enim constat, beatum Petrum Antiochiae, quae civitas Graecorum imperio vel
regno subjecta est, ab antiquo sedisse; et inde Simonem Magum et alios haereticos confusos aufugasse.”
240
importance of a church and empire on the outreaches of Christendom, the patriarch

ended with a reminder of the premier status of Constantinople in the church and the

see’s illustrious history.

Innocent IV did not leave the advocacy of the Latin Empire to its principals.

The pope framed the Council with five great sorrows, one of which was the schism with

the Greek church and the state of the Latin Empire. 681 The Brevis Nota does not contain

reference to the patriarch’s speech. Here, however, Innocent IV’s description of his

sorrows contains a similar portrayal of the state of the Latin Empire—endangered by

the schismatic Greeks who “occupied and destroyed the land almost up to

Constantinople.” 682 This matches the patriarch’s statement in Matthew Paris that the

Greeks came “to the gates of the city of Constantinople.” 683 Matthew Paris recounted a

more evocative image: The Greek church was a child turning away, insolently, from its

mother, as though she were its stepmother. 684 The author of the Brevis Nota lacked

either the imagination or the fidelity to the record, but he referred to the schismatic

681
Matthew Paris and the anonymous author of the Brevis Nota agreed on the first four sorrows—the
devastation caused by the Mongols, the state of the Holy Land, and the perfidious behavior of Frederick
II—- but differed on the last: The former mentioned the new heresies, while the latter referred to the poor
behavior of the clergy. Ibid., IV: 434-35 and “Brevis nota,” pp 513-14. W. E. Lunt, arguing for the
reliability of the Brevis Nota, commented that, “the canons enacted by the council deal largely with the
discipline of the clergy and not at all with heresy.” W. E. Lunt, “The First Council of Lyons, 1245,” The
English Historical Review 33, no. 129 (January 1918): 77. Canale mentioned the same four concerns.
Canale, “Cronicon,” p. 404, ch CXVI: “Maintes paroles i furent dites ileuc, et de secore la Sainte Tere
dela la mer, et de secore l’empire de Costantinople, et de aler chascnu en contre les Tatars, por ce que il
manivent la char humaine. Et apres I fu dit de sor Monseignor Fedric li Empereor tantes paroles et d’un
et d’autre.”
682
“Brevis nota,” p. 514: “occupaverant et destruxerant terram fere usque ad Constantinopolim.”
683
Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 432: “ad portas civitatis Constantinopolis.”
684
Ibid., IV: 435: “Alium, quem pro schismate Romaniae, id est, Graecae ecclesiae, quae nostris
temporibus et paucis evolutis annis a gremio matris suae, velut novercae, insolenter et insolerter decisa
est et aversa.” Innocent IV used a similar image a year and a half later when he wrote to the queen of
Hungary, asking her to send envoys to Nicaea “ut ad sinum matris ecclesie redeat Vatacius et gens eius.”
Theiner, VMH, II: 203, no. 377.
241
status of the Greeks twice in one sentence. 685 The message is certain in both reports:

The danger to Constantinople was directly tied to the schism between the Greek and

Latin chuches.

The council’s constitution providing for assistance to the Latin Empire invoked

the theme voiced by the patriarch: Constantinople’s place within the universal

church. 686 The levies to aid the Latin Empire were “because the body of the church

would be shamefully deformed by the lack of a loved member, namely the aforesaid

empire, and be sadly weakened and suffer loss.” 687 This conflation between the

political and the religious entities is characteristic not merely of the Council of Lyon but

more generally of Innocent IV’s dealings with the Latin Empire and its neighbors and

rivals. A few years later, this argument would endanger the Latin Empire when

Innocent IV’s desire for church union with Nicaea led him to back away from support

for the Latin Empire. For the time being, however, it justified provisions of aid for the

Latin Empire. The consideration raised by previous popes—that the security of the

Latin Empire was important to the success of the Christian states in the Holy Land—

came and, in a sentence, it went: “[A]nd especially because while the empire is helped,

assistance is consequently rendered to the Holy Land.” 688

685
“Brevis nota,” p. 514: “Tertio de scismate Grecorum, quomodo Vatacius imperator Grecorum cum
Grevis scismaticis occupaverant et destruxerant terram fere usque ad Constantinopolim et de civitate
timeri poterit, nisi a Christianis velocem succursum haberent.”
686
For the transmission of the constitutions of the council see Norman P Tanner, trans., Decrees of the
Ecumenical Councils (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), pp 273-77. This constitution, along with the one
about the Mongols and several others, survives only in the papal registry and not in the other versions.
687
Translation and text from Ibid., p. 295.: “Quia tamen ecclesiae corpus ex membri causa cari, videlicet
imperii praefati carentia notam probrosae deformitatis incurret et sustineret debilitatis dolendae
iacturam.”
688
Translation and text from Ibid.: “Maxime quia dum praedicto subventur imperio, consequenter
subsidium impenditur Terrae sanctae.”
242
 The patriarch’s and the pope’s focus on the body of the church and the status of

Constantinople in it reflected the surroundings of a church council, but also the dire

situation of the Latin Empire and the lack of alternative, reasonable arguments for

supporting its continued existence. Under different circumstances, the story of the

Fourth Crusade and the importance of the Latin Empire for the health of the crusader

states in the Holy Land might have and, in fact, did have weight. At the Council of

Lyon, however, these justifications were not believable. The story of the Fourth

Crusade was one of victory, but that victory had soon lost its luster in the early

thirteenth century. 689 By 1245, it was a distant and not necessarily positive memory.

The weaknesses of the Latin Empire were far more present. As a result, the argument

that the Latin Empire could help the Holy Land was hard to swallow. The Latin Empire

was in a “wretched state,” lacking funds and men and threatened by multiple enemies.

The relic-rich, glorious city that the Fourth Crusaders could barely believe they had

captured was now defended primarily by its own walls. Neither of these exhortations

was likely to provoke support in the West.

Although Innocent IV would later move away from active support of the Latin

Empire, in 1245, perhaps fueled by competition with Frederick II, he provided for its

aid. For three years, the Latin Empire would receive half the income of benefices

whose holders were absent for more than six months, although certain exemptions were

delineated for legitimate absences. 690 The pope himself offered one-tenth of his own

income, after one-tenth went to support the crusade. In addition to these financial

provisions, he renewed crusader privileges for those who went to aid the Latin Empire

689
Angold, The Fourth Crusade, pp 115-16.
690
The exceptions included those on the business of the papal curia, those on pilgrimage, those at school,
those absent on the business of their church, and those on crusade.
243
and included it in his exhortation that clerics encourage their constituents to bequeath

money for the crusading cause. 691 The Holy Land, however, took precedence with

Innocent IV and other ecclesiastical and lay leaders and it was to the Holy Land that the

crusade was directed. 692 In this respect, Innocent IV was no Gregory IX.

In his condemnation of Frederick II, Innocent IV enshrined the separation

between Baudouin II and the other imperial envoys, noting that “our dear son in Christ,

the illustrious emperor of Constantinople,” was present the previous year when

Frederick II’s envoys, Raymond de Toulouse, Petrus de Vinea, and Thaddaeus of

Suessa, committed the Western emperor to attendance at the council. 693 The Latin

emperor might have arrived at Lyon with Raymond de Toulouse, but the Council ended

with him in the papal retinue. And, indeed, in the accounts of the Council Baudouin II

is not recorded as defending Frederick II. Instead, Thaddaeus of Suessa spoke for the

Western emperor, responding to the accusations laid against him and arguing for his

position. 694

Baudouin II’s very presence helped make Innocent IV’s case against Frederick

II. Here was an emperor who acted as a dutiful son of the church, providing a striking

contrast to his Western counterpart. Baudouin II was useful to Innocent IV in other

ways. In the bull of deposition, after detailing Frederick II’s relationships with and

affection for Muslims, Innocent IV used the marriage of Anna-Constance to Vatatzes as

further proof of the Western emperor’s perfidy, accusing him of “securing a bond by

691
Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p. 296: “aliquid in Terrae sanctae vel imperii Romaniae
subsidium pro suorum peccaminum remissione relinquant.”
692
The constitution on the crusade was significantly longer and more detailed than that calling for support
of the Latin Empire. Ibid., pp 297-301.
693
Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 453: “praesentibus carissimo in Christo filio nostro Constantinopolitano
imperatore illustri.”
694
“Brevis nota,” pp 515-16.
244
friendship and marriage with those who, wickedly making light of the apostolic see,

have separated from the unity of the church.” 695 This accusation was disingenuous. A

marriage between a Frank or Westerner and a Greek was neither innovative nor

shocking. Baudouin II’s own sister had married Vatatzes’s father-in-law and his

brother had been engaged to Vatatzes’s sister-in-law. More significant, Anna-

Constance’s marriage benefited the Latin Empire. Matthew Paris directly attributed the

one-year truce to the kin relationship between Vatatzes and Frederick II. Baudouin II’s

lengthy stay with Frederick II confirms that he thought the Western emperor was able

and likely to come to the aid of the Latin Empire, either through direct financial or

military support or diplomacy. In the papal bull, however, Innocent IV transformed the

connection between his despised enemy Frederick II and the Nicaean Greeks from one

that aided the Latin Empire into one that injured the church.

The Council of Lyon served the interests of both pope and Latin emperor. The

former got a natural foil to Frederick II and a further accusation against him. The latter

got financial aid and papal avowal that his cause was worthy of the crusading mantle.

Constantinople’s position was also affirmed in the secular and ecclesiastical hierarchies.

There is no way to know whether Baudouin II had already decided at the beginning of

the Council to side with the papacy. It seems more likely that, once in Lyon, Baudouin

II was flattered by the pope’s attention and persuaded that the papacy was a more likely

source of serious aid than was the Western emperor. After all, a year in Frederick II’s

695
Translation from Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p. 282. Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 453:
“Aliorum quoque infidelium perniciosis et horrendis obsequiis contra fideles abutens, et illis, qui
dampnabiliter vilipendentes Apostolicam sedem ab unitate ecclesiae discesserunt, procurans affinitate ac
amicitia copulari … et Battacio, Dei et ecclesiae inimico, a communione fidelium per excommunicationis
sententiam, cum adjuratoribus, consiliatoribus et fautoribus suis solempniter separato, filiam suam tradidt
in uxorem.”
245
camp had resulted in nothing more than a one-year truce. The presence of the patriarch

of Constantinople and the push from the Capetian king for a crusade were also

encouragement for him to join with the papacy. Regardless, present in Lyon, sitting at

the pope’s side, the recipient of promises of financial and recruiting aid, Baudouin II did

not publically protest the condemnation against Frederick II. Wolff proclaimed that

Baudouin II “could not be an ally of Frederick against the Pope: the Latin Empire had

always drawn whatever strength it may have had in the west from papal backing.” 696

Although the “always” and “whatever” of this statement dismiss significant Capetian

aid, his point is well taken. The rapprochement between the two emperors was a

welcome development for the Latin Empire, but a one-year truce could not compare

with the two armies that Gregory IX had helped Baudouin II gather in the late 1230s

and the Latin emperor could not afford to abandon the papacy permanently for its

archrival.

In the first year and a half of his stay in the West, Baudouin II acted as the

emperor of Constantinople. In the papal and Western imperial courts and especially at

the Council of Lyon, Baudouin II was feted and valued for his imperial stature. He had

not abandoned, however, his role as a Western noble. In the summer of 1245, Baudouin

II attested to the relationship between Raymond de Toulouse, his previous partner as

Frederick II’s envoy, and Raymond’s wife Marguerite de la Marche. 697 In his

testimony, Baudouin II acted as any Western noble might have, swearing as to his

grandfather’s relationship to the king of France and the lineage of the relevant

696
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 622.
697
Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II: 575, no. 3367.
246
parties. 698 Other witnesses also attested to the relationship. Baudouin II’s imperial title

was mentioned but was not at issue. The testimony acknowledged that, despite his

upbringing and residence in the East, Baudouin II’s parentage placed him within the

Western system and authorized him to speak to matters of ancestry.

After the Council of Lyon, Baudouin II’s name disappears once again from the

record. He most likely spent much of the next nine months with the pope, repairing

relations and discussing avenues of papal support. Mathew Paris reported provisions

established by the pope, in 1245–1246, to collect financial support for the Latin Empire,

and Baudouin II was most likely present for the discussions. 699 During this period, the

pope also facilitated an agreement between Baudouin II and representatives of the Order

of Santiago. The agreement, which was drafted in Lyon in the winter of 1245–1246,

provided for the Order to send troops to Constantinople for two years in return for forty

thousand marks sterling, control over two towns, and a portion of all conquests. 700 In

May, Alfonso X, then heir to Castile, authorized the Order of Santiago to go to the aid

698
Ibid.: “Dominus [Balduinus] imperator Constantinopolitanus illustris, remisso a partibus juramento,
dicit quod audivit et firmiter credit ita esse quod regina Constantia, et dominus Lodovicus rex Francie, et
dominus Petrus de Cortaniaco fuerunt fratres carnales. – Dominus (Petrus) de Cortaniaco genuit dominam
Adalmues comitissam Engloisme; domina Adalmues genuit dominam Ysabellem uxorem comities
Marchie; domina Ysabellis genuit Margaretam de qua agitur. – Ex alio latere, dicit quod regina
Constantia genuit dominum Raymundum comitem Tholosanum patrem istius comitis, et ille dominus
Raymundus genuit istum dominum Raymundum comitem Tholose de quo agitur. – Interrogatus si vidit
aliquas de istis personis se habere pro consanuineis? Dicit quod personas supradictas non vidit, tamen
ipse habet eos pro consanguineis, tam comitem Tholose quam Margaretam predictam, et credit quod sic
sit, et fama sic se habet.”
699
Paris, Chronica Majora, IV: 564-66.
700
In February 1246, Innocent IV wrote to the master of the Order of Santiago, urging him to accept the
agreement, which had been concluded by his representatives. This series of documents is collected in
Eloy Benito Ruano, “Balduino II de Constantinopola y la Orden de Santiago. Un proyecto de defensa del
Imperio latino de Oriente,” Hispania 12, no. 46 (March 1952): 29-36.
247
of the Latin Empire with troops from the kingdom. In August, Baudouin II was at

Valladolid to enter into an agreement with Pelagius, the master of the Order. 701

In Castile, Baudouin II extended his appeal to Marie’s relatives, possibly

drawing on his close relationship with Blanche of Castile. Alfonso X was Marie’s

cousin and Blanche’s great-nephew, and he explained his approval of the agreement as

a response “ad preces Sanctissimi Patris Domini Pape et karissimi affinis nostri

Balduini Imperatoris Constantinopolitani.” 702 The Courtenay family was tied to Castile

in another way. Alfonso X was married to Yolande of Aragon, the daughter of the king

of Aragon and Yolande of Hungary, granddaughter of Andrew of Hungary and Yolande

de Courtenay, and great-granddaughter of Pierre de Courtenay and Yolande. The king

of Castile, thus, was married to the great-niece of the emperor of Constantinople, as

well as being, himself, the cousin of the empress.

It is hard to know to what extent the kin relationship influenced the parties’

ability to reach an agreement. The Order’s commitment was significant: three hundred

knights, two hundred balistrarios, and one thousand foot soldiers, all at the service of

the Latin Empire. No wonder Baudouin II traveled personally to Castile in order to

finalize the agreement. Of course, the Order was well compensated for its efforts,

receiving the towns of Visoi and Medes, forty thousand marks sterling, and a portion of

all land conquered during the mission in Constantinople. It was not a charitable

donation and, indeed, it seems that when Baudouin II was unable to pay up, the

701
Some have called into question Baudouin II’s presence in Castile. Ruano argued, however, that the
documents themselves unambigiously indicate Baudouin II’s personal presence. Ibid., pp 21-26.
702
Ibid., p. 30, no. 2.
248
agreement fell apart. 703 In promising to provide forty thousand marks sterling,

Baudouin II must have been counting on a fund-raising success similar to that of his

previous visit—a combination of the redemption of crusader vows, grants from his

Capetian relatives, and funds from his own lands in Namur. Unfortunately, Louis IX’s

crusade tied up the majority of the crusading funds and the Capetians’ own resources.

Baudouin II and his Western Resources

Baudouin II was in Namur by October 1246 and was still, or again, in his

territory nine months later. Although the records are less extensive than are those from

his prior visit, they reveal similar actions—provisions for governance, donations, and

confirmations. He was more interested in strengthening and exploiting old relationships

than in creating new ones. His giving was far more circumspect than it had been nine

years before, and the three institutions mentioned in his charters all had prior

relationships with him. In his earlier visit, Baudouin II used donations, confirmations,

and sales to establish his authority by creating connections with his brothers through the

institutions they supported and to gain support for the Latin Empire. His second visit

did not display any new strategies, but it conspiciously lacked the energy of the first.

Baudouin II’s first recorded act was to confer on Thierri de Fossez and his heirs

the office of portier. 704 Here and elsewhere, he spoke of himself only as the emperor of

Constantinople, ignoring the title marquis of Namur, which expressed his right to grant

the office in the first place. He had already abandoned his Western title in his

correspondence with the Capetians after his return to Constantinople and his coronation.

703
Innocent IV informed the master of the Order in February 1247 that Baudouin II did not have the
money but hoped to be able to pay it by August. Ibid., p. 36, no. 6. Ruano noted that the activities of the
order in the fall of 1247 all but precluded the possibility of their particpation in the Latin Empire. Ibid.,
pp 27-28.
704
Wauters, Table chronologique, IV: 481; Galliot, Histoire générale, VI: 2.
249
There he was “Balduinus eadem gratiâ fidelissimus in Christo Imperator à Deo

coronatus, Romaniae moderator, et semper Augustus.” 705 In his testimony in the case

of Raymond de Toulouse and his wife, he was, more succinctly, “dominus imperator

Constantinopolitanus illustris,” still not the marquis or count of Namur. 706 Back in

Namur, however, acting in his capacity as ruler of the county, he might be expected to

employ that title again. He had used it liberally in his first visit, when he was “haeres

Imperii romani et comes Namurcensis,” “marchio” and even “dominus Curtiniaci.” 707

Yet, even his return to Namur did not prompt him to use his Western titles, at least not

in official documents. Baudouin II’s move from “haeres” to “imperator” led him to

shed his Western titles.

The document concerning the office of portier, from October 1246, is a lone

witness to Baudouin II’s activities between August 1246 and June 1247, when the

record yields a series of documents, made as he prepared to return to the West. A

charter confirmed the rights and liberties given to the inhabitants of Fleurus by his

brother Henri. 708 He also made two donations, to the abbeys of Argenton and Moulins,

and approved a donation to Val Saint George. All three institutions had been recipients

of his generosity in 1237–1238. Both his donations to Argenton, dated respectively

from April 1239 and June 1247, consisted of woods of Beaufaux, although the amounts

were different. 709 His second one may have been a confirmation of part of his original

donation or a gift of adjacent territory. The donation to Moulins, of fifty eels, seems

705
This specific phrase was from his letter to Louis IX concerning the transfer of Courtenay, but his other
three letters employed similar formulae. Duchesne, Historiae Francorum Scriptores, V: 423-24.
706
Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II: 575, no. 3367.
707
See, for example, Brouwers, L'administration, IV: 59-60, 63-64, nos. 97, 101.
708
Hendrickx dated this document between spring and December 1247, but they were made in Namur,
which Baudouin left in June 1247. Ibid., IV: 76, no. 125, summary.
709
Ibid., IV: 68, 74, nos. 108, 121.
250
unrelated to his previous transactions with the abbey, namely the donation of the chapel

of Marlagne and sale of the forest of Rovroit. 710 Finally, he recorded two charters

concerning Val Saint George, both about Mehaigne, north of Namur. In these, he

approved the reassignment of the tenth of that church from the monastery to Jean de

Valenciennes and a donation from two of his vassals. 711

Jean de Valenciennes is already known as one of Baudouin II’s creditors from

the latter’s letter to Blanche of Castile. In July, after the transaction concerning

Mehaigne, the emperor noted that he still owed Jean three thousand, four hundred and

thirty three livres, possibly from the same loan. Baudouin II also arranged for a second

loan, of three hundred and twenty livres tournois, from Flamenus de Ambliniaco. In

order to repay the debt, he assigned Flamenus revenues from Courtenay and

Valenciennes. 712 Once again, his Western lands were employed to gather money for his

Eastern empire.

Baudouin II’s actions in Namur show that he had regained authority over Namur

from Louis IX, to whom he had mortgaged it five years earlier. The great poverty of

the Latin Empire makes it extremely unlikely that Capetian king received any financial

remuneration from Baudouin II. Instead, the return of the county was a form of indirect

support from the French king who was, of course, preparing for his own crusade in the

mid- to late-1240s. In this sense, the timing of Baudouin II’s second visit was

unfortunate. Consumed by his efforts at fiscal and judicial reform and his plans for the

crusade, Louis IX had little inclination to fund Baudouin II.

710
Peeters, Analectes, V: 376-77, 382.
711
Wauters, Table chronologique, IV: 500, 502; Société archéologique de Namur, Annales de la société
archéologique de Namur (Namur: La Société, 1849), II: 197-98; Brouwers, L'administration, IV: 74, no.
122, summ.
712
Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III: 12, no. 3605.
251
 In June of 1247, as he prepared to return to Constantinople, Baudouin II placed

Namur under the control of Louis IX and called upon his men to obey any officials

appointed by Louis IX, his mother, or his brothers, specifically Robert d’Artois,

Alphonse de Poitiers, and Charles d’Anjou, and to defend the county against attack. 713

Here, Baudouin II once again, and more completely this time, conveyed his land to

Louis IX. He did not, however, alienate it from his family. In the same document,

Baudouin II made provisions for the succession of Namur. He set the order of

inheritance among his sisters, if he died without heirs: first Marguerite de Vianden,

then Élisabeth de Montagu, and finally Agnès of Achaia. 714 These were his three

surviving full siblings, excepting perhaps two sisters who had entered the church. His

halfsister, Mathilde, had no claim on Namur, which was an inheritance from Baudouin

II’s mother. By specifying his sisters’ rights to the county in the same document in

which he entrusted it to Louis IX, Baudouin II made sure that those who read of his

abandonment of Namur to the king did not think this was a permanent alienation from

the Courtenay family. Marguerite’s challenge to Baudouin II’s rule in the 1230s had

demonstrated the difficulty of governing Western lands from the East. It also suggested

that she at least would not easily relinquish her claims on Namur. By arranging for the

eventual inheritance of his own siblings, Baudouin II forestalled complaints that he had

alienated land in which they had an interest.

713
Ibid., III: 11-12, no. 3604.
714
The challenge that Marguérite and her husband Henri had asserted to Baudouin II’s control of Namur
in the 1230s did not affect his rating of her inheritance rights. Published Ibid. AN, J 509: “et se de nos
et de noz anfanz deffalloit sanz oir de lor cors, il randeroient le chastel à nostre seror ainznée Marguerite
contesse de Viane, s’ele estoit vive, après le decès de nos et de nos anfanz, il randeroient le chastel à
nostre soror Isabiae, dame de Montagu; et se il deffaloit de nos II serours devantdites, ainz que de nos et
de nos anfanz, après le decès de nos et de nos anfanz, il randeroient le chastel à nostre autre soror Agnès,
princess de Acaye.”
252
 The drive to preserve Namur for Baudouin II’s heirs may also have come from

the Capetians. According to the Récits d’un ménestrel de Reims, a source of

questionable reliability, the Queen Mother balked at Baudouin II’s irresponsible plan to

sell Namur and lent him twenty thousand livres to prevent this. 715 No document

survives recording this transaction, nor does Baudouin II’s consignment of the territory

to Louis IX mention a payment. The echoes of Louis IX’s refusal to allow Baudouin II

to alienate Courtenay to Geoffroy II de Villehardouin in the early 1240s, however,

suggest that the story may have the flavor of truth even if the details are fictional. The

Capetians cared more about preserving his Western territory as a Courtenay inheritance

than Baudouin II did. It would be entirely plausible for Blanche to intervene to prevent

a sale, especially if her intervention meant that her son could gain control of Namur.

Besides land, Baudouin II’s greatest assets were the relics of Constantinople.

During his prior visit, a complex series of transactions had left the Crown of Thorns in

Louis IX’s possession and enriched Baudouin II in the amount of ten thousand livres.

After leaving Namur, Baudouin II proceeded to Saint Germain, where, in June 1247, he

ceded, once again, the Crown of Thorns, along with other relics, to Louis IX. 716 The

additional items included relics from the Passion, from Jesus’s infancy, and from other

saints including the Virgin Mary and John the Baptist. 717 In his charter, Baudouin II

715
The author imagined a dialogue between the two: ‘‘Dame, dist li empereres, il me couvient deniers;
que je ne puis mie tenir l’empire sans grant coustage. Si me couvient vendre le contei de Namur qui me
vient naissant de mon heritage. -- En non Dieu, dist la roïne, ce ne vuel je pas que vous la vendez. –
Dame, que ferai-je dont? – Par foi, dit la roïne, je vous presterai vint mil livres à rendre aus issues, et ainsi
sera sauvée à vous et à voz oirs; en teil maniere que vous me jurerez sour sainz que dedenz le mois que
vous serez revenuz en Coustantinoble, vous m’envoierez l’empereriz; car je la desir mout à veoir.” Récits
d'un ménestrel de Reims, pp 225-26, ch 439.
716
Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 133-35, no. LXXIX.
717
Baudouin II named the relics “predictas sacrosanctam Spineam Coronam Domini et Crucem sanctam;
item de Sanuine Domini nostri Iesu Christi; pannos infantie Salvatoris quibus fuit in cunabulis involutus;
aliam magnam partem de Ligno Sancte Crucis; de Sanguine qui de quadam imagine Domini ab infideli
253
recounted the original transaction: the use of the relics as collateral for debts made

necessary by the “pressing poverty of the empire of Constantinople” and Louis IX’s

redemption of them. 718 Unlike the grant of Namur, which bestowed control of the

county to Louis IX but explicitly preserved it for Baudouin II’s heirs, the transfer of the

relics was complete, and the language expressing it definitive: “as a spontaneous and

free gift we gave it fully, conceded it absolutely, and in total we relinquished and

relinquish it.” 719

There is no evidence that Louis IX offered to restore the Crown of Thorns to

Baudouin II upon his return to the West, and, given the king’s affection and affinity for

the relics and his construction of a building to house them, such an offer is improbable.

