Topic:-Corporate Governance: Assignment of
Topic:-Corporate Governance: Assignment of
Of
Organizational
Effectiveness and Change
Topic:-Corporate Governance
In corporations, the shareholder delegates decision rights to the manager to act in the
principal's best interests. This separation of ownership from control implies a loss of
effective control by shareholders over managerial decisions. Partly as a result of this
separation between the two parties, a system of corporate governance controls is
implemented to assist in aligning the incentives of managers with those of shareholders.
With the significant increase in equity holdings of investors, there has been an opportunity
for a reversal of the separation of ownership and control problems because ownership is
not so diffuse.
A board of directors often plays a key role in corporate governance. It is their responsibility
to endorse the organisation's strategy, develop directional policy, appoint, supervise and
remunerate senior executives and to ensure accountability of the organisation to its
owners and authorities.
All parties to corporate governance have an interest, whether direct or indirect, in the
effective performance of the organization. Directors, workers and management receive
salaries, benefits and reputation, while shareholders receive capital return. Customers
receive goods and services; suppliers receive compensation for their goods or services. In
return these individuals provide value in the form of natural, human, social and other
forms of capital.
PRINCIPLES
Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty, trust and integrity,
openness, performance orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual respect, and
commitment to the organization.
Of importance is how directors and management develop a model of governance that aligns
the values of the corporate participants and then evaluate this model periodically for its
effectiveness. In particular, senior executives should conduct themselves honestly and
ethically, especially concerning actual or apparent conflicts of interest, and disclosure in
financial reports.
Monitoring by the board of directors: The board of directors, with its legal
authority to hire, fire and compensate top management, safeguards invested capital.
Regular board meetings allow potential problems to be identified, discussed and
avoided. Whilst non-executive directors are thought to be more independent, they may
not always result in more effective corporate governance and may not increase
performance. Different board structures are optimal for different firms. Moreover, the
ability of the board to monitor the firm's executives is a function of its access to
information. Executive directors possess superior knowledge of the decision-making
process and therefore evaluate top management on the basis of the quality of its
decisions that lead to financial performance outcomes, ex ante. It could be argued,
therefore, that executive directors look beyond the financial criteria.
Internal control procedures and internal auditors: Internal control procedures
are policies implemented by an entity's board of directors, audit committee,
management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance of the entity
achieving its objectives related to reliable financial reporting, operating efficiency, and
compliance with laws and regulations. Internal auditors are personnel within an
organization who test the design and implementation of the entity's internal control
procedures and the reliability of its financial reporting
Balance of power: The simplest balance of power is very common; require that the
President be a different person from the Treasurer. This application of separation of
power is further developed in companies where separate divisions check and balance
each other's actions. One group may propose company-wide administrative changes,
another group review and can veto the changes, and a third group check that the
interests of people (customers, shareholders, employees) outside the three groups are
being met.
Remuneration: Performance-based remuneration is designed to relate some
proportion of salary to individual performance. It may be in the form of cash or non-
cash payments such as shares and share options, superannuation or other benefits.
Such incentive schemes, however, are reactive in the sense that they provide no
mechanism for preventing mistakes or opportunistic behavior, and can elicit myopic
behavior.
competition
debt covenants
demand for and assessment of performance information (especially financial
statements)
government regulations
managerial labor market
media pressure
takeovers
Demand for information: In order to influence the directors, the shareholders must
combine with others to form a significant voting group which can pose a real threat of
carrying resolutions or appointing directors at a general meeting.
Monitoring costs: A barrier to shareholders using good information is the cost of
processing it, especially to a small shareholder. The traditional answer to this problem
is the efficient market hypothesis (in finance, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH)
asserts that financial markets are efficient), which suggests that the small shareholder
will free ride on the judgements of larger professional investors.
Supply of accounting information: Financial accounts form a crucial link in enabling
providers of finance to monitor directors. Imperfections in the financial reporting
process will cause imperfections in the effectiveness of corporate governance. This
should, ideally, be corrected by the working of the external auditing process.
In the United States, the main problem is the conflict of interest between widely-dispersed
shareholders and powerful managers. In Europe, the main problem is that the voting
ownership is tightly-held by families through pyramidal ownership and dual shares (voting
and nonvoting). This can lead to "self-dealing", where the controlling families favor
subsidiaries for which they have higher cash flow rights.
Anglo-American Model
There are many different models of corporate governance around the world. These differ
according to the variety of capitalism in which they are embedded. The liberal model that is
common in Anglo-American countries tends to give priority to the interests of
shareholders. The coordinated model that one finds in Continental Europe and Japan also
recognizes the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community.
Each model has its own distinct competitive advantage. The liberal model of corporate
governance encourages radical innovation and cost competition, whereas the coordinated
model of corporate governance facilitates incremental innovation and quality competition.
However, there are important differences between the U.S. recent approach to governance
issues and what has happened in the UK. In the United States, a corporation is governed by
a board of directors, which has the power to choose an executive officer, usually known as
the chief executive officer. The CEO has broad power to manage the corporation on a daily
basis, but needs to get board approval for certain major actions, such as hiring his/her
immediate subordinates, raising money, acquiring another company, major capital
expansions, or other expensive projects. Other duties of the board may include policy
setting, decision making, monitoring management's performance, or corporate control.