Louis IX might have sought confirmation of the original grant, closer in time to the

consecration of Sainte-Chapelle as their resting place, or Baudouin II may have

included it to inflate the importance of this second gift. The ability to bestow the

Crown of Thorns both signaled Baudouin II’s power and emphasized the religious

nature of his empire. These symbols of piety were particularly appropriate for this

moment when Louis IX was preparing his own crusade to the Holy Land. The renewal

of this gift, like the transfer of Namur, demonstrates the scarcity of Baudouin II’s

resources. Baudouin II could regrant Namur, which Louis IX had generously returned

percussa stupendo miraculo distilavit; Cathenam etiam, sive vinculum ferreum, quasi in modum anulli
factum, quo creditur idem Dominus noster fuisse ligatus; Sanctam Toellam tabule infertam; magnam
partem de lapide Sepulcri Domini nostri Iesu Christi; de lacte beate Marie virginis; item ferrum Sacre
Lancee quo perforatum fuit in cruce latus Domini nostri Iesu Christi; crucem aliam mediocrem, quam
Crucem triumphalem veteres appellabant, quia ipsam in spem victorie consueverant imperatores ad bella
deferre; Clamidem coccineam quam circumdederunt milites Domino nostro Iesu Christo in illusionem
ipsius; Spongiam quam porrexerunt ei sitienti in cruce, aceto plenam; partem Sudarii quo involutum fuit
corpus eius in sepulchro; Lintheum etiam quo precinxit se quando lavit manus discipulotum, et quo
eorum pedes extersit; Virgam Moysi; superiorem partem capitis beati Iohannis Baptiste; et capita
Sanctorum Blasii, Clementis et Simeonis.” Ibid.
718
Ibid., II: 134, no. LXXIX: “pro urgenti necessitate imperii Constantinopolitani.”
719
Ibid., II: 133-35, no. LXXIX: “spontaneo et gratuito dono plene dedimus, absolute concessimus, et ex
toto quictavimus et quictamus.”
254
to him, and he could add a few additional relics to his prior gift, but he had no new

resources to trade for significant aid.

In the document concerning control of Namur, addressed to anyone reading the

letters, but specifically geared “au chastelain dou chastiae de Namur, au doian, au

chanoines at à touz les sergenz dou chastel,” Baudouin II did not make reference to the

kinship between himself and the French monarchy, which so marked his other

correspondence. Instead, he referred to the Capetians merely by their title, and their

relationship to the king: “dou roi de France Louis, qui or est, et par la roine Blanche, sa

mère, et par les contes, c’est à savoir: Robert de Artois, Anfons de Poitiers, Challe

d’Angeou, freires au devantdit roi.” 720 This plain language could be read as a sign of

Baudouin II’s frustration that Louis IX had not given him more or as a reflection of the

straightforward purpose of the document—not persuading, merely reporting and

ordering. Baudouin II’s second grant to Louis IX suggests the latter. The chrysobull

transferring the relics referred to Louis IX as “nos carissimo amico et consanguineo

nostro Ludovico, regi Francie illustrissimo.” 721 The double appellation, of friend and

relative, contrasts with the plain description of Louis IX as “roi de France” from the

other document and signals that Baudouin II still thought it worthwhile to remind his

cousin of their kin relationship and their personal connection.

The language here, however, serves as a reminder that little is known from this

visit about Baudouin II’s relationship with either Blanche or Louis IX. Baudouin II’s

grants, of Namur and relics, to Louis IX suggests that he at least continued to value their

relationship. In the Récits, Blanche was displeased with Baudouin II’s childish

720
AN, J 509. Published in Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III: 11-12, no. 3604.
721
Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 133-35, no. LXXIX.
255
behavior, but she still lent him the funds to prevent the sale of Namur. 722 The loan was

dependent on Baudouin II’s promise to send Marie to visit Blanche, who “desired

greatly to see her.” 723 In the eyes of this author, then, Blanche maintained her close

relationship with Baudouin II, in part because of her kinship with and affection for

Marie, but this relationship was a vastly unequal one. Baudouin II was a childish

spendthrift, unable to manage his own affairs, and he was easily guided by Blanche.

The details in the Récits cannot be accepted without confirmation. Yet, they show that

contemporaries perceived a continued closeness between Blanche and Baudouin II, one

that survived the latter’s constant need for financial aid and advice. The story in the

Récits also reminds us that Baudouin II must have spent at least some time with the

Capetians. At some point, he arranged with Louis IX to regain control over Namur. He

returned to France before leaving for the East and was in Saint-Germain-en-Laye in

June of 1247 when he granted the collection of relics to Louis IX.

This visit, Baudouin II’s second to the West, was markedly less successful than

his first one. Then, he had, through the sale of relics, the mortgaging of land, and the

redemption of crusading vows, gathered funds for two armies, one of which made it to

Constantinople under his own direction. These men, however, were not committed to

the Latin Empire, and they returned home, according to the Récits, because Baudouin II

was unable to pay them. 724 On this second visit, Baudouin II had gotten a one-year

truce with Vatatzes (which expired before the Latin emperor returned to

722
Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims, pp 225-26, ch 439-40.
723
Ibid., p. 226, ch 439: “car je la desire mout à veoir.”
724
Ibid., p. 224, ch 437: “Et li empereres Baudouins estoit juenes et enfantis; si despendi largement, et ne
prist pas garde à son affaire; si fu povres et endeteiz, et n’ot que donneir aus chevaliers et aus serjanz. Si
s’en partirent de lui une granz partie, et s’en ralerent en leur païs. Et quant li empereres vit qu’ainsi
estoit, si ot conseil qu’il venroit en France à l’apostoile qui estoit à Lion, et à la roïne qui estoit ante sa
famme, et requerroit ajue à l’apostoile et à la roïne.”
256
Constantinople), the temporary return of his lands, and a promise of aid from the Order

of Santiago, which was never realized. Part of the problem, of course, was timing. At

the Council of Lyon, where Baudouin II and the patriarch of Constantinople were well-

placed to make a pitch for aid, the assembled company was more concerned with the

Hohenstaufen emperors and the Holy Land. These great issues, which came to a head

in the mid-1240s in the form of the deposition of Frederick II and Louis IX’s crusade to

the Holy Land, consumed Europe and left little energy or resources to devote to the

Latin Empire. Baudouin II responded to this situation by entering into the tangle of

European alliances and negotiations. Lacking the background to understand the

problems, however, he fumbled between Frederick II and Innocent IV, as he would later

between Manfred, Alfonso X, and the papacy. We cannot know, of course, what would

have happened had Baudouin II not abandoned the papal curia for Frederick II in 1244–

1245. But it seems that, for Innocent IV, Baudouin II was more of a pawn in his

propaganda war against Frederick II than anything else. Wolff argued that “Baldwin’s

relations with the pope seem not to have suffered as a result” of his temporary alliance

with Frederick II. 725 Yet the mid-1240s marked a new stage in the papacy’s attitude

toward the Latin Empire, one marked by a much lower level of commitment and a

willingness to abandon the Latin Empire if it would result in church union. No source

gives a specific reason behind this change, but it is certainly plausible that the Latin

emperor’s temporary alliance with Frederick II cooled the ardor of the papacy to

support his cause. Baudouin II’s initial foray into European politics marked a new

pattern in his engagements in the West and reflected his belief, repeatedly demonstrated

725
Wolff, “The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261),” p. 622
257
and repeatedly disproved, that he could intervene in Western affairs without harming

his cause.

Baudouin II in Constantinople

The timing of Baudouin II’s return, in the summer of 1247, might have been in

response to the rising danger posed by Nicaea. 726 In 1246, Kaliman, the Bulgarian tsar

and Asen’s son, died and Vatatzes, having achieved peace with Epiros and the sultan,

turned his attention to recovering territory held by Bulgaria. 727 The campaign was

executed with little violence, and many of the cities went over to the emperor

peacefully. According to Akropolites, the marriage of Theodore II, Vatatzes’s son, and

the Bulgarian princess Helen influenced the inhabitants of at least one town, Melnik, to

open the gates to the Nicaean army. This marriage did what the proposed marriages

between Robert and Eudokia and Baudouin II and Helen could have done: It united two

political claims, in this case to the area to the north of Constantinople. This

development did not pass unnoticed, either in the court of Vatatzes or, apparently, in the

communities of Thrace and Macedonia. According to Akropolites, a prominent citizen,

Nicholas Manglavites, persuaded the inhabitants to welcome Vatatzes. Nicholas

employed a series of arguments. 728 He opened with a brief exposition of the misfortune

726
Gardner, Lascarids of Nicaea, p. 157.
727
Acropolites, Opera, pp 72-79, ch 43 and 44. Trans. in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History,
pp 225-35, ch 43 and 44.
728
Acropolites, Opera, pp 76-77, ch 44: “ἡμῖν μὲν ἐγένετο προσταλαιπωρῆσαι τῇ τοῦ παιδὸς τοῦ
Καλιμάνου ἀρχῇ, καὶ ἦν πρὸς ἐλπίδος ἀνδρωθῆναί τε τοῦτον καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῦ τὰς ἀμοιβὰς τῆς
κακοπαθείας ἀντιλαβεῖν εἰς ἡλικίαν ἐλθόντος, ὅτε διακρῖναι δύναιτ’ἄν τις ἀπὸ φαύλου ἄνδρα καλόν.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτου κακούργῳ τύχῃ ἡμάρτομεν, πρόκειται δὲ ἡμῖν Βρεφύλλιον ἀρχήν, παντὸς ἄν
ἀνοηταίνοντος χείρους φανείημεν, εἰ πάλιν πρὸς δυσπραγίας ἄλλας αὐτοὺς ἐπιδοίημεν, ἀδέσποτοι
τὸν πάντα βίον διατελεῖν αἱρούμενοι, ὑφ’ οὗ πολλά τε καὶ μείζω τὰ δεινὰ φύεται. ἀλλ’ἐπεὶ βασιλεὺς
ἡμῖν ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων προσήγγισε, δεῖ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοὺς ἐγχειρίσασθαι, δεσπόρῃ ριστῷ καὶ εἰδότι ἄνδρα
ἠδὲ κακὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν, καὶ δίκαιον ἐν ἡμῖν ἔκπαλαι σχόντι. ὅ τε γὰρ ἡμέτερος χῶρος τῇ τῶν
Ῥωμαίων προσήκει ἀρχῇ -- πλεονεκτικώτερον γὰρ οἱ Βούλγαροι ποῖς πράγμασι χρησάμενοι καὶ ἐκ
Φιλιππουπόλεως ὁρμώμεθα, καθαροὶ τὸ γένος Ῥωμαῖοι. ἄλλως τε καὶ ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων βασιλεὺς
258
of people ruled by a child, referring to the Bulgarian tsar, and then noted that Vatatzes,

whom he called the emperor of the Romans, was in the area. Vatatzes was “a

trustworthy master and one who knows a bad man from a good one.” Moreover, he

“has a long-standing right with regard to us” since Melnik was rightfully Roman, i.e.

Greek, and had been captured by the Bulgarians. The ethnicity of the people of the

town was also relevant to Vatatzes’s claim—they were all “pure Romans by birth.”

Finally, “the emperor of the Romans truly has a right with respect to us, even if we are

related to Bulgarians, for his son, the emperor Theodore, became the son-in-law of the

emperor of the Bulgarians, Asan, and now the daughter of the emperor Asan, the wife

of this emperor, is called, and is in deed, empress of the Romans.” Both the Greek and

the Bulgarian claims were thus recognized and united in the marriage of Theodore and

Helen. These claims could be fulfilled, or at least their fulfillment proclaimed, through

submission to Nicaea. The rising and declining fortunes of the various regional actors

over the previous four decades—the fall of Byzantium; the establishment of the Latin

Empire; the growth, fall, reemergence, and fall again of Bulgaria; Epiros’s mutating

alliances and affinities; the changing focus of Nicaea—had hit the area north and west

of Constantinople particularly hard. Nicholas Manglavites represented a region that had

seen multiple armies march and fight, changing political authority, and the assertions of

varying loyalties and allegiances. Akropolites recounted the citizen’s words at some

length and in direct speech, an emphasis that suggests that they reflected the arguments

ἀληθῶς καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν δικαιοῦται, καὶ εἰ Βουλγάροις προσήκοιμεν. ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς τούτου καὶ βασιλεὺς
Θεόδωρος τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Βουλγάρων τῷ Ἀσὰν κεκήδευτο, καὶ νῦν ἡ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ Ἀσὰν
θυγάτηρ ἡ σύζυγος τοῦ τοιούτου Βασιλέως δέσποινα Ῥωμαίων ὀνομάζεταί τε καὶ ἐστί. Τούτων οὖν
ἁπάντων χάριν τὰ πολλὰ τῶν λεγομένων καταλιπόντας ἐπ’αὐτῷ χρὴ ἰέναι καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας
ὑποκλῖναι τῷ τῆς δουλείας ζυγῷ. Χρηστὸς γὰρ ὁ ζυγὸς τῶν φρονίμων βασιλέων καὶ γηραιῶν, καὶ
πολλῷ κουφότερος τῶν ἔτι διατελούντων ἐν μείραξι.” The following translations come from
Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 230-31, ch 44.
259
of Vatatzes and Nicaean propoganda. The Bulgarian-Nicaean marriage had originally

secured an offensive alliance against the Latin Empire. A decade later, Vatatzes used it

to proclaim his claims to territory held by Bulgarians.

Vatatzes’s European campaign yielded another, even greater, prize:

Thessaloniki. As at Melnik, this city was surrendered by its inhabitants. John Doukas,

Theodore Doukas’s eldest son, had been succeeded by his younger brother Demetrios in

1244. Demetrios’s profligate and irresponsible behavior turned the inhabitants against

him and encouraged them to appeal to Vatatzes. 729 Akropolites reported that Vatatzes

was ready to return home for the winter when he received an embassy from

Thessaloniki. Conquering the great city was not on his agenda. Faced with the

opportunity, however, to gain it with little cost to himself, he proceeded to Thessaloniki

where conspirators within the city opened a gate and Nicaean troops entered easily.

The year of 1246, then, saw Nicaea establishing its supremacy over both Bulgaria and

the Doukai. In 1247, secure on a wave of successes, and “since he had a truce with

everyone,” Vatatzes recommenced his attack on Frankish possessions. 730

The most well known and, for the purposes of this dissertation, interesting

feature of Vatatzes’s military campaign was his attack on Tzouroulos. In 1247, Anseau

de Cayeux, a Frankish baron, governed this city, which had shifted between Greek and

Latin rule several times since 1204. Anseau was almost certainly the descendant of a

Fourth Crusader of the same name and was certainly married to Eudokia, Theodore

729
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, pp 136-42.
730
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 245, ch 47. Acropolites, Opera, p.
85, ch 47: “ἐκεχειρίαν δὲ ἔχων ἐξ ἁπάντων.” Macrides notes that Nicaea accomplished treaties with
the Turks in 1243, and the Bulgarians and Doukai in 1246.
260
Lascaris’s daughter, the emperor Robert’s ex-fiancée and Vatatzes’s sister-in-law. 731

The marriage resulted from the efforts in the 1220s, initiated by Yolande and Theodore

Lascaris, to make peace between the Latin Empire and Nicaea. Eudokia and Robert had

been engaged twice before Robert married a Frankish noblewoman, a marriage that

proved to be the downfall of both husband and wife. 732 According to Akropolites,

Eudokia’s subsequent marriage to Anseau was with the consent and even desire of her

sister Eirene and Vatatzes himself. 733 Their approval is something of a mystery.

Theodore Laskaris arranged prestigious marriages for his daughters: Eudokia to the

emperor Robert, Maria to the son of the king of Hungary and the last, Eirene, first to the

despot Andronikos Palaiologos and then John III Vatatzes. 734 As a husband, Anseau,

although a prestigious Frankish baron, represented a significant drop in status from the

emperor of Constantinople, even a Frankish emperor. Moreover, although the treaty

between the Franks and Nicaean Greeks might survive the change in husbands,

Eudokia’s new marriage did not fulfill the other goal of her engagement to Robert: the

return of Greeks to power in Constantinople through their children. One can only guess

as to why Eudokia and her sister and brother-in-law accepted her marriage to Anseau.

Eudokia’s personal inclinations might have played a part. She spent, it appears, several

years in Constantinople and might have formed a relationship with Anseau. Events in

Nicaea might have also played a part. Early in his reign, Vatatzes had to deal with

challenges from Theodore Lascaris’s brothers and Eudokia’s return to Nicaea would

731
See Macrides on the generational problem of the Anseau de Cayeux’s. Akropolites, George
Akropolites: The History, pp 177-78, ftnt 20.
732
See pp 119-23 above.
733
Acropolites, Opera, p. 85, ch 47. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 245,
ch 47.
734
Acropolites, Opera, p. 26, ll 10-22, ch 15. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The
History, p. 148, ch 15.
261
have left her available to marry a potential rival to his rule. Of course, Akropolites’

claim that Vatatzes approved might have been inaccurate, an attempt to portray an

undesired event in a better light. In the end, one cannot know for sure.

Regardless of its original rationale, Anseau and Eudokia’s mixed marriage made

them ideal candidates to rule Tzouroulos, a city of strategic and symbolic import. As

Agnès and Branas had in Thessaloniki, Anseau and Eudokia united Frankish power

with Greek claims. Upon hearing that Vatatzes was marching to attack the city, Anseau

fled the town, leaving Eudokia in charge of a garrison. Akropolites left no doubt as to

the strategy behind this move: “For he thought that the emperor would not wish to

besiege the town because of his sister-in-law.” 735 But the couple misjudged the

intensity of Vatatzes’s family feelings. “The emperor, for the most part disregarding

such considerations,” laid siege to the town. 736 The siege was short, and the peace was

a generous one. The Nicaean emperor gave Eudokia a horse and sent her back to

Constantinople. He also freed the garrison. His concessions were limited; Akropolites

was clear that Eudokia received “a single horse for her mount,” making no reference to

other gifts or provisions. 737 Her men were released, but without transport or supplies.

Vatatzes may have treated Eudokia with particular generosity, but there is no suggestion

that either of them wanted her to stay and return to Nicaea with the Greek army.

Although the date of her marriage is uncertain, it was probably in the mid-1220s, soon

735
Translation from Ibid., p. 245, ch 47. Acropolites, Opera, p. 85, ch 47: “ἔδοξε γὰρ αὐτῷ, ὡς διὰ
τὴν αὐτοῦ γυναικαδέλφην οὐκ ἂν βουληθείη ὁ βασιλεὺς πορθῆσαι τὸ ἄστυ.”
736
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 245, ch 47. Acropolites, Opera, p.
85, ch 47: “ἐκεῖνος δὲ τὰ πολλὰ παρορῶν τῶν τοιούτων.”
737
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 245, ch 47. Acropolites, Opera, p.
85, ch 47: “καὶ τὴν μὲν αὐτοῦ γυναικαδέλφην εἰς τὴν Κωνσταντινούπολιν ἐξαπέστειλεν,
ἕνα ἵππον αὐτῇ δοὺς ἵν’ ἐποχῆται.”
262
after her second engagement to Robert collapsed. For two decades Eudokia had lived

with and among the Franks. Her loyalties were with her husband and his people.

Vatatzes’s success at Tzouroulos and, afterward, at Bizye frightened the Franks.

Their anxiety is evident in a letter from April of 1247. The letter was from Philippe de

Toucy, who held the role of bailli, as his father had, and Egidio Quirino, the podestà,

and approved by an impressive array of individuals including the empress Marie, the

barons, the council, the vicar of the chapter, the archbishop of Heracleia, the bishop of

Selymbria, three abbots, and the preceptores of the Military Orders. 738 The letter,

addressed to all readers, explained and excused the extended stay of Dominique

d’Aragon, a Franciscan friar, in Constantinople. In the spring of 1245, before the

Council of Lyon, Innocent IV had sent Dominique on a mission to the East “to people,

who do not know the lord Jesus Christ, and to the sons of those who withdrew, who are

not obedient to the holy Roman church.” 739 Little else is known for sure about the

mission itself, but in the spring of 1247 the friar stopped in Constantinople upon his

return to the West. 740 According to the letter, Dominique’s delay there was for the

benefit of the Roman Church and the Latin Empire and necessary for his own safety.

Vatatzes’s siege of the city certainly made any departure dangerous. What contribution

a lone Franciscan friar could make to the safety of the city is less clear. Vatatzes had a

deep respect for the Franciscans and Philippe de Toucy and Egidio Quirino may have

planned for Dominique to carry an appeal to the Niceaen emperor. Tisserant also

738
The letter is published in E. Tisserant, “La légation en Orient du Franciscain Dominique d'Aragon
(1245-1247),” Revue de l'Orient Chrétien XXIV (1924): 336-55. More than half the text is, in fact,
occupied with listing the individuals approving its message.
739
Sbaralea, Bullarium Franciscanum, p. 772: “ad gentes, quae Jesum Christum Dominum non
agnoscunt et ad substractionis filios qui Sacrosancte Romane ecclesie non obediunt.”
740
Tisserant proposed an itinerary based on circumstantial evidence. Tisserant, “La légation en Orient,”
350-51.
263
suggested that Dominique, as a representative of the papacy, might have been drafted to

assist in the resolution of conflicts between the many exempt orders in Constantinople

and the diocese. 741

The letter plaintively reveals the dire straits facing Constantinople, a situation to

which Baudouin II soon returned. The circumstances of Baudouin II’s departure from

the West, without a great deal of aid, provide credence that he knew of the stress his

empire was under. His delay in Europe until this critical moment suggests that he held

out for the expectation of more aid, which had, after all, eventually come during his

previous visit. That it never came in this second one can be attributed both to the wider

environment of Europe, especially the competing concerns of the Capetians and the

papacy, and Baudouin II’s own missteps in turning to the Hohenstaufen emperor.

741
Ibid., pp 346-47.
264
 CHAPTER 7:

In a Strange Land, 1247–1261

Baudouin II returned to Constantinople in 1247 but this did not bring an end to

the Franks’ efforts to raise Western aid. His wife, Marie de Brienne, replaced him in

Western courts and continued his fund-raising and attempts to control Namur. The

distance between the Latin Empire and the papacy, which first became apparent in the

mid-1240s, grew in the 1250s. Innocent IV and Alexander IV turned to negotiations

with Nicaea as the most promising way to restore unity to the church and as a further

arena in their conflict with the Hohenstaufen. Papal support for the Latin Empire, once

reliable if not always effective, began to disappear. Instead of exorting the Greeks to

abandon their attacks on the Latin Empire, the papacy offered, subtlely of course, the

promise of a return of Greek power to Constantinople in return for church union. The

papacy was not the only Western actor that pulled away from the Latin Empire. Marie

de Brienne struggled to establish control over Namur for five years before abandoning

the county to the countess of Flanders and, indeed, leaving France and Flanders

altogether for the richer pastures of her mother’s homeland, Castile. Her adjustment in

tactics shows the Franks’ continued and somewhat surprising ability to gain support,

even as parts of their appeal, particularly the religious and crusading foundations, were

no longer prominent.

The Papacy and Nicaea

As Vatatzes launched his attack on Tzouroulos and other Frankish possessions

in 1246, he also opened diplomatic negotiations with the West. In January of 1247,

265
while Baudouin II was still in Europe, Innocent IV received word from the queen of

Hungary, the daughter of Theodore Lascaris and the sister of Vatatzes’s late wife

Eirene, that Vatatzes wanted to reconcile with the Western church. 742 Vatatzes’s appeal

signaled that church union, the perennial goal of the papacy, might yet come through

political reconciliation and not as a result of military conquest. Innocent IV’s initial

response was to urge the queen, Maria, to send messengers to Nicaea, men “provident

and wise” who could bring Vatatzes back into the fold. 743 The pontiff did not send his

own envoy for two years. No record remains of Hungarian envoys or their reception by

Vatatzes. In 1247–1248, the Niceaen forces stopped their attack on Frankish

possessions, which may have been in response to positive signs from the Hungarians,

although other factors were certainly in play. 744

In the two years between his response to Maria and the departure of papal

envoys, perhaps to lay the groundwork for an appeal to Vatatzes, Innocent IV began to

withdraw his support for the Latin Empire. The subsidy that had been instituted at the

Council of Lyon was twice restricted in letters to the archbishop of Sens. In the first

instance, an Augustinian house was exempt from payment and Baudouin II was

specifically forbidden to collect from them. 745 In the second, “although we desire the

tranquil and prosperous state of Constantinople,” exemptions were established for

742
Theiner, VMH, I: 203, no. CCCLCCVII; Berger, Registres d'Innocent IV, no. 2954.
743
Theiner, VMH, I: 203, no. CCCLXXVII.: “Ut igitur, Carissima in Christo filia, effectus huiusmodi
negotii favilius subsequatur, excellentiam tuam requirimus et rogamus, quatenus nuntios, viros providos
et discretos, ad prefatum Vatacium non differas destinare, quorum diligentie studio et sollicitudinis
industria predictus Vatacius ad unitatem matris ecclesie revertatur.”
744
Our source for these events, Akropolites, moved directly from the attacks on Tzouroulos and Bizye to
the Genoese occupation of Rhodes in 1248 and Vatatzes’s attempts to retake the city, providing no
account of the shift. In addition to the Hungarian response, the Genoese threat in Rhodes, the relative
weakness of the Latin Empire compared to Nicaea’s other enemies, and the natural break in the campaign
over the winter, all probably moved Vatatzes to abandon his attack on the Franks. Acropolites, Opera,
pp 85-88, ch 47-48. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 245-49, ch 47-48.
745
Berger, Registres d'Innocent IV, pp 356-57, no. 2404.
266
prebends vacant because of death or absence due to business. 746 Monies already

collected, however, were not to be returned. Innocent IV recognized the great burden it

would place on the Latin Empire, always strapped for cash, to return money already

received and, almost certainly, spent. Other exemptions might have been issued.

Certainly, there is little sign that Innocent IV sought to enforce the subsidy.

In the spring of 1249, more than two years after Maria’s letter, Innocent IV

dispatched Giovanni da Parma, the minister general of the Franciscans, to Vatatzes to

negotiate for church union. The Franciscan chronicler Salimbene di Adam reported that

Vatatzes, “hearing of the sanctity of Giovanni da Parma,” specifically requested that the

pope send the friar. 747 Even without such a request, Vatatzes’s long-standing respect

for Franciscans urged the choice of one as envoy. Innocent IV clearly placed a great

deal of importance in the mission: He tasked the minister general of the order, instead

of a lower-level friar, and gave him the authority to call a church council in order to

bring the Eastern churches in line with Rome on the issue of the procession of the Holy

Spirit, an authority that his predecessors in the 1230s had lacked. 748 The prestige of the

envoy and the authority given to him reflect Innocent IV’s genuine hopes for church

union and his desire to disrupt the relationship between Vatatzes and Frederick II. 749

746
Ibid., pp 521-22, no. 3468: “Licet imperii Constantinopolitani tranquillum statum et prosperum
affectemus.”
747
Salimbene di Adam, “Cronica fratris Salimbene de Adam ordinis Minorum,” in MGH SS, ed. Oswald
Holder-Egger (Hanover, 1912), p. 304, ll 24-27: “Vattatius similiter imperator Grecorum, audiens
sanctitatem fratris Iohannis de Parma, misit ad papam Innocentium quartum rogando, quod mitteret ei
fratrem Iohannem generalem, quia sperabat, quod per eum Greci redirent ad precepta Romane ecclesie.”
748
Two papal letters, both dated May 28, 1249, survive—one charging John of Parma with the mission
more generally and the second focusing on the debate of the procession of the Holy Spirit and granting
him the authority to call a church council. Berger, Registres d'Innocent IV, pp 129-30, nos. 4749-50. For
the mission in the mid-1230s, see pp 157-61 above.
749
Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp 362-64.
267
Negotiations between Innocent IV and Vatatzes continued, albeit slowly, until the

deaths of both men in 1254.

Vatatzes was caught in the ongoing conflict between the pope and the Western

emperor. He apparently did not recognize that friendship with both parties was

impossible. In the spring of 1250 he sent troops to fight with his father-in-law and

wrote to inform him of the victory at Rhodes. 750 Frederick II, unsurprisingly, was

deeply opposed to negotiations between Innocent IV and Vatatzes. When Nicaean

envoys to the papacy came into Italy, he detained them. 751 He wrote to Vatatzes,

expressing his shock and dismay that his son-in-law had entertained friars sent by the

pope. 752 The letter began with Frederick II’s expressions of joy at Vatatzes’s success in

Rhodes, but it soon moved on to the more pressing issue: disparing the papacy and

urging Vatatzes away from that alliance. Throughout the letter, Frederick II’s language

is incendiary, designed to enrage Vatatzes against Innocent IV and make the case that

peace with such a man as the pontiff was neither desirable nor genuinely possible. 753

750
In March 1250, Frederick II wrote to Michael Doukas requesting that he allow the Nicaean troops pass
through his territory and sail from Dyrrachium. Michael, Frederick II argued, should support him against
the pope who had accused the Greeks of impiety and heresy. N. Festa, “Le lettere greche di Federigo II,”
Archivio storico italiano XIII, 5 (1894): 14-16. For the role of the Greek troops also Huillard-Bréholles,
Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi, VI: 761-62. Vatatzes’s letter to Frederick II concerning the
capture of Rhodes is known from Frederick II’s reply. Festa, “Lettere greche,” pp 21-22: “τὰς
ἀποκομισθείς γραφάς τῇ αἰθριότητι ἐκ μέρους τῆς βασιλείας σου μετὰ τοῦ παιδρήτου
παιδοπούλλου αὐτῆς μετὰ πολλῆς εὐθυμίας ἐδεξάμεθα.”
751
Nicholas de Curbio, Vita Innocentii Papae IV, RISS III, p. 592k: “tunc vero temporis, cum a Bathasio
Imperatore Graecorum solemnes nuntii, utpote archiepiscopi, episcopi, quidam nobiles milites ad
Romanam curiam mitterentur, prima facie in regnum Apuliae pervenerunt; ubi per adversarium dictae
Ecclesiae Fredericum, ne posset concordia provenire inter Graecorum Ecclesiam et Latinam, per anum et
dimidium sunt detenti.”
752
The letter has been published, in the original Greek and Huillard-Bréholles’s Latin transation in Festa,
“Lettere greche,” pp 21-28. See Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp 363-65.
753
Frederick II launched his argument with a reminder that the pope had excommunicated Vatatzes and
his people and called the Greeks heretics. This was only the beginning: Frederick II accused his arch-
enemy of opposing pious Latins and Greeks, of encouraging clerics to take up arms against Christians, of
causing the defeat of Louis IX’s crusading force in Egypt, and of calling for Frederick II’s death and
turning his men against him. The first salvo is typical of the letter: “οὗτος ὁ λεγόμενος μέγας
268
 In addition to driving a wedge between Vatatzes and Innocent IV, Frederick II

drew the Nicaean emperor closer to him. He opened the letter by expressing his

pleasure (εὐθυμία, θυμήρη) at the news that Nicaean forces had recaptured Rhodes.

He also appealed to Vatatzes’s family feeling, invoking their kinship several times. He

reminded Vatatzes that Innocent IV had condemned his marriage to Anna-Constance by

accusing Frederick II of “contracting a marriage with heretics.” 754 Frederick II’s

campaign to prevent Vatatzes from allying with Innocent IV continued in two further

letters from July and September of 1250. 755 These did not touch directly on the issue of

negotiations with the papacy or make an explicit argument for the Western imperial

position. Instead, they informed the Nicaean emperor of Frederick II’s military

successes. In doing so, these communications called on the affection that existed

between the father and son-in-law and portrayed the former as a desirable ally by

emphasizing his strength. 756

The Franks and Louis IX’s Crusade

As Innocent IV and Frederick II jockeyed for Vatatzes’s friendship, just as they

had once for Baudouin II’s, Marie de Brienne, the Latin empress, left Constantinople in

the wake of her husband’s arrival from the West. She had come East as a child in the

ἀρχιερεὺς, ὁ πάντων ἐνώπιον καθ’ἑκάστην τὴν βασιλείαν σου ὁνομαστὶ καὶ πάντας τοὺς
ὑπὸ σὲ Ῥωμαίους ἀφορισμῷ καθυποβάλλων, αἱρετικοὺς τοὺς ὀρθοδοξοτάτους Ῥωμαίους,
ἐξ ὧν ἡ πίστις τῶν Χριστιανῶν εἰς τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐξῆλθε πέρατα, ἀναισχύντως καλῶν,
τοιούτους ἄνδρας πνευματικοὺς κατ’αὐτον πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν σου ἀποστέλλειν ὀυκ
ἠρυθίασε.” Festa, “Lettere greche,” pp 22-23.
754
Ibid., pp 23: “ὅτι μετὰ τῶν αἱρετικῶν συνοικέσιον ἐτρακταῖσαμεν.”
755
These are also published in Ibid., pp 17-21, 28-30. Commentary provided in Martin, “O felix Asia!
Frédéric II, l'Empire de Nicée et le "césaropapisme",” p. 478 and passim.
756
The close of the first of these letters makes this point: “Οὕτω γοῦν ἡ ἐκ θεόθεν βασιλεία ἡμῶν,
τῇ ἄνωθεν προμηθία κρατυνομένη, τὸ ὑπήκοον ἅπαν αὐτῇς ἐν εἰρήνῃ διέπει καὶ δυθύνει,
ὅπερ εἰς χαρὰν τῇ συγγενικῇ γνησία ἀγάπῃ τῆς βασιλείας σου διὰ τῶν παρόντων
γνωρίζομεν.” Festa, “Lettere greche,” p. 24.
269
early 1230s and was now, finally, returning to the West. According to the Récits, in

1247, Blanche, desiring to see her great-niece, made her aid to Baudouin II conditional

on his promise to send Marie west. 757 In the fall of 1248, fulfilling her husband’s vow,

Marie left Constantinople, carrying permission from Baudouin II to engage his Western

lands in order to repay twenty-four thousand hyperers he had borrowed from various

merchants in Constantinople. 758 Although we do not know how Marie paid this debt, if

indeed she did, it sets the context for her visit and subsequent events, demonstrating the

great poverty of the Latin Empire and its continued need for aid from the West. This

document also expressed well Marie’s role in her trip to the West; she acted as

Baudouin II’s representative for his Western lands and undertook the business of the

Latin Empire.

Marie’s first stop was Cyprus, where she met up with Louis IX’s crusading

forces. The presence of the Capetian king with a large force in the East presented an

opportunity for the Franks to connect with their kinsmen, fellow French nobles and past

and future supporters. Marie had come to solicit aid from Louis IX for the Latin

Empire, or, as Joinville phrased it, “for her husband, who had stayed at

Constantinople.” 759

After Marie disembarked, her vessel was blown off its moorings and she was

bereft of her belongings. She requested that Joinville and Erard de Brienne, her cousin,

757
Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims, pp 225-26, ch 439: “Par foi, dit la roïne, je vous presterai vint mil
livres à rendre aus issues, et ainsi sera sauvée à vous et à voz oirs; en teil maniere que vous me jurerez
sour sainz que dedenz le mois que vous serez revenuz en Coustantinoble, vous m’envoierez l’empereriz;
car je la desir mout à veoir.”
758
Charles Du Cange, Histoire de l’empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs française jusqu’à la
conquête des turcs, Collection des chroniques nationales françaises, écrites en langue vulgaire du
treizième au seizième siècle (Paris, 1826), p. 433, no. XIII.
759
Translation from Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, p. 58, ch 139. Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, p. 68, ch
139: “por son seigneur, qui estoit en Constantinnoble demourez.” .
270
come to meet her. Joinville clearly found the empress charming. He sent her ermine,

wool, and satin to fashion a dress, since her clothing had vanished with her ship. 760

Once clothed, she sought aid from the crusaders. Joinville insisted that “she did her

work so well that she took with her more than a hundred letters in duplicate from me

and from other friends she had in Cyprus. In these letters we were bound by oath,

should the King, after his return from overseas, or the Legate, decide to send three

hundred knights to Constantinople, to fulfill our undertaking and make the journey.” 761

In fact, despite Joinville’s admiration for Marie’s persuasive talents, this outcome was

less than impressive. Other than the material that Joinville provided Marie for a dress,

no actual aid from the crusaders was recorded. There is no indication that Louis IX

responded to Marie’s appeals or encouraged the the crusaders to do so. Joinville

related that after the crusade he went to the king and offered to go to Constantinople if

the king desired to send a contingent. He did this “in the presence of the Count of Eu,”

Marie’s brother Alphonse. 762 Perhaps Alphonse d’Eu also wanted to go in aid of

Constantinople or promised to lead such a force, as someone close to the emperor. His

presence in Joinville’s vignette certainly provided a detail that lent the story veracity.

Louis IX declined the offer, blaming the great expense of the crusade that made it

impossible to finance such an expedition from the state coffers. 763 The story is self-

760
Ibid., p. 68, ch 138. Translation in Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, p. 58, ch 138.
761
Translation from Ibid., p. 58, ch 139. Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, p. 68, ch 139: “[Elle] pourchassa
tant que elle emporta .C. paire de lettres et plus, que de moy que des autres amis qui la estoient, es quiex
lettres nous estions tenus par nos seremens que se le roy ou le legaz vouloient envoier troiz cens
chevaliers en Constantinnoble aprés ce que le roy seroit parti d’outre mer, que nous y estions tenu d’aler
par nos seremens.”
762
Translation from Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, p. 58, ch 140. Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, p. 68, ch
140: “devant le conte d’Eu.”
763
Ibid.: “Et je, pour mon serement aquiter, requis le roy au departir que nous feismes, par devant le
conte d’Eu dont j’é la lettre, que se il y vouloit envoier .IIIc chevaliers, que je iroie pour mon serement
271
aggrandizing, of course, highlighting Joinville’s fidelity to his oath and to Marie. It also

reveals the provisional nature of Western aid to the Latin Empire. The nobles agreed to

take part in an expedition only if it was sponsored and financially supported by either

the king or the pope. In the mid-1250s, neither of these two men desired to commit

their resources to Constantinople.

Marie’s visit was not the only connection between the Franks of Constantinople

and the crusaders. In June of 1249, Baudouin II joined the army at Damietta,

presumably to echo his wife’s pleas for aid and to encourage those men who had

committed to future expeditions. The visit is known only from Baudouin II’s grant of

the head of “ly pretieux chiez dou glorieus apostre nostre seignor, monseignor sain

Jacque le frere nostre seignor,” to Louis IX’s brother Robert d’Artois. 764 Here,

Baudouin II reached out beyond Louis IX and Blanche to strengthen his ties with other

Capetians. Unsurprisingly, in naming Robert, the document specifies his relationship

with the French king and their kinship with Baudouin II himself: “noble seignor

monseignor le conte Tobert [Robert] d’Artois, le frere de monseignor lou roy de France

nostre tres-chier cosin.” 765 The Latin emperor almost certainly met Robert in his prior

visits to the West. Louis IX’s brothers had appeared in Baudouin II’s documents

before: His transfer of Namur to Louis IX specifically mentioned Robert d’Artois,

Alphonse de Poitiers, and Charles d’Anjou, and instructed his men to obey their

commands, as well as those of the king and Queen Mother. Baudouin II’s hope for

assistance from Louis IX’s brothers appeared again in his later appeals to Charles

acquiter. Et le roy me respondi que il n’avoit de quoy, et que il n’avoit si bon tresor dont il ne feust a la
lie.” Translation in Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, pp 58-59, ch 140.
764
Martène and Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, I: 1042.
765
Ibid.
272
d’Anjou to help him recover Constantinople after it was lost to the Greeks. If Robert

provided aid in return for the grant, no record survives of it and no other detail sheds

light on Baudouin II’s visit to Damietta.

A third resident of Constantinople and sometime official in the Latin Empire

joined the crusaders. Philippe de Toucy, whose parents were Narjot de Toucy and the

daughter of Agnès of France and Branas, was present at Caesarea. The Toucy family

was prominent in Constantinople and Philippe himself had served as bailli of the Latin

Empire during Baudouin II’s absence in the West. Joinville, who had been silent about

Baudouin II’s visit, recorded Philippe de Toucy’s participation, although he referred to

the Frank by Narjot, his father’s name. Philippe de Toucy came with nine knights and

they entered into Louis IX’s service for a year before returning to Constantinople.

Louis IX recognized his kin relationship with Philippe, calling him “cousin, for he

[Philippe] was descended from one of the sisters of King Philip, whom the Emperor

himself had married.” 766 Joinville’s account does not tell us why Philippe joined the

crusading army. He might simply have been struck with the desire to serve in and fight

for the Holy Land, as many medieval men and women were. Guillaume de

Villehardouin, the prince of the Morea, had likewise joined the crusading force as they

approached Damietta. 767 On the other hand, Philippe’s appearance in the wake of Marie

and Baudouin II’s earlier visits suggests that it might have had a political purpose.

Baudouin II and Marie had each seen firsthand how important the crusade was to their

royal relatives. Participating in the king’s highest priority might encourage him, or

766
Translation adapted from Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, p. 150, ch 495. The translation names the
emperor, which is not in the original. Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, p. 244, ch 495: “et disoit le roy que il
estoit son cousin, car il estoit descendu d’une des seurs le roy Phelippe, que l’empereur mesmes ot a
femme.”
767
Ibid., p. 73, ch 148. Translation in Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, p. 61, ch 148.
273
even other crusaders, to look with favor on later pleas for aid. Philippe’s presence also

strengthened the personal connections between the Franks in Constantinople and the

French nobles who were often their kinsmen. He appears to have been well integrated

into the army, entertaining the crusaders with tales from the Latin Empire. 768 In July of

1251, Philippe de Toucy received a loan from the king, although it is not apparent

whether this loan was to cover crusading expenses, debts associated with the Latin

Empire, or other, personal expenditures. 769

The plight of the Franks made an impact on Louis IX, even if he was unable to

supply significant financial aid. In 1252, while the crusaders were in the Holy Land, the

king received envoys from Trebizond, who brought gifts and a proposal for a marriage

between their emperor and a Capetian relative. Since there were no appropriate women

in his company, Louis IX “advised them to go to the Emperor at Constantinople, his

cousin, and ask him to give their Lord a wife who would be of the Emperor’s lineage

and his own.” The king hoped that this alliance would provide Baudouin II with

support against Vatatzes. 770

Marie de Brienne to the West

By the time Philippe de Toucy was telling stories to the crusaders, Marie had

long been in the West. When Marie left Cyprus in the winter of 1248–1249, she did so

768
Joinville reported a couple of Philippe’s stories about the Cumans, including the alliance between
them and Constantinople and their strange practices. Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, pp 244-46, ch 495-98.
Translation in Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, pp 150-51, ch 495-98.
769
AN, J 441, de mutuis ultramarinis, no. 13. Published in Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III:
138, no. 3934.
770
Translation from Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, p. 176, ch 592. Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, p. 294,
ch 592: “Et le roy respondi que il n’en avoit nulles amenees d’outre mer; et leur loa que il alassent en
Constantinnoble a l’empereour, qui estoit cousin le roy, et li requeissent que il leur baillast une femme
pour leur seigneur tele qui feust du lignage le roy et du sien. Et ce fist il pour ce que l’empereur eust
aliance a cestuy grant riche home contre Vatache, qui lors estoit empereur des Griex.”
274
with her brother Jean d’Acre. 771 According to Guillaume de Nangis, Jean had gone

west with Baudouin II in 1236 and stayed in the Capetian court. 772 He probably

accompanied Louis IX on the crusade. 773 Another brother, Alphonse d’Eu. joined the

crusade in the Holy Land. 774 In January of 1249, Marie and Jean d’Acre were in

Negropont where she acknowledged various debts and provided letters requesting that

Blanche repay the debts from the possessions of Marie and her brother. 775 Even before

her arrival in France, these letters announced Marie’s dependence on and confidence in

her great-aunt. Blanche was an unsurprising choice as an agent entrusted with repaying

the Latin Empire’s debts. The Capetians had already been a source of financial aid to

the Courtenays, and Blanche was regent during her son’s absence. Marie would have

known this from her visit to Cyprus, if the news had not arrived in Constantinople prior

to her departure. Personal relationships might have been as important as official status.

Three of the four letters refer to the kin relationship between the Latin empress and the

French Queen Mother. In these, Blanche is, with minor variations, “la très haute et

nostre très chière dame et très chière auntein ma dame Blanche.” 776 Marie cannot have

known her great-aunt well, but Baudouin II’s close relationship with her had already

affirmed and strengthened the bond created by their kinship. Royal quittances from

771
Ibid., p. 69, ch 140. Translation in Joinville, The Life of St. Louis, p. 59, ch 140.
772
Guillaume de Nangis, Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis et de ses continuateurs de 1113 à
1300 et les continuations de cette chronique de 1300 à 1368, I: 187-88.
773
Joinville’s use of “enmena” to describe her action suggests to me that Jean d’Acre was previously one
of the crusading army and that Marie whisked him away with her, but I am unaware of other documents
speaking to this question.
774
Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, p. 258, ch 521. Both Hague and Monfrin identify the count d’Eu as Jean
II, the son of Alphonse and his wife Marie. But Alphonse was born in the mid-1220s, the son of Jean de
Brienne and Berengaria of Castile. He was clearly identified as the count d’Eu in Castilan documents
dated 1255. Memorial histórico español: colección de documentos, opúsculos y antigü edades(Madrid:
La Academia, 1851), I: 78, no. XXXVII: “D. Alfonso, fijo del Rey Johan Emperador de Constantinopla
et de la Emperadriz Doña Berenguela, conde Do, vassallo del Rey.” His son, Jean, could not have been
of age in the early 1250s to go on crusade with Louis IX.
775
AN, J 509. Published in Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III: 54-56, nos. 3737, 3740, 3741, 3743.
776
AN, J 509. Published in Ibid., III: 56, no. 3743.
275
May 1249 reveal that Blanche’s clerk repaid the debts for at least three of the creditors,

as Marie had anticipated. 777

Marie’s creditors or their representatives were in France in May of 1249 and

perhaps she was as well. No reliable source speaks to her activities duing her first few

years in the West. Based on Baudouin II’s previous visits, one would expect to see

Marie in the papal curia on her way to France. There is no evidence, however, that she

made such a visit. The papacy was not the ally it had once been. In the spring of 1249,

the probable time of her arrival in Europe, Innocent IV had already limited subsidies to

the Latin Empire and was giving Giovanni da Parma his brief for negotiations with

Vatatzes. Marie’s visit, if it happened, did not sway the pope to abandon these

conversations or even to temper them with assistance to the Latin Empire. On the

contrary, the papal registers are silent in these years about aid to Constantinople.

According to the Récits, Blanche was overjoyed to see Marie, who remained in

the court until the Queen Mother died in 1252, at which point the young empress “took

possession of [Namur]” which Blanche had given to her. 778 This chronology, unattested

elsewhere, does correspond with Marie’s appearance in Namur in June of 1253, seven

months after the queen’s death. In Namur, Marie faced great challenges to her

possession of the county and attempts to control it.

Namur was a fief of Hainaut and thus of the Holy Roman Empire. In April of

1248, less than a year after Baudouin II’s transfer of Namur to Louis IX, William of

Holland, king of the Romans, recorded his decision that Baudouin II properly “held

777
Ibid., III: 69-70, nos. 3775-77.
778
Translation from Robert Levine, trans., A Thirteenth-Century Minstrel's Chronicle (Lewiston: Mellen
Press, 1990), p. 103, ch XLI. Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims, pp 226-27, ch 441-42: “Quant la roïne la
vit, si ne fu onques joie faite se là non; et demoura avec li tant comme elle vesqui. Et quant elle mourout,
elle li donna la contei de namur; et en fu en possession.”
276
[Namur] from the empire and us, by feudal title, and owed liege and due homage.” 779

This homage was to be performed to Jean d’Avesnes, the count of Hainaut. Neither

Baudouin II nor anyone representing him had performed this homage for a year and a

day, as law and custom required. Moreover, Baudouin II had transferred the county to

Louis IX without Jean d’Avesnes’s consent. 780 As a result, William confiscated the

county and turned it over to the count of Hainaut. In a second document, William

wrote to the nobles, garrisons, and inhabitants of Namur and its lands informing them of

the judgment and ordering them to acknowledge Jean d’Avesnes as their lord. 781 In

these documents, Baudouin II is “imperator Constantinopolis” and Louis IX

“karissimus frater et amicus nostrus Ludovicus, illustris rex Francie.” 782 The French

king, unsurprisingly, is granted the closer and more affectionate title. Both men,

however, despite being emperor and king, were expected to follow the ordinary rules of

homage and conveyance of property. When they failed to do so, they relinquished their

rights to the county. In the eyes of William of Holland and Jean d’Avesnes, Baudouin

II was fully incorporated into the Western system of landholding. In practice, however,

his upbringing and residence in the East put him at a disadvantage in terms of

maintaining control over his Western inheritance. In his grant of Namur to Louis IX,

779
Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierre, II: 188, ch CXI: “ab Imperio et a nobis, titulo
feodi, possidet, legium et debitum fecerit homagium, Balduinus, imperator Constantinopolis, qui eumdem
comitatum ab ipso tenere debuit, postquam idem Johannes nobis de ipso fecit homagium, et ipsi Johanni
tale homagium facere (debuit) quale dictum feodum requirebat, illud feodum suum, dictum comitatum
Namurcensem, infra annum et diem, prout moris et juris est, nec per se nec per alium requisivit nec de
ipso fecit quod debuit.”
780
Ibid.: “Balduinus imperator castrum Namurcence et omnes fortalitias ac possessiones eidem catro et
comitatui attinentes, sine assenu et voluntate ipsius Johannis, qui prefati comitatus heres erat sicut ille a
quo teneri debebat, karissimo fratri et amico nostro Ludovico, illustri regi Francie, per mutuum et
custodiam obligavit, castri et comitatus predictorum eum constituens possessorem.”
781
Ibid., II: 190-91, ch CXII.
782
Ibid., II: 188-90, ch CXI, CXII.
277
Baudouin II overreached in his efforts to employ his Western assets in support of his

Eastern priorities.

Other than the Courtenays, the Franks in Constantinople rarely appear in

Western archives after their departure for the east. A papal letter in 1241, however,

suggests that the situation Baudouin II faced in Namur was not unique. In 1241,

Gregory IX instructed his representative to give one-fourth of his collection from the

Morea to Geoffrey de Méry, constable of the Latin Empire. The funds were needed to

protect Asquili, a town near Constantinople. Geoffrey had to leave it to go to France to

take control of his inheritance, but worried it would fall to Vatatzes. 783 Apparently,

Franks other than the Courtenays remained involved in their western lands, at least at

the point of inheritance.

In August of 1249, following Marie’s arrival in the West, Innocent IV

intervened on behalf of Baudouin II, requesting that William invalidate the sentence. 784

Someone “ex parte carissimi in Christo filii nostri, illustris imperatoris

Constantinopolitani” had come before Innocent IV and requested his intervention in this

matter. Although this person could have been Marie, his anonymity suggests a lower-

level emissary. The timing implies either that Baudouin II sent a messenger to the pope

as part of Marie’s entourage or that she, upon her arrival in France, appealed to the

pope. In the letter, which is notable for appearing during a period otherwise lacking in

papal support for the Latin Empire, Innocent IV stated that Namur was under papal

protection and argued that the sentence should be withdrawn since “it is very fitting that

783
Auvray, Registres de Grégoire IX, III: 547, no. 6089.
784
Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierre, II: 217-18, no. CXXXIII.
278
you and all other catholic princes abstain from molesting this emperor. 785 The tone is

not forceful, however, and Innocent IV stopped at suasion and did not threaten any

consequences should William ignore the request, which he did. In fact, in July of 1252,

William renewed the grant of Namur to Jean d’Avesnes, along with other lands that he

confiscated from Jean’s mother, Marguerite, the countess of Flanders. 786

Marie continued to appeal to Innocent IV for aid. In November of 1252, he

instructed the bishops of Paris and Évreux to protect Baudouin II’s inheritance and to

support Marie in her struggles to control it. 787 Marie, “carissima in Christo filia nostra

M. imperatrix Constantinopolitana illustris,” had sought Innocent IV’s help against

those clerics and laity who were giving her trouble. The pope did not name the

offenders or specify where the land was. The letter could pertain to Namur or the

Courtenay inheritance in France itself. Wherever the difficulties arose, Marie felt that

papal intervention was necessary to resolve the conflict, and the pope, in turn, directed

the bishops not to permit anyone to trouble them.

In the spring of 1253, after Blanche’s death, Marie was in Namur, where she

recorded a transaction with Foulques of Samson, who had received the castle from

Baudouin II in 1237. 788 Her presence did not mark the end of the troubles there. In

October of 1253, Marguerite, frustrated by her inability to obtain freedom for her

Dampierre sons, offered Hainaut to Charles d’Anjou. In the absence of Louis IX,

Charles d’Anjou, always lusting after additional territories and titles, accepted the

785
Ibid.: “ab ejusdem imperatoris molestiis eo magis te ac alios quoslibet catholicos principes abstinere
deceat.”
786
Ibid., II: 282-85, nos. CLXIX, CLXX.
787
Berger, Registres d'Innocent IV, p. 127, no. 6071.
788
Brouwers, L'administration, IV: 63, 68, nos. 100, 135.
279
county and, in December, he was in Valenciennes demanding fealty from Ypres. 789 He

encountered significant resistance from the populace in Hainaut, and William of

Holland prepared, in the winter of 1253–1254 to defend Jean d’Avesnes’s claim to the

county. Henri de Luxembourg joined the opposition to Angevin forces and, in February

of 1254, Jean d’Avesnes bestowed Namur on him, a transaction approved by William of

Holland. 790 In the summer of 1254, William of Holland established a treaty among

“illustri domine Marie, Dei gratia Constantinopolitane imperatrici,” Charles d’Anjou,

“comiti Andegavie et Provincie,” Marguerite, “Flandrie comitisse,” the Frisons and all

other followers of these parties. 791 The treaty set out the division of territory between

Charles d’Anjou and Jean d’Avesnes. William avoided any disputed titles—Marie was

the empress of Constantinople but not the countess of Namur, while neither Charles

d’Anjou or Jean d’Avesnes was count of Hainaut, a title both used in their own charters.

Despite the agreement, control of Namur was still at issue. Finally, in

September of 1256, Jean and Baudouin d’Avesnes renounced their claim to control

Namur and revoked the grant to Henri de Luxembourg. According to their charter, they

were moved to do so not by kinship or sympathy for the crusading enterprise, but by the

exhortations of Louis IX. The two brothers addressed the charter to the king personally,

referred repeatedly to him, and completed it in his presence. 792 In addition to their

desire for Louis IX’s support, the brothers had a more specific reason to be grateful.

The French king, upon his return to France, had encouraged Charles d’Anjou to

789
For an account of Charles d’Anjou’s involvement in Hainaut, see Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes
et des Dampierre, I: 235-62. See documents in Ibid., II: pp 351-52, 355, nos. CCII, CCV.
790
Ibid., II: 360-61, 395-96, nos. CCIX, CCXXXII.
791
Ibid., II: 379, no. CCXXIV.
792
The repetition is quite notable: “in presencia domini regis Francie”, “concessimus eciam et
promisimus dicto domino regi Francie”, “in manu ipsius domini regis Francie”, “si forte dictus rex
premissa recovare vel irritare noluerit”. Teulet, Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, II: 324-25, no. 4292;
Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierre, II: 422-24, no. CCXLII.
280
withdraw his claim to Hainaut and in 1255 Marguerite once again used the title countess

of Hainaut. 793 The king’s involvement had precipitated Baudouin II’s loss of the

territory, but his influence recovered it. For William of Holland and the d’Avesnes

brothers, the future of Namur was entirely a Western matter. They referred with respect

to Baudouin II, but the state of the Latin Empire and its dire need for funds did not enter

into the equation.

Marie’s control over Namur was short-lived. After she recovered the county, in

1256, a new conflict erupted. In the account of the Récits, the problem originated with

unruly and violent teenagers, sons of important men of Namur. While attempting to

rein them in, her bailli was killed. Marie reacted angrily, insisting that the whole of the

city bear responsibility for his death. The citizens sought help from Louis IX but were

dissatisfied with the response they received. Upon their return to Namur, they turned to

Henri de Luxembourg, who came with an army and laid siege to the town for almost

two years before it fell. 794

The story of the bailli’s murder is unattested elsewhere. Other sources,

however, speak of the financial exactions imposed by Marie on the citizens of

Namur. 795 Exploitation of the city’s resources was of a piece with Baudouin II’s earlier

use of his land to repay debts to Jean de Valenciennes and Flamenus de Ambliniaco.

793
Charles d’Anjou’s relinquishment of Namur was done “à proière et à la requeste nostre chier segneur
et frère Loeys, par la gracie de Deu roi de France.” Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes et des
Dampierre, II: 428, no. CCXLV. See Marguerite’s acknowledgment that she owed Charles d’Anjou in
recompense for his renunciation of Hainaut. Ibid., II: 424-27, no. CCXLIII.
794
Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims, pp 227-34, ch 442-55. Levine, A Thirteenth-Century Minstrel's
Chronicle, pp 103-6, ch XLII. Wolff provides a very helpful summary of the events and sources. Wolff,
“Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of Constantinople,” p. 63,
ftnt 41.
795
Jean de Hocsem, La chronique de Jean de Hocsem, ed. Godefroid Kurth (Brussels: Kiessling, 1927),
pp 35, 37. Guillaume de Nangis noted that Marie came to France in order to gather aid for Baudouin II.
Guillaume de Nangis, “Chronicon,” 557.
281
Resistance to Marie might also have been prompted by her status as a foreigner. The

author of the Récits has her claim as much. After the death of her bailli “she almost

went mad and she said: “Am I truly without friends in this foreign country?’” 796

Whether she said, or felt, this sentiment, the author believed it would be credible to his

audience, suggesting that she was perceived as isolated. According to this account, far

from identifying as a Westerner, she viewed herself as a foreigner in Namur and

possibly in the West more generally.

Such frustration is understandable. After three years in Namur, struggling to

regain her husband’s inheritance from the d’Avesnes and Henri de Luxembourg, her

success was followed by an uprising of her subjects. But Marie was not ready to give

up control of Namur. The author of the Récits recounted how she called upon the

countess of Flanders, her own brothers Alphonse d’Eu and Jean de Montfort, and, from

Champagne, the count of Joigny and Erard de Vallery to help her raise the siege. The

countess placed her forces under the control of her son Baudouin d’Avesnes, who

prosecuted the war without enthusiasm. More than that, his forces apparently attacked

the Champenois troops. In this struggle, Marie could count on her relatives and on men

from the homeland of her father’s and father-in-law’s more than on her purported allies

in Flanders and Hainaut. 797 Although the account of the Récits is often fanciful, the

796
Translation from Levine, A Thirteenth-Century Minstrel's Chronicle, p. 104, ch XLI. Wailly, Récits
d'un ménestrel de Reims, p. 228, ch 444: “Quant l’empereriz le sot, près ala qu’elle ne perdi le sens, et
dist: ‘Voirement sui je sans amis et en estranges contrées?’”
797
For Guillaume III, count of Joigny, see Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire
général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, pp 278-80, no. 578. A cousin of Guillaume III’s, Pétronille, married
Pierre de Courtenay, lord of Conches before May 1249. Ibid., p. 250, no. 528. Guillaume III’s maternal
grandmother was Agnès de Brienne and his grandfather’s first wife was Alix de Courtenay. For Alix see
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 874, ll 18-26 and Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite
au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, p. 27, no. 61. For Guillaume II’s marriage to Élisabeth,
daughter of Milo VII de Noyers, see Ibid., p. 139, no. 317. Milo VII’s wife Agnès is mentioned in the
same document. Milo VII was close enough to Erard de Brienne to act as a guarantee for him. Ibid., p.
282
author’s identification of these four men—Alphonse d’Eu, Jean de Montfort, Guillaume

III de Joigny, and Erard de Vallery—is probably reliable. First of all, the identifications

were specific, naming Alphonse, Jean, and Erard and referring to Guillaume as “count

of Joigny.” These men were not stock characters in the Récits; this was their only

appearance, adding validity to the author’s identification. Moreover, these men were

likely to be the subjects of appeals from Marie. Throughout Marie’s reign as empress,

she maintained a close relationship with her brothers, and Jean accompanied her from

Cyprus and offered his lands as payment for her debts. Alphonse’s presence in Namur

was attested in a subsequent charter of Marie’s, where he appeared as a messenger

between her and Louis IX. Alphonse and Jean were in Castile for much of the late

1250s, where their presence was noted in a series of royal charters. Jean’s name is

missing from a charter where his brothers appear in the fall of 1257, and he may have

been in Namur from the spring of 1257 to the winter of 1258. 798 The counts of Joigny,

including Guillaume III, operated in the same circles as the Brienne and the Courtenay

and had, in fact, intermarried with both families in the previous century. The Vallery

were also an important family in Champagne and Burgundy. 799 The appearance of

these men in Namur shows that the Champenois and Burgundian ties of the Brienne and

the Courtenay had not died out.

134-35, no. 308. In 1217, they were excommunicated together. Petit, Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne,
IV: 470, no. 298. Evergates spoke a little about the Joignys: Evergates, The Aristocracy in the County of
Champagne, 1100–1300, pp 109, 232-33.
798
The brothers first appear in a charter dated November 1255, following that in 1256 their presence is
attested in January, July, and September (this last Alphonse and Louis only); in 1257 in March and
October (the latter also missing Jean); in 1258 February, April, and September (the last missing Jean).
Memorial histórico español, I: 77-147.
799
Erard de Vallery (or perhaps several of them) appear a number of times in Quantin’s volumes. See
Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, nos. 489, 600,
614, 615, 627, 634, 741, 881. The last of these dates from 1252 and, thus, is likely the Erard who came to
Marie’s aid in Namur. In 1238, a relative of his, Hugh, lord of Vallery, appeared in a charter with Jean de
Toucy. Ibid., p. 202, no. 446.
283
 This assistance was insufficient to preserve Namur for the Courtenay. In July of

1257, Richard of Cornwall, who was pursuing his own claim to king of the Romans,

recognized Henri’s claim to Namur, based on Jean d’Avesnes’s repudiated grant. 800

Marie’s attempts to break the siege of Namur failed. 801 On June 17, 1258, a charter

recorded Marie’s assignment of Namur to Louis IX and reported that, at his request, she

was “placing it in the hands of the countess of Flanders” and instructing her men to

obey the countess. 802 Her brother, the count d’Eu; a cousin, Jean de Vallet; and the

chamberlain of France, Pierre had conveyed messages between Marie and the Capetian

king, once again showing her continued connections to France. 803 By June of 1258,

Marie had given up. Her relinquishment to Marguerite was an admission that, even

present in Namur, she could not govern the county. Instead, she moved on to Spain,

where she sought aid from her maternal relatives. After several years of struggle over

her husband’s lands, it is not surprising that she would be drawn to her own relatives,

especially since her brothers were there.

Jean d’Avesnes and his brother Baudouin were cousins of Baudouin II’s. 804 The

three greatest challenges to his Western land came from relatives—his sisters Mathilde

800
Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierre, II: 472-73, no. CCLXXV.
801
Jean de Hocsem, La chronique de Jean de Hocsem, pp 35-37.
802
“Cum il soit chose que nos ayens mis les chastialx, les fortereches et la terre de Namur en la main
monseigneur le roy di Franche, liquelle nos a requis par nostre frere le comte d’Eu, par messire Jehan de
Vallet nostre cousin, et par messire Pierre le chambellain de Franche, et il les chastialx, les fortereches et
la terre devant dite, de par monseignor le roy, ayent mis en la main de madame la comtesse de Flandres,
nous vous mandons et prions que vous obeissiez à madame de Flandres devant dite ou à son
commandement.” Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierre, II: 523, no. CCXCI.
Marguerite announced her new acquisition a week earlier: “je ai pris en ma main les chasteaus, et les
fortereces et le tiere de le conté de Namur, que li emperere Bauduins de Constantinoble tient de moi, pour
garandir et pour sauver à lui et à ses hoirs, et promait ke je en boene foi les garderai et sauverai selonc
men pooir, ensi com desseur est dit, au devandit empereur et à ses hoirs.” Layettes du Trésor des
Chartres, III: 417-18, no. 4424.
803
Duvivier, La querelle des d'Avesnes et des Dampierre, II: 523, no. CCXCI.
804
Jean d’Avesnes and his brother were the grandsons of Baudouin IX of Flanders and I of
Constantinople, through their mother Marguerite. Baudouin II was his nephew.
284
and Marguerite and his cousins Jean and Baudouin d’Avesnes. Of course, a threat from

relatives did not set Baudouin II apart in the thirteenth-century West. Jean and

Baudouin d’Avesnes themselves spent much of their lives in conflict with their mother

Marguerite and their half brothers Guillaume and Guy de Dampierre over the rightful

inheritance of Flanders. The repeated opposition that Baudouin II faced from various

relatives, however, suggests that the ties of kinship were strained across the

Mediterranean, especially when land was at issue.

In 1258, Marie had left Namur, after consigning Baudouin II’s property to

Marguerite. Now she moved on to Castile, where her cousin was king. During her time

there, the empress sought funds to redeem her son, Philippe, who, in a sign of the abject

poverty of the Latin Empire, had been sent to Venice as security for a loan. In an article

from 1954, Wolff reconstructed the entire affair—the mortgage of Philippe and his time

in Venice, Marie’s visit to Castile and the aid she obtained, and subsequent negotiations

between the Courtenay and the Castilian king. Wolff discussed in detail sources for

Philippe’s captivity and release, the most useful of which are Sanudo’s three accounts,

especially the Fragmentum, two almost identical Castilian chronicles; and a papal letter

from 1266 denying dispensation for the accompanying marriage. 805

Philippe had been mortgaged to the Venetians sometime before 1258.

Historians know very little about events interior to the Latin Empire in these years, so

the lack of evidence here is unsurprising, if frustrating. The dating was a matter of

805
Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of
Constantinople,” passim, especially pp 56-58, inc ftnts 23, 24. Sources include: Marino Sanudo,
“"Fragmentum" in Hopf's so-called 'Fragmentum' of Marino Sanudo Torsello,” in The Joshua Starr
Memorial Volume, ed. Robert Lee Wolff (New York: Jewish Social Studies, Publication V, 1953), pp
150-53; Sanudo, “Istoria del regno di Romania,” p. 115; Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” p.
73; Martène and Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, II: 303, no. 258.
285
debate between Hendrickx and Wolff, both of whom wielded an expert knowledge of

the sources. 806 Noting the description of Philippe as “puerulus” and of his stay in

Venice as “diu,” Wolff argued for a date in the 1240s, probably as early as 1248. 807 He

associated the debt for which Philippe was collateral with the twenty-four thousand

hyperpers that Baudouin II owed and for which he authorized Marie to mortgage his

Western lands. Hendrickx rejected this reasoning, arguing that “puerulus” could

describe an adolescent and thus there is no need to attribute Philippe’s residence in

Venice to his childhood. 808 Complicating all this is the fact that the year of Philippe’s

birth is also unknown. It seems likely that he was born in the period between Baudouin

II’s trips to the West, 1240–1243. Marie would have been at most twelve years old

when her husband left in 1236, and her departure immediately after his return in 1248

left no opportunity for a pregnancy and birth. Although it is not inconceivable that

Baudouin II would have sent his eight-year-old son to Venice, it is unlikely. Even less

likely is that, with Philippe residing with his father’s debtors for ten years, no mention

of him appears in discussion of Marie’s visit to the West—not in terms of her time with

Blanche, her debt repayments, the papal advocacy on her behalf, or her difficulties in

Namur. Thus, although the question cannot be settled, I agree with Hendrickx that a

later date, perhaps in the mid-1250s, is more probable.

806
Sanudo, “Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,” p. 73. “quem & tam diu generis huius afflixerunt, vt
filium suum, Philippum nomine, quibusdam burgensibus Constantinopolitanis coactus fuit, pro certa
quantitate pecuniae obligare: qui dictum puerulum, securioris custodiae causâ, Venetias postmodum
transmiserunt.” Sanudo, “Istoria del regno di Romania,” p. 115. “El qual Filippo era stato obstaso in
Venetia per una quantità di denari, che ‘l Padre avea avuto da quelli de Cà Ferro.” Sanudo,
“Fragmentum,” pp 150-51: “Et maxime quia unigenitum filium suum Phylippum dedit pro pignore
quibusdam burgensibus Constantinopolitanis Venetis de Ca Ferro pro certa pecunie quantitate. Qui
Phylippus fuit transmissus Venetias, diu in Venetiis moram contrahens ulta post amissionem
Constantinopolitanam aliquo tempore.”
807
Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of
Constantinople,” pp 52-54.
808
Hendrickx’s point by point refutation of Wolff’s argument is in Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 161-65, no.
261.
286
 Whenever his enforced visit began, there can be no doubt that Philippe was in

Venice in January 1258, when Louis IX made provisions to forward one thousand livres

tournois to cover the young man’s expenses. Marie was in contact with Louis IX during

this period, as her transfer of Namur proclaimed. One of the messengers might have

conveyed her request to the French king that he aid her son. Louis IX’s letter does not

mention Marie, speaking only of providing money “pro expensis Karissimi

consanguinei nostri Phylippi filii illustris imperatoris Constantinopolitani.” 809 The

money was received and in June of 1259 Philippe wrote to Louis IX thanking him for

the sum. 810 Philippe addressed Louis IX in a conventional fashion: “Excellenti et

Magnifico Domino Ludovico dei gratia Regi francorum illustri.” 811 He identified

himself as “Phylippus filius serenissimi domini Balduini dei gratia Constantinopolitani

imperatoris (fidelissimi in Christo) imperatoris (a deo coronati Romanie moderatoris

semper augusti) eius [Louis IX’s] consanguineus.” 812 Both sides, therefore,

acknowledged the kin relationship and the other’s title and status. Philippe’s thanks

were effusive; he used a form of “gratia” three times in one sentence and spoke of Louis

IX’s generosity.

This one thousand livres is the only documented example of Capetian financial

help to the Courtenay after Marie’s arrival in the West. It was a relatively minor

contribution, especially considering that Marie was searching for money to redeem her

son. Louis IX did charge his representative, Jean de Brabant, with working toward

809
Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of
Constantinople,” p. 49.
810
Ibid. See also Hendrickx, Regestes, pp 167-68, no. 266.
811
The letter is published in Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the
Latin Empire of Constantinople,” p. 49 and all quotes come from there.
812
The parentheses indicate text crossed out in the original.
287
Philippe’s release, but the Capetians were not the source of the funds to redeem the

imperial heir. 813 Instead, Marie successfully sought this aid among her maternal

relatives in Castile. Already in Baudouin II’s prior visit, the Capetians had shown

themselves less generous than in the 1230s. After Blanche of Castile’s death, her son’s

interest in aiding his cousins diminished further.

In the late 1250s, Marie’s primary destination was Castile, where she had close

relatives and Baudouin II had already received the promise of aid, if not its

fulfillment. 814 According to Sanudo, she also sought assistance in Aragon as well. 815

She had reason to believe the Aragonese were susceptible to an appeal: The king of

Aragon’s late wife, Yolande, was the granddaughter of Pierre II and Yolande de

Courtenay, and thus the niece of Baudouin II, although probably close to his own

age. 816 If Marie came overland, part of her journey to Castile would have most likely

taken her through Aragon and a stop to ascertain the possibility of aid would have been

natural. About Marie’s stay in Aragon, nothing is known beyond this brief mention.

According to the various sources, Alfonso X provided the funds to recover

Philippe as part of an alliance that included the engagement of Alfonso X’s daughter to

Philippe. Alfonso X’s willingness to contribute this money, certainly a large sum, is

never entirely explained. Sanudo linked the Castilian provision of monies with the

813
Jean de Brabant noted Louis IX’s instructions: “Dominacioni vestre cupio fore notum quod me
Veneciam applicante studiosus extiti circa negocium deliberationis domini Phylippi filii serenissimi
domini Balduini Imperatoris Constantinopolitani fideliter prosequendum.” Wolff, “Mortgage and
Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of Constantinople,” p. 49.
814
Despite the varying dates provided in the sources, Wolff has argued convincingly that Marie’s visit
happened between 1258 and 1261, when Philippe was free. Ibid., pp 59-64.
815
Sanudo, “Fragmentum,” p. 152: “Domina vero imperatrix uxor eius precesserat ad petendum auxilia
regum pincipum et baronum et aliorum quorumcumque fidelium. Inter alios vero regis Aragonum Jacobi
ac etiam Nanfosi generi sui regis Castelle petens auxilium pro recuperatione filii sui Phylippi iam dicti.”
816
She married James of Aragon in 1236 and bore him a daughter that year. Her mother, Yolande de
Courtenay, had married Andrew of Hungary in the mid-1210s.
288
marriage arranged between Philippe and Alfonso X’s daughter. 817 He mistakenly

placed the redemption of Philippe and the arrangement of the alliance after the fall of

Constantinople and so attributed the aid to the push for its recovery. Relocating the

event to before 1261, as Wolff did, changes the context but not the purpose. As had

Bonifacio del Monferrato, Theodore Lascaris, John Asen, Jean de Brienne and, later,

Charles d’Anjou, Alfonso X saw marriage between his daughter and the imperial heir as

a means to acquire a claim over Constantinople. When the negotiations began,

Baudouin II still held the city and, thus, Marie was in a position to promise Alfonso X a

future stake in the great commercial and religious center. Although this marriage never

took place, later events confirm the Castilian king’s ambitions toward Constantinople.

In the early 1270s, Alfonso X married his daughter to the marquis of Montferrat to

solidify an anti-Angevin alliance. More than twenty years later, he sent his

granddaughter, Yolande del Monferrato, to marry Andronikos II and included in the

dowry her claim to the kingdom of Thessaloniki, which she inherited through her

father. 818

In addition to Sanudo, two Castilian sources offer a single fanciful version of

Marie’s visit. In these accounts, Baudouin II, not Philippe, was in captivity, and he was

held by the Saracens, not the Venetians. It also incorrectly places the event in 1268.

This story confirms, however, the basic report from Sanudo: that Marie came to visit

817
Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of
Constantinople,” p. 46. Sanudo, “Fragmentum,” p. 152: “Et habuit maxime a rege Castelle, cum quo
etiam ipsam tractabat parentelam, scilicet velle dare filiam suam filio suo Phylippo pro acquirendo
imperium Romanie.”
818
Angeliki E. Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins: the Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp 44-48. Albert Failler, “Le second mariage
d'Andronic II Palaiologos,” Revue de Études Byzantines 57 (1999): 225-35.
289
Alfonso X and that he provided her with the funds to redeem her son. 819 Although the

tale is obviously fabricated, the elements are evocative. In the Castilian version, Marie

arrived in dramatic fashion—in the company of thirty dueñas clad in black—and

refused to sit with the queen because of Baudouin II’s captivity. 820 The queen acted as

an intermediary between Marie and Alfonso X, relating the empress’s sad tale to her

husband, who insisted on providing the funds to redeem the emperor. 821

A number of elements of this story are worth exploring. Upon hearing of her

husband’s captivity, Alfonso X asked why his own countrymen had not redeemed him.

Marie responded that that was not the custom and that they felt that they had done

enough by not replacing him with a new emperor. 822 This answer must have been

shocking—to Alfonso X, if it was actually given, and certainly to the tale’s readers.

Even after the great Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa, raids and the detention of

travelers resulted in significant numbers of Christian captives in Muslim kingdoms . 823

In Iberia, the ransoming of captives was the responsibility of the crown, the church, the

various ransoming orders, relatives, and, indeed, the entire community. 824 Alfonso X’s

own law code, Siete Partidas, whose composition was already underway in 1258, spoke

of the obligation to ransom captives. Sons who did not ransom their fathers could be

819
See the discussion in Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin
Empire of Constantinople,” pp 56-60.
820
Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, Crónica de España del Arzobispo Roderigo Ximénes de Rada, Colección de
documentos inéditos para la historia de España CVI (Madrid: J. Perales, 1893), p. 15: “E estando en
Burgos, veniéronle nuevas de una Emperatrix que venia á él, que era su marido captiuo en tierra del
Soldán, e venian con ella treinta dueñas, todas vestidas de negro.”
821
Jiménez de Rada, Crónica de España, pp 15-16; Cayetano Rosell, ed., “Crónica del Rey Don Alfonso
Decimo,” in Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles (Madrid, 1875), pp 12-
13.
822
Jiménez de Rada, Crónica de España, p. 15: “E ella dixo que non era uso que diesen por él nada, mas
antes decian ellos que le facian mucho cuando non facian otro Emperador.”
823
Rodriguez, Captives & Their Saviors in the Medieval Crown of Aragon, p. 10.
824
Jaribel Rodriguez has demonstrated how the community of Aragon in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth centuries was geared toward and around the redemptive of captives. Rodriguez, Captives &
Their Saviors in the Medieval Crown of Aragon.
290
disinherited. 825 In this context, the idea of an entire political community that refused to

raise the money to redeem their emperor was alien.

Alfonso X’s question and Marie’s answer reminds the reader that the barons of

the Latin Empire displayed a great deal of independence and were willing to act in

opposition to the emperor. Apparently, this was recognized and notable in the West.

The relative weakness of the emperor when it came to his subjects, a term that seems

inappropriate to describe his relationship with the French barons, was unfamiliar and,

indeed, may have seemed dangerous to the Castilian emperor.

The Castilian fictional accounts credited Alfonso X’s aid to Constantinople with

his selection as German emperor. This latter event took place in 1257, before Marie’s

visit to Castile or the redemption of Philippe, thus rendering this chain of events

impossible. His interest in Constantinople, however, might have been connected to his

European ambitions. 826 Alfonso X faced a strong rival claimant for the German title in

Richard of Cornwall, not to mention the Hohenstaufen. 827 A connection or even claim

to the Eastern empire would strengthen his position as an international ruler, not merely

a Castilian king. The Hohenstaufen emperors, especially Frederick II, had used

crusading and support for crusader states to bolster their position. 828 Frederick II had at

least twice interfered in favor of the Latin Empire in the 1240s, and Baudouin II and

Marie could have easily reminded Alfonso X of these incidents. Crusading credentials

825
Ibid., pp 39, 119.
826
See Wolff’s speculations on this matter. Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son:
Castile and the Latin Empire of Constantinople,” pp 81-82.
827
For a discussion of the French opposition to Alfonso X’s candidacy, see Jones, Eclipse of Empire?, pp
114-18.
828
Ibid., pp 340-45.
291
and international scope could only help Alfonso X in his desire to succeed to the

Western imperial throne.

The Castilian chronicles also compared Alfonso X, favorably, to the Capetian

monarch and the pope. According to the story, Marie had already received two-thirds

of the sum needed from Louis IX and Alexander IV, but Alfonso X told her to return

those monies since he would pay the entire amount. 829 The choice of the papacy and

the French king is not accidental. As should be apparent by now, these were the Latin

Empire’s greatest allies and Louis IX had already provided a sum for Philippe’s

expenses and sent an envoy to inquire into getting the imperial heir released. Although

there is no evidence that Louis IX or Alexander IV actually contributed money for

Philippe’s release, it is certainly plausible and the story placed Alfonso X in the

company of and then asserted him above the two great institutions of the thirteenth

century: the Capetian monarchy and the papacy. This comparison certainly played into

his desire to become the German emperor. The Latin Empire, once again, was a pawn

in European politics.

In addition to these political reasons, the family tie between Alfonso X and

Marie, strengthened by the presence in his court of her brothers, Alphonse, count d’Eu;

Louis, count de Beaumont; and Jean, count de Montfort; likely influenced him to aid

her. From 1255 to 1274, the brothers appeared frequently in charters of Alfonso X’s,

where they were identified as children of Jean de Brienne and Berenguela, with their

French titles and land, and as vassals of the Castilian king. 830 Their continued and

829
Jiménez de Rada, Crónica de España, p. 15.
830
Their identity is certain: “D. Alfonso, fijo del Rey Johan Emperador de Constantinopla et de la
Emperadriz Doña Berenguela, conde Do, vasallo del Rey, conf. – D. Lois, fijo del Emperador é de la
Emperadriz sobredichos, conde de Belmont, vasallo del Rey, conf. – D. Johan, fijo del Emperador é de la
292
prominent presence in the documentation reveals them as close advisers and

companions to the Castilian king, as well as, in the case of Alphonse and Jean, officials

of the Capetian monarchy. 831 These relatives, at least, were a source of support to

Baudouin II and Marie. The contrast between their behavior and that of the Courtenay

siblings suggests that, as one might expect, it was not the kin connection itself but rather

the personal relationship that garnered support and loyalty. Baudouin II’s sisters were

unwilling to relinquish land they had come to see as their own to a younger brother,

whom they had never met before his trip to the West as a teenager. Marie’s brothers

consistently appeared at her side in France, Cyprus, Flanders, and Castile.

Finally, Marie’s own personal appeal played a role in her ability to get funds.

She has already appeared, in the account of Joinville and the Récits, as a persuasive

woman with a dramatic touch. This portrait is confirmed in the Castilian account by the

thirty women clothed in black and her refusal to join the queen at the table because her

husband was in captivity. 832 She had spent the prior decade advocating for the Latin

Empire in the west and presumably honed her presentation and arguments.

Marie’s advocacy and Alfonso X’s generosity secured Philippe’s release at some

time between June 1259 and May 1261. On May 1, 1261, he was present at Beauvais in

the company of Louis IX, Thibaut II, king of Navarre (V count of Champagne), and the

future Philip III. 833 The text refers to Philippe as “Philippo Balduini illustris

Imperatoris Constantinopolitani primogenito.” Louis IX had provided support and

Emperadriz sobredichos, conde de Monfort, vasallo del Rey, conf.” Memorial histórico español, I: 77-
303 passim .The first dated from November 1255. Ibid., I: 77-79, no. XXXVII.
831
Père Anselme, Augustin Déchauffé, and M. Du Fourny, Histoire de la maison royale de France (New
York: Johnson Reprint Corportation, 1726), VI: 134, VIII: 518, 845.
832
Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of
Constantinople,” p. 57.
833
Ibid., pp 54-55.
293
advocacy for Philippe during his captivity and the visit probably included an expression

of thanks and a request for further aid for the failing Latin Empire. Louvet published

this document in 1614. In the publication, the above-cited text was followed by

“Buticulario.” Wolff argued, persuasively I think, that Philippe’s status as the imperial

heir made it unlikely that he held the title of buticularius. Philippe’s departure from

Constantinople as a boy or young teenager and his long absence also casts doubt on this

title. Instead, Wolff speculated that Philippe’s uncles, Alphonse d’Eu and Jean de

Montfort, who was the buticularius of France, were the subsequent witnesses in the

document and that in transcribing it Louvet omitted a line of text, thus erroneously

attaching the title of buticularius to Philippe when it actually belonged to Jean. 834 If

Alphonse and Jean were present at Beauvais in the spring of 1261, they might have

drawn Philippe to the Capetian court—or vice versa. If they were, it was a quick visit,

since they were with the Castilian king on March 24 and May 30. 835 The Brienne

siblings, brothers as well as sister, spent their careers in Castile and France, embodying

their joint heritage.

Fall of Constantinople

As Marie struggled to regain control of Namur and sought assistance in Spain,

negotiations between the papacy and Nicaea continued and demonstrated the weakness

of papal support for the Latin Empire. In 1253, after Innocent IV’s rush of

correspondence concerning the Latin Empire, Vatatzes reached out once again to the

West. He had subdued, once again, Michael II Doukas and sought, once again, a lasting

834
Ibid.
835
Memorial histórico español, I: 181-84, no. LXXXIV, LXXXV.
294
peace through the marriage of his granddaughter and Michael II’s son. 836 Vatatzes was

still searching for a solution that would tie the Doukai to him and forestall future

rebellions. Incorporating them into the Nicaean hierarchy, through titles and marriage,

still seemed to be the best solution, especially when coupled with the capture of the

troublesome Theodore Doukas.

A letter from the Greek patriarch, Manuel, to Innocent IV, tentatively dated to

the end of 1253 by Norden, emphasized the great possibility of peace and the benefit it

would bring to all of Christendom. 837 Manuel avoided mention of specific provisions,

but the details are recorded in later letters of Alexander IV’s summarizing the events of

1253–1254. 838 Both Vatatzes and Innocent IV were willing to make serious

concessions in order to reach an agreement. The Greeks would accept papal supremacy

in matters of faith and ecclesiastical organization, although they withheld a decision on

the filioque question and suggested that a council be called to debate the issue. In

exchange for these concessions, the Nicaean envoys requested their own in return: that

Greek rule, secular and religious, be reinstated in Constantinople and that the Franks be

exiled. 839

The Nicaean offer clearly appealed to Innocent IV. He agreed to a council to

discuss the filioque, although there could be no question that the Roman position was

836
Acropolites, Opera, pp 88-90, ch 49. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp
349-51, ch 49.
837
I have only been able to find the letter in Norden’s German translation, which includes the occasional
Greek excerpt. Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp 756-59. Norden’s commentary about this letter
and the reinstatement of the negotiations is illuminating. Ibid., pp 367-72.
838
When Alexander IV restarted negotiations in 1256, his instructions to his envoy, the bishop of Orvieto,
included a lengthy discussion of Innocent IV’s and Vatatzes’s positions. F. Schillman, “Zur
Byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV,” Römische Quartalschrift 22, no. Heft 4 (1908): 109-12.
839
For discussions of these negotiations see Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp 367-76 and
Schillman, “Zur Byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV” The details are known from communications of
Alexander IV: Bourel de la Roncière, Registres d'Alexandre IV, no. 1406; Baronio and Raynaldus,
Annales ecclesiastici, yr 1256, sect 48-49.
295
the correct one. 840 Most startling was his attitude toward Constantinople. He was

unwilling to commit to the reinstatement of Greek authority in Constantinople, but his

response was far from a full-bodied proclamation of support for the Latin Empire.

Instead, the pope objected that, without any legitimate charge against Baudouin II, he

had no standing to remove him. He made a vague promise to do his best to resolve the

outstanding issues—a ridiculous promise considering that the Nicaean demand was for

the exile of the Franks from Constantinople, a move that would (and eventually did)

bring the Latin Empire to an end. 841 Innocent IV also asserted his authority over secular

offices, implying that, if a charge were to arise against Baudouin II, he could depose

him. 842 This reminder would have rung a particular bell with Vatatzes who, because of

his relationship with Frederick II, was well aware of this papal claim and this pope’s

willingness to use it. As an immediate concession, Innocent IV offered to call the

Greek patriarch “patriarch of Constantinople” after the union. More significantly, the

pope anticipated the Greek recovery of the great city, speaking of the day when “it

should come to pass, by whatever means, that the city of Constantinople fall to (devolvi)

the dominion of this emperor” and implying, if not outright stating, his willingness to

see this happen. 843

840
Schillman, “Zur Byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV,” pp 116-17.
841
Ibid., pp 117: “Porro de predicti imperii negotio idem nuntii hoc receperunt ab eodem predecessore
responsum, quod super eo non vocato imperatore Latino contra iuris ratio non patitur aliquid diffinire,
quia diffinitio irrita videretur, nisi adversus citatum confessum procederet vel convictum. Sed ut nichil de
hiis, qu reconciliationi orientalis ecclesie cooperantur, ommitteret, paratum se obtulit ad compositionem
inter prefatum Caloiohannem et imperatorem eundem interponere studiosius partes suas, confidens eam
per suum studium provenire.”
842
Ibid.: “ad cuius tutelam christianis sunt distribute principibus administrationes secularium
dignitatum.”
843
Ibid., pp 118: “ex tunc Constantinopolitanum patriarcham vere appellationis nomine nuncuparet, et
postquam Constantinopolitanam civitatem ad eiusdem imperatoris dominium devolvi casu quolibet
contigisset, eum faceret in antiqui patirarchatus sedem reduci, ut ibi residens preesset subditis, quibus in
presentiarum noscitur presidere patriarcha latinus suis quos nunc habet subditis pacifice profuturo.”
296
 The deaths of Innocent IV and Vatatzes did not signal a final break in the papal-

Nicaean negotiations. In 1256, after a two-year conflict with Bulgaria ended, Theodore

II sent word to Alexander IV, Innocent IV’s successor, requesting the reopening of the

papal-Nicaean negotiations. 844 A series of papal communications, including

instructions to the envoy, Constantinus, the bishop of Orvieto; and letters to Theodore

II; the Greek clergy; Baudouin II; and the Franks in Constantinople, survive. 845

Alexander IV took the opportunity seriously. His instructions to Constantinus reviewed

the offer made by Innocent IV and the response of Vatatzes, including the demand that

Greek authority, secular and religious, be restored in Constantinople and the Franks

exiled. The pope urged caution on his envoy. He was to try, essentially, to strike a

better deal with Nicaea instead of simply picking up where the negotiations had left off

in 1254. He had, however, “plenitudinem potestatis” if it seemed that unity was

possible, including the authority to summon a council to resolve the filioque question. 846

Alexander IV’s letter to Theodore II, like his instructions to the bishop,

discussed the negotiations between Innocent IV and Vatatzes. The pope repeatedly

mentioned, and praised, Vatatzes. He extolled the virtues of peace and the piety and

prudence of those who brought it about. He did not repeat Innocent IV’s half-made

offer to support a Greek return to Constantinople, but he did voice an expectation that

Theodore II’s secular authority would be strengthened by his reliance on the “solid rock

844
Akropolites gave a detailed account of the Nicaean campaign against the Bulgarians. Acropolites,
Opera, pp 107-22, ch 54-59. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 281-94, ch
54-59.
845
These are our source for the events of 1253–1254 as well as 1256.
846
Schillman, “Zur Byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV,” pp 118-19.
297
of the church.” 847 To the Greek clergy, Alexander IV spoke at some length about the

ideal of unity in the church, a state akin to that of the apostles, many members but one

body. The unity, in addition to being the fulfillment of Christ’s intention, would

strengthen the Christian faith and diminish heresies. 848

Alexander IV also sought the support of Westerners and Franks for

Constantinus. To them, unsurprisingly, he was more circumspect about the goals of the

mission. He wrote an open letter of introduction to clerics requesting that they assist

Constantinus’s travel through their lands. 849 He also wrote three separate letters to the

Franks—one to the patriarch and clerics of the Latin Empire, one to Baudouin II, and

one to the barons. He announced Constantinus’s mission with the goal of “the

reconciliation of the eastern church,” and asked for their support for him in that

undertaking. 850 Innocent IV and Alexander IV deceived the Franks in regard to the

nature of their conversations with Vatatzes. Certainly, discussions of church union

were familiar to the Franks of Constantinople. Gregory IX’s legation in the mid-1230s

had attempted to negotiate a Greek submission to Rome. These envoys had also mixed

the political with the religious, at the urging of the emperor, clerics, and barons of

Constantinople, and sought a year-long truce. 851 Innocent IV’s offer, however, which

Alexander IV was willing to second, to recognize a Greek patriarch and, eventually, to

support the reinstatement of Greek secular and religious authority in Constantinople

seriously threatened the Franks’ hold on the city. The letters to the Franks reflect that,

847
Ibid., pp 123: “Unde tibi Deo dante proveniat, quod tronus tuus supra firmam petram ecclesie
solidatus contra omnes temporum turbines, contra omnes incursus infidelium nationum inconvulsam
obtinebit indeficientis roboris firmitatem.”
848
Ibid., pp 124-26.
849
Ibid., pp 127-28.
850
Ibid., pp 128: “apostolice sedis legatum ad partes imperii Grecorum pro reconciliatione orientalis
ecclesie commisso, sibi plene legationis officio destinemus.”
851
See pp 157-61 above.
298
speaking only of the possibility for religious reconciliation and not the restoration of

Greek power.

These careful preparations were for nought. The envoys were with Theodore II

in September of 1256, but in October Akropolites was dispatched to dismiss them

without an agreement. 852 This brought to an end, until after the reconquest of

Constantinople, all known attempts at negotiated agreement between the papacy and

Nicaea. The lengthy discussions, the exchanges of envoys, the remarkable concessions

on both sides had failed to bring about reconciliation. Norden blamed this final failure

on Theodore II’s convictions and commitment to the status of the Greek church. 853

None of the previous attempts brought about reconciliation, however, and that the union

accomplished in 1274 at the Second Council of Lyon floundered on the opposition of

the Greek clergy and populace. It is hard to forgo the impression that reconciliation

between the Eastern and Western churches, especially while control of Constantinople

was an issue, was simply too fraught to succeed.

The collapse of the negotiations was followed by yet another breakdown in

relations with the Doukai. In August of 1258, Theodore II Lascaris died and

Palaiologos quickly rose to power, first as guardian for the heir John IV, then as despot

and finally as emperor. Baudouin II, attempting to take advantage of Palaiologos’s

uncertain succession, sent ambassadors to negotiate a treaty. In Akropolites’ account,

852
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 321, ch 67: “Departing from
Thessalonike, I arrived at Berroia; the pope’s emisaries were there whom I was to dismiss by imperial
order. I stayed there for a short time for the dismissal of the emissaries and a few other matters.”
Acropolites, Opera, pp 139-40, ch 67: “τῆς γοῦν Θεσσαλονίκης ἐξιὼν ἀπικόμην περὶ τὴν Βέρροιαν:
ἐκεῖσε γὰρ ὑπῆρχον καὶ οἱ τοῦ πάπα πρέσβεις, οὓς ἀπεκβαλεῖν βασιλικῷ προστάγματι ἔμελλον.
κἀκεῖσε μικρὸν προσκαρτερήσας διὰ τὴν τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπεκβολὴν καὶ δι’ ἑτέρας τινὰς ὑποθέσεις.”
Macrides offered a useful, if brief, summary of the evidence for the negotiations at Thessaloniki, which is
only enough to confirm that they happened. Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 321-22,
ftnt 3.
853
Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, p. 380.
299
the newly crowned emperor mocked the messengers, who may have been Greeks, and,

after refusing to give up one territory after another, offered peace in exchange for half

of the tax on trade and transactions and of the revenue from the mint. “Thus put to

shame, the ambassadors of the Latins returned home to Constantinople having

accomplished nothing.” 854 Nothing better illustrates the state of the Latin Empire in its

last years than this incident. Once, during the reign of Theodore Lascaris, the Franks of

Constantinople seemed a worthwhile partner. Forty years later, an upstart emperor in

Nicaea teased and mocked the “so-called” emperor of Constantinople.

The threat to Nicaea and Palaiologos’s power originated not in the Franks, but in

Michael II Doukas, who continued to challenge Nicaea. Michael II had enlisted some

unusual allies through marriage alliances. These arrangements demonstrate both the

possibilities and weaknesses of marriage alliances, especially those that crossed cultural

and geographic boundaries. Around the time of Theodore II Lascaris’s death, Michael

II negotiated alliances with Guillaume de Villehardouin, prince of the Morea, and

Manfred, king of Sicily, alliances accompanied by marriages to Michael II’s daughters

Anna and Helena. Michael II Doukas made major concessions for these marriages to

work—Guillaume got sixty thousand hyperper, gifts, and several castles in Thessaly as

a dowry, while Manfred received recognition of his 1257–1258 conquests along the

northern Epirote and Albanian coast. 855 In addition to his desire for land on the Adriatic

854
Acropolites, Opera, ppp 161-63, ch 78. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History,
p. 352, ch 78. For confirmation of the embassy, and the information that the envoys were Greeks, see
Pachymeres, Relations historiques, I: 149-51.
855
Nicol provides a good account of the circumstances and agreements. Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros,
pp 158-72.
300
coast, Manfred’s interest in the alliance might have been encouraged by the poor

treatment his sister, Anna-Constance, received in Nicaea. 856

Armed with his new relatives, Michael II Doukas dismissed Palaiologos’s offers

of peace. The new Nicaean ruler then appealed to Manfred, whose father, Frederick

II,had been an ally of Nicaea’s, “but how could he fulfil any of the emperor’s wishes

when he was absolutely bound to the renegade Michael and was possessed by the dream

of a greater gain? The emperor likewise sent an embassy to the prince of Achaia. But

he too, emboldened by the marriage alliance with the renegade, and expecting many

benefits to come to him from it, held the discussions of no account.” 857 At the end of

1258, Guillaume de Villehardouin and Michael II Doukas met to arrange a joint attack

on Nicaean possessions.

The alliance, however, could not hold. As opposed to the unified Nicaean army,

that of Guillaume de Villehardouin and Michael Doukas was beset by troubles. Nicol

provided a stark evaluation: “[T]heir alliance was unreal and unnatural, and their

relationships were bedevilled by the spirit of mistrust and misunderstanding that existed

between Greeks and Latins.” 858 On the battlefield at Pelagonia, Michael II Doukas’s

son John Doukas deserted to the Nicaean army, the despot himself fled, and the

remainder of the Epirote forces dissipated. The prince and the Frankish army were left

856
See pp 236-37 above for Vatatzes’s affair with her companion.
857
Acropolites, Opera, pp 163-65, ch 79. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History,
pp 354-55, ch 79.
858
Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros, p. 180.
301
on their own and severely defeated. 859 Guillaume de Villehardouin and many of his

barons were seized. 860

The defeat at Pelagonia ended an intriguing possibility—an alliance between

Greeks, Franks, and Westerners. Although there is no evidence of an official contingent

from Constantinople, imperial barons did participate in the battle. One of them was

Anseau de Toucy, the son of Narjot de Toucy and his French-Greek wife. Anseau’s

sister, possibly named Agnès, had married Guillaume de Villehardouin in the late

1230s, although she had died by 1258 when the prince married Michael II’s daughter. 861

Another of Anseau’s sisters, Marguerite, had left her Cistercian convent in order to

marry an Italian in the service of the Villehardouin. 862 As Anseau’s presence in the

Morean army demonstrates, the ties between Constantinople and the Morea remained

strong.

But Michael II’s marriage alliances could not keep him in the battlefield. This

collapse of this alliance, in which the participants had great hopes, highlights the

unreliability of the Doukai. It is not hard, here, to sympathize with the anonymous

author of the Chronicle of the Morea who, when describing the loss at Pelagonia, railed

against the Doukai abandonment: “Who will hear of this and ever believe a Roman,

either for love or Friendship or for any relationship? Never believe a Roman in

whatever he may swear to you; when he wants and desires to betray you, then he makes

you godfather of his child or his adopted brother, or he makes you an in-law so that he

859
For a look at how this incident in the Chronicle of Morea affirmed a Moreot identity see Shawcross,
The Chronicle of Morea, pp 208-9.
860
Acropolites, Opera, pp 165-71, ch 80-81. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The
History, pp 357-64, ch 80-81.
861
Aubri de Trois-Fontaines recorded the marriage. Aubri de Trois-Fontaines, “Chronicon,” p. 939, ll 3-
5: “Frater eius Guielmus, qui custodit terram suam, habet filiam Nargaldi, natam de filia Livernas et
sororis regis Francie.” See Longnon, “Les Toucy en Orient et en Italie au treizième siècle,” p. 9.
862
Berger, Registres d'Innocent IV, p. 40, no. 5647.
302
may exterminate you.” 863 In a world in which marriages and their ensuing kin

connections were supposed to create political alliances, the repeated behavior of the

Doukai was maddening to Greek and Frank alike.

Palaiologos set out for Constantinople in the spring of 1260, preparing to take

the city. According to Akropolites, Palaiologos hoped to take it with the cooperation of

an insider—as Vatatzes had taken Melnick and Thessaloniki. A Frank named Anseau,

who was a relative and ex-prisoner of Palaiologos’s, agreed to open the gate for the

Nicaean troops. “And he [Anseau] was believed when he said this; for their kinship

provided the illusion that the man was telling the truth and Anselm [Anseau] had

received promises, confirmed by oaths, of more honours and gifts […] of the Franks in

the battle of the prince of Achaia.” 864 Secondary sources have variously identified this

Anseau as either Anseau de Cayeux or Anseau de Toucy. Anseau de Cayeux and

Palaiologos were distantly related by marriage, while Anseau de Toucy had been

captured at Pelagonia. Whoever Anseau was, he did not follow through on his

arrangement with Palaiologos. Instead, he stalled until he finally announced that he was

no longer entrusted with the keys to the gate. Not ready to take Constantinople by

siege, Palaiologos agreed to a one-year truce with the Franks and retreated to Asia

863
Translation in Lurier, Crusaders as Conquerors: The Chronicle of the Morea, p. 187. Codex
Havniensis in Schmitt, The Chronicle of Morea. To Chronikon tou Moreos, p. 260, ll 3932-37:
“Ποῖος ν’ ἀκούσῃ πώποτε Ρωμαίου νὰ ἔχῃ πιστέψει
δι’ ἀγάπην γὰρ ἢ διὰ φιλίαν ἢ διὰ καμμίαν συγγένειον;
ποτὲ Ρωμαίου μὴ ἐμπιστευτῇς διὰ ὅσα καὶ σοῦ ὀμνύει:
ὅπαν θέλῃ καὶ βούλεται τοῦ νὰ σὲ ἀπεργώσῃ,
τότε σὲ κάμνει σύντεκνον ἢ ἀδελφοποιτόν του,
ἢ κάμνει σε συμπέθερον διὰ νὰ σὲ ἐξολοθρέψῃ.”
864
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 367, ch 83. Acropolites, Opera, p.
174, ch 83: “Καὶ ἐπιστεύετο λέγων ταῦτα: τό τε γὰρ συγγενὲς φαντασίαν ἐδίδου τοῦ ἀληθεύειν τὸν
ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὸ πλειόνων τε τιμῶν καὶ δωρημάτων ὑποσχέσεις ἐνωμότους λαβόντα*** Φράγγων ἐν
τῇ τοῦ πρίγκιπος Ἀχαΐας μάχῃ.” (The *** notes a lacuna in the text.)
303
Minor. 865 Other sources recounted a full-scale attack on the city, which failed. 866

Constantinople might be immersed in poverty and bereft of defenders, but its walls still

presented a formidable challenge to any attacking force.

In 1260, the Venetians, along with the barons, left in the Morea and the lords of

the Western-held islands in the Aegean, agreed to finance a garrison of one thousand

men in Constantinople to provide for the permanent defense of the city. 867 Strangely

enough, this provision, which seemed to fill the ever-present need of the Latin Empire

for a permanent fighting force, doomed the city. In the summer of 1261, Palaiologos

dispatched two armies to Europe to fight Michael II, who had not given up his ambition,

and Constantine, the Bulgarian tsar and John IV’s brother-in-law, the son of Theodore

II Lascaris who had been shunted aside by Palaiologos. 868 He gave them orders to

launch a fake attack on Constantinople, instructing the caesar that “he should make an

assault against it and the army should run up to its very gates so that they might instil

terror in the Latins inside.” 869 Palaiologos was still hesitant to devote his energies to an

all-out siege of the city. The defending forces, however, had departed Constantinople to

attack on a Nicaean possession in the Black Sea. Some members of the Nicaean forces

had lived in Constantinople and they informed the caesar of a narrow opening in the

wall. A small number of men entered through the gap and, overwhelming the

gatekeeper, threw open the doors to the city and the Nicaean troops entered. The

Frankish residents of the city panicked and hid themselves as best they could, as the

865
Ibid., pp 174-75, ch 83. Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, pp 367-68, ch 83.
866
See the comments in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 368.
867
The agreement is published in Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, 760-61.
868
See comments in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 377, ftnt 1.
869
Translation from Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 375, ch 85. Acropolites, Opera,
p.181, ch 85: “ἔφοδόν τινα κατ’αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι καὶ μέχρι τῶν πυλῶν αὐτῆς ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰ
στρατεύματα, ὡς ἂν πτοία παρ’ αὐτῶν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐντὸς Λατίνοις ἐγγένηται.”
304
Greeks set fire to Western quarters. The Venetian-led fleet returned to find the city in

flames and the Western population desperately seeking escape. Baudouin II himself

had fled to the Great Palace, from which a ship collected him. 870 Finally, just more than

fifty-seven years after the Fourth Crusaders captured it, “these things happened in this

way, and by the providence of God the city of Constantine again became subject to the

emperor of the Romans, in a just and fitting way.” 871

870
Ibid., p. 183, ch 85. Translation in Akropolites, George Akropolites: The History, p. 376, ch 85.
871
Translation from Ibid. Acropolites, Opera, p. 183, ch 85: “καὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὕτω ζυνέβη, καὶ ἡ
Κωνσταντίνου προνοίᾳ θεοῦ καὶ αὖθις ὑπὸ χεῖρα τοῦ βασιλέως τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐγένετο κατὰ λόγον
δίκαιόν τε καὶ προσήκοντα.”
305
 CHAPTER 8:

THE FRANKS IN EXILE, 1261–1282

The fall of Constantinople to the Greeks in 1261 does not mark the end of the

Latin Empire’s story. Far from it—the twenty years following the Franks’ flight

witnessed a variety of diplomatic activity involving the empire and its principals.

Baudouin II pursued alliances with Manfred, Urban IV and his successors, Alfonso X,

and Charles d’Anjou—at times simultaneously. Seeking aid wherever he could find it,

the exiled emperor did not seem to mind, or perhaps even to consider, that the

Hohenstaufen and Castilian rulers, for example, were at odds, not to mention the

ongoing conflict between the former and the papacy. He took sides based on his own

needs and not on any principaled position. His pursuit of all possible avenues of

support turned out to be harmful, alientating potential supporters, especially the papacy.

Once the Franks had been exiled, Constantinople and Baudouin II’s title held more

interest for Westerners than it had during the previous decades. Although, at moments,

the possibilities were promising, in the end European politics and, for the papacy, the

hope of church union through negotiation, doomed the prospects for Frankish recovery

of Constantinople. This chapter traces Baudouin II’s attempts after 1261 to secure aid

in the West and responses from popes, kings, dukes, and counts. This process of

discussions, promises, and retreat revealed the weaknesses in Baudouin II’s strategy.

In July of 1261, as Greek forces occupied the city, the Venetian fleet collected

Baudouin II, among others, from the Great Palace, on the Sea of Marmara, and took

306
him to Greece. 872 One can only imagine his shock. Despite the many years Baudouin

II had spent in the West, Constantinople was his home. He had been born there and

been the presumptive heir or emperor since childhood. Although frequently tested, the

city’s walls had held against direct attack in his lifetime and, in fact, held in the summer

of 1261. It was only with the knowledge of Greek natives of the city that the Nicaean

army found gaps in the wall and entered the city. In hindsight, the fall of

Constantinople seems inevitable. Defended by a small number of underresourced men,

unable to recruit help from the West, the city could not hold out forever against the

gathering strength of Nicaea. Yet, yet. Had Michael II Doukas’s alliance with Manfred

and Guillaume de Villehardouin held on the battlefield and the battle of Pelagonia gone

the other way. 873 Had Philippe de Courtenay, released from Venetian custody, returned

with a significant force from Castile and France. Had the Nicaean commander in 1261

feinted at the city and moved on, as his instructions had imagined. Palaiologos’s own

disbelief at the city’s fall shows that contemporaries did not view it as inevitable, at

least not at that moment. Even after it happened, Baudouin II’s actions, the Western

response, and Byzantine reaction show that they all believed in the possibility of

Western recovery. If the city had been taken once, it could be taken again and, this

time, with a Sicilian alliance, it could receive the support it needed.

872
Sanudo testified to this: “Amissa vero civitate Constantinopolitana, currente anno domini milesimo
ducentesimo, imperator Balduinus de Constantinopoli fuit egressus, cum navibus comunitatis Venetiarum
veniens cum multo popolo tam Veneto quam aliis gentium generationibus, masculis feminis et parvulis,
qui cum eo se reduxerunt in navigiis Venetorum.” Wolff, “Fragmentum,” p. 151. Canale also described
Baudouin II’s flight: “Voirs fu, ensi com ie vos ai contes sa en ariere, que Monsignor Marc Gradenic
conduist li Empereor a Nigrepont; et il trova Monsignor Laurens Teupes que il dona la moite de son
vaselement d’arient ei un biau destrier; et Mesire li Prince de la Moree le aaisa por seiorner.” Canale,
“Cronicon,” p. 498, ch CLXXXIX.
873
Geanakoplos saw the alliance as doomed but also mused that it if had held together, Constantinople
might have remained in the hands of the Franks. Deno John Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus
and the West, 1258–1282: a Study in Byzantine-Latin Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1959), pp 58-59, 73-74.
307
 In 1261, however, the Franks fled to the Aegean Islands and to southern Greece,

the havens closest to Constantinople. Although the Frankish lords there had long acted

independently from the Latin Emperor, they remained loyal allies. In the mid-1230s,

Geoffroy II de Villehardouin had come to the rescue of the city. 874 The papacy

frequently sought support for the Latin Empire in the Morea, although the Franks there

were not always eager to contribute funds. 875 Noble families such as the Toucy spanned

the Aegean, appearing in both Constantinople and the Morea. 876 Sanudo described the

warm reception which Baudouin II received in Negropont. The ruler of Athens, the

duchess of Nacos and Andros, and the lords of Negropont received him with great

honor and magnificent gifts. 877 Although it had been many years since the Latin

Empire had exercised significant power in the region, the imperial title still had

prestige. In Greece, Baudouin II knighted a number of men, fulfilling his ceremonial

role as their overlord. 878

In October, Baudouin II was in Athens where he relinquished to Otho de Cicon,

lord of Carystos on Negropont, several items that he had used as collateral for a loan,

including a relic of John the Baptist’s arm of. 879 The date of the loan is uncertain but

was likely before the fall of Constantinople. Even when in possession of his city,

874
See pp 162-64 above.
875
See, for example, from 1218: Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz, pp 749-50, no 50; from 1224:
Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papae III, pp 283-84, nos. 5186, 5189; from 1236: Auvray, Registres de
Grégoire IX, II: 522-23, no. 3409; from 1238: Ibid., II: 858-60, no. 4035; from 1243: Berger, Registres
d'Innocent IV, pp 6-7, no. 22; from 1252: Ibid., p. 100, no. 592. é
876
Longnon, “Les Toucy en Orient et en Italie au treizième siècle”.
877
Wolff, “Fragmentum,” pp 151-52: “Sed ad imperatorem Balduinum Latinum revertar, qui venit de
Constantinopoli Nigropontem ubi a suis hominibus fuit gratanter receptus, prout ab illis de Rocia qui
ducatui Athenarum dominabantur. Ac etiam a ducissa Nichxie et Andre et aliarum insularum. Et a
dominis Nigropontis magnifice fuit receptus et quamplurimum honoratus, eidem dona magna largientibus
secundum possibilitatem eorum.”
878
Ibid., p. 152: “Qui imperator ibi plures milites fecit.” For an assertion of the importance of the Latin
emperor’s formal position as overlord see Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204–1500, pp 166-67.
879
The loan was for five thousand hyperpers. Two years later, Otho donated the relic to the Cistercians.
Riant, Exuvie sacrae Constantinopolitanae, II: 144-49, nos. XCII, XCV-XCVII.
308
Baudouin II had few sources of income, as constantly demonstrated by his pleas for aid

and the many loans he took out. 880 Once exiled, he acknowledged the futility of trying

to pay back this loan and instead relinquished the relic.

Some exiled barons remained in the Morea. The Chronicle of Morea named

twelve such individuals, from seven different families, and said that others also settled

there. 881 These men included Anselin de Toucy and Villain d’Aulnay, both important

figures in the Latin Empire. According to the Chronicle, in at least two cases siblings

remained together. Clerics originally based in Constantinople also relocated, in large

part at least, to other Frankish states in the Aegean. 882 The appeal of Greece is easy to

understand. Fist of all, the cultural similarities were profound. The Franks in southern

Greece, like those from Constantinople, came from families who came from the West,

mostly France, one or two generations before. Moreover, Palaiologos’s triumph at

Pelagonia and the death and capture of many Franks had substantially weakened the

principality and the remaining community likely welcomed the arrival of men fresh

from Constantinople and motivated to fight the Greeks. According to the Chronicle,

Anselin de Toucy married the mother of Geoffroy de Tournay, and Villain d’Aulnay

received Arkadia. After decades of losing their land to the growing Greek powers and

880
In the late 1250s, the Venetians authorized several loans to Baudouin II for the defense of
Constantinople. Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp 79-80.
881
The Greek version lists Ancelin de Toucy, Vilain d’Aulnay, four d’Aby brothers, two d’Agny
brothers, and at least one member of the Plancy, the de Brice, and the d’Espinas, among others. The
French version has a slightly difference list, including a member of the de Nivelet family; the Italian
version has a much-abbreviated account; and the Aragonese version omits the section. See the text and
translation in Shawcross, The Chronicle of Morea, pp 324-36.
882
This is known from Urban IV’s letters making arrangements for clerics who had been exiled from
Constantinople. In October 1263, he placed clerics in Athens, Methoni, Negropont, and Thebes.
Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, pp 436-37, nos. 908-11. The following spring, he wrote to the bishop
Corinth and priors of a church in Negropont with a similar request. Ibid., pp 230, 425, nos. 1564, 2522.
309
their increasing confinement to Constantinople, the possibility of acquiring their own

property in a society that needed military leaders must have been appealing.

Baudouin II’s warm welcome in Greece and his close relations with the Franks,

however, did not keep him there. He was not prepared to settle down as a permanent

exile, and if he was going to regain Constantinople he needed the kind of assistance that

only the West could provide. Palaiologos had already demonstrated his ability to defeat

the Franks on the battlefield. In 1261, Palaiologos still held Guillaume de

Villehardouin, and the Byzantines, now restored to their ancient capital in Europe,

posed a new and heightened threat to the Franks in Greece, who, far from sponsoring

Baudouin II’s return to his city, needed outside aid themselves.

The Courtenays in Europe

Leaving Greece, Baudouin II continued west to Italy where he met Manfred. 883

The encounter was probably unplanned. Baudouin II’s journey west would have

logically brought him to Italy, where he could seek the papacy’s immediate financial

support and institute the process of gathering resources to retake the lost city. Canale

painted the scene: Manfred “went to meet him and received him most cordially, with

joy and feasts … and gave him gold and silver plate and cloths of silk and beautiful

destriers and palfreys and other horses for his suite, and many servants to serve

them.” 884 In doing so, Manfred transformed Baudouin II from a destitute refugee back

into an imperial figure. After this, Manfred gave Baudouin II funds and “promised him

883
Sanudo gave this impression: “Et inde descendens venit in Apuliam, illic inveniens quod princeps
Manfredus Tarenti in Apulia et Sicilia regnabat.” Wolff, “Fragmentum,” p. 152
884
Translation adapted from Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the
Latin Empire of Constantinople,” p. 66. Canale, “Cronicon,” pp 498-500, ch CLXXXIX: “Quant li rois
Manfrois que a celui tens estoit sire de Puille et de Cesile, sot la venue de Monsignor li Enpereor de
Coustantinople, si li ala a l’encontre, et le resut mult bel, et li fist ioie et feste, et le aaisa de totes iceles
choses que apartient a voir Enpereor; et li dona vaisselement, que d’or que d’arient, a devise; li biaus dras
de soie, biaus destriers et palefrois et autre chevaus por sa maisnee, et maint vaslet por lui servier.”
310
the aid of his own body” to regain Constantinople. 885 He had a request in return: that

the Latin emperor seek a reconciliation between Manfred and the pope, in return for

which Manfred would participate in the crusade to regain Constantinople. If Urban IV

conceded Apulia to the German king, he would even go to the Holy Land to recapture

Jerusalem. 886 If the pope did not want him to lead a crusade to the Holy Land, he

offered to aid Baudouin II in the Latin Empire. 887

Manfred’s assistance was not dependent on peace with the papacy. He enfiefed

Frankish barons with lands, establishing a permanent relationship with them. 888 The

settlement of barons in the Morea and in Sicily confirms the impression left by the

absence of these men in the archives of Champagne and Burgundy: that they, unlike

their emperor, no longer had significant ties to Western land and institutions. Soon after

his departure, Mathilde de Courtenay and her husband had imagined the return of Narjot

de Toucy and made provisions to protect the chapter of Auxerre from his claims. 889

Yet, in 1261, exiled from their home, Narjot’s descendants did not return to the lands of

their parents but rather established themselves in the territory of the Latin Empire’s

allies.

885
Ibid., p. 500, ch CLXXXIX: “Et apres li dona grant plante de mehailles d’or por despendre, et li
promist l’aide que de son cors meesme, que de ces Barons, que de ces homes a sa despanse.”
886
Ibid., p. 500, ch CXC: “Sire Enperere (fait li Rois Manfrois), vos ales a Monsignor l’Apostoille ensi
com vos dites. Il n’est bien de moi: de voir le sai. Ie veul, se il vos plest, que vos li dites de par moi, que
se il me veut doner sa grace et pes, ou au mains trive, ie passerai en Romanie aveuc vos a ma despanse, et
vos metrai en sasine de Coustantinople; et au retorner que ie ferai en Puille, se il me vodra doner Puille,
m’en irai dela la mer a tot mon esfors; et ferai tant a mon pooir, que ie prendrai Ierusalem, que paiens ont
en sasine, et le rendrai a la sainte crestientes.”
887
Ibid.: “Et se Monsignor l’Apostoille ne vodra fere ceste chose, et vos passes en Romanie, ie vos
donerai mult bele aide.”
888
Ibid.: “et apres li dona li Baron de sa tere grant plante d’or et d’avoir.”
889
AD Yonne, G 1846: “In super dixit quod si Nariodus frater Iterii de Tociaco qui in partibis
Costantinopolitanis existit, rediret et super hiis capitulo molestiam aliquam inferre vellet, vel etiam
quilibet alius nos ea garantine teneremur capitulo prefato, et resarcue ei omnia dampna, et gravamina qui
hoc sustineret, et pre omnia ipsum conseruare indempne.”
311
 In 1261, Manfred was a promising prospect. He had already demonstrated his

interest in the East with his marriage to Helen of Epiros, Michael II Doukas’s daughter,

and his alliance with Epiros and the Franks at Pelagonia. In the early 1240s, his father,

Frederick II, had extended help to the Latin Empire, facilitating two treaties with

Vatatzes. His son now demonstrated similar goodwill, and Sicily had great potential as

a base from which to recover Constantinople. For Manfred, as for his father twenty

years earlier, Baudouin II provided the opportunity to demonstrate his piety to the

papacy. 890 That he would attempt this is not surprising, nor is the failure of the strategy.

The Hohenstaufen had been on bad terms with the papacy for decades. The exile of the

Franks from Constantinople did not change that.

Baudouin II left Manfred and proceeded to the papal curia, where he was by

April 1262. 891 Representatives from the doge of Venice joined the Latin emperor and

added their pleas to his. 892 Their presence in the spring of 1262 explains the series of

letters coming out of the papal curia in late spring and early June, calling for collections

in favor of the Latin Empire and even a crusade. A letter to the minister provincial of

the Franciscans in France (undated, but probably from June of 1262) instructed him to

890
See more extensive discussion below.
891
Canale, ch CXCI, 500: “Quant demora Monsignor li Enpereor de Coustantinople aveuc li Rois
Manfrois, com a lui plot. Et puis prist conie, et s’en ala a Monsignor l’Apostoille, et fist devant lui la
complainte de sa ville que enblee li estoit par nuit. Et Monsignor l’Apostoille li la cruis.” In a charter
allowing a marriage within the prohibited degrees of kinship, Urban IV referred to Baudouin II’s support
for the dispensation: “Nos itaque carissimi in Christo filii nostri Balduini, imperatoris
Constantinopolitani illustris.” Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, p. 27, no. 86. As far as I know, the couple,
Alatrino Rimmanni and his wife Letitie, daughter of Johannis Luce de Freento, had no connection to the
Latin Empire or to the Courtenays.
892
Ibid., p. 47, no. 131: “considerantes etiam, quod carissimus in Christo filius noster Balduinus, illustris
imperator Constantinopolitanus, et nobilis vir dux Venetorum, sicut idem imperator et ejusdem ducis
nuntii nobis in nostra constituti presentia retulerunt, una cum prelatis et baronibus principatus jamdicti
magnificum tam per mare quam per terram, pro succursu ejusdem imperii jam disposuerunt facere
apparatum, ac volentes eos in hoc fidelium Christi presidiis adjuvari, digne providimus fore ab eisdem
fidelibus oportunum propter hoc suffragium postulandum.”
312
preach the crusade and have others do so as well. 893 The Franciscans, of course, had a

long history of preaching the crusade and engagement with the East, including as

envoys to the Nicaean Empire. 894 Several letters to the bishop of Agen provided

instructions on the collection of the subsidy for the Latin Empire. Agen was in the

territory of Alphonse de Poitiers, Louis IX’s brother, and had earlier been a possession

of Raymond de Toulouse’s; Toulouse had been Baudouin II’s companion in missions

between Frederick II and Innocent IV. 895 Eudes Rigaud, who was the archbishop of

Rouen, a Franciscan and close adviser to the king, was involved with the collection.

Simultaneously with this effort, Baudouin II was to be gathering an army to return to

Constantinople. He had the authority, in consultation with the bishop of Agen and the

archbishop of Rouen, to distribute funds to princes, dukes, counts, and barons who

promised to aid the Latin Empire. 896 Venetian ships would carry these men without

cost to the East. 897 Here was the support missing in the 1250s.

In one of his letters to the bishop of Agen, Urban IV included correspondence to

Louis IX, encouraging his support for Baudouin II and describing the plan. 898 This

letter probably preceded Baudouin II to France, where Philippe, his son and heir, had

already been in the company of Louis IX for over a year. 899 In the summer of 1262,

Philippe and his uncles, Alphonse d’Eu and Jean de Montfort, appeared as witnesses in

a document in which King James I of Aragon, in anticipation of the marriage of his

893
Guiraud placed the letter in June 1262. It correlates with other papal correspondence from then
concerning the crusade and the Latin Empire. Ibid., pp 46-48, no. 131.
894
See Christoph T Maier, Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), passim, especially 16-17, 20-22, 34, 39-52.
895
See pp 235-37 above.
896
Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, p. 49, nos. 136-37.
897
Urban IV mentioned this arrangement: “dictus dux Venetorum omnes crucesignatos hujusmodi suo
potenti navali stolio illuc deferri faciet sine naulo.” Ibid., p. 47, no. 131. See also Ibid., p. 48, no. 132.
898
Ibid., p. 49, no. 135.
899
See pp 293-94 above for Philippe at Beauvais.
313
daughter to Louis IX’s heir, promised never to support Manfred, whose daughter had

married James’s son. 900 It is not hard to imagine these three men, the son and brothers-

in-law of the emperor, speaking to the king and his court about the fall of

Constantinople and urging their support for the Franks. In the fall of 1262, Baudouin II

joined them in Paris.

Baudouin II, accompanied by representatives of the Venetian doge, cast his net

wide in search of aid. 901 Having already visited Manfred, Urban IV, and Louis IX, he

was in Spain in the spring of 1263, where he was found in the company of Alfonso X of

Castile and the king of Aragon. 902 The embassy to Castile apparently did not result in

any aid, although Alfonso X made various promises. 903 Presumably, the king and

emperor discussed the proposed marriage between Philippe and Alfonso X’s daughter.

The pope eventually denied permission for the marriage, probably in line with Castilian

desires, but in 1263 the marriage was still a possibility. The eldest of Alfonso X’s

daughters, Berengaria, would only have been ten years old and thus too young for the

marriage to go forward.

900
Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, IV: 42, no. 4775.
901
Venetian support is promised in Urban IV’s letters calling for the crusade. It also appears in Canale.
Canale, ch CXCII, 502: “Me l’autre part, veul ie que vos sachies, que lors quant Mesire Rainer Gen, li
haut Dus de Venise, ot receus les letres de l’Enpereor de Coustantinople, il manda ces mesaies a
l’Apostoille … et quant li II mesages de Monsignor li Dus furent devant l’Apostoille aveuc li Enpereor, il
saluerent Monsignor l’Apostoille de par Monsignor li Dus; et puis distrent, que se li Empereor de
Coustantinople vodra aler au recovrer l’enpire, que Monsignor li Dus li donera la navie, et a tos ciaus que
vodront passer en Romanie por recovrer Coustantinople; et se sera a la despense de Venise. Et
Monsignor l’Apostoille I promist la cruis et la solucion a tos ciaus que donera li secors.”
902
In Baudouin II’s own letter: “cum nos redeuntes de Hispania ad partes Franciae venissemus.”
Martène, Thesaurus, n. XI, col 24. Three Venetian sources related the visit to Castile, Canale, Dandolo,
and Sanudo, although the last only mentioned the Venetian representative, not Baudouin II. Canale, 502.
Dandolo, 311. Wolff, “Fragmentum,” 152.
903
Canale, ch. CXCIII, 502: “D’ileuc s’en alerent au Roi de Castele, et il leur promist de doner
chevaliers a plante. Saches, signors, que aces li fu promis et petit atendu. Il ne trova se paroles non.”
Wolff, “Fragmentum,” p. 152: “Et inter alios ad regem Castelle predictum. Ambasciator vero fuit
dominus Marcus Justinianus Sancti Pantaleonis vir probissimus, ibi in Castella diu morando, set non
habuit complementum.” See also Dandulus, “Chronica per extensum aa. 46–1280 d.c.,” p. 311.
314
 Wolff explained the lack of aid from Alfonso X as a reaction to Baudouin II’s

close relationship with Manfred. The Castilian king’s claim on the Western imperial

title had put him at odds with the Hohenstaufen heir. 904 Alfonso X had also allied with

the Genoese, long-standing rivals of the Venetians’ and recent allies of Palaiologos’s. 905

Wolff thought it necessary to explain how the Courtenay could pursue alliances with

Manfred and Alfonso X simultaneously and suggested “that the Castilian marriage

alliance was Marie’s policy rather than Baldwin II’s … while the policy of friendship

with and dependence upon Manfred was Baldwin II’s rather than Marie’s.” 906 Yet,

there is no reason to divide the Courtenay in this way. In fact, Baudouin II’s presence

in Castile makes his support for this alliance probable. The couple had long misread

Western opinion. Baudouin II’s attempts to make peace between Frederick II and

Innocent IV in 1244–1245 provide the simplest parallel to his simultaneous pursuit of

alliances with Manfred, the papacy, and the French and Castilian kings. But his arrival

in England without warning in the late 1230s, his hope to convince Blanche to send a

French noblewoman to marry the sultan, and his various attempts to alienate his

Western lands also reveal his lack of understanding of Western society and customs.

Baudouin II’s visit to Spain did result in assistance from the king of Aragon,

James I, known from three Aragonese documents discussed by Wolff. In these

documents (two unpublished), James I acknowledged several debts. He borrowed

seven hundred and sixteen solidi to support himself and Baudouin II, one thousand

solidi solely for the Latin emperor’s expenses, and a third sum of seven hundred and

904
See Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of
Constantinople,” p. 70, inc ftnt 60.
905
Ibid., p. 71
906
Ibid., p. 73
315
sixty solidi for an unknown purpose, possibly to assist Baudouin II. 907 The sums were

not large, but they demonstrate that Baudouin II was in Aragon in April and May of

1263 and that he was receiving funds to cover his expenses. There is no indication, at

least in the portion of the sources available to me, that James I intended this money for

the crusade. Rather, they appear to have supported Baudouin II himself.

Urban IV expanded his efforts on behalf of the Latin Empire in the winter and

spring of 1263. In letters to the archbishops of Berry, Reims, and Sens, all in France of

course, he lamented the loss of the Latin Empire and asked them to encourage people to

come to its aid. 908 He accused the archbishop of Berry of being unconcerned about the

state of the Latin Empire because of his delinquency in forwarding the subsidy. 909 He

also reached out to the clerics of the Morea, Athens, and Negropont and instructed them

to aid Guillaume de Villehardouin and the Franks against the Greeks. 910 His

intervention took other forms as well; in January and May, he sent strongly worded

missives to the Genoese, ordering them to desist from their alliance with Palaiologos. 911

To the Franciscan minister provincial, Urban IV was expansive about his

emotions at the loss of Constantinople: “What great grief it conceived! How many

sighs it brought forth! What bitter tears the Roman mother church shed, when it heard

that it had lost the aforementioned city, which shone out loftily, while it remained in

907
Ibid., p. 72, inc ftnt 63.
908
Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, pp 74-77, nos. 187-89.
909
Ibid., p. 74, no. 187: “in ejusdem imperii occupatione percussi et lesi graviter non doletis.”
910
Ibid., p. 103, nos. 231-32.
911
Ibid., pp 72-73, 98-101, nos. 182, 228. The second letter expressed well Urban IV’s frustration with
the Genoese: “Post frequentes ammonitiones quibus apud vos et per litteras et per nuntios institumus, ut
a confederatione Paleologi scismatici totaliter recedentes, ad sinum matris ecclesie a quo, vestris culpis
exigentibus, excidistis, humiliter rediretis, demum ardentiori studio vobis mandavimus.”
316
unity in her bosom.” 912 He spoke elsewhere of his concern for “the needs of the empire

of Constantinople” and his intention, through these letters, to provide for those needs. 913

The loss of Constantinople was particularly lamented because of the blow it dealt to the

hope of a unified church. Constantinople was a limb that had been severed from its

body, a division that injured the whole church. 914 The pope’s language reflected this

renewed and heightened emotion. Although Alexander IV wrote “carissimo in Christo

filio T(heodoro) imperatori Grecorum illustri,” in June 1262 Urban IV spoke of

“Paleologus namque schismaticus, qui Grecorum imperatorem vocari se facit.” 915

In early 1263, then, Urban IV seemed devoted to the cause of the Latin Empire

and consumed with grief on its behalf. His letter to Palaiologos that summer, however,

struck a wholly different tone. 916 The Byzantine emperor had sent messengers to the

pope, whom the latter had received “with enormous joy and exulation and befitting

honor.” 917 Palaiologos had, in his letters, objected to the excommunication of the

Genoese and the papal insistence that they withdraw from association with the

Byzantines. He also complained about the behavior of the Franks, injurious to the

912
Ibid., pp 46-48, no. 131: “O quantos concepit dolores! O quot suspiria protulit! O quam acerbas
effudit lacrimas Romana mater ecclesia, cum audivit quod predictam civitatem, que in ejus permanens
unitate in suo gremio altius relucebat, amisit!”
913
Ibid., pp 48-49, no. 134, 135: “necessitatibus Constantinopolitani Imperii cupientes.” The phrasing is
different in other letters, but the point the same. Ibid., pp 48-49, no. 133, 136-37.
914
See, for example, his letter to the Genoese in October 1263: “corpus generalis ecclesie membro
nobilisimo, Imperio videlicet Constantinopolitano, totaliter mutilabitur.” Ibid., pp 343, no. 720.
915
Schillman, “Zur Byzantinischen Politik Alexanders IV,” 121. Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, p. 46,
no. 131.
916
Geanakoplos has ably and exhaustively reviewed the history of communications between Palaiologos
and the papacy in this period. My focus here will be on what is revealed about the pope’s priorities and
the hopes of the Latin Emperor. Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West.
917
Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, pp 48-49, no. 134, 135: “cum ingenti gaudio et exultatione ac
honorificentia condigne recepimus.” As a side note, these envoys carried letters written in Greek which
the papacy had translated into Latin: “quas de greco transferri fecimus in latinum.” Ibid., p. 135, no. 295
317
Christian people in Greek lands and to religious places themselves. 918 Despite these

matters, Palaiologos expressed his desire to resolve quickly the issues between the

Greek and Latin churches and to achieve peace with Rome. In his response, Urban IV

sought to persuade the Byzantine emperor to return the Greeks to unity with Rome.

Here, far from a schismatic, self-titled emperor, Palaiologos was “imperator

Grecorum.” 919 The theme of unity overwhelms the letter, with repeated references to

concord and peace. 920

Urban IV’s observations about the desirability of peace and his hope for unity

were interspersed with more specific comments, relating to recent events. Urban IV

described the practical benefits for kings and princes of obedience to Rome. The

church acted as an arbiter of secular disputes, whether they were between rulers or

between a ruler and rebellious vassals. 921 In addition to papal help, if the Byzantines

returned to unity with the Roman church, they would merit “not only the aid of the

Genoese, whose friendship you complain we want to remove from you, and the power

of the other devoted Latins, yet truly, if it were useful, men of all orthodox kings and

princes of the world.” The pope promised to “strive to bring about and attend to an

indissolvable alliance of love and peace between you and them, to the praise and glory

918
Ibid.: “Descripsisti insuper multa mala que contigerunt populo christiano a tempore quo Latine gentes
Grecorum terram, ut tuis verbis utamur, velut sortem propriam acceperunt, imponens Latinis eisdem
templorum conculcationes et exterminia divinorum et quamplura alia que in sacris illarum partium edibus
per eos asseris attempta, que quidem, quoniam facta sunt et preterierunt, et quod factum est pro infecto
haberi non potest, in eisdem litteris videbaris appetere ut hinc inde inimicitie dissolverentur, abicerentur
scandala et omne removeretur obstaculum, ad quod pedes suos possent offendere christiani.”
919
Ibid.
920
Ibid.: “zelans pacis et concordie bonum”, “pace premissa prehabitaque inter Latinos et Grecos
concordia”, “homines videlicet pacis et pacificos Christi discipulos”—all in the first page of Guiraud’s
edition.
921
Ibid.: “Reges quoque catholici, cum inter ipsos aliquid dissensionis emergit vel cum vassalli eorum
presumunt contra eos calcaneum rebellionis erigere, mox habent ad portum ecclesie predicte recursum,
ejusque salubre consilium et auxilium implorantes tranquillitatis et pacis remedia infallibiliter ab ipsa
recipiunt, per que et inter discordes et turbatos eorum animos serena concordia et concors serenitas
reformatur, sedantur seditiones a subditis concitate et litigantium clamores queruli conticescunt.”
318
of the divine name and the help of the Christian religion.” 922 As long as the Greek

church remained disobedient to Rome, however, the pope had no choice but to urge and

compel Christian powers to avoid alliances with the Byzantines.

The implication here is unavoidable. The pope had spent the previous year

encouraging Western powers to support Baudouin II and authorizing the preaching of a

crusade to gather aid. Yet, in the summer of 1263, Urban IV as much as promised

Palaiologos that if the Greek church entered into union with Rome, the papacy would

call off the crusade and, in fact, encourage European leaders to enter into alliances with

the Byzantines. Only once in the letter did Urban IV mention Constantinople or the

Latin Empire, and that was simply to note that Palaiologos had sent his envoys

“immediately after the city of Constantinople had been captured.” 923 No moral

judgment was laid on the capture of the city; it simply marked time. The concern for

the Franks, when it came, was for those still in the East. In keeping with his letters to

the Genoese and the ones to spur the collection of funds, the pope spoke of the terrible

situation of Guillaume de Villehardouin and the Franks remaining in Greece and the

Aegean islands. 924 The possibility of restoration was never raised. This letter, from a

pope who a year earlier lamented the loss of Constantinople, shows a remarkable shift.

922
Ibid., p. 138, no. 295: “Quia, si te in consilia meliora retuleris et ad eandem ecclesiam in spiritus
humilitate redieris, non solum auxilium Januensium, quorum amicitiam nos tibi subtrahere velle
conquereris, et aliorum fidelium Latinorum potentiam, verum etiam, si oportunum fuerit, vires omnium
orthodoxorum regum et principum orbis terre in tuum tuique solii fulcimentum conflare ac procurare
studebimus inter te et ipsos indissolubilis federa dilectionis et pacis, ad lauem et gloriam divinie nominis
et christiane religionis augmentum.”
923
Ibid., p. 135, no. 295: “statim capta Constantinopolitana urbe.”
924
Ibid., p. 136, no. 295: “Infesti quoque rumores, que ad audientiam nostram medio tempore
pervenerunt, de persecutionibus, vexationibus, molestiis et pressuris que nobili viro Guillelmo de
Villarduino, principi Achaye devotissimo utique dicte matris ecclesie filio, ejusque terris et insulis ac
Latinis morantibus in eisdem, per tui vires Imperii jugiter inferuntur.”
319
 Baudouin II’s close relationship with Manfred may have prompted Urban IV’s

positive response to Palaiologos. When Baudouin II arrived at the papal curia in early

1262, he told Urban IV of Manfred’s offer, but the pope was noncommital. 925 This first

appeal was not enough to dissuade Urban IV from supporting the Latin emperor, as the

events of 1262 and early 1263 demonstrated, but the ongoing relationship between the

Hohenstaufen and the Latin emperor eventually alienated the latter from the papacy. In

late July of 1263, Urban IV forwarded a letter to his notary, Albert, instructing him to

share it with Charles d’Anjou and, if it seemed helpful, Louis IX. The letter, which had

been intercepted and handed over to the pope, was from Baudouin II to Manfred and

showed the author’s support for his correspondent. 926 The timing was spectacular:

That same month, Charles d’Anjou officially became the papacy’s choice to rule Sicily

and accepted the mantle.

Baudouin II’s letter also survives. In it, he warned Manfred that Urban IV had

written to the king of France and told him that Manfred “did not have the desire or

disposition to make peace” and was “fraudulently” engaged in discussions with the

papacy. 927 Baudouin II believed that the relationship between Manfred and Louis IX

could be redeemed, however, and urged his correspondent to send an embassy to

Baudouin II and the duke of Burgundy with letters directed to Louis IX and Marguerite

925
Canale, “Cronicon,” p. 500, ch CXCI: “et Mesire li Enperere li dist dou grant henor que li Rois
Manfrois li fist, et coment il l’avoit aaise de tot se que apartient a Enpereor a avoir: et puis li dist tot ensi
com vos aves oi sa en ariere que li Rois li mandoit, et mult l’en proia que il le fist ensi. Saches, signors,
que Monsignore l’Apostoille ne respondi a ces paroles ne si ne quoi.”
926
Martène and Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, II: 23, no. 10: “dilectum filium nobilem virum
Carolum Andegaviae ac Provinciae comitem reddas sollicitum et attentum, ut sibi et negotiis suis a
praedicto imperatore, cum fautor praedicti Manfredi per ea quae in praemissis continenter litteris
videatur, penitus studeat praecavere.”
927
Ibid., II: 23, no. 11: “Mandaverunt etiam quod nec voluntatem habebatis quod pax fieret, nec
affectum: et quicquid super tractatu praedicto videbamini facere, faciebatis fraudulenter.”
320
of Provence, the queen. 928 The envoy should be ready to speak of Manfred’s desire for

peace and harmony with the papacy and to explain the cause of the breakdown in

discussions. 929

The letter shows that, far from being a bystander, Baudouin II insisted on

involving himself in European politics. He was intimately aware of the contents of the

papal correspondence to the Capetians, he had made an ally of the duke of Burgundy,

and he believed he could act as a mediator between Louis IX and the Hohenstaufen. He

had already attempted the last, of course, in the mid-1240s before the Council of Lyon,

and he had failed to secure a peace. This had not dissuaded him; in fact, it might have

convinced him of the possibility. Baudouin II was very clear to Manfred that it would

be best if the envoy arrived while he was still in Paris, and that he should be sent,

“directly” and “secretly,” to Baudouin II and the duke of Burgundy so they could

mediate with the French king. 930 The Latin emperor clearly still had confidence in his

relationship with the Capetians and his ability to persuade them to his point of view.

Baudouin II’s close relationship with Manfred, begun in the fall of 1261 in

southern Italy, had continued and been strengthened as the Latin emperor sought aid in

the West. Manfred’s pledge, to finance Baudouin II’s return to Constantinople and

928
Ibid., II: 24, no. XI: “vos ad partes istas Franciae aliquem nuntium, qui secum deferat litteras vestras
credentiae, transmittatis, qui ad nos et ducem Burgundiae directe veniat, et a vobis habeat in praeceptis
quod dicat et faciat illud, quod nos et dictus dux sibi, prout Dominus Deus nobis ministraverit,
consulemus ipsi Domino Regi Franciae enarrare: et etiam dictus nuntius alias litteras credentiae deferat
ipsi domino Regi Franciae et Reginae, per quas litteras vestras et nuntium ipsum innocentiam vestram
melius quam poteritis excuseris, ac ipsam rei veritatem declaretis, et in quo remansit concordia, nisi vos
culpabiles esse noveritis, quod nullatenus crederemus.”
929
This language is present throughout the letter, for example: “Talem etiam nuncium mittat vestra
serenitas, qui omnia sibi a vobis sciat narrare et exponere, et in quo et propter quod est dicta concordia
annullata.” Ibid., II: 25, no. XI.
930
Ibid.: “et si ad partes praedictas Franciae nuntium vestrum miseritis, dum sumus in illis partibus, nos
pro vobis ibidem locum obtinere poterimus, et pro vobis efficaciter assistemus … etiam ad ipsum ducem
Burgundiae directe veniat.” Earlier and later in the letter Baudouin II described the envoy’s arrival as
“secretius.”
321
even accompany the army himself, along with the gifts and grants he had already given

the exiled Franks, made him a promising ally. Yet, as long as he was consumed with

his conflict with the papacy, he could not extend aid to the Franks. By the summer of

1263, Baudouin II thought that the best strategy was to engage Louis IX’s sympathy

and support for the Hohenstaufen. He had his own best interests at heart, telling

Manfred that benefit would accrue not merely to the Hohenstaufen cause, but to the

whole of Christianity. 931 At the end of the letter he mentioned the Latin Empire briefly,

requesting Manfred’s aid and expressing his trust in him. 932 The Latin emperor

continued his close relationship with Manfred until the latter’s defeat and death in the

winter of 1266 at the hands of Charles d’Anjou. 933 Although there is no overt link

between Urban IV’s realization of Baudouin II’s closeness with Manfred and his sudden

openness to Palaiologos’s overtures and his withdrawal from support for the Latin

Empire, there can be little doubt that they were related.

In the summer of 1263, Urban IV’s letter to Palaiologos signaled his priorities—

to bolster the Franks of the Morea and other Aegean possessions—and his willingness,

despite his earlier expressed emotions, to abandon Baudouin II and the Latin Empire.

In his correspondence, the pope referred repeatedly to the other Frankish states in the

Aegean, specifically the Morea and Negropont, the “residui ejusdem imperii,” which

were at risk of being overrun and desperately needed help. 934 When ordering the

Genoese to withdraw from their alliance with Palaiologos, he singled out their fleets

931
Ibid.: “quae vobis et toti christianitati melior et utilior esse possit.”
932
Ibid., II: 26, no. XI: “Ceterùm vestram celsitudinem requirimus et rogamus, de qua plenam fiduciam
gerimus, quatenus negotia nostra et imperii Romani habentes propensius commendata, consilium vestrum
et auxilium in his sicut plenè de vestra benignitate confidimus apponatis.”
933
This is known from a letter from Clement IV to Baudouin II in 1266. See below. Ibid., II: 354-55,
no. CCCXII.
934
See, for example, Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, pp 46-48, 102-3, nos. 131, 231-32.
322
near Negropont for immediate removal. 935 In October 1263, perhaps to follow

Baudouin II’s visit of the previous spring, he sent Garinus, a deacon from Catalonia, to

Castile and Leon to encourage the prelates there to come to the aid of the Franks. 936

The letter opened with a commentary on the grief and sadness caused by the fall of

Constantinople and the exile of the Franks from Constantinople. Yet, despite this

moving beginning, Urban IV’s focus was on “aid to conserve those remaining in this

empire” and not on encouraging support for the recapture of the city. 937

Like Innocent IV and Alexander IV before him and Clement IV after him,

Urban IV was lured away from providing for the Latin Empire by the prospect of

church union through negotiation, although it did not wholly extinguish the possibility.

In seeking to bring Constantinople back into the Roman church, the papacy fluctuated:

Efforts toward agreement with the Greeks were countered with measures against them.

Even after his letter to Palaiologos, he continued to urge the Genoese away from their

alliance with Byzantium and toward peace with Venice, fulfilling his promise that he

could not support an alliance with those disobedient to Rome. 938 The popes from

Innocent IV on sought two things persistently, which directed their policy toward the

Latin Empire: the defeat of the Hohenstaufen and the return of Constantinople to

obedience to the Roman church, either through conquest or through union. The return

of the Franks to Constantinople was only a secondary goal.

935
Ibid., pp 342-43, no. 720: “de terris et insulis predictorum principis, vassallorum atque fidelium et
specialiter de insula Nigripontensi penitus revocarent.” For an account of the struggle in the Morea and
Negropont during this period see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp 150-65.
936
Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, pp 351-53, nos. 740-41.
937
Ibid., p. 352. no. 740: “eorum saltem ad conservandas ejusdem imperii reliquias implorare auxilium
curaremus.”
938
See pp 316-19 above. Ibid., pp 341-43, nos. 719-21.
323
 In the spring of 1264, Urban IV was engaged in raising support for Charles

d’Anjou’s planned invasion of Sicily. He mentioned the Latin Empire with the Holy

Land as causes to be aided by the conquest of Sicily and the defeat of Manfred. 939 In

the early months of 1264, he supplied aid to Guillaume de Villehardouin. 940 In May of

1264, having received many communications from prelates, princes, and barons

detailing Byzantine attacks on and sieges of Frankish possessions, he called for the use

of indulgences and crusading privileges to summon support for these threatened states,

a call that survives in three letters. Two letters to clerics focused on the Greeks in the

Aegean. He encouraged the bishop of Koroni to urge the faithful in Greece to defend

the land vigorously and offered indulgences to those who remained there. 941 The letter

to the bishop of Maastricht commenced with a reference to his desire for the recovery of

Constantinople, but focused, not on retaking the city, but on defending the principality

of Achaia. 942 The loss of Constantinople featured less as a reason for any expedition

and more as background for the current, urgent threat. If help did not arrive, the loyal

Christians in the region, already worn down by the attacks, would be further

diminished. Urban IV hammered home the danger that the Franks faced; the Greeks

(once again schismatics) were “plunderers [who] … pursue the principality with

939
See, for example, letters to clerics in France, Flanders and Provence and to the papal legate. Ibid., pp
390-93, 398, nos. 804, 813. Clement IV continued this theme: “cum promotio negotii terre sancte et
Constantinopolitani imperii a negotio regni Sicilie pro majori parte dependere noscatur.” Édouard
Jordan, Registres d'Clément IV, Registres des papes 11 (Paris: Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises
d'Athènes et de Rome, 1899), p. 59, no. 216. See also Ibid., pp 318-19, no. 817.
940
Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 172.
941
Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, p. 293, no. 578.
942
Ibid., pp 292-93, no. 577: “tantumque jam inibi diminuerunt numerum fidelium populorum et tantum
eos, qui residui sunt, predictis et aliis diversis afflictionibus attriverunt, quod vix aliqua superest fiducia
seu spes, ut iidem, absque aliorum fidelium Christi succursu, diu valeant persequentium manus effugere,
et terram illam vero Christi cultui conservare, prout hactenus per litteras prelatorum, principum et
baronum illarum partium ac speciales nuntios ad apostolicam sedem exinde transmissos, nobis innotuit
evidenter.”
324
incessant insults, with what harsh sieges they choked the towns and cities.” 943 They

were contrasted to the “devoted sons of the church,” and “loyal people.” It was not just

the Christian people at risk, however; the very land itself would be lost to the Christian

faith if action was not taken. The papacy’s understanding of Christianitas as “a

territorial unit to be defended and enlarged, under the leadership of the pope” meant that

the loss of territory to the Byzantines was of equal, if not greater, concern to the danger

to the people who lived there. 944 This understanding, however, also meant that the

recovery of Constantinople could happen through church union, which would return the

city to Christianitas, and which did not necessitate the return of the Franks to the city.

Urban IV’s third letter was an appeal to Hugues IV, the duke of Burgundy,

asking that he take up the cross himself. 945 Hugues IV was a likely candidate for many

resaons. He was a confidant of Baudouin’s II in 1263, as the latter attempted to

negotiate peace between Manfred and Louis IX. Although we are not privy to

conversations between the duke and the Latin emperor, there were ample opportunities

and reasons for them to discuss a crusade during that period. Hugues IV had already

participated in two expeditions to the East: the Barons’ Crusade in 1239 and Louis IX’s

Crusade a decade later. In 1249, on his way to join the crusading force in Cyprus, he

943
Ibid.: “Sane Greci scismatici, ex captione Constantinopolitane civitatis elati vento superbie et ad
impugnandum plus solito fideles illarum partium, vicinitatis oportunitate paratiores effecti, ad terram
principatus Achaye depopulatrices manus extendunt, et ut ibidem in devotis ecclesie filiis extinguant
penitus nomen matris, quamlibet partem principatus ejusdem continuis persecuntur insultibus, quamduris
obsidionibus ilius municipia et civitates angustant, et ibidem irremediabiliter omnem terre faciem cunctis
ad usum generis humani mascentibus ex ipsa, denudant; tantumque jam inibi diminuerunt numerum
fidelium populorum et tantum eos, qui residui sunt, predictis et aliis diversis afflictionibus attriverunt,
quod vix aliqua superest fiducia seu spes, ut iidem, absque aliorum fidelium Christi succursu, diu valeant
persequentium manus effugere, et terram illam vero Christi cultui conservare, prout hactenus per litteras
prelatorum, principum et baronum illarum partium ac speciales nuntios ad apostolicam sedem exinde
transmissos, nobis innotuit evidenter.”
944
Berend, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims, and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000– c.
1300, p. 43.
945
Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, pp 293-94, no. 579.
325
and a number of other nobles stopped in the Morea and visited with Guillaume de

Villehardouin, who then sailed with the duke to Cyprus. 946 Other ties connected

Burgundy to the Morea. Athens was ruled by the la Roche family, who came from

Burgundy, and other Burgundians were involved in the Frankish stat 947es. 948 Despite

the many years that separated the Franks from their homelands, in the 1260s

connections remained, renewed by Hugues IV’s stop in the Morea in 1249. In 1260,

Guy de la Roche, the lord of Athens, borrowed funds from Hugues IV, presumably to

fund his journey back to Greece. 949 In Paris in January of 1266, Baudouin II and

Hugues IV settled the terms of their agreement. In exchange for Hugh IV’s promise of

aid for the Latin Empire, Baudouin II committed to pay him thirteen thousand livres

tournois and granted him the kingdom of Thessaloniki and several other territories. 950

Baudouin II’s optimism about fund-raising was unfounded. He had gained the promise

of twenty thousand livres parisis from the sale of Namur to Guy of Flanders three years

earlier, but the debt was not fully paid in 1268. 951 Papal efforts at fund-raising, as

discussed above, ran into problems and some of the funds had already been forwarded

to the Morea in early 1264. Baudouin II and Marie were racking up debts in Spain and

946
Wolff and Hazard, The Later Crusades, 1189–1311, 2: 244-45. Joinville noted the joint arrival of the
duke and the prince. Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis, p. 72, ch 148: “Le roy et nous qui estions avec li
demourez, si comme Dieu voult, feismes voille de rechief et encontrames le prince de la Moree et le duc
Bourgoingne, qui avoit sejourné en la Moree.”
947
Sanudo, “Istoria del regno di Romania,” p. 118
948
The La Roche appear throughout Ernest Petit’s volumes on the dukes of Burgundy. For example:
Petit, Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne, III: 454-55, 481, nos. 1336, 1341, 1450, IV: 218, 240, 261, nos.
1804, 1922, 2040, V: 395, nos. 2700-1.
949
Ibid., V: 185, nos. 3158-59.
950
Du Cange, Histoire de l’empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs française jusqu’à la conquête
des turcs, I: 158, no. XXVI.
951
Galliot, Histoire générale, VI: 31-32; Reiffenberg, Monuments pour servir à l'histoire des provinces
de Namur, de Hainaut et de Luxembourg, I: 158, no. XXVI.
326
France, which they had to use their Western lands to repay. 952 It is possible that the

grant of Thessaloniki and other territories was intended to compensate for Baudouin II’s

inevitable default on his promise, but the charters do not mention any such transaction.

Soon after Baudouin II’s grants to Hugues IV, the Battle of Benevento brought

to an end the Latin emperor’s split allegiances. 953 Baudouin II wrote quickly to the

pope, professing his joy at Charles d’Anjou’s victory. Clement IV had received the

communication by mid-June, when he replied to Baudouin II, voicing his conditional

satisfaction “if you, as you assert, delight on account of God and in God” in the

outcome at Benevento. 954 That spring, Clement IV had already denied a dispensation

for the marriage between Philippe de Courtenay and the daughter of Alfonso X, citing

their kinship. Wolff rightly noted that this denial came before the reconciliation

between the pope and the Latin emperor and might have, in fact, been in response to

Alfonso X’s desire not to go through with the alliance. 955

Despite the pope’s skepticism, the alliance between Baudouin II and Charles

d’Anjou proceeded. In October of 1266, the Sicilian monarch wrote to his ally, cousin,

and banker, Enrique of Castile, about a possible marriage between the latter and an

unnamed woman, revealed in other correspondence to be Helen of Epiros, Manfred’s

widow whose dowry consisted of towns along the Adriatic coast. According to the

952
See pp 314-15 above for Aragonese loans to Baudouin and pp 339-40 below for the funds owed by
Marie.
953
It is of interest to note that Muslim, Cuman, and Greek troops apparently made up part of Manfred’s
army. Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 189.
954
Martène and Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, II: 254-55: “Commune gaudium Deum
amantium si te, ut asseris, propter Deum et in Deo laetificat, reddit te commendabilem in hac parte,
quamvis olim notatus fueris, quod cum hoste pestifero M. nun prostrato foedus contraxeras amicitae, nec
Deo, nec hominibus gratiosum.”
955
Clement IV’s letter speaks of the alliance as “nec tibi etiam expedire.” Ibid., II: 303, no. 258. See
Wolff’s discussion Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire
of Constantinople,” pp 69-71.
327
letter, Charles d’Anjou supported the connection and believed that the prospective bride

did as well but wanted the permission of her father, Michael II Doukas, whose

friendship was part of the appeal of the marriage. Charles d’Anjou referred in the letter

to his consultations with “our dear relative B. the illustrious Emperor of

Constantinople.” 956 Whether these consultations were in person or through letters is

unknown, but less than a year after Benevento the two men were already discussing

affairs in the East and the best way to gain an advantage there.

That Charles d’Anjou intended the marriage to aid the recapture of

Constantinople is confirmed by papal letters. In January of 1267, Clement IV wrote to

him and to Enrique of Castile encouraging the marriage since “if this marriage were

accomplished it would be of the greatest benefit to our dearest son in Christ the

illustrious Emperor of Constantinople and to our beloved child his noble son and to the

Roman Church and the whole race of Christians.” 957 In early 1267, however, Clement

IV was still hedging his bets. While encouraging a union between Helen and Enrique,

he was also engaged in negotiations for union with Palaiologos, who had restarted the

exchange of embassies in the spring of 1266. Emboldened, probably, by the Angevin

victory and the growing possibility of a Western allied attack on Constantinople,

Clement IV took a tougher stance than his predecessor had—rejecting the idea of a

956
Guiseppe Del Guidice, ed., Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I. E Il. d'Angio (Napoli: Stamperia
della R. Universita, 1863), I: 193, no. 56. Riccardo Filangieri, ed., I registri della Cancelleria angioina
(Napoli: L'Accademia, 1950), I: 29, no. 15.
957
Translation adapted from Wolff, “Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the
Latin Empire of Constantinople,” p. 77. Martène and Durand, Thesaurus novus anecdotorum, II: 437-38,
no. 422: “Quia vero hujusmodi matrimonium si consummatum fuerit, carissimo in Christo filio nostro
imperatori Constantinopolitano illustri et dilecto filio viro nobili nato ejus, Ecclesiae Romanae ac toti
populo christiano plurimum credimus fructuosum.” Similar language is in the letter to Enrique. Ibid., II:
438, no. 423.
328
council, demanding the acceptance of the confession of faith, and insisting on union as

the only way to protect Byzantine lands from Western attack. 958

At Viterbo in May of 1267, Clement IV put his imprimatur on Western plans to

retake Constantinople. Two treaties tied Charles d’Anjou to the Franks in the Aegean.

The first treaty was with Guillaume de Villehardouin and concerned the principality of

the Morea. It arranged a marriage between Isabelle, the daughter of Guillaume de

Villehardouin, and Philippe d’Anjou, Charles’s son. Guillaume was to retain his

principality as long as he lived, with restrictions on alienation, and the Angevins were to

inherit it. If Philippe died without children, the territory would pass to Charles d’Anjou

and his heirs. At the time of the treaty, Guillaume de Villehardouin did not have any

sons, but if he had a son subsequent to the treaty he could grant him one-fifth of the

Morea and the Greek territories that Baudouin II had given him. The rest of his

territory would still pass to the Angevins. Baudouin II was present at the signing of the

treaty and gave his consent. 959

Guillaume de Villehardouin had already considered one marriage to preserve his

kingdom and arrange for its future. The prior suitor was Palaiologos, who proposed a

marriage between his oldest son, Andronikos, and Isabelle in 1264, when the conflict in

the Morea was at a peak. As with the eventual treaty with Charles d’Anjou, the

proposed agreement provided that the Morea would remain in Guilluime de

Villehardouin’s control during his lifetime but pass to Andronikos as Isabelle’s dowry

after his death. According to Sanudo, the barons rejected the proposed alliance. The

prospect of marrying a Greek was familiar to the Villehardouin and the barons;

958
See the analysis of Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp 200-5.
959
Jean Longnon, “Le rattachement de la principauté de Morée au royaume de Sicile en 1267,” JS (1942):
136-37.
329
Guillaume de Villehardouin’s third marriage was to Michael II Doukas’s daughter,

confirming the alliance that then collapsed at Pelagonia. Palaiologos’s proximity,

however, and the danger that he had already posed to the continued existence of the

Frankish states made him a risk the barons were unwilling to accept. 960 The Angevin

alliance was less of a threat to the Franks, although in the end, of course, the barons felt

beseiged by Angevin rule as well. 961

Three days later a second treaty was signed. 962 The document outlined a plan

to recover the city and other Byzantine territory. Charles d’Anjou promised to supply

two thousand cavalry within six (or seven) years to aid in the recovery of

Constantinople. They would serve for a year, excluding travel time. In return, he

received significant territorial commitments. First of all, his suzerainty over the Morea,

already granted in the prior treaty, was confirmed by Baudouin II. His possession of

Helen of Epiros’s dowry, which Manfred had held, was made official, and he agreed to

be Baudouin II’s vassal for those territories. He received rights to the islands in the

Aegean, excepting Mytile, Samos, Kos, and Chios. Future conquests were to be

divided, one-third to Charles d’Anjou and two-thirds to Baudouin II, whose portion

included Constantinople. Charles d’Anjou could pick which territories he wanted,

including Epiros, Albania, and Serbia. His selection could even include Thessaloniki, if

those who had a claim to it, i.e. the duke of Burgundy, did not abide by their

commitments. The inclusion of Thessaloniki raised the possibility that Charles d’Anjou

would gain another royal title.

960
See Sanudo, “Istoria del regno di Romania,” p. 118: “mà li Baroni Latini non assentirono e non seguì
deto Concordio.” Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp 172-75 and Longnon,
“Le rattachement de la principauté de Morée au royaume de Sicile en 1267,” p. 135.
961
Shawcross, The Chronicle of Morea, pp 242-49.
962
Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III: 222-24, no. 5284.
330
 The agreement then addressed the inheritance of the throne of Constantinople.

If Baudouin II and Philippe died without direct heirs, “the mentioned empire with all its

honors, dignities, demesne, fiefs, jurisdictions, rights and appurtenances would devolve

wholly to us and our heirs in the kingdom of Sicily.” 963 The likelihood of Baudouin II

having another child was small, since his wife Marie was over forty. Any heir of

Philippe’s would, hopefully, also be a descendant of Charles d’Anjou since the next

provision of the treaty arranged the marriage between the imperial heir and Béatrice, to

happen as soon as the latter was of age. A dispensation from the pope to allow the

marriage and the consent of both mothers was obtained to forestall subsequent

objections. 964

Was the Treaty of Viterbo a benefit to the Latin Empire? Put differently, did

Baudouin II strike a good deal with Charles d’Anjou? Geanakoplos has argued that “for

a bare promise of aid to Baldwin, Charles would secure immediate, tangible results,”

specifically recognition of his suzerainty over the Morea and his claim to Helen of

Epiros’s dowry in the Balkans. 965 The treaty combined these immediate benefits to

Charles d’Anjou with the promise of future territory if he aided the recapture of the

Latin Empire. The time frame for the expedition to Constantinople, six to seven years,

allowed him to consolidate control over his newly conquered lands and establish

himself in Sicily, the Morea, and the Balkans. Yet, as Geanakoplos also recognized,

Charles d’Anjou did not become emperor of Constantinople, nor, according to the terms

963
Ibid.: “si vos et Philippum karissimum filium vestrum, seu alios a vobis et eodem Philippo per rectam
lineam descendentes, absque justo et legitimo herede de proprio corpore, quod absit! mori contingat,
memoratum imperium cum omnibus honoribus, dignitatibus, demaniis, feudis juridictionibus, juribus et
pertinentiis suis ad nos nostrosquein regno Sicilie heredes plenarie devolvatur.”
964
The rights of Venice merited only a sentence at the end: “Preterea actum et conventum est inter vos
et nos quod antiquo juri quod Veneti habere dicuntur in terra predicti imperii nullum per premissa vel
premissorum aliquod prejudicium generetur.” Ibid.
965
Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, p. 199.
331
of the agreement, was he ever likely to. Moreover, this treaty was not so different from

prior ones that had lured powerful men to help the Latin Empire. Pierre II and Robert

received the throne outright. Jean de Brienne, the closest comparision to Charles

d’Anjou, had secured the imperial title and control over the Latin Empire during his

lifetime. The Angevin king settled for less but was willing to make less of a

commitment and had to deal with an adult emperor, Baudouin II, who had held the

throne for many years and was committed to holding it. The most probable result of the

treaty was the actual outcome: The throne fell to Charles d’Anjou’s grandchild, born to

Philippe de Courtenay and Béatrice.

In the treaty, Charles d’Anjou explained that his assistance was deemed

particularly desirable “because of the power and location of our kingdom.” 966 Sicily

was clearly a critical part of the deal. Charles d’Anjou repeatedly referred to the

agreement as pertaining to “us and our heirs in the kingdom of Sicily,” thus ensuring

that if his lands were divided after his death, the alliance with the Latin Empire would

remain with Sicily. 967 Sicily’s location, combined with its grain wealth and status as a

trading center, made it uniquely situated as a staging ground for expeditions to East.

Baudouin II had already recognized Sicily’s useful location in his previous alliance with

Manfred, as had Urban IV in promoting Charles d’Anjou’s expedition to capture Sicily.

With the accompanying claim to territory in the Balkans and the Morea, Charles

d’Anjou was better positioned than anyone to launch a joint land and sea attack on

Constantinople. Support from the papacy, which had already sponsored his conquest of

966
Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, III: 221, no. 5284: “propter regni nostri potentiam et vicinitatem
nobis non solum ad succurrendum eidem imperio, sed et ad occurrendum per recuperationem ejus
orthodoxe fidei ac Terre Sancte periculis promptior et efficacior est facultas.”
967
Ibid., III: 222-24, no. 5284: “nos nostrosque in regno Sicilie heredes”
332
Sicily, and his relationship to the Capetians can only have helped. Moreover, the new

king of Sicily had proven his willingness to follow through on acquired claims and his

military prowess. In his alliance with Charles d’Anjou, Baudouin II combined his old

appeals to family and the papacy with a newfound consideration: strategic location. He

deemed Angevin help worth the wait.

With the signing of the Treaty at Viterbo, the fate of the Latin Empire moved

into the story of Charles d’Anjou and the union negotiations between the papacy and

Palaiologos. The challenge from and defeat of Conradin, the second crusade of Louis

IX, the destruction of the Angevin fleet in 1272, the Council of Lyon in 1274, the

machinations concerning union, the conflict in Lombardy, and, finally, the Sicilian

Vespers governed the possibilities for recapturing Constantinople. Historians differ

sharply in measuring Charles d’Anjou’s commitment to the recovery of Constantinople.

Steven Runciman argued for the king’s commitment to Constantinople and focus on

recovering the city. 968 Jean Dunbabin, in contrast, located Charles d’Anjou’s interest in

the Morea, where, after 1267, he had a direct claim and responsibility. 969 Only in 1279,

twelve years after the Treaty at Viterbo, when the conditions seemed right did a Sicilian

expedition truly take form. Geanakoplos, although not taking as definite a stand,

claimed that Charles d’Anjou got the better end of the deal since he obtained immediate

rewards in exchange for vague promises. A study of Charles d’Anjou’s motivations and

intentions is far beyond the scope of this study. Although no major attack was ever

launched against Constantinople, however, he committed two of his children, Philippe

968
Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: a History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp 139, 156-57, 186.
969
Jean Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou: Power, Kingship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe
(London: Longman, 1998), pp 91-94.
333
and Béatrice, in marriage in order to create a claim to the Aegean states and to obtain

the loyalty of the Franks there. The title to Constantinople remained in the family

beyond this generation—Philippe and Béatrice’s daughter married Charles d’Anjou’s

great nephew. Her daughter, in turn, married his grandson. This commitment was also

demonstrated in his frequent preparations for an expedition to the East, including in

1269–1270. 970

In 1269, Baudouin II made a further agreement with Thibaut II, king of Navarre

and count of Champagne. After many pages of considering Baudouin II’s letters, it is

no surprise to see him refer to Thibaut II as “karissimi consanguinei nostri domini

Th[eobaldi], illustris regis Navarre, Campanie et Brie comitis palatini.” 971 Thibaut II fit

neatly into the mold of potential supporters. His wife was Louis IX’s daughter, and his

sister was the wife of Hugues IV of Burgundy, who had signed a treaty with Baudouin

II three years before. He also participated in the crusade of 1239. The arrangements are

familiar: Thibaut II would get one-fourth of the Latin Empire, a grant that would not

prejudice those already made to the king of Sicily and the duke of Burgundy or the

rights of the Venetians. 972 Constantinople was excluded. 973 With Hugues IV, Charles

d’Anjou, and Thibaut II, Baudouin II followed the same practice: the promise of a

portion of the empire outside of Constantinople in return for assistance with reclaiming
970
Rámon Muntaner, no friend of Charles d’Anjou, agreed that he sought peace with Aragon because of
his desire to launch an expedition against Palaiologos, “who had the Empire of Constantinople against all
right; for, surely, the Empire should belong to the sons of the Emperor Baldwin, who were the nephews
of King Charles.” Translation from Ramón Munanter, The Chronicle of Muntaner, trans. Anna Kinsky
Goodenough (London: Hakluyt Society, 1920), p. 79, ch XXXVIII. Ramón Muntaner, Chronik des
Edlen en Ramon Muntaner, ed. Karl Friedrich Wilhelm Lanz (Stuttgart: Literarischer Verein, 1844), p.
69, ch XXXVIII: “E aço feya asenyaladament lo rey Carles, com entenia a fer passatge en Romania
contra lemperador Paliagolo qui tenia lemperi de Constantinoble contra raho; com per cert dels fills del
emperador Baudy deuia esser lemperi, los quals eren nabots del rey Carles.”
971
Layettes, no. 5499, 331.
972
Layettes, no. 5499, 331.
973
Layettes, no. 5499, 331: “salva etiam et excepta civitate Constantinopolitana cum omnibus
pertinentiis circumquaque per unam dietam.”
334
it. While in Constantinople, he had mortgaged and alienated his Western lands in

exhange for aid. Once exiled, he made commitments to relinquish significant territory

and rights in the East in exchange for promises of aid. His strategy was eminently

reasonable. Before 1261, the Franks were essentially restricted to Constantinople

anyway. It had been decades since they had controlled Thessaloniki or significant lands

in northern Greece and the Balkans. Baudouin II was giving away land he had never or

not recently held. Moreover, if Baudouin II could be restored to Constantinople, he

would benefit greatly from having Hugues IV of Burgundy, Charles d’Anjou, and

Thibaut II control neighboring territory. They could be a buffer between him and the

Greeks of Epiros, act as a deterrent to Greeks in Asia Minor, and, when necessary,

contribute to the defense of the city.

A further commitment, also in 1269, came from Alfonso X who as recently as

1266 was a possible in-law for Baudouin II. In negotiations with Charles d’Anjou, the

Castilian king agreed to provide two hundred knights, two hundred men-at-arms and

one hundred archers for an expedition. Charles d’Anjou was responsible for their

expenses. 974 In 1270, discussions between Baudouin II and the illegitimate son of

James I of Aragon resulted in an agreement for the latter to provide one hundred

soldiers for a year in the Latin Empire in exchange for a certain sum. 975 The

arrangement for these forces, explicitly intended to aid Baudouin II and Philippe, were

part of a push in 1269–1271 that included Angevin alliances with Genoa, Hungary, and

Serbia and appeals to the Venetians and the Mongols. 976 In the case of Hungary, two of

974
Charles Camillo Minieri Riccio, Alcuni fatti riguardanti Carlo i. di Angiò, dal 1252 al 1270 (Naples,
1874), p. 81.
975
Ibid., pp 97, 104-5, 110.
976
Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, pp 213-20.
335
Charles d’Anjou’s children were deployed in marriage alliances. In 1271, Angevin

forces captured Durazzo and the Albanians turned to the king of Sicily and, the

following year, he became king of Albania as well. Angevin power had well and truly

arrived on the far side of the Adriatic. 977 Louis IX’s crusade and Charles d’Anjou’s

appearance at Tunis with his fleet put to rest, at least temporarily, any plans for an

attack on Constantinople.

Angevin aid never did help the Courtenay reclaim their land. Charles d’Anjou’s

ongoing efforts to control Sicily and papal pressure to focus on the possibility of union,

along with the occasional bad luck, constantly delayed any major attack, although

reinforcements did make it to the Morea at various times. However, even in retrospect,

Charles d’Anjou, by dint of his Capetian background, his relationship with the papacy,

his newly acquired territory in the Mediteranean, and his adventurous nature, appeared

to be the Latin Empire’s best hope.

Baudouin II died in 1273. He was the last Western emperor to rule in

Constantinople—and the only one of those to have been born and raised in the city.

Unlike his uncles, mother, brother, and father-in-law, his entire career centered around

the great city. After 1261, he was unwilling to resign himself to life as an exile.

Instead, he sought aid and support from his allies—the Capetians, the papacy, the

Castilians, and the Aragonese—with the hope of returning to Constantinople.

Settlement in the West

Soon after Baudouin II’s arrival in Paris in 1263, he conceded to his son,

Philippe, full authority in regard to Namur and other territories in Hainaut, including the

authority to sell them or alienate them in some other way, and he sent him there to deal
977
Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp 89-91.
336
with it. 978 Marie’s alienation of the county to Marguerite, countess of Flanders, in 1258

had apparently not put the issue to rest. On March 19, 1263, Philippe used the authority

given to him by his father to sell Namur to Guy, count of Flanders, for twenty thousand

livres. Finally, twenty-five years after Baudouin II took possession of the county, after

numerous struggles, mortgages, temporary transfers, and financial exploitations, the

Courtenay relinquished this territory—exacting one final sum in return, or rather a

series of installment payments. It is puzzling that this final alienation occurred not

while the Courtenay were in Constantinople, but once they returned to the West, at

which point they might actually have been able to govern the territory. Perhaps the

events of 1256–1258 had finally made Namur seem more trouble than it was worth.

True, Baudouin II’s letter also conferred on Philippe the authority to administer and

manage the territories, suggesting that the Courtenays had not completely relinquished

hope of holding Namur. However, in 1263, desperate for money to fund a recovery of

Constantinople, the twenty thousand livres Guy was willing to pay in order to settle the

question once and for all was worth far more than was a claim to the land that might

never be realized. And so the question, in 1263, was settled. Unlike Baudouin II’s

transfer of Namur to Louis IX, the sale to Guy was a permanent alienation:

“vendidimus dilecto consanuineo nostro nobili viro Guidoni, comiti Flandrie, et

heredibus eius in perpetuum.” 979 A series of charters from Philippe and Baudouin II

confirmed the sale and instructed the baillis, châtelains, knights, hommes de fief,

maires, échevins, et al. to render homage to Guy and obey him. 980

978
Baudouin II may have also gone to Hainaut himself. Wolff, “Fragmentum,” p. 152: “Inde vero
discedens ivit in Franciam ac etiam in Hannoniam, ubi ipse certam terram habebat.”
979
Brouwers, L'administration, IV, part 1, pp 107-8.
980
Galliot, Histoire générale, VI: 12,16-17, 20.
337
 According to Philippe, the sale was done at the advice of Louis IX and “other

friends” of his. 981 Baudouin II’s charter had the same formulation adding only that

Louis IX was “consanguineus nostrus.” 982 Did Baudouin II feel closer to his royal

relative? Did the relationship seem less important to Philippe? Was it merely an

oversight or an insignificant difference in notation? We are left to speculate. But the

mention of Louis IX in the charters provides further confirmation of the French king’s

place in the desires and strategies of the Courtenays. The imperial family, unlike other

exiled Franks, returned to France. They traveled elsewhere, of course, most particularly

to Spain and Italy. However, charters and correspondence place Baudouin II in Paris in

1262–1263, again in 1266, and after the treaty of Viterbo in 1268–1269. Philippe was

in Louis IX’s company in 1261–1262, at least, and spent further time in Paris and in

Hainaut. The Latin emperor may have held out hope for further aid from Louis IX.

In 1262, the papacy still lodged its hopes in the French, from which important

help had come in the past. Papal letters recruiting help for Constantinople were

directed toward bishops and other religious and secular men in France and Flanders. In

his two prior Western visits, Baudouin II had sought aid there and he did so again after

1261. He was certainly in Paris for significant periods of time. But this destination, so

lucrative in the 1230s, was no longer, by the 1260s, a siginificant source of aid for the

Latin Empire. He had greater luck with Manfred, Alfonso X of Castile, the papacy and,

finally, Charles d’Anjou, men who had self-interest in recovering Constantinople.

981
Brouwers, L'administration, IV, part 1, pp 106-7, no. 148: “de consilio excellentissimi domini nostri
Ludovici, Dei gratia regis Francorum illustris, et aliorum amicorum nostrorum.”
982
Ibid., IV, part 1, pp 107-10, no. 149: “de consilio excellentissimi domini L[udovici], Dei gratia regis
Francorum illustris, consanguinei nostri et aliorum amicorum nostrorum.”
338
 The charter evidence confirms Baudouin II’s connection with France and the

Western lands that remained to him. Although he appears most frequently in these

years selling Namur and negotiating about the Latin Empire, his return to Europe

resulted in engagement with his other Western lands. In June of 1263, he was at Douai,

perhaps in the company of the count of Flanders at his castle there. 983 That same

spring, he wrote to the pope about the office of treasurer in the church of Saint Savior at

Harlebecke, a town about twenty-five miles from Ghent. 984 This town concerned him

again the next year, when he requested that the countess of Flanders and Hainaut

approve a market he had established there. 985 In 1265, he reaffirmed the market and

noted that any serfs who had been in the town a year and a day would have the liberties

of the burgesses of the city. 986

Starting in the mid-1260s, Baudouin II and Marie took a further interest in their

French lands. In 1264, a conflict was resolved with the priory in Andresny, near Paris.

A problem had arisen with Baudouin II’s men and the prior appealed to Baudouin II.

He appointed two men, Guillermus de Locto and Albericus de Pratis, to look into the

matter. They ruled in favor of the priory and Baudouin II ordered what was seized to be

returned. In June of 1266, he used his woods at Piphon and Chantecoc to pay Marie’s

debts to an impressive array of religious institutions and individuals—the prior of

Courtenay, the prior of Andresy near Paris, the abbesse of Rosay, the prior of Codou,

and a lengthy series of individuals, including the son of Jean of Syria, a knight who had

983
Galliot, Histoire générale, VI: 20-22.
984
Jordan, Registres d'Clément IV, IV: 33.
985
Wauters, Table chronologique, V: 313.
986
Ibid., V: 337-38.
339
accompanied Jean le Brebant, and many others. 987 Marie had presumably been

spending time at Courtenay, since she incurred debts there. In fact, the list, with many

items recording loans of relative small sums—ten livres parsis, thirty-two livres parsis,

forty solidi—conveys the distinct impression that she borrowed money to pay for her

ongoing expenses wherever she went. The document does not specify when the debts

were incurred; however, the length of the list suggests that they were done so over

several years. Moreover, since they were identified as Marie’s debts, they were almost

certainly made in the absence of Baudouin II, during her various travels around Europe

in the previous decade. Finally, the timing, in 1266, suggests that, even after Baudouin

II arrived in Europe, the couple traveled separately, presumably to spread out their

fund-raising power.

The king of France appointed two men to collect the monies and distribute them

to Baudouin II and Marie’s creditors. If these woods did not generate enough income to

repay the debts within six years, then Baudouin II’s possessions at Courtenay would be

liable to be used for this purpose. Baudouin II’s actions here demonstrate the

Courtenays’ lack of funds, but also his ability, with royal support, to exploit his lands.

This was not Baudouin II’s only involvement in his paternal inheritance. In July

of 1268, Baudouin II acknowledged a payment of Marguerite, countess of Flanders,

toward the twenty thousand livres owed to him for the sale of Namur. He did so in

Courtenay. The following year he entered into an agreement with the Hospitallers

about rights to justice in Courtenay. 988 What else he did there—managing his lands,

repaying debts, exacting monies—has been lost with the destruction of the archives of

987
Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, IV: 174-77, no. 5158.
988
Du Cange, Histoire de l’empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs française jusqu’à la conquête
des turcs, I: 467-68, no. XXVI; Layettes du Trésor des Chartres, IV: 375, no. 5566.
340
the Loiret, if not long before. The archives of Yonne do yield several documents, from

1275, 1283, and 1286, showing that, after Baudouin II’s death, Marie and their son

Philippe were involved in Courtenay, confirming donations, recognizing obligations,

and addressing issues of jurisdiction. 989 Baudouin II’s prestige, his closeness with the

Capetians, and, of course, the vagaries of inheritance allowed him to preserve

ownership over at least some of his territories in the West. His exile from

Constantinople allowed him to be involved with these territories. But as the previous

section shows, he never lost sight of his lost empire.

***

Angold claimed that “the Latins in the Levant failed to evolve any clear identity.

Increasingly, they saw themselves as an offshoot in France.” 990 Yet in the pages of this

dissertation, I hope, a very different picture has emerged. In their relations with the

west and their neighbors, the men and women who settled in Constantinople and their

descendants acted in ways startling to their French contemporaries and displayed

remarkable streaks of independence.

The Latin Empire was the creation of a crusade, and the conquest of

Constantinople was justified, in part, by the obstinance of the Greek church. The

Franks were supported by popes who evoked, especially in later decades, the danger

posed to the Roman church as a reason to support the Latin Empire. Yet the Franks

cared more about language and customs than they did about religion. In Henri’s reign,

the Bulgarians were less acceptable than the Greeks as marriage partners because of

language and customs, not religion. Greeks living under his rule even saw Henri as a

989
Quantin, Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au Cartulaire général de L'Yonne, XIIIe siècle, p. 345, no.
684. AD Yonne, G 230, fol 239 r; AD Yonne, G 229, fol 9 r.; AD Yonne, G 232, p 116.
990
Angold, The Fourth Crusade, p. 226.
341
potential ally and advocate. In the 1210s and 1220s, the Franks sought marriages and

alliances with Nicaea. For Baudouin II, a sultan’s dignified behavior compensated for

his religious difference and made him an acceptable, even desirable, political and

marriage partner.

The Franks, particularly the Courtenay emperors and empresses, maintained

their connections with France and the Capetians, connections founded in kinship and

lordship. They relied heavily on the papacy for recruitment and fundraising. But these

associations did not prevent the Courtenays from seeking aid from the Hohenstaufen,

even, after 1261, promoting Manfred’s cause despite the harm it would do to Charles

d’Anjou’s ambitions.

One final example: From the mid-1230s to the mid-1250s, Baudouin II and

Marie struggled to establish and maintain control over Namur and use that territory to

raise funds. In the end, however, the Latin emperor was willing to alienate this land, as

he had been eager to do so with Courtenay years earlier, in order to recover

Constantinople. In the mid-1260s, Baudouin II turned to revenue from his western

lands to pay debts incurred during Marie’s time in the west. These transactions show

Baudouin II’s ability to act as a French aristocrat, but also his fundamentally eastern

priorities.

The example of the Morea suggests a possible trajectory for the Franks in

Constantinople, had the events of 1261 not interceded. The Franks in the Peloponnese

were not exiled in the 1260s, despite the increasing pressure from the Byzantines after

the battle at Pelogonia and the capture of Constantinople. In 1267 at Viterbo,

Guillaume de Villehardouin bound his principalitity to the Angevins, who sought to

342
control the Morea by selecting husbands for Villehardouin heiresses and sending baillis.

As Shawcross has shown, this arrangement, which dramatically increased the contact

between Franks and Europeans, did not result in assimilation. To the contrary, close

contacts with others, specifically new arrivals from Europe and Byzantine neighbors,

heightened the Moreot identity. 991 In Constantinople, the barons’ reaction to Robert’s

behavior in the 1220s, their re-assertion of power after the death of Jean de Brienne, and

their general participation in the affairs of governance reveal a nascent identity that

might, over time, have developed into a distinct ethnic identity.

Instead, 1261 marked the beginning of Franks’ re-integration into European

politics. The exile of the Franks from Constantinople resulted in a level of contact and

integration between the Franks and Westerners not seen previously. In addition to the

barons who settled in the Morea and those who gained land from Manfred in southern

Italy, other Franks entered into the service of the Angevins. The Toucys, one of the

most prominent families in Constantinople, served as admirals in his navy. 992 The

Aulnays, one of whom was the marshal of the Latin Empire, also contributed a number

of members to the Angevin government. 993 All of Baudouin II’s years in the Capetian

court were nothing compared to this incorporation of the Frankish barons into the

Angevin court. In Greece, it was the Angevins who came to the Franks, but, similarly,

Westerners and Franks were in contact as never before. 994

The connections among the Aegean states, France, Flanders and the Angevin

world continued long after the death of Baudouin II and the Sicilian Vespers. Baudouin

991
Shawcross, The Chronicle of Morea, pp 203-41.
992
Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou, pp 73, 92, 125, 177, 187-88, 193, 223.
993
Ibid., p. 122.
994
For a discussion of the ramifications of these close encounters see Shawcross, The Chronicle of
Morea, pp 242-59.
343
II and Marie’s descendents were born and raised in an Angevin milieu but their claim to

Constantinople was repeatedly asserted, through their titles and their marriages.

Philippe and Béatrice’s daughter and granddauther, both named Catherine, married,

respectively, grandsons of Louis IX and Charles d’Anjou. These women, despite their

limited western holdings and claim to a far-off and lost empire, were sought after.

Complex political negotiations accompanied their marriages––at one point a marriage

seemed possible between Catherine I de Courtenay and the son of the Byzantine

emperor Andronicus and Catherine II de Valois’s marriage in 1313 to Philippe d’Anjou

involved a many-sided transaction involving her French lands and Louis de

Bourgogne’s inheritance of the Morea. 995 The Courtenays never returned to

Constantinople, but they continued to employ the imperial title. 996 They also retained a

claim over the Morea and Catherine II de Valois spent two and a half years ruling

there. 997 The Angevin involvement in Frankish Greece kept the western claim to

Constantinople alive, in word if never in deed.

995
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp 281, 302-4.
996
See Arsenal, MS 6023, nos. 40 and 44. In 1336 Philip VI, in a document addressing the question of
the boundaries of Courtenay and other lands, referred to Catherine as “emperris de Costentinople” and
“dame de Courtenay.” Arsenal, MS 6023, no. 59.
997
Longnon, L'empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée, pp 323-25.
344
